Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Bonifacio
Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 01, 2012 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio
on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral relationship with Carlos Ui,
her (Lesli) husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a photocopy
of a marriage certificate that said that she andCarlos got married in 1985 but according
to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State Department of Health, they
were married in 1987.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the right to
enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he must also have a
continued possession of good moral character. A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly
immoral conduct , which has been defined as the conduct which is willful, flagrant, or
shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the good and respectable members
of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree
of social responsibility and thus must handle their personal affairs with great caution.
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact remains
that her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as a valid
marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that shows
indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable
members of the community. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, it must be
grossly immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also behave
himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is flouting those
moral standards. Her act of distancing herself on her discovery that Carlos was married
proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the
legal profession.
On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience and
highly improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to check
that the information on the document she attached to her Answer were correct. Lawyers
are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts of
malpractice.
IN RE CUNANAN (CASE DIGEST)
Standard
IN RE CUNANAN
94 PHIL. 534
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952.
The title of the law was, An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946
up to and including 1955.
1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%
1954..73%
1955..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall
be included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.
ISSUE:
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in
the title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to
1955 Bar examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time.
It was also struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact
that laws and jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for
1953 to 1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was
based under the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to
1952 had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of
World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the
said candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Courts primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter
and supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power
are only minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can
practice law; and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it
will not revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an
petitioner. The same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter,
supplement or modify rules of admission to the practice of law.
Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge CorocoyMoson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith Melingconsidered
the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties
as "closed andterminated."8.
Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.9.
As regards the use of the title "Attorney," Meling admits that some of his
communications really contained the word "Attorney"as they were, according to him,
typed by the office clerk.10.
OBC disposed of the charge of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise: The reasons
of Meling in not disclosing the criminalcases filed against him in his petition to take the
Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court ofcompetent
jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor.11.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his
act of concealing them which constitutesdishonesty.12.
As regards Melings use of the title "Attorney", the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation "Attorney"in his letters, the explanation of
Meling is not acceptable.13.
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers
Oath and sign the Roll of Attorneys in
the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. F
urther, it recommended that Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be
suspended until further orders from the Court.14.
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC.15.
Meling, however, did not pass the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the
Petition,
insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from
taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
Issue: whether or not Meling be disqualified in the examinations for the bar in relation to
the violation of CPR for non-disclosure of hispending criminal casesHeld: YesRatio:1.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is
satisfactory evidence of good moral
character of the applicant. Melings concealment of the fact that there are three
(3) pending criminal cases against him speaksof his lack of the requisite good moral
character.2.
The
Petition
is granted insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S.
Meling as a member of the
Philippine Sharia Bar.
3.
According
ly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby
SUSPENDED
until further orders fromthe Court.4.
Insofar as the
Petition
seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of
Attorneys as a
member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED
for having become moot and academic.
On February 21, 2002, complainants counsel sent respondent a second letter5 demanding the return
of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest, for failing to comply with his promise. The
demand was unheeded.
Hence, this administrative complaint6 that respondent engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct. Allegedly, respondent violated his oath under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and he ought to be disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, to whom
the instant disciplinary case was assigned for investigation, report and recommendation, found
respondent guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct proscribed under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In her Report dated October 9, 2003, she recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years. The IBP Board of
Governors, through Resolution No. XVI-2003-226, dated October 25, 2003, approved the
recommendation of Commissioner San Juan.
We agree.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in
office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation
of the lawyers oath; (6) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willfully
appearing as an attorney for a party without authority. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that "A lawyer shall not engage
in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." "Conduct," as used in this rule, does not
refer exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. This Court has made clear in a
long line of cases7 that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
In the instant case, respondent may have acted in his private capacity when he entered into a
contract with complainant Marili representing to have the rights to transfer title over the townhouse
unit and lot in question. When he failed in his undertaking, respondent fell short of his duty under
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It cannot be gainsaid that it was
unlawful for respondent to transfer property over which one has no legal right of ownership.
Respondent was likewise guilty of dishonest and deceitful conduct when he concealed this lack of
right from complainants. He did not inform the complainants that he has not yet paid in full the price
of the subject townhouse unit and lot, and, therefore, he had no right to sell, transfer or assign said
property at the time of the execution of the Deed of Assignment. His acceptance of the bulk of the
purchase price amounting to Nine Hundred Thirty-Seven Thousand Five Hundred Pesos
(P937,500.00), despite knowing he was not entitled to it, made matters worse for him.
Respondents adamant refusal to return to complainant Marili Ronquillo the money she paid him,
which was the fruit of her labor as an Overseas Filipino Worker for ten (10) years, is morally
reprehensible. By his actuations, respondent failed to live up to the strict standard of morality
required by the Code of Professional Responsibility and violated the trust and respect reposed in
him as a member of the Bar, and an officer of the court.
Respondents culpability is therefore clear. He received a letter from complainants counsel
demanding the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the complainants, or, in the
alternative, the return of the money paid by complainants. In reply to said letter, respondent
acknowledged his obligation, and promised to settle the same if given sufficient time, thus:
xxx
I am working now on a private project which hopefully will be realized not long from now but I need a
little time to fix some things over. May I please request for a period of 20 days from May 15, 2000
within which to eithercompletely pay Crown Asia or return the money at your option. (Emphasis
supplied)
In no uncertain terms, respondent admitted not having full ownership over the subject townhouse
unit and lot, as he has yet to completely pay Crown Asia. Respondent even failed to produce the
Contract to Sell he allegedly executed with Crown Asia over the subject unit, which would show the
extent of his right of ownership, if any, over the townhouse unit and lot in question.
To be sure, complainants gave respondent sufficient time to fulfill his obligation. It was only after
almost two years had passed, after respondent promised to pay Crown Asia or return to
complainants the amount they paid him, that complainants sent respondent a second
letter8 demanding solely the return of the amount of P937,500.00, including legal interest. By this
time, it was indubitable that respondent would not be able to perform his end of their agreement.
The practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character.9 The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing.10 Lawyers must
conduct themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or the
public at large,11 and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the
imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.12
Be that as it may, we cannot grant complainants prayer that respondent be directed to return the
money he received from them in the amount of P937,500.00. Disciplinary proceedings against
lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather investigations by the court into the conduct of
one of its officers. The only question for determination in these proceedings is whether or not the
attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar.13 Thus, this Court cannot rule on
the issue of the amount of money that should be returned to the complainants.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent Atty. Homobono T. Cezar is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of THREE (3) YEARS, effective immediately. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts for their
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
are indicative of a character not worthy of a member of the bar. The fact that complainant has
withdrawn her complaint against respondent does not wipe out the grievous offense he had
committed. Respondent "has failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and
required of a member of the bar. Therefore, he is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" within
the meaning of Section 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4748. August 4, 2000
VICTORIA V. RADJAIE, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE O.
ALOVERA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
b) It can also be seen that all the orders issued prior to the
retirement were all type-written in the same type-[writer] except
the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87) and the Decision (pp. 88-93)
Plaintiffs had until January 20, 1994 to formally offer their evidence
but it took them one (1) year and five (5) days to file such a simple
pleading. It goes against the normal human experience when
plaintiffs who are allowed to present evidence ex-parte are usually
very quick in having things done because there is no opposition but
in this case it took plaintiffs a while to formally rest which was only
fifteen (15) days prior to the retirement of Mr. Alovera. This timing
is highly suspect.
chanrob les vi rtua l law lib rary
It was dated January 20, 1995 but the date of the Professional Tax
Receipt (PTR) of Atty. Alberto A. Villaruz, counsel for the plaintiffs,
was issued only on January 31, 1995. This is shown on Page 71 of
the records.
chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
e) There is no showing that the January 25, 1995 Order (p. 87)
admitting the formal offer was even received by a Court staff for
filing with the records.
chanroble s virtual law lib rary
f) The same can be said of the January 30, 1995 Decision (pp. 8893) which was allegedly decided five (5) days after the Order
admitting the evidence (p. 87) was allegedly issued. What a swift
action from a retiring judge.
chanroble s virtual law l ib rary
g) A copy of the Decision was not even sent to the counsel for the
plaintiffs but is shown to have been received by one of the plaintiffs
only on August 1, 1995 (p. 93).
chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
i) The records show that all orders after the retirement of Mr.
Alovera bear the stamp "RECEIVED" by the Court staff who received
them for filing in the court records.
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
chanroble s virtual
law libra ry
On February 18, 1998, the Court directed the Office of the Bar
Confidant to proceed with the investigation of the instant case.[12
libra ry
chambers. Respondent himself did not testify and neither did any
other witness testify for him, despite the issuance of subpoena ad
testificandum on Ireneo Borres and Ludovico Buhat, who both failed
to appear at the investigation. In lieu of their oral testimonies,
respondent offered and presented their respective
affidavits.[13 Complainant chose not to object thereto and even
waived her right, through her counsel, to cross-examine them.
chanrobles vi rtual law lib rary
On July 16, 1993, Br. 17, to which Civil Case No. V-6186 was reraffled, declared herein complainant in default and ordered the
Borres heirs to present their evidence on July 30, 1993.[14
chanroble s virtual law l ibra ry
It was only after three (3) postponements that the Borres heirs
were able to start presenting their evidence ex-parte on October 8,
1993. For lack of material time, however, the presentation of
evidence was again reset to November 22, 1993, which again was
postponed and reset to December 10, 1993.15
chanroble s virtual law lib rary
On December 10, 1993, there were several criminal and civil actions
scheduled for trial, which commenced at about 10:00 in the
morning, before Br. 17, including Civil Case No. V-6186, which was
listed number four in the court calendar. Judge Alovera presided
over the hearing and Teresita V. Bauzon, court stenographer of Br.
17, took down notes of the Proceedings. Atty. Villaruz appeared for
From this point on, complainant would establish how the January
30, 1995 decision of Judge Alovera in Civil Case No. V-6186 came
about.
chanrobles vi rt ual law li bra ry
Civil Case No. V-6186 submitting the same for decision, except for
the order made by Judge Alovera on December 10, 1993 during the
"simulated proceedings" inside his chambers, where he directed the
counsel for the plaintiffs to file his offer of exhibits.[39 Mrs. Rosa
Dapat, who took down notes during the said proceedings and who
was not a member of the staff of Br. 17, was not even
acknowledged on the records as the official stenographer in the
course thereof.[40 Thus, in his resolution of September 25, 1997,
Judge Abela granted the petition for relief filed by complainant and
the latter was ordered reinstated to the possession of the property
in question. In the same resolution, Judge Abela declared the
January 30, 1995 decision null and void, the same not being filed
with the clerk of court and not properly rendered in accordance with
Section 1, Rule 36, Rules of Court.41
chanrobles vi rtua l law li bra ry
From the foregoing facts and circumstances the following facts are
established that:
chanrobles virtual law lib rary
1) Civil Case No. V-6186 was not tried on December 10, 1993. What
transpired was a mock or simulated trial inside the chamber of
Judge Alovera where only Atty. Alberto Villaruz, the plaintiffs and
Mrs. Rosa Dapat, a court stenographer from another court, were
present. No Judge or RTC Branch 17 court personnel were present
as there was actual court session in open court going on at that
time.
chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry
2) The records of Civil Case No. V-6186 were with Judge Jose O.
Alovera and remained with him even after his retirement on January
31, 1995. He did not return the record to Mrs. Concepcion Alcazar,
Court Clerk III in Charge of Civil Cases.
chanrobles vi rtua l law lib rary
- CONCLUSIONS -
The Order admitting the exhibits and the decision were made after
the retirement of Judge Alovera. He was no longer a judge.
chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry
LAWYER'S OATH
SO HELP ME GOD.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
chanrob les vi rtual law lib rary
All of these underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. When respondent took the oath as a member of the
legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so stand by his
pledge.[46 In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
chan roble s virtual law lib rary
This Court has been nothing short of exacting in its demand for
integrity and good moral character from members of the Bar. By
swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of
truth and the rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair
and impartial administration of justice - a vital function of
democracy a failure of which is disastrous to society. Any departure
from the path which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the
virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority[48 for there is perhaps no profession after that
of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is more
imperative than that of law.[49
chanrobles v irt ual law l ibra ry
law libra ry
SO ORDERED.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
On April 27, 1971, Pilar Abaigar filed this administrative case for disbarment against David D. C.
Paz, a member of the Philippine Bar.
The verified complaint alleged that sometime in March 1970, the complainant, Pilar Abaigar sought
the aid of a legal counsel regarding her divorce case filed by her husband in the Superior Court of
California, County of Alameda, U.S.A.; that she called on the telephone the office of Congressman
Bagatsing in Manila; that the respondent David D.C. Paz, answered the telephone call and
volunteered his legal services; that believing that the respondent had the necessary legal
experience, the complainant confided her legal problems to him: that after the termination of the
divorce case, the respondent became exceedingly friendly with the complainant and started to
profess his love for her; that at the start, the complainant was hesitant in continuing the cordial
relations between her and the respondent but the respondent made her believe that although he was
living with another woman, his relations with said woman were no impediment that the respondent
convinced the complainant that he had been compelled to contract a civil marriage with the woman
and that since it was not a marriage under the church laws, it was no bar for him to get married
under the church laws with the complainant; that the respondent proposed marriage to the
complainant; that believing in this good faith, the complainant accepted the proposal of the
respondent; that sometime in the latter part of November 1970, an application for the issuance of a
marriage license to the complainant and the respondent was made and executed: that thereafter, the
respondent convinced the complainant that since they were going to get married anyway, they
should act as husband and wife; that because of the confidence which the complainant reposed
upon the respondent, she reluctantly acceded to said demands; that as a result of their being
together, the complainant became pregnant but due to causes beyond her control, the pregnancy
was lost; that sometime in the third week of April 1971, one Virginia Paz was introduced to the
complainant by the respondent; that said Virginia Paz was the woman previously referred to by the
respondent as his wife with whom he had contracted a forced civil marriage; that said Virginia Paz,
in the course of the meeting, informed the complainant that there had been actually two marriages
between Virginia Paz and the respondent, one under the civil law and one under the church law; that
upon being confronted by the complainant, the respondent made no explanation whatsoever and
merely kept silent; that since that time, the respondent had done nothing to make amends for having
deceived the complainant and for having taken advantage of her; and that the complainant has no
other recourse but to ask for the disbarment of the respondent who is a member of the Philippine
Bar and an officer of the courts of justice. 1
In his answer filed on June 10, 1971, the respondent denied having had any illicit relations with the
complainant and alleged that when the complainant called by telephone Congressman Ramon D.
Bagatsing, the respondent advised complainant to come to the office; that on the next day when the
complainant came to the office of Congressman Bagatsing, she was at first referred to Atty.
Geronimo Flores of the Legal Assistance Service to handle the case; that two or three days
thereafter, the complainant requested the respondent to personally handle her case; that on October
30, 1970, the respondent prepared a letter to complainant's husband, Samuel L. Navales, which
letter was signed by Congressman Bagatsing; that sometime in the latter part of October 1970, the
complainant borrowed from the respondent the sum of P200.00 to complete the payment for the
hospitalization and treatment of her brother, Eric, at the Makati Medical Center: that as a act of pity,
the respondent gave her the loan; that after the election for delegates to the Constitutional
Convention in November 1970, the complainant called at the residence of the respondent and asked
help in filing a case against the assailant of her brother who was stabbed in Olongapo City; that the
wound sustained by complainant's brother was only superficial and he could not Identify his
assailant, hence, no criminal case was filed; that after the trip to Olongapo, the complainant
requested the help of the respondent to recommend her admission to a hospital because of
abdominal and chest pains; that the respondent recommended complainant to be admitted to the
Singian Clinic located at General Solano Street, San Miguel Manila; that on December 20, 1970, the
complainant caged up the respondent at his residence by telephone and requested him to assist her
mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar to file a criminal action against her minor sister, Vilma Abaigar for
disobedience; that the respondent prepares a complaint on the same night and a sworn statement of
her mother, Mrs. Cecilia Abaigar that he accompanied the complainant to the Fiscal's Office at
Pasig, Rizal and to the Municipal Court of Mandaluyong, Rizal where Criminal Case No. 23994
entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Vilma Abaigar was filed by her mother; that the respondent
also helped the mother of the complainant to prepare and file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal; that by reason of said petition for habeas corpus, the mother of
the complainant was able to take Vilma Abaigar into her custody although the petition was denied;
that the respondent had never informed the complainant that he was compelled to contract a civil
marriage with his wife; that the respondent never proposed marriage to the complainant; that the
respondent has no recollection of the supposed application for the issuance of a marriage license in
the latter part of November 1970; that respondent and complainant had never acted as husband and
wife; and that the respondent had not deceived complainant nor taken advantage of her. 2
In a resolution dated August 20, 1971, this Court referred this case to the Solicitor General for
investigation, report and recommendation. 3
After hearing the parties, the Solicitor General submitted on June 30, 1973 his report and
recommendation containing the following findings:
The complaint seeks the disbarment of respondent Paz on grounds that may
properly fall under the category of deceit and grossly immoral conduct as found in
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
Assuming for the moment that there had been sexual intercourse between
complainant and respondent, the first inquiry, we respectfully submit, is whether
respondent Paz practiced demotion on complainant by making her believe that
notwithstanding their subsisting marriages to their respective spouses, they could
legally get married to each other and based on his promise of marriage, she
consented to go to bed with him.
Complainant admitted that during her alleged romantic liason with respondent, she
was married to a certain Samuel Navales, also a Filipino, who divorced her in the
U.S.A. sometime in the middle of 1970 (par. 2, Complaint; p. 46, t.s.n., November 18,
1971). She also admitted that before she submitted herself to his sexual desires, she
was informed by him that, he had a wife with whom he was civilly married but that the
marriage was void because it was either fake or 'forced' (sic).
Whether there was deceit hinges on whether complainant actually believed the
representation of respondent that they could legally marry. Highly intelligent that she
is and with the educational background that she has, it is difficult to accept the
proposition that she swallowed hook, line and sinker his supposed assurances that
notwithstanding full awareness by both of the existence of each other's previous
marriages, no legal impediment stood in the way of their getting married
ecclesiastically. It is worthwhile repeating that complainant was a fifth placer in the
Board Examinations for Chemical Engineering. She was licensed as a chemical
engineer in 1964 or 1965, after which she taught at one time or another in different
schools and colleges in Manila. In 1970 or 1971 when she was supposedly tricked
into surrendering her body on a promise of marriage, she was already in her late
twenties. It is improbable that at this age, she was still ignorant of the law regarding
indissolubility of marriage. Before jumping headlong into accepting respondent's
proposal that they act as husband and wife, she should have pondered upon the
serious legal implications and complications of a second marriage for both of them.
She could have easily asked a lawyer for advice on the matter. Complainant's own
neighbor in Mandaluyong, Rizal is a lawyer by the name of Atty. Paler whose wife
testified on her behalf. According to Mrs. Paler, her husband and complainant used
to converse (p. 18, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). In these conversations complainant
could have asked, perhaps in a casual manner, Mrs. Paler's husband as to the legal
effects of a divorce obtained abroad by a Filipino citizen or the effects of a marriage
brought about through the use of force and intimidation in order to settle whatever
doubts she had in her mind.
The truth however, of the matter is that complainant did not even have to consult a
lawyer to know that she could not legally marry respondent. It is of no little
significance that some persons utilized by complainant as witnesses on her behalf
because of their supposed knowledge of her relations with respondent, were
themselves aware that divorce is not recognized in this country. Thus Mrs. Paler
categorically stated that she knew for a fact that divorce obtained abroad is not
recognized in the Philippines (p. 19, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). The same
admission was elicited from Fr. Troy de los Santos, another witness for the
complainant. Fr. de los Santos who used to be her spiritual adviser admitted at one
point of his testimony that divorce obtained abroad cannot be recognized in the
Philippines insofar as state laws are concerned and complainant knew about this (pp.
33-34, t.s.n., November 23, 1971). Thus, the Jesuit priest declared under crossexamination:
Q Do you know that complainant's husband is still alive?
A Yes.
Q Up to the present?
A Yes.
Q Do you know that divorce is not recognized in the Philippines?
A I know, but the church does not recognize divorce.
Q How about the State, do you know that the State recognize
divorce?
A As far as my knowledge, I do not think that our laws permit divorce.
Continuing with his testimony, Fr. de los Santos stated:
Q Did not the fact that complainant's husband is still have and that
divorce is not recognized in ' the Philippines be considered an
impediment to complainant's marriage to anyone?
A Yes.
Q Did you inform her so?
A She knows about that.
(33,34, t.s.n., Id.)
Again, granting that complainant did not actually comprehend the existence of a legal
bar to her remarriage, 'not being steeped in the intricacies of the law'. just the mere
realization that both respondent's wife and her own husband being still have was
enough to stir her mind and to impel her to make her own investigation. She could
have, for instance, made discreet inquiries as to who was the woman respondent
was married to and verified his claim whether he was forced into the marriage. Or,
perhaps, she could simply have asked Congressman Bagatsing about respondent's
personal status. After all she was competent enough to prepare, without anyone's
help her own affidavit, Exhibit 'A', and resourceful enough to make research in the
Supreme Court's Library on the subject of disbarment (pp. 63, 89, t.s.n., November
18, 1971).
What conclusion then can a reasonable mind draw from the given premises? Either
complainant was so helplessly naive as to be beguiled by respondent's
blandishments or. comprehending fully the legal impossibility of the fulfillment of his
marriage proposals, she unconditionally laid herself prostrate to his charms, too
much enamored of him to care about anything else. For, as philosopher Blaise
Pascal has so pithily stated of the profundity of human love, 'love has reasons that
reason cannot explain.' Since complainant cannot hide behind the camouflage of
innocence, considering her intellectual capacity and educational background, no
other conclusion is possible 'except that she voluntarily submitted to sexual intimacy
with respondent without entertaining any illusion or hope of sublimating the illicit
relations by legal union.
6. That there never is an illicit relationship between Atty. Paz and me at present
because I believed all along that he was single and able to marry me. In fact, our
relationship is above- board just like any engaged couple.
7. That I was made to understand by the Citizens Legal Assistant Office that the
tenor of the affidavit made by Mr. Rudolfo Del Prado is such that the consideration
for the illicit relationship was promissory note which to all intents and purposes is
immoral and illegal.
8. That I am only after the collection of the loan which Atty. Paz got from me and not
revenge for his deception. 6
The foregoing portions of her letter militate against the credibility of the complainant.
In her complainant for disbarment, she pictured the respondent as morally perverse. However, in the
aforementioned letter, she states that there never was an illicit relationship between her and the
respondent, Atty. David D.C. Paz, and that their relationship was aboveboard just like any engaged
couple. And finally, she avers that she was only after the collection of the loan which the respondent
got from her and not for revenge for his deception.
It has been held that the power of this Court to disbar a lawyer should be exercised with caution
because of its serious consequences. 7 The burden of proof rests upon the complainant and the case
against a respondent must be established by convincing proof.
Barredo, Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Melencio- Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
Fernando, C.J.,Teehankee, Antonio JJ., took no part.
Santos,J., is on leave
MARIA
A.C.
ELENA
No.
MORENO
1109.
VS.
ATTY.
April
ERNESTO
27,
ARANETA
2005
Facts: Ernesto Araneta issued two checks to Elena Moreno for his indebtedness which amounts to P11,
000.00, the checks were dishonored. It was dishonored because the account against which is drawn is
closed. Thereafter the case was forwarded to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline pursuant to Rule 139B of the Rules of Court. The Commission recommended the suspension from the practice of law for three
(3) months. On 15 October 2002, IBP Director for Bar Discipline Victor C. Fernandez, transmitted the
records of this case back to this Court pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b) of the Rules of Court. Thereafter,
the Office of the Bar Confidant filed a Report regarding various aspects of the case. The Report further made
mention of a Resolution from this Court indefinitely suspending the respondent for having been convicted
by
final
judgment
of
estafa
through
falsification
of
a
commercial
document.
Issue: Whether or not Araneta should be disbarred due to the issuance of checks drawn against a closed
account.
Held: The Court held that the act of a person in issuing a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he
or she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check in full
upon its presentment, is a manifestation of moral turpitude. In Co v. Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we held
that for issuing worthless checks, a lawyer may be sanctioned with one years suspension from the practice
of law, or a suspension of six months upon partial payment of the obligation. In the instant case, however,
herein respondent has, apparently been found guilty by final judgment of estafa thru falsification of a
commercial document, a crime involving moral turpitude, for which he has been indefinitely suspended.
Considering that he had previously committed a similarly fraudulent act, and that this case likewise involves
moral turpitude, we are constrained to impose a more severe penalty. In fact, we have long held that
disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude.
As we said in In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo, the review of respondent's
conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become final but has been executed. No
elaborate argument is necessary to hold the respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a
member of the bar. Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
protect the administration of justice.
LINSANGAN V. TOLENTINO
Facts:
A complaint of disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan, Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office
against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients & encroachment of professional services. Linsangan alleges
that Tolentino with the help of paralegal Labiano convinced his clients to transfer legal representation by promising
financial assistance and expeditious collection of their claims. To induce them, Tolentino allegedly texted and called
them persistently. To support his allegation, Linsangan presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail over him to sever his client-atty relationship with Linsangan. Also, he attached respondents
calling card:
Front
NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
LAW OFFFICE
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
Fe Marie L. Labiano
Paralegal
1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. Rm. M-01
Tel: 362-7820
6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar
Fax: (632) 362-7821
Grace Park, Caloocan City
Cel.: (0926) 2701719
Back
SERVICES OFFERED:
CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
In his defense, Tolentino denies knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing and circulating of said calling card.
Issue:
W/N Atty. Tolentino is guilty of advertising his services
Held:
Yes. Atty. Tolentino suspended for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03, 8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
With regard to Canon 3, the practice of law is a profession and not a business. Thus, lawyers should not
advertise their talents as merchants advertise their wares. To allow lawyers to advertise their talents/skill is a
commercialization of the practice of law (degrading the profession in the publics estimation).
With regard to Rule 2.03, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for purpose of gain, either personally or
through an agent. In relation to Rule 1.03, which proscribes ambulance chasing (involving solicitation personally or
through an agent/broker) as a measure to protect community from barratry and champertry.
As a final note regarding the calling card presented as evidence by Linsangan, a lawyers best advertisement
is a well-merited. reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct. For this
reason, lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyers name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labianos calling card contained the phrase with financial assistance. The phrase was clearly used to entice
clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions.
Money was dangled to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress
and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and deserves no place in the
legal profession.
DE ROY
The firewall of a burned out building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop
occupied by the family of the private respondents resulting in injuries to private respondents had been
warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former
failed to do. In the RTC, petitioners were found guilty of gross negligence. On the last day of the 15
days period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was again denied.
The Supreme Court finds that Court of Appeal did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habulayas vs
Japzon. Counsel for petitioner contends that the said case should not be applied non-publication in
the Official Gazette.
ISSUE: Whether or not Supreme Court decisions must be published in the Official Gazette before they
can be binding.
HELD: There is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decision in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court
particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated and published in the advance
reports of Supreme Court decisions and in such publications as the SCRA and law journals.
Facts:
A taxi driver (Soriano) filed an action for the disbarment of Atty. Dizon, on the grounds that Dizon was convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude, and violated Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Soriano allegedly fell victim to Dizon, who was found to have:
a. Driven his car under the influence of liquor;
b. Reacted violently and attempted assault for over a simple traffic incident;
c. Shot at Soriano, who was unarmed and not in the position to defend himself (treachery);
d. Denied his acts despite positive evidence against him (dishonesty);
e. Guilty of dishonesty, claiming to be mauled by the victim (Kawawang driver, binaril na nga, may lakas pa daw
mag maul ng attorney na may baril. Hindi din tanga mag rason si Dizon diba?);
f. Despite neing granted probation, he did not satisfy his civil liabilities to the victim (Ano ba problema nito?!)
Issues:
(1) Is Dizons crime of Frustrated Homicide considered a crime involving moral turpitude
(2) Does his guilt to such crime warrant disbarment?
Held:
(1) Yes.
Moral Turpitude is everything which is done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals
Dizon was obviously the aggressor for having pursued and shot Soriano, not only because of his treachery,
but also his intent to escape, betrayed by his attempt to wipe off his prints from the gun. His inordinate reaction to a
simple traffic incident clearly indicates his non-fitness to be a lawyer.
(2) Yes.
His illegal possession of fire-arms, and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities all justify disbarment. The
court reminds him that in oath and in the CPR, he is bound to obey the laws of the land. The liabilities in question
have been sitting for 4 years, unsatisfied, despite it being the condition for his probation (you ungrateful person!)
Dizon displayed an utter lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to
enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.