SABINA EXCONDE vs.

DELFIN CAPUNO and

DANTE CAPUNO
G.R. No. L-10068-70 June 29, 1957
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
FACTS
Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was
accused of double homicide through reckless
imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperia and
Amado Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of
First Instance of Laguna. During the trial, Sabina
Exconde, as mother of the deceased Isidoro
Caperia, reserved her right to bring a separate
civil action for damages against the accused.
After trial, Dante Capuno was found guilty of the
crime charged and, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno
was only fifteen (15) years old when he
committed the crime.
In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed
the present action against Delfin Capuno and his
son Dante Capuno asking for damages in the
aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of
her son Isidoro Caperia. Defendants set up the
defense that if any one should be held liable for
the death of Isidoro Caperia, he is Dante
Capuno and not his father Delfin because at the
time of the accident, the former was not under
the control, supervision and custody of the latter.
This defense was sustained by the lower court
and, as a consequence, it only convicted Dante
Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the
complaint. From this decision, plaintiff appealed
to the Court of Appeals but the case was certified
to the Supreme Court on the ground that the
appeal only involves questions of law.

It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of

the Boy Scouts Organization and a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School situated in a
barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31,
1949 he attended a parade in honor of Dr. Jose
Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city
school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with
other students, boarded a jeep and when the
same started to run, he took hold of the wheel
and drove it while the driver sat on his left side.
They have not gone far when the jeep turned
turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon
and Isidoro Caperia, died as a consequence. It
further appears that Delfin Capuno, father of
Dante, was not with his son at the time of the
accident, nor did he know that his son was going
to attend a parade. He only came to know it
when his son told him after the accident that he
attended the parade upon instruction of his
teacher.
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is
liable for the damages in question jointly and
severally with his son Dante because at the time
the latter committed the negligent act which
resulted in the death of the victim, he was a
minor and was then living with his father, and
inasmuch as these facts are not disputed, the
civil liability of the father is evident. And so,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in
relieving the father from liability.

RULING
YES.1
RATIO
Parents shall be liable for the tortious conduct of
their minor children living with them although at
the time of the tort, the children were under the
direct control or supervision of an academic
institution. (THIS IS A LANDMARK DOCTRINE,
WHICH WAS LATER MODIFIED BY J CRUZ IN
AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS)
REASONING
The provision Teachers or directors of arts
and trades are liable for any damages caused
by their pupils or apprentices while they are
under their custody", only applies to an
institution of arts and trades and not to any
academic educational institution.
Dante Capuno was then a student of the
Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his
extra-curricular activity, he attended the parade
in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon instruction of the
city school's supervisor. And it was in connection
with that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with
some companions and while driving it, the
accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is
clear that neither the head of that school, nor the
city school's supervisor, could be held liable for
the negligent act of Dante because he was not

ISSUE
The case involves an interpretation of Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 and 5,
(schools liability versus parental liability) which provides:
"ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding articles is enforceable not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
1

Whether defendant Delfin Capuno can be held

civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son
Dante, for damages resulting from the death of
Isidoro Caperia caused by the negligent act of
minor Dante Capuno.

The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused
by the minor children who live with them.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or
apprentices while they are under their custody."

then a student of an institution of arts and trades

as provided for by law.
The civil liability which the law impose upon the
father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, for any damages that may be caused by
the minor children who live with them, is obvious.
This is a necessary consequence of the parental
authority they exercise over them which imposes
upon the parents the "duty of supporting them,
keeping them in their company, educating them
and instructing them in proportion to their
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the
"right to correct and punish them in moderation"
(Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). The
only way by which they can relieve themselves of
this liability is if they prove that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage (Article 1903, last
paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). This defendants
failed to prove.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is
modified in the sense that defendants Delfin
Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff,
jointly and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as
damages, and the costs of action.

watching that his pupils do not commit a tort to

the detriment of third persons, so long as they
are in a position to exercise authority and
supervision over the pupil. In my opinion, in the
phrase "teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades" used in Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code, the words "arts and trades" does not
qualify "teachers" but only "heads of
establishments". The phrase is only an updated
version of the equivalent terms "preceptores y
artesanos" used in the Italian and French Civil
Codes.
If, as conceded by all commentators, the basis of
the presumption of negligence of Art. 1903 in
some culpa in vigilando that the parents,
teachers, etc. are supposed to have incurred in
the exercise of their authority, it would seem
clear that where the parent places the child under
the effective authority of the teacher, the latter,
and not the parent, should be the one
answerable for the torts committed while under
his custody, for the very reason that the parent is
not supposed to interfere with the discipline of
the school nor with the authority and supervision
of the teacher while the child is under instruction.
And if there is no authority, there can be no
responsibility.

REYES, J.B.L., J., dissenting:

I believe we should affirm the judgment
relieving the father of liability. I can see no
sound reason for limiting Art. 1903 of the old Civil
Code to teachers of arts and trades and not to
academic ones. What substantial difference is
there between them in so far as concerns the
proper supervision and vigilance over their
pupils? It cannot be seriously contended that an
academic teacher is exempt from the duty of

I submit that the father should not be held liable

for a tort that he was in no way able to prevent,
and which he had every right to assume the
school authorities would avoid. Having proved
that he entrusted his child to the custody of
school authorities that were competent to
exercise vigilance over him, the father has
rebutted the presumption of Art. 1903 and the
burden of proof shifted to the claimant to show

actual negligence on the part of the parent in

order to render him liable.
Padilla and Reyes, A., JJ., concur.
SALEN V. BALCE
FUELLAS V. CADANO
Nature: Appeal from the Decision of the Trial
Court making defendant therein, now appellant
Agapito Fuellas, the father of the minor who
caused the injuries to Pepito Cadano, also a
minor, liable under Art. 2180 of the new Civil
Code for damages.
Facts: Pepito Cadano and Rico Fuellas, son of
defendant-appellant Agapito Fuellas, were both
13 years old, on September 16, 1954. They were
classmates at St. Mary's High School, Dansalan
City. They had a quarrel that lead to Pepitos
injury, his right arm was broken after Rico
pushed him on the ground.
It is contended that in the decision of the
Court of Appeals, the petitioner-appellant was
ordered to pay damages for the deliberate injury
caused by his son; that the said court held the
petitioner liable pursuant to par. 2 of Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code, in connection with Art. 2176 of the
same Code; that according to the last article, the
act of the minor must be one wherein "fault or
negligence" is present; and that there being no
fault or negligence on the part of petitionerappellant's minor son, but deliberate intent, the
above mentioned articles are not applicable, for
the existence of deliberate intent in the
commission of an act negatives the presence of
fault or negligence in its commission. Appellant,
therefore, submits that the appellate Court erred

in holding him liable for damages for the

deliberate criminal act of his minor son.
Issue: WON the father is liable civilly for the
criminal act of his son?
Held: Yes. In an earlier case (Exconde vs.
Capuno, et al., G.R. No. L-10132, prom. June 29,
1957), holding the defendants jointly and
severally liable with his minor son Dante for
damages, arising from the criminal act committed
by the latter, this tribunal gave the following
reasons for the rule:
The civil liability which the law
imposes upon the father and, in case
of his death or incapacity, the mother,
for any damages that may be caused
by the minor children who live with
them, is obvious. This is a necessary
consequence of the parental authority
they exercise over them which
imposes upon the parents the "duty
of supporting them, keeping them in
their company, educating them in
proportion to their means", while on
the other hand, gives them the "right
to correct and punish them in
moderation" (Arts. 134 and 135,
Spanish Civil Code). The only way by
which they can relieve themselves of
this liability is if they prove that they
exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the
damage (Art. 1903, last paragraph,
Spanish Civil Code). This, defendants
failed to prove.
In another case, Salen and Salbanera vs. Jose
Balce, the defendant Balce was the father of a
minor Gumersindo Balce, below 18 years of age
who was living with him. Gumersindo was found
guilty of homicide for having killed Carlos Salen,

minor son of plaintiffs. The trial court rendered

judgment dismissing the case, stating that the
civil liability of the minor son of defendant arising
from his criminal liability must be determined
under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code
and not under Art. 2180 of the new Civil Code. In
reversing the decision, this tribunal held:
It is true that under Art. 101 of the
Revised Penal Code, a father is made
civilly liable for the acts committed by his
son only if the latter is an imbecile, an
insane, under 9 years of age, or over 9
but under 15 years of age, who acts
without discernment, unless it appears
that there is no fault or negligence on his
part. This is because a son who commits
the act under any of those conditions is
by law exempt from criminal liability
(Article 12, subdivisions 1, 2 and 3,
Revised Penal Code). The idea is not to
leave the act entirely unpunished but to
attach certain civil liability to the person
who has the delinquent minor under his
legal authority or control. But a minor
over 15 who acts with discernment is not
exempt from criminal liability, for which
reason the Code is silent as to the
subsidiary liability of his parents should
he stand convicted. In that case, resort
should be had to the general law which is
our Civil Code.
The particular law that governs this
case is Article 2180, the pertinent
portion of which provides: "The father
and, in case of his death or
incapacity,
the
mother,
are
responsible for damages caused by
the minor children who live in their
company." To hold that this provision

does not apply to the instant case

because it only covers obligations
which arise from quasi-delicts and not
obligations which arise from criminal
offenses, would result in the absurdity
that while for an act where mere
negligence intervenes the father or
mother may stand subsidiarily liable
for the damage caused by his or her
son, no liability would attach if the
damage is caused with criminal intent.
Verily, the void apparently exists in
the Revised Penal Code is subserved
by this particular provision of our
Civil Code, as may be gleaned from
some recent decisions of this Court
which cover equal or identical cases.
Moreover, the case at bar was decided by the
Court of Appeals on the basis of the evidence
submitted therein by both parties, independently
of the criminal case. And responsibility for fault or
negligence under Article 2176 upon which the
action in the present case was instituted, is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability
arising from fault of negligence under the Penal
Code (Art. 2177), and having in mind the reasons
behind the law as heretofore stated, any
discussion as to the minor's criminal
responsibility is of no moment.
IN VIEW HEREOF, the petition is dismissed, the
decision appealed from is affirmed
GUTIERREZ VS GUTIERREZ
MALCOLM; September 23, 1931
Nature:
an action brought by the plaintiff in the Court of
First Instance of Manila against the five

defendants, to recover damages in the amount of

P10,000, for physical injuries suffered as a result
of an automobile accident.
Facts:
A passenger truck and an automobile of private
ownership collided while attempting to pass each
other on the Talon bridge on the Manila South
Road in the municipality of Las Pias, Province
of Rizal. The truck was driven by the chauffeur
Abelardo Velasco, and was owned by Saturnino
Cortez. The automobile was being operated by
Bonifacio Gutierrez, a lad 18 years of age, and
was owned by Bonifacio's father and mother, Mr.
and Mrs. Manuel Gutierrez. At the time of the
collision, the father was not in the car, but the
mother, together will several other members of
the Gutierrez family, seven in all, were
accommodated therein. Narcisso Gutierrez was
a passenger of the bus. He had a fracture on his
right leg.
It was conceded that the collision was
caused by negligence pure and simple. But,
Narcisso Gutierrez blames both the bus and the
car while the truck blames the car and the car in
turn blames the truck.
the youth Bonifacio was in incompetent
chauffeur, that he was driving at an excessive
rate of speed, and that, on approaching the
bridge and the truck, he lost his head and so
contributed by his negligence to the accident.
The guaranty given by the father at the time the
son was granted a license to operate motor
vehicles made the father responsible for the acts
of his son. Based on these facts, pursuant to the
provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code, the
father alone and not the minor or the mother,
would be liable for the damages caused by the
minor.

Issue:
1. WON the father of Bonifacio (car) is
liable.
2. WON the owner of the truck is liable.
Held:
1. Yes. In the United States, it is uniformly
held that the head of a house, the owner
of an automobile, who maintains it for the
general use of his family is liable for its
negligent operation by one of his
children, whom he designates or permits
to run it, where the car is occupied and
being used at the time of the injury for
the pleasure of other members of the
owner's family than the child driving it.
The theory of the law is that the running
of the machine by a child to carry other
members of the family is within the scope
of the owner's business, so that he is
liable for the negligence of the child
because of the relationship of master
and servant.
2. Yes. The liability of Saturnino Cortez,
the owner of the truck, and of his
chauffeur Abelardo Velasco rests on a
different basis, namely, that of contract.
The reason for this conclusion reaches to
the findings of the trial court concerning
the position of the truck on the bridge,
the speed in operating the machine, and
the lack of care employed by the
chauffeur. In its broader aspects, the
case is one of two drivers approaching a
narrow bridge from opposite directions,
with neither being willing to slow up and
give the right of way to the other, with the

inevitable result of a collision and an

accident
Disposition
In consonance with the foregoing rulings, the
judgment appealed from will be modified, and the
plaintiff will have judgment in his favor against
the defendants Manuel Gutierrez, Abelardo
Velasco, and Saturnino Cortez, jointly and
severally, for the sum of P5,000, and the costs of
both instances.
RODRIGUEZ-LUNA V IAC (DELA ROSA)
135 SCRA 242
ABAD SANTOS; February 28, 1985
NATURE: Petition to review a decision of CA
FACTS: Roberto Luna, a businessman, was
killed in a vehicular collision (between Luna,
driving a gokart, and Luis dela Rosa, 13 years
old, driving a Toyota car without a license) at a
gokart practice area.
Heirs of Luna brought a suit for damages against
Luis and his father, which the CFI ruled in favor
of the Lunas, awarding P1,650,000 as unearned
net earnings of Luna, P12,000 compensatory
damages, and P50,000 for loss of his
companionship (come on!!), with legal interest
from date of the decision, and attorneys fees of
P50,000 (no interest mentioned). (Note: father
and son solidarily liable for damages.)
The Dela Rosas appealed in the CA, which
affirmed in toto the RTC. In a MFR filed by the
Dela Rosas, the CA modified the decision, this
time reducing the unearned income to P450,000.
Both parties filed separate petitions for review in
the SC.

Petition of the Dela Rosas was denied for lack of

merit. The instant petition is the one filed by
Lunas, contending that the CA erred in reducing
the award for unearned income, and that the
award for attys fees should include legal interest.
Pending the decision, the SC came out with a
resolution ordering the Dela Rosas, in the
interest of justice (since the death took place in
1970, and 15 years after the process of litigation
is still not over), to pay the Lunas P450,000 for
unearned net earnings, P12,000 compensatory
damages, P50,000 for loss of companionship, all
with legal interest, and attys fees of P50,000,
within 30 days.
The Dela Rosas failed to pay the amounts,
saying that they had no cash money. The writ of
execution produced only a nominal amount. In
the meantime, Luis is already of age, married,
with 2 kids, and living in Spain but only causally
employed (His compensation is hardly enough
to support his family. He has no assets of his
own as yet).
ISSUES:
1. WON the CA erred in reducing the unearned
income
2. WON the award for attys fees should have
legal interest
HELD:
1. YES
Ratio: The reduction of the award of net
unearned earnings had no basis, thus is void.
Reasoning: the RTC based its computation of
the net unearned earnings on 2 factors: life
expectancy of the deceased of another 30 years,
and an annual net income of P55,000 (P75,000
gross income less P20,000 personal expenses).

In coming out with the life expectancy, RTC

considered the age and health of the deceased.
However, the CA modified this by factoring in the
engagement of Luna in car racing, thus
lowering the life expectancy to only 10 years.
WRT to the gross income, RTC considered the
various positions the deceased held at the time
of his death, and the trend of his earnings over
the span of his last few years, thus coming up
with a potential gross income of P75,000.
However, the CA increased the annual personal
expenses to P30,000, due to the escalating
gasoline expenses, thus lowering the net annual
unearned income to P45,000.
CA erred in ruling that the engagement with car
racing reduced the life expectancy. There is
nothing on record that supports the claim that the
car racing was a dangerous and risky activity
tending to shorten his life expectancy. That Luna
was engaged in go-kart racing is the correct
statement but then go-kart racing cannot be
categorized as a dangerous sport for go-karts are
extremely low slung, low powered vehicles, only
slightly larger than foot-pedaled four wheeled
conveyances. It was error on the part of the CA
to have disturbed the determination of the RTC
which it had previously affirmed.
Also, it was an error to increase the expenses
without increasing the gross income. It stands to
reason that if his annual personal expenses
should increase because of the escalating price
of gas which is a key expenditure in Roberto R.
Luna's social standing [a statement which lacks
complete basis], it would not be unreasonable to
suppose that his income would also increase
considering the manifold sources thereof
2. YES

Ratio: The attorney's fees were awarded in the

concept of damages in a quasi-delict case and
under the circumstances, interest as part thereof
may be adjudicated at the discretion of the court.
(The attys fees should accrue interest from the
date of filing of the compliant.)
Obiter:
The Dela Rosas invoke the ruling in Elcano v
Hilll, where the court held that A2180 applied to
Atty. Hill nothwithstanding the emancipation by
marriage of his son, but since the son had
attained majority, as a matter of equity, the
liability of Atty. Hill became merely subsidiarily to
that of his son. The Dela Rosas now invoke that
the father should also be held only subsidiarily.
To this contention, the court is unwilling to apply
equity instead of strict law because to do so will
not serve the ends of justice. Luis is abroad and
beyond the reach of Philippine Courts. Also, he
has no property in the Phils or elsewhere.
Disposition: resolution of CA SET ASIDE,
reinstating the earlier decision with slight
modification regarding the award of attys fees.
LIBI V INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
(SPS GOTIONG)
214 SCRA 16
REGALADO; September 18,1992
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court.
FACTS
- respondent spouses are the legitimate parents
of Julie Ann Gotiong who, at the time of the
deplorable incident which took place and from

which she died on January 14,1979, was an 18year old first year commerce student of the
University of San Carlos, Cebu City; while
petitioners are the parents of Wendell Libi, then a
minor between 18 and 19 years of age living with
his aforesaid parents, and who also died in the
same event on the same date.
- More than 2 years before their deaths, Julie
Ann Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts
until December, 1978 when Julie Ann broke up
with Wendell after she found him to be sadistic
and irresponsible.
- January, 1979 - Wendell kept pestering Julie
Ann with demands for reconciliation but the Julie
refused, prompting him to resort to threats
against her. In order to avoid him, Julie Ann
stayed in the house of her best friend, Malou
Alfonso
- January 14,1979 - Julie and Wendell died from
a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same
firearm licensed under Cresencio Libi, father of
Wendell
- both set of parents came up with versions of the
story
Gotiongs:
> Wendell caused her death by shooting her and
thereafter turning the gun on himself to commit
suicide
Libis:
> an unknown third party, whom Wendell may
have displeased or antagonized by reason of his
work as a narcotics informer of the Constabulary
Anti-Narcotics Unit (CANU), must have caused
Wendell's death and then shot Julie Ann to
eliminate any witness and thereby avoid
identification
- CFI Cebu: Gotiongs filed civil case against the
parents of Wendell to recover damages arising
from the latter's vicarious liability under A2180

CC.
CFI dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of the evidence.
- IAC: CFI decision set aside and found Libis
subsidiarily liable
ISSUE
WON A2180 CC is applicable in making Libis
liable for vicarious liability
HELD
YES
Ratio The diligence of a good father of a family
required by law in a parent and child relationship
consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and
supervision of the child. Had the defendantsappellees been diligent in supervising the
activities of their son, Wendell, and in keeping
said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong.
Therefore, appellants are liable under A2180 CC.
Reasoning
- undue emphasis was placed by the lower court
on the absence of gunpowder or tattooing around
the wound at the point of entry of the bullet. It
should be emphasized, however, that this is not
the only circumstance to be taken into account in
the determination of whether it was suicide or not
as the body was cleaned already in the funeral
parlor
- Amelita Libi, mother of Wendell, testified that
her husband, Cresencio Libi, owns a gun which
he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in
their bedroom. Each of these petitioners holds a
key to the safety deposit box and Amelita's key is
always in her bag, all of which facts were known
to Wendell. They have never seen their son
Wendell taking or using the gun. She admitted,
however, that on that fateful night the gun was no
longer in the safety deposit box. We, accordingly,

cannot but entertain serious doubts that

petitioner spouses had really been exercising the
diligence of a good father of a family by safely
locking the fatal gun away. Wendell could not
have gotten hold thereof unless one of the keys
to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying
around or he had free access to the bag of his
mother where the other key was.
- A2180': The subsidiary liability of parents for
damages caused by their minor children imposed
by A2180 CC covers obligations wising from both
quasi-delicts and criminal offenses.'
- BUT Liability is not subsidiary BUT primary
> if the liability of the parents for crimes and QDs
of their minor children is subsidiary, they they can
neither invoke nor be absolved of civil liability on
the defense that they acted with the diligence of
a good father of the family to prevent damages.
But if the liability id direct and primary, the
diligence would constitute a valid substantial
defense. HENCE, LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR
QDS OF THEIR MINOR KIDS AS
CONTEMPLATED IN A2180 ID PRIMARY NOT
SUBSIDIARY
> applying A2194 (solidary liability of joint
tortfeasors) the parent is also solidarily liable with
the child. THE LIABILITY OF PARENTS FOR
FELONIES IS LIKEWISE PRIMARY NOT
SUBSIDIARY. A101 RPC SAYS SO
> RULES:
+ for civil liability from crimes committed by
minors under the legal authority and control or
who live in the company of the parents:
PRIMARY
= premised on A101 RPC fot damages ex delicto
by kids 9 or under or 9-15 but without
discernment
= premised on A2180 CC for kids 9-15 with
discernment or 15-21 (now 18)

+ liability effected against father or mother?

BOTH PARENTS AND THOSE WHO EXERCISE
PARENTAL AUHTORITY OVER THE MINOR
= youth welfare code
= FC: responsibility of parents
+ for civil liability arising from QDs committed by
minors: same rules in A2180 and A2182
Disposition Instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed judgment of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED
TAMARGO vs CA (Rubio, Bundoc)
209 SCRA 518
Feliciano, J; 1992
NATURE
Appeal for review of CA decision
FACTS
- On October 20, 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then
aged ten, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle
causing injuries which resulted in her death. He
was charged with reckless imprudence resulting
to homicide but was acquitted and exempted
from criminal liability ob the ground that he had
acted without discernment. The adopting and
natural parents of Jennifer filed a civil complaint
for damages against the parents of Bundoc.
- The parents of Adelberto claimed that they are
not the indispensable party in the action as their
son adopted by the spouses Rapisura on
November 18, 1982 via an adoption decree
granted by the CFI of Ilocos Sur. The trial Court
agreed with the respondents and dismissed the
complaint.

- The case contained procedural questions which

were raised in the appeal. The SC however
decided to hear the appeal based on substantial
justice.
ISSUE
- WON the spouses Bundoc were indispensable
party to the tort action under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
HELD- Yes. The Court held that parental authority did
not retroactively transfer to and vested in the
adopting parents at the time the shooting incident
occurred. The adopting parents had no actual or
physical custody of Adelberto at the time of the
incident as they were then in the US were they
live. To do so and hold them liable for the
tortious act when be unfair and unconscionable.
Reasoning- The act of Adelberto gave rise to a cause of
action on quasi-delict against him under Article
2176. However, because of his minority, the
provision of Article 2180 would be applicable.
Article 2180 reads the obligation imposed by
Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones
own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible The
father and, incase of his death or incapacity, the
mother are responsible for the damages caused
by the children who live in their company The
responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the person herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of
a family to prevent damage.
- The principle of parental liability is designated
as vicarious liability or the doctrine of imputed

liability under the Anglo-American tort law. Thus,

under this doctrine, a person is not only liable for
torts committed by him also torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship
and for whom he is responsibility. Thus parental
liability is made a natural or logical consequence
of the duties and responsibilities of the parents
which include the instructing, controlling, and
disciplining of the child. The presumption under
law is that when a child under their care commits
a tortuous act the parents were negligent in the
performance of these duties and responsibilities.
As stated, sufficient proof can be presented to
overcome this presumption.
Disposition
Petition granted. Decision set aside.
MERCADO v. COURT OF APPEALS AND
QUISUMBING
L-14342
LABRADOR; May 30, 1960
NATURE
This is a petition to review a decision of the Court
of Appeals
FACTS
- Plaintiff-appellant Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. is the
son of his co-plaintiff-appellants Ana Pineda and
Manuel L. Quisumbing, while Augusto Mercado
is the son of defendant-appellee Ciriaco L.
Mercado, Manuel Quisumbing, Jr. and Augusto
Mercado were classmates in the Lourdes
Catholic School on Kanlaon, Quezon City.
- A "pitogo", which figures prominently in this
case, may be described as an empty nutshell
used by children as a piggy bank. On February
22, 1956, Augusto Mercado and Manuel
Quisumbing, Jr. quarrelled over a "pitogo". As a

result, Augusto wounded Manuel, Jr. on the right

cheek with a piece of razor.
ISSUES
1. WON the teacher or head of the school should
be held responsible instead of the of the father
since the incident of the inflicting of the wound on
respondent occurred in a Catholic School (during
recess time)
2. WON the moral damages fixed at P2,000 are
excessive.
HELD
1. NO. The last paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, upon which petitioner rests his claim
that the school where his son was studying
should be made liable, is as follows:
ART. 2180. . . .
Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their
pupils and students or apprentices, so
long as they remain in their custody.
- It would be seem that the clause "so long as
they remain in their custody," contemplates a
situation where the pupil lives and boards with
the teacher, such that the control, direction and
influence on the pupil supersedes those of the
parents. In these circumstances the control or
influence over the conduct and actions of the
pupil would pass from the father and mother to
the teacher; and so would the responsibility for
the torts of the pupil.
- Such a situation does not appear in the case at
bar; the pupils appear to go to school during
school hours and go back to their homes with
their parents after school is over. The situation
contemplated in the last paragraph of Article
2180 does not apply, nor does paragraph 2 of

said article, which makes father or mother

responsible for the damages caused by their
minor children.
2. YES. It is possible that the Court of Appeals
may have considered Augusto Mercado
responsible for or guilty, of a quasi-delict causing
physical injuries, within the meaning of paragraph
2 of Article 2219. Even if we assume that said
court considered Mercado guilty of a quasi-delict
when it imposed the moral damages, yet the
facts found by said court indicate that Augusto's
resentment, which motivated the assault, was
occasioned by the fact that Manuel, Jr. had tried
to intervene in or interfere with the attempt of
Mercado to get "his pitogo from Renato." It is,
therefore, apparent that the proximate cause of
the injury caused to Quisumbing was
Quisumbing's own fault or negligence for having
interfered with Mercado while trying to get the
pitogo from another boy. (Art. 2179, Civil Code.)
After considering all the facts as found by the
Court of Appeals, we find that none of the cases
mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code,
which authorizes the grant of moral damages,
was shown to have existed. Consequently, the
grant of moral damages is not justified.
PALISOC VS. BRILLANTES
41 SCRA 548
TEEHANKEE; October 4, 1971
NATURE
An appeal in forma pauperis on pure questions of
law from a decision of the CFI Manila.
FACTS
- Palisoc spouses as parents of their 16-year old
son, Dominador Palisoc, and a student in

automotive mechanics at the Manila Technical

Institute filed the action below for damages
arising from the death of their son at the hands of
a fellow student, defendant Virgilio L. Daffon, at
the laboratory room of the said Institute.
- the deceased Dominador Palisoc and the
defendant Virgilio L. Daffon were classmates,
and one afternoon, they, together with another
classmate Desiderio Cruz were in the laboratory
room located on the ground floor. At that time the
classes were in recess. Desiderio Cruz and
Virgilio L. Daffon were working on a machine
while Dominador Palisoc was merely looking on
at them. Daffon made a remark to the effect that
Palisoc was acting like a foreman. Because of
this remark Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the
face. Daffon, in retaliation, gave Palisoc a strong
flat blow on the face, which was followed by other
fist blows on the stomach. Palisoc retreated
apparently to avoid the fist blows, but Daffon
followed him and both exchanged blows until
Palisoc stumbled on an engine block which
caused him to fall face downward. Palisoc
became pale and fainted. First aid was
administered to him but he was not revived, so
he was immediately taken to a hospital. He never
regained consciousness; finally he died.
- Defendants were: Antonio C. Brillantes, at the
time when the incident occurred was a member
of the Board of Directors of the institute;
Teodosio Valenton, the president thereof;
Santiago M. Quibulue, instructor of the class to
which the deceased belonged; and Virgilio L.
Daffon, a fellow student of the deceased.
- At the beginning the Manila Technical Institute
was a single proprietorship, but lately, it was duly
incorporated.

- the trial court found defendant Daffon liable for

the quasi delict under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code.
- The trial court, however, absolved from liability
the three other defendants-officials of the Manila
Technical Institute, in this wise:
In the opinion of the Court, this article(art.2180)
of the Code is not applicable to the case at bar,
since this contemplates the situation where the
control or influence of the teachers and heads of
school establishments over the conduct and
actions by the pupil supersedes those of the
parents...The clause "so long as they remain in
their custody" contemplated a situation where the
pupil lives and boards with the teacher, such that
the control or influence on the pupil supersedes
those of the parents...There is no evidence that
the accused Daffon lived and boarded with his
teacher or the other defendant officials of the
school.
ISSUE
WON the school officials are jointly and severally
liable as tortfeasors with Daffon.
HELD
a. YES (head and teacher of the Manila
Technical Institute, Valenton and Quibulue,
respectively)
Ratio The rationale of such liability of school
heads and teachers for the tortious acts of their
pupils and students, so long as they remain in
their custody, is that they stand, to a certain
extent, as to their pupils and students, in loco
parentis and are called upon to "exercise
reasonable supervision over the conduct of the
child." In the law of torts, the governing principle
is that the protective custody of the school heads
and teachers is mandatorily substituted for that of

the parents, and hence, it becomes their

obligation as well as that of the school itself to
provide proper supervision of the students'
activities during the whole time that they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time,
as well as to take the necessary precautions to
protect the students in their custody from
dangers and hazards that would reasonably be
anticipated, including injuries that some student
themselves may inflict willfully or through
negligence on their fellow students.
Reasoning
- The lower court based its legal conclusion
expressly on the Court's dictum in Mercado vs.
Court of Appeals, that "(I)t would seem that the
clause "so long as they remain in their custody,"
contemplates a situation where the pupil lives
and boards with the teacher, such that the
control, direction and influence. It is true that
under the law abovequoted, teachers or directors
of arts and trades are liable for any damage
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they
are under their custody, but this provision only
applies to an institution of arts and trades and not
to any academic educational institution"
- phrase used in the cited article "so long as
(the students) remain in their custody" means the
protective and supervisory custody that the
school and its heads and teachers exercise over
the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.
There is nothing in the law that requires that for
such liability to attach the pupil or student who
commits the tortious act must live and board in
the school, as erroneously held by the lower
court, and the dicta in Mercado on which it relied,
must now be deemed to have been set aside by
the present decision.

- At any rate, the law holds them liable unless

they relieve themselves of such liability, in
compliance with the last paragraph of Article
2180, Civil Code, by "(proving) that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage." In the light of the
factual findings of the lower court's decision, said
defendants failed to prove such exemption from
liability.
b. NO (Brillantes as a mere member of the
school's board of directors and the school) itself
cannot be held similarly liable, since it has not
been properly impleaded as party defendant
- the school had been incorporated since and
therefore the school itself, as thus incorporated,
should have been brought in as party defendant.
DISPOSITION
The judgment appealed from is modified so as to
provide as follows: .
1. Sentencing the Daffon, Valenton and Quibulue
jointly and severally to pay plaintiffs as heirs of
the deceased Dominador Palisoc (a) P12,000.00
for the death of Dominador Palisoc; (b)
P3,375.00 for actual and compensatory
expenses; (c) P5,000.00 for moral, damages; (d)
P10,000.00 for loss of earning power and (e)
P2,000.00 for attorney's fee, plus the costs of this
action in both instances; 2. absolving defendant
Antonio C. Brillantes from the complaint; and 3.
dismissing defendants' counterclaims. .
REYES, J.B.L., J., concurring:
-I would like to clarify that the argument of the
dissenting opinion of the effect that the
responsibility of teachers and school officers
under Articles 2180 should be limited to pupils
who are minors is not in accord with the plain text
of the law.

- Examination of the article shows that where the

responsibility prescribed therein is limited to
illegal acts during minority, the article expressly
so provides, as in the case of the parents and of
the guardians. It is natural to expect that if the
law had intended to similarly restrict the civil
responsibility of the other categories of persons
enumerated in the article, it would have expressly
so stated. The fact that it has not done so
indicates an intent that the liability be not
restricted to the case of persons under age.
Further, it is not without significance that
- finally, that while in the case of parents and
guardians, their authority and supervision over
the children and wards end by law upon the latter
reaching majority age, the authority and custodial
supervision over pupils exist regardless of the
age of the latter.
MAKALINTAL, J., dissenting:
- I see no reason to depart from the doctrine laid
down by this Court in Mercado v. Court of
Appeals. I think it is highly unrealistic and
conducive to unjust results, considering the size
of the enrollment in many of our educational
institutions, academic and non-academic, as well
as the temper, attitudes and often destructive
activism of the students, to hold their teachers
and/or the administrative heads of the schools
directly liable for torts committed by them.
- It would demand responsibility without
commensurate authority, rendering teachers and
school heads open to damage suits for causes
beyond their power to control.
- one other factor constrains me to dissent. The
opinion of the majority states: "Here, the parents
of the student at fault, defendant Daffon, are not
involved, since Daffon was already of age at the
time of the tragic incident." Note that for parental

responsibility to arise the children must be minors

who live in their company...it stands to reason
that (1) the clause "so long as they remain in
their custody" as used in reference to teachers
and school heads should be equated with the
phrase "who live in their company" as used in
reference to parents; and (2) that just as parents
are not responsible for damages caused by their
children who are no longer minors, so should
teachers and school heads be exempt from
liability for the tortious acts of their students in the
same age category.
AMADORA VS CA (COLLEGIO DE SAN JOSERECOLLETOS)
160 SCRA 315
CRUZ; April 15, 1988
Facts:
It was summer of 1972 Alfredo Amadora about to
graduate at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletes.
Alfredo went to the school to submit his Report
in Physic. While they were in the auditorium of
their school, hewas shot to death by his
classmate Pablito Daffon.
ISSUE:
WON Art 2180 is applicable.
Held:
Yes. Art 2180 NCC applies to all schools,
academic or non-academic. Teachers are liable
for acts of their student except where the school
is technical in nature (arts and trade
establishment) in which case the head thereof
shall be answerable.
There is really no substantial difference
distinction between the academic and non-

academic schools in so far as torts committed by

their students are concerned. The same vigilance
is expected from the teacher over the student
under their control and supervision, whatever the
nature of the school where he is teaching. x x x
x The distinction no longer obtains at present. x
xx
The student is in the custody of the school
authorities as long as he is under the control and
influence of the school and within its premises,
whether the semester has not ended, or has
ended or has not yet begun. The term custody
signifies that the student is within the control and
influence of the school authorities. The teacher in
charge is the one designated by the dean,
principal, or other administrative superior to
exercise supervision over the pupils or students
in the specific classes or sections to which they
are assigned. It is not necessary that at the time
of the injury, the teacher is physically present and
in a position to prevent it.
Thus, for injuries caused by the student, the
teacher and not the parent shall be held
responsible if the tort was committed within the
premises of the school at any time when its
authority could be validly exercised over him.
In any event, the school may be held to answer
for the acts of its teacher or the head thereof
under the general principle of respondent
superior, but it may exculpate itself from liability
by proof that it had exercised the diligence of a
bonus paterfamilias. Such defense they had
taken necessary precautions to prevent the injury
complained of and thus be exonerated from
liability imposed by Art 2180.

Basis of teachers vicarious liability is, as such,

they acting in Loco Parentis (in place of parents).
However teachers are not expected to have the
same measure of responsibility as that imposed
on parent for their influence over the child is not
equal in degree. x x x The parent can instill more
lasting discipline more lasting disciple on the
child than the teacher and so should be held to a
greater accountability than the teacher or the
head for the tort committed by the child.
As the teacher was not shown to have been
negligent nor the school remised in the
discharged of their duties, they were exonerated
of liability.
(Note the court view on increasing students
activism likely causing violence resulting to
injuries, in or out of the school premises J.
Guttierez, Jr concurringly said many student x x x
view some teachers as part of the bourgeois and
or reactionary group whose advice on behavior
deportment and other non-academic matters is
not only resented but actively rejected. It seems
most unfair to hold teacher liable on a
presumption juris tantum of negligence for acts of
students even under circumstances where strictly
speaking there could be no in loco parentis
relationship.
The provision of Art 2180 NCC involved in this
case has outlived its purpose. The court cannot
make law, it can only apply the law with its
imperfections. However the court can suggest
that such a law should be amended or repealed.
PASCO V CFI (ARANETA UNIVERSITY)
160 SCRA 785
PARAS; April 25, 1988

NATURE
Petition for certiorari under RA5440 praying that
judgment be rendered setting aside the
questioned order dismissing the complaint as
against the respondent school and denying the
reconsideration of the questioned order of
dismissal.
FACTS
- A group of students walking inside Araneta
University were accosted and mauled by a group
of Muslim students led by Abdul Karin Madidis
alias Teng. Petitioner (Reynaldo) was
subsequently stabbed by Teng requiring him to
be hospitalized and to undergo surgery.
- Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against
Teng and Arante University based on Art 2190
CC
- Respondent school filed a MTD claiming that
the provision only applies to vocational schools
and not to academic institutions. They also claim
that the civil liability in this case arose from a
crime, which they did not commit. Since it was a
civil case, respondent school claims that a
demand should have been made by the plaintiff
rendering it premature to bring an action for
damages against respondent school. MTD was
granted by the CA.
- Petitioner mover to reconsider the Order of
Dismissal. Motion was denied due to insufficient
justification to disturb ruling.
ISSUE
WON the Art 2180 CC2 applies to academic
institutions

"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody."
2

HELD
It is unnecessary to answer the issue. What the
petitioner wants to know is WON the school or
the university itself is liable. The answer is no
since the provision speaks of teachers or heads
Dispositive
WHEREFORE, this Petition is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
YLARDE
vs.
GANCAYCO; 1988 July 29

AQUINO

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Private respondent Mariano Soriano was the
principal of the Gabaldon Primary School and
private respondent Edgardo Aquino was a
teacher therein. At that time, the school was
littered with several concrete blocks which were
remnants of the old school shop that was
destroyed in World War II. Realizing that the
huge stones were serious hazards to the
schoolchildren, another teacher by the name of
Sergio Banez stated burying them all by himself.
Deciding to help his colleague, private
respondent Edgardo Aquino gathered eighteen of
his male pupils, aged ten to eleven. Being their
teacher-in-charge, he ordered them to dig beside
a one-ton concrete block in order to make a hole
wherein the stone can be buried. The work was
left unfinished. The following day, also after
classes, private respondent Aquino called four of
the original eighteen pupils to continue the
digging. These four pupils ---- Reynaldo Alonso,
Fransico Alcantara, Ismael Abaga and Novelito

Ylarde, dug until the excavation was one meter

and forty centimeters deep. At this point, private
respondent Aquino alone continued digging while
the pupils remained inside the pit throwing out
the loose soil that was brought about by the
digging.
When the depth was right enough to
accommodate the concrete block, private
respondent Aquino and his four pupils got out of
the hole. Then, said private respondent left the
children to level the loose soil around the open
hole while he went to see Banez who was about
thirty meters away. Private respondent wanted to
borrow from Banez the key to the school
workroom where he could get some rope. Before
leaving, private respondent Aquino allegedly told
the children "not to touch the stone."

a very cautious person; and (3) that the demise

of Ylarde was due to his own reckless
imprudence.
ISSUE
WON whether or not under Article 2176 and
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, both private
respondents can be held liable for damages.
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter."

A few minutes after private respondent Aquino

left, three of the four kids, Alonso, Alcantara and
Ylarde, playfully jumped into the pit. Then,
without any warning at all, the remaining Abaga
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to
slide down towards the opening. Alonso and
Alcantara were able to scramble out of the
excavation on time but unfortunately for Ylarde,
the concrete block caught him before he could
get out, pinning him to the wall in a standing
position. As a result thereof, Ylarde sustained
injuries and died three (3) days later.

On the other hand, the applicable provision of

Article 2180 states:

Ylarde's parents, petitioners in this case, filed a

suit for damages against both private
respondents Aquino and Soriano. The lower
court dismissed the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) that the digging done by the pupils is
in line with their course called Work Education;
(2) that Aquino exercised the utmost diligence of

HELD
Only Aquino, the teacher, is liable.
Ratio: As regards the principal, We hold that he
cannot be made responsible for the death of the
child Ylarde, he being the head of an academic
school and not a school of arts and trades.
Reasoning:

"Art. 2180. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

"Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of

arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody."

This is in line with the Courts ruling in Amadora

vs. Court of Appeals, wherein this Court
thoroughly discussed the doctrine that under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the
teacher and not the head of an academic school
who should be answerable for torts committed by
their students. This Court went on to say that in a
school of arts and trades, it is only the head of
the school who can be held liable.
Ratio: Private respondent Aquino can be held
liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the
teacher-in-charge of the children for being
negligent in his supervision over them and his
failure to take the necessary precautions to
prevent any injury on their persons.
Reasoning:
(1) failed to avail himself of services of adult
manual laborers and instead utilized his pupils
aged ten to eleven to make an excavation near
the one-ton concrete stone which he knew to be
a very hazardous task;
(2) required the children to remain inside the pit
even after they had finished digging, knowing
that the huge block was lying nearby and could
be easily pushed or kicked aside by any pupil
who by chance may go to the perilous area;
(3) ordered them to level the soil around the
excavation when it was so apparent that the
huge stone was at the brink of falling;
(4) went to a place where he would not be able to
check on the children's safety; and (5) left the
children close to the excavation, an obviously
attractive nuisance.
(6) In ruling that the child Ylarde was imprudent,
it is evident that the lower court did not consider
his age and maturity. This should not be the
case. The degree of care required to be
exercised must vary with the capacity of the
person endangered to care for himself. A minor

should not be held to the same degree of care as

an adult, but his conduct should be judged
according to the average conduct of persons of
his age and experience. The standard of conduct
to which a child must conform for his own
protection is that degree of care ordinarily
exercised by children of the same age, capacity,
discretion, knowledge and experience under the
same or similar circumstances. Bearing this in
mind, We cannot charge the child Ylarde with
reckless imprudence.
DISPOSITION
Granted.
SALVOSA v. IAC (CASTRO)
166 SCRA 274
PADILLA, J.: October 5, 1988
FACTS
Jimmy Abon, a commerce student of Baguio
Colleges Foundation (BCF) and a duly appointed
armorer of the BCF ROTC (under the control of
AFP) was convicted of the crime of Homicide for
shooting Napoleon Castro, a student of the
University of Baguio on 3 March 1977, at around
8:00 p.m., in the parking space of BCF. BCF is
both an academic and arts and trade Union and
the ROTC Unit was under the control of AFP.
Subsequently, the heirs of Napoleon Castro sued
for damages, impleading Jimmy B. Abon,
Roberto C. Ungos (ROTC Commandant
Benjamin Salvosa (President and Chairman of
the Board of BCF), Jesus Salvosa (Executive
Vice President of BCF), Libertad D. Quetolio
(Dean of the College of Education and Executive
Trustee of BCF) and the Baguio Colleges
Foundation Inc. as party defendants.

After hearing, the Trial Court rendered a

decision, (1) sentencing defendants Jimmy B.
Abon, Benjamin Salvosa and Baguio Colleges
Foundation, Inc., jointly and severally, to pay
private respondents, as heirs of Napoleon
Castro; (2) absolving the other defendants; and
(3) dismissing the defendants' counterclaim for
lack
of
merit.
ISSUE
WON petitioners can be held solidarity liable with
Jimmy B. Abon for damages under Article 2180
of the Civil Code, as a consequence of the
tortious act of Jimmy B. Abon.
HELD
NO. Jimmy B. Abon cannot be considered to
have been "at attendance in the school," or in the
custody of BCF, when he shot Napoleon Castro.
Logically, therefore, petitioners cannot under Art.
2180 of the Civil Code be held solidarity liable
with Jimmy B. Abon for damages resulting from
his acts.
Ratio:
Under the penultimate paragraph of Art. 2180 of
the Civil Code, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades are hable for
"damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody." The rationale of such liability is that so
long as the student remains in the custody of a
teacher, the latter "stands, to a certain extent, in
loco parentis [as to the student] and [is] called
upon to exercise reasonable supervision over the
conduct of the [student]." Likewise, "the phrase
used in [Art. 2180 'so long as (the students)
remain in their custody means the protective and
supervisory custody that the school and its heads
and teachers exercise over the pupils and

students for as long as they are at attendance in

the school, including recess time."
Reasoning:
a. The SC hold a contrary view to that espoused
by the CA. According to the CA, while it is true
that Abon was not attending any class or school
function at the time of the shooting incident,
which was at about 8 o'clock in the evening; but
considering that Abon was employed as an
armorer and property custodian of the BCF
ROTC unit, he must have been attending night
classes and therefore that hour in the evening
was just about dismissal time for him or soon
thereafter. The time interval is safely within the
"recess time" that the trial court spoke of and
envisioned by the Palisoc case, supra. In line
with the case of Palisoc, 17 a student not "at
attendance in the school" cannot be in "recess"
thereat. A "recess," as the concept is embraced
in the phrase "at attendance in the school,"
contemplates a situation of temporary
adjournment of school activities where the
student still remains within call of his mentor and
is not permitted to leave the school premises, or
the area within which the school activity is
conducted. Recess by its nature does not include
dismissal. Likewise, the mere fact of being
enrolled or being in the premises of a school
without more does not constitute "attending
school" or being in the "protective and
supervisory custody' of the school, as
contemplated in the law.
b. Jimmy B. Abon was supposed to be working
in the armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot
Napoleon Castro.
ST.
FRANCIS
CA(Castillo/Cadiz)

HIGH

SCHOOL

194 SCRA 340

Paras, J.: Feb. 25, 1991
NATURE
Petition for review of the decision of the CA
FACTS
-Ferdinand Castillo, then a freshman student at
St. Francis HS wanted to join a school picnic at
Talaan Beach, Quezon. His parents didnt allow
him to go due to short notice but directed him to
bring food to the teachers for the picnic and go
straight home. However, he was persuaded by
his teachers to go and later drowned in an
attempt to rescue a drowning teacher.
-his parents filed a complaint against St. Francis
HS, represented by its principal, Illumin, and
several teachers for damages incurred from the
death of their son, contending that it occurred
due to petitioners failure to exercise proper
diligence of a good father of the family. The TC
found against the teachers as they had failed to
exercise diligence by not testing the waters in
which the children (12-13 yrs old) were to swim.
Also, the male teachers who were to watch over
the kids were not even in the area as they went
off drinking. The TC dismissed the case against
the principal and the teacher Cadorna as the
former had not consented to the picnic which was
not school sanctioned, and as the latter had her
own class to supervise then and was not actually
invited.
-Both parties appealed to the CA. On the issue of
the liability of St. Francis HS and the Illumin, the
CA held that both are liable under Article 2176
taken together with the 1st, 4th, and 5th
paragraphs of Article 2180. They cannot escape
liability simply because it wasnt an extracurricular activity of the HS. From the evidence,

it was shown that the principal had known of the

picnic from its planning stage and merely
acquiesced to the holding of the event. As such,
under Article 2180, both are jointly and severally
liable w/ the teachers for the damages incurred
as the negligence of the employees (teachers)
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on
the part of the owner/manager (St. Francis and
the principal). Petitioners contend that the
victims parents failed to prove by evidence that
they didnt give their son consent to join the
picnic. The Court finds this immaterial to the
determination of the existence of their liability.
Also, 2 of the teachers who arrived after the
drowning were absolved from liability as they had
satisfactorily explained their lateness and thus
could not be said to have participated in the
negligence attributed to the other teachers.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE
(1) WON there was negligence attributable to the
defendants
(2) WON Art. 2180, in relation to 2176 is
applicable
(3) WON the award of exemplary and moral
damages is proper
HELD
(1) NO. Petitioners are neither guilty of their own
negligence or the negligence of people under
them. At the outset, it should be noted that the
victims parents allowed their son to join the
picnic as evidenced by a mental and physical
cross examination.
-Mere knowledge by Illumin of the planning of the
picnic does not show acquiescence or consent to
it. If the CAs findings are to be upheld,
employers will be forever exposed to the risk and

danger of being hailed to Court to answer for the

misdeeds or omissions of their employees even if
such acts or omissions are committed while they
are not in the performance of their duties.
-No negligence can be attributable to the
teachers as the presumption is overthrown by
proof that they exercised diligence of a good
father of the family. In fact, 2 P.E. teachers were
invited as they were scout masters and had
knowledge in First Aid and swimming. Life savers
were brought in the event of such an accident.
The records also show that the 2 P.E. teachers
did all that was humanly possible to save the
victim.
(2) NO. The CA erred in applying Art. 2180,
particularly par 4. For an employer to be held
liable for the negligence of his employee, the act
or omission which caused damage or prejudice
must have occurred while an employee was in
the performance of his assigned task. In the case
at bar, the teachers were not in actual
performance of their duties as the picnic was a
purely private affair and not a school sanctioned
activity.
(3) Since petitioners were able to prove that they
had exercised the diligence required of them, no
moral or exemplary damages under Art. 2177
may be awarded in favor of respondent spouses.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the questioned
decision is SET ASIDE
PSBA v CA (BENITEZ/BAUTISTA)
205 SCRA 729
Padilla, J.: Feb. 4, 1992
FACTS
-Carlitos Bautista, enrolled in the 3rd year
commerce course of PSBA, was stabbed and
killed while on campus by assailants who were

from outside the schools academic community.

This prompted his parents to file suit with the
RTC of Manila w/ Judge Ordonez-Benitez
presiding for damages against PSBA and its
corporate
officers,
alleging
negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions,
means and methods before, during and after the
attack of the victim.
-PSBA sought to dismiss the case, alleging that
since they were presumably sued under Art
2180, there was no cause of action since
academic institutions are not subject to the said
provision.
-A motion to dismiss and a subsequent MFR
were denied by the TC, yielding the same results
upon appeal with the CA. Hence this petition.
ISSUES
(1) WON PSBA may be held liable under articles
2176 and 2180
HELD
(1) NO. Because the circumstances of the
present case evince a contractual relation
between the parties, the rules on quasi-delict do
not really govern; but the court has repeatedly
held that the liability for a tort may still exist even
when there is a contract.
-Quoting Cangco v Manila Railroad: the mere
fact that a person is bound to another by contract
does not relieve him from extra-contractual
liability to such person. When such a contractual
relation exists the obligor may break the contract
under such conditions that the same act which
constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the
parties

-Using the test in Cangco, a contractual relation

is a condition sine qua non to PSBAs liability;
hence, any finding of negligence would generally
give rise to a breach of contractual obligation
only.
-When an academic institution accepts a student
for enrollment, a contract is established between
them, resulting in a bilateral obligation. The
school is obliged to provide the student with an
education, along with a safe atmosphere that
promotes the undertaking of imparting
knowledge. In turn, the student abides by the
schools academic requirements and observes its
rules and regulations. However, a school cannot
be an insurer for its students against all risks;
one can only expect it to employ the degree of
diligence required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponding to the circumstances of
persons, time and place.
- In the case at bar a finding is yet to be made as
to whether the contract was breached due to
PSBAs negligence in providing proper security
measures. At this stage, the proceedings have
yet to commence on the substance of the private
respondents complaint and the record is bereft
of all material facts which only the TC can
determine.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The
Court of origin is hereby ordered to continue
proceedings consistent with this ruling of the
Court. Costs against the petitioners.
SOLIMAN, JR. V JUDGE TUAZON
209 SCAR 47
FELICIANO, J; May 18, 1992
NATURE
Civil complaint for damages
FACTS

- On August 13, 1982, while the plaintiff Maximo

Soliman, Jr., a student of the defendant Republic
Central Colleges (RCC), was in the campus
premises thereof, the defendant, Jimmy
Solomon, who was then in the premises of said
school performing his duties as security guard
under the employment of defendant R.L. Security
Agency, Inc., without any provocation, shot the
plaintiff on the abdomen. The plaintiff was
confined in a hospital, and as per doctor's
opinion, he may not be able to attend to his
regular classes and will be incapacitated in the
performance of his usual work for a duration of
from three to four months. Petitioner, represented
by his guardian, filed a civil complaint for
damages against RCC, RL Security Agency and
Solomon,
- RCC filed a motion to dismiss, contending that
the complaint stated no cause of action against it.
It argued that it is free from any liability for the
injuries sustained by petitioner student for the
reason that it was not the employer of the
security guard Solomon, and hence was not
responsible for any wrongful act of Solomon. It
further argued that Article 2180, 7th paragraph,
of the Civil Code did not apply, since said
paragraph holds teachers and heads of
establishment of arts and trades liable for
damages caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, while security guard Jimmy
Solomon was not a pupil, student or apprentice
of the school.
- Resspondent Judge Ramon Tuazon granted
RCCs motion to dismiss. Petitioners MFR was
denied, Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES
1. WON RCC is liable for damages under Articles
2180, as well as those of Articles 349, 350 and
352 of the Civil Code

2. WON RCC could be held liable upon any other

basis in law, for the injury sustained by petitioner
HELD
1. NO
- Under Art. 2180, the obligation to respond for
damage inflicted by one against another by fault
or negligence exists not only for one's own act or
omission, but also for acts or omissions of a
person for whom one is by law responsible.
Among the persons held vicariously responsible
for acts or omissions of another person are the
following:
xxx
xxx
xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helper, acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils, their students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
- The first paragraph quoted above offers no
basis for holding RCC liable for the alleged
wrongful acts the of security guard Solomon
inflicted upon Soliman, Jr. RCC was not the
employer of Solomon. The employer of Solomon
was the R.L. Security Agency Inc., while the
school was the client of the latter. It is settled that
where the security agency, as here, recruits,
hires and assigns the work of its watchmen or
security guards, the agency is the employer of
such guards or watchmen. Liability for illegal or
harmful acts committed by the security guards
attaches to the employer agency, and not to the
clients
of such agency. There being no
employer-employee relationship between RCC

and Solomon, petitioner cannot impose vicarious

liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- Since there is no question that Solomon was
not a pupil or student or an apprentice of the
Colleges, he being in fact an employee of the
R.L. Security Agency Inc., the other abovequoted paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code is similarly not available for imposing
liability upon the RCC for the acts of Solomon.
- The relevant portions of the other Articles of
the Civil Code invoked by petitioner are as
follows:
Art. 349. The following persons shall exercise
substitute parental authority:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(2) Teachers and professors;
xxx
xxx
xxx
(4) Directors of trade establishments with regard
to apprentices;
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 350. The persons named in the preceding
article shall exercise reasonable supervision over
the conduct of the child.
xxx
xxx
xxx
Art. 352.
The relations between teacher and
pupil, professor and student are fixed by
government regulations and those of each school
or institution. In no case shall corporal
punishment be countenanced. The teacher or
professor shall cultivate the best potentialities of
the heart and mind of the pupil or student."
- In Palisoc v. Brillantes, the Court held the
owner and president of a school of arts and
trades known as the Manila Technical Institute
responsible in damages for the death of Palisoc,
a student of that Institute, which resulted from fist
blows delivered by Daffon, another student of the
Institute. It will be seen that the facts of Palisoc v.
Brillantes brought it expressly within the 7th

paragraph of Article 2180, quoted above; but

those facts are entirely different from the facts
existing in the instant case.
- Persons exercising substitute parental authority
are made responsible for damage inflicted upon
a third person by the child or person subject to
such substitute parental authority. In the instant
case, Solomon who committed allegedly tortious
acts resulting in injury to petitioner, was not a
pupil, student or apprentice of the Republic
Central Colleges; the school had no substitute
parental authority over Solomon.
2. YES
- In the case of PSBA v CA, the Court held that
Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable
where a student had been injured by one who
was an outsider or by one over whom the school
did not exercise any custody or control or
supervision. At the same time, however, the court
stressed that an implied contract may be held to
be established between a school which accepts
students for enrollment, on the one hand, and the
students who are enrolled, on the other hand,
which contract results in obligations for both
parties. It held: When an academic institution
accepts students for enrollment, there is
established a contract between them, resulting in
bilateral obligations which parties are bound to
comply with. For its part, the school undertakes
to provide the student with an education that
would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher
education or a profession. On the other hand, the
student covenants to abide by the school's
academic requirements and observe its rules and
regulations.Institutions of learning must also
meet the implicit or 'built-in' obligation of
providing their students with an atmosphere that
promotes or assists in attaining its primary

undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly,

no student can absorb the intricacies of physics
or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the
arts and other sciences when bullets are flying or
grenades exploding in the air or where there
looms around the school premises a constant
threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school
must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus
premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
- It was also pointed out in said case that: "In the
circumstances obtaining in the case at bar,
however, there is, as yet, no finding that the
contract between school and Bautista had been
breached thru the former's negligence in
providing proper security measures. This would
be for the trial court to determine. And, even if
there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual
obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra,
the negligence of the school would not be
relevant absent a contract. In fact, that
negligence becomes material only because of
the contractual relation between PSBA and
Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is
a condition sine qua non to the school's liability.
The negligence of the school cannot exist
independently of the contract, unless the
negligence occurs under the circumstances set
out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
- In the PSBA case, the trial court had denied
the school's motion to dismiss the complaint
against it, and both the CA and this Court
affirmed the trial court's order. In the case at bar,
the court a quo granted the motion to dismiss
filed by RCC, upon the assumption that
petitioner's cause of action was based, and could
have been based, only on Art. 2180 of the Civil
Code. As PSBA, however, states, acts which are

tortious or allegedly tortious in character may at

the same time constitute breach of a contractual
or other legal obligation. Respondent trial judge
was in serious error when he supposed that
petitioner could have no cause of action other
than one based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Respondent trial judge should not have granted
the motion to dismiss but rather should have, in
the interest of justice, allowed petitioner to prove
acts constituting breach of an obligation ex
contractu or ex lege on the part of RCC.
Disposition GRANT DUE COURSE to the
Petition, to treat the comment of respondent
Colleges as its answer, and to REVERSE and
SET ASIDE the Order granting the motion to
dismiss the case.This case is REMANDED to the
court a quo for further proceedings.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY VS. CARPITANOS
PARDO, February 6, 2002
NATURE
Appeal via certiorari from CA deci and resolution
denying MFR
FACTS
(this case was already assigned in PFR)
-Sherwin Carpitanos, together with James Daniel
II (then 15, driving the jeep) and Ched Villanueva
(then in possession and was driving the jeep,
Grandson of Vivencio Villanueva - the owner of
the jeep) and other companions were on their
way to an enrollment drive for the Petitioner
school when the vehicle turned turtle. It was
found out that the steering wheel guide was
detached. Carpitanos sued the school, James
Daniel II, his parents, and Vivencio Villanueva.
-TC: absolved Villanueva and James Daniel II,
held parents and school liable

-CA: school liable under A218 and 219, FC,

finding that school was negligent in letting a
minor drive the vehicle without a teacher
accompanying them.
ISSUE (regarding liability of St. Marys Academy)
WON St. Marys Academy should be held liable
for death of Sherwin Carpitanos, and therefore,
liable for damages
HELD
NO. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.
Ratio. For the school to be liable, it must be
shown that the injury for which recovery is
sought must be the legitimate consequence of
the wrong done; the connection between the
negligence and the injury must be a direct and
natural sequence of events, unbroken by
intervening efficient causes.
Reasoning. The Carpitanos failed to prove that
the negligence of the school was the proximate
cause of the death of the victim.
-The cause of the accident was not the
recklessness of James Daniel II but the
mechanical defect in the jeep of Vivencio
Villanueva.
-Respondents did not present any evidence to
show that the proximate cause of the accident
was the negligence of the school authorities, or
the reckless driving of James Daniel II so
reliance on A219 is unfounded.
-There was no evidence that petitioner school
allowed the minor James Daniel II to drive the
jeep of respondent Vivencio Villanueva. It was

Ched Villanueva was in possession and in

control of the jeep, and was in fact the one who
allowed James Daniel II to drive the jeep.
-Liability for the accident, whether caused by the
negligence of the minor driver or mechanical
detachment of the steering wheel guide of the
jeep, must be pinned on the minors parents
primarily. The negligence of petitioner St. Marys
Academy was only a remote cause of the
accident. Between the remote cause and the
injury, there intervened the negligence of the
minors parents or the detachment of the steering
wheel guide of the jeep.Considering that the
negligence of the minor driver or the detachment
of the steering wheel guide of the jeep owned by
respondent Villanueva was an event over which
petitioner St. Marys Academy had no control,
and which was the proximate cause of the
accident, petitioner may not be held liable for the
death resulting from such accident.
- It is not the school, but the registered owner of
the vehicle who shall be held responsible for
damages for the death of Sherwin Carpitanos.
Disposition.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court
REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of
the Court of Appeals[18] and that of the trial
court.[19] The Court remands the case to the trial
court for determination of the liability of
defendants, excluding petitioner St. Marys
Academy, Dipolog City. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
PHIL RABBIT BUS LINES V PHIL-AM
FORWARDERS
63 SCRA 231
AQUINO; March 25, 1975
NATURE
Petition for review of CFI Tarlac decision

FACTS
- PHIL RABBIT Bus Lines, Inc. and Felix
PANGALANGAN filed a complaint for damages
in an action based on quasi-delict or culpa
aquiliana
against
PHIL-AMERICAN
FORWARDERS, Inc., its manager BALINGIT
and the driver, PINEDA.
- It was alleged that Pineda drove recklessly a
freight TRUCK, owned by Phil-Am, along the natl
highway at Sto. Tomas, Pampanga. The truck
bumped the BUS driven by Pangalangan, owned
by Phil Rabbit. Pangalangan suffered injuries and
the bus was damaged and could not be used for
79 days. This deprived the company of earnings
of about P8,600.
- Among the defenses interposed by the
defendants was that Balingit was not Pineda's
employer. Balingit moved that the complaint
against him be dismissed on the ground that the
bus company and the bus driver had no cause of
action against him.
- CFI dismissed their complaint against
BALINGIT on the ground that he was not the
manager of an establishment contemplated in
Art.2180 CC.
- In the appeal, the bus company also argued
that Phil-Am is merely a business conduit of
Balingit because out of its capital stock with a par
value of P41,200, Balingit and his wife had
subscribed P40T. This implied that the veil of
corporate fiction should be pierced and that PhilAm and Balingit and his wife should be treated as
one and the same civil personality. But this was
not alleged in their complaint.*
ISSUE
WON the terms "employers" and "owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise"

used in Art. 2180 NCC (Art.1903 OCC) embrace

the manager of a corporation owning a truck
(this is a novel and unprecedented legal issue!)
HELD
NO
Vicarious Liability of Owners and Managers
of Establishments: Art.2180 uses the term
"manager" ("director" in the Spanish version)
to mean "employer.
- Hence, under the allegations of the complaint,
no tortious or quasi-delictual liability can be
fastened on Balingit as manager of PhilAmerican Forwarders, Inc., in connection with the
vehicular accident because he himself may be
regarded as an employee or dependiente of his
employer, Phil-American Forwarders, Inc.
* This issue was not raised in the lower court so it
would be unfair to allow them to do so now. The
case has to be decided on the basis of the
pleadings filed in the trial court where it was
assumed that Phil-Am has a personality separate
and distinct from that of the Balingit spouses.
Dispositive Lower courts order of dismissal is
AFFIRMED.
PHILTRANCO V CA (HEIRS OF ACUESTA)
273 SCRA 562
DAVIDE; June 17, 1997
NATURE
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA
FACTS
-Civil Case No. 373 was an action against herein
petitioners for damages instituted by the heirs of
Ramon A. Acuesta
-Private respondents alleged that the petitioners
were guilty of gross negligence, recklessness,

violation of traffic rules and regulations,

abandonment of victim, and attempt to escape
from a crime
Private Respondents Version
-In the early morning of March 24, 1990, about
6:00 oclock, the victim Ramon A. Acuesta was
riding in his easy rider bicycle along the Gomez
Street
-On the Magsaysay Blvd., defendant Philtranco
Service Enterprises, Inc. (Philtranco for brevity)
Bus No. 4025 driven by defendant Manilhig was
being pushed by some persons in order to start
its engine.
-The Magsaysay Blvd. runs perpendicular to
Gomez St. and the said Philtranco bus 4025 was
heading in the general direction of the said
Gomez Street.
-As the bus was pushed, its engine started
thereby the bus continued on its running motion
and it occurred at the time when Ramon A.
Acuesta who was still riding on his bicycle was
directly in front of the said bus.
-As the engine of the Philtranco bus started
abruptly and suddenly, its running motion was
also enhanced by the said functioning engine,
thereby the subject bus bumped on the victim
Ramon A. Acuesta who, as a result thereof fell
and, thereafter, was run over by the said bus.
Petitioners Version
-Manilhig, in preparation for his trip back to
Pasay City, warmed up the engine of the bus and
made a few rounds within the city proper of
Calbayog.
-While the bus was slowly and moderately
cruising along Gomez Street, the victim, who was
biking towards the same direction as the bus,
suddenly overtook two tricycles and swerved left
to the center of the road.

-The swerving was abrupt and so sudden that

even as Manilhig applied the brakes and blew the
bus horn, the victim was bumped from behind
and run over by the bus.
-Petitioners alleged that Philtranco exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its employees,
including petitioner Manilhig who had excellent
record as a driver and had undergone months of
rigid training before he was hired.
-Petitioners further claimed that it was the
negligence of the victim in overtaking two
tricycles, without taking precautions such as
seeing first that the road was clear, which caused
the death of the victim
**Trial Court ruled in favor of private respondents
-Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court, and denied MFR
-Hence, this appeal
ISSUE
WON petitioner Philtranco is solidarily liable with
Manilhig for damages
HELD
Yes.
-Civil Case No. 373 is an action for damages
based on quasi-delict under Article 21763 and
21804 of the Civil Code against petitioner

(limited to that involved in the outline)

3Art.

2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence,
is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions
of this Chapter
4Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
xxxxxxxxx
The owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible for damages
caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter are employed or on the
occasion of their functions.
xxxxxxxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers
acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxxxxxxx

Manilhig and his employer, petitioner Philtranco,

respectively.
-We have consistently held that the liability of
the registered owner of a public service
vehicle, like petitioner Philtranco, for
damages arising from the tortious acts of the
driver is primary, direct, and joint and several
or solidary with the driver. As to solidarity,
Article 2194 expressly provides: the
responsibility of two or more persons who are
liable for a quasi-delict is solidary.
-Since the employer's liability is primary, direct
and solidary, its only recourse if the judgment for
damages is satisfied by it is to recover what it
has paid from its employee who committed the
fault or negligence which gave rise to the action
based on quasi-delict. Article 2181 of the Civil
Code provides: Whoever pays for the damage
caused by his dependents or employees may
recover from the latter what he has paid or
delivered in satisfaction of the claim.
Disposition
Appealed decision is affirmed. (with regard to this
issue)
CASTILEX V. VASQUEZ
Dec. 21, 1999. Davide
Facts: At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning,
Romeo So Vasquez, was driving a Honda
motorcycle around Fuente Osmea Rotunda. He
was traveling counter-clockwise, (the normal flow
of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective
helmet or goggles. He was also only carrying a
Student's Permit to Drive at the time. Upon the
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

other hand, Benjamin Abad [was a] manager of

Appellant Castilex Industrial Corporation,
registered owner [of] a Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up
with plate no. GBW-794. On the same date and
time, Abad drove the said company car out of a
parking lot but instead of going around the
Osmea rotunda he made a short cut against
[the] flow of the traffic in proceeding to his route
to General Maxilom St. or to Belvic St.
In the process, the motorcycle of
Vasquez and the pick-up of Abad collided with
each other causing severe injuries to the former.
Abad stopped his vehicle and brought Vasquez
to the Southern Islands Hospital and later to the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital. Vasquez died at the
Cebu Doctor's Hospital. It was there that Abad
signed an acknowledgment of Responsible Party
(Exhibit K) wherein he agreed to pay whatever
hospital bills, professional fees and other
incidental charges Vasquez may incur.
After the police authorities had
conducted the investigation of the accident, a
Criminal Case was filed against Abad but which
was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute. So, the present action for damages
was commenced by Vicente Vasquez, Jr. and
Luisa So Vasquez, parents of the deceased
Romeo So Vasquez, against Jose Benjamin
Abad and Castilex Industrial Corporation. In the
same action, Cebu Doctor's Hospital intervened
to collect unpaid balance for the medical expense
given to Romeo So Vasquez.
Issue: WON an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the death resulting from the
negligent operation by a managerial employee of
a company-issued vehicle.

Held: Castilez is absolved from any liability. The

negligence of ABAD is not an issue at this
instance. Petitioner CASTILEX presumes said
negligence but claims that it is not vicariously
liable for the injuries and subsequent death
caused by ABAD.
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of
Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only apply
to instances where the employer is not engaged
in business or industry. Since it is engaged in the
business of manufacturing and selling furniture it
is therefore not covered by said provision.
Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply.
Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is
not accurate. The phrase "even though the
former are not engaged in any business or
industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for
the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his
employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task.
A distinction must be made between the
two provisions to determine what is applicable.
Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth
paragraph, to owners and managers of an
establishment or enterprise; and the fifth
paragraph, to employers in general, whether or
not engaged in any business or industry. The
fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of
employees committed either in the service of the
branches or on the occasion of their functions,
while the fifth paragraph encompasses negligent
acts of employees acting within the scope of their
assigned task. The latter is an expansion of the
former in both employer coverage and acts
included. Negligent acts of employees, whether
or not the employer is engaged in a business or
industry, are covered so long as they were acting

within the scope of their assigned task, even

though committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions.
For, admittedly, employees oftentimes wear
different hats. They perform functions which are
beyond their office, title or designation but which,
nevertheless, are still within the call of duty.This
court has applied the fifth paragraph to cases
where the employer was engaged in a business
or industry such as truck operators and banks.
The Court of Appeals cannot, therefore, be
faulted in applying the said paragraph of Article
2180 of the Civil Code to this case. Under the
fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not
engaged in any business or industry, an
employer is liable for the torts committed by
employees within the scope of his assigned
tasks. But it is necessary to establish the
employer-employee relationship; once this is
done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the
employer liable, that the employee was acting
within the scope of his assigned task when the
tort complained of was committed. It is only then
that the employer may find it necessary to
interpose the defense of due diligence in the
selection and supervision of the employee.
It is undisputed that ABAD was a
Production Manager of petitioner CASTILEX at
the time of the tort occurrence. As to whether he
was acting within the scope of his assigned task
is a question of fact, which the court a quo and
the Court of Appeals resolved in the affirmative.
Well-entrenched in our jurisprudence is
the rule that the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are entitled to great respect, and even
finality at times. This rule is, however, subject to
exceptions such as when the conclusion is
grounded on speculations, surmises, or
conjectures. Such exception obtain in the present

case to warrant review by this Court of the finding

of the Court of Appeals that since ABAD was
driving petitioner's vehicle he was acting within
the scope of his duties as a manager.
On the issue of whether the private
respondents have sufficiently established that
ABAD was acting within the scope of his
assigned tasks, ABAD, who was presented as a
hostile witness, testified that at the time of the
incident, he was driving a company-issued
vehicle, registered under the name of petitioner.
He was then leaving the restaurant where he had
some snacks and had a chat with his friends after
having done overtime work for the petitioner. No
absolutely hard and fast rule can be stated which
will furnish the complete answer to the problem
of whether at a given moment, an employee is
engaged in his employer's business in the
operation of a motor vehicle, so as to fix liability
upon the employer because of the employee's
action or inaction; but rather, the result varies
with each state of facts. The court a quo and the
Court of Appeals were one in holding that the
driving by a manager of a company-issued
vehicle is within the scope of his assigned tasks
regardless of the time and circumstances. The
SC does not agree. The mere fact that ABAD
was using a service vehicle at the time of the
injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to
charge petitioner with liability for the negligent
operation of said vehicle unless it appears that
he was operating the vehicle within the course or
scope of his employment. It used the principles in
American Jurisprudence on the employer's
liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence
of an employee in the use of an employer's motor
vehicle:
I.
Operation of Employer's Motor
Vehicle in Going to or from Meals

It has been held that an employee who

uses his employer's vehicle in going from his
work to a place where he intends to eat or in
returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily
acting within the scope of his employment in the
absence of evidence of some special business
benefit to the employer. Evidence that by using
the employer's vehicle to go to and from meals,
an employee is enabled to reduce his time-off
and so devote more time to the performance of
his duties supports the findings that an employee
is acting within the scope of his employment
while so driving the vehicle.
II.
Operation of Employer's Vehicle
in Going to or from Work
In the same vein, traveling to and from
the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem
or concern of the employee, and not a part of his
services to his employer. Hence, in the absence
of some special benefit to the employer other
than the mere performance of the services
available at the place where he is needed, the
employee is not acting within the scope of his
employment even though he uses his employer's
motor vehicle. 14 cda
The employer may, however, be liable
where he derives some special benefit from
having the employee drive home in the
employer's vehicle as when the employer
benefits from having the employee at work earlier
and, presumably, spending more time at his
actual duties. Where the employee's duties
require him to circulate in a general area with no
fixed place or hours of work, or to go to and from
his home to various outside places of work, and
his employer furnishes him with a vehicle to use
in his work, the courts have frequently applied
what has been called the "special errand" or
"roving commission" rule, under which it can be

found that the employee continues in the service

of his employer until he actually reaches home.
However, even if the employee be deemed to be
acting within the scope of his employment in
going to or from work in his employer's vehicle,
the employer is not liable for his negligence
where at the time of the accident, the employee
has left the direct route to his work or back home
and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
III.
Use of Employer's Vehicle
Outside Regular Working Hours
An employer who loans his motor vehicle
to an employee for the latter's personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not
liable for the employee's negligent operation of
the vehicle during the period of permissive use,
even where the employer contemplates that a
regularly assigned motor vehicle will be used by
the employee for personal as well as business
purposes and there is some incidental benefit to
the employer. Even where the employee's
personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip
to his house where the vehicle is normally kept, it
has been held that he has not resumed his
employment, and the employer is not liable for
the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle
during the return trip.
The
foregoing
principles
and
jurisprudence are applicable in our jurisdiction
albeit based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior, not on the principle of bonus pater
familias as in ours. Whether the fault or
negligence of the employee is conclusive on his
employer as in American law or jurisprudence, or
merely gives rise to the presumption juris tantum
of negligence on the part of the employer as in
ours, it is indispensable that the employee was
acting in his employer's business or within the

scope of his assigned task. ABAD was engaged

in affairs of his own or was carrying out a
personal purpose not in line with his duties at the
time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was
then about 2:00 a.m., way beyond the normal
working hours. ABAD's working day had ended;
his overtime work had already been completed.
His being at a place which, as petitioner put it,
was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps,
and drug pushers and addicts," had no
connection to petitioner's business; neither had it
any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather,
using his service vehicle even for personal
purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of
the perks attached to his position.

and seeing that the road was clear, Allan let

Funtecha drive. Then there was a fast moving
truck (opposite direction) with glaring lights.
Funtecha swerved right and hit the pedestrian
Kapunan. Kapunan was walking in his lane in the
direction against vehicular traffic (I think ito yung
tamang lane and direction ng pedestrians). The
jeep had only one functioning headlight that
night.
- TC and CA ruled in favor of Kapunan. SC
reversed, saying that FCI is not liable for the
injuries caused by Funtecha on the grounds that
the latter was not an authorized driver for whose
acts the petitioner shall be directly and primarily
answerable.

FILAMER V IAC
212 SCRA 637
GUTIERREZ SR; August 17, 1992

ISSUE
WON the employer of the janitor driving the
school jeep can be held liable

NATURE
Motion for Reconsideration

HELD
YES
- Driving the vehicle to and from the house of the
school president where both Allan and Funtecha
reside is an act in furtherance of the interest of
the petitioner-school. Allan's job demands that
he drive home the school jeep so he can use it to
fetch students in the morning of the next school
day.
- It is indubitable under the circumstances that
the school president had knowledge that the jeep
was routinely driven home for the said purpose.
Moreover, it is not improbable that the school
president also had knowledge of Funtecha's
possession of a student driver's license and his
desire to undergo driving lessons during the time
that he was not in his classrooms.
- In learning how to drive while taking the vehicle
home in the direction of Allan's house, Funtecha

FACTS
- Funtecha is a scholar of FCI. He is also
employed as a janitor. The president of FCI is
Agustin Masa. Agustin has a son, Allan, who is
the school bus (bus na jeepney) driver. Allan
lives with his dad. Funtecha also lives in the
presidents house free of charge while a student
at FCI.
- It is the practice of the driver (Allan) after
classes to bring the kids home, then go back to
the school, then go home in the school jeep. He
is allowed to bring home the jeep because in the
morning hes supposed to fetch the kids and
bring them to school.
- One night, Funtecha wanted to drive home. He
has a student license. After a dangerous curb,

definitely was not, having a joy ride Funtecha

was not driving for the purpose of his enjoyment
or for a "frolic of his own" but ultimately, for the
service for which the jeep was intended by
the petitioner school. The act of Funtecha in
taking over the steering wheel was one done for
and in behalf of his employer for which act the
petitioner-school cannot deny any responsibility
by arguing that it was done beyond the scope of
his janitorial duties. The clause "within the scope
of their assigned tasks" for purposes of raising
the presumption of liability of an employer,
includes any act done by an employee, in
furtherance of the interests of the employer or for
the account of the employer at the time of the
infliction of the injury or damage. Even if
somehow, the employee driving the vehicle
derived some benefit from the act, the existence
of a presumptive liability of the employer is
determined by answering the question of whether
or not the servant was at the time of the accident
performing any act in furtherance of his master's
business.
- Funtecha is an employee of petitioner FCI. He
need not have an official appointment for a
driver's position in order that the petitioner may
be held responsible for his grossly negligent act,
it being sufficient that the act of driving at the
time of the incident was for the benefit of the
petitioner. Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not
the school driver or was not acting with the scope
of his janitorial duties does not relieve the
petitioner of the burden of rebutting the
presumption juris tantum that there was
negligence on its part either in the selection of a
servant or employee, or in the supervision over
him. The petitioner has failed to show proof of its
having exercised the required diligence of a good
father of a family over its employees Funtecha

and Allan. There were no rules and regulations

prohibiting the use of the school jeep by persons
other than the driver. There was thus no
supervision on the part of FCI over its employees
with regard to the use of the jeep.
- The petitioner, thus, has an obligation to pay
damages for injury arising from the unskilled
manner by which Funtecha drove the vehicle. In
the absence of evidence that the petitioner had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employees, the law
imposes upon it the vicarious liability for acts or
omissions of its employees. The liability of the
employer is, under Article 2180, primary and
solidary. However, the employer shall have
recourse against the negligent employee for
whatever damages are paid to the heirs of the
plaintiff.
NPC v CA (PHESCO INC.)
294 CRA 209
ROMERO; August 14, 1998
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- On July 22, 1979, a convoy of four dump trucks
owned by the National Power Corporation (NPC)
left Marawi City bound for Iligan City.
Unfortunately, enroute to its destination, one of
the trucks driven by Gavino Ilumba figured in a
head-on-collision with a Toyota Tamaraw. The
incident resulted in the death of three persons
riding in the Toyota Tamaraw, as well as physical
injuries to seventeen other passengers.
- The heirs of the victims filed a complaint for
damages against NPC and PHESCO
Incorporated (PHESCO is a contractor of NPC

with the main duty of supplying workers and

technicians for the latter's projects, but in this
case it was alleged that they own the dump
trucks).
- The trial court rendered a decision absolving
NPC of any liability. PHESCO appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's
judgment absolving PHESCO and sentencing
NPC to pay damages.
ISSUE
WON NPC is the employer of Ilumba, driver of
the dump truck, which should be solidarily liable
for the damages to the victims
HELD
YES
- In the provisions of the "Memorandum of
Understanding" entered into by PHESCO and
NPC, we are convinced that PHESCO was
engaged in "labor only" contracting. In a "labor
only" contract, the person acting as contractor is
considered merely as an agent or intermediary of
the principal who is responsible to the workers in
the same manner and to the same extent as if
they had been directly employed by him. Finding
that a contractor was a "labor-only" contractor is
equivalent to a finding that an employeremployee relationship existed between the owner
(principal contractor) and the "labor-only"
contractor, including the latter's workers.
- Article 2180 of the Civil Code explicitly provides:
"Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry."
- In this regard, NPC's liability is direct, primary
and solidary with PHESCO and the driver. Of

course, NPC, if the judgment for damages is

satisfied by it, shall have recourse against
PHESCO and the driver who committed the
negligence which gave rise to the action.
DISPOSITION Assailed decision affirmed.
LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY &
RODOLFO ROMAN vs MARJORIE NAVIDAD,
Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD &
PRUDENT SECURITY AGENCY
VITUG, J/February 6, 2003
397 SCRA 75
NATURE: APPEAL from CAs DECISION
- 14 Oct 1993, about 730pm, Nicanor Navidad,
then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after
purchasing a "token" (representing payment of
the fare).
- While Navidad was standing on the platform
near the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the
security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad.
- A misunderstanding or an altercation between
the two apparently ensued that led to a fist fight.
- No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate
how the fight started or who, between the two,
delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell
on the LRT tracks.
- At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT
train, operated by petitioner Rodolfo Roman, was
coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving
train, and he was killed instantaneously.
- Marjorie Navidad (Nicanors widow), along with
their children, filed a complaint for damages
against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the
LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc.
(Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her
husband.

- LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against

Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and
Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability
and averred that it had exercised due diligence in
the selection and supervision of its security
guards.
- The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence
while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting
evidence, filed a demurrer contending that
Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was
negligent in his assigned task.
- TC: Rendered in favor of the Navidads and
against the Prudent Security and Junelito
Escartin ordered the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; 2)
Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; 3)
Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the
sum of P50,000.00; b) Moral damages of
P50,000.00; c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; d)
Costs of suit.
- TC: dismissed complaint against defendants
LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit.
-Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals.
- CA: exonerated Prudent from any liability for
the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead,
holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable for the following amounts:
a) P44,830.00 as actual damages; b) P50,000.00
as nominal damages; c) P50,000.00 as moral
damages; d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the
death of the deceased; and e) P20,000.00 as
and for attorneys fees.
-CA ratiocinated that while the deceased might
not have then as yet boarded the train, a contract
of carriage theretofore had already existed when
the victim entered the place where passengers
were supposed to be after paying the fare and
getting the corresponding token therefor. In

exempting Prudent from liability, the court

stressed that there was nothing to link the
security agency to the death of Navidad. It said
that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted
fist blows upon the victim and the evidence
merely established the fact of death of Navidad
by reason of his having been hit by the train
owned and managed by the LRTA and operated
at the time by Roman. The appellate court faulted
petitioners for their failure to present expert
evidence to establish the fact that the application
of emergency brakes could not have stopped the
train.
- CA denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October
2000.
ISSUES:
WON CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT LRTA IS
LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR
NAVIDAD, JR.
WON ERRED CA ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF
LRTA AND ALSO LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF
NAVIDAD
LRTAs CLAIMS:
-Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused
the latter to fall on the tracks, was an act of a
stranger that could not have been foreseen or
prevented.
- NO employer-employee relationship between
Roman and LRTA because Roman himself had
testified being an employee of Metro Transit and
not of the LRTA.
Navidads Contention:
- A contract of carriage was deemed created
from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the
LRT station and entered the premises of the

latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and

protection under a contractual relation, and that
the appellate court had correctly held LRTA and
Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to
exercise extraordinary diligence imposed upon a
common carrier.
HELD:
1. NO. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the
contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of
that contract by reason of its failure to exercise
the high diligence required of the common
carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to
ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may
choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of
the services of an outsider or an independent
firm to undertake the task. In either case, the
common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
- PRUDENT could also be held liable but only for
tort under the provisions of Article 217612 and
related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180,13 of the Civil Code. (But there wasnt any
evidence shown that linking Prudent to the death
of Navidad in this case- SC) The premise,
however, for the employers liability is negligence
or fault on the part of the employee.
- Once such fault is established, the employer
can then be made liable on the basis of the
presumption juris tantum that the employer failed
to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the
selection and supervision of its employees. The
liability is primary and can only be negated by
showing due diligence in the selection and
supervision of the employee, a factual matter that
has not been shown.
- A contractual obligation can be breached by tort
and when the same act or omission causes the

injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the

other in culpa aquiliana, Article 219414 of the Civil
Code can well apply.
- In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a
contract, where tort is that which breaches the
contract. Stated differently, when an act which
constitutes a breach of contract would have itself
constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the
contract can be said to have been breached by
tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.
2. YES.
There is no showing that Rodolfo Roman himself
is guilty of any culpable act or omission, he must
also be absolved from liability as Prudent is.
Needless to say, the contractual tie between the
LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation
between the latter and Roman; thus, Roman can
be made liable only for his own fault or
negligence.
REASONING:
- Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common
carrier, both from the nature of its business and
for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the
duty of exercising utmost diligence in ensuring
the safety of passengers.
- The Civil Code, governing the liability of a
common carrier for death of or injury to its
passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound
to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or
injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed

extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles

1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable
for the death of or injuries to passengers through
the negligence or willful acts of the formers
employees, although such employees may have
acted beyond the scope of their authority or in
violation of the orders of the common carriers.
"This liability of the common carriers
does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of their employees."
"Article 1763. A common carrier is
responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger
on account of the willful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers, if the common
carriers employees through the exercise of the
diligence of a good father of a family could have
prevented or stopped the act or omission."
-The law requires common carriers to carry
passengers safely using the utmost diligence of
very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
- Such duty of a common carrier to provide safety
to its passengers so obligates it not only during
the course of the trip but for so long as the
passengers are within its premises and where
they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of
carriage
- The statutory provisions render a common
carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers
(a) through the negligence or wilful acts of its
employees or b) on account of wilful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers if
the common carriers employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented
or stopped the act or omission.

- In case of such death or injury, a carrier is

presumed to have been at fault or been
negligent, and by simple proof of injury, the
passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish
the fault or negligence of the carrier or of its
employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier
to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen
event or to force majeure. In the absence of
satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the
accident occurred, which LRTA and Roman,
according to the CA, have failed to show, the
presumption would be that it has been at fault, an
exception from the general rule that negligence
must be proved.
DISPOSITION: CAS DECISION AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of
nominal damages is DELETED and (b) petitioner
Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No
costs.
______________
12 Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties,
is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the
provisions of this Chapter.
13 Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article
2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts
or omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity,
the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their
company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the
minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live in their company.

The owners and managers of an establishment

or enterprise are likewise responsible for
damages caused by their employees in the
service of the branches in which the latter are
employed or on the occasion of their functions.
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
The State is responsible in like manner when it
acts through a special agent, but not when the
damage has been caused by the official to whom
the task done properly pertains, in which case
what is provided in article 2176 shall be
applicable.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of
arts and trades shall be liable for damages
caused by their pupils and students or
apprentices, so long as they remain in their
custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
14 Art. 2194. The responsibility of two or more
persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary.
MCKEE V IAC (TAYAG & MANALO)
221 SCRA 517
Davide, Jr.; July 16, 1992
NATURE
- Petition to review the resolution of the CA
FACTS
- On January 8, 1977, in Pulong Pulo Bridge
along MacArthur Highway, Pampanga, a headon-collision took place between an International

cargo truck, Loadstar,

owned by private
respondents, Jaime Tayag and Rosalina Manalo,
and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford Escort
car driven by Jose Koh. The collision resulted in
the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim McKee and Loida
Bondoc, and physical injuries to George McKee,
Christopher McKee and Araceli McKee, all
passengers of the Ford Escort.
- Immediately before the collision, the cargo
truck, which was loaded with 200 cavans of rice
weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling
southward from Angeles City to San Fernando
Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to
Angeles City from San Fernando. When the
northbound car was about 10 meters away from
the southern approach of the bridge, 2 boys
suddenly darted from the right side of the road
and into the lane of the car. The boys were
moving back and forth, unsure of whether to
cross all the way to the other side or turn back.
Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, swerved to
the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then
switched on the headlights of the car, applied the
brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his
lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with
the truck. The collision occurred in the lane of the
truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said
bridge.
- Please see first Mckee digest for details on the
collision.
- Civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict
were filed as a result of a vehicular accident.
ISSUE
WON the owners of the cargo truck (Tayag and
Manalo) are liable for the resulting damages
HELD
YES

- The Court rules that it was the truck driver's

negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
avoid the collision which was, in law, the
proximate cause of the collision. As employers of
the truck driver, Manalo and Tayag are, under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and
primarily liable for the resulting damages. The
presumption that they are negligent flows from
the negligence of their employee. That
presumption, however, is only juris tantum, not
juris et de jure. Their only possible defense is
that they exercised all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent the damage. Article
2180 reads as follows:
The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for
whom one is responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages
caused by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned
tasks, even though the former are not engaged in
any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall
cease when the persons herein mentioned prove
that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
The diligence of a good father referred to means
the diligence in the selection and supervision of
employees.
- The answers of the private respondents in Civil
Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
VALENZUELA v CA (LI and ALEXANDER
COMMERCIAL, INC.)
253 SCRA 303

KAPUNAN; February 7, 1996

NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
- Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela was driving when she
realized she had a flat tire. She parked along the
sidewalk of Aurora Blvd., put on her emergency
lights, alighted from the car, and went to the rear
to open the trunk. She was standing at the left
side of the rear of her car pointing to the tools to
a man who will help her fix the tire when she was
suddenly bumped by a car driven by defendant
Richard Li and registered in the name of
defendant Alexander Commercial, Inc.
- Because of the impact plaintiff was thrown
against the windshield of the car of the
defendant, which was destroyed, and then fell to
the ground. She was pulled out from under
defendant's car. Plaintiff's left leg was severed up
to the middle of her thigh, with only some skin
and sucle connected to the rest of the body. She
was confined in the hospital for twenty (20) days
and was eventually fitted with an artificial leg.
She filed a claim for damages against defendant.
- Lis alibi was that he was driving at 55kph when
he was suddenly confronted with a speeding car
coming from the opposite direction. He
instinctively swerved to the right to avoid colliding
with the oncoming vehicle, and bumped plaintiff's
car, which he did not see because it was
midnight blue in color, with no parking lights or
early warning device, and the area was poorly
lighted. Defendants counterclaimed for damages,
alleging that plaintiff was the one who was
reckless or negligent.
-RTC found Li and Alexander solidarily liable. CA
absolved Alexander.

ISSUE
1. WON Li was grossly negligent in driving the
company issued car
2. WON Valenzuela was guilty of contributory
negligence
3. WON Alexander Commercial is liable as Lis
employer
HELD
1. YES
- The average motorist alert to road conditions
will have no difficulty applying the brakes to a car
traveling at the speed claimed by Li. Given a light
rainfall, the visibility of the street, and the road
conditions on a principal metropolitan
thoroughfare like Aurora Boulevard, Li would
have had ample time to react to the changing
conditions of the road if he were alert as every
driver should be to those conditions. Driving
exacts a more than usual toll on the senses.
Physiological "fight or flight" mechanisms are at
work, provided such mechanisms were not dulled
by drugs, alcohol, exhaustion, drowsiness, etc.
Li's failure to react in a manner which would have
avoided the accident could therefore have been
only due to either or both of the two factors: 1)
that he was driving at a "very fast" speed as
testified by one of the witneses; and 2) that he
was under the influence of alcohol. Either factor
working independently would have diminished his
responsiveness to road conditions, since
normally he would have slowed down prior to
reaching Valenzuela's car, rather than be in a
situation forcing him to suddenly apply his
brakes.
- Li was, therefore, negligent in driving his
company-issued Mitsubishi Lancer
2. NO

- Contributory negligence is conduct on the part

of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause
to the harm he has suffered, which falls below
the standard to which he is required to conform
for his own protection. Under the "emergency
rule" adopted by this Court in Gan vs. Court of
Appeals, an individual who suddenly finds
himself in a situation of danger and is required to
act without much time to consider the best
means that may be adopted to avoid the
impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if
he fails to undertake what subsequently and
upon reflection may appear to be a better
solution, unless the emergency was brought by
his own negligence.
- While the emergency rule applies to those
cases in which reflective thought or the
opportunity to adequately weigh a threatening
situation is absent, the conduct which is required
of an individual in such cases is dictated not
exclusively by the suddenness of the event which
absolutely negates thoroughful care, but by the
over-all nature of the circumstances. A woman
driving a vehicle suddenly crippled by a flat tire
on a rainy night will not be faulted for stopping at
a point which is both convenient for her to do so
and which is not a hazard to other motorists. She
is not expected to run the entire boulevard in
search for a parking zone or turn on a dark street
or alley where she would likely find no one to
help her.
- Negligence, as it is commonly understood is
conduct which creates an undue risk of harm to
others. It is the failure to observe that degree of
care, precaution, and vigilance which the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such
other person suffers injury.
3. YES

- Since important business transactions and

decisions may occur at all hours in all sorts of
situations and under all kinds of guises, the
provision for the unlimited use of a company car
therefore principally serves the business and
goodwill of a company and only incidentally the
private purposes of the individual who actually
uses the car, the managerial employee or
company sales agent. As such, in providing for a
company car for business use and/or for the
purpose of furthering the company's image, a
company owes a responsibility to the public to
see to it that the managerial or other employees
to whom it entrusts virtually unlimited use of a
company issued car are able to use the company
issue capably and responsibly.
- In fine, Alexander Commercial, inc. has not
demonstrated, to our satisfaction, that it
exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of the family in entrusting its company car to Li.
No allegations were made as to whether or not
the company took the steps necessary to
determine or ascertain the driving proficiency and
history of Li, to whom it gave full and unlimited
use of a company car. Not having been able to
overcome the burden of demonstrating that it
should be absolved of liability for entrusting its
company car to Li, said company, based on the
principle of bonus pater familias, ought to be
jointly and severally liable with the former for the
injuries sustained by Ma. Lourdes Valenzuela
during the accident.
DISPOSITION Judgment of RTC reinstated.