HEG BAD

Hegemons seek war to prove their dominance through pre-emptive strikes

Robinson 13 [7/10/13, Dr. Paul Robinson is Acting Director for the Institute of Applied Ethics
at University of Hull, England Pre-emptive War as a Manifestation of Hegemonic Power: Rome,
Britain, and the United States http://isme.tamu.edu/JSCOPE05/Robinson05.html /sb]
Just as the United States of America dominates the world today as a hegemonic power, so once did Britain and Rome. It is the purpose of this paper
to compare the use by contemporary America, nineteenth century Britain and Ancient Rome of the strategy of pre-emptive war. In so doing it will
suggest

that the doctrine of pre-emptive war is one promoted by those with great power to

justify the aggressive use of force in pursuit of their own hegemonic interests . I will show that
both Rome and Britain regularly fought what they claimed were pre-emptive wars of self-defence,

justified by exaggerated fear

of largely non-existent threats . Romans and Britons were willing to fight over these flimsy pretexts because their power
was sufficiently strong to enable them to do so at relatively little cost to themselves. In
short, they made war because they could. Other weaker powers did not have the luxury
of engaging in pre-emption in the same way, and from the perspective of those
attacked in these wars they could not be described as anything other than aggression.
One can now observe a similar pattern in the wars of the United States of America, most especially the 2003 invasion of Iraq. I will conclude that the
purpose of

the doctrine of pre-emption, today as in the past, appears to be to provide a

means by which hegemonic powers can re-define aggression as self-defence . As such it is not a
doctrine which one can expect anybody other than those with hegemonic power to accept. It should be stressed that the form of pre-emptive war in
question does not refer to military action taken against actually existing threats which pose an imminent danger to national security. Rather, the subject
of the paper is military action undertaken against threats which are more remote, and may not even have yet manifested themselves. As we shall see,
Romans, Britons and Americans have all fought wars of this second kind. Ancient Rome

Hegemonic powers do not feel

secure in their hegemony . According to one recent history: The Romans seem to have perceived foreign relations as a competition
for honor and status between Rome and barbarian peoples

; by proving its superior force through war and

conquest, Rome extracts deference and reverence from other nations, who then remain
submissive, refraining from revolt or attack. It is in this way that the empire is supposed
to maintain security.

Conversely, signs of weakness on Romes part, such as a show of deference to a foreign people, or failure to

avenge a defeat in war or to punish a revolt with sufficient ferocity, are considered invitations to disasters. For these reasons the Romans sometimes
seem to react very aggressively to apparently minor breaches of treaty, to exaggerate the threat posed by rivals, and to respond to crises with
conquest or even attempted genocide while insisting that their concerns are for their own security.[1] We observe in this quotation a pattern which will
reappear in both the British Empire and twenty-first century America.

with very small military forces

Great powers often have to secure vast areas

(a mere 300,000 at the peak of the Roman Empire, even fewer at the peak of the British Empire).

Security comes to depend on portraying an impression of strength. This entails forceful

responses to any perceived defiance . The watchful hegemons soon display a tendency to see threats and insults where
none exist, and then to lash out at those who are perceived as challengers. In short,

they manifest a form of defensive

aggressiveness . It is noticeable that histories of the expansion of both the Roman and British empires often promote the theory that these
empires were built for purely defensive purposes. In the case of Rome, this theory claims that Roman conquest did not flow from a master plan of
world domination. It was foisted upon Rome by circumstances.[2] There was, says E. Badian, a traditional policy of avoiding major aggressive wars
and administrative commitments.[3] When Rome did annex land, it did so solely because the persistently aggressive behaviour of the owners had left
Rome with little choice for its own safety. The problem with this theory is that there

aggression

are too many examples of outright

to make it plausible. One such was Julius Caesars attack on the German tribes led by the chieftain Ariovistus. These had settled

in Gaul, and Caesar justified his attack on them by claiming that: If the Germans formed a habit of crossing the Rhine and entering Gaul in large

numbers, he saw how dangerous it would be for the Romans. If those fierce barbarians occupied the whole of Gaul, the temptation would be too
strong: they would cross the frontier into the Province ... and march on Italy ... This danger, he considered, must be provided against immediately.
Moreover, Ariovistus personally had behaved with quite intolerable arrogance and pride.[4] We see in Caesars quote a clear exposition of the theory
of pre-emptive war.

An act of unprovoked aggression (for such it was) was justified by a

succession of ifs, designed to conjure up a terrible threat which had to be dealt with
immediately, but which never in fact existed . Similar pre-emptive logic was used by Cato the Elder to justify the Third
Punic War, which destroyed Carthage, by then a shadow of its former might (Cato said that the war was necessary to forestall growing Carthaginian
power some other Romans, though, felt that Romes actions were unjust, as Carthage no longer posed any threat). What is interesting in these cases
is that Caesar and Cato felt it necessary to produce a pretext for aggression. It was not acceptable to wage war for any reason. Under the Republic at
least, it was necessary to persuade Senate and people to agree to war. If the people felt that there was not a just cause, and that the war was not
compatible with the honour of Rome, then war would not happen. The only just causes in Roman eyes were defence of oneself or ones allies, and
response to provocation. The emphasis on self-defence was especially strong in the late Republic, when at least a handful of senators probably felt a
serious philosophical aversion to wars that were not genuinely defensive,[5] Cato the Younger being the most notable example. As Susan Mattern
says, the idea was well atttested that wars of conquest ought not to be simply plundering missions, or occasions for self-aggrandizement, though
plunder and self-aggrandizement were permitted as an incidental by-product of just wars.[6] The origins of this attitude lie in what was known as the
fetial law, which laid down certain criteria for a just war.[7] By the late Republic the fetial law had fallen into disuse. Nonetheless, despite some
argument to the contrary,[8] it was not irrelevant. For even if it did not act to stop Rome fighting unjust wars, it did influence the way they framed the
justice of their actions. Its effect was that Roman senators were conditioned from their earliest history to the notion of justifying a war in terms of the
other partys wrong-doing.[9] This had important practical consequences.

An unjust war brought dishonour upon

Rome, and so senators felt justified in punishing those who waged one . For instance, when Lucius
Hortensius stormed and sacked the Greek city of Abdera, the Senate determined that Hortensius had waged an unjust war. It then freed all those
whom he had enslaved, and restored to Abdera its freedom and independence.[10] It is true that in this and other cases, factors other than justice also
motivated the Senate. Romans were extremely envious of successful colleagues.[11] The restoration of freedom to the people of Abdera may have
been done from a desire to humiliate Lucius more than from a sense of justice. These facts created an interesting dynamic. Roman generals sought
glory by fighting wars. But they had to find a way to make their aggression appear just, in other words defensive, in order to avoid giving their domestic
political enemies an opportunity to attack them. To do so, they played on Romans paranoia about external threats. Rome had at one time been
occupied by the Gauls, and the army of Hannibal had appeared before its walls. Romans were in consequence susceptible to scaremongering. By
conjuring up images of Ariovistuss Germans marching on Rome, Caesar could easily persuade most that his pre-emptive war was in truth an act of
self-defence. From the point of view of the Germans, though, as of every target of Roman aggression, there was nothing defensive about Caesars
actions. Caesar used the overwhelming power of his state to assault a much weaker opponent on the pretext that the latter posed a potential future
threat. In truth, it was precisely the Germans weakness that made them such an attractive target. Caesar attacked them not because they were
dangerous, but because he knew he could defeat them and he wanted the glory which victory would bring. This fits in with a general pattern. As one
commentator says, the Romans attacked numerous enemies, not because they feared them, but because they had nothing to fear. ... Most Roman
wars, if not all, were undertaken from a position of strength when Rome was secure in its military superiority.[12] Roman behaviour, writes William
Harris, can be explained convincingly without much recourse to defensive thinking. Often the hostile or disobedient actions of other states seem to
have had the effect of attracting Roman attention. The Romans, for their part, would have found someone to march against in any case.[13] Imperial
Britain One can observe a similar pattern in the expansion of the British Empire almost two thousand years later a paranoid view of potential threats,
a sensitivity to insults to national honour, and a corresponding tendency to engage in pre-emptive wars of aggression against much weaker
opponents, defeat of whom brought glory to the Empire. One of the oddities of the phenomenon was that the leaders of British governments in the late
nineteenth century, most notably William Gladstone and Lord Salisbury, were men who had no desire to add territory to the empire. Historians of British
imperialism therefore tend to explain the great expansion of the Empire in that era in terms of pre-emptive defence. Britain conquered much of the
world in order to prevent others conquering it or to prevent others becoming so strong that one day they might be in a position to threaten British
hegemony. From the subjective position of the British, one could possibly describe this logic as defensive. From the point of view of the natives of the
conquered lands, it is hard to see how such a label applies. Furthermore, the defensive logic also happened to play very usefully into the hands of
more aggressively inclined Empire builders, who wished to expand commerce and conquer land, or of ideologically-inclined dreamers who wished to
spread Christianity and the benefits of Western civilization. Two examples illustrate the British use of the doctrine of pre-emptive war the South
African War (Boer War), 1899-1902, and the 1903 invasion of Tibet. At the time of these wars, Britain was at the peak of its power, but countries such
as Germany, France and the United States were developing advanced industrial economies and Britains status as number one nation was
increasingly insecure. It became ever more important, therefore, to maintain an image of power, and not to lose face in any circumstances.[14]
Sensitivity to insults to national honour increased as a result. Where one is afraid of not appearing strong in the face of threats, one tends to assume
the worst. If one does not know whether a threat exists or one has been insulted, one must assume that it does or one has and respond accordingly.
As a result, the British, like the Romans, developed paranoid views about the nature of the threat to their Empire. To counter the threat, some then
demanded pre-emptive action. One such threat was to British possessions in South Africa from the Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free
State, which in the last two decades of the nineteenth century became extremely rich due to discoveries of gold and diamonds. Fearing that if the
Boers were left unchecked they would eventually gain sufficient power to dominate South Africa at the expense of the British, the British High
Commissioner in Cape Town, Sir Alfred Milner, demanded a pre-emptive war against them. This he achieved by deliberately provoking a dispute with
the Boers concerning the status of British residents of the Boer Republics. Eventually, the Boers, aware that the British intended to attack them, preempted their pre-emption by attacking first. The Boer pre-emption, though, was of the sort that is generally recognised as legal a strike to defend
oneself against imminent attack. The British pre-emption, though, was more distant. There was no evidence that the Boers would have attacked the
British if left to themselves. As Prime Minister Lord Salisbury said, the real point to be made good to South Africa is that we not the Dutch are
Boss.[15] The misfortune of the Dutch (ie the Boers) was to be weak enough to be considered beatable by the British. Major powers such as Germany
and Russia could not be pre-empted in this way, although the British did pre-empt them indirectly by occupying large parts of the world which they
feared these other powers might occupy if they did not do so first. The British were particularly concerned about the Russian threat to the prize
possession of the Empire - India. As Russia expanded through Central Asia, the British began to worry that the Russians would move through
Afghanistan and Tibet and into India. This was a bizarre fear given the logistical impossibilities of supporting a Russian army through such terrain so far
from home, but many nevertheless believed that the threat was real. British officials in India persuaded themselves that the Russians were planning to
seize control of Tibet, from where they could directly threaten India. In a parallel with the American experience of Iraqi exiles providing false intelligence
about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, a Chinese political exile named Kang-yu Wai gave the British a copy of a supposed secret treaty between
China and Russia in which the Chinese government gave the Russians exclusive rights to the economic development of Tibet.[16] Shortly afterwards,
the British invaded Tibet. Although the British viewed themselves as acting defensively, it is very hard for an outside observer to support this opinion.
The Tibetans had not attacked, nor did they intend to attack, nor did they even have the means to attack, the British. They had, though, refused to
permit the British to trade freely in their country and had refused to accept a British envoy. This was their real sin, and the British wished to teach them
a lesson. As Major General George Younghusband said: It is never wise to stand studied impertinence, or even the semblance of it, from any Oriental.
the moment there is a sign of revolt, mutiny or treachery, of which the symptoms are a swollen head and a tendency to incivility, it is wise to hit the

Oriental straight between the eyes, and to keep on hitting him thus, till he appreciate exactly what he is, and who he is.[17] The British, like the
Romans, were at the same time both militaristic and moralistic. Proponents of philosophies such as Muscular Christianity[18] believed in the
aggressive use of force, while at the same time Britons viewed themselves as proponents of fair play who denounced the bully.[19] It is quite obvious
that the British bullied both the Boers and the Tibetans, but they did not wish to think of themselves in that way. They therefore convinced themselves
that they were acting in self-defence. Since there was no obvious threat in the immediate future, they had to invent more distant ones. One sees here
that the role of the doctrine of pre-emption is not simply, or even primarily, to provide external justification for aggression. Rather it is part of a process
of self-deception, convincing the aggressors themselves that they are in reality acting justly. The United States of America

invasion of Iraq falls into the same pattern

The 2003

we have observed in Rome and Britain above. In the first place

,a

hegemonic power attacked a much weaker state. In the second place, it did so on the
basis of exaggerated tales of future threats . Just as Caesar justified the attack on the Germans by a series of extremely
improbable ifs (If the Germans formed a habit of crossing the Rhine If those fierce barbarians occupied the whole of Gaul), in 2003 the United
States justified its attack on Iraq by a series of equally unjustified and improbable conditionals:

if the Iraqis have weapons of

mass destruction, and if they have the means to deliver them, and if they have links with
terrorists, and if their leaders are irrational, and if they decide to give the weapons to the
terrorists, and if they decide to use them then they will be a terrible threat, and that is a
risk we cannot take . We can now say with certainty that what flimsy evidence was provided to justify
this logic was false. But the idea that Iraq posed a serious threat to the United States of
America was always difficult to justify .[20] Given this, it is hard to see perceptions of future threat as being the real cause
of the decision to wage war. This does not mean that decision makers did not believe in the threat many clearly did, just some British leaders really
believed that a Russian army might come marching through Tibet

but it seems likely that they were only able to

hold this belief because they were pre-conditioned to do so by other considerations. In

other words, they believed in the threat because it provided an emotional crutch which
would support the decision they had already made to start the war.

Modern leaders need such a crutch

as much as the Romans and British did, for the contemporary world still considers wars of aggression to be unjust. The general perception, as in Rome
and Britain, is that war must be fought in self-defence. The doctrine of pre-emption appeals because it can provide the necessary justification where it
would otherwise not exist. In 2003, just as the Romans and British felt insecure in their hegemony,

Americans felt insecure after

the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 . And just as the Romans and British decided that the route to security was
hypersensitivity to real and imagined insults and threats, so too do some American decision-makers in the present era. America, according to their
logic, was attacked because it appeared weak and decadent, after it fled from Somalia and failed to deal with Saddam Husseins defiance over a tenyear period.

The purpose of attacking Iraq was to demonstrate strength and resolve.

As the

belligerent journalist Mark Steyn wrote: thats the real reason Saddam had to go: Having cocked a snook at Washington for over a decade, he

symbolised the limits of American power. And it was necessary to make those limits
look a lot less limited .[21] Iraq was also chosen because it was weak . The Romans and British knew
that their power would enable them to prevail over their opponents. So too,

the Americans in 2003 knew that they could

conquer Iraq quickly and at relatively little cost. Such a cost-free outcome was not
assured with other potential opponents , such as North Korea or Iran. In the circumstances, it is very hard to view the
invasion of Iraq as in any way defensive, and from the perspective of Iraqis, who know they posed no threat to the United States, it must be
impossible. Conclusion Comparing the three case studies, one can see a recurring pattern.

Hegemonic states commit acts of

aggression in order to display their power, prove their strength, and win honour for
themselves. They justify this aggression by reference to imaginary future threats, based
on intelligence which is faulty at best or entirely fabricated at worst. The targets of the
aggression are invariably considerably weaker than the aggressors ; the ease with which they can be
beaten is one of their attractions as targets. This in turn reveals one of the characteristics of pre-emptive war. It is a form of war fought by the strong
against the weak. This is necessarily so.

If the weak attempted to pre-empt those stronger than

themselves, they would invite their own destruction

(as the Boers found out). Because of this, one can conclude

that the doctrine of pre-emption lacks universality. It is not a rule for behaviour which can apply to all. It is a manifestation of power, designed to support

the power of those who already have the most, giving the powerful additional rights while depriving the weak of theirs. It masks aggression, and
provides a justification for it. If you are the powerful, and consider your own interests paramount, then perhaps this doctrine may satisfy you. If you are
not, it is one which must surely disturb you greatly.

Hegemony promotes terrorismcreates a self-fulfilling prophecy

Muzaffar 7 [2007, Chandra Muzaffar is the Director of the Centre for Civilization Dialogue at
the University of Malaya and Noordin Sopiee Professor of Global Studies at the Science
University of Malaysia in Penang Hegemony, Terrorism, And WarIs Democracy The
Antidote? http://static7.userland.com/ulvs1-j/gems/wlr/08muzaffar.pdf /sb]
If we reflect upon al-Qaeda attacks, it is obvious that the military, political, and economic dimensions of U.S. hegemony figure prominently on its radar
screen. It is seldom acknowledged, however,

that the cultural dimension of hegemony has also been a

consideration . For instance, during their trial, a couple of the Bali bombers inveighed against Western
cultural imperialism and how it was destroying the identity and integrity of indigenous
communities . By arguing that hegemony in all its manifestations breeds terrorism , we are in no way
condoning terrorism. Al-Qaedas deliberate targeting of noncombatants and civilians in generalin East Africa, on 9-11, in Bali, in Madridhas been
condemned by right-thinking people everywhere. Leading Muslim theologians and scholars have not only denounced al-Qaedas misdeeds from a
humanitarian perspective, but have also castigated Osama and his underlings as men who have shamelessly violated the essence of Islamic
teachings.2 Nonetheless,

if we fail to recognize how hegemony control and dominance over

peopleleads to acts of terror, we will be no better than the proverbial ostrich that
buries its head in the sand . There is perhaps another interesting aspect to hegemony and terrorism that is not widely
acknowledged. Al-

Qaeda, which now claims to be fighting U.S. hegemony, in fact owes its

origin to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which helped to arm and fund the outfit
as part of the resistance to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the eighties . It
served U.S. interests to create and sustain organizations like al-Qaeda since the U.S.
was determined to defeat the Soviet Union at all costs .3 Indeed, the utter failure of the Soviet Army to maintain
its grip upon Afghanistanat least 20,000 of its soldiers were killedwas one of the more important reasons for the eventual collapse of the Soviet
Union in 1991. What this implies is that

since al-Qaeda had also contributed to the Soviet demise, it

would not be wrong to hold it partially responsible for the emergence of the U.S. as the
worlds sole hegemonic power . It may be appropriate at this point to ask: if American hegemony comes to an end, will al-Qaeda
terrorism also cease to exist?

Without American hegemony, al-Qaeda will lose much of its

constituency . That segment of the Muslim population that applauds Osama because he
is prepared to stand up to the arrogance of hegemonic power will disappear
immediately . Besides, it will be more difficult for al-Qaeda to recruit its operative s. In this regard, it
is the U.S. led occupation of Iraqmore than any other eventthat has accelerated al-Qaedas recruitment drive! Having said that, we must
nonetheless concede that even without U.S. hegemony, al-Qaeda may still be around. It nurses a foolish dream of establishing a global Islamic
Caliphate based upon its doctrinaire Wahabist ideologyan ideology that dichotomizes the world into pure Muslims and impure infidels, deprives
women of their dignity, subscribes to a bigoted, punitive concept of law, and has no qualms about employing violence in pursuit of its atavistic goals.4

Hegemony doesnt lead to peacestatistics show it actually leads to war

Montiero 12--Assistant Professor of Political Science at Yale University
Nuno, Unrest Assured, International Security, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Winter 2011/12),
http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Unrest_Assured.pdf
How well, then, does the argument that unipolar systems are peaceful account for the first two decades of unipolarity since the end
of the Cold War? Table 1 presents a list of great powers divided into three periods: 1816 to 1945, multipolarity; 1946 to 1989,
bipolarity; and since 1990, unipolarity. 46 Table 2 presents summary data about the incidence of war during each of these periods.

Unipolarity is the most conflict prone of all the systems, according to at least two
important criteria: the percentage of years that great powers spend at war and the
incidence of war involving great powers. In multipolarity, 18 percent of great power years were spent at war. In

bipolarity, the ratio is 16 percent. In unipolarity, however, a remarkable 59 percent of great power years until now were spent at war.
This is by far the highest percentage in all three systems. Furthermore, during periods of multipolarity and bipolarity, the

probability that war involving a great power would break out in any given year was,
respectively, 4.2 percent and 3.4 percent. Under unipolarity, it is 18.2 percentor more
than four times higher. 47 These figures provide no evidence that unipolarity is
peaceful .48

Decline is inevitablerise of the rest

Kupchan 2/6--professor of international affairs at Georgetown University
2k12, Charles, Sorry, Mitt: It Won't Be an American Century,
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/02/06/it_won_t_be_an_american_century?page=0,0
Even if Romney's rhetoric were to get more domestic traction, 2it would still bear no resemblance to the new global landscape
that is fast emerging. The United States is indeed an exceptional nation -- in its prized geographic

But the country's

exceptionalism should not be used as an excuse to hide from global realities. China's
GDP will catch up with America's over the course of the next decade. The World Bank
predicts that the dollar, euro, and China's renminbi will become co-equals in a "multicurrency" monetary system by 2025. Goldman Sachs expects the collective GDP of the top four developing
countries -- Brazil, China, India, and Russia -- to match that of the G-7 countries by 2032. The United States will no
doubt exit the current slump and bounce back economically in the years ahead.
Nonetheless, a more level global playing field is inevitable.
location, commitment to freedom and democracy, and brand of international leadership.

Decline will be peaceful and solves all their offenseonly a risk of chain
ganging
MacDonald and Parent 11Profs of Political Science @ Williams and Miami
Paul K. and Joseph M., Graceful Decline?, International Security, Spring 2k11, Volume 35,
Number 4, Muse
In short, the United States should be able to reduce its foreign policy commitments in East Asia
in the coming decades without inviting Chinese expansionism. Indeed, there is evidence that a policy of
retrenchment could reap potential benefits. The drawdown and repositioning of U.S.
troops in South Korea, for example, rather than fostering instability, has resulted in an improvement in
the occasionally strained relationship between Washington and Seoul.97 U.S. moderation on
Taiwan, rather than encouraging hard-liners in [End Page 42] Beijing, resulted in an improvement in cross-strait relations and
reassured U.S. allies that Washington would not inadvertently drag them into a Sino-U.S. conflict.98 Moreover, Washington's
support for the development of multilateral security institutions, rather than harming bilateral alliances, could work to enhance U.S.
prestige while embedding China within a more transparent regional order.99 A policy of gradual retrenchment

need not undermine the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments or unleash destabilizing
regional security dilemmas. Indeed, even if Beijing harbored revisionist intent, it is unclear
that China will have the force projection capabilities necessary to take and hold
additional territory.100 By incrementally shifting burdens to regional allies and multilateral
institutions, the United States can strengthen the credibility of its core commitments
while accommodating the interests of a rising China. Not least among the benefits of
retrenchment is that it helps alleviate an unsustainable financial position. Immense
forward deployments will only exacerbate U.S. grand strategic problems and risk
unnecessary clashes .101

Data disproves hegemony impacts

Fettweis 11 (Christopher J. Fettweis, Department of Political Science, Tulane University, 9/26/11, Free Riding or Restraint?
Examining European Grand Strategy, Comparative Strategy, 30:316332, EBSCO)

It is perhaps worth noting that there

is no evidence to support a direct relationship between the relative level

activism and international stability. In fact, the limited data we do have suggest the
opposite may be true. During the 1990s, the United States cut back on its defense spending fairly substantially. By 1998, the
United States was spending $100 billion less on defense in real terms than it had in
1990.51 To internationalists, defense hawks and believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible peace dividend endangered both national and
of U.S.

global security. No serious analyst of American military capabilities, argued Kristol and Kagan, doubts that the defense budget has been cut much

if the pacific trends were not based

upon U.S. hegemony but a strengthening norm against interstate war, one would not
have expected an increase in global instability and violence. The verdict from the past two decades is fairly
plain: The world grew more peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to
believe that its security was endangered by a less-capable United States military, or at least none
took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were enhanced to address
power vacuums, no security dilemmas drove insecurity or arms races, and no regional
balancing occurred once the stabilizing presence of the U.S. military was diminished. The
too far to meet Americas responsibilities to itself and to world peace.52 On the other hand,

rest of the world acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern, despite the reduction in U.S. capabilities. Most of all, the United
States and its allies were no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the United States cut its military spending under
President Clinton, and kept declining as the Bush Administration ramped the spending back up. No complex statistical analysis should be necessary to
reach the conclusion that the two are unrelated. Military spending figures by themselves are insufficient to disprove a connection between overall U.S.
actions and international stability. Once again, one could presumably argue that spending is not the only or even the best indication of hegemony, and
that it is instead U.S. foreign political and security commitments that maintain stability. Since neither was significantly altered during this period,
instability should not have been expected. Alternately, advocates of hegemonic stability could believe that relative rather than absolute spending is
decisive in bringing peace. Although the United States cut back on its spending during the 1990s, its relative advantage never wavered. However,

even if it is true that either U.S. commitments or relative spending account for global pacific trends,
then at the very least stability can evidently be maintained at drastically lower levels of both. In other words, even if one can be allowed to argue in the
alternative for a moment and suppose that there

is in fact a level of engagement below which the United States

cannot drop without increasing international disorder, a rational grand strategist would
still recommend cutting back on engagement and spending until that level is determined.
Grand strategic decisions are never final; continual adjustments can and must be made as time goes on.
Basic logic suggests that the United States ought to spend the minimum amount of its blood and treasure while seeking the maximum return on its
investment. And if the current era of stability is as stable as many believe it to be, no increase in conflict would ever occur irrespective of U.S.
spending, which would save untold trillions for an increasingly debt-ridden nation. It is also perhaps worth noting that if opposite trends had unfolded, if
other states had reacted to news of cuts in U.S. defense spending with more aggressive or insecure behavior, then internationalists would surely argue
that their expectations had been fulfilled.

If increases in conflict would have been interpreted as proof of

the wisdom of internationalist strategies, then logical consistency demands that the lack
thereof should at least pose a problem. As it stands, the only evidence we have regarding the
likely systemic reaction to a more restrained United States suggests that the current
peaceful trends are unrelated to U.S. military spending. Evidently the rest of the world can
operate quite effectively without the presence of a global policeman. Those who think
otherwise base their view on faith alone.