Commissioned by Enciclopedia Italiana.

Published in Italian translation in Dizionario

delle Scienze Fisiche. Roma: Istituto della Enciclopedia Italiana. Vol. 5, pp. 427433. The
more technical passages and the scholarly notes were omitted in the translation.

SPACE.
Summary. 1. Introduction. 2. Cosmologists and theologians. 3. The age of Newton. 4. The mathematical
revolution of the 19th century. a. Non-Euclidian geometry. b. Riemanns conception of physical space. c.
Geometries and groups. 5. Relativistic kinematics and Minkowski spacetime.

1. Introduction
Any normal speaker of a classical or modern European languageand, presumably, of
other languages toois able to discern in his environment certain properties and relations we call spatial, such as direction and distance, containment and contiguity, size and
shape. This ability alone neither presupposes nor yields the physico-mathematical idea of
space. The latter does, indeed, bestow systematic unity on our use of spatial predicates.
But the experiences motivating such use do not imply or even suggest some of the more
salient features of that idea, viz. () that space is the seat of all bodies and the site of all
intervening spans; () that it isat least notionallydistinct from the things in space; and
() that the aggregate of all spatial locations and relations is an instancea modelof
a definite mathematical structure (identified before Einstein with so-called Euclidean 3space, in which, characteristically, different volumes can have the same shape). Classical
Greek did not have a word for such an idea; and the Latin word spatium employed
by Newton to convey it had for the Romans an essential connotation of betweenness,
which is still alive in the modern descendants of Latin, but is inimical to the notion
of all-encompassing space. The said idea of space has belonged to mathematical physics throughout its history and must have preceded it, though only in the thoughts of a
few unconventional minds. Due to the big cultural success of physics it has become an
indispensable component of the intellectual stock-in-trade of the more educated segment
of westernized mankind. The history of this idea will be sketched in sections 2-5, from
its foreshadowings among Greek cosmolog ists and medieval theologians (2), through its
mature articulation and discussion by the great philosopher-physicists of the 17th and
18th century (3), to its analysis and generalization by 19th-century mathematicians (4),
and the premier application of their work to physics in Minkowskis chronogeometric
reading of Einsteins relativistic kinematics (5). On the subsequent use of the generalized
idea of space in relativistic cosmology: v. space-time models.

Torretti, Space

2. Cosmologists and theologians

In Hesiods Theogony (ca. 700 B.C.), Chaos (Xow) was born first of all, followed
by Earth, Love, Night, Day, the starry Heaven, etc.1 The noun xow is etymologically
related to xskvgape, yawnand xsmagaping mouth, chasmand may have
meant the gap between heaven and earth.2 In the beginning, before these two came
into being, Xow stood alone, a borderless opening, a jawless yawn, sheer betweenness
with nothingto separate. To us, this strongly suggests pure, empty space; but in Greek
intellectual history, Hesiods Xow comes out rather as a forerunner of t peiron, the
unlimited indefinite stuff which the philosopher Anaximander (ca. 550 B.C.) conceived
as the source of everything.3
Primordial stuff is also designated by a word connoting extension in Platos Timus
(ca. 360 B.C.). Here, the whole heaven and all things inside it are molded out of the
pre-existing xra by a divine craftsman who fashions them after the changeless, perfect
Platonic Forms. Now, xra is a very common Greek word, meaning room, place,
land, country (the cognate verb xvrv means to move, to go forward, but also to
contain, to hold). Plato says that the primary xra is just what we have in mind when
we claimmistakenlythat all being is in some place (tpow) somewhere (pou).4 In
his story, this reservoir of becoming seethes with confused physical powers (dnameiw)watery and fiery, earthy and airyuntil the god puts order and balance into it.5
He does it by forming elementary particles of regular shapes germane to the powers of
each of the four classical elements: cubes for stable, tightly packed earth, icosahedra for
smoothly flowing water, tetrahedra for stinging fire, octahedra for air. (The availability of
still one more regular shape, the dodecahedron, does not raise the question of a missing element, for Plato simply assigns it to heaven itself). Significantly, the god does not
knead the elementary particles out of the xra, but constructs them geometrically by
apposing regular polygons made from plane figures of two kinds, viz. right-angled triangles with their angles in the simple proportions 1:1:2 and 1:2:3.6 These triangles are
thus the true elements of Platos cosmos, which, however, are confined to the faces of
the elementary particles.
A boundless expanse, deliberately purged of even the suggestion of ma
te
r iality, is
afforded by t kenn, the void surrounding the atoms of Leucippus (ca. 440 B.C.) and
Democritus (v.: atom). Cornford7 hailed these thinkers as the inventors of space (with
all three features , , , noted in 1). In his opinion, t kenn was not only intended
to provide room for the incessant motion of atoms, but also to be a suitable domain
for the constructions of geometry. There is, however, a big difference between the space
of modern physics and the atomists void, namely, that bodies do not fill the latter but
move through it. The atomists counter the Eleatic denial of plurality and change by adding
nothingness (t mhdn) to being (t n, t dn), but these complementary realities are, of
course, mutually exclusive.8 The void outside the atoms enables at once the multiplication

Torretti, Space

and the motion of being, while at the same time securingby its very aliennessthe
unity and invariability of each existent.
There is no evidence that the atomists had the needs of geometry in mind when they
conceived t kenn. As a matter of fact, in Antiquity working geometricians concentrated
on figures, their properties and relations, and did not explicitly consider the structure
of the domain in which the figures are imbedded. On the other hand, the demands or
postulates stated by Euclid at the beginning of his Elements certainly entail the avail
ability of points standing farther apart than any assignable distance. By Postulate 3, one can
construct a circle taking any point for its center and any distance for its radius. Hence,
there is always a segment twice as long as any given segment , viz. the diameter of a
circle with radius . By Postulate 5, two coplanar straights a and b which form with a
third one c, angles and , on one side of c, such that + < , must meet somewhere
on that same side of c. Obviously, as decreases to 0, the distance from c to the
intersection of a and b increases beyond all bounds. Many propositions in Euclid, beginning with I.29, depend on Postulate 5, and the unboundedness of distances is already
implicit in the proof of I.16. So, even though Euclid and his predecessors possibly had
no inkling of infinite Euclidian space, this idea lurks in their mathematical practice. As
Koyr9 rightly saw, it was bound to come out into the open when geometry was taken
seriously as the language of physics by Galilei and his successors.
Insight into the implications and physical significance of Greek geometry may have
been hindered by Aristotle (384-322 B.C.), the most articulate and influential of Greek
cosmolog ists, who expressly denied that physics had any proper use for mathematics, and
accounted for what we call spatial properties and relations in a way that is deeply at
variance with modern physico-mathematical conceptions. The key notions of his account
are body (sma) and place (tpow). Bodies are either simple or compound. There are five
simple bodies, viz. earth, water, air, fire and aether. The first four go into everything that
lies under the moon, while aether is the peculiar stuff of the 55 concentric spheres which
Aristotle judged necessary to explain the regular motions in the sky.10 In the Categories,
Aristotle wrote that each part of a body holds (katxei) a part of the bodys place, thus
suggesting that the place of a body is none other than the extension (disthma) within
its boundary. In the Physics, however, he expressly rejects this, on the ground that if this
extension were something on its own, different from the body itself, it would in turn
have a place, which, in turn, would hold another one, etc. Moreover, if the place of a
body had length, width and depth it would also be a body, so there would be two bodies
in the same place.11 Aristotle therefore defined the place of a body as the first immobile
limit of its container (t to perixontow praw kneton prton).12 It follows that the
innermost limit of heaven is the place of the aether and, in a sense, of everything, while
heaven itself is not in something else.13 This takes care of the question: What lies beyond
heaven? There is nothing outside the whole.14 Inside heaven Aristotle distinguishes five

Torretti, Space

concentric regions which constitute the proper places of the simple bodies (ascending
from the center of the world in the order in which they were listed above). By nature
the sublunar bodies tend to rest at their respective proper place or to move directly to it
if they happen to be somewhere else. The aether, on the other hand, cannot be dragged
away from its place but moves in it eternally with uniform circular motion. For Aristotle
the void is a physical absurdity:15 a body located in such an uniform environment would
have no ground for moving in a particular direction or for resting at a particular point,
and yet, not meeting any resistance, it would travel through it with infinite speed. He
also rejects the possibility of an infinite body.16 On the other hand, bodies are infinitely
divisible. But, in his view, and contrary to what Zeno of Elea had argued ca. 450 B.C,
this does not imply that a fast runner cannot catch a slow one or reach the goal.17 To
achieve it the runner does not have to traverse the racetracks infinitely many parts in
a finite time, for, though the track is potentially divisible in infinitum, it is not actually
divided.18 Besides, for each piece of track, no matter how small, which the runner must
cover, there is a corresponding time interval in which to cover it.19 This matching of
distances with times in the analysis of motion was perhaps Aristotles greatest contribution
to modern scientific thought.
Aristotles influence in Antiquity was strong, but not decisive. Epicurus and the Roman poet Lucretius (55 B.C.) upheld atomism and the infinite void. The Stoics saw the
world as a plenum standing in a boundless vacuum. The Aristotelian Strato of Lampsacus
(269 B.C.) understood that a body filled its place, which he conceived as an empty
extension. The Christian commentator John Philopon revived this notion in the 6th
cent. A.D. Placehe wroteis not the limiting surface of the surrounding body It
is a certain interval, measurable in three dimensions, incorporeal in its very nature and
different from the body contained in it.20
Western Christendom received the Aristotelian corpus from Muslim Spain ca. 1200.
Aristotelian physics, favored by the Dominicans, was re
sisted by the Franciscans, but
eventually prevailed. In the 16th century it dominated European universities and tinged
the wording of Catholic dogma at the Council of Trent. In 1276, however, the Church
had forbidden, under pain of excommunication, the teaching of 219 largely Aristotelian
proposi
tions, in
cluding this one: That God could not move the heaven in a straight
line, the reason being that He would then leave a vacuum.21 Though orthodoxy seemed
thus to require a vacuum extramundanum, most medieval authors shunned it, for it raised
a grave theological dilemma: it would either be an infinite being outside God or an
attribute of God Himself. Among those who grappled with it, Bradwardine (1349)
came up with the notion of an infinite imaginary vacuum or place (situs),22 which
presumably God might realizeinsofar as it is requiredshould He will to move the
world. Oresme (1382) also refers to the extracosmic void as an imagined place (lieu),23
or space (espace).24 But at times he plainly asserts its actual existence: Hors le ciel est

Torretti, Space

une espace vide incorporelle dautre manire que nest quelconque espace pleine et corporelle Cette espaceest infinie et indivisible et est limmensit de Dieu et est Dieu
mme.25 Uncannily anticipating Newton, he defines motion as a change in a bodys
intrinsic stance with regard to the motionless imagined space.26

3. The age of Newton

In the preface to the Principia (1687), Newton stated the task of mathematical physics
thus: To find out the forces of nature by studying the phenomena of motion, and then,
from those forces, to infer the other phenomena.27 In Newtons analysis, the motion or
translation of a body from one place to another is preserved by the bodys intrinsic force
(vis insita) until an extrinsic force (vis impressa) acting on the body causes it to change.28
The place (locus) of a body is the part of space (spatium) which it occupies (occupat) at
the moment, not its position, nor the circumambient surface. Newton distinguishes absolute space, which by nature, and without any relation to something external, always
remains similar and immobile, from relative space, which is a mobile measure or dimension of the former, defined by its position with respect to bodies.29 The forces
of nature must, of course, account for the continuation and change of true motions, i.e.
the displacement of bodies in absolute space. Newton seeks for observable differences
between true or absolute, and merely relative motion, and finds themhe believesin
some phenomena of rotation. The very idea of an absolute space could not be suggested
by such phenomena. But it is not entirely Newtons creation.
By 1600, spatium and its modern renderings generally meant a 3-dimensional expanse
which can either be taken up by a body placed in it, or else be empty. Theology probably contributed to this meaning, for the very room which God must have at hand to
move the world should that be His will can be readily viewed as providing, at creation,
a site for the world itself. Space, in some such sense, received much attention from the
great Italian philosophers of nature. Telesio (1509-1588) conceived it as the incorporeal,
immobile, homogeneous receptacle of bodies, and declared that it was neither a substance
nor an accident. According to Patrizi (1529-1597) space was created before anyuthing
else. It is an infinite continuum containing infinitely many lines, surfaces and solids which
are the subject of geometry. Space is not a worldly entity (de mundanis), and hence does
not fall under the Aristotelian categories. For Bruno (1548-1660) space is a continuous
physical quantity with three dimensions, in which the magnitude of bodies is comprised.
It precedes bodies, stays motionless while they succeed each other, and will remain when
all bodies are gone. It indifferently receives everything, and neither acts nor suffers. It is
neither matter nor form nor a composite of both, and must therefore be judged praeternatural.30 Like views were voiced by Campanella (1568-1639) and the French atomist
Gassendi (1592-1655).
Descartes (1596-1650), who had little sympathy for the philosophers of nature, took

Torretti, Space

dis
tance from them by outrightly denying the possibility of a vacuum. On the other
hand, by analyzing geometrical figures into sets of points meeting specific conditions and
labelling each point with its oriented distances to three unbounded mutually orthogonal planes, he contributed decisively to the conversion of geometry into the science of
space. He maintained, moreover, that the substance of bodies was none other than their
geometrical extension. Thus, as Huygens (1629-1695) adroitly noted, body according to
Descartes was pretty much the same as the void.31 Yet Henry More (1614-1687) chided
Descartes for equating body and extension, because the infinity of the latter must then
lead to the divinization of the material world.32 More and the other Platonists at Cambridge stressed the distinction between space as the field of Gods action, and the bodies
He creates in it. Like the Italians, they maintained that space was neither a substance nor
an attribute of a substance, in the familiar Aristotelian sense.
Newton grew in this tradition. It may be expectedhe wrote in the 1660sthat I
should define extension as substance or accident or else nothing at all. But by no means,
for it has its own manner of existence It is not a substance, for it does not subsist
absolutely by itself, but as an emanative effect of God and an affection of all being; nor
does it underlie such affections of its own as would signal a substance, i.e. actions (such
as a minds thoughts or a bodys motions). Moreover, since we can clearly conceive
extension existing without any subject, as when we may imagine spaces outside the world
or places empty of body, and we believe it to exist wherever we imagine there are no
bodies, and we cannot believe that, if God should annihilate a body, [extension] would
perish with it, it follows that [extension] does not exist in the manner of an accident
inherent in some subject.33
But Newton went further and deeper than any of his predecessors in elucidating the
peculiar ontology of space: Just as the parts of duration are individuated by their order,
so that (for example) if yesterday could change places with today and become the later
of the two, it would lose its individuality and would no longer be yesterday, but today; so
the parts of space are individuated by their positions, so that if any two could exchange
their positions, they would also exchange their identities, and would be converted into
each other qua individuals. It is only through their reciprocal order and positions (propter
solum ordinem et positiones inter se) that the parts of duration and space are understood
to be the very ones that they truly are; and they do not have any other principle of
individuation besides this order and position.34
Newtons description of space not as a substance or a relation between substances,
but a structure, forestalled the objections that Leibniz (1646-1715) would raise against
his supposed substantivalism. Unfortunately, it was not printed until 1962. In his lifetime
he entrusted his defense to Samuel Clarke, who argued that ifas Leibniz claimed
space was nothing but the order of coexisting things, then, if God should remove in
a straight line the whole material world entire,it would stillcontinue in the same

Torretti, Space

place.35 But this is also true if the points of space get their individual identity solely
from their reciprocal positions and order, for, if space is Euclidian, that order is invariant under translation. So the theologians vision of world transport is nonsense also in
Newtons own terms.
Ironically, in Newtons physics, his concept of absolute space stands idle. By Cor. V
to the Laws of Motion, the motions of bodies included in a given space are the same
among themselves, whether that space is at rest, or moves uniformly in a right line without rotation.36 So the job assigned to the admittedly inaccessible absolute space can be
performed by any relative space tied to an inertial frame of reference. (By Cor. VI, the
same can be said of a frame falling freely in a uniform gravitational field.)37 As a matter
of fact, the absolute structure underlying Newtons relative spaces is not 3-dimensional
space, but 4-dimensional spacetime (v. space-time models). But this could only be understood in the light of 19th-century mathematics (v. 4,5).
In the 1770s Kant (1724-1804) sought to detheologize Newtons overt views on
space while at the same time canonizing them as eternal necessities of human reason.
He had advocated Leibnizian relationalism, but in 1768 he satisfied himself that bodies presuppose space. (He noted that the incon
g ruence of, say, a right shoe with the
matching left shoe cannot be described in terms of the mutual relations between the
parts of each, but only by referring them both to the surrounding space.)38 Thus, space
was no attribute of bodies. Since, in his view, it could not be pronounced a substance
without running into antinomies, he declared it an attribute of the mind: the form of
our external sense. (Whence the bodies, which presuppose it, were demoted to appearances.) This thesis, however, was turned into a sort of philosophical joke by the critical
reflections he mounted on it. For they imply that the mind-substance is unknowable;
indeed, the substanceattribute relation would lack objective validity if applied to it.
The philosophy of space must therefore rest upon the analysis of human experience and
its presuppositions as disclosed from inside. That analysis showsaccording to Kantthat
ordinary self-awareness pressupposes the perception of objects in space.39 Space does not
therefore depend on the human psyche as we know it, for it is indeed the latter which
requires the prior availability of space. Kant revolutionized philosophy, and his conception
of the human understanding as Natures legislator probably contributed to the uninhibited
intellectual creativity displayed by the founders of 20th century physics.40 But his tortuous
thinking on space does not appear to have had any direct influence on them.

4. The mathematical revolution of the 19th century

Standing on the shoulders of Newton and Leibniz, of Euler and Lagrange, 19th
century mathematicians quietly carried through a revolution in thought whose import
has not yet been fully appreciated. The next three subsections refer to those aspects of
it which directly concern physical geometry.

Torretti, Space

4a. Non-Euclidean geometry

Euclids Postulate 5 never appeared self-evident to all. Of course, if two coplanar
straights a and b form with a straight c internal angles on the same side of c adding to
less than , a and b must indefinitely approach each other on that side of c. But must
a and b therefore meet? After all, a hyperbola approaches its asymptotes without ever
intersecting them.
Several Greek mathematicians sought to derive Postulate 5 from more obvious state
ments. In modern times, Wallis (1616-1703) showed that it holds if and only if there exist
figures of different size with equal shape, and Saccheri (1667-1733) contended that the
existence of a single rectangle warrants its validity. But then, there is no way of certifying
that a given quadrilateral is exactly rectangular.
Saccheri41 considered a so-called Saccheri quadrilateral, i.e. a quadrilateral with two
equal sides perpendicular to the base. By symmetry, the other two angles are equal. They
could either be (a) larger than, (b) equal to, or (c) smaller than a right angle. Saccheri
dismissed (a) offhand, for it implies that there can be a polygon with 2 sides. From (c)
he inferred a good many consequences without coming across any blatant contradiction.
One of them is that some pairs of coplanar straights which form with another straight
and on the same side of it internal angles adding to less than share a perpendicular
at their meeting point at infinity. This would contradict the fact that all right angles
are equal, so that (iii) has to be dismissed too. Thus, only (b) remains, which is provably
equivalent to Postulate 5.
Less than a century later Lobachevski (1793-1856) founded the first system of nonEuclidian geometry on assumptions equivalent to Saccheris alternative (c). Lobachevski
defined a straight as the locus of all points which remain unmoved if space is rotated
about two fixed points.42 This definition is compatible with both the assertion and the
negation of Postulate 5. Lobachevskis geometry rests on its negation. In a Lobachevskian
space there are no rectangles (and hence no cubes) and the 3 internal angles of a triangle
add up to less than . More surprisingly perhaps, through the interior of any right angle
there runs a straight line parallel to both sides of . (The distance from to s
vertex is a characteristic of the space, so Lobachevskian spaces form a one-parameter family;
if = , the space is Euclidian.) A system of geometry equivalent to Lobachevskis was
independently developed by Bolyai Janos (1802-1860). Gauss (1777-1855) had worked
much earlier on such a geometry, but refrained from publishing for fear of the clamor
of Botians.43
Lobachevski showed that the formulae of Lobachevkian trigonometry yield those of
standard spherical trigonometry if for each segment-length x occurring in the former
one substitutes x(1).44 The algebraic correspondence between both sets of formulae
ensures that any contradiction arising in Lobachevskian geometry would be matched by
a contradiction in Euclidian geometry.

Torretti, Space

Is physical space Euclidian or Lobachevskian? The question was raised in Schweikarts

correspondence with Gauss in 1818-19,45 and later, publicly, by Lobachevski himself, who
tried to solve it by calculating the sum of the internal angles of a triangle formed by
three stars. He concluded that contemporary astronomical data were compatible with the
Euclidian value .46 Some philosophers were unnerved by the idea that Euclidian geome
tryhitherto the epitome of reasoncould thus be handled as an empirical hypothesis,
confirmed to within the margin of experimental error. Lotze (1817-1881) argued that
if the 3 angles of an astronomical triangle added to a value different from , this would
show, not that physical space is non-Euclidian, but rather that light rays are not straight.47
By thus drawing attention to the underdetermination of geometrical theory by experience,
Lotze unwittingly contributed to a much more radical reassessment of geometryand
of reason itselfthan Gauss or Lobachevski had in mind.

4b. Riemanns conception of physical space

In 1854 Riemann (1826-1866), at Gausss behest, delivered in Gttingen an inaugural
lecture on The hypotheses that lie at the foundation of geometry.48 This is perhaps
the most original essay ever written on space, and certainly the most fruitful one for
our current understanding of physical ge
om
etry. The authors interest is focussed on
physical space, or rather on the mathematical structure instantiated by it. He conceives
this structure as a species of the fairly broad genus of n-fold extended quantities. This
genus is narrower than that of n-dimensional (topological) spaces, and is presum
ably
coextensive with the class of real n-dimensional differentiable manifolds. Riemann took
it for granted that physical space is 3-dimensional. He thought that physicists did well
in assigning it a metric, the nature of which, however, he regarded as an open question,
subject to theoretical hypothesizing and experimental corroboration. The lectures main
effort goes to introducing some mathematical concepts which should be useful in the
scientific handling of this question. To avoid lengthy explanations they will be sketched
here in todays mathematical vocabulary.
It may seem that, through its use of coordinates, physics assumes that space is homeo
morphic (topologically equivalent) to 3. Riemann saw that such an assumption would be
needlessly strong. The physicist never coordinatizes more than a finite region surrounding
the objects under study. Hence, what he tacitly presupposes is that each point of space
has a neighborhood homeomorphic to 3. But such neighborhoods may well be pieced
together to form a global structure which is very different from 3. (As the several patches
mapped by geographers onto the flat pages of an atlas jointly form thetopologically
sphericalsurface of the earth.) In order to use mathematical analysis physics requires
that coordinate trans
formations be ex
pressible by differentiable functions. Now, a real
n-dimensional differentiable manifoldor n-manifold, for shortis a topological space
M, every point of which has a neighborhood homeomorphic with n which is mapped

Torretti, Space

10

bijectively and bicontinuously onto an open region of n, so that (i) every point of M
lies in the domain of one of these maps or charts, and (ii) if two such charts, g and h,
have overlapping domains, the composite mappings (coordinate transformations) g h1
and h g1 are Cdifferentiable. Thus, through its use of coordinates and analysis, physics
had in effect presupposed that space is a 3-manifold.
Physicists also assume that any path joining two points in space has a definite length.
If the path is straight, its length obeys the Theorem of Pythagoras, so that, if a, b and c
are the the lengths of the three sides of a triangle, and is the internal angle formed
by a and b,

c2 = a2 + b2 ab cos

(1)

If the path is curved, its length is, by definition, equal to the (demonstrably unique)
limit as n of the lengths (P1), (P2), of any sequence of non-intersecting polygonal arcs P1, P2, inscribed in the path, and such that the length of the longest side
in Pn converges to 0 as n . However, in a Lobachevskian space, lengths do not
satisfy eqn. (1). In Riemanns view, the length of a path in physical space depends on
the interplay of forces acting on and about the path. The successful employment of the
Pythagorean metric in physics bespeaks its approximate validity on the human scale. But
on a much larger or a much smaller scale it might well break down. Riemann is interested in developing a more general concept of a metric, which would enable a physicist
to formulatewhenever experience makes it advisablea more accurate definition of the
metric of physical space. Such a concept can be specified at different levels of generality.
Since the Pythagorean metric had up to then proved suitable, Riemann thought that,
for the time being, one ought to abide by a type of metric which agrees to first order
with the Pythagorean metric on a neighborhood of each point. This is now known as
a Riemannian metric. Riemann conceived it as a generalization to n-mani
folds of the
intrinsic metric of surfacesi.e., 2-manifoldsdeveloped by Gauss.
Let M be an m-manifold and N an n-manifold (m,n 1). Consider a mapping : M
N by P P. is smooth at P M if and only if there is a chart g defined at P
and a chart h defined at P such that the composite mapping h g1 (of m into
n) is Cdifferentiable. is smooth if it is everywhere smooth. A scalar field on M is
a smooth mapping of M into . Scalar fields on M form a ring F(M), with addition
given by (+)(P) = (P) +(P), and multiplication given by ()(P) = (P)(P). A
curve in M is a smooth mapping of an open interval I into M. Consider a curve
: (a,b) M; u u. The tangent to at , denoted by ( (a,b)), is the linear
mapping of F(M) into defined, for each F(M), by:

Torretti, Space

11
t () =

d
du

u =t

(2)

If P M lies in the range of a curve , is said to go through P. The tangents at P of

all curves through P form an m-dimensional real vector space attached to P: the tangent
space TPM. The tangent spaces attached to all points of M constitute the tangent bundle
TM. TM is a 2m-manifold which is mapped onto M by the projection defined by
the condition: for each w TPM, w = P. A vector field on M is a section of TM, i.e.
a smooth mapping W: M TM, by P WP TPM. The vector fields on M form a
module v(M) over the ring (M). In particular, we define for each curve in M a vector field by setting P = if P = for any in the domain of ; letting fade
smoothly to 0 in a narrow neighborhood of the range of , and putting equal to 0
everywhere else.
Consider now a mapping g: v(M) v(M) (M). If V,W v(M), we denote by
gP(V,W) the value of g(V,W) at P M. g is a Riemannian metric if and only if it is:
bilinear, so that V,W,Y v(M) and (M), g(V,W) = g(V,W) = g(V,W);
g(V,W) + g(Y,W) = g(V+Y,W), and g(V,W) + g(V,Y) = g(V,W+Y);
(ii) symmetric, so that V,W v(M), g(V,W) = g(W,V);
(iii) non-degenerate, so that W v(M) and P M, gP(W,W) 0, unless WP =
0; and
(iv) positive definite, so that W v(M) and P M, gP(W,W) 0.
(i)

In that case, M,g is said to be a Riemannian manifold, and the length of a curve in
M between two points a and b is given by the definite integral:
b

(g ( , ) 2)d

g determines a 4-linear mapping of v(M) v(M) v(M) v(M) into F(M) called
the curvature of M,g, and a scalar field R F(M) known as the curvature scalar. Definitions of and R can be found in any good textbook of differential geometry. (If g
meets all the above conditions except (iv) it is said to be a semi-Riemannian metric. M,g
is then a semi-Riemannian manifold. The concept of curvature remains, but the concept
of length needs refurbishing, as g no longer is positive-definite.)
Riemanns view of geometry lies at the heart of Einsteins theory of grav
ity (v.
relativity, general). This theory imposes a semi-Riemannian metric on a 4-manifold
representing, not physical space, but spacetime. The metric agrees to first order with the

Torretti, Space

12

metric h of Minkowski spacetime (5). In agreement with Riemanns conception of the

dependence of geometry on physical forces, the theorys field equations link the metric to the distribution of matter and non-gravitational energy. On the other hand, the
metric alone fixes the spacetime trajectories of freely falling (uncharged, non-spinning)
test particles.

4c. Geometries and groups

The 19th century witnessed numerous innovations in geometry, besides those presented in 4a and 4b. The center of the stage was held by projective geometry, which was
generally regarded as a fairly innocuous improvement on Euclidian geometry, although it
breaks with it at the topological level, and thus ultimately poses a more serious challenge
to intuition than Lobachevskian geometry. Though projective geometry can be traced
back to Kepler (1571-1630) and two of its basic theorems were proved by Desargues
(1591-1661) and Pascal (1623-1662), its flourishing began with Poncelet (1788-1867),
in the wake of the revival of synthetic geometry by Monge (1746-1818). In projective
geometry every straight has a point at infinity, where it intersects its parallels. Since
this point can be approached from either direction, the points on the projective line lie
in cyclical order. The projective plane contains a straight line at infinity; projective space,
a plane at infinity. Projective space is topologically compact. The projective plane is onesided and non-orientable.
Analytic methods based on the use of real-valued homogeneous coordinates were intro
duced into projective geometry by Mbius (1790-1868) and Plcker (1801-1868). There
upon Staudt (1798-1867) enriched projective space with imaginary points labelled with
complex-valued homogeneous coordinates and constituted, under some naturalmostly
tacittopological assumptions, the complex projective space.49 This new creation of the
European mind is often the referent of late 19th-century mathematicians statements on
space. In particular, it is tacitly presupposed by the group-theoretical investigations of
Felix Klein (1849-1925) and Sophus Lie (1842-1899) on the foundations of geometry.
In his so-called Erlangen Programme (1872),50 Klein presented the algebraic theory
of groups as a means for unifying the variegated developments in geometry. Let P stand
for (3-dimensional) complex projective space and consider all the bijective mappings of P
onto itself. Such mappings form a group (with the identity on P as the neutral element
and composition of mappings as the group product): the most general group of space
transformations. Under such mappings P transforms as an unstructured set. Cardinality
is the only property they all preserve. Bicontinuous bijections constitute the subgroup
of topological transformations, which preserve neig
bor
hood and connectivity relations.
Consider now the projective transformations, which map sets of collinear points bijectively
and bicontinously onto sets of collinear points. These form a subgroup of the topological transformations. The properties they preserve constitute the full scope of projective

Torretti, Space

13

geometry. A subgroup of projective transformations permutes imaginary points among

themselves, thus justifying the standard treatment of real projective space as an independent
subject. Among the latter trans
forma
tions, one may distinguish the subgroup of affine
transformations, which map the plane at infinity onto itself and therefore preserve the
Euclidian relations of incidence, collinearity, linear order and parallellism. Euclidian similarities, which preserve the ratios between Euclidian distances form a subgroup of the affine
group. It contains as a proper subgroup the distance-preserving Euclidian isometries. The
congruence-preserving Euclidian motions are, in turn, a subgroup of the latter.
Klein, however, did not approach the subgroup of Euclidian motions in this way, but
accessed it directly from the projective transformations of P.51 Any such transformation
will preserve the cross-ratio between 4 collinear points. Following an idea of Cayley
(1821-1895), Klein defined the distance between 2 points A and B relative to a quadric
surface S as a function of the cross-ratio between A, B and the two points where the line
AB meets S. The projective transformations that map S onto itself constitute a subgroup
which plainly preserves this function. Klein showed that if S consists exclusively of real
points, the points in the interior of S, as related among themselves by the said distance
function, satisfy the theorems of Lobachevskian geometrywhich Klein called hyperbolic.
If S consists only of imaginary points, the real points of P, as related by the said distance
function, comply with a different non-Euclidian geometry discovered by Kleinwhich he
called elliptic. Finally, if S is the degenerate conic consisting of the line at infinity taken
twice, the real points of P, not on the plane at infinity, as related by the said function,
satisfy the theorems of Euclidian geometrycalled parabolic by Klein. In this very specific
and somewhat contrived sense, ome may therefore regard the same underlying space as
a relization of Euclidian geometry or of one of the said non-Euclidian geometriesde
pending on ones free choice of a transformation group. This discovery prompted the
geometric conventionalism of Poincar (1854-1912) for, as he noted, the existence of a
group is not incompatible with that of another group,52 and the mathematical physicist
may choose the group he feels most comfortable with.
A characterization of Euclidian geometry by the congruence-preserving motions had
been attempted by the philosopher Ueberweg in 1851. Later, Helmholtz (1821-1894) lighted
on the same idea, but he soon realized that not just Euclidian, but also Lobachevskian
geometry could be characterized in this way.53 Are these the only geometries which can
be characterized by a group of motions? Lie tackled this question with the powerful means
of this theory of differentiable transformation groups.54 A Lie group is a mathematical
structure which sports the algebraic properties of a group and the geometric properties
of an n-manifold. The dimension number n is usually referred to as the number of parameters of the group. Take an m-manifold M endowed with a Riemannian metric g. It
can be shown that M,g admits at most an (n(n +1)/2)-parameter Lie group of g-preserving transformations. Indeed, M,g does admit such an (n(n +1)/2)-parameter group

Torretti, Space

14

if and only if the curvature scalar R determined by g is constant. M,g is Euclidian if

and only if R = 0. If the constant R is less than 0, M,g is Lobachevskian, and if it is
greater than 0, M,g is a realization either of Kleins elliptic geometry or of the related
but topologically distinct system known as spherical geometry.

5. Relativistic kinematics and Minkowski spacetime

In the last third of the 19th century the foundations of Newtonian mechanics were
closely scrutinized. Mach (1838-1916) argued that Newtons rotational thought experiments did not prove the existence of absolute space, for their effects might be due to the
cosmic distribution of matter.55 This idea, dubbed Machs Principle by Einstein, played a
heuristic role in the development of General Relativity.
James Thomson and Ludwig Lange would not question the key Newtonian idea of
real forces causing absolute acceleration, but they rightly saw that its effectiveness does
not require the existence of an absolute space. In Newtonian kinematics absolute acceleration is acceleration with respect to the relative spaces determined by inertial frames
of reference. By 1885 Thomson and Lange had independently worked out precise definitions of an inertial frame and an inertial time scale attached to it.56 Langes approach is
akin to Einsteins in the original formulation of relativistic kinematics (1905), and indeed
Einsteins famous definition of simultaneity in an inertial frame may be regarded as a
necessary supplement to Langes definitions.
Lange presupposes the Newtonian distinction between free particles and particles acted
on by an external force. He bids us consider three arbitrarily chosen free particles ,
and , moving in three non-collinear directions from a point P fixed in the relative space
SF de
termined by a frame of reference F. If , and describe straight lines in SF, F
is by definition an inertial frame. Also, any time scale T by which the particle traverses
equal distances in equal times is by definition an inertial time scale. If these definitions
are adopted, then the following are testable laws of nature:
I. Any free particle describes a straight line in SF.
II. Any free particle traverses equal distances (in SF) in equal times (as measured
by T).
Langes definitions, together with these laws, pick out an infinite family of inertial
frames and inertial time scales. What they do not do, however, is to assign a definite value
to a free particles constant speed (or to a non-free particles acceleration). As Einstein
remarked in 1905, such a valuation presupposes the synchronization of clocks at distant
places, viz. the places successively traversed by the particle in question.57
This had already been noted by Thomson,58 but he apparently thought that any
plausible signalling method would satisfy the stated requirement in a manner compatible

Torretti, Space

15

with the admissible margin of experimental error. However, as Ein

stein would show,
the level of accu
racy achieved in optics with Michelsons inter
ferometer demanded a
more discerning definition of synchronism. The one proposed by Einstein can be stated
in Lange-like fashion as follows.59 Let F be an inertial frame in Langes sense and P a
point fixed in its relative space SF. Use any established metod for measuring time at
Psay, a frictionless top. Consider a pulse of light issuing at a given moment from P
and propagating in vacuo in every direction. If in time t the light pulse reaches a point
Q P, is instantaneously reflected at Q, and comes back to P, then by definition it takes
exactly Ht to reach Q. As Q ranges over SF, this condition defines a universal time for
the inertial frame F. It follows that the wave front of forms in SF at any given moment a sphere centered at P. If the said condition is substituted for Langes definition
of an inertial time scale, the testable laws I and II still hold. Moreover, the following is
also a testable law of nature:
III. Any light-signal in vacuo propagates in a straight line (in SF) with constant
speed (according to the stated definition of time).
As Einstein showed, under the proposed definitions, this Principle of the Constancy
of the Velocity of Light does not conflict with the Principle of Rel
ativity, according
to which the laws of nature afford no grounds for distinguishing any particular inertial
frame from the others. As is well known, the compatibility between these two principles
is secured if the laws of nature, when formulated in terms of Einstein time and Cartesian
space coordinates adapted to an inertial frame, take the shape of equations invariant under
transformations of the Lorentz group. To satisfy this requirement, the basic concepts and
laws of kinematics and dynamics were subjected by Einstein to a substantial revision.
One of the baffling features of the new relativistic kinematics is that the spatial distance between two separate points and the time interval between two successive events
depend on the inertial frame to which the points or events in question are referred.
Both magnitudes are greatest relatively to the rest frame of the object bearing the points
and the clock marking the events, and they both tend to 0 as the relative speed of that
object in the chosen frame of reference approaches the speed of light c. On the other
hand, if the time interval between two events A and B relatively to an inertial frame
F is denoted by F and the distance relative to F between the locations of A and B is
denoted by F, the quantity (A,B) = c2F2 F2 remains unchanged as F ranges over
the inertial frames.
Pursuing an idea first adumbrated by Poincar, Minkowski (1864-1909) interpreted
the quantity designated above by (A,B) as a measure of the separation or interval between A and B in the 4-dimensional cosmic contin
uum of events which he dubbed
the world, but is currently called spacetime.60 One sees at once that (A,B) = 0 if

Torretti, Space

16

and only if A and B respectively coincideat least potentiallywith the emission and
the reception of a light signal propagated in vacuo. All other pairs of events fall into two
classes: those separated by a timelike interval ((A,B) > 0), and those separated by
a spacelike interval ((A,B) < 0). Clearly, the intervals between two event pairs are
properly comparable only if they both belong to the same class. The cosmic continuum
of eventsor instantaneous event-sitescan be read
ily conceived within the classical
tradition of physics as the Cartesian product of the Euclidian space SF determined by
any given inertial frame F and the domain TF of an Einstein time coordinate for F. The
differentiable structures of TF and SF induce in TF SF the topologyindeed, the differentiable structureof 4. Let the 4-manifold thus defined be denoted by M. Minkowski
spacetime consists of M endowed with some additional structure. This can be presented
in two seemingly disparate yet logically equivalent ways, either in the spirit of Riemann
(4b), or in that of Klein(4c).
Given the arbitrary choice of a Euclidian space SF and an Einstein time TF attached
to an inertial frame F, every spacetime point E M projects onto a unique spatial point
PE SF and a unique instant TE TF. (PE and TE are the place and the timerelative
to Fat which E occurs). If x, y, z are Cartesian coordinates for SF and t is an Einstein
time coordinate for TF, one can define on M a global chart u which assigns to each
spacetime point E a real-number quadruple u0(E),u1(E),u2(E),u3(E) given by:
u0(E) = t(TE), u1(E) = x(PE), u2(E) = y(PE), u3(E) = z(PE)
A semi-Riemannian metric h is everywhere defined on M by specifying its action on
the vector fields /uk determined by the coordinate functions uk (k = 0,1,2,3), viz.:

(/u h ,/u k )

c if h = k = 0
1 if h = k > 0
0 if h k

M,h is Minkowski spacetime. [Note that, for any P M, (/uk)P is the tangent at P
of the one curve through P which is such that, for any t , uk(t) = t, and uh(t)
= uh(P) if h k.] If A and B are two events as above and : (a,b+) M is a
geodesic such that (a) is the spacetime site of A, and (b) that of B,
b

(( , ) 2)d = (,)

This approach, though straightforward, is somewhat anachronistic, for the concept of

Torretti, Space

17

a geodesic of zero lengthsuch as would be if it tracks the spacetime path of a light

signal in vacuomade little sense until Levi-Civit (1873-1941) introduced in 1917 the
notion of parallelism along a curve in an arbitrary nmanifold.61 By means of this notion, it became possible to characterize a geodesic not by its (extremal) length, but by
its (steady) direction, viz. as a curve whose tangents are mutually parallel along it.
But Minkowski spacetime can also be introduced as follows. Let M be just the set of
spacetime points. (Forget its topology and differentiable structure.) Let the additive group
of the vector space 4 act transitively and effectively on M; i.e., let there be a mapping
: 4 M M by ,E E, such that (i) , 4, E M, (+)E = (E);
(ii) E1,E2 M there is some 4 such that E1 = E2; and (iii) E = 0 for every
E M if and only if 0. Endow 4 with the inner product defined as follows:
For every = 0,1,2,3 4 and every = 0,1,2,3 4,

hkh k (3),
h = 0k = 0

where

hk =

c if h = k = 0
1 if h = k > 0
0 if h k

Recalling that P,Q M there is some 4 such that P = Q, one readily

defines the interval (P,Q) between two spacetime points P and Q:

(P,Q) = (P,P) = (4).

The vector a and the interval (P,P) are said to be spacelike, timelike, or null if
is, respectively, positive, negative or equal to 0. A null or timelike vector = 0,1,2,3
is said to be future-directed if 0 > 0. The structure M,4,, is equivalent to Minkowski
spacetime (as presented earlier) if the action satisfies the following physical requirements:
P,Q M such that P = Q ( 4), (i) if is a future-directed null vector, P and
Q may stand for the spacetime sites of the emission and reception, respectively, of a light
pulse in vacuo; (ii) if is a timelike vector such that = 1, P and Q may be the
sites of two ticks, separated by unit time, of a clock at rest in an inertial frame; (iii) if
= 1 and R = P = Q (, 4; R M), where = = 0, P, Q and
R may be the sites of three distinct events such that the first two occur at the same
end of an unstressed rod of unit length at rest in an inertial frame, while the third oc-

Torretti, Space

18

curs at the other end of it. The inner product (1) and the partition of 4 into timelike,
spacelike and null vectors are, of course, invariant under Lorentz transformations. Such
transformations can be understood actively, as hyperbolic rotations of the vector space,
or passively, as changes in the decomposition of each vector into 4 components. Either
way, the structure signalled on M by (4) may be characterized, in the style of the Erlangen Programme, as the geometry of the Lorentz group. (Needless to say, the action
induces in M the topology and differentiable structure of 4which must hold at least
on a neighborhood of each spacetime point to ensure the applicability of mathematical
analysis).
Minkowskis restatement of relativistic kinematics has often been described, somewhat
disparagingly, as a formalism. This usage is all right, provided that it does not suggest an
unfavorable comparison with earlier modes of thought. Though less familiar, Minkowskis
spacetime is not more formal, and certainly not a whit more artificial than Newtons
spaceandtime. Indeed, the impressive successes of General Relativity in the very large
and of Quantum Field Theory in the very small have ratified Minkowskis forecast: From
now on space by itself and time by itself shall be wholly reduced to shadows, and only
a sort of union of them both shall subsist independently.

ROBERTO TORRETTI
Universidad de Puerto Rico

NOTES
1

7

5
6

8
9

Theog., 116-125. Aristotle quotes line 116 pntvn mn prtista xow gnet', atr peita
ga' ersternow, and adds this comment: w don prton prjai xran tow osi, di
t nomzein, sper o pollo, pnta enai pou ka n tp (Phys., IV, i, 208b30-33).
Other scholars prefer to think of xow as the gap between earth and Tartarus; see Hesiod, Theogony,
edited by M.L. West, Oxford 1966, ad 116.
Diels-Kranz, Vorsokratiker, 12A9-11.
prw d ka neiropolomen blpontew ka famen nagkaon enai pou t n pan n
tini tp ka katxon xran tinTim., 52b.
Tim., 52d-53b.
Tim., 53c-55c.
F.M. Cornford, The invention of space, in Essays in Honour of Gilbert Murray, London 1936, pp.
215-235.
See, for instance, Diels-Kranz, Vorsokratiker, 67A6, 68A37.
A. Koyr, From the closed world to the infinite universe, Baltimore 1957.

Torretti, Space
10

11

14

15

16

12
13

17
18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

29

30

19

On the simple bodies, see De Clo, I, i-iv. On the 55 spheres which Aristotle be
lieved were
necessary and sufficient to make mechanical sense of of the planetary theory of Eudoxus and
Calippus, see Metaphysics, , viii.
Adnaton d sma enai tn tpon: n tat gr n eh do smataPhys., IV, i, 209a67.
Phys., IV, i, 212a20-21.
d' oranw okti n ll Phys., IV, v, 212b22.
par d t pn ka lon odn stin jv to pantw Phys., IV, v, 212b16.
The impossibility of the void (kenn) is the subject of Phys., IV, vi-ix.
The impossibility of an infinite body (sma peiron) is argued in De Clo, I, v-vii. The infinite
(t peiron) is discussed in Phys., III, iv-viii.
On Zenos arguments against motion, see Phys., VI, ii, ix; VIII, viii.
n d t sunexe sti mn peira msh, ll' ok ntelexe& ll dnamei Phys., VIII,
viii,
tn mn on kat posn pervn ok ndxetai casyai n peperasmn xrn, tn d
kat diaresin ndxetai: ka gr atw xrnow otvw peirow. ste n t per ka
ok n t peperasmn sumbanei diinai t peiron, ka ptesyai tn pervn tow
peroiw, o tow peperasmnoiw. Phys., VI, ii, 233a26-31.
Ioannis Philoponi in Aristotelis physicorum libros quinque posteriora commentaria, ed. H. Vitelli; Berlin
1888, p. 567.
Quod Deus non possit movere celum motu recto: Et ratio est, quia tunc relinqueret vacuum.
H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Chartularium universitatis parisiensis, 12001452, Paris 1889 ff. Vol. I,
p. 546.
Deus essentialiter et prsentialiter necessario est ubique, ne dum in mundo et in eius partibus
universis; verumetiam extra mundum in situ seu vacuo imaginario infinito. Thomas Bradwardine,
De causa Dei contra Pelagium, ed. H. Savile; London 1618, p, 177; my italics.
Nicole Oresme, Le Livre du ciel et du monde, ed. by A.D. Menut and A.J. Denomy; Madison 1968,
p. 724.
Oresme, l.c., p. 368: Hors le monde est une espace ymaginee infinie et immobile, et est possible sanz contradiction que tout le monde fust meu en celle espace de mouvement droit. Et dire
le contraire est un article condampn a Paris. (Cf. supra, n. 21.)
Oresme, l.c., p. 176. (French spelling modernized by R.T.)
Estre meu selon lieu est soy avoir autrement en soy meisme ou resgart de lespace ymaginee
immobile, car ou resgart de celle espace ou selon elle est mesuree le isnelet [speedR.T.] du
mouvement et de ses parties. Oresme, l.c., p. 372.
Omnis enim philosophi difficultas in eo versari videtur, ut a phnomenis motuum investigemus vires natur, deinde ab his viribus demonstremus phnomena reliqua. Newton, Philosophi
Naturalis Principia Mathematica, ed. by Koyr and Cohen, Cambridge MA, 1972, p. 16.
Definitio III. Materi vis insita est potentia resistendi, qua corpus unumquodque, quantum in
se est, perseverat in statu suo vel quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum. [] Definitio
IV. Vis impressa est actio in corpus excercita, ad mutandum ejus statum vel quiescendi vel movendi
uiniformiter in directum. Newton, Principia, ed. cit., pp. 40f.
Newton, Principia, ed. cit., p. 46.
Est ergo spacium, quantitas qudam continua physica triplici dimensione constans, in qua corporum
magnitudo capiatur. [] Ipsum etenim locandis corporibus presse oportet, et cum locatis esse, et

Torretti, Space

31

32

33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40

41

42

20

mutuo iisdem succedentibus immobiliem consistere, et omnibus demum recendentibus remanere.

[] Pauperrima illa natur et naturalium distributio in materiam, formam, atque compsitum non
satisfaciat; inde enim spacium prternaturale, et antenaturale judicare oporteret. [] Indifferenter
omnia recipiat []. Nil agat, nilque patiatur. Bruno, De immenso et innumerabilibus, I.viii, in Opera
Latina Conscripta, Vol. I.1, Napoli 1879, p. 231. On Telesio and Patrizi I am indebted to Grant,
Much ado about nothing, Cambridge 1981, Chapter 8.
Videtur corpus secundum Cartesium non differre a vacuo philosophorumHuygens, uvres
compltes, La Haye 1888-1950, vol. 16, p. 221.
This drastic step away from the Judo-Christian tradition would indeed soon be taken by the
Cartesian Spinoza (1632-1677). On More, see Koyr, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe,
Baltimore 1957, chapter V and VI.
De extensione jam forte expectatio est ut definiam esse vel substantiam vel accidens aut omnino
nihil. At neutiquam sane, nam habet quendam sibi proprium existendi modum qui neque substantiis neque accidentibus competit. Non est substantia tum quia non absolute per se, sed tanquam
Dei effectus emanativus, et omnis entis affectio qudam subsistit; tum quia non substat ejusmodi
propriis affectionibus qu substantiam denominant, hoc est actionibus, quales sunt cogitationes in
mente et motus in corpore. Prterea cum extensionem tanquam sine aliquo subjecto existentem
possumus clare concipere, ut cum imaginamur extramundana spatia aut loca qulibet corporibus vacua; et credimus existere ubicunque imaginamur nulla esse corpora, nec possumus credere
periturum esse cum corpore si modo Deus aliquod annihilaret, sequitur eam non per modum
accidentis inhrendo alicui subjecto existere. De Gravitatione et equipondio fluidorum, in Hall
& Hall, eds. Unpublished Scientific Papers of Isaac Newton, Cambridge 1962, p. 99.
Quemadmodum enim durationis partes per ordinem individuantur, ita ut (instanti gratia) dies
hesternus si ordinem cum hodierno die commutare posset et evadere posterior, individuationem
amitteret et non amplius esset hesternus dies sed hodiernus: Sic spatii partes per earum positiones
individuantur ita ut si du quvis possent positiones commutare, individuationem simul commutarent, et utraque in alteram numerice converteretur. Propter solum ordinem et positiones inter
se partes durationis et spatii intelliguntur esse edem ips qu revera sunt; nec habent aliud in
dividuationis principium prter ordinem et positiones istas. De Gravitatione, l.c., p. 103.
The LeibnizClarke Correspondence, ed. by H. G. Alexander, Manchester 1956, p. 32. (Dr. Clarkes
Third Reply, 4.)
Corporum dato spatio inclusorum iidem sunt motus inter se, sive spatium illud quiescat, sive
moveatur idem uniformiter in directum sine motum circulari. Newton, Principia, ed. cit., p. 63.
Si corpora moveantur quomodocunque inter se, et a viribus acceleratricibus qualibus secundum
lineas parallelas urgeantur; pergeant omnia eodem modo moveri inter se, ac si viribus illis non
essent incitata. Newton, Principia, ed. cit., p. 64.
Kant, Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume, Wochentliche Knigs
bergsche Frag und AnzeigungsNachrichten, 6-8, February 1768.
Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 2. Aufl., Riga 1787, pp. 274-279.
Remember the strong presence of Kantianism in the better universities of Germany, Britain and
France at the turn of the century.
G. Saccheri, Euclides ab omne nvo vindicatus, Milan 1733. Chelsea Publications has recently issued
a reprint, with facing English translation.
During the revolution of the surface containing it the straight line does not change its place
if it goes through two unmoving points in the surface (i.e. if we turn the surface containing it
about two points of the line, the line does not move). Lobachevski, Geometrische Untersuchungen
zur Theorie der Parallellinien, Berlin 1840, fact #1.

Torretti, Space
43
44

47

48

45
46

49

50

51

52

53

54

55

56

57

60

58
59

61

21

Gauss to Bessel, January 27, 1829. Gauss, Werke, VIII, Leipzig 1900, p. 200.
Lobachevski, Zwei geometrische Abhandlungen, German translation by F. Engel, Leipzig 1898-99, p.
65.
Gauss, Werke, VIII, Leipzig 1900, pp. 180f.
Lobachevski, Zwei geometrische Abhandlungen, l.c., p. 22.
H. Lotze, Metaphysik, Leipzig 1879, pp. 248f.
B. Riemann, ber die Hypothesen, welche der Geometrie zu Grunde liegen, Abhandlungen
der Kgl. Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Gttingen, vol. 17, 1867. See the English translation with
mathematical commentary in Spivak, A Comprehensive Introduction to Differential Geometry, Berkeley
1979, vol. 2, pp. 135ff.
On Staudt, see H. Freudenthal, The impact of von Staudts Foundations of Geometry, in R.S.
Cohen et al., eds., For Dirk Struik, Dordrecht 1974, pp. 189-200.
F. Klein, Vergleichende Betrachtungen ber neuere geometrische Forschungen, Erlangen 1872. Revised text
in Mathematische Annalen, 43: 63-100 (1893).
F. Klein, ber die sogenannte Nicht-Euklidische Geometrie, Mathematische Annalen, 4: 573-625
(1871); 6: 112-145 (1873); 7: 531-537 (1874).
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