Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

International Phenomenological Society
Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

Author(s): Jessica Moss
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 72, No. 3 (May, 2006), pp. 503-535
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
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Research
Philosophyand Phenomenological
Vol. LXXII,No. 3, May 2006
PleasureandIllusioninPlato
JESSICA MOSS
University
ofPittsburgh
Plato linkspleasure withillusion,and this link explains his rejection of the view that all
desires are rational desires forthe good. The Protagoras and Gorgias show connections
between pleasure and illusion; the Republic develops these into a psychological theory.
One part of the soul is not only prone to illusions, but also incapable of the kind of
reasoning that can dispel them. Pleasure appears good; therefore this part of the soul
(the appetitive part) desires pleasures qua good but ignores reasoning about what is
really good. Hence the new moral psychology of the Republic: not all desires are
rational,and thus virtuedepends on bringingone's non-rational desires under the control of reason.
Introduction
In the many, deception seems to come about on account of pleasure. For while it is not the
good, it appears to be. They choose the pleasant as being good, then, and avoid pain as being
bad.
Aristotle,Nicomachean Ethics 1 113a33-b2)
Plato is suspiciousof pleasure.He devotesthewholeof thePhilebusanda

portionof theGorgiasto attackson hedonism.He declaresthat
significant
"thesoulofa truephilosopher...
keepsawayfrompleasuresandappetitesand
painsandfearsas muchas itcan" (Phaedo83b5-7)anddenouncespleasureas
that
lure"(Timaeus 69dl).1 And even whenacknowledging
"evil's greatest
some pleasuresare good, and thatthe good life (the philosopher'slife) is
pleasant,he holdsthattheverybest life- thelifeof thegods is
supremely
a lifewithno pleasureat all {Philebus33b).2
of pleasure,andwhydoes he devoteso much
Whyis Platoso mistrustful
to thetopic?Some havetakenhis concernwithpleasureto stem
attention
or froman excessivereactionagainstcontemporary
fromplainprudishness,
I will arguethatPlato's suspicionof
advocatesof hedonism.By contrast,
1
2
Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

The apparent exception to Plato's general anti-hedonism is the Protagoras, in which
Socrates gives an argumentbased on the premise that pleasure is not only good, but the
good. It is a testamentto the stronglyanti-hedonistictendency of the other dialogues,
however, that this passage of the Protagoras has generated so much interpretative
debate.
PLEASURE AND ILLUSION IN PLATO

503
pleasure is systematicand philosophical, and tied to his most centralviews.

Pleasure is dangerousbecause it is a deceiver. It leads us astraywith false
appearances,bewitchingand beguiling us, cheatingand trickingus.3 In particular,it deceives us by appearingto be good when it is not.
This paper tracesthedevelopmentof theassociation between pleasure and
illusion throughthreedialogues, the Protagoras, Gorgias, and Republic. I
argue that this association explains why Plato's account of the desire for
pleasure- thedesire forthingsqua pleasant- changes radicallybetweenthese
dialogues, and therebyexplains a more generalshiftin his theoryof virtue
and desirefromthe early dialogues to the middle. (While thereare important
refinements
of the association betweenpleasure and illusion in the Philebus
and Laws, a discussion of those dialogues lies outside the scope of this
paper.)
In theearlydialogues, Plato argues thatall desires (includingthe desire for
pleasure) are rational desires for the good. On this view of desire, vice is
merelya matterof ignoranceabout good and bad: once we learn which things
are reallygood and bad, we can relyon our desiresto lead us to virtue.In the
Republic, by contrast,Plato argues that some desires, including desires for
pleasure (understoodnow as belongingto theappetitivepartof the soul),4 are
distinctfromand can conflictwith rationaldesiresfor the good. Correspondingly,the Republic rejects the intellectualistmoral psychologyof the earlier
dialogues: it holds that vice is a matterof psychic disorder,not mere ignorance,and thatvirtuecan be achieved only when the partsof the soul withthe
wrongkindof desires are ruledby thebestpartof the soul, reason. Why does
Plato change his view of desire in thisway? I will argue that he is motivated
to do so by his developing thoughtsabout pleasure and illusion.
If theaccount I offeris correct,then,the association betweenpleasure and
illusion is central to Plato's thought.For the most part,however,the association has been little noted,and, whereit has been noted, not well understood.5The only contextin which the connectionhas been widely recognized
is Republic X, where Plato seems to argue that the part of the soul that
desirespleasure is the partthat is deceivedby optical illusions. No satisfactoryaccount has been given of why Plato would group these traitstogether
3
504
This is an accusationthatPlatomakesthroughout
thedialogues.The soul is bewitched
(yoriTEuoiiEvr))
bythebodyand itspleasures(Phaedo 81b3); people are bewitchedand
charmed(Kr|Xr)6evTes)
by pleasure(Republic4 13c1-2,cf.Rep. 584a10); pleasure"does
whateverherwill wishesby meansof persuasionwithdeceit (TT6i0oT
heto andiTis)"
(Laws 863b7-ll). In the Philebus,Protarchuscalls pleasure "the greatestimpostor"
(ctAaôvtoTaTov,Phil.65c5).
See section111forexplanation
and defenseof thisclaim.
Shoreyand GoslingandTaylornoticesomeaspectsof pleasure's deceptions,butmainly
in connection
withbodilypleasuresin thePhaedo (Shorey 1903: 28, Goslingand Taylor
1982: 86); Price notes a connectionbetweenpleasure and illusion,but only in the
Timaeus(Price1995:86).
JESSICAMOSS

havefoundtheclaimbizarre.As
andindeedmanyinterpreters
here,however,
Annasputsit,"desirehas nothingto do withopticalillusions."6By tracing
betweenpleasureandillusionintheProtagorasand Gorgias,
theconnections
I show that
I providean accountthatmakessenseofRepublicX's argument:
in
have
the
desire
for
much
to do with
view
on Plato's
pleasuredoes, fact,
opticalillusions.
In SectionI, I showthatPlatoassociatespleasureandillusionin theProtagorasinordertoexplainwhydesiresforpleasureleadpeopleastray:when
or viciouspleasuresinsteadof doingwhatis good,we do
we pursueharmful
so becausewe havebeendeceivedbyillusionsgenerated
bypleasantandpainfulthings.SectionsII andIII arguethatthe Gorgias and Republic expand
revision.Whereasaccordingto the Protagoras
thisidea,withan important
rationalcalculationhas the powerto overcomethe illusions inherentin
pleasure,so that they no longeraffectour desires,these laterdialogues
developan accountof whythedesireforpleasureis subjectto illusionthat
view of thatdesire.Pleasureappearsto be good even
entailsa verydifferent
whenit is not(sectionII); one partof our souls is inherently
susceptibleto
of reasoning;thispartof the
effects
illusion,andimmuneto thecorrective
desirespleasureas good,andwhenthispartrulesour souls we
soultherefore
althoughthis partof the soul
pursuepleasure(sectionIII). Furthermore,
- itsinability
to see beyond
desirespleasureas good,itscognitivelimitations
the
toward
whatis truly
desires
unfit
to
lead
its
render
agent
appearances
of
the
desire
for
view
Plato
this
Once
pleasure,he
adopts
good(sectionIV).
oftheearlierdialoguesand thetheoryof
psychology
rejectstheintellectualist
virtueit entails,and in the Republic definesvirtueas the statein which
reasonrulesthelower,nonrational
partsof the soul. SectionV tracesthe
that
the
idea
of
pleasureappearsgood in laterGreekthought;in the
history
lastsectionI indicatePlato's viewson themetaphysical
aspectof pleasure's
deceptions.
I. Pleasure and illusionin the Protagoras
theProtagoras'accountof thedesireforpleasure,we
Inorderto understand
twoviewsof thisdesireimplicitin thediscussionof pleasmustdistinguish
ureat Protagoras351b ff.This is the passage in whichSocrates,arguing
thatno one everfailsto
fromthepremisethatpleasureis thegood,maintains
do whathe knowsis bestbecausehe is "overcomeby pleasure,"andthatvirofknowledge.7
He directshisargument
a matter
tueis therefore
againstpopu6
Annas1981:339.
on theclaimthatpleasureis thegood,whichhe
Whydoes Socratespremisehisargument
in otherdialogues,includingone consideredroughlycontemporacontradicts
explicitly
neous,the Gorgias(495e-499b)? 1 willnot address thisquestionhere, as it does not
bearon mydiscussionof thedesireforpleasure.
directly

505
lar opinion, or "the many," who initiallyclaim that they often do what is
pleasant insteadof whattheyknow is good.
Althoughthereis no explicit discussion of desire in this passage, behind
the claims Plato attributesto the many thereclearly lies a view of the desire
forpleasure as an impulsivedesireforimmediategratification.This view has
a good deal of intuitiveappeal. It says that the pleasure-seekereats a second
piece of cake just because the cake will give her pleasure now, even if she
knows she will feel sick or sorrylater. Someone who resists the immediate
temptationin orderto obtain long-termpleasures is not, on this view, ruled
solely by her desire forpleasure: she is subjugatingher hedonisticimpulses
to her more rational,calculating side. Left to itself, the desire for pleasure
will lead us to pursue immediategratification.When Socrates argues that
thereis no reason to care about when a pleasure will come, an imaginary
of the many protests,"But Socrates, the immediatepleasure
representative
(to TTapaxpfjua ^50) differsgreatlyfromthe pleasure and pain of a later
time" (Prot. 356a5-7). This imaginaryinterlocutormeans, of course, that
immediatepleasure is more attractivethan distantpleasure; when he claimed
that he sometimes does something bad just because it is pleasant, it was
immediatepleasurehe had in mind.
Socrates advances an opposing view: thedesireforpleasure is a desire not
for what will provide immediategratification,but ratherfor what will be
more pleasant thanpainfuloverall. When the imaginaryinterlocutorprotests
thatimmediatepleasuresdifferfromremoteones, Socrates replies:
They don't differin any other way than by pleasure and pain, do they? For there is no other
possible way. But like a man good at weighing,having put the pleasures togetherand the pains
togetherand having weighed both the near and the faron the scale, say which one is greater.
For if you weigh pleasures against pleasures, the greater and more must always be taken
(Ar]TTTea)...and if you weigh pleasures against pains... that action must be done (TrpaKTeov)
in which pains are exceeded by pleasures. (Prot. 356a7-b8)
The contextmakes clear that the 'must' here denotesa psychological necessity.Socrates is tellingthe many that when knowinglyfacedwith an opportunityto get more pleasure than pain overall they will inevitably take it,
even if it means passing up immediategratification
in favorof deferred.
Socrates needs to make this counterintuitive
claim in orderto argue that
the "art of measurement"he proposes can lead people to virtue.For on his
account, both the apparentlyimpulsive person who overindulges and the
temperatepersonwho abstainsare motivatedby thesame desire: thedesire for
what will bring more pleasure than pain overall. The difference
is only that
the apparentlyimpulsivepersonhas false beliefs about what will gratifythis
desire,because she has false beliefs about the relativesizes of specific pleasures and pains. If we can instructher in the art of measuring pleasures and
pains, teachingherto calculate correctlywhetherthepleasures inherentin and
506
JESSICA MOSS

consequenton an act will outweighthe pains, she will become virtuous.The

verydesirethatnow leads herastraywill thenlead hertowardthegood.8
Whydo people make mistakes about which things will best gratifytheir
desires- whydo we need an art of measurementto guide us in our choices?
And why,if the desire forpleasure is in facta desire for more pleasure than
pain overall, do the manyfalselythinkof it as a desirefor immediategratification? Plato answers both questions with the claim that we are subject to
systematicillusions about pleasures.
Things of the same size appear to your sight to be bigger from nearby, and smaller from afar,
don't they?... If then our well-being lay in this,doing and choosing the large things,avoiding
and not doing the small, what would appear to be our salvation in life? The art of measurement,or the power of what appears [or "of appearance" (toO cpaivopevou)]? (Prot. 356c5d4)
Pleasant and painfulthingsare analogous to the objects of vision: those that

are near (in time)appear largerthanthosethatare faraway. Thus, while what
people really care about in desiringpleasure is getting more pleasure than
pain overall,"people who make mistakes concerningthe choice of pleasures
and pains make these mistakes througha lack of knowledge...of measurement" (Prot. 357d3-7).9 People pursue near pleasures in the mistaken view
thattheyare overall greater,and thusseem to care only for immediategratification insteadof forwhatis trulygood.
Socrates insists,however, thatthis fault is perfectlycorrectable.'The art
- the knowledgeof how to judge the trueoverall pleasantof measurement"
ness of different
options, regardlessof theirimmediacyor distance "would
make the appearancelose its power (aKupov hev av EiToiriaE toOto to
cpdvTaoLia)" (Prot. 356d7-8).10Once a person learns to judge that some
pleasure will be outweighedby the pains to
particularimmediatelygratifying
9
10
For this account to work, of course, it must be the case that virtuous acts yield more
pleasure than pain in the long run,while vicious acts do not; this is clearly an underlying
assumptionof the Protagoras. Irwin argues that Plato abandons this idea in the Gorgias
(Irwin 1995: 112-113). Irwin is certainly rightthat Plato's view in that dialogue is more
complex: the vicious person experiences pleasures that are more intense than the virtuous person's (cf. Philebus 45a ff.),while the virtuousperson experiences a greater balance of pleasure over pain overall; this makes a purely quantitativeranking of lives by
pleasure difficultor impossible. Nonetheless, Plato always holds onto a modified version
of the idea that the life of virtue is the most pleasant life: see Republic 58Od-588a and
Laws 732e-734d.
The analogy recurs and is made more explicit at Philebus 41e-42a.
How should we understandthe idea that an appearance "loses its power": does an illusion- forinstance,the illusion that the second piece of cake is pleasant enough to outweigh the pains that will follow on eating it actually disappear, or does this illusion
desires?
The second alternative is more plausible,
to
affect
our
lose
its
merely
power
althoughnothingPlato says here rules out the first.See my discussion of Republic X in
section III below.

507
follow, she will lose her desireforthat pleasure, and desire the bettercourse
of action instead.11
It is importantto note that Socrates' confidencethat the illusions generated by pleasure can be overcome by the rightkind of reasoning- the art of
- is directlyrelated to his characterizationof the desire for
measurement
pleasure as a desirefor more pleasure than pain overall. For on this characterizationdesires for pleasure are sensitive to, and often even arise out of,
calculations about the relativesizes of pleasures and pains. The apparently
intemperatehedonistpursueswhatshe pursuesin the belief that it will bring
hermore pleasure thanpain, and to acquire such beliefsshe will oftenhave to
calculations. ("The cake may make me sick later on,"
performrudimentary
she mightthink,"but thatdiscomfortwill be outweighedby the pleasure of
eating it!" It is thiscalculation that makes her desirethe cake.) Furthermore,
her desire will also be sensitive to furthercalculations: if she comes to
believe that the discomfortsto follow will in factoutweigh the pleasure of
eating the cake, she will no longer desire the cake at all. Her desires for
pleasure are thus like our judgmentsabout optical illusions, and unlike our
mere perceptionsof them, in that they can be influencedby illusions but
thoroughlycorrectedby rationalcalculations.
Contrast the desire for pleasure understoodas an impulsive desire for
immediategratification.
No calculationis requiredto generatesuch desires. A
piece of cake strikessomeone as pleasant, and rightaway- withoutneeding
to considerbeforehandwhatwould ensue fromeatingthecake, nor how much
pleasure the cake would give her relative to any other pleasant or painful
- she desires thatpiece of cake. Likewise, her desire is not sensitive
activity
to subsequentcalculation: if she learns that the painful after-effects
of the
cake will outweigh the pleasure of eating it she might restrainherselfand
decide notto gratifyher desire,but the desire will remain. If she is ruledby
such desires- as the many claim to be when they act against their beliefs
about what is best {Prot. 352d)- she will go for what strikesher as pleasant
even when she recognizesbetterreasonsto abstain.
To say thaton Socrates' accountthedesire forpleasuredependson calculation while on the many's account it does not is to say that on Socrates'
account it is a rational desire while on the many's account it is irrational.
Measurement,and more broadlycalculation, is for Plato a paradigmatically
11
508
It cannot be that the agent continues to desire (e.g.) the cake qua pleasant but is motivated by some other desire to eschew it, for this other desire would have to be a desire
for what is good in contrastto what is pleasant, and the many have conceded that pleasure is the only thingtheythinkgood {Prot. 355a). Neithercan it be that the agent continues to desire the cake qua immediately pleasant but is motivated by a distinctdesire for
an overall balance of pleasure over pain to eschew it, for the many have conceded that
all they care about is the overall balance; they never desire things qua immediately
pleasant at all {Prot. 356a-c).
JESSICA MOSS

In theRepublicPlatodefinesreasonas thepartof thesoul

rationalactivity.12
wherethisincludesmeasurement
thatengagesincalculation,
(Rep. 602el-2);
- AoyiaTiKOv
- literallymeans
translated
as 'rational'
the wordstandardly
the Republic holds thatit is throughcalculation
calculative.Furthermore,
thatreasongeneratesits desires(Rep. 439dl, see sectionIV below). The
itintheProtagoraswouldthuscount
desireforpleasureas Socratespresents
view fromthe
in theRepublicas a desireof reason.This is a verydifferent
one theRepublicitselfwill present:there,thedesireforpleasureis a nonto a non-rational
rationaldesirebelonging
partofthesoul.
betweenthe Protagoras'
Of course we expect significantdifferences
accountofthedesireforpleasureandthatofotherdialogues,becausetheProtagoras'discussionis basedon a premisethatPlato nowhereelse accepts:
theProtagorasimpliesthatthemany
thatpleasureis thegood.Furthermore,
onlypursuewhattheythinkpleasant:theirconcessionthattheythinkgood
withSocrates'view thatall our
onlywhatwillbringthempleasure,together
of thegood,impliesthat,forthemat least,pleasureis
actionsare in pursuit
This meansthatthemoralpsychology
of the
thegenericobjectof desire.13
betweendesiresforpleasureanddesiresforanydialoguecannotdistinguish
the
else:
Protagorasimpliesthata soldierchooses to go to war not
thing
frompleasure,as in the Republic,but
becausehe desireshonoras distinct
becausethehonorableactionis morepleasant(Prot. 359e-360a).These are
withcommonsensenorwithPlato's own views
viewsthatsit well neither
to dismisstheentirediscussion
inotherdialogues;one maythusbe tempted
if we stepbackfrom
ofpleasurein thisdialogueas anomalous.Nonetheless,
we see thatthedialoguemakes
theoddcontextoftheProtagoras'discussion,
observation
aboutpleasure(and one thatwill haveseriouscona compelling
between
thatthereis a specialconnection
sequencesforPlato'slaterthought):
to
illusions.
and
desiring
pleasure beingsusceptible
thatdelayedones lack,
Close-at-hand
pleasuresdo havea specialattraction
andPlatohasexpressedthiswellbysayingthattheyseem pleasanter,
just as
with
illusions
The
seem
close-at-hand
may
analogy
optical
larger.
objects
seem so apt thatwe hardlynoticethatit calls forexplanation.For not all
12
and science or knowledge

betweenmeasurement
Noteforexampletheclose connection
at Protagoras357b4and Philebus55d5-e3.
(ETTiOTrmn)
Socratesdoes notstatetheviewthatwe always and onlypursuewhatwe thinkgood as
in theProtagorasas he does at Gorgias468b-corMeno 77c-78b,butit is very
explicitly
clearlyimpliedby his defenseof thepowerof knowledgeto controlour actions.For
whenSocratesclaimsthat"ifsomeoneknowswhatis goodand whatis bad, he wouldn't
to do anything
else otherthanwhathis knowledgecombe prevaileduponbyanything
mands"{Prot.352c4-6)- thatis, he will do what he knowsto be good- he clearly
assumesthateveryonehas thedesireto do onlywhathe thinksgood. He comes close to
at Prot.358c6-d2:"No one goes willingly
towardbad thingsnor
sayingthisexplicitly
towardthingsthathe believesbad,noris this,as itseems,in humannature,to wantto go
towardthingsthatone believesbad insteadof [thingsthatone believes]good."

509
objects of desire work on us this way: someone who pursues wealth for its
own sake, for instance,will easily recognize a smaller, immediategain as
less lucrativethan a largerone that will come only in five years. Nothing
about the nearnessin time of the firstmakes it seem largerthan it is, or
largerthan the second. (It may of course seem more attractivein another
sense, but I thinkit would be fairto explain thisby saying with Plato that it
seems more gratifying,more pleasant). 14 The same is true of health, and
knowledge,and manyotherthingsone mightdesire. Why then should desires
- why should these desires,more than otherdesires,
forpleasure be different
be subject to illusions of distance; why should pleasures, more than other
objects of desire,behave in thissense like objects of vision?
A quick (althoughmysterious)solution to this puzzle would be to claim
thatdesiringpleasurejust is a matterof perceivingsome sort of appearance;
below I shall argue that this is preciselyPlato's account. But if desiring
pleasure is akin to perception,then Socrates' suggestion in the Protagoras
that the desire forpleasure is sensitive to rationalcalculation is very likely
wrong. Reasoning can make optical illusions "lose theirpower" over a person's judgment,but notover hervision: hereyes will see the nearerobject as
largereven when she knows that it is not. If desires for pleasure are really
analogous to perception,then we should expect that reasoning can make
pleasure-illusionslose theirpower over a person's judgment,but not over her
desires for pleasure: she will still desire the nearerobject even when she
knows that she should not.15Moreover, we have empirical reason to think
thatsomethinglike thismay be right.Socrates' argumentabout the power of
the art of measurementseems too optimistic: sometimes even afterrational
deliberationshows us thatan immediatepleasure is to be avoided we still feel
the pull of that pleasure,just as sometimes even aftercalculation shows us
that the two lines in the Miiller-Lyerillusion are equal we still see one as
longer.
No one makes this case about the desirefor pleasure in the Protagoras.
But Plato himselfwill make it, as I argue in the next sections, in his characterizationof the appetitesin the Gorgias and laterdialogues. He will recognize the desire forpleasure as a distinctivelyillusion-pronedesire, and will
offerexplanations forthis susceptibilityto illusion that will entail that it
cannotbe overcome,and therefore
thatthe desireforpleasure is not in facta
rationaldesire at all.
Compare Parfit:"[Bjias toward the near... applies most clearly to events thatare in themselves pleasant or painful" (Parfit 1984: 160).
For an interestingdiscussion of this parallel, put to very differentuses from mine, see
Penner 1971.
510
JESSICA MOSS

II. Pleasure and illusionin the Gorgias

of
Pleasureandillusionarefirstassociatedin theGorgiasvia thedescription
a categorythatincludesthe dialogue'smain
whatSocratescalls "flattery,"
withPolus, Socratesdeniesthat
Earlyin theconversation
subject,rhetoric.
is a craft(texvti), sayinginsteadthatit is a knack(EpTTEipia)etyrhetoric
derived
fromexperience),
andpartof thepracticeof
mologically,something
He
then
divides
(KoAaKEi'a).
practices
dealingwiththebodyandthe
flattery
knackson theother,andcatesoul intocraftson theone handandflattering
as oneof theflattering
knacksdealingwiththesoul. Crafts,
gorizesrhetoric
he explains,arebasedon knowledgeand aim to benefitthe bodyor soul;
and aim onlyto providegratifiknacksarebasedon guessingandexperience,
cation.16
and describesthe relationof the flattering
As he characterizes
flattery
on both
knacksto thecraftsof body-andsoul-care,Plato condemnsflattery
it
in
and
and
ethical
deals
not
charges:first,
appearances
reality;
metaphysical
second,itdealsin pleasureandnotthegood.17The implicationis thatthese
arenaturally
two traitsarejoined:pleasureandappearance
groupedtogether.
Platoimpliesthatflattery
uses pleasureas a tool of decepMorespecifically,
becausepeoplewho go forpleasureareeasily
tion,andthatthisis effective
deceived easilytakeninbyillusions.
16
17
The crafts set over the body are medicine and physical training; the corresponding
knacks are pastry-bakingand cosmetics. The craftsset over the soul are the administration of justice and legislation; the correspondingknacks are rhetoricand sophistry(Gorg.
464b-c).
First, the metaphysical charge: flatterydeals in appearances, pretence, illusion and
deception. Flattery"makes the body and the soul seem to be in good condition (BokeTv eu
exeiv), but not to be so one bit more" (Gorg. 464a8-bl). It hides its own true nature and
pretendsto be somethingelse: "having put on the mask (\!rrro5uoa) of each of the parts
[of the crafts of soul-care and body-care] it pretends to be that part whose mask it
wears" (464c7-dl); pastrybaking"seems (6oke7) to be a craft, but I say it isn't a craft
but a knack and a routine" (463b3-4); "Pastrybaking has put on the mask of medicine,
and pretends to know what foods are best for the body" (464d3-5); flattery"deceives
(EâTTaTg), so as to seem to be of the greatest worth" (464d2-3); cosmetics is "deceptive (aTraTrjArj)" (465b3; cf. aTraTcboa, 465b5). Rhetoric is defined as a false image
(eTSgoAov) of the craft of administeringjustice (463d2), and Socrates says that rhetoric
"has discovered a certain mechanism of persuasion so that it appears (<pa(vea0ai) to
those who do not know to know more than those who do" (459b8-c2).
Second, the ethical charge: flatteryhas no concern for the good, but only for pleasure. Rhetoric and pastrybakingare knacks of "producing gratification and pleasure"
(462c7, 462dll-el). Flattery"is not at all concerned with what's best; with the lure of
what is pleasantest at the moment it lures foolishness and deceives it" (464dl-2). "It
guesses at what is pleasant without[thoughtof] what is best" (465a2). "The pleasant is
differentfromthe good, and for each of them there is a practice and a plan for obtaining
it, the huntforpleasure on the one hand, and for the good on the other" (500d8-10); in
the case of the soul, some practices "are craft-like(texvikoi'), having forethoughtabout
what's best regarding the soul, while the others don't care about that, having considered... only the pleasure of the soul, in what way this mightcome about.... nor caring for
anythingother than gratification...and I say this sortof thingis flattery"(501b3-c3).

5 11
Like the Protagoras, then, the Gorgias suggests a general correlation

betweendesiringpleasure and being susceptible to illusion; unlike the Protagoras, it also suggestsexplanationsforthiscorrelation.One explanation is
thatillusions are pleasing, oftenmore pleasing than the truth.18
But implicit
in the descriptionof flatteryis anothersuggestion with importantconsequences forPlato's thought.We desire whatwe thinkgood (Gorg. 468b); but
what is pleasantappears to be good, whetheror not it is (see below). People
who tendto pursuepleasure thusdo so because they are deceivedby the illusion that pleasure qua pleasure is good- because they fail to distinguish
appearancesfromreality.
Socrates introducesthe idea that what is pleasant is good in making his
distinctionbetweenknacksand crafts.He argues thatin thecase of both body
and soul thereis such a thing as good condition (eueia), and also such a
thing as merelyapparentgood condition (BoKoOaa EUEîa, 464a3). Crafts
aim to produce the good conditionof body and soul, while knacks aim only
to produce theapparentgood condition- notwhatis genuinelygood forbody
or soul, but what appears good whetheror not it is so.19 In each case the
knacksproduce is a pleasant state. The case
apparentgood statetheflattering
of pastry-baking,
and thecraftof medicine which it imitates,is most straightforward:medicineaims to producethe genuinelygood conditionof the body,
health;pastriesdo notof course make people physicallyhealthy,but theydo
providephysical pleasure. Likewise, cosmetics gives us pleasing physical
appearances,sophistrygives the sophist a pleasing appearanceof wisdom,
and rhetoricpleases us by making us appear to ourselves to be wise. People
who are taken in by appearanceswill believe that the pastrychefs pleasing
We can find an argumentfor this suggestion in the Encomium of Helen of Gorgias, the
dialogue's namesake. Here Gorgias not only describes rhetoric as deceptive but also
implies thatit persuades because we take pleasure in being deceived. He describes one
form of speech, divine incantations,as "bringers of pleasure and banishers of pain"
which work by "enchanting, persuading and altering the soul through sorcery
(yorjTEiai)" (Helen 10). The incantations bring pleasure because (yap) they work
magic on us, and magic is deceptive. He also claims that "Whoever persuaded or persuades anyone concerninganythingdoes so by molding a false account (yeu5f) Aoyov)"
(Helen 11). Wardy interpretsthe passage as follows: "now Gorgias' promise to retail
pleasure ratherthan (known) truth[see Helen 5] appears to reach disconcerting fruition
in the statementthatpersuasion resultsfroma misleading pleasure induced by rhetorical
skill inimical to truth"(Wardy 1996: 45). Of Gorgias' argument that Helen can't be
blamed for what she did if she was a victimof persuasion, Wardy says "The implication
is that Helen mighthave enjoyed Paris' verbal seduction; in fact, it was precisely the
pleasure she took in his logos which caused her to yield
Perhaps, in the last analysis,
we who are persuaded are all more or less willing victimsof persuasion" (Wardy 1996:
37).
In principle it seems thatgood condition and apparentgood condition mightcoincide, but
Plato clearly does not have this kind of case in mind, "...what about a condition that
seems good, but isn't really (BoKoOoav pev EUEîav, ouaav 5' ou)?" (Gorg. 464a3-4).
Here as elsewhere in the corpus Plato uses words for appearance to connote mere, misleading appearance, not the manifestationof reality.
512
JESSICA MOSS

confectionsare good forthem(Gorg. 464d5-e2), and that the orator's gratifying counsels will benefitthem (Gorg. 459b3-4, 459b8-c2). These things
appear to be good, simply because they are pleasant; when someone pleases
us, we thinkhe is doing us good. This is an idea that Plato holds onto until
theend: at Laws 657c he argues that"wheneverwe are pleased, we thinkthat
we are faringwell."20
In saying thatflattery
is concernedwithwhatseems good but is not, then,
Socrates means thatit is concernedwithpleasure. The metaphysicaland ethical charges againstflattery
ultimatelyamountto the same charge. Knacks are
mereimitationsof crafts(Gorg. 464c7-dl), and thepleasure they produceis a
mere imitationof thegood thatcraftsproduce.
Accordingto the Protagoras, the illusions generatedby pleasure can be
I
neutralizedby a certainkind of rationalactivity,the art of measurement.21
suggestedthata morepessimisticview may be more plausible. The Gorgias
takes no explicit stance on this question, but several passages suggest that
the illusion that pleasure is good is veryhard to dispel. One cannot easily
correctsomeone who is underthe illusion thata harmfulbut pleasant thingis
good; one cannoteasily redirectherdesireforgood towarditsproperobjects.
There are several instancesin thedialogue in whichpeople reject or ignore
argumentsthatsomethingis good, on the groundthat that thing is unpleasthese are cases in which, because the thing is
ant. On my interpretation,
unpleasant,it simplyappears bad to them (just as a pleasant thing will simply appear good), and argumentsto the contrarycannot compete with the
appearances.An exchangebetweenSocrates and Polus providesa particularly
clear example. Socrates has argued that it is betterto pay the penalty for
one's injusticesthanto go free;Polus respondswith a graphiclist of painful
punishments(Gorg. 473bl2-c5). Socrates accuses him of failingto refutethe
argument(Gorg. 473d3), but the meaning of Polus' response is clear: he is
saying,"How can you claim thatthisis good, when I can show you that it is
bad?" wherethe descriptionof the pains is meant to do the showing. Punit just evidentlyis bad. Polus believes he has
ishmentis painful; therefore
A
second
refutedSocrates' claim.
example occurs in Socrates' allegory of the
pastrychef who accuses the doctor of having harmedthe childrenon the
20
As wellas vice versa:xaipopev otov oicbueBaeu npaTTeiv, kcuottotcxvxaip<^>MEv.

oiopeSa eu TrpaTTeivau , Laws 651c5-l.) (For clear evidence thatxaipeiv is here,as
usually,connectedwithpleasure(nSovrj),see Laws 658a10.) Comparealso Xenophon's
Socrates,whosaysthatwe feel pleasureand rejoice (eu9paiveo0cu) whenwe believe
we aredoingwell(oionevoi eu TrpaTTeiv)(MemorabiliaI.vi.8-9),and that"thosewho
perceivethattheyare becomingbetterlive mostpleasantly"(MemorabiliaIV.viii.6-7).
not
Herepleasureis theblessedrewardof thosewho are in genuinelygood condition,
to be so.
thedelusionofthosewhoignorantly
appearto themselves
The illusionsinquestionintheProtagorasand Gorgiasdifferslightly,
buttheireffectis
thesame:bothdialoguesholdthatpeople pursueharmfulpleasuresor avoid beneficial
bythepleasuresand pains.
painsbecausetheyare takenin by illusionsgenerated

513
groundsthathe caused thempain. The pastrychefdetails the pains the doctor

causes (Gorg. 521e7-522a2). Socrates adds: "[if the doctorshould say] 'I did
all these things,children,in the interestof health (uyieivcbs),' how greatan
uproardo you thinkjudges like that [the children]would make? Wouldn't it
be a greatuproar?"(Gorg. 522a5-7). The doctorclaims his work was beneficial; thechildrenshout him down. Because he pained them they believe that
he harmedthem, and they are deaf to the claim that the pain was beneficial- thatin thiscase pleasure and benefitcome apart.
The same explanationunderliesthe enormous persuasive powers of rhetoric which both Socrates and Gorgias emphasize early in the dialogue. The
oratorcan convince thecitizensto appointhimdoctorratherthan a real medical man; in facthe can win such a contestagainst any craftsmanor expert,
even though he has no knowledgeof theircrafts(456a-c). Why are doctors
and generalsand architectspowerless to convince the citizens of what should
be obvious, that the orator is completely ignorantabout these crafts and
should be ignored?Because, as Socrates emphasizes throughoutthe dialogue,
the orator's words please the audience. The pleasure he provides makes the
audience thinkhe does them good, and argumentsthat his advice is bad cannotcompete withthatappearance.
The dialogue thussuggests thatthe belief that pleasure is good (and pain
bad) is oftenimmuneto argument.Pleasure appears to be good, and formost
people, appearances win out over reasoning.22Compare the beginningof the
Philebus, whereinsteadof arguing that pleasure and not knowledge is the
good, the hedonist Philebus declares argumentirrelevant:"I think, and I
always will think,thatpleasure wins altogether"(Philebus 12a7). Here Plato
nicely anticipatesthe attitudeof Epicurus, who accordingto Cicero "denies
thatany reason or argumentis necessaryto show why pleasure is to be pursued, pain to be avoided. He holds that we perceivethese things,as we perceive that fireis hot, snow white, honey sweet; it is unnecessaryto prove
any of these things with sophisticatedreasoning; it is enough just to point
Note that in the cases of both Polus and Callicles, however, Socrates does make some
headway in getting them to recognize the distinctionbetween pleasure and benefit. He
does so not precisely by argument,but rather by appeal to shame. In the conversation
withPolus, he gets Polus to admitthat he sometimes thinksa thingk<jA6v, admirable, on
the grounds thatit is beneficial even if not pleasant, and thathe finds committinginjustice
shameful,thoughdesirable in other ways (i.e. pleasant). In the conversation with Callicles, he cites shameful pleasures and thereby gets Callicles to retract his claim that all
pleasures are good. Why do these appeals work, when arguments that rationally appeal
to benefit(e.g. Gorg. 466d ff.)do not? A promisinganswer is thatpleasure is not the only
apparent good (and pain not the only apparent bad). To the rightkind of person, whatever is aioxpov - ugly or shameful- will appear bad, and whatever is kcxAov will
appear good. If this is right,Plato is demonstratingthat one appearance can be countered,if not by argument,then by another appearance. See Moss 2005 for a fuller discussion of this claim and of its repercussionsfor Plato's moral psychology.
514
JESSICA MOSS

themout"(De Finibus1.30). One can simplysee thatpleasureis good,the

here?
linegoes; whatneedoruse is thereforargument
On thisview,a personwho pursuespleasurewill seldomsay to herself,
'This pleasantthingappearsgood(or thisunpleasant
thingappearsbad),but
I
should
be
thatit is
a
mere
to
that
is
open arguments
appearance;
perhaps
not in factas it appears."Rather,she will stop at the appearance:she will
northinkto
acceptit,she willnotconsiderthatitmaybe a mereappearance
thatchallengeit. Comlook beyondit, andwill thusbe deafto arguments
paredto theProtagoras,then,theGorgias offersa morepessimisticview
aboutreason'spowertoovercometheillusionsinducedbypleasure.Does the
forthispessimism?
One possibleexplanation
is
dialogueofferan explanation
thatpeopletakepleasurein theillusionthatpleasureis good. It is pleasant
whatgratifies
to believethatin pursuing
you,youaredoingwhatyou should
betweenthepastry
be doingandgettingwhatis good foryou. The contrast
- orbetweentheorators'successin
andthedoctor'sillfame
chefs popularity
- suggeststhisview. Flattery
makes
peopleandSocrates'failures
persuading
us feelgood aboutourselves;theharshtruth forinstance,Socrates'arguour lives
mentsthatwe care about the wrongthingsand should redirect
- does not.Becausetheillusionthatpleasureis good is itself
towardvirtue
pleasing,someonewho tendsto pursuepleasurewill of courseresistletting
go of thisillusion.
The finalsectionofthedialogue,whereSocratesimpliesthattheappetites
locationinthesoul,and thata temperate
person'sappetites
occupya distinct
in
nature
fromthoseofan intemperate
aredifferent
person{Gorg.493a-494a),
reasonwhy
fora secondand farstronger
ofan argument
givesthebeginnings
relieson
This argument
theillusionthatpleasureis good maybe intractable.
at whichtheGorgiasonlyhints:thatthesoul
of moralpsychology
a theory
andbelief.In
sourcesof bothmotivation
is dividedintodifferent,
conflicting
thenextsectionI willshowthattheRepublicdevelopsthistheoryin sucha
bytheirdesiresforpleasureareunable
wayas toentailthatpeopledominated
andthuscannotbe persuaded
tolookbeyondappearances,
by reason.It is left
a
view
to theRepublic,then,to develop
by theGorgias; in
onlysuggested
an accountof thedesireforpleasureradiso doing,theRepublicwillpresent
in
we
theProtagoras.23
what
saw
from
different
cally
23
The Gorgias seems in fact to suggest two conflictingaccounts of the desire for pleasure.
Socrates' argumentthat whatever we pursue we thinkgood (Gorg. 468b-c) entails that
this desire must be a species of the desire forthe good. The discussion of the appetites in
the conversation with Callicles, however (49 Id ff.) seems to imply an account much
closer to that of the Republic: desires for pleasure are rooted in their own part of the
soul, do not aim at the good, and can conflict with desires for good. Irwin 1979 argues
thatthe Gorgias is internallyinconsistentin this and related ways. The account I offer in
section IV is intendedto reconcile the apparent inconsistencies.

515
III. Pleasure and illusionin theRepublic

The desired and wished for is eitherthe good or the apparent good. Therefore the pleasant is
also desired: forit is an apparentgood. Some believe thatit is [good], while to some it appears
and
so even though they do not believe that it is. For appearance-perception (9avTao(a)
belief (S6a) are not in the same partof the soul. (Aristotle,Eudemian Ethics 1235b25-9)
a new theoryof desire.Now rationaldesire

In theRepublic,Platointroduces
forthegood is onlyone speciesof desire,andhas its sourcein a particular
desires,rooted
partof thesoul,thereasoningpart;therearealso non-rational
in non-rational
of
the
soul.
Where
desires
for
do
parts
pleasurefit in this
scheme?I hold thatthe Republic distinguishes
desiresforpleasuresqua
- desiresfortruthandhonor,forexampleasuresfromothersortsof desires
ple, whichwhengratified
yieldtheirown particular
pleasures,but are not
construed
as
desires
and
forpleasures
properly
assignsthesedesiresto appetite(to TTi6unr)TiK6v).
introduces
(The Republic
appetiteas thepartwith
whichwe "desirethepleasuresof fooddrink,sex, and whatever
othersare
akintothem,"the"companion
ofcertainindulgences
and pleasures"(436alOof appetitesas
bl, 439d8); whilethisfalls shortof the explicitdefinition
I takethe
desiresforpleasurethatwe see in theCharmidesandin Aristotle,
viewtobe thesame.)24
underlying
Plato defines ettiSumi'cuas desires for pleasure at Charmides l67el-2, Aristotle at
Niconiachean Ethics 11 1Ibl7 and De Anima 414b5-6. There are two possible objections
to the claim thatthe appetitive part is well characterized as the pleasure-desiring part of
the soul. First,in Book IX {Rep. 580d ff.) Plato assigns each part its own pleasures; this
may be thoughtto undermine the claim that desiring pleasure is distinctiveof appetite.
But nonetheless thereis a special connection between pleasure and appetite, which we
can account for by saying thatappetitepursues pleasure for its own sake, pursues things
just forthe pleasure theybring. While Plato introduces the appetitive part of the soul as
the part desiring and related to pleasures (436alO-bl, 439d8), pleasure plays no role in
the definitionof the other parts,nor do we even discover thatthey have their own pleasures until Book IX. Moreover, in describingthe democratic man in Book VIII (561c ff.),
he ascribes to the appetitive soul desires for a wide variety of objects, including objects
associated with reason (the democrat dabbles in philosophy) and with spirit(the democrat may have a whim for politics and militaryaffairs) (56 Id). This passage implies that
we mustdistinguishthis part of the soul not by the kind of thingit desires (e.g. sensory
- just for the pleasure they will
indulgence), but rather by how it desires these things
See
1984:
are
those
desires
that
"have theirultimateorigin simply
bring.
Cooper
appetites
in... the fact that the person in question happens to get a certain pleasure from doing
these things,and thisjustifies classifying [desires such as the democratic man's appetite
for philosophy]... togetherwith the bodily appetites" (Cooper 1984: 130).
Second, some object that pleasure is not precisely what appetite pursues. The
6Tn8unr)TiKOvis sometimes referred to not as the pleasure-desiring part, but rather as
the part that pursues mere "desire-satisfaction" (see e.g. Santas 2001: 144). However,
this suggestion is not really a rejection of the view of appetites as pleasure-seeking.
Desiring an object only because it will satisfy your desire for it amounts to desiring the
experience of having your desire satisfied,namely (on Plato's account) pleasure. This is
very clear in the Gorgias, where the claim thatpleasure is the good (495d4) is treated as
equivalent to the claim thatappetite-satisfactionis the good (491e-492a).
516
JESSICA MOSS

What motivatesthischange in Plato's view of desire,and of the desire for

pleasure in particular?In thissectionand the next, I shall argue that Plato is
providingan explanation for what we saw hintedat in the Gorgias: that
althoughall desiresare in some sense for the good, when we desire pleasure
we pursuewhatonly appears good, and are immune to reasoningabout what
is really good. The Republic explains this by assigning desires forpleasure
to a partof the soul that lacks the cognitive ability to see beyond appearances. In this section, I show that the Republic characterizesappetite, the
pleasure-desiring
partof the soul, as illusion-bound. In the next section, I
show the significanceof thisfactforPlato's theoryof desire.
Let us begin with Plato's distinctionof the appetitive part of the soul
fromthe rationalpart,in Book IV. Here he argues fora division of the soul
using what is sometimescalled theprincipleof opposites:
It's clear thatthe same thingwill not be willing to do or undergo opposite thingsin the same
partof it (kcxt& toutov) and in relationto the same thingat the same time, so that if we discover these things[the soul's motivations),we will know thattherewas not one thingbut many.
(Rep. 436b8-cl)
He applies the principleto show that when someone is thirstybut does not
wish to drink,theremustbe two distinctforcesat work withinhis soul (Rep.
439b3-5). What pushes the person to drink, Socrates says, is something
"unreasoning(dXoyiaTov) and appetitive,companion of certainindulgences
and pleasures" (Rep. 439d7-8). What forbidshimto drinkis somethingdifferent: the resistancearises "out of calculation (ek AoyianoO)" (Rep. 439dl),
and has its source in "the calculatingpartof the soul (t6...Xoyiotik6v...
Tfjs MA/xnsVnamelyreason (Rep. 439d5-6).
This argumentthusserves to distinguishtwo distinct,potentiallyconflicting sources of motivationin the soul: the partthat desires pleasure, and the
partthatcalculates what is best. Recall the significanceof calculation in the
Protagoras: only throughthe weighing and measuringof pleasures can the
illusions attendingpleasures be dispelled. In the Protagoras, where there is
no distinctionbetweenpleasure and goodness and no partitionof the soul,
desiringpleasureand engaging in calculation are in no sense opposed. Now,
in the Republic, the partthatcalculates is not concernedwith pleasure but
ratherwith what is best, while the part thatdesires pleasure does not calculate. Plato puts thisemphaticallyby calling appetitedAoyiaxov (unreasoning or incapable of calculation) while emphasizing the role of calculation in
formingthedesiresof reason.
In Book X, Plato again appeals to the principle of opposites to distinmental states. This time the
guish distinctsources in the soul fordifferent
states in question are not motivationalbut cognitive: believing illusions on
theone hand,and calculatingthetruthon theother.In a passage that includes
examples familiarfromtheProtagoras, Socrates contraststhese two states:

5 17
The same magnitude viewed fromnearby and fromafar does not seem equal to us.... And the
same thinglooks bent when seen in water and straightout of water.... And are not measuring,
counting and weighing most welcome aids in these cases, so thatwhat appears bigger, smaller,
more numerous or heavier does not rule in us, but rather what has calculated (to
Xoyiod|aevov), measured or weighed? (Rep. 602c7-d9)
Now he applies the principleof opposites, arguingthat the experienceof

optical illusions reveals two distinctpartsof the soul:
And this [calculating, measuringand weighing] is the work of the rational (XoyiOTiKoG) part
of the soul.... But often when this part has measured and has shown that some things are
greateror smaller or the same size as others, the opposite appears at the same time about the
same things ....Didn't we say that it is impossible for the same thing at the same time to
believe opposite thingsabout the same things?.... Therefore the part of the soul that believes
contraryto the measurements can't be the same as the part that believes in accord with the
measurements....But surely the part that trustsin measurement and calculation (Aoyiopcp) is
the best partof the soul.... Therefore what opposes it is one of the inferiorparts in us. (Rep.
602el-603a8)
Socrates is arguingthat reasoningbelongs to one partof the soul, while

belief in appearances belongs to another.When a rationalperson perceivesan
optical illusion,one partof her soul believes that (e.g.) the submergedstick
is bent; only because anotherpartof her, which sees throughthe illusion, is
dominantin her soul does she resist acting on this belief. The distinction
looks very like the distinctionof Book IV: cognitive dissonance is being
explained by the same mechanismas motivationalconflict.Plato makes the
analogy explicita few lines later:
Justas in the case of sight [a person] took sides against himself and had opposite beliefs in
himselfat the same time about the same things,thus also in actions will he take sides and do
battle against himself.(Rep. 603dl-3)
The question arises,then: is Plato explaining both motivationaland cognitiveconflictwithreferenceto the same partsof the soul? Both Book IV and
Book X identifyreason (to XoyiaTiKOv ) as one player in the conflicts
(Rep. 439d5 and 602el). The partof the soul that in mattersof action looks
to our overall good is the same partthatin cognitive mattersuses calculation
to resist the power of appearances. But what is the "inferiorpart" that
opposes reason in the cognitive case, being taken in by the illusions? Is it
The claim thatone thing "rules in us (dpxeiv ev nplv)" recalls Book IV's definitionof
the virtuesas relations of rule between parts of the soul (Rep. 441e ff.). There a person
is wise, courageous, moderate and just when reason "rules" in him and the inferiorparts
are ruled; here a person is cognitively virtuouswhen the calculating part rules in him and
the illusion-believingpartis ruled.
On the translationof this problematicsentence see the following footnote.
518
JESSICA MOSS

eitherappetiteor spirit- thepartsdistinguishedfromreason in Book IV- or

a combinationof both,or some otherpartaltogether?27
We learn the answer by attendingto the context of the passage. Plato
introducesthediscussion of optical illusions in orderto make a point about
appearancesof anotherkind, those createdby imitative poets. His claim is
thatoptical illusions and the creationsof poets appeal to the same partof the
soul:
...the imitativepoet instillsa bad constitutionin the private soul of each person, gratifyingthe
partof the soul thatis foolish (avor)Tcp) and doesn't distinguishgreaterthings from lesser, but
thinksthatthe same thingsare at one time large and anothertime small. (Rep. 605b7-c3)
his descriptionof imitativepoetryclearly implies that it is

Furthermore,
its illusions appeal to and strengthenour appetites, our
because
dangerous
desires forpleasure. The discussion of poetryends by warningthat "If you
let in the pleasurable (r)8ua|ievr]v) muse in lyricor epic poetry,pleasure and
27
There is much dispute in the literature.Some come down in favor of appetite: see Murdoch 1977: 5, Reeve 1988: 127, 139, Penner 1971: 100-101, Annas 1981: 131. Others
thinkthat both appetite and spiritare intended, although neither very precisely (Adam
1902 II: 406) or thatsome new, unspecified part is here introduced(Janaway 1995: 144).
Others have argued thatBook X posits a division withinreason itself:one part calculates,
while another,inferiorpartof reason falls prey to illusion (Murphy 1951: 239-40, Nehais a naturalreading of lines 602e4-6:
mas 1982: 265). The evidence forthis interpretation
toutcp Be TToXXaKis METprjaavTi kcu orinaivovTi me(coa-rra elvai r| eXaTTco
ETepa eTEpcov f\ica TavavTi'a 9a(vETai ana TTEpitouto: "But [often] when this
part [reason] has measured and has indicated that some thingsare larger or smaller or
the same size as others,the opposite appears to it at the same time" (trans. Grube/Reeve,
emphasis mine). If we read the sentence this way, it implies that reason both does and
does not believe in the illusion; the principle of opposites would thus force a division
which is not
withinthe rational partof the soul. I thinkwe should resistthis interpretation,
only ad hoc (there is no other evidence in the Republic nor, so far as I can see, in any
other dialogue for this kind of division within reason) but also stronglycountered by
Plato's otherremarksin the passage. Plato refersto the illusion-believingpart as "a part
of us thatis far from wisdom (9povr)OEcos)" (Rep. 603al2) and avor)Tov (not understanding,foolish, unreasonable, Rep. 605b8). Furthermore,he has introduced this part of
the soul as the part over which imitativeart has power (see Rep. 603c), and, as I go on to
argue, the rest of his remarks in Book X, as well as those in the initial discussion of
poetry, mythsand other mimetic arts in Books II and III, make clear that imitation
primarilyaffects the appetitive and spirited parts of the soul. Lastly, the association
between the desire for pleasure and susceptibilityto illusion which I demonstrate in this
chapter should provide a substantiveanswer to Nehamas' question "Why should our
desire tell us thatthe immersedstick is bent?" (Nehamas 1982: 265). What, then, should
we do with the problematic lines 602e4-6? Adam suggests thatwe understand Tavavria
not as "'opposite appearances' in general, but the contrary(in any given instance) of the
impression formed withoutthe aid of measurement" in which case Plato "merely says
thatthe rational element takes the opposite view of an object from that which is at the
same momententertainedby the irrationalelement" (Adam 1902 II: 408, 466-7). Lorenz
2006 argues compellingly for Adam's reading, and gives a detailed exposition of Book X
to supportthe view thatPlato is attributingsome formof appearance-based belief to spirit
and appetite.

519
pain will be kings in your city" (Rep. 607a5-6), and condemns imitative
poetryas "the poetrythataims at pleasure" (Rep. 607c4-5). Many otherpas- and thus optical
sages in Book X also suggest that the illusions of poetry
illusions as well appeal to the pleasure-desiring,appetitive soul.28 These
passages specifythe kinds of pleasure we take in the illusions poetrypresents. Plato claims thatpoetic imitationgratifiesour desires forstrongemotions,and he describesthesedesires as appetitive.29Passages in Book III also
supportthe conclusion thatpoetryappeals to the appetitivesoul, arguingthat
imitativepoetryis dangerousbecause it makes people and cities intemperate- thatis, because it strengthens
theirappetites.30
(In fact,thereis some indicationthatimitativepoetryaffectsspiritas well
as appetite.31The question of the relationof spiritto poetry,and to appear28
520
That accordingto Book X imitativepoetryappeals to the appetitivesoul is widely

accepted,even amongthosewho denyor doubtthatopticalillusiondoes as well. See
Annas1981: 338, Ferrari1989: 138,Nehamas1988: 282, Reeve 1988: 230.
The partof thesoul thatdesiresto remembermisfortunes
and to grieve over themis
"insatiable"forthesethings(a-rrArioTcos
exov> Rep-604d9): variationsof aTrAriaTOS
are used in connectionwiththe appetitesat Republic442a7, 555b9, 562b6, 562b10,
562c5, 578al, 586b3,and 590b8. (Oddly,thewordis also used once to characterize
of weepingand
reason,at 475c7.) The partof thesoul that"hungersforthesatisfaction
sufficiently
being by nature such as to have appetitesfor these things
lamenting,
is the part thatis satisfiedand delightedby the poets" (Rep. 606a4-7,
(6TTi8uneTv),
emphasismine);whenwe allow ourselvesto enjoywatchingsomeone else indulgein
Plato describesthetypeof
suchemotion,we obtainpleasure(Rep. 606b4). Furthermore,
character
thatgivesintoexcessiveemotionsand thatis naturally
akin to poeticimitation
as "irritable
and multicolored"
(ayavaKTr)TiK6vte kcuttoiki'Aov,
Rep. 605a5). Earlier
he has used theword 'multicolored'several timesin connectionwiththe appetites:to
describethedemocrat,the characterwho is ruled by his appetites(Rep. 561e5; cf.
557c5-9, 558c5, 559d9), and to describe the appetitesthemselves("a multicolored,
multiheaded
beast"(Rep. 588c7-8)). (See also Rep. 404e3.) A passage I quotedabove
"And
mentions
appetitive
qualities(as well as anger) as thetargetsof poeticimitation:
sexualdesiresand angerand all theappetitivedesiresand pains and pleasconcerning
ures in thesoul....poeticimitation....
thesethings,
nurtures
wateringthemalthoughthey
and setsthemup torulein us although
shouldwither,
theyshouldbe ruled"(Rep. 606dl5, emphasismine).
In outlining
hisprogram
ofcensorship,
Socratessaysthatinsultsmadeto rulers(likethose
at Iliad 1.225)shouldnotbe heardbyyoungpeoplewhomone wantsto make temperate,
"althoughif theyoffersome otherpleasure,that'snothingto be wonderedat" (Rep.
390a4-5). He also condemnspassagesaboutthepleasuresof food,drinkand sex as detto self-control
rimental
(evKpdTeia,Rep. 390b3). The styleof poetryhe rejectsas bad
- the'mixedstyle,'in whichthepoet notonlynarratesbutalso imitatesthe
forthecity
characters
(i.e. speaksin theirvoices) is notonlydangerousbutalso offersthegreatest
and teachers...and
pleasuresto ignorant
people:"itis byfarthemostpleasantto children
thegreatcrowd"(Rep. 397d7-8).Finally,Socratesand Glaucon agree thattheircensor"Without
shipis an exercisein makingthecitytemperate:
noticingit we have been puri- That's because we're being
fyingagainthecitywhichjustnowwe said was luxurious.
temperate(oco9povo0vtes)" (Rep. 399e5-7). Temperance (ocoq>poouvr)) is later
describedas "A kindof orderand themastery
of certainpleasuresand appetites"(Rep.
430e6-7,cf. 442a-d).
At Rep. 604e2 and 605a5 Platospeaks of imitations
of and for "irritable"(ayavaKtfjtikov) characters;thisseems to be an allusionto spirit,the part thatexperiences
JESSICAMOSS

ances and illusions more generally,is too broad to enteron here; my aim at
presentis to make sense of the widely recognizedbut mysteriousimplication
thatappetite believes the illusions discussed in Republic X.)
Justlike optical illusions, then,imitativepoetryappeals to the unreasoning (dAoyiOTov) part(s) of the soul instead of to the part that follows
rationalcalculation (\oy\o\x6%).It appeals to thispartby arousing and gratifying our emotions and desires. Republic X thus implies that indulging
emotionis analogous to- or even an instanceof- accepting appearances.32In
the discussion of imitative poetry Plato describes a reason-led person as
and says thatsuch a person holds back fromlamen"measured"in his grief,33
tation because he follows "calculation" (Rep. 604d5); these two remarks
remindus of reason's role in combating optical illusions (reason measures
and calculates at Rep. 602d-603a). The thoughtsthat Plato here describesas
calculation include the thoughtthat "it is unclear what is good and bad in
such things[e.g. thedeath of one's son]" (Rep. 604bl0-ll). The implication
is that although the deathof a son certainlyappears to be bad, just as the
stickin waterappears to be bent, reason does not simply accept this appearance. In desiring to grieve and lament, meanwhile, the unreasoning
(dXoyiaTov, Rep. 604d9) appetitivesoul is passively giving in to the way
things appear, and it must be resistedby rational calculations about how
anger. There is also a direct referenceto anger at 606dl-5, quoted above. This passage
implies thatboth spiritand appetite both the partof the soul thatexperiences anger, and
the part associated with sex "and all the appetitive desires, pleasures and pains" - are
affectedby poetry.Books II and III also imply that spiritis affected by poetic imitation:
theyoutline a programof education that aims to mold the spiritby means of poetry and
other arts.
Ferrarinotes the analogy in his excellent discussion of this passage: he writes that to the
rational person "the stick does still look bent, the person still looks tiny....So too.... the
bereaved father....knows, as it were, the true size of his bereavement when measured
against the fullness of a life. This knowledge will not stop him grieving (the stick still
looks bent,the bereavementis still painful).... But this knowledge will prevent the immediate reaction fromruling or obsessing him" (Ferrari 1989: 133). See also White: "Our
visual perspective,which paintingrenders,shows thingsas theyappear from a particular
standpoint.... Similarly....tragedyshows us situationsin that manner in which they produce an immediate emotional reaction,not as they would be looked on by reason, that is,
as requiring a calculated and rational response designed to make the best of
them Moreover,just as a preoccupation with appearances may prevent us from calculating the facts,so by succumbing to emotions we may be prevented from the calculation thatis needed to improvethe situation"(White 1979: 256). Murphysuggests a similar
view: tragedy is analogous to paintingand optical illusion because it appeals to "our
carelessness and inattentionand our readiness to jump to conclusions uncritically" (Murphy 1951: 241). Belfiore, in her analysis of Republic X, argues that pain appears bad
(and pleasure good), and that when we succumb emotionally to poetry we are uncritically accepting this appearance (Belfiore 1983).
MexpiaoEi, from peTpiaêiv, Rep. 603e8: the word means "to be moderate," but the
remarksthatfollow encourage us to note the etymological connection with METpeTv,"to
measure."

521
thingsreallyare.34Imitativepoetryappeals to appetiteby presentingappearances (e.g. thatthedeathof a son is bad) thatappetiteembracesas real; appetitefails to questionappearances withrespectto good and bad just as it fails
to questionappearanceswithrespectto farand near.Thus Plato concludes the
passage with the explicit referenceback to optical illusions that I quoted
above: "the imitativepoet ... gratifies] thepartof the soul that...doesn't distinguishgreaterthingsfromlesser,but thinksthatthe same thingsare at one
timelarge and anothertimesmall" {Rep. 605b7-c3).
Thus Book IV's case of thethirsty
man and Book X's case of optical illudo
after
all
the
sions
divide
soul into the same parts: a calculating, rational
irrationalpart on the other.35
part on the one hand, and a pleasure-desiring,
When we see a straightstickin wateras bent,or a distantobject as small, it
is appetitethatbelieves the appearance.The Republic assigns to the appetitive part of the soul not only the lowest kind of desire,but also the lowest
kind of cognitive power: imagination (eiKaaia), a power of apprehending
36
only images and notreality. Like theprisonersin the cave, appetitefails to
distinguishhow thingsare fromhow theyappear.
It may be objected thatthisis too starka view of appetite.Afterall, Plato
does recognizethat some appetitesare necessary,and even beneficial (Rep.
558d ff),and have a positiverole in thejust, well-orderedsoul. They "do their
own work" (Rep. 586e5-6)- satisfyingtheirmoderatedesires and in the process supplyingthe body withthe nourishmentit needs to sustain the activity
of the soul, and supplying a modicum of appetitive "wellbeing" arguably
beneficialto the soul itself.37If the pleasures that these appetitesseek is in
factbeneficial,can it be that these appetitesexercise lowly EiKaaia? Can it
be thateven the soul of a philosopher,the wise, just, well-ordered
soul, is in
one of its partsso cognitivelybase?38
34
522
Anotherthought
describedas calculationis that"humanaffairsare notworthgreatseriousness"{Rep.604bl2-cl): reasonputstheman'spainsintoperspective,
as it does when
itcorrectsforeffects
of distancein matters
of sight.
Again,I omita discussionofspirit.
The cognitivepowersare listedin Book VI, 51 ld-e. For arguments
thatappetiteexercises EiKaaia, see Reeve 1988: 139 and Murdoch1977:4-5.
Platosaysthattheappetitefordelicacies(oyov), whilenotessentialto survivalor even
health,maybe necessary"if itofferssome benefitregardingwellbeing(ei/Eîa)"{Rep.
thatin some
559b6). Platodoes notelaboratehis idea, butwe are clearlyto understand
cases itis simplya good thingtoexperience(moderate,quiet) appetitivepleasures.Certainlyit is easier to do philosophyand practicejustice when one's appetitesare not
starvedforbasic needs(comparethepassage on preparingforsleep, at Republic57Id
content!
ff.);perhapsit is eveneasierto do so whenone's appetitesare positively
I owe thisobjectionto JohnMcDowell and Ben Morison.Reeve arguesthatnecessary
to tti'otis,notEiKaaia, and thatthoseruledby necessaryappetite
appetitecorresponds
exercisethishigherfaculty
(Reeve 1988: 97-98). He wishesto map the partsof thesoul
ontothefourcognitivefacultiesdescribedin thedividedlinesimilein RepublicVI; thisis
an interesting
project,but I thinkReeve goes wrongin executingit. While Sidvoia
shouldsurelybe attributed
to reasonalongwithvorjois,he attributes
it to spirit,claiming
JESSICAMOSS

In factI thinkthisis preciselyPlato's view. Necessaryappetitesunreflectively pursue what strikesthem as good, just as unnecessaryappetites do.
The only differenceis thatin the case of necessaryappetites,the appearances
of goodness are true;in fact,we can simply definethe necessaryappetitesas
those thathappen to be constitutedsuch thatbeneficial things appear good to
them.Compare thecognitivestateof the producingclass in the ideal city, the
political counterpartof necessaryappetites in the just soul. These crafts- are
men- necessaryforthecity's survival and wellbeing, and thus tolerated
no more cognitivelyadvancedthan theircounterpartsin ordinarycities. The
ideal citydoes notencourage its lowest class to do the kind of thinkingthat
insteadit protects
would take themaway fromimages and up towardtruth;39
of
themfromharmfulimages (thecensored passages
poetrythat glorifylust,
or make deathseem terrible)and replaces these with myths and stories and
music thatpresenttruth-like
images of thegods and virtues.These images are
like "useful drugs" administeredby wise doctors {Rep. 389b): beneficial
butdrugsnonetheless,meantto be swallowed whole rather
because truth-like,
than criticallyexamined. Necessary appetites and the ideal city's craftsmen
have a limitedset of truebeliefs about what is good, but no awareness of
of why theirbeliefs are true;40and while
highergoods and no understanding
true beliefs withoutunderstanding
may be innocuous and even useful, they
are nonetheless,Plato tells us, blind and shamefulthings.41
In the Republic, then,the association betweenpleasure and illusion that
functionedalmostas a backgroundassumptionof theProtagoras is developed
intoa full-fledged
theory.The pleasure-seekingand illusion-susceptiblefaculties are separatedofffromthe good-seekingand reasoningfaculties; each of
these pairs is now rootedin its own partof the soul. Various passages from
outside the Republic support this interpretation.
First, there are passages
41
one needstoexercisein orderto satisfya love of honor.To

thatitis thekindofthought
resourcesnecessaryto
he mustconstrue
Siavoia as "theintellectual
makethisargument
yieldtruebeliefsaboutthevisibleworld"(ibid.96), whichseems to me a sharpdeparmathematicians
ofSidvoia as thekindofthought
turefromPlato'sconception
engagein,
thatmakesuse of thevisibleworldmerelyas an imageof the intelligible
{Rep.
thought
510d-e).If we assignspirittti'otisinstead,as we maysurelydo- forPlatomakesit quite
clearthatspiritis tiedto perceptionand theworldof thecave- thenwe cannotfollow
betweenthecognitivefacultiesof necessaryand unnecessary
Reeve in distinguishing
I givebelow should
leftoverbutlowlyeiKaoia. The arguments
appetites:thereis nothing
distinction
makethislackofcognitive
compelling.
educationneeded to turnthe soul away
The producingclass is deniedtheintellectual
frombecomingand towardbeing{Rep. 521d3-4),and even, it would seem, the nonrational,"musical"educationthattheauxiliariesreceive(see 456d).
can ensure thatthe Spiritedpart finds
CompareBobonich:"Althoughpropertraining
of necessary
honorin fineobjectsand thattheAppetitive
partprefersthesatisfaction
of unnecessaryappetites,neitherpartcan be brought
to thesatisfaction
bodilyappetites
to value theseobjectsbecause theypossesswhatreason would recognize as genuine
value"(Bobonich2002: 332-3).
506c6-7;thecontextis a discussionof beliefsaboutthegood in particular.
PLEASUREAND ILLUSIONIN PLATO 523

where Plato groups pleasure with perception:see e.g. Phaedo 65c,

Theaetetus156b, and Timaeus69c-d.Perceptionrespondsonly to appearances,havingno access to howthingsreallyare; theotherwise
puzzlingconnectionbetweenpleasureandperception
in thesedialoguesbecomesclearif
we takeit thatPlato regards
desiresforpleasureas slaves to appearances
as
well.42Second,the Timaeus statesappetite'sdependence
on images quite
explicitly:
The partof the soul thathas appetites forfood and drinkand whateverelse it feels a need for,
given the body's nature43...[does not] understand the deliverances of reason... [or] have an
innate regard for any of them, but... [is] much more enticed by images and phantoms
(eiScbAcov Kai yavraoiiaTCAv) nightand day. Hence the god conspired with this very tendency by constructinga liver [as the bodily seat of the appetites].... so that the force of its
thoughtssent down fromthe mind mightbe stamped upon it as upon a mirrorthat receives the
stamps and returnsvisible images. (Tim. 70d7-71b5, trans.Donald J.Zeyl)44
In thenextsection,I will show how theseparation

of thepleasure-desirfrom
the
motivates
to abandonthe ProPlato
ing faculty
reasoningfaculty
view
that
in
all
desires
can
thegood,andto
lead
toward
us
tagoras'
principle
can onlybe attainedvia thesuppression
and
adoptinsteadtheviewthatvirtue
ofourdesiresforpleasure.
mastery
IV. The desireforpleasureand thedesireforgood
In thedialoguesthoughtto pre-date
the Republic,Socratesarguesthatwe
desireonlywhatwe believegood,evenwhenwe pursuepleasure.45
Whenever
we desirea particular
we
it
when
desire
someone
desiresa
qua good;
thing,
harmful
shedoes so inthemistakenbeliefthatthatthing
pleasure,therefore,
is good.Accordingtoa widelyacceptedview,intheRepublicPlato abandons
thisposition.Onlyreasondesiresthegood; thedesiresof thelowerpartsof
- are not concerned
thesoul- includingappetitivedesiresforpleasure
with
Timaeus 69c-d also associates perceptionwith spirit(thumos), which together with appetitecomprises the nonrational soul in the Republic and later dialogues. As I mention in
section III, Republic X implies a connection between spiritand illusion. It is certainly
plausible to see spirited desiresfor honor, glory, reputation,victoryand the like- as
susceptible to the power of appearance in various ways (in particular, as subject to bias
toward the near,just like desires for pleasure); however, it is also clear that Plato holds
spiritin much higheresteem thanappetite. For some discussion of the relation of spiritto
appetite see Moss 2005.
Clearly a reference to necessary appetites, supportingmy argument that these too are
^
524
image-bound.
In Coopered. 1997.
Protagoras 354c claims explicitly that people pursue pleasure because they believe it
good. For the more general claim that whatever we pursue we thinkgood, see Gorgias
468b-c, Meno 77c-78b, and Symposium 205a ff.(where the desire for money, according
to the Republic a paradigm appetitive desire, is specifically described as a desire for the
good (205d)). A similar view of desire can be inferredfromApology 25e-26a and other
passages in the early dialogues.
JESSICA MOSS

thegood.46The factthatthelowerpartsof thesoul do not desirethe good

conflictis possible,contraSocrates'positionin
explainswhymotivational
theProtagorasandotherearlydialogues,andwhyvirtuecan onlybe achieved
through
psychicorder,thestatein whichreasonrulesandthelowerpartsof
the soul obey. As TerenceIrwinputs it, only reason'sdesiresare "good- onlya rationaldesirefor x dependson the beliefthat x is
dependent"
are"good-independent."47
good whilethedesiresofappetite
truethat,according
to theRepublic,only reason'sdesires
It is certainly
can be reliedupontoleadus towardthegood (hencethenecessitythatreason
desiresareoftenindependent
rulein a virtuous
soul),andan agent'sappetitive
of herrationalpart'sbeliefsabout good and bad (hencethe possibilityof
motivational
conflict).Is it rightto say, however,thatonlyreasondesires
thegood?Does appetitedesireits objectswithoutin any wayconceivingof
thoseobjectsas good?Recentworkopposestheseconclusions:Lesses 1987,
thatin the Republic
Carone2001 andBobonich2002 arguecompellingly
all desireis forthe
view
that
retains
the
"Socratic"
Plato
later
(and
dialogues)
good.
I havethreereasonsforwishingto join this resistanceto the orthodox
betweenthe view of
view. First,thatview entailsa radicaldiscontinuity
toSocratesin theearlierdialoguesandthelater,whichgoes
desireattributed
formakingsenseofthedialogues;it evenattributes
beyondwhatis necessary
on the questionof desireto a single dialogue,the
radicalinconsistency
Gorgias. Second,it leavesno roomforwhatI have arguedis a well-supbetweenthe dialoguesand within
continuity
portedviewthatdoes preserve
the Gorgias: thatappetitedesirespleasurebecauseit appearsto be good.
in the
Third,if Plato has rejectedthe view thatdesireis good-dependent
to
he
seems
claim
so:
about
is
from
clear
he
far
certainly
saying
Republic
the
to
even
of
and
thateveryone
appespeak
alwaysdesiresthegood(505d-e),
titivepartof thesoul as desiringits objectsqua good (555b, 562b);48meanwhile,the evidencethatthe Republic construesappetitesas "bareurges,"
46
4/
4
Here again I will concentrate only on appetites, leaving the question of spiritmostlyto
one side. See Reeve 1988: 136-7 and Irwin 1995: 212 for arguments that unlike appetitive desires, spirit's desires involve the notion of goodness in some way. (Reeve also
argues that necessary appetites have a limitedconcept of the good, while unnecessary
appetites have none (Reeve 1988: 135-6).)
Irwin 1977: 78, 117 192, Irwin 1979: 218, 221, Irwin 1995: 208-9.
One can read these passages as noncommittalon the question of good-dependence: perhaps at 505d-e Plato means only that we pursue the good in virtue of our rational part;
perhaps when he speaks of the oligarachic and democratic appetiteruled- constitutionssettingout money or freedom as good (555b, 562b) he means only
that the civic analogue of the rational part in such cities, enslaved as it is to appetite,
regards money or freedomas good. But I would urge thatsuch readings are unnecessarily indirect.

525
devoidof all cognitivecontentandin particularly

devoidof thoughtsabout
is
at
best
inconclusive.49
goodness,
very
In fact,ifwe lookcarefully
at thearguments
thathavebeenmadeforthe
claim thattheRepublicdoes notconstrue
appetitesas desiresforgood, we
finda good deal of inconsistency
betweenauthors(and sometimeswithina
singleauthor'swork)as to whatpreciselyis meantbythisclaim.Only those
theuntenable
"bareurge"viewof appetitearguethatappetitein
supporting
we findonlydenials
no waythinks
ofitsdesiredobjectsas good; elsewhere,
thatappetiteconstrues
itsobjectsas good in one or anotherof variouscomor
plex ways: as best overall,forinstance,or good all thingsconsidered,
morallygood.50
The evidence for this view comes from Book IV's example of the thirstyperson who
does not wish to drink,which Plato uses to establish the distinctionbetween reason and
appetites. "Thirst itselfwill never be an appetite foranythingother than what it is for by
nature,drinkitself,and hungerforfood.... - Each appetite is only for that thingwhich it
is for by nature, while appetites for something that is of such and such a kind have
somethingadded.- ...Let no one then find us unprepared and disturbus, saying that no
one has an appetite for drink but for beneficial [xphotoO] drink....because everyone
has appetites for good things[tgjv aya6cbv]" (Rep. 437e4-438a4). This passage has
been interpretedas a direct denial of the Socratic claim thatall desires are for the good,
and furthermore
as implyingthatappetite lacks the cognitive resources to desire anything
qua good (Cornford 1941: 130, Irwin 1995: 209-1 1, Reeve 1988: 135, and many others).
But when we look at the wider context, the interpretationsimply does not work. Cooper
points out thatlater in the dialogue desires forparticularkinds of food and drink are construed as appetites,and argues thatthe bare, unqualified appetites presented in Book IV
are intendedonly as the clearest, simplest cases (Cooper 1984: 126-8, citing among other
examples the desires of the democrat at Rep. 561c, and Rep. 437dl l-e2); Annas, among
others, argues that later passages attributeto appetite far more complex cognitive
resources than the minimal ones required for bare urges, so that the Book IV passage
should not be taken as the last word on appetite (Annas 1981: 129-30, citing Rep. 442c-d,
571c-572b, and 580d-581a); and Price points to several passages that clearly attribute
evaluative thoughtsto appetite,includingthoughtsabout what is "better" (Price 1995: 50,
citing Rep. 442d, 554d, and 574d). (I am broadly sympatheticto Price's discussion of this
topic, at Price 1995: 49-52.) Bobonich uses these same passages to argue that appetite
does have a concept of the good, namely of what is good forit (Bobonich 2002: 243 ff).
Adam offersa plausible interpretationof the Book IV passage which allows that appetitesdo thinkof theirobjects as good: in denying that thirstis always the desire for good
drinkSocrates means to deny only that thirstis always the desire for "drink which is in
reality good;" Socrates does not deny that thirstis always the desire for "drink which
desire thinksgood" (Adam 1902 I: 250). On Carone's reading, the point of the passage is
thatdesires are individuatedby their characteristic objects, where this is consistentwith
every desire being a desire for its object qua good; she cites importantparallels between
the Book IV passage and the uncontroversiallySocratic Charmides (167c ff.) in support
of her reading (Carone 2001: 118-120).
Hence Irwin sometimes defines good-dependent desires as ones dependent on beliefs
about "the final good" or "what is best over all" (Irwin 1977: 78, 191), although his
examples sometimes assume a weaker notion of the good (ibid. 117, 184); Cornford
treatsthe thoughtthatan object is good as "a moral judgment"- to desire somethingas
good is to desire it as morally good, and to have the normative thoughtthat "the desire
ought to be satisfied" (Cornford 1912: 260-261, n.2); Penner denies only that appetite has
thoughtsabout "the good, all thingsconsidered" (Penner 1971: 97); while when Murphy
526
JESSICA MOSS

between the way reason conCertainlythere is an importantdifference

ceives of its objects of desire and the way appetite does- and between the
desire forpleasureas presentedin theProtagoras and this same desire as presentedin the Republic- but this difference
is not best expressedas a difference betweendesiresthatinvolve thoughtsabout goodness and those thatdo
not. In this paper I have provideda way of distinguishingbetween reason's
and appetite's cognitive capacities thatcan also, I now suggest, help us to
thedifference
betweentheirdesires. Appetitivedesires are different
understand
in kind fromreason's not because they lack all concern for the good, but
ratherbecause appetitefails to distinguishbetween what merelyappears good
and what is trulygood- thatis, because it is stuck at the cognitive level of
e'lKaaia, imagination.
Recall the distinctionbetweentwo views of desire implicit in the Protagoras: desireas rational,arising out of calculation and sensitive to subseto calquentcalculation(Socrates' view) vs. desire as nonrational,indifferent
culationand respondingmerelyto how thingsappear (the many's view). The
Republic findsa place in the soul foreach kind of desire. The rational part
employs calculation to counteractthe effectof appearances on its beliefs
(Book X), and its desires arise "out of calculation" (Book IV). Appetite,
meanwhile,is dXoyiaTov, unreasoning:it neithercalculates nor changes its
beliefs in response to calculations; thereforeits desires too will be nonrational,insensitiveto calculation.51
We can point to two ways in which this cognitive quality rendersappebut very deficient indeed as
tite's desires not literally good-independent,
desires forthe good. First,as Republic X emphasizes, appetite's insensitivity
speaks of reason as the only part that desires the good he means that it is the only part
thatdesires euSaipovia (Murphy 1951: 29), or thateschews "anything which on general
grounds, everythingrelevanthaving been taken into account, we consider bad" (Murphy
1951: 46-47). Murphyeven allows that in Book IV the appetitive soul desires drink qua
good, so long as "good" is understoodas "good 'of its kind,'" by which he means pleasant (Murphy 1951: 45); thushis view turnsout to be veryclose to that of Price, who says
that"it will fitthe same phenomena to say that appetite aims only at pleasure and takes
no interestin the good, or thatit identifiesthe good withpleasure" (Price 1995: 50).
It may seem a problem for Plato's claim thatthe appetitivesoul is aAoyioTov and that its
desires do not arise out of calculation (Rep. 439d) that he characterizes this part of the
soul as money-lovingin Book VIII. For as he describes it, the desire for money seems to
arise out of one formof calculation: the means-end reasoning thattells us thatmoney will
procure more pleasures. Perhaps this is not the case: see Lorenz 2004: 111 for an arguas a "direct source of pleasure." Or
ment thatappetite desires money non-instrumentally,
perhaps Plato does not include means-end reasoning as a form of calculation, although
he does not tell us why: he may thinkof calculation properas concerningonly the choice
of ends. At any rate, appetite's desire for money is compatible with its inabilityto question appearances: money strikesus as good because it can procure pleasant things,just as
particularpleasant things(pastries, for instance) strike us as good because they give us
pleasure. Appetite needs some empirical beliefs in order to form even its simplest
desires; plausibly, the experience-based belief that money procures pastries is not cognitively more complex than the experience-based belief thatpastries taste good.

527
to calculation makes its beliefs intractable,and this will apply to its beliefdependentdesiresas well. Appetiteaccepts appearances:because a submerged
stickappears bent,appetitewill continueto believe thatit is bent even when
the agent's rationalpart has calculatedotherwise.Likewise, because a pleasing drinkappears good, appetitewill continueto believe that it is good even
- and thus will conwhen the agent's rationalparthas calculated otherwise
tinueto desire it. This is of course preciselythe phenomenonwe saw at work
in several examples fromthe Gorgias: because pleasure appears good, a certain kindof person believes that pleasure is good, and is immune to reasoning thatquestionsthisappearance.Now we can understandthatkindof person
as one whose soul is ruled by appetite.
On this understanding,
appetite does desire things qua good: it desires
them to be good. Because appetiteis separate
because
it
takes
pleasures just
fromthe rationalpartof the soul both in its desires and its beliefs, however,
a person may continue appetitivelydesiringa particularpleasure qua good
even while rationally believing thatpleasure bad. Note that, while denying
Irwin's characterization
of appetitesas strictlygood-independent,this interpretationdoes agree withwhatI believe to be the main point of Irwin's distinction and the view most interpreters
have intendedin claiming that appetites
are not desires forgood. For on my interpretation
appetitivedesires will be
indeindependentof theagent's rationalbeliefs about the good, and therefore
pendentof theagent's beliefsabout thegood insofaras the agent is identified
withherreason.52
There is also a second way in whichappetite's cognitive limitationsmake
itsdesiresdeficientas desiresforthe good. The Republic characterizesreason
not merelyas thinkingabout what is good, but as thinkingabout the good in
complex ways. Reason is "the partthat has calculated about the betterand
worse" {Rep. 441cl-2); it "has within it knowledgeof what is advantageous
foreach partand forthewhole" {Rep. 442c6-7); it "has foresighton behalfof
the whole soul" {Rep. 441e5). To have thoughtslike this, one must engage
in some fairlysophisticatedformsof thinking.One must make comparative
judgments,or considera complex object as a whole while also considering
each of its parts,or prioritizebetween different
parts of the soul, or calculate
the long-termagainsttheshort-term
consequences of an action. I suggest that
when Plato describes reason's desires as arisingek XoyiajioO (out of calculation), he has preciselythese typesof thoughtin mind,and thathe thinksthis
kind of calculation is valuable because only by engaging in it can one dis5
528
Vlastossuccinctly
formulates
whatI have called the"mainpoint"of thegood-dependdistinction
without
ent/good-independent
anyappealto theconceptof goodness:he says
thatin theBook IV passagequotedabove {Rep. 437e-438a), whichsome have takento
show thatappetitesare good-independent
to the
desires,Plato"wantsto call attention
fact thatwe may crave at timesformsof gratification
unacceptableto our reason"
(Vlastos 1991: 87).
JESSICAMOSS

cover what is trulygood- just as only by engaging in calculation of other

kinds can one discoverthe relativesizes of objects at different
distances, or
thetrueshape of a submergedstick.
such thoughtsare clearly unavailable to a part of the soul
Furthermore,
that formsits beliefs simply on the basis of appearance. An object cannot
simply appear to have good long-termconsequences that on balance outdrawbacks,or to be well-suitedto the natureof the soul
weigh its short-term
consideredas a whole (as when reason thinks that something is "advantageous"); to have these thoughts,one must at some point have engaged in
some formof calculation.53Therefore,while appetitemay desire things qua
good, it can neverhave the kindof thoughtsabout goodness that reason does.
Reason is well-suitedto rule the soul not merelybecause it desires what it
thinksgood, but because it can reason in ways that allow it to figureout
what is in fact good, and therebydevelop desires for what is truly good.
Republic VII makes this point vivid by making knowledgeof the Form of
the Good the culminationof a long, rigorousphilosophic education. "Whoever is unable to distinguishthe Form of the Good by means of a rational
account (tco Xoycp), isolatingit fromall otherthings,survivingall refutation... knows neitherthe Good itself nor any other good' {Rep. 534b8-c5,
emphasis mine). Only by graspingthe Form can one know which things are
trulygood, and only by workingthroughmathematics,astronomyand dialectic can one come to know theForm; thereforeonly a partof the soul able to
engage in very sophisticatedthought(the rational part)- or perhaps a part
sufficientlyreceptiveto the thoughtsof such a part (spirit)- can reliably
guide itsdesires withtruebeliefsabout thegood.54
On myreading,then,appetitedoes desire things qua good, but its desires
are highlydeficientdesiresforgood, desiresthatcannotbe reliedupon to lead
us toward the good because they are insensitive to the kind of
- rationalcalculation- thatis alone suited to discernthe good. This
thought
way of making the distinctionbetweenreason's and appetite's desires avoids
and
thedisadvantagesof making the distinctionin termsof good-dependence
good-independencethatI mentionedabove: it offersa coherentaccount of the
natureof appetite's desires, and also preserves continuity within Plato's
Although perhaps afterone has habituallyengaged in such calculations objects can simply appear to one to have such complex characteristics. Aristotle's view of virtue as a
quasi-perceptual capacity, and his insistence that even the virtuousperson pursues what
appears good to him (see Nicomachean Ethics 1114a32) imply such a view.
Compare Carone: "[O]nly reason can know what is actually good for the overall wellbeing of the person, and can thus oppose the lower parts of the soul, which have at most
narrow-mindedbeliefs about what simply 'appears' to be good to each of them" (Carone
2001: 120). Lesses argues thatonly reason can have "all thingsconsidered" views about
what is good, and thattherefore"The non-rational parts are especially liable to be mistaken about whether what they pursue really is good since they, unlike reason, are not
equipped to answer questions about the natureof what is good" (Lesses 1987: 151).

529
accountofdesire.Furthermore,
andveryimportantly,
thiswayof makingthe
ties together
of theappetitive
distinction
thecognitiveandethicalattributes
arestuckin therealmof
partofthesoul.Morallyand intellectually,
appetites
The partof the soul thatdesirespleasureis a slave to how
appearances.
it notonlyfromexercising
thehigherkinds
thingsappear,andthisprevents
of thought(hencetheideathattheappetitive
soul exercisesonlythelowest
kindof thought,
the higherkindof
EiKaoia), but also fromexperiencing
desire.55
V. Pleasure as apparentgood: a briefsubsequenthistory
I wishto note,in supportof my interpretation
of Plato,
Beforeconcluding
in
theprevalence
of theideathatpleasureis an apparent
the
worksof
good
Plato:
Aristotle,Epicurus,and the
philosophersverymuchinfluenced
by
Stoics.
I havealreadyindicated
Aristotle'spositionin the two epigraphsabove.
He explainswhypleasureis an objectof desireby callingit an "apparent
good"(9aiv6nEvov dya66v) (EudemianEthics 1235b25-9;compareDe
Motu Animalium700b29 and NicomacheanEthics 1155b25-6).For Aristotle,as forPlato,theappearancethatpleasureis goodcontainsan elementof
illusion:"In themany,deception
seemsto come abouton accountof pleasure.For whileit is notthegood,it appearsto be. Theychoosethepleasant
as being good, then,and avoid pain as beingbad" {NicomacheanEthics
1113a33-b2).56
andgoodness
betweenpleasure,appearance,
Epicurus'viewoftherelation
is veryclose to the one I have attributed
to Plato, but withdiametrically
For Plato, theapparent
opposedsignificance.
goodnessof pleasureis a danillusion.
For
and
gerous
Epicurus,pleasure
pain,57along withperceptions
andpreconceptions,
arecriteriaoftruth
(DiogenesLaertiusX.31). Whatdoes
thismean?Thatjust as whatever
appearswhiteto us, in thatwe perceiveit
Price draws an analogy that points in this direction, although he does not follow up the
consequences for appetite: "What differentiatesSocrates' position [in the early dialogues] is thathe aimed all desires notjust at the good taken indefinitely,but at long-term
happiness (eudaimonia) as conceived rationally (if often foolishly) by the agent. Again,
belief and truthprovide a helpful analogy: all beliefs aim at truth,indeterminatelyconceived.... but some beliefs may irrationallyidentifyrealitywith appearance, while others
take realityto be captured not by looking but by measuring" (Price 1995: 51). See also
Annas: "We can see in an impressionisticway that desire is associated with what is
'subjective', thatis, what appeals immediatelyto the person regardless of whether it is
confirmedby intersubjectivestandards,and thatreason is associated with what is objective... based on what can be judged to be the case afterreflection"(Annas 1981: 131).
For Aristotle,however, it turnsout thatthereis somethingafterall correct in the appearance thatpleasure is good, just as more generally there is, on Aristotle's view far more
than on Plato's, somethingafterall correctin appearances. For good discussion of Aristotle on the apparent good see Segvic 2002.
The two TraSri (Diogenes Laertius X.34).
530
JESSICA MOSS

as white,mustreallybe white,so too whatever

appearsgood to us, in that
we takepleasurein it, mustreallybe good. "Frompleasurewe beginevery
all good by this
choiceandeveryflight,andto it we come back,discerning
is
"Pleasure
to be pursued,
a
as
(Kavovi)" (DL X.129).
feeling by yardstick
pain to be avoided....[W]e perceivethesethings,as we perceivethatfireis
hot,snowwhite,honeysweet"{De FinibusI.3O).58It is on thebasis of such
thatpleasureis thehighest
thatEpicurusestablisheshis doctrine
arguments
good.
The Stoics,likePlato,treatpleasureas a merelyapparent
good. "Pleasure
but in truth
a persuasive
appearance[cpavTaoia] thatit is good,"59
projects
but "preferred."60
virtuealone is good, while pleasureis at best indifferent
Moreoverin theirdiscussionsof pleasureas a passion,61
theytake the conthanPlato everdoes,
nectionbetweenpleasureandapparent
goodnessfarther
an
of pleasure.Pleasto
idea
of
the
analysis
goodness
provide
apparent
using
is good: someone
beliefthatsomething
ureis (in part)theappearance-based
and
to
the appearance
assents
who possessessome q>aiv6|ievov aya66v,
are not to be
But such appearances
thatit is good, experiences
pleasure.62
neverexperiences
thewisepersonneverassentstothemandtherefore
trusted:
pleasureat all.
Thustheidea thatpleasureappearsgood,whichI havearguedis implicit
in laterGreekthought.Moreover
doctrine
inPlato'sworks,becomesstandard
use theideajustas Platouses it, on my account:to
theseotherphilosophers
explainwhywe pursuepleasure,and- evenin Epicurus'case to arguethat
theguidanceofreason.
indoingso we actin somesensewithout
58
betweengoodness
Thissimplehedonismis ofcoursecomplicated
by Epicurus'distinction
all pleasures,qua pleasures,are good, butbecause some lead to
and choiceworthiness:
pain,notall shouldbe chosen (DL X.129). Goslingand Taylor providea compelling
on which"pleasure
of truth,
of Epicurus'viewthatpleasureis a criterion
interpretation
as itshould,or (equivais operating
structure
thatone's psycho-physical
is consciousness
lently)in a way appropriateto it" (Goslingand Taylor 1982: 404). Here we findthe
to Platoin theGorgias,butwiththe characteristic
sameclaimthatI attribute
Epicurean
twist:forPlato,pleasureis a misleadingappearance of bodilyor psychiceueô (good
condition);forEpicurus,pleasureis solidevidencethatone is doingwell.
Posidonius.
et Platonis,5.5.23-24,paraphrasing
Galen,De PlacitisHippocratis
DL VII. 102
frompleasureas an experienceor sensation.The sage mayexperiTo be distinguished
- will not,thatis, assentto
butwill nottakepleasure in them
ence pleasurablefeelings,
discussionof this
thefalse appearance thattheyare good. For a briefbutilluminating
see LongandSedley1987Vol.1: 421.
distinction,
as being for the apparentgood ((pcuvonevov
Stobaeus definesappetite(ETn6uMi'a)
aya06v), and pleasureas whatariseswhenwe get theobjectof our appetite(Stobaeus
Eclogae 11.88.17-19); Adronicusdefines pleasure as "...a fresh opinion (56a
TTpoo9aTos) thata good is present..."(Adronicus,On passions I); compare Cicero:
IV. 14).
"laetitiaopiniorecensbonipraesentis..."(TusculanDisputations

53 1
VI. Pleasureand thecave

I beganbyclaimingthattheassociationbetweenpleasureandillusionplaysa
Now we have a completepictureof
centralroleinPlato's moralpsychology.
thatrole:
desiresfor
PlatobeginswiththeSocraticviewthatall desires,including
pleasure,arerationaldesiresforthegood. He notesin the Protagorasthat
whenwe desirepleasurewe arepeculiarly
susceptibleto the powerof illuforpleasurearein factrational,
but
claims
that
our
desires
nonetheless
sion,
fortheconnecsensitiveto calculation.Once he beginsto offerexplanations
tionbetweenpleasureandillusion,herejectstheidea thatdesiresforpleasure
arerational.Hencethemorepessimisticstanceof theGorgias: reasonwill
thata harmful
oftenfailtopersuadesomeonethattheappearance
pleasureis
offered
forthis pessimismin the
good is false.Hencealso theexplanation
Republic:thatin us whichdesirespleasureis not only proneto illusions,
but also (contratheProtagoras)immuneto thekindof reasoningthatcan
Plato concludesin theRepublic,desiresforpleasure
dispelthem.Therefore,
as desiresforgood.Illusion-bound
areverydeficient
desires,like thoseof the
are
desires
for
what
soul,
appears good,but thesedesiresignore
appetitive
theagent'smorereliablethoughts
aboutwhatreallyis good andthuscannot
leadtheagenttowardvirtue.
andmotivational
OncePlatohasacknowledged
theexistence
powerof this
kindof desire,he movesfromSocraticintellectualist
moralpsychologyto
full-blown
divided-soul
Some partsof us do notengagein reapsychology.
soning,and are prisonersof illusion; thesepartswill always have faulty
beliefsaboutwhatis good,andtheirdesireswill leadus astray.A virtuous
personis one whogetsthesepartsunderthecontrolof reason.The illusions
in pleasure,theillusionsthatlead us intovice, will only"lose their
inherent
power"overa personwhentheillusion-believing
partof hersoul has ceded
itsownpowerandhas submitted
to theruleofreason.
Once we recognizetheimportance
oftheassociationbetweenpleasureand
to
illusion Plato's ethicsandmoralpsychology,
we shouldalso be able to
accountof Plato's moremetaphysical
givea unified
complaintsaboutpleasure.I havein mind,forinstance,
in
which
Plato
associatespleasure
passages
withperception
and
Timaeus
Theaetetus
156b,
(Phaedo 65c,
69c-d),argues
thatpleasureis ontologicallyinferior
to the good (Phaedo 60b-c, Gorgias
495e ff.and Philebus53c ff.),63
or accusespleasuresof impedingthesoul's
The Philebusarguesthatpleasureis a becomingand nota being,whilegood is a being:
thiswouldseemto putpleasurein the lowerhalfof RepublicVI's dividedline,leaving
good at thetop.The Phaedo holdsthatpleasureis always accompaniedby pain,while
theGorgiasarguesthatpleasureand paincan coexist(whilegood and bad cannot):these
two arguments
implythatpleasureis ontologicallyimpureand unstable(compare the
in Republicand Phaedothatworldlythings,
unlikeForms,sufferfromwhatis
arguments
sometimescalled the"compresence
of opposites")
532
JESSICAMOSS

towardtruth
(Phaedo81b-cand83c-d).Ifwe studythesepassages,I
progress
chargesagainstpleasurethatturn
suggest,we willdiscovera set of coherent
whereappearanceis now understood
on itsassociationwithappearance,
as an
from
and
the
of
realm
distinct
inferior
to
real
world
the
Forms.
ontological
to be real althoughit is not,andfurtherPleasuredeceivesus by appearing
worldappearto be realalthoughit
morebymakingthephysical,perceptible
is not;whenwe devoteourselvesto pleasure,we accepta counterfeit
reality
andfailtoseekoutthetrueworldthatliesbeyondappearances.64
Thusin thecave allegoryof RepublicVII, thebondswhichkeeppeople
in thecave are"thebondsof kinshipwithbecoming,whichhave
prisoner
to [a person'snature]by feasting,
beenfastened
greed,andothersuchpleasuresand which,like leadenweights,pull its visiondownwards,"
awayfrom
Form
of the
therealworld,theworldof theFormsandabove all othersthe
Good.65Philosophyseeksto freeus fromthe cave; pleasureskeep us fast.
makesus striveforthegoodandthetruth;
pleasuretricksus with
Philosophy
its illusions,makingus contentwithwhatmerelyseems good, and what
^
merelyseemsreal.
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Pleasure and Illusion in Plato

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Plato is suspiciousof pleasure.He devotesthewholeof thePhilebusanda

Translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

PLEASURE AND ILLUSION IN PLATO

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pleasure is systematicand philosophical, and tied to his most centralviews.

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consequenton an act will outweighthe pains, she will become virtuous.The

Pleasant and painfulthingsare analogous to the objects of vision: those that

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In theRepublicPlatodefinesreasonas thepartof thesoul

and science or knowledge

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II. Pleasure and illusionin the Gorgias

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Like the Protagoras, then, the Gorgias suggests a general correlation

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As wellas vice versa:xaipopev otov oicbueBaeu npaTTeiv, kcuottotcxvxaip<^>MEv.

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groundsthathe caused thempain. The pastrychefdetails the pains the doctor

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themout"(De Finibus1.30). One can simplysee thatpleasureis good,the

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III. Pleasure and illusionin theRepublic

a new theoryof desire.Now rationaldesire

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What motivatesthischange in Plato's view of desire,and of the desire for

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Now he applies the principleof opposites, arguingthat the experienceof

Socrates is arguingthat reasoningbelongs to one partof the soul, while

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eitherappetiteor spirit- thepartsdistinguishedfromreason in Book IV- or

his descriptionof imitativepoetryclearly implies that it is

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That accordingto Book X imitativepoetryappeals to the appetitivesoul is widely

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one needstoexercisein orderto satisfya love of honor.To

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where Plato groups pleasure with perception:see e.g. Phaedo 65c,

In thenextsection,I will show how theseparation

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thegood.46The factthatthelowerpartsof thesoul do not desirethe good

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devoidof all cognitivecontentandin particularly

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between the way reason conCertainlythere is an importantdifference

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cover what is trulygood- just as only by engaging in calculation of other

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as white,mustreallybe white,so too whatever

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VI. Pleasureand thecave

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Adam,J. (1902) The RepublicofPlato, 2 volumes,CambridgeUniversity