Call +91- 9830110214 to enquire. Whatsapp: 9830110214.

Mail: projecthelpforyou@gmail.com

MARKS: 80
COURSE: DBM
SUBJECT: General Management
N.B: 1} Attempt all the questions
2} All Questions Carries equal Marks
Case 1 (Marks 16)
'That's not my job' - Learning delegation at Cin-made
When Robert Frey purchased Cin Made in 1984, the company was near ruin. The Cincinnati,
Ohi-based
manufacturer of paper packaging had not altered its product line in 20 years. Labor costs had hit
the
ceiling, while profits were falling through the floor. A solid quarter of the company's shipments
were late
and absenteeism was high. Management and workers were at each other's throats.
Ten years later, Cin Made is producing a new assortment of highly differentiated composite
cans, and pre-tax profits have increased more than five times. The Cin Made
workforce is both flexible and deeply committed to the success of the company. On-time delivery
of
products has reached 98 percent, and absenteeism has virtually disappeared. There are even
plans to
form two spin off companies to be owned and operated by Cin-Made employees. In fact, at the
one day
"Future of the American Workforce" conference held in July 1993, Cin-Made was recognized by
President
Clinton as one of the best run companies in the United States.
How did we achieve this startling turnaround?" Mused Frey. "Employee empowerment is one
part of the answer. Profit sharing is another."
In the late spring of 1986, relations between management and labor had reached rock bottom.
Having recently suffered a pay cut, employees at Cin- Made came to work each day, performed
the duties
required of their particular positions, and returned home-nothing more. Frey could see that his
company
was suffering. "To survive we needed to stop being worthy adversaries and start being worthy
partners,"
he realized. Toward this end, Frey decided to call a meeting with the union. He offered to restore
worker
pay to its previous level by the end of the year. On top of that, he offered something no one
expected: a
15 percent share of Cin-Made's pre-tax profits. " I do not choose to own a company that has an
adversarial relationship with its employees." Frey proclaimed at the meeting. He therefore
proposed a
new arrangement that would encourage a collaborative employee-management relationship
Employee
participation will play an essential role in management."
Managers within the company were among the first people to oppose Frey's new idea of
employee

involvement. "My three managers felt they were paid to be worthy adversaries of the unions."
Frey
recalled. It's what they'd been trained for. It's what made them good managers. Moreover, they
were
not used to participation in any form, certainly not in decision making." The workers also resisted
the
idea of extending themselves beyond the written requirements of their jobs. " (Employees)
wanted
generous wages and benefits, of course, but they did not want to take responsibility for anything
more
than doing their own jobs the way they had always done them," Frey noted. Employees were
therefore
skeptical of Frey's overtures toward "employee participation." "We thought he was trying to rip
us off
and shaft us," explained Ocelia Williams, one of many Cin-Made employees who distrusted Frey's
plans.
Frey, however, did not give up, and he eventually convinced the union to agree to his terms. " I
wouldn't take no for an answer," he asserted. "Once I had made my two grand pronouncements,
I was
determined to press ahead and make them come true." But still ahead lay the considerable
challenge of
convincing employees to take charge :
I made people meet with me, then instead
Of telling them what to do, I asked them.
They resisted.
" How can we cut the waste on his run ?" I'd say, or "How are we going to allocate the
overtime on this order ?"
"That's not my job," they'd say.
"But I need your input," I'd say. "How in the
World can we have participative management
If you won't participate?
"I don't know," they'd say. "Because that's
not my job either. That's your job. ?"
Gradually, Frey made progress. Managers began sharing more information with employees.
Frey was able slowly to expand the responsibilities workers would carry. Managers who were
unable to
work with employees left, and union relations began to improve. Empowerment began to
happen. By
1993, Cin Made employees were taking responsibility for numerous tasks. Williams, for example,
used to
operate a tin-slitting machine on the company's factory floor. She still runs that same machine,
but now
is also responsible for ordering almost $ 100,000 in supplies.
Williams is just one example of how job roles and duties have been redefined throughout CinMade. Joyce Bell, president of the local union, still runs the punch press she always has, but now
also
serves as Cin- Made's corporate safety director. The company's scheduling team, composed of
one
manager and five lead workers from various plant areas, is charged with setting hours,
designating
layoffs, and deciding when temporary help is needed. The hiring review team, staffed by three
hourly
employees and two managers, is responsible for interviewing applicants and deciding whom to
hire. An
employee committee performs both short and long term planning of labor, materials,
equipment,

production runs, packing, and delivery. Employees even meet daily in order to set their own
production
schedules. "We empower employees to make decisions, not just have input," Frey remarked. "I
just
coach."
Under Frey's new management regime, company secrets have virtually disappeared. All CinMade employees, from entry-level employees all the way to the top, take part in running the
company. In
fact, Frey has delegated so much of the company's operations to its workers that he now feels
little in the
dark. "I now know very little about what's going on, on a day-to-day basis," he confessed.
At Cin-Made, empowerment and delegation are more than mere buzzwords; they are the way of
doing business good business. "We, as workers, have a lot of opportunities," said Williams. "If
we want
to take leadership, it's offered to us."
Question & Answers:
Q 1. How were principles of delegation and decentralization incorporated into Cine Made
operations?
Q 2. What are the sources and uses of power at Cin Made?
Q 3. What were some of the barriers to delegation and empowerment at Cin Made?
Case 2 (Marks 16)
Culture Shock
Warren Oats was a highly successful executive for American Auto Suppliers, a Chicago-based
company
that makes original-equipment specialty parts for Ford, GM, and Chrysler. Rather than retreat
before the
onslaught of Japanese automakers, AAS decided to counterattack and use its reputation for
quality and
dependability to win over customers in Japan. Oats had started in the company as an engineer
and
worked his way up to become one of a handful of senior managers who had a shot at the next
open vicepresidential
position. He knew he needed to distinguish himself somehow, so when he was given a chance
to lead the AAS attack on the Japanese market, he jumped at it.
Oats knew he did not have time to learn Japanese, but he had heard that many Japanese
executives
speak English, and the company would hire a translator anyway. The toughest part about leaving
the
United States was persuading his wife, Carol, to take an eighteen-month leave from her career
as an
attorney with a prestigious Chicago law firm. Carol finally persuaded herself that she did not
want to miss
an opportunity to learn a new culture. So, armed with all the information they could gather about
Japan
from their local library, the Oats headed for Tokyo.
Known as an energetic, aggressive salesperson back home, Warren Oats wasted little time
getting started.
As soon as his office had a telephoneand well before all his files had arrived from the States
Oats made
an appointment to meet with executives of one of Japans leading automakers. Oats reasoned
that if he
was going to overcome the famous Japanese resistance to foreign companies, he should get
started as
soon as possible.
Oats felt very uncomfortable at that first meeting. He got the feeling that the Japanese
executives were

waiting for something. It seemed that everyone but Oats was in slow motion. The Japanese did
not speak
English well and appeared grateful for the presence of the interpreter, but even the interpreter
seemed to
take her time in translating each phrase. Frustrated by this seeming lethargy and beginning to
doubt the
much-touted Japanese efficiency, Oats got right to the point. He made an oral presentation of his
proposal, waiting patiently for the translation of each sentence. Then he handed the leader of the
Japanese delegation a packet containing the specifics of his proposal, got up, and left. The
translator
trailed behind him as if wanting to drag out the process even further.
By the end of their first week, both Oats and his wife were frustrated. Oatss office phone had
not rung
once, which did not make him optimistic about his meeting with another top company the
following week.
Carol could scarcely contain her irritation with what she had perceived of the Japanese way of
life. She
had been sure that a well-respected U.S. lawyer would have little trouble securing a job with a
Japanese
multinational corporation, but the executives she had met with seemed insulted that she was
asking them
for a job. And the way they treated their secretaries! After only a week in Japan, both Carol and
Warren
Oats were ready to go home.
A month later, their perspective had changed radically, and both looked back on those first
meetings with
embarrassment. Within that month, they had learned a lot about the Japanese sense of protocol
and
attitudes toward women. Warren Oats believed he was beginning to get the knack of doing
business with
the Japanese in their manner: establishing a relationship slowly, almost ritualistically, waiting
through a
number of meetings before bringing up the real business at hand, and then doing so
circumspectly. It was
difficult for Oats to slow his pace, and it made him nervous to be so indirect, but he was
beginning to see
some value in the sometimes humbling learning process he was going through. Perhaps, he
thought, he
and Carol could become consultants for other executives who needed to learn the lessons he was
beginning to understand.
Case Questions
1. What specific errors did Warren and Carol Oats make during their first week in Japan?
2. If you were talking to a non-U.S. businessperson making a first contact with an American
company, what advice would you give?
CASE 3 : (Marks-16)
COKES EUROPEAN SCARE
What seemed like an isolated incident of a few bad cans of Coca-cola at a school in Belgium
turned into
near disaster for the soft drink giants European operations. In June 1999, Coke experienced its
worst
nightmare-acontamination scare resulting in the recall of 14 million cases of Coke products in
five European
countries and a huge blow to consumer confidence in the quality and safety of the worlds most
recognizable
brand.

After the initial scare in Bornem, Belgium, Coke and Coca-Cola Enterprises (CCE), a bottler 40
per
cent owned by Coca-Cola, thought they had isolated the problem. Scientists at the CCE bottling
plant in
Antwerp found that lapses in quality control had led to contaminated carbon dioxide that were
used in the
bottling of a recent batch of Coke. Company officials saw the contamination as minor problem
and they
issued an apology to the school.
At the same time that the problems were being dealt with in Antwerp, things were breaking
down at
Cokes Dunkirk, France, bottling plant. In Belsele,10 miles from Bornem. Children and teachers
were
complaining of illnesses related to drinking Coke products. The vending machines at the school
were
stocked with Coke from the companys Dunkirk plant and were thought to be safe. Now a second
bottling
plants practices were being questioned. What initially seemed like an isolated incident was now
a crisis.
On June, 15,1999. 11 days after the initial scare in Bornem, Coke finally issued an explanation to
the
public. Most Europeans were not satisfied, Coca-cola officials used vague language and often
contradicted
one another when making statements. Frances health minister, Bernard Kouchner, stated That
a
company so very expert in advertising and marketing should be so poor in communicating on
this matter
is astonishing.
After three weeks of testing by both Coke officials and French government scientists, it was
concluded
that the plants were safe and that their was no immediate threat to the health of concluded that
the
plants were safe and that there was no immediate threat to the health of consumers. Coke has
destroyed
all of the pallets in Dunkirk and tightened quality control on CO2.
How could this happen to the company that is revered worldwide for its quality control and the
European market now represents 73 per cent of total profits.14 While the scare has had some
effect on
Cokes profits in Europe, the company is more concerned with damages to its reputation and
consumer
confidence in its products.
Many critics say that Cokes slow response time, insisting that no real problem existed and
belated
apology have severely damaged the companys reputation in Europe. Some would disagree and
feel that
Coke handled the situation as best it could. I think that Coke acted in a responsible, diligent
way, says
John Sitcher, editor of Beverage Digest. Their first responsibility was to ascertain the facts in a
clear and
unequivocal way. And as soon as Coke knew what the facts were, they put out a statement to
the Belgium
people.
The character and quality of a company can often be measured by how it responds to adversity.
CocaCola believes that this crisis has forced the company to re-examine both its marketing and
management

strategies in Europe. Coke executives in Brussels are predicting that the company will double its
European
sales in the next decade and that this setback will only make the company stronger. Wall Street
analysts
seem to agree. Only time will tell.
Questions:1. What are the management issues in this case
2. What did Coke do and what could have been done differently?
3. What are the key factors that were or should have been considered by management?
CASE 4 : (Marks-16)
FORDS EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION CHANGES STRATEGY
Ford Motor Company has a long history of operating in Europe. Starting with exports to the
United
Kingdom in 1903, the company established sales branches in France and England in 1908 and
1909. Later
assembly plants ware set up in those countries. In Germany, Ford established a plant in
Germany in 1926.
For several decades, the European operations were separate subsidiaries, each being
accountable to the
headquarters in the United States with little coordination among them. The rational for the
organization
structure was that each countrys customers have different needs, testes, and preferences. In
addition,
each country had its own tariff regulations.
As the European countries grew closer together, Ford viewed its European operation as a
common
market with a regional organization named Ford Europe with two big manufacturing facilities in
Germany
and England. But now, the companies in the European countries were not anymore considered
separate
and independent, but operated with a coordinated strategy. The aim was to achieve economies
of scale
and to reduce engineering costs. Ford designed similar case for Europe, instead of designing
different ones
for each country. Models such as Fiesta, Capri, and Escort were the results of this new
organization
structure. According to the new strategy, products were largely designed in the UK and Germany
and
manufactured in those countries as well as in Belgium and Spain.
In1994, a new strategy emerged that was named Ford 2000. in 1995, Ford merged its
Automotive
Operating in North America with that of Europe. Again, an important reason was to be more
competitive
and cost reduction through the elimination of unnecessary car platform and engine duplication.
This
meant fewer basic vehicle platforms as well as engines and transmissions. Moreover, the
regional profit
center concept was replaced by product line concentration. Specifically, the Ford Automotive
Operation
consisted of five vehicle centers with worldwide development for car and trucks. While four of
those
centers were in North America, the European centre was responsible for developing small and
midsize
automobiles Moreover, the North American center worked together with the Europeans to
develop Mondeo

which was called the Mercury Mystique and the Ford Contour, produced in the U.S. and Mexico.
These
models were sold in some 78 countries.
But the Ford 2000 strategy and organization did not work well as shown by the 1998
performance
especially in Europe where Ford was loosing market share to competitors such as General Motors
and
Volkswagen. Consequently, the newly elected Jacques Nasser reviewed the centralized Ford 2000
strategy
and reintroduced the market focus that gives more autonomy to the regions especially in Europe
where
many of its competitors introduced brands that addressed the needs of its customer. Nasser also
created
the Premier Auto Group for luxury cars that were more profitable than the low- and mid-priced
cars. This
luxury car division consisted of cars such as Lincoln, Volvo, Jaguar, and Aston Martin.
The 21st century brings new challenges for Ford. In the past, European carmakers were protected
by
quotas on Japanese cars. But these restrictions are going to be reduced or eliminated in the new
century.
This means that Japanese and Korean car manufacturer will market their cars in Europe. Also the
introduction of the best price. Finally, the global car industry is plagued with overcapacity that
may result
in fierce competition. Ford may have to review is its current strategy.
Questions: - (Any Four)
1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of centralization and decentralization?
2. What was the rationale for the Ford 2000 program?
3. Why did Ford change from decentralization to centralization to recentralization?
4. Why did Ford establish a luxury car division?
5. Do you think Ford will be in the competitive global market? Why or why not?
CASE 5 : (Marks-16)
TRIALS AND CHALLENGES FOR BARRETT AT INTEL
Intel Corporation is best known for its processors. The sign Intel Inside is familiar to most
people
using a computer. There is, for example, the Pentium 3 and 4 and the new generation Itanium.
For
servers and workstations, Intel produces the Xeon. The colorful CEO Andy Grove led the
company for
many years. By 2001, however, the chief Executive Officer Craig R. Barrett face many
challenges,
including criticism.
The new strategy of moving into new markets such as information appliances, communications,
and
Internet services was costly and so far less then successful. In fact, the move beyond its core
businesses
may have detracted from its core business of computer chips. These new directions resulted in
frequent
reorganizations resulting in organizational uncertainties for the managers. While some think that
the
frequent changes were necessary to adapt to new situations and to keep the organization agile,
others
disagree.
Barretts leadership and his moves into various directions is quite different from Groves carefully
crafted strategy that focused on chips. Barretts personal strengths lie in manufacturing. He
invested

heavily in research and development. But new products such as the Itanium require several
years before
they show result, and Barrett has only a few more years before his retirement. Investing in new
manufacturing technologies with the aim of achieving virtually automated plants results in the
reduction of
manufacturing costs of chips. But the PC market is stagnated in the early 21st century and
wireless
communication and cell phones are becoming important in the market. In the cell phone market,
for
example, Motorola and Texas Instruments are developing new digital signal processors and Intel
would
have to work hard to catch up. A key to success of Intel may be whether the company can
become an
important player in the wireless market. Barrett made a number of costly acquisitions, including
Level One
Communication. But the question if the heavy investment in new technologies will result in
profitable
businesses.This may determine the legacy of Craig Barrett.
Questions: 1) What is your assessment of Barretts performance and his vision for Intel? Is he the right
person for the
job at Intel?
2) What are some problems associated with frequent reorganization?
3) What are the pros and cons for focusing on the distant futures and the heavy investment in
new
technologies?