Rule87 nos.

1-4 MelMel Bernardino (submitted)

Rule87 no.5 and rule no. 88 nos.1-3 Ortiz (submitted)
Rule89 nos.1-4 Zarah Maglines (submitted)
Rule89 nos.5-8 Delight Calimot (submitted)
Rule89 nos.9,10 and rule 90 nos. 1,2 Emman Cahilog (Submitted)
Rule 90 nos.3-6 macmac Manabat (submitted)
Rule90 nos. 7-10 Charmaine Barcelona (submitted)
Rule 90 nos.11-14 Mary ann constantino (submitted)
Rule91 nos.1-4 Mac-Mac Combista (submitted)
Rule92 no. 5, all cases general guardians and guardianships and 1 case under
rule96- nino Nio Gonzaga Ortonio. (submitted)

Rule 87:
ACTIONS BY AND AGAINST EXECUTORS AND
ADMINISTRATORS
RULE 87, CASE NO. 1
De Bautista vs. De Guzman
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.,
FACTS:

Numeriano Bautista, husband and father of the plaintiffs-appellees, respectively,

was a passenger of jeepney, owned and operated by Rosendo de Guzman,
deceased husband and father of defendants-appellants, respectively, as one of
the jeepneys used in his transportation business. Eugenio Medrano y Torres was
employed by said Rosendo de Guzman as the driver of said jeepney. Said driver
drove and managed said jeepney in a negligent and reckless manner and, as a
result, the jeepney turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano
Bautista sustained physical injuries which caused his death.
Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence and to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano Bautista, plaintiffs-appellees
herein. A writ of execution was issued against said driver, Eugenio Medrano but
the same was returned to the Court unsatisfied.
Rosendo de Guzman died.
Plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint against defendants-appellants alleging
subsidiary liability but Rosendo de Guzman and later the herein defendantsappellants refused to pay the same.
Defendants-appellants through counsel filed a motion to dismiss predicated on
two grounds, namely, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the litigation and that the complaint stated no cause of action. In
support of said motion, they maintained that the suit was for a money claim
against the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it should be
filed in testate or intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings,
after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors should initiate such proceedings,
that the heirs could not be held liable therefor since there was no allegation that
they assumed the alleged obligation.

The lower court sustained the motion to dismiss.

Plaintiffs- appellants filed a second complaint they further allege that on June 12,
1952, Rosendo de Guzman died intestate and that intestate proceedings were
filed in the same court.
Defendants-appellants again filed a motion to dismiss alleging the same grounds
as those interposed in the first complaint but adding the further ground of res
judicata.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLEES CAN STILL CLAIM DAMAGES OVER
THE ESTATE OF ROSENDO DE GUZMAN DESPITE THE ESTATE WAS FINALLY
DISTRIBUTED TO THE HEIRS.
HELD:

The requirement therein is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The
executor or administrator is informed of the claims against it, thus enabling him to
examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be
allowed. Therefore, upon the dismiss of the first complaint of herein plaintiffs-appellees
in Civil Case No. 2050, they should have presented their claims before the intestate
proceedings filed in the same court and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1303-P.
Instead of doing so, however. the plaintiffs-appellees slept on their right. They allowed
said proceedings to terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs pursuant
to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. Such do not sanctioned by
the above rule for it strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of claims
against the decedent's estate in order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as
possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. (See Py Eng Chong v. Herrera, 70
SCRA 130). With the exception provided for in the above rule, the failure of herein
plaintiffs-appellees to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate
of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar to a subsequent
claim against the estate or a similar action of the same import.
Therefore, it was an error on the part of the trial court to hold that the plaintiffs-appellees
had a cause of action against the defendants-appellants who are the heirs of the
deceased against whom the liability is sought to be enforced, much less take
cognizance of the complaint. As in the first complaint, said court could not have
assumed jurisdiction over the second case for the simple reason that it was no longer
acting as a probate court which was the proper forum to file such complaint. The
termination of the intestate proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did
not alter the fact that plaintiffs-appellees' claim was a money claim which should have
been presented before the probate court. The liability of the late Rosendo de Guzman
arose from the breach of his obligations under the contract of carriage between him and
the unfortunate passenger. The obligations are spelled out by law but the liability arose
from a breach of contractual obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim.
The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court
before the creditors can file an action directly, against the distributees. Such is not the
situation, however, in the case at bar. The complaint herein was filed after the intestate
proceedings had terminated and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. If we are to
allow the complaint to prosper and the trial court to take cognizance of the same, then
the rules providing for the claims against the estate in a testate or intestate proceedings
within a specific period would be rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money
against the distributees may be filed independently of such proceedings. This precisely
is what the rule seeks to prevent so as to avoid further delays in the settlement of the

estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his property to the heirs, legatees or
devisees.

RULE 87, CASE NO. 2

Chua vs. Absolute Management
Ponente: Carpio, J
FACTS:

A petition for letters of administration filed by [herein petitioners] Jennifer T.

Chua-Locsin, Benison T. Chua, and Baldwin T. Chua. Betty T. Chua was
appointed as administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased Jose L. Chua.
One of the creditors of the deceased, [herein respondent] Absolute Management
Corporation, filed a claim.
Absolute Management Corporation, suspecting that the documents attached to
Betty T. Chuas reply were spurious and simulated, filed a motion for the
examination of the supposed transferees and premised its motion on Section 6,
Rule 87, Revised Rules of Court.
The trial courts order denying Absolute Management Corporations

ISSUE:
WHETHER SECTION 6, RULE 87 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHICH IS THE
PRINCIPAL BASIS OF ABSOLUTES MOTION, IS MANDATORY OR MERELY
DIRECTORY ON THE TRIAL COURT.
HELD:
The court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through
the filing of the corresponding proceedings has supervision and control over these
properties. The trial court has the inherent duty to see to it that the inventory of the
administrator lists all the properties, rights and credits which the law requires the
administrator to include in his inventory. In compliance with this duty, the court also has
the inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased the
administrator should include or exclude in the inventory. An heir or person interested in
the properties of a deceased may call the courts attention that certain properties, rights
or credits are left out from the inventory. In such a case, it is likewise the courts duty to
hear the observations of such party. The court has the power to determine if such
observations deserve attention and if such properties belong prima facie to the estate.
However, in such proceedings the trial court has no authority to decide whether the
properties, real or personal, belong to the estate or to the persons examined. If after
such examination there is good reason to believe that the person examined is keeping
properties belonging to the estate, then the administrator should file an ordinary action
in court to recover the same.18 Inclusion of certain shares of stock by the administrator
in the inventory does not automatically deprive the assignees of their shares. They have
a right to be heard on the question of ownership, when that property is properly
presented to the court.
In the present case, some of the transferees of the shares of stock do not appear to be
heirs of the decedent. Neither do they appear to be parties to the intestate
proceedings.20 Third persons to whom the decedents assets had been conveyed may
be cited to appear in court and examined under oath as to how they came into

possession of the decedents assets. In case of fraudulent conveyances, a separate

action is necessary to recover these assets.
Taken in this light, there is no reason why the trial court should disallow the examination
of the alleged transferees of the shares of stocks. This is only for purposes of eliciting
information or securing evidence from persons suspected of concealing or conveying
some of the decedents properties to the prejudice of creditors. Petitioners admission
that these persons are the decedents assignees does not automatically negate
concealment of the decedents assets on their part. The assignment might be simulated
so as to place the shares beyond the reach of creditors. In case the shares are
eventually included in the estate, this inventory is merely provisional and is not
determinative of the issue of ownership. A separate action is necessary for
determination of ownership and recovery of possession.

RULE 87, CASE NO. 3

Marshall vs. Antal
Ponente: Street, J.
FACTS:

Walter Toehl, for several years was the Manila manager of Behn, Meyer & Co.,
H. Mij., a foreign corporation engaged in business in the Philippine Islands. At the
same time Carl Antholtz was a chemist and oil technologist, also living in Manila.
Toehl contracted for the services of Antholtz as manager of an oil mill.
It was therefore agreed that Antholtz would conduct the business in his own
name. Antholtz installed for Toehl a factory for the manufacture of coconut oil on
the property mentioned, and he proceeded thereafter to operate the concern in
his own name.
Toehl decided to establish the business in corporate form with a capital.
Antholtz happened to be the owner and holder of all the certificates of stock of a
corporation known as A. Murray & Co., Ltd., a concern without capital, which had
totally ceased to function.
Toehl assumed possession of the documents relating to this corporation with a
view to reviving it as corporate owner of the oil plant above-mentioned.
Toehl transferred to it the parcel of land above-mentioned, with the factory and
machinery established thereon.
Toehl died before the rehabilitation of A. Murray & Co., Ltd., was completed, but
a conveyance was executed by Toehl placing the land, with improvements, in the
name of A. Murray & Co., Ltd.,
Meanwhile Antholtz was operating the oil mill under his contract with Toehl.
After Toehl's death the then manager of Behn, Meyer & Co., H. Mij., procured
Eugen Marschall to be appointed administrator of the estate, and the present
action was instituted by him the recover possession of the oil mill property abovementioned and to hold Antholtz personally liable for certain personal property
pertaining to the oil mill and products of the same which have been sold by
Antholtz in the continuation of his duties as manager.
The plaintiff's case supposes that Toehl and Antholtz were in collusion.
As a consequence of this supposed collusion, it is insisted for the plaintiff that
Antholtz is liable for everything which Toehl had taken from Behn, Meyer & Co.,
H. Mij., and placed in the oil mill business.

ISSUE:
WHETHER ANTHOLTZ IS LIABLE FOR THE PROCEEDS OF CERTAIN EFFECTS
SOLD BY HIM AFTER THE DEATH OF TOEHL, AS WELL AS THE PROCEEDS OF
THE OUTPUT OF THE MILL WHILE ANTHOLTZ CONTINUED IN THE
MANAGEMENT.
HELD:
Any person, before the granting of letters testamentary or of administration on the
estate of a deceased person, embezzles, or alienates, any of the effects of such
deceased person, such person shall be liable to an action in favor of the executor or
administrator of such estate for double the value of the property sold, embezzled, or
alienated, to be recovered for the benefit of the estate. But this provision has reference
primarily to funds that are lost by embezzlement or alienation, and it cannot be
understood as making the manager of a going concern liable for proceeds of sales
applied by him to the proper uses of the business, as occurred in this case. The proof
shows that the personal property other than the products of the mill, sold by Antholtz in
the manner mentioned, was sold with the consent of the manager of Behn, Meyer &
Co., H. Mij., and with the consent of the administrator of Walter Toehl, and the proceeds
of these sales, as well as the proceeds of the products of the mill, were applied by
Antholtz to the obligations incurred by him in running the business, without the improper
diversion of a single cent. In article 280 of the Code of Commerce, it is provided that a
contract of agency shall not be rescinded by the death or incapacity of the principal,
although it may be revoked by his representatives. As the oil mill in Santo Ana was a
going concern, it was apparently to the interest of all persons concerned that its
operation should continue, at least until the authority of Antholtz should be revoked by
the representative of Toehl, which does not appear to have been done prior to the
accomplishment of the acts complained of. Nor was there error in the action of the trial
court in requiring the estate, as a condition of the taking over of this property, that it
should compensate or reimburse Antholtz to the extent stated in the dispositive part of
the appealed decision.

RULE 87, CASE NO. 4

Gutierrez vs. Barretto
Ponente: Makalintal, J.
FACTS:

Maria Gerardo Vda. de Barretto, owner of hectares of fishpond leased the same
to appellant Gutierrez.

The lessor having died, Gutierrez filed a claim.

Appellant commenced the instant ordinary civil action against the executrix of the
testate for the recovery of the amount. The complaint specifically charges
decedent Manila Gerardo Vda. de Barretto, is lessor, was having violated a
warranty in the lease contract again any damages the lessee might suffer by
reason of the claim of the government that several rivers and creeks of the public
domain were included in the fishponds.

ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR DAMAGES BASED ON
UNREALIZED PROFITS IS A MONEY CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE
DECEASED MARIA GERARDO VDA. DE BARRETTO WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF
RULE 87, SECTION 5.
HELD:
The word "claims" as used in statutes requiring the presentation of claims against a
decedent's estate is generally construed to mean debts or demands of a pecuniary
nature which could have been enforced against the deceased in his lifetime and could
have been reduced to simple money judgments; and among these are those founded
upon contract. 21 Am. Jur. 579. The claim in this case is based on contract
specifically, on a breach thereof. It falls squarely under section 5 of Rule 87 "Upon all
contracts by the decedent broken during his lifetime, even though they were personal to
the decedent in liability, the personal representative is answerable for the breach out of
the assets." 3 Schouler on Wills, Executors and Administrators, 6th Ed., 2395. A claim
for breach of a covenant in a deed of the decedent must be presented under a statute
requiring such presentment of all claims grounded on contract. Id. 2461; Clayton v.
Dinwoody, 93 P. 723; James v. Corvin, 51 P. 2nd 689.1
The only actions that may be instituted against the executor or administrator are those
to recover real or personal property from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and
actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal. Rule
88, section 1. The instant suit is not one of them.

CASE NO 5
RIOFERIO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]
Facts:
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal and real properties. Private
respondents discovered that petitioner Teodora Rioferio (the paramour) and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, real estate mortgages and
transfers involving the properties of the estate of the decedent. To recover their rights, Alfonso Clyde P.
Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of Administration praying that letters of administration
encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.
Issue: Whether the heirs (respondents) may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the
appointment of an administrator.
Ruling: YES.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to
bring suit in behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the
New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the
decedent. The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations
to the extent and value of the inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or others
by his will or by operation of law. Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been appointed. The heirs cannot be expected
to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed
would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime
do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.

RULE 88: PAYMENT OF THE DEBTS OF THE

ESTATE
CASE 1
(1) ARKONCEL v. LAGAMON
204 SCRA 560

FACTS: The late Casimiro F. Arkoncel died intestate on July 20, 1976 at Davao City (his residence at the time of his
death), leaving behind an estate with a probable value of about P241,020.00. Casimiro V. Arkoncel, Jr., the eldest
son, was appointed as judicial administrator. The Court of First Instance allowed him one year within which to dispose
of the estate and to pay the debts of the deceased.

FNCB Finance, respondent herein, filed on October 7, 1977 with the court a quo its claim against the estate for the
payment of certain debts incurred by the decedent during his lifetime. Casimiro Jr. and FNCB entered into an
amicable settlement. The intestate Court approved the amicable settlement in, directing the parties to strictly comply
with the terms thereof and the Judicial Administrator, "to pay the amounts agreed upon out of the estate finds and/or
properties within 30 days from receipt" of the said order.

Casimiro Jr. failed to settle the claim. Thus, on November 26, 1978 private respondent filed with the intestate court a
motion for execution praying for the issuance of a writ of execution to satisfy its claims, which the court granted.

ISSUE: WON a writ of execution is the property remedy/procedure to satisfy money claims or for the payment of
debts before an intestate court in an administration proceedings.

HELD: YES.

The Judicial Administrator voluntarily entered into an amicable settlement with the claimant FNCB Finance, which
was duly approved by the intestate Court. The rule is that a judgment rendered in accordance with a compromise
agreement is immediately executory unless a motion is filed to set aside the agreement on the ground of fraud,
mistake or duress in which case an appeal may be taken against the order denying the motion. It then becomes
ministerial for the lower court to order the execution of its final executory judgment.

Even more than a contract which may be enforced by ordinary action for specific performance, the compromise
agreement is part and parcel of the judgment, and may therefore be enforced as such by a writ of execution.
Finally, when the terms of an amicable settlement are violated, as in the case at bar, the remedy of the aggrieved
party is to move for its execution.

CASE 2
(2) SANTOS v. MANARANG
27 Phil. 209

FACTS: Don Lucas de Ocampo died on November 18, 1906, possessed of certain real and personal property which,
by his last will and testament, he left to his three children. The fourth clause of this will reads as follows:

I also declare that I have contracted the debts detailed below, and it is my desire that they may be religiously
paid by my wife and executors in the form and at the time agreed upon with my creditors.

Among the debts mentioned in the list referred to are two in favor of the plaintiff, Isidro Santos; one due on April 14,
1907, for P5,000, and various other described as falling due at different dates (the dates are not given) amounting to
the sum of P2,454. The will was duly probated and a committee was regularly appointed to hear and determine such
claims against the estate as might be presented. This committee submitted its report to the court on June 27, 1908.
On July 14, 1908, the plaintiff, Isidro Santos, presented a petition to the court asking that the committee be required
to reconvene and pass upon his claims against the estate which were recognized in the will of testator. This petition
was denied by the court, and on November 21, 1910, the plaintiff instituted the present proceedings against the
administratrix of the estate to recover the sums mentioned in the will as due him. Relief was denied in the court
below, and now appeals to this court.

ISSUE: WON petitioners claim is within the purview of the committees jurisdiction.

HELD: YES

The petition of the plaintiff filed on November 21, 1910, wherein he asks that the administratrix be compelled to pay
over to him the amounts mentioned in the will as debts due him appears to be nothing more nor less than a complaint
instituting an action against the administratrix for the recovery of the sum of money. Obviously, the plaintiff is not
seeking possession of or title to real property or specific articles of personal property. When a committee is appointed
as herein provided, no action or suit shall be commenced or prosecute against the executor or administrator upon a
claim against the estate to recover a debt due from the state; but actions to recover the seizing and possession of
real estate and personal chattels claimed by the estate may be commenced against him. (Sec. 699, Code Civ. Proc.)

It is evident from the brief outline of the sections referred to above that the Code of Civil Procedure has established a
system for the allowance of claims against the estates of decedents. Those are at least two restrictions imposed by
law upon the power of the testator to dispose of his property, and which pro tanto restrict the maxim that "the will of
the testator law: (1) His estate is liable for all legal obligations incurred by him; and (2) he can not dispose of or
encumber the legal portion due his heirs by force of law. The former take precedence over the latter. (Sec. 640, Code
Civ, Proc.) In case his estate is sufficient they must be paid. (Sec, 734, id.) In case the estate is insolvent they must
be paid in the order named in section 735. It is hardly necessary to say that a provision in an insolvent's will that a
certain debt be paid would not entitle it to preference over other debts. But, if the express mention of a debt in the will
requires the administrator to pay it without reference to the committee, what assurance is there, in the case of an
insolvent estate, that it will not take precedence over preferred debts?

If it is unnecessary to present such claim to the committee, the source of nonclaims is not applicable. It is not barred
until from four to ten years, according to its classification in chapter 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, establishing
questions upon actions. Under such circumstances, when then the legal portion is determined? If, in the meantime
the estate has been distributed, what security have the differences against the interruption of their possession? Is the
administrator required to pay the amount stipulated in the will regardless of its correctness? And, if not, what authority
has he to vise the claim? Section 706 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that an executor may, with the approval
of the court, compound with a debtor of deceased for a debt due the estate, But he is nowhere permitted or directed
to deal with a creditor of the estate. On the contrary, he is the advocate of the estate before an impartial committee
with quasi-judicial power to determine the amount of the claims against the estate, and, in certain cases, to equitably
adjust the amounts due. The administrator, representing the debtor estate, and the creditor appear before this body
as parties litigant and, if either is dissatisfied with its decision, an appeal to the court is their remedy. To allow the
administrator to examine and approve a claim against the estate would put him in the dual role of a claimant and a
judge. The law in this jurisdiction has been so framed that this may not occur. The most important restriction, in this
jurisdiction, on the disposition of property by will are those provisions of the Civil Code providing for the preservation
of the legal portions due to heirs by force of law, and expressly recognized and continued in force by sections 614,
684, and 753 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But if a debt is expressly recognized in the will must be paid without its
being verified, there is nothing to prevent a partial or total alienation of the legal portion by means of a bequest under
a guise of a debt, since all of the latter must be paid before the amount of the legal portion can be determined.

Plaintiff's argument at this point becomes obviously inconsistent. Under his first assignment of error he alleges that
the committee on claims should have been reconvened to pass upon his claim against the estate. It is clear that this
committee has nothing to do with legacies. It is true that a debt may be left as a legacy, either to the debtor (in which
case it virtually amounts to a release), or to a third person. But this case can only arise when the debt is anasset of
the estate. It would be absurd to speak of a testator's leaving a bare legacy of his own debt. (Arts. 866, 878, Civil
Code.) The creation of a legacy depends upon the will of the testator, is an act of pure beneficence, has no binding
force until his death, and may be avoided in whole or in part by the mere with whim of the testator, prior to that time.
A debt arises from an obligation recognized by law (art. 1089, Civil Code) and once established, can only be
extinguished in a lawful manner. (Art. 1156, id.) Debts are demandable and must be paid in legal tender. Legacies
may, and often do, consist of specific articles of personal property and must be satisfied accordingly. In order to
collect as legacy the sum mentioned in the will as due him, the plaintiff must show that it is in fact a legacy and not a
debt. As he has already attempted to show that this sum represents a debt, it is an anomaly to urge now it is a
legacy.

But it is said that the plaintiff's claims should be considered as partaking of the nature of a legacy and disposed of
accordingly. If this be perfect then the plaintiff would receive nothing until after all debts had been paid and the heirs
by force of law had received their shares. From any point of view the inevitable result is that there must be a hearing
sometime before some tribunal to determine the correctness of the debts recognized in the wills of deceased
persons. This hearing, in the first instance, can not be had before the court because the law does not authorize it.
Such debtors must present their claims to the committee, otherwise their claims will be forever barred.

For the foregoing reasons the orders appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

CASE 3
(3) WT CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. CAETE
GR 157287, February 12, 2008

FACTS: Juliana vda. De Cabahug filed a case for the settlement of the estate of her deceased husband, Alberto
Cabahug, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaue City, Branch 55, presided by public respondent, Judge
Ulric R. Caete.

Ciriaco Cabahug, the administrator of the estate and heir of Alberto, was granted the authority to sell one of the
properties of the estate to defray the expenses for the payment of taxes due from the estate. Ciriaco entered into an
Agreement for Sale of Land with Downpayment with WT Construction, Inc. for P8,691,000. WT Construction made a
50% downpayment, while the balance was to be paid immediately after the land is free from all
occupants/obstructions . They also agreed that if the buyer will be the one to handle the clearing or ejectment of
occupants, all the expenses incurred thereto shall be charged to and be deducted from the remaining balance
payable.

WT Constuction took steps in clearing the property of its occupants by filing a complaint for ejectment in 1998 with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 3,Mandaue City. But it was discovered that Ciriaco did not inform his coheirs of the sale. He appropriated the amount paid by petitioner, so Judge Caete issued an Order on August 19,
1997, relieving Ciriaco of his functions as administrator and directing him to render an accounting of all the properties
and assets of the estate.

Consequently, Administrator Linda Cabahug-Antigue, along with her co-heirs, demanded from petitioner the payment
of the balance of the purchase price. Petitioner refused to pay.

Judge Caete ordered that if no manifestation is filed, WT Construction is further ordered to pay the estate of Alberto
Cabahug the amount of P4,259,400.00 less expenses incurred in the ejectment case within a period of fifteen (15)
days, otherwise, failure to do so will prompt the court to issue a writ of execution. WT construction motion for
reconsideration was denied, so a Writ of Execution was granted.

ISSUE: WON a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine the rights and obligations of the parties in a
contract, one of which is a private corporation.

HELD: YES.

It is but logical that probate/estate courts can enforce obligations under such a deed of sale. Otherwise, they would
not be able to secure the proceeds to pay for the taxes and this would defeat the purpose of the proceedings to settle
the estate. Stated otherwise, the power to enforce obligations under the deed of sale of a property ordered sold to
pay debts of the estate is but a necessary incident of the power of a probate/estate court to order and effect such sale
in the first place.

RULE 89: SALES, MORTGAGES,AND OTHER

ENCUMBRANCES
OF
PROPERTY
OF
DECEDENT
CASE 1
Rule 89
Case No. 1
Julita Go Ong vs CA
G.R. No. L-75884 September 24, 1987
Ponente: Paras, J.

FACTS:
Two parcels of land under 1 TCT are in the name of Alfredo Ong married to Julita Go Ong. Alfredo died and Julita Go Ong was
appointed administratrix of her husbands estate. Julita thereafter mortgaged 1 lot to Allied Banking Corp. to secure a loan.
On the loan there was due a sum and Allied tried to collect it from Julita.
Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure
from the court. In response thereto, the bank averred that it was Julita who promised to secure the courts approval.

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND UNDER PETITIONERS
ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
HELD: Mortgage is valid

Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court . The
CA aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal
capacity and not in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband. Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code applies in a case
where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for
the payment, say of a conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are excluded from the requisite
judicial approval for the reason already adverted to hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the
government.
The mortgage constituted on the property under administration, by authority of the petitioner is valid, notwithstanding lack of judicial
approval with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that what had been mortgaged was in custodial
legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal share and hereditary share in the property is concerned, for after all, she was the
absolute owner thereof.
Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot adversely affect the substantive rights of private respondent to dispose of her ideal [not
inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husbands death and her hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the
death of the decedent.

CASE 2
Rule 89
Case No. 2
Maneclang vs Baun
G.R. No.27876. April 22, 1992

Ponente: Davide Jr.

Gist: The Core issue of this case is the validity of a sale of a parcel of land by the administrator of an intestate estate made pursuant
to a petition for authority to sell and an order granting it which were filed and entered, respectively, without notice to the heirs of the
decedents.

Facts:

Margarita died intestate, leaving nine children. One of them, Oscar Maneclang, petitioned for the settlement of the estate. No
guardian ad litem was appointed for any of the minor heirs.

On September 1949, despite the absence of notice to the heirs, the intestate court issued an Order "authorizing the administrator to
mortgage or sell so much of the properties of the estate for the purpose of paying off the obligations" referred to in the petition.

Come 1965, the newly appointed administratrix contested said sale, saying that no sale can be valid with the absence of notice to
the heirs, who did not even have a guardian ad litem to begin with.

The RTC ruled for the annulment of the sale. CA reversed the decision of the lower court. Hence, this petition.

Issue: whether or not the sale was valid, considering no notice of assailed sale was made to the heirs.

Held:

Without notice and hearing, the sale, mortgage or encumbrance is void. Notice is mandatory. Noncompliance therewith under the
sale is null and void.
It does not follow that for purposes of complying with the requirement of notice under Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, notice
to the father is notice to the children. Sections 2, 4 and 7 of said Rule state explicitly that the notice, which must be in be writing,
must be given to the heirs, devisees, and legatees and that the court shall fix a time and place for hearing such petition and cause
notice to be given to the interested parties. There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by a
guardian ad litem in the case of the minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem.
In this case, however, only the surviving spouse, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector
Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven (7) children
were still minors with no guardian ad litem having been appointed to represent them. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was
not satisfied.

The requisite set forth in the aforesaid sections of Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale
itself and the order approving it would be null and voidab initio. The reason behind this requirement is that the heirs, as the
presumptive owners since they succeed to all the rights and obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter's deathare
the persons directly affected by the sale or mortage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided
by law.

As to whether the plaintiff is in estoppel from assailing the validity of the sale. Estoppel is unavailable as an argument against
the administratrix of the estate and against the children.

As to prescription.As to prescription, this Court ruled in the Boaga case that "[a]ctions to declare the inexsistence of contracts do
not prescribe (Art. 1410, N.C.C.)
As to laches. Laches is different from prescription. As the court held in Nielsen & Co. Inc . vs. Lepanto Consolidated Mining
Co., 26 the defense of laches applies independently of prescription. While prescription is concerned with the fact of delay, laches is
concerned with the effect of delay.

CASE 3
RULE 89
CASE NO. 3
SANDEJAS VS LINA
G.R. No. 141634 February 5, 2001
INTRODUCTION
A contract of sale is not invalidated by the fact that it is subject to probate court approval. The transaction remains binding on the
seller-heir, but not on the other heirs who have not given their consent to it. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court
has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Rule 89, Section 8 of the Rules of Court, deals with the
conveyance of real property contracted by the decedent while still alive. In contrast with Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, the said
provision does not limit to the executor or administrator the right to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage or otherwise
encumber realty under administration. The standing to pursue such course of action before the probate court inures to any person
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or to be entitled to the avails of the suit
FACTS:
-

Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for
the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS, who died on April 17, 1955
Letters of Administration were issued and he took his oath as an administrator

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by [M]ovant Alex A.
Lina alleging among others that on June 7, 1982, movant and [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as
seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns, to sell forever and absolutely and in their
entirety the following parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios R. Sandejas *(intervenor filed
an evidence of receipt of earnest money with promise to buy; P70,000.00 was given as earnest money and another
P100,000.00 in addition therewith)*

"On January 7, 1985, the counsel for [A]dministrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas filed a [M]anifestation alleging among others
that the administrator, Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas, died sometime in November 1984 in Canada. He also alleged, among
others that the matter of the claim of Intervenor Alex A. Lina becomes a money claim to be filed in the estate of the late
Mr. Eliodoro P. Sandejas

Respondent Alex Lina moved for the consolidation of this civil case with the special proceedings case: 'IN RE:
INTESTATE ESTATE OF ELIODORO P. SANDEJAS, SR;
The motion was granted by the court

Intervenor Alex A. Lina filed [a] Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.
Sandejas which was granted by the court. However, Sixto, the son of Sandejas, moved that he be the one to be assigned
as the administrator; such motion was granted by the court. Alex was replaced by Sixto
Ruling of the Lower Court:
o

The lower court upheld the sale between Sandejas and Alex Lina and directed to pay the balance of the
purchase price amounting to P729,000.00 within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and the
Administrator is directed to execute within thirty (30) days thereafter the necessary and proper deeds of
conveyancing
Ruling of the Court of Appeals:
o
No sale involved. The CA held that the contract between Eliodoro
o

Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale.
The CA held that Section 1, Rule 897 of the Rules of Court was inapplicable, because the lack of written notice
to the other heirs showed the lack of consent of those heirs other than Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. For this reason,
bad faith was imputed to him, for no one is allowed to enjoyed a claim arising from ones own wrongdoing.
Thus, Eliodoro

Sr. was bound, as a matter of justice and good faith, to comply with his contractual commitments as an owner
and heir.
Petitioner files a petition before the Supreme Court; contentions:
o

jurisdiction over ordinary civil action seeking not merely to enforce a sale but to compel performance of a
contract falls upon a civil court, not upon an intestate court; and (b) that Section 8 of Rule 89 allows the
executor or administrator, and no one else, to file an application for approval of a sale of the property under
administration.

ISSUE:
Whether the [trial court] acting as a probate court could approve the sale and compel the petitioners to execute a deed of
conveyance even for the share alone of Eliodoro P. Sandejas Sr." YES.

RULING:
Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules
75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 78-85). It also
extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to
settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately
enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries
-

In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to respondent; hence, that
obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on
whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the
settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses.

The suspensive condition did not reduce the conditional sale between Eliodoro Sr. and respondent to one that was "not a
definite, clear and absolute document of sale," as contended by petitioners. Upon the occurrence of the condition, the
conditional sale became a reciprocally demandable obligation that is binding upon the parties

CASE 4
RULE 89
CASE NO. 4
PAHAMOTANG VS. PNB
G.R. No. 156403, March 21, 2005
PONENTE: GARCIA, J.

FACTS: On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their eight (8) children, namely:
Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang. On September
15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his
deceased wife. The petition, docketed as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court, hereinafter referred to as the intestate
court. In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It appears that Agustin
was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785 also of the CFI of Davao City, Branch VI. On
December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order granting Agustins petition.
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the PNB and Arguna respectively. The heirs later
questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. The trial court found out that Agustin did not notify the petitioners of the filing
of his petitions for judicial authority to alienate estate assets. The court declared the real estate mortgage and the sale void but both were
valid with respect to the other parties. The decision was reversed by the Court of Appeals; to the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal
error of mounting a collateral attack on the foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.
ISSUE: Whether or not authority to mortgage or sell the estate asset is valid without notice to the heirs.
RULING:
The requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and failure to give notice to the heirs would invalidate the authority granted
by the intestate/probate court to mortgage or sell estate assets.
When an order authorizing the sale or encumbrance of real property was issue by the testate or intestate court without previous notice to
heirs, devisees and legatees, it is not only the contract itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the same.
***NOTICE TO HEIRS UNDER RULE 89 IS MANDATORY. FAILURE TO NOTIFY HEIRS INVALIDATES AUTHORITY TO MORTGAGE OR SELL ESTATE
ASSETS.

CASE 5

Liu vs. Loy (2003)

Ponente: Carpio
Facts:
While the decedent, Jose Vano was still living, his son and attorney in fact, Teodoro Vano sold (in
behalf of the decedent) certain parcels of land to Frank Liu.
After the decedent died, the son sold the same properties, specifically Lot nos. 5 and 6 to Alfredo
Loy and Teresita Loy, respectively.

Upon an ex parte motion filed by the second set of buyers (Loys) of estate properties, the probate
court approved the sale in their favor.
Consequently, certificates of title covering the estate properties were cancelled and new titles issued
to the 2nd set of buyers.
Frank Liu filed a complaint for conveyance/annulment of title with the RTC.
The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of appeals affirmed the dismissal.
Issue:
Whether or not the probate courts ex-parte approval of the contract of sale in favor of Loys was
valid.
Held: No.
The probate courts ex-parte approval of the sale of estate properties was not valid.
Section 8, Rule 89 makes it mandatory that notice be served on the heirs and other interested
persons of the application for approval of any conveyance of property held in trust by the deceased,
and where no such notice is given, the order authorizing the conveyance , as well as the
conveyance itself, is completely void.
In this case, the administratrix, the wife of the deceased Teodoro Vano was not notified of the motion
and hearing to approve the sale of the lots to the Loys.
Frank Liu did not also receive any notice, although he obviously was an interested party. The
issuance of new titles to the Loys did not vest title because the conveyance itself was completely
void.

CASE 6

Orola vs. Rural Bank (2005)

Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
Facts:
Josephine Orola and her siblings, Mryna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea filed a complaint
against the Rural bank of Pontevedra, their father Emilio Orola (the administrator of his wifes estate,
Trinidad Laserna) and the Ex-officio Provincial sheriff for the nullification of the promissory notes and
real estate mortgages executed by Josephine Manuel and Antonio Orola, and the sale of the
property subject of the said deed at public auction.
They alleged that the real estate mortgage contracts were null and void because the same were
never submitted to and approved by the RTC in a special proceeding. Moreover, they were
hoodwinked by their father-administrator Emilio Orola into signing the contracts of lease and
amended contracts of lease, promissory notes and deeds of real estate mortgages as security for
the P600,000 loan on the assurance that they would benefit therefrom but did not receive he
proceeds of the said loan. As such, the extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages and
the sale of the property covered by the said deeds were null and void. The RTC of Roxas City gave
their favor on the petitioner. But the CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the mortagages constituted over the real estate properties of petitioners-appellees
are void
Held: Yes.
Any mortgage of the realty of the estate without the appropriate authority of the estate court has no
legal support and is void. The purchaser at public auction acquires no title over the realty. The real
estate mortgage contracts, as well as the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof and the sale of the
property described therein at public auction, can thus be attacked directly and collaterally.
The Court agrees with the petitioners contention that respondent Emilio Orola failed to secure an
order from the intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage the subject lots and execute a real

estate mortgage contract in favor of respondent bank.

What the intestate estate court approved was the authority incorporated in the amended contracts of
lease respondent Orola gave to petitoners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so that the said lots
could be mortgaged to the respondent Rural Bank as security for the P600,000 loan under their
respective names. In fine, intestate estate court authorized the petitioners, not respondent Orola, to
mortgage the said lots to respondent Rural Bank. Lastly, under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court, only the executor or administrator of the estate may be authorized by the intestate estate
court to mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence the order of the estate court authorizing
the petitioners to mortgage the realty of the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a nullity.
CASE 7

Halili vs. Lloret (1954)

Ponente: Bautista Angelo
Facts:
Petitioner, Fortunato Halili filed an action against the defendants, Maria Lloret and Ricardo Gonzales
Lloret (administrator of the intestate estate of Francisco Gonzales ) to compel the latter to execute a
deed of sale of certain parcels of land.
Accordingly, Halili through Atty. Teofilo Sauco negotiated the sale of the 6 parcels of land with
Ricardo for P200,000. Hence, he gave two checks, one for the sum of P100,000 drawn against the
Philippine National Bank in favor of Maria Lloret and another for the same amount drawn against the
Philippine Trust Co. in favor of Ricardo Gonzales Lloret.
Later on, Ricardo refused to sign the deed of sale. That he could not carry out the agreement in view
of the fact that he had received other better offers of the purchase of the lands.
He denied that a definite understanding had ever been reached between him and the plaintiff or his
representative relative to the sale of the lands in question. In fact, Halili suspended the payment of
the two checks. And that the understanding he had with Teofilo Sauco regarding the sale did not
pass the stage of mere negotiation, and, as such it did not produce any legal relation by which the
defendants could be compelled to carry out the sale as now pretended by plaintiff in his complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the sale of lands can be compelled by specific performance.
Held:
The court ruled in the negative.
The parties knew well that the properties were subject to judicial administration and that the sale
could have no valid effect until it merits the approval of the court, so much so that before the lands
were opened for negotiation, the judicial administrator, with the conformity of the heirs, secured from
the court an authorization to that effect, and yet, as will be stated elsewhere, the terms that were
made to appear in the document (Exhibit D) differ substantially from the conditions prescribed in the
authorization given by the court, which indicates that said document cannot have any binding effect
upon the parties nor serve as basis for an action for specific performance, as now pretended by the
plaintiff, in the absence of such judicial approval.
And the court finally found that the authorization calls for the sale of six parcels of land belonging to
the estate, but in the document as drawn up by Sauco it appears that only five parcels would be sold
to the plaintiff, and the other parcel to Ricardo Gonzales Lloret. Undoubtedly, this cannot legally be
done for, as we know, the law prohibits that a land subject of administration be sold to its judicial
administrator.

CASE 8

Opulencia vs. CA
Ponente: Panganiban
Facts:
Aladin Simundac and Miguel Oliven filed a complaint for specific performance against Natalia
Carpena Opulencia on the basis of a contract to sell of a lot in Sta. Rosa Laguna wherein a
downpayment of P300,000 was received by the latter.
Opulencia admitted the foregoing facts but claims that the subject property was formed part of the
estate of her father, in respect of which a petition for probate was filed in the RTC. And that this fact
was known by the respondents. She further added that the same should be approved by the probate
court and upon realization of the nullity of the contract, she wanted to have the contract rescinded
and was willing to give back the downpayment.
The RTC ruled in favor of the petitioner citing Rule 89 Section 7 which allows the sale of properties
subject of a probate proceeding provided that it is beneficial to the estate and complies with the
requirement of law. It further stated that where the administratrix realizes that nullity of the
transaction entered into, she is not estopped from interposing the contracts nullity.
The CA reversed the Trial courts decision. Hence, the appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not a contract to sell a real property involved in an estate proceeding is valid and binding
without the approval of probate court.
Held: Yes.
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not applicable in this case because petitioner entered
into the contract to sell in her capacity as an heiress, not as an executrix or administratrix of the
estate. In the contract, she represented herself as the lawful owner and seller of the subject parcel of
land.
The Court emphasized that hereditary rights are vested in the heir or heirs from the moment of the
decedents death. Petitioner, therefore, became the owner of her hereditary share the moment her
father died. Thus, the lack of judicial approval does not invalidate the contract to sell, because the
petitioner has the substantive right to sell the whole or a part of her share in the estate of her late
father.
CASE 9
JOSEPHINE OROLA, MYRNA OROLA, ANGELINE OROLA, MANUEL OROLA, ANTONIO OROLA and ALTHEA OROLA,
Petitioners,
vs.
THE RURAL BANK OF PONTEVEDRA (CAPIZ), INC., EMILIO Q. OROLA, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF CAPIZ and THE
EX-OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF CAPIZ, Respondent.
FACTS:
On July 16, 1969, Trinidad Laserna Orola died intestate. She was survived by her husband Emilio Orola and their six
minor children, namely, 10-year-old Antonio, 12-year-old Josephine, 16-year-old Manuel, and other siblings,
Myrna, Angeline and Althea.
Emilio Orola, who, in the meantime, had married anew, executed a waiver of all his rights and interests over the
said property in favor of his children by Trinidad Laserna, namely, Josephine, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio
and Althea, all surnamed Orola.
On September 12, 1980, the court granted the motion of the administrator and authorized him to negotiate the
loan through the Rural Bank of Capiz (Rural Bank of Pontevedra, Capiz) and to transfer the sugar account of the
9
estate to the RPB in Roxas City. Emilio then filed an application with the Rural Bank for a financing loan of

P600,000.00. However, the bank informed him that the said loan would have to be processed by the Central Bank
and that it would take some time. He was informed that there would be no need for the Central Bank to intervene
if the loan of P600,000.00 would be broken down into three parts of P200,000.00, each to be applied for by three
applicants to whom the property to be used as collateral would be leased by the estate. Emilio agreed and talked
10
to his children, Josephine, Manuel and Antonio, about the banks proposal. The three siblings agreed. The Estate
of Trinidad Laserna, through its administrator, Emilio, as lessor, and Josephine, Manuel and Antonio, all surnamed
Orola, as lessees, executed separate contracts of lease over the aforesaid property of the estate. On September 20,
1982, the intestate estate court issued an Order approving the contracts.
17

Antonio, Manuel and Josephine signed separate Promissory Notes on March 21, 1983 in which they promised
and bound themselves to pay their respective loans in 10 years in stated annual installments. This prompted the
Rural Bank to write separate letters of demand to Josephine, Manuel and Antonio, demanding payment of the
balance of their accounts within seven days from the receipt thereof, otherwise the Rural Bank would cause the
25
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages. Emilio Orola pleaded to the Rural Bank not to foreclose the
mortgages.
On October 1, 1987, Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, filed a
Complaint against the Rural Bank, their father Emilio and the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the nullification of the
Promissory Notes and Real Estate Mortgages executed by Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, and the sale of
the property subject of the said deed at public auction. They alleged therein that they became the sole owners of
Lots 1088 and 1071 when their father executed a waiver of his rights over the said lots in their favor. They also
alleged that the real estate mortgage contracts were null and void because the same were never submitted to and
approved by the RTC in Sp. Proc. Nos. V-3526 and V-3639. Moreover, they were hoodwinked by their father into
signing the contracts of lease and amended contracts of lease, promissory notes and deeds of real estate
mortgages as security for the P600,000.00 loan on the assurance that they would be benefited therefrom;
moreover, they did not receive the proceeds of the said loans. As such, the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgages and the sale of the property covered by the said deeds were null and void.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT THE SUBJECT MORTGAGES CONSTITUTED OVER THE REAL ESTATE PROPERTIES OF PETITIONERSAPPELLEES UNDER SECTION 7, RULE 89 OF THE RULES OF COURT ARE VOID FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE
MANDATORY REGULATIONS OF THE SAID PROVISION.
RULING:
Under Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, only the executor or administrator of the estate may be
authorized by the intestate estate court to mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence, the order of the
estate court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the realty of the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a
nullity.
Orola failed to submit the real estate mortgage contracts to the intestate estate court for its consideration and
39
approval. To give approval means to confirm, ratify, or to consent to some act or thing done by another. Unless
and until the said contracts are approved by the intestate estate court, the same cannot have any binding effect
upon the estate; nor serve as basis for any action against the estate and against the parcels of land described in the
40
said contracts belonging to it.
It bears stressing that respondent Orola had no right or authority to mortgage the realty belonging to the estate.
He derived his authority from the order of the estate court which had jurisdiction to authorize the real estate
mortgage thereof under such terms and conditions and upon proper application. Any mortgage of realty of the
41
estate without the appropriate authority of the estate court has no legal support and is void. The purchaser at
42
public auction acquires no title over the realty. The real estate mortgage contracts, as well as the extrajudicial
foreclosure thereof and the sale of the property described therein at public auction, can thus be attacked directly
and collaterally.
Had the real estate mortgage contracts been submitted to the intestate estate court for consideration and
approval after proper notice to the petitioners, the court would have been apprised of the terms and conditions
contained therein, and that about one-half of the loan would be used to pay the accommodation loan of
respondent Emilio Orola.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court is REINSTATED.

CASE 10
JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR PAHAMOTANG-BASA, Petitioners,
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) and the HEIRS OF ARTURO ARGUNA, Respondents.
FACTS:
On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their eight
(8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and
Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang. On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of
Davao City a petition for issuance of letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. The petition,
docketed as Special Case No. 1792, was raffled to Branch VI of said court, hereinafter referred to as the intestate
court. In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased
spouse. It appears that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case
No. 1785 also of the CFI of Davao City, Branch VI. On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order
granting Agustins petition.
The late Agustin then executed several mortgages and later sale of the properties with the PNB and Arguna
respectively. The heirs later questioned the validity of the transactions prejudicial to them. The trial court declared
the real estate mortgage and the sale void but both were valid with respect to the other parties. The decision was
reversed by the Court of Appeals; to the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a
collateral attack on the foregoing orders instead of initiating a direct action to annul them.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of contracts of sale and mortgage entered into by
Agustin without first initiating a direct action against the orders of the intestate court authorizing the challenged
contracts.
RULING:
We answer the question in the affirmative.
It bears emphasizing that the action filed by the petitioners before the trial court in Civil Case No. 16,802 is for the
annulment of several contracts entered into by Agustin for and in behalf of the estate of Melitona, namely: (a)
contract of mortgage in favor of respondent PNB, (b) contract of sale in favor of Arguna involving seven (7) parcels
of land; and (c) contract of sale of a parcel of land in favor of PLEI.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case upon the allegations in the complaint that
said contracts were entered into despite lack of notices to the heirs of the petition for the approval of those
contracts by the intestate court.
Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the action which petitioners lodged with the trial court in Civil Case
No. 16,802 is not an action to annul the orders of the intestate court, which, according to CA, cannot be done
collaterally. It is the validity of the contracts of mortgage and sale which is directly attacked in the action.
And, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made a factual finding in its decision of August 7, 1998 that
petitioners were, in fact, not notified by their father Agustin of the filing of his petitions for permission to
mortgage/sell the estate properties. The trial court made the correct conclusion of law that the challenged orders
of the intestate court granting Agustins petitions were null and void for lack of compliance with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof, which respectively read:
"Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies
through personalty not exhausted. - When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts,
expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such personal estate may injure the business or

other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision
for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may authorize
the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber so much as may be necessary of the real
estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly appears
that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part cannot be
sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the authority may
be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or so much thereof as is
necessary or beneficial under the circumstances".
"Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. - When it
appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs, devisees,
legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator and on
written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold, authorize the
executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay debts, legacies,
or expenses of administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the provisions of a will.
In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the proper
proportions".
"Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. - The court having
jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to
sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate; in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary
or beneficial, under the following regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the
expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other
encumbrance is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature of
the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the
persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem
proper;

RULE 90: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF

THE ESTATE
CASE 1
PATRICIA NATCHER, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OFAPPEALS AND THE HEIR OF GRACIANO DEL ROSARIO LETICIA DEL ROSARIO, EMILIA DEL
RESORIO MANANGAN, ROSALINDA FUENTES LLANA, RODOLFO FUENTES, ALBERTO FUENTES, EVELYN DEL
ROSARIO, and EDUARDO DEL ROSARIO, respondent..
FACTS:
Spouses Graciano del Rosario and Graciana Esguerra were registered owners of a parcel of land with an area of
9,322 square meters located in Manila and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 11889. Upon the death of
Graciana in 1951, Graciano, together with his six children, entered into an extrajudicial settlement of Graciana's
estate on 09 February 1954 adjudicating and dividing among themselves the real property.
On 20 March 1980, Graciano married herein petitioner Patricia Natcher. During their marriage, Graciano sold the
4
land covered by TCT No. 107443 to his wife Patricia as a result of which TCT No. 186059 was issued in the latter's
name. On 07 October 1985,Graciano died leaving his second wife Patricia and his six children by his first marriage,
as heirs.
5

In a complaint filed in Civil Case No. 71075 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, herein private
respondents alleged that upon Graciano's death, petitioner Natcher, through the employment of fraud,
misrepresentation and forgery, acquired TCT No. 107443, by making it appear that Graciano executed a Deed of
6
Sale dated 25 June 1987 in favor herein petitioner resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 107443 and the
issuance of TCT no. 186059 in the name of Patricia Natcher. Similarly, herein private respondents alleged in said
complaint that as a consequence of such fraudulent sale, their legitimes have been impaired.
7

In her answer dated 19 August 1994, herein petitioner Natcher averred that she was legally married to Graciano in
20 March 1980 and thus, under the law, she was likewise considered a compulsory heir of the latter. Petitioner
further alleged that during Graciano's lifetime, Graciano already distributed, in advance, properties to his children,
hence, herein private respondents may not anymore claim against Graciano's estate or against herein petitioner's
property.
After trial, the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 55, rendered a decision dated 26 January 1996 holding:

"1) The deed of sale executed by the late Graciano del Rosario in favor of Patricia Natcher is prohibited by
law and thus a complete nullity. There being no evidence that a separation of property was agreed upon
in the marriage settlements or that there has been decreed a judicial separation of property between
them, the spouses are prohibited from entering (into) a contract of sale;
"2) The deed as sale cannot be likewise regarded as a valid donation as it was equally prohibited by law
under Article 133 of the New Civil Code;
"3) Although the deed of sale cannot be regarded as such or as a donation, it may however be regarded as an
extension of advance inheritance of Patricia Natcher being a compulsory heir of the deceased."
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC acting as a regular court has jurisdiction to distribute the estates
RULING:
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the exclusive
province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.

Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the questions and on
the heir.
11

While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may", it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings".

Analogously, in a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated the long standing principle that although
generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet if the interested parties are all heirs,
or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
A perusal of the records, specifically the antecedents and proceedings in the present case, reveals that the trial
court failed to observe established rules of procedure governing the settlement of the estate of Graciano Del
Rosario. This Court sees no cogent reason to sanction the non-observance of these well-entrenched rules and
hereby holds that under the prevailing circumstances, a probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is
indeed the best forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of advancement as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of Graciano Del Rosario's estate.
It is the probate court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate. The court a
quo, trying an ordinary action for reconveyance / annulment of title, went beyond its jurisdiction when it
performed the acts proper only in a special proceeding for the settlement of estate of a deceased person.

CASE 2
EMILIA FIGURACION-GERILLA, Petitioner,
vs.
*
CAROLINA VDA. DE FIGURACION, ELENA FIGURACION-ANCHETA,* HILARIA A. FIGURACION, FELIPA
FIGURACION-MANUEL, QUINTIN FIGURACION and MARY FIGURACION-GINEZ, Respondents.
FACTS:
On August 23, 1955, Leandro executed a deed of quitclaim over his real properties in favor of his six children.
When he died in 1958, he left behind two parcels of land in the name of "Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina
Adviento" Leandro had inherited both lots from his deceased parents.
Leandro sold a portion of Lot 2299 to Lazaro Adviento, as a result of which TCT No. 4221-P was cancelled and TCT
No. 101331 was issued to "Lazaro Adviento, married to Rosenda Sagueped" as owner of the 162 sq. m. and
"Leandro Figuracion, married to Carolina Adviento" as owner of 7,385 sq. m. This lot continued to be in the name
of Leandro in Tax Declaration No. 616 for the year 1985.
What gave rise to the complaint for partition, however, was a dispute between petitioner and her sister,
respondent Mary, over the eastern half of Lot 707 of the Cadastral Survey of Urdaneta with an area of 3,164 sq. m.
Lot 707 belonged to Eulalio Adviento, as evidenced by OCT No. 15867 issued on February 9, 1916. When Adviento
died, his two daughters, Agripina Adviento (his daughter by his first wife) and respondent Carolina (his daughter by
his second wife), succeeded him to it. On November 28, 1961, Agripina executed a quitclaim in favor of petitioner
over the one-half eastern portion of Lot 707. Agripina died on July 28, 1963, single and without any issue. Before
her half-sisters death, however, respondent Carolina adjudicated unto herself, via affidavit under Rule 74 of the
Rules of Court, the entire Lot 707 which she later sold to respondents Felipa and Hilaria. The latter two
immediately had OCT No. 15867 cancelled, on December 11, 1962. A new title, TCT No. 42244, was then issued in
the names of Felipa and Hilaria for Lot 707.
In February 1971, petitioner and her family went to the United States where they stayed for ten years. Returning in
6
1981, she built a house made of strong materials on the eastern half-portion of Lot 707. She continued paying her
share of the realty taxes thereon.

It was sometime later that this dispute erupted. Petitioner sought the extrajudicial partition of all properties held
in common by her and respondents. On May 23, 1994, petitioner filed a complaint in the RTC of Urdaneta City,
Branch 49, for partition, annulment of documents, reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against
respondents, praying, among others, for: (1) the partition of Lots 2299 and 705; (2) the nullification of the affidavit
of self-adjudication executed by respondent Carolina over Lot 707, the deed of absolute sale in favor of
respondents Felipa and Hilaria, and TCT No. 42244; (3) a declaration that petitioner was the owner of one-half of
Lot 707 and (4) damages. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. U-5826.
On the other hand, respondents took the position that Leandros estate should first undergo settlement
proceedings before partition among the heirs could take place. And they claimed that an accounting of expenses
chargeable to the estate was necessary for such settlement.
7

On June 26, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment nullifying Carolinas affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of
absolute sale of Lot 707. It also declared Lots 2299 and 705 as exclusive properties of Leandro Figuracion and
therefore part of his estate. The RTC, however, dismissed the complaint for partition, reconveyance and damages
on the ground that it could not grant the reliefs prayed for by petitioner without any (prior) settlement
proceedings wherein the transfer of title of the properties should first be effected.
On appeal, the CA upheld the dismissal of petitioners action for partition for being premature. The CA reversed
the decision, however, with respect to the nullification of the self-adjudication and the deed of sale. Upholding the
validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale as to Carolinas one-half pro-indiviso share, it instead
partitioned Lot 707. Dissatisfied, respondents elevated the CA decision to this Court in G.R. No. 151334, entitled
Carolina vda. de Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla
ISSUE:
The issue for our consideration is whether or not there needs to be a prior settlement of Leandros intestate estate
(that is, an accounting of the income of Lots 2299 and 705, the payment of expenses, liabilities and taxes, plus
compliance with other legal requirements, etc.) before the properties can be partitioned or distributed.
RULING:
In any event, there appears to be a complication with respect to the partition of Lot 705. The records refer to a
case entitled Figuracion, et al. v. Alejo currently pending in the CA. The records, however, give no clue or
information regarding what exactly this case is all about. Whatever the issues may be, suffice it to say that
partition is premature when ownership of the lot is still in dispute.
The right to an inheritance is transmitted immediately to the heirs by operation of law, at the moment of death of
the decedent. There is no doubt that, as one of the heirs of Leandro Figuracion, petitioner has a legal interest in
Lot 2299. But can she compel partition at this stage?
11

There are two ways by which partition can take place under Rule 69: by agreement under Section 2 and through
12
commissioners when such agreement cannot be reached, under Sections 3 to 6.
Neither method specifies a procedure for determining expenses chargeable to the decedents estate. While
Section 8 of Rule 69 provides that there shall be an accounting of the real propertys income (rentals and profits) in
13
the course of an action for partition, there is no provision for the accounting of expenses for which property
belonging to the decedents estate may be answerable, such as funeral expenses, inheritance taxes and similar
expenses enumerated under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
In a situation where there remains an issue as to the expenses chargeable to the estate, partition is inappropriate.
While petitioner points out that the estate is allegedly without any debt and she and respondents are Leandro
Figuracions only legal heirs, she does not dispute the finding of the CA that "certain expenses" including those
14
related to her fathers final illness and burial have not been properly settled. Thus, the heirs (petitioner and
respondents) have to submit their fathers estate to settlement because the determination of these expenses
cannot be done in an action for partition.
In estate settlement proceedings, there is a proper procedure for the accounting of all expenses for which the
estate must answer. If it is any consolation at all to petitioner, the heirs or distributees of the properties may take

possession thereof even before the settlement of accounts, as long as they first file a bond conditioned on the
15
payment of the estates obligations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals decision and resolution in CA-G.R. CV No.
58290 are AFFIRMED in so far as the issue of the partition of Lots 2299 and 705 is concerned.
But with respect to Lot 707, we make no ruling on the validity of Carolina vda. de Figuracions affidavit of selfadjudication and deed of sale in favor of Felipa and Hilaria Figuracion in view of the fact that Carolina vda. de
Figuracion, et al. v. Emilia Figuracion-Gerilla (G.R. No. 151334) is still pending in this Division.

CASE 3

RULE 90 - Case 3 - Heirs of Marcelino Donorio vs Heirs of Fortunato Donorio;

Ponente: REYES, R.T.
Ruling: Petitioners (Heirs of Marcelino Doronio) are correct in alleging that the issue regarding the
impairment of legitime of Fortunato Doronio must be resolved in an action for the settlement of
estates of spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante. It may not be passed upon in an action for
reconveyance and damages. A probate court, in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction, is the best
forum to ventilate and adjudge the issue of impairment of legitime as well as other related matters
involving the settlement of estate.
An action for reconveyance with damages is a civil action, whereas matters relating to settlement of the
estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property made by the decedent, partake of the
nature of a special proceeding. Special proceedings require the application of specific rules as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
As explained by the Court in Natcher v. Court of Appeals:
Section 3, Rule 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure defines civil action and special proceedings, in this wise:
a) A civil action is one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong.
A civil action may either be ordinary or special. Both are governed by the rules for ordinary civil actions,
subject to specific rules prescribed for a special civil action.
xxxx
c) A special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular fact.
As could be gleaned from the foregoing, there lies a marked distinction between an action and a special
proceeding. An action is a formal demand of ones right in a court of justice in the manner prescribed by the
court or by the law. It is the method of applying legal remedies according to definite established rules. The
term "special proceeding" may be defined as an application or proceeding to establish the status or right
of a party, or a particular fact. Usually, in special proceedings, no formal pleadings are required unless the
statute expressly so provides. In special proceedings, the remedy is granted generally upon an application or
motion.
Citing American Jurisprudence, a noted authority in Remedial Law expounds further:
It may accordingly be stated generally that actions include those proceedings which are instituted and
prosecuted according to the ordinary rules and provisions relating to actions at law or suits in equity, and
that special proceedings include those proceedings which are not ordinary in this sense, but is instituted and
prosecuted according to some special mode as in the case of proceedings commenced without summons and
prosecuted without regular pleadings, which are characteristics of ordinary actions x x x. A special
proceeding must therefore be in the nature of a distinct and independent proceeding for particular relief,
such as may be instituted independently of a pending action, by petition or motion upon notice.

Applying these principles, an action for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages is a civil action,
whereas matters relating to settlement of the estate of a deceased person such as advancement of property
made by the decedent, partake of the nature of a special proceeding, which concomitantly requires the
application of specific rules as provided for in the Rules of Court.
Clearly, matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall within the
exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited jurisdiction.
Thus, under Section 2, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, questions as to advancement made or alleged to have
been made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of
the estate proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person raising the
questions and on the heir.
While it may be true that the Rules used the word "may," it is nevertheless clear that the same provision
contemplates a probate court when it speaks of the "court having jurisdiction of the estate proceedings."
Corollarily, the Regional Trial Court in the instant case, acting in its general jurisdiction, is devoid of authority
to render an adjudication and resolve the issue of advancement of the real property in favor of herein
petitioner Natcher, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 71075 for reconveyance and annulment of title with damages
is not, to our mind, the proper vehicle to thresh out said question. Moreover, under the present
circumstances, the RTC of Manila, Branch 55, was not properly constituted as a probate court so as to validly
pass upon the question of advancement made by the decedent Graciano Del Rosario to his wife, herein
petitioner Natcher.
We likewise find merit in petitioners contention that before any conclusion about the legal share due to a
compulsory heir may be reached, it is necessary that certain steps be taken first. The net estate of the
decedent must be ascertained, by deducting all payable obligations and charges from the value of the
property owned by the deceased at the time of his death; then, all donations subject to collation would be
added to it. With the partible estate thus determined, the legitime of the compulsory heir or heirs can be
established; and only then can it be ascertained whether or not a donation had prejudiced the legitimes.

FACTS: Sps. Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased, were the registered owners of a
parcel of land. Among their children were Marcelino and Fortunato Donorio whose heirs are the
petitioners and respondents in this case, respectively. Petitioners filed a petition "For the Registration of
a Private Deed of Donation" claiming that the entire subject property has been donated to their
predecessors by virtue of the private deed of donation propter nuptias. Said petition was granted,
respondents filed thereafter a petition for the reconsideration of the registration of the donation, but
was denied. Respondents thereafter, filed an action for reconveyance and damages against petitioners.
Respondents contend that the subject land is different from what was donated based on the
descriptions of the property under the original title and the deed of donation. The respondents posited
that spouses Donorio intended to donate only one-half of the property. The RTC ruled in favor of the
petitioners (heirs of Marcelino) while on appeal, the CA ruled in favor of the defendants. The CA ruled
that, among others, the donation of the ENTIRE property in favor of the petitioners' predecessors is
invalid as it impairs the legitime of the respondents' predecessors. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE: Whether issues on Impairment of Legitimes should be threshed out in a Special Proceeding or a
Civil Action
HELD: Such should be threshed out in a Special Proceeding.

CASE 4

RULE 90 - Case 4 - IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED MERCEDES CANO.
FLORANTE C. TIMBOL, appellee, vs. JOSE CANO, appellant.
Ponente: LABRADOR, J
RULING: In an assignment of error, appellant argues that since the project of partition had already
been approved and had become final, the lower court has lost jurisdiction to appoint a new
administrator or to authorize the enlargement of the land to be converted into a subdivision. This
assignment of error needs but a passing mention (stated otherwise, without merit). The probate court
loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the
remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had
not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such.
FACTS: Mercedes Cano died, leaving her only son Florante Timbol as sole heir. Her brother, Jose Cano,
was appointed judicial administrator. Jose proposed that the agricultural lands of the estate be leased to
him which was approved by the court. The court later on, approved the reduction of rent and the
conversion of some of the agricultural lands to a subdivision. A year later, a project of partition was
approved by court designating Florante as the sole heir and he was appointed judicial administrator. He
then proposed that the area designated for the subdivision be increased but was opposed by Jose.
ISSUE: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction over the partitioned property.
HELD: The probate court still has jurisdiction over the property when such is still under administration.
CASE 5

RULE 90 - Case 5 LEONIDA MARI and CARIDAD EVANGELISTA, plaintiffs-appellees,

vs.
ISAAC BONILLA and SILVINA ORDAEZ, defendants-appellants.
Ponente: TUASON, J
RULING: Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership and certainly none of the co-owners
may convey to the other more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceeding is not
final and conclusive and not being of such definitive as to stop all mean of redress for a co-heir who has
been deprived of his lawful share such co-heir may still within the prescriptive period bring an action
for reivindicacion in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad
perspective of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a
co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition judicial or extrajudicial has been
had." (Lajom vs. Viola, 73 Phil., 563.)
-- If as is probably the case defendants relied on the court order adjudicating to Deogracias the entire
estate in the distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court their innocence avails them less as
against the true owners of the land. That was a summary settlement made on the faith and strength of
the distributees self-serving affidavit; section 4 of the above-mentioned rule provides that, "If it shall
appear at anything within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate . . . that an heir or
other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate such heir or other person
may compel the settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for purpose of
satisfying such participation." Far from shielding defendants against loss the adjudication and the rule
under which it was made gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. "A judicial

partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereon. No partition
judicial or extrajudicial could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioner had during
the joint possession."
FACTS: Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel of land. He was married to Leonida Mari.
The two begot two children, Deogracias and Caridad. Casimiro died intestate on or about 1938. In 1944
Deogracias, alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro executed a declaration of ownership and sold on the
same date subject property to defendant spouses Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordanez. The OCT was
cancelled and a TCT was thereafter issued to the respondent spouses. Respondents claim that they did
not know that the Deogracias is the son of Leonida and that he had a sister as well. The trial court
decided in favor of the plaintiffs. It should be noted that in the OCT, the registered owner of the land in
question was and still is Casimiro.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents' claim of good faith bars the right of co-owners of a property under
administration.
HELD: No.
CASE 6

RULE 90 - Case 6 - REYES vs RTC Makati

Ponente: Brion
RULING: Contrary to the findings of both the trial and appellate courts, we read only one cause of
action alleged in the complaint. The "derivative suit for accounting of the funds and assets of the
corporation which are in the control, custody, and/or possession of the respondent [herein petitioner
Oscar]" does not constitute a separate cause of action but is, as correctly claimed by Oscar, only an
incident to the "action for determination of the shares of stock of deceased spouses Pedro and
Anastacia Reyes allegedly taken by respondent, its accounting and the corresponding delivery of these
shares to the parties brothers and sisters." There can be no mistake of the relationship between the
"accounting" mentioned in the complaint and the objective of partition and distribution when Rodrigo
claimed in paragraph 10.1 of the complaint that:
10.1 By refusal of the respondent to account of [sic] his shareholdings in the company,
he illegally and fraudulently transferred solely in his name wherein [sic] the shares of
stock of the deceased Anastacia C. Reyes [which] must be properly collated and/or
distributed equally amongst the children including the complainant Rodrigo C. Reyes
herein to their damage and prejudice.
We particularly note that the complaint contained no sufficient allegation that justified the need for an
accounting other than to determine the extent of Anastacias shareholdings for purposes of
distribution.
Another significant indicator that points us to the real nature of the complaint are Rodrigos repeated
claims of illegal and fraudulent transfers of Anastacias shares by Oscar to the prejudice of the other
heirs of the decedent; he cited these allegedly fraudulent acts as basis for his demand for the collation
and distribution of Anastacias shares to the heirs. These claims tell us unequivocally that the present
controversy arose from the parties relationship as heirs of Anastacia and not as shareholders of
Zenith. Rodrigo, in filing the complaint, is enforcing his rights as a co-heir and not as a stockholder of
Zenith. The injury he seeks to remedy is one suffered by an heir (for the impairment of his
successional rights) and not by the corporation nor by Rodrigo as a shareholder on record.

More than the matters of injury and redress, what Rodrigo clearly aims to accomplish through his
allegations of illegal acquisition by Oscar is the distribution of Anastacias shareholdings without a prior
settlement of her estate an objective that, by law and established jurisprudence, cannot be done. The
RTC of Makati, acting as a special commercial court, has no jurisdiction to settle, partition, and distribute
the estate of a deceased. A relevant provision Section 2 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court
that contemplates properties of the decedent held by one of the heirs declares:
Questions as to advancement made or alleged to have been made by the deceased to
any heir may be heard and determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings; and the final order of the court thereon shall be binding on the person
raising the questions and on the heir.
Worth noting are this Courts statements in the case of Natcher v. Court of Appeals:
Matters which involve settlement and distribution of the estate of the decedent fall
within the exclusive province of the probate court in the exercise of its limited
jurisdiction.
xxxx
It is clear that trial courts trying an ordinary action cannot resolve to perform acts
pertaining to a special proceeding because it is subject to specific prescribed rules.
That an accounting of the funds and assets of Zenith to determine the extent and value of Anastacias
shareholdings will be undertaken by a probate court and not by a special commercial court is completely
consistent with the probate courts limited jurisdiction. It has the power to enforce an accounting as a
necessary means to its authority to determine the properties included in the inventory of the estate to
be administered, divided up, and distributed. Beyond this, the determination of title or ownership over
the subject shares (whether belonging to Anastacia or Oscar) may be conclusively settled by the probate
court as a question of collation or advancement. We had occasion to recognize the courts authority to
act on questions of title or ownership in a collation or advancement situation in Coca v.
Pangilinan where we ruled:
It should be clarified that whether a particular matter should be resolved by the Court of
First Instance in the exercise of its general jurisdiction or of its limited probate
jurisdiction is in reality not a jurisdictional question. In essence, it is a procedural
question involving a mode of practice "which may be waived."
As a general rule, the question as to title to property should not be passed upon in the
testate or intestate proceeding. That question should be ventilated in a separate action.
That general rule has qualifications or exceptions justified by expediency and
convenience.
Thus, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or testate
proceeding the question of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.
Although generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, yet
if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the
rights of third parties are not impaired, the probate court is competent to decide the
question of ownership.
In sum, we hold that the nature of the present controversy is not one which may be classified as an
intra-corporate dispute and is beyond the jurisdiction of the special commercial court to resolve.

FACTS: Petitioner and private respondent were siblings. Together with their parents, namely Pedro and
Anastacia, owned shares of stocks of Zenith Insurance Corporation, a corporation established by their
family. Pedro died and Anastacia after some years died as well. The former had his estate judicially
partitioned among his heirs, but the latter had not made the same in her shareholding in Zenith. Zenith
and Rodrigo filed a complaint with the SEC against petitioner a derivative suit to obtain accounting of
funds and assets of Zenith, and to determine the shares of stock of deceased Pedro and Anastacia that
were arbitrarily and fraudulently appropriated by Oscar, and were unaccounted for. In his answer with
counterclaim, petitioner denied the illegality of the acquisition of shares of Anastacia and questioned
the jurisdiction of SEC to entertain the complaint because it pertains to settlement of Anastacias estate.
Petitioner filed Motion to Declare Complaint as Nuisance or Harassment Suit and must be dismissed.
The RTC denied the motion. The motion was elevated to the Court of Appeals, but was again denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the special commercial court has jurisdiction over the case in light of the nature
of the controversy therein.

HELD: No.

CASE 7
Rule 90
Case 7
QUASHA ANCHETA PEA AND NOLASCO LAW OFFICE FOR ITS OWN BEHALF, AND
REPRESENTING THE HEIRS OF RAYMOND TRIVIERE, petitioners,
vs.
LCN CONSTRUCTION CORP., respondent.
FACTS:
Raymond Triviere passed away on 14 December 1987. On 13 January 1988, proceedings for the
settlement of his intestate estate were instituted by his widow, Amy Consuelo Triviere, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 of the National Capital Region (NCR), docketed as
Special Proceedings Case No. M-1678. Atty. Enrique P. Syquia (Syquia) and Atty. William H. Quasha
(Quasha) of the Quasha Law Office, representing the widow and children of the late Raymond Triviere,
respectively, were appointed administrators of the estate of the deceased in April 1988. As administrators,
Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha incurred expenses for the payment of real estate taxes, security services,
and the preservation and administration of the estate, as well as litigation expenses.
In February 1995, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Quasha filed before the RTC a Motion for Payment of their
litigation expenses. Citing their failure to submit an accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate
under administration, the RTC denied in May 1995 the Motion for Payment of Atty. Syquia and Atty.
Quasha.
In 1996, Atty. Quasha also passed away. Atty. Redentor Zapata (Zapata), also of the Quasha Law Office,
took over as the counsel of the Triviere children, and continued to help Atty. Syquia in the settlement of
the estate.
3

On 6 September 2002, Atty. Syquia and Atty. Zapata filed another Motion for Payment, for their own
behalf and for their respective clients,
4

LCN, as the only remaining claimant against the Intestate Estate of the Late Raymond Triviere in Special
Proceedings Case No. M-1678, filed its Comment on/Opposition to the afore-quoted Motion. LCN
argued that its claims are still outstanding and chargeable against the estate of the late Raymond
Triviere; thus, no distribution should be allowed until they have been paid; especially considering
that as of 25 August 2002, the claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere
amounted to P6,016,570.65 as against the remaining assets of the estate totaling P4,738,558.63,
rendering the latter insolvent.
RTC: 2 June 2003, the RTC issued its Order taking note that "the widow and the heirs of the deceased
Triviere, after all the years, have not received their respective share (sic) in the Estate x

declared that there was no more need for accounting of the assets and liabilities of the estate
considering that:
[T]here appears to be no need for an accounting as the estate has no more assets except the
money deposited with the Union Bank
As to the payment of fees of Atty. Syquia and the Quasha Law Office, the RTC found as follows:
[B]oth the Co-Administrator and counsel for the deceased (sic) are entitled to the payment for the
services they have rendered.
LCN sought recourse from the Court of Appleals and maintained that:
(2) The awards violate Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court, as there still exists its (LCN's)
unpaid claim in the sum of P6,016,570.65;
CA: promulgated a Decision essentially ruling in favor of LCN. Deleted the shares awarded to the heirs.
ISSUE: THE AWARD IN FAVOR OF THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RAYMOND TRIVIERE IS ALREADY A
DISTRIBUTION
OF THE RESIDUE OF THE ESTATE. (yes)
HELD: Section 1, Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to
the estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign
the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions, or
parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been
made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the
The 12 June 2003 RTC Order would immediately reveal that it was not yet distributing the residue of the
estate. The said Order grants the payment of certain amounts from the funds of the estate to the
petitioner children and widow of the late Raymond Triviere considering that they have not received their
respective shares therefrom for more than a decade. Out of the reportedP4,738,558.63 value of the
estate, the petitioner children and widow were being awarded by the RTC, in its 12 June 2003 Order, their
shares in the collective amount of P600,000.00. Evidently, the remaining portion of the estate still needs
to be settled. The intestate proceedings were not yet concluded, and the RTC still had to hear and rule on
the pending claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere and only thereafter can it
distribute the residue of the estate, if any, to his heirs.
While the awards in favor of petitioner children and widow made in the RTC Order dated 12 June 2003
was not yet a distribution of the residue of the estate, given that there was still a pending claim against the
estate, still, they did constitute a partial and advance distribution of the estate. Virtually, the petitioner
children and widow were already being awarded shares in the estate, although not all of its obligations
had been paid or provided for.
Section 2, Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly recognizes advance distribution of the
estate, thus:
Section 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Notwithstanding a pending controversy
or appeal in proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon
such terms as it may deem proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected
by the controversy or appeal be distributed among the heirs or legatees,upon compliance with the
conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these rules. (Emphases supplied.)
The second paragraph of Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court allows the distribution of the
estate prior to the payment of the obligations mentioned therein, provided that "the distributees, or any of

them, gives a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations
within such time as the court directs."
In sum, although it is within the discretion of the RTC whether or not to permit the advance distribution of
the estate, its exercise of such discretion should be qualified by the following:
[1] only part of the estate that is not affected by any pending controversy or appeal may be the subject of
advance distribution (Section 2, Rule 109); and
[2] the distributees must post a bond, fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of outstanding
obligations of the estate (second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 90).
There is no showing that the RTC, in awarding to the petitioner children and widow their shares in the
estate prior to the settlement of all its obligations, complied with these two requirements or, at the very
least, took the same into consideration. Its Order of 12 June 2003 is completely silent on these matters. It
justified its grant of the award in a single sentence which stated that petitioner children and widow had not
yet received their respective shares from the estate after all these years. Taking into account that the
claim of LCN against the estate of the late Raymond Triviere allegedly amounted to P6,016,570.65,
already in excess of the P4,738,558.63 reported total value of the estate, the RTC should have been
more prudent in approving the advance distribution of the same.
Hence, CA is correct in disallowing the advance award of the shares to the children and widow of
Raymond Triviere.

CASE 8
Rule 90
Case 8
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR.
Vs
COURT OF APPEALS (Fifth Division) Promulgated:
and NELIA S. SILVERIO-DEE,
Facts:
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate the premises
of the property located at No. 3, Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. She received a copy of the said
Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, private respondent
filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order. This motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order
dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December 22, 2005. On
January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on Appeal on
January 23, 2006.
RTC denied her notice of appeal based on two (2) grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was
against an order denying a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court; and (2) that Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary
period to file an appeal provided under Sec. 3 of Rule 41.
CA: ruled that the filing of the Notice of Appeal in this case was proper saying that the appeal pertained to
the earlier Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005.
Issue: When shall the properties of estate be distributed
Held:
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it
ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares
of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned,
each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a
particular property.

In Alejandrino v. Court of Appeals, we succinctly ruled:

Art. 1078 of the Civil Code provides that where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
decedent is, before partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of the debts of the
deceased. Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided thing or right belongs to different
persons. Each co-owner of property which is held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property
and may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the interests of his
co-owners. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint
ownership over the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
Although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long as
the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to
exercise rights of ownership over such inchoate right. Thus, the Civil Code provides:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co[22]
ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
Additionally, the above provision must be viewed in the context that the subject property is part of
an estate and subject to intestate proceedings before the courts. It is, thus, relevant to note that in Rule
84, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court, the administrator may only deliver properties of the estate to the heirs
upon order of the Court. Similarly, under Rule 90, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, the properties of the
estate shall only be distributed after the payment of the debts, funeral charges, and other
expenses against the estate, except when authorized by the Court.
Verily, once an action for the settlement of an estate is filed with the court, the properties included
therein are under the control of the intestate court. And not even the administrator may take possession of
any property that is part of the estate without the prior authority of the Court.
In the instant case, the purported authority of Nelia Silverio-Dee, which she allegedly secured from
Ricardo Silverio, Sr., was never approved by the probate court. She, therefore, never had any real
interest in the specific property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City. As such, the May
31, 2005 Order of the RTC must be considered as interlocutory and, therefore, not subject to an appeal.

CASE 9
Rule 90
Case 9
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMILIO T. LOPEZ. SATURNINA M. VDA. DE
LOPEZ, administratrix-appellee,
vs.
DAHLIA LOPEZ and ROY LOPEZ, minors, represented by their mother and natural guardian
LOLITA B. BACHAR, movants-appellants.
FACTS:
The facts are not disputed. On October 13, 1962 Saturnina M. Vda. de Lopez, judicial administratrix of the
estate of the deceased filed with the lower court a project of partition adjudicating the whole to herself and
her legitimate children with the deceased.
Lower court: approved the project of partition and declared the intestate proceeding "terminated and
closed for all legal purposes."
1

Seventeen days thereafter the minors Dahlia and Roy, both surnamed Lopez, represented by their
mother, Lolita B. Bachar, filed a motion to reopen the proceeding, together with a petition claiming that
they were illegitimate children of, the deceased Emilio Lopez, born out of his extra-marital relations with
Lolita B. Bachar, and asking that their rights as such be recognized and their shares in the estate given to
them.

The motion was opposed by the judicial administratrix on the ground that the proceeding had already
been ordered terminated and closed and the estate was already in the hands of the distributees; and that
the reopening of the intestate proceeding was not the proper remedy, which should be an independent
action against the individual distributees..
TC: Denied the motion and said proceeding was already ordered closed and that the property was divided
to their respective heirs. In the opinion of the Court, under the law, reopening is not the proper remedThe
movants asked for reconsideration.
ISSUES:
(1) whether or not the motion to reopen the estate proceeding was filed too late; and
(2) whether or not such motion was the proper remedy.
HELD:
1. On the face of such claim they are legal heirs of the deceased and hence entitled to share in his estate.
Having been omitted in the partition presented by the judicial administratrix and approved by the Court,
they were not bound thereby. The following statement of this Court in Vda. de Marbella vs. Kilayko, et
al., 104 Phil. 41, citing Lajom vs. Viola, 73 Phil. 563, expresses the general governing principle:
A judicial partition in probate proceedings (and the same thing can be said of partition in
intestate proceedings) does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition,
judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the petitioner
had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership
and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true
right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not
being of such definitive character to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who
has been deprived of his lawful share, such co-heir may still, within the
prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindication in the province where any of
the real property of the deceased may be situated.
The motion to reopen was not too late. The court's order declaring the intestate proceeding closed did not
become final immediately upon its issuance. It was no different from judgments or orders in ordinary
actions. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 72 provides that "in the absence of special provisions, the rules provided
for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in Special Proceedings." And judgments
or orders in ordinary actions become final after thirty (30) days from notice to the party concerned. In this
case appellants' motion to reopen was led only seventeen (17) days from the date of the order of closure.
The remedy was therefore invoked on time.
2. as to whether the remedy pursued was proper, or whether it should have been an independent action
against the individual distributees to annul the partition and recover appellants' shares in the estate is
not a novel one.
Finally, in the recent case of Uriarte vs. Uriarte,there are two alternatives for an acknowledged
natural child to prove his status and interest in the estate of the deceased parent, to wit:
(1) to intervene in the probate proceeding if it is still open; and
(2) to ask for its reopening if it has already been closed.

CASE 10
RULE 90
Case 10.
SALUD DIVINAGRACIA, EMILIA DIVINAGRACIA, DOLORES DIVINAGRACIA, ROSARIO
DIVINAGRACIA and JUANITA DIVINAGRACIA, petitioners,
vs.
JUDGE VALERIO V. ROVIRA in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch IV, Court of First
Instance, Iloilo City, and CAMILO DIVINAGRACIA, respondents.
Facts:

Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1, 1964. He was survived by his wife, Salud and their
four daughters named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. Two days after his death, a petition was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as
administratrix on May 22, 1964. She administered the estate for seven years. Judge Castrense C. Veloso
in his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting and project of partition and declared the
proceeding "closed and terminated.The partition was duly registered.
On June 8, 1971 or after the order closing the intestate proceeding had become final, Camilo
Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He alleged that he was an
illegitimate child of the decedent.
Respondent Judge Valerie V. Rovira who issued the questioned order dated October 18, 1975 reopening
the intestate proceeding.
ISSUE: whether an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still be reopened so as to
allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the decedent's estate.

HELD:
No. The probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which
Camilo Divinagracia is deemed to have had constructive notice . The order closing it was already
final and executory. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period
counted from the date the order of closure was served on the administratrix. The closure order
could not be disturbed anymore.
The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's motion to reopen the intestate
proceeding. It erred because that motion involved the determination of his status as the decedent's
spurious child. That question falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Iloilo. Republic Act No. 4834, which took effect on June 18, 1966, provides:
SECTION 1. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations court. There shall be a Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court in the Province of Iloilo, for which a judge who shall possess the same
qualifications, enjoy the same privileges and receive the same salary as judges of courts of first
instance, shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments.
Provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases after the effectivity of this Act:
(b) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, paternity and acknowledgment;
xxx xxx xxx
If any question involving any of the above matters (seven classes of cases) should arise as
an incident in any case pending in the ordinary courts, said incident shall be determined in
the main case.
Court held that cases involving paternity and acknowledgment fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
The Paterno and Bartolome cases involve provisions of the Charter of Manila inserted by Republic Act
No. 1401 in Republic Act No. 409), which created its Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Those
provisions are similar to the provisions of Republic Act No. 4834 which created the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Iloilo.
It was clarified in the Paterno case that the rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule
2, Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the action to establish plaintiff's filiation as an
illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and cannot be joined to the
action of the illegitimate child for partition and recovery of his hereditary share in his putative father's
estate, which is cognizable by the Court of First Instance:
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 a case involving paternity and
acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See
Baluyot vs. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such
an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated.

REMEDY
There is a rule that the remedy of a natural child, who has not been voluntarily acknowledged (Art. 278,
Civil Code) but who can justifiably compel recognition. is either :
(a) a separate action against his parent to compel recognition, or, if the parent is dead, against all the
potential heirs who would be prejudiced by his recognition together with an action for the enforcement of
his rights against his parent or the latter's heirs; or
(b) he may intervene in the administration proceeding for the settlement of his deceased parent's estate
and there ask for recognition and at the same time enforce his hereditary rights
This rule, which may be applied to the spurious child's action to establish his filiation and assert his
hereditary rights, is good in provinces where there are no Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and
where the administration proceeding has not been instituted or is already closed.
How should their filiation be proven?
Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity of spurious children
under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the
rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
PROOF
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children (Art.
278, Civil Code).
In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be
established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the
aforementioned articles 283 and 284
The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as
provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.
In the instant case, Camilo Divinagracia did not disclose whether he has any evidence of voluntary
recognition of his filiation. There is no allegation in his motion that would sustain his claim for compulsory
acknowledgment of his filiation.

Case 11
GUILAS VS. JUDGE OF THE CFI OF PAMPANGA
GR No. L-26695
FACTS:

Jacinta was married to Alejandro. They had no children.

Jacinta executed a will instituting her husband Alejandro as her sole heir and executor.

Petitioner Juanita, then single and now married to Federico Guilas, was declared legally adopted daughter
and legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and Alejandro.

After adopting legally herein petitioner Juanita Lopez, the testatrix Doa Jacinta did not execute another
will or codicil so as to include Juanita as one of her heirs.

The will was admitted to probate and the surviving husband, Alejandro, was appointed executor without
bond.

In a project of partition executed by both Alejandro and Juanita, the right of Juanita to inherit from Jacinta
was recognized and Lots Nos. 3368 and 3441 (Jacinta's paraphernal property), were adjudicated to
Juanita as her share.

The lower court approved the said project of partition and directed that the records of the case be sent to
the archives, upon payment of the estate and inheritance taxes

Petitioner Juanita filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition.

Juanita filed a petition praying that Alejandro be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said
lots nos. 3368 and 3441 as well as the 1,216 caverns of palay that he collected from the 10 tenants or
lessees of the said two lots.

Alejandro claims that, by virtue of the order which approved the project of partition submitted by both
Alejandro and Juanita and directed that the records of the case be archived upon payment of the estate
and inheritance taxes, and the order which "ordered closed and terminated the present case", the testate
proceedings had already been closed and terminated.

Juanita contends that the actual delivery and distribution of the hereditary shares to the heirs, and not the
order of the court declaring as closed and terminated the proceedings, determines the termination of the
probate proceedings.

ISSUE: W/N the testate proceedings had already been closed and terminated.
HELD: No.
The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and
the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project
of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding.
As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot
be deemed closed and terminated; because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the
heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed.
The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper
motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative
proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another
court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and
executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of.
Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the
right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession."

CASE 12
FRAN VS. SALAS
GR No. L-53546
FACTS:

Remedios, a widow, died with neither descendants nor ascendants; she left real and personal properties,
she executed a last will and testament 3 wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives (brothers,
sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario or, upon the latter's death, Jesus
Fran, as executor to serve without bond.

Fran filed a petition for the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. The petition alleged that Rosario
is not physically well and, therefore, will not be assuming the position of administratrix. The probate court
issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Meanwhile, the court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as
special administrator.

The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the testatrix, Remedio, and
appointing petitioner Fran as executor thereof. The requisite notice to creditors was issued, but despite
the expiration of the period therein fixed, no claim was presented against the estate.

Petitioner Fran filed an Inventory of the Estate; copies thereof were furnished each of the private
respondents.

Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the
devisees and legatees, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion M.
Espina, was submitted by the executor for the court's approval. 10 Said legatees and devisees submitted
certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of
hearing, and state that they had no objection to its approval.

After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court issued its Order approving the same, declaring the
parties therein as the only heirs entitled to the estate of Remedios Mejia Vda. de Tiosejo, directing the
administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed.

Private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate
judgment of and the Order of partition, in said motion, they ask the court to declare the proceedings still
open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will. One of the grounds raised for the re-opening
of the proceedings was the non-distribution of the estate to the devisees and legatees.

ISSUE: W/N the allegation of non-distribution of the estate is sufficient ground to warrant the re-opening of the
testate proceedings.
HELD: No.
The non-distribution of the estate, which is vigorously denied by the petitioners, is not a ground for the re-opening
of the testate proceedings. A seasonable motion for execution should have been filed.
In De Jesus vs. Daza, the Court ruled that if the executor or administrator has possession of the share to be
delivered, the probate court would have jurisdiction within the same estate proceeding to order him to transfer that
possession to the person entitled thereto. This is authorized under Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court.
However, if no motion for execution is filed within the reglementary period, a separate action for the recovery of
the shares would be in order.

CASE 13

SOLIVIO VS. CA
GR No. 83484

FACTS:

This case involves the estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr., who died a bachelor, without descendants,
ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces.

His only surviving relatives are: (1) his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia, the spinster half-sister of his
mother, Salustia; and (2) the private respondent, Concordia, sister of his deceased father, Esteban
Javellana, Sr.

Salustia and her sister, Celedonia, brought up Esteban, Jr.

Salustia died, leaving all her properties to her only child, Esteban, Jr.

During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr. had, more than once, expressed to his aunt Celedonia and some close
friends his plan to place his estate in a foundation to honor his mother and to help poor but deserving
students obtain a college education. Unfortunately, he died of a heart attack without having set up the
foundation.

Pursuant to their agreement that Celedonia would take care of the proceedings leading to the formation of
the foundation, Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice of her counsel, filed a special proceeding for
her appointment as special administratrix of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Later, she filed an
amended petition praying that letters of administration be issued to her; that she be declared sole heir of
the deceased; and that after payment of all claims and rendition of inventory and accounting, the estate
be adjudicated to her.

She was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr.

Branch 23, RTC declared her the sole heir of Esteban, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to
pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA SOLIVIO
VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION" which she caused to be registered in the Securities and Exchange
Commission.

Concordia Javellana Villanueva filed a motion for reconsideration of the court's order declaring Celedonia
as "sole heir" of Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased.

Her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 26, for partition, recovery of possession, ownership and damages.

On Concordia's motion, the trial court ordered the execution of its judgment pending appeal and required
Celedonia to submit an inventory and accounting of the estate. In her motions for reconsideration of those
orders, Celedonia averred that the properties of the deceased had already been transferred to, and were
in the possession of, the 'Salustia Solivio Vda. de Javellana Foundation."

ISSUE: W/N the intestate proceedings had already been terminated.

HELD: No.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, lacked jurisdiction to entertain Concordia Villanueva's action for partition and
recovery of her share of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate proceedings for the settlement of
said estate are still pending in Branch 23 of the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and
approval of the administratix's inventory and accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and
terminating the proceedings.
It is the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto that
brings to a close the intestate proceedings, puts an end to the administration and thus far relieves the
administrator from his duties.
The assailed order declaring Celedonia as the sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. did not toll the end of
the proceedings.
In view of the pendency of the probate proceedings in Branch 11 of the Court of First Instance (now RTC, Branch
23), Concordia's motion to set aside the order declaring Celedonia as sole heir of Esteban, and to have herself
(Concordia) declared as co-heir and recover her share of the properties of the deceased, was properly filed by her.
Her remedy when the court denied her motion, was to elevate the denial to the Court of Appeals for review on
certiorari. However, instead of availing of that remedy, she filed more than one year later, a separate action for the
same purpose in Branch 26 of the court. We hold that the separate action was improperly filed for it is the probate
court that has exclusive jurisdiction to make a just and legal distribution of the estate.
In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and conflicting dispositions of a decedent's estate, a
court should not interfere with probate proceedings pending in a co-equal court.

CASE 14
NUAL VS. CA
GR No. 94005
FACTS:

This case originated from a suit filed by Emma in her behalf and as guardian ad litem of private
respondents (minors) against Nual, now deceased and herein represented by her heirs (herein
petitioners), for partition and accounting of a parcel of land.

The then CFI (now RTC) rendered its judgment in favor of private respondents and ordered the partition of
the property but dismissing private respondents' complaint for accounting.

An order for the issuance of the writ of execution was issued by the court a quo.

Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of the late Frank C. Lyon and Mary Ekstrom Lyon, assisted by her counsel filed
a motion to quash the order of execution with preliminary injunction. In her motion, she contends that not
being a party to the above-entitled case her rights, interests, ownership and participation over the land
should not be affected by a judgment in the said case; that the order of execution is unenforceable insofar
as her share, right, ownership and participation is concerned, said share not having been brought within
the Jurisdiction of the court a quo.

Subsequently, on appeal, the appellate court rendered a decision ordering the inclusion of Mary Lyon
Martin as one of the heirs who shall benefit from the partition.

ISSUE: W/N the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin was proper.

HELD: No.
In the ease of Manning International Corporation v. NLRC, 19 the court held that ". . ., nothing is more settled in
the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The
judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived
to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made
by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of land. The only recognized exceptions are the correction of
clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, and, of
course, where the judgment is void."
Furthermore, "(a)ny amendment. or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null
and void for lack of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose."

In the case at bar, the decision of the trial court has become final and executory. Thus, upon its finality, the trial
judge lost his jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, any modification that he would make, as in this case, the
inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin would be in excess of his authority.
The remedy of Mary Lyon Martin is to file an independent suit against the parties and all other heirs for her share in
the subject property, in order that all the parties in interest can prove their respective claims.

RULE 91: ESCHEATS

CASE 1
Case #1
G.R. No. 143483

January 31, 2002

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND AMADA H. SOLANO,

Facts:
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around
personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins'
lifetime and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl

Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and
were nowhere to be found

While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth
Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. In early September 20, 1985, it was established that there
were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the
estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.

By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808
and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.

In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been
looking for a long time. Respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition before the Court of Appeals
for the annulment of the lower court's decision.

17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the Register of Deeds
(herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.

Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City
and the Presiding judge of the lower court and ruled in favour to Amada Solana.

ISSUE: W/N private respondent is barred by statute of limitation?

Held: Yes!
We rule for the petitioner.
Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by virtue of its sovereignty,
steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no heir.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of
such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall be
accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee,
have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this
regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de
San Jose, Inc.,7 is applicable at least insofar as it concerns the Court's discussion on who is an "interested party" in
an escheat proceeding In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated
is likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the
Colegio de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de
San Pedro Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter
because he claims to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former (underscoring
supplied).
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it
was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously,
private respondent's belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against recovery

With the lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the
supposed "discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which
has long attained finality.

CASE 2
CASE# 2
G.R. No. L-44347 September 29, 1988
VICENTE TAN, petitioner,
vs.
CITY OF DAVAO, respondent

The spouses Cornelia Pizarro and Baltazar Garcia, during their lifetime, were residents of Davao City. As they were
childless, they adopted a three-year old girl whom they named Dominga Garcia and brought up as their own.
Dominga Garcia married a Chinaman, Tan Seng alias Seng Yap, with whom she had three children, named Vicente,
who was born in 1916, Mariano who was born in 1918, and Luis who was born in 1921.

In 1923, Dominga Garcia and her three children emigrated to Canton, China.

Dominga Garcia died intestate in 1955 .She left in the Philippines a 1,966-square-meter lot on Claveria Street,
Townsite of Davao, District of Davao, registered in her name under T.C.T. No. 296. Since her departure for China

with her family, neither she, nor her husband, nor any of their children has returned to the Philippines to claim the
lot.

Dominga's adoptive parent, Cornelia Pizarro, died in May 1936. In 1948, her nephew, Ramon Pizarro, occupied a
part of Dominga's property and collected the rentals from the owners of other houses occupying the land. Another
nephew of Cornelia, Segundo Reyes, in a burst of civic spirit, informed the Solicitor General
about the property

On September 12,1962, the City of Davao filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I to declare
Dominga Garcia's land escheated in its favour.

Ramon Pizarro opposed the escheat petition on the ground that courts are not authorized to declare that a person
is presumed to be dead and that Dominga Garcia's being in Red China is not a sufficient ground to deprive her of
her property by escheat proceedings

he alleged that in 1960 he met Vicenta on Claveria Street, that she told him to take care of her property because
she would come again later; that they met again in Hongkong in 1966; and he recognized her from her pictures .

March 23, 1972, the trial court rendered judgment infavor to City of Davao.

Pizarro appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA-G.R. No. L-51786-R). He passed away on June 16, 1975 during the
pendency of the appeal.On August 19,1975, a certain Luis Tan, alias Chen Yek An claiming to be the long missing
son of Dominga Garcia, filed a motion for intervention in the Court of Appeals.
On April 2, 1976, the Court of Appeals affirmed the appealed decision of the trial court.

ISSUE: 1.W/N the city of Davao had personality to file the escheat petition? Yes
2.W/N Pizarro and Luis Tan(intervenor) were party in interest? No

Held:
1.We find no merit in the petition for review.
City of davao can file petition base Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court.
With respect to the argument that only the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General, may file
the escheat petition under Section 1, Rule 91 of the Revised (1964) Rules of Court, the Appellate Court correctly
ruled that the case did not come under Rule 91 because the petition was filed on September 12,1962, when the
applicable rule was still Rule 92 of the 1940 Rules of Court which provided:
Sec. 1. When and by whom,petition filed.When a person dies intestate, seized of real or personal
property in the Philippines, leaving no heirs or person by law entitled to the same,
the municipality or city where the deceased last resided, if he resided in the Philippines, or
the municipality or city in which he had estate if he resided out of the Philippines, may file a
petition in the court of first instance of the province setting forth the facts, and praying that the
estate of the deceased be declared escheated. (Emphasis supplied.)
Rule 91 of the Revised rules of Court, which provides that only the Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor
General, may commence escheat proceedings, did not take effect until January 1, 1964. Although the escheat
proceedings were still pending then, the Revised Rules of Court could not be applied to the petition because to do so
would work injustice to the City of Davao. Rule 144 of the 1964 Rules of Court contains this "saving" clause:
These rules shall take effect on January 1, 1964. They shall govern all cases brought after they take

effect, and also all further proceedings in cases pending, except to the extent that in the opinion of
the court, their application would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the
former procedure shall apply.
2.
The Court of Appeals should have dismissed the appeal of Vicenta Tan and Ramon Pizarro earlier because the
records show that Vicenta was never a party in the escheat proceedings. The trial court's order dated February 4,
1972 ordering that she be substituted for Ramon Pizarro as oppositor was set aside by the same court in its Order of
March 23, 1972 which was not appealed.
Vicenta Tan, if she still exists, was never served with summons extra-territorially under Section 17, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court. She never appeared in the trial court by herself, or counsel and never filed a pleading therein, hence,
she never submitted to the court's jurisdiction.

CASE 3
G.R. No. L-44658

January 24, 1936

EMILIA DIVINO, petitioner,

vs.
CEFERINO HILARIO, respondents.

Facts:
In the CFI of Davao, Tan Kui Sing began the intestate of the deceased Tan Chay, special proceeding No. 314, stating
that the deceased was a party in civil case No. 1147 of the same Court of First Instance the Judgment of which was
appealed to this court, and asking that, while his properties are yet unknown, a special administrator be appointed to
duly represent said deceased in the appeal.
In an order of November 5, 1932, the court appointed Ang Liongto special administrator
On August 24, 1935, the court called the petition for hearing, and after the presentation of the evidence declared that
Tan Chay, had died intestate, that he left no legal heirs, that he left as his only estate the sum of P5,000 deposited
with the Philippine Foreign Trading & Company, and decreed the escheat of said funds to the municipality of
Guianga, Province of Davao.
Thereafter the municipal president of Guianga took charge of the funds.
On October 16, 1935, the petitioner, in the same capacity as guardian, appeared and file a motion to set aside the
decree escheating the P5,000 to the municipality of Guianga.
ISSUE: W/N CFI of Davao acquire jurisdiction over the case?
Held: No
SEC. 750. Procedure when persons dies intestate without heirs. When a person dies intestate, seized of real or
personal by law entitled to the same, the president and municipal council of the municipality where the deceased last
resided, if he was an inhabitant of these Islands, or of the municipality in which he had estate, if he resided out of the
Islands, may, on behalf of the municipality, file a petition with the Court of First Instance of the province for an
inquisition in the premises; the court shall thereupon appoint a time and place of hearing, and deciding on such petition,
cause a notice thereof to be published in some newspaper of general circulation in the province of which the deceased
was last an inhabitant, if within the Philippine Islands, and if not, in some newspaper of general circulation in the
province in which he had estate. The notice shall recite the substance of the facts and request set forth in the petition,
the time and place at which persons claiming the estate may appear and be heard before the court, and shall be
published at least six weeks successively, the last of which publications shall be at least six weeks before the time
appointed by the court to make inquisition.

Section 750 provides how the Court of First Instance may acquire jurisdiction over the properties left by deceased
who resided in the Philippine Islands and may decree its escheat to the municipality where he resided.
It provides that the municipal president and the municipal council may file a petition to that effect.
In the case under consideration, the procedure fixed by section 750 has neither been followed nor complied
with, wherefore, we hold that the respondent judge and the Court of First Instance of Davao did not acquire
jurisdiction either to take cognizance of the escheat
No petition was filed either by the required publication made which was the essential step which should have
conferred jurisdiction. Respondent judge and the Court of First Instance of Davao never acquired jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the escheat case.

CASE 4
G.R. No. L-30381 August 30, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
CFI of MANILA respondents.
Facts:
Pursuant to Section 2 of Act No. 3936(Unclaimed Balance Law), some 31 banks including herein private respondent
Pres. Roxas Rural Bank forwarded to the Treasurer of the Philippines in January of 1968 separate statements under
oath by their respective managing officers:

all deposits and credits held by them in favor, or in the names of such depositors or creditors
known to be dead, or who have not been heard from, or who have not made further deposits or
withdrawals during the preceding ten years or more.

In the sworn statement submitted by private respondent Bank, only two (2) names appeared: Jesus Ydirin with a
balance of P126.54 and Leonora Trumpeta with a deposit of P62.91.
Thereafter,on July 25, 1968, the Republic of the Philippines instituted before the CFI of Manila a complaint for
escheat against the aforesaid 31 banks, including herein private respondent. Likewise named defendants therein
were the individual depositors and/or creditors.
On October 5,1968, private respondent Bank filed before the CFI a motion to dismiss the complaint as against it on
the ground of improper venue. The motion to dismiss was granted.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not Pres. Roxas Rural Bank is a real party in interest in the escheat Court of First Instance of Manila?
Yes!
b. Whether or not venue of action is properly laid in the City of Manila, since all defendant banks, wherever they
may be found, could be included in one single action, pursuant to the provisions of Act No. 3936? No!
c. Whether or not Sec. 2(b), Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court on venue only refers to personal action? No!
Held:
1. Yes! A "real party in interest" has been defined as the party who would be benefitted or injured by the judgment of
the suit or the party entitled to avail of the suit. There can be no doubt that private respondent bank falls under this
definition for the escheat of the dormant deposits in favor of the government would necessarily deprive said bank of
the use of such deposits
2. No. The first sentence of Section 3 of Act No. 3936 directs the Attorney General, now Solicitor General, to
commence an action or actions in the name of the People of the Philippines in the Court of First Instance of the
province where the bank is located. The phrase "or actions" in this section is very significant. It manifests awareness
on the part of the legislators that a single action to cover all banks wherever located in the Philippines would not be
legally feasible in view of the venue prescribed for such action under the same section, i.e., the province where the
bank is located. Thus, the addition of the last sentence, which the lower court had correctly interpreted to mean "that
for escheat of unclaimed bank balances all banks located in one and the same province where the Court of First
Instance concerned is located may be made parties defendant "in one action" was clearly intended to save on
litigation and publication expenses, but certainly not as authority for the lumping together of all banks wherever
found in the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.for the lumping together of all banks wherever found in
the Philippines in one single escheat proceedings.
3. No. Anent the third issue raised, suffice it to say that Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court cannot
govern escheat proceedings principally because said section refers to personal actions. Escheat proceedings are
actions in rem which must be brought in the province or city where the rem in this case the dormant deposits, is
located.

CASE 5
Gopoco Grocery v. Pacific Coast Biscuit Co.
G.R. Nos. L-43697 and L-442200, March 31, 1938
FACTS: Mercantile Bank of China was declared in liquidation as it could not continue operating as such
without running the risk of suffering losses and prejudice its depositors and customers.
Creditors Gopoco Grocery, et. al. alleged that they deposited sum of money in the bank
under liquidation on current account. To resolve these claims, Fulgencio Borromeo was appointed by the
lower court as commissioner and referee to receive the evidence which the interested parties may desire
to present. Borromeo resolved the claims by recommending that the same be considered as an ordinary
credit only, and not as a preferred credit as Gopoco Grocery, Et Al wanted, because they were at the
same time debtors of the bank. The lower court upheld Borromeos recommendations. Gopoco Grocery,
et. al. contended that their claims are preferred credits because they are deposits in contemplation of law,
and as such, should be returned with the corresponding interest thereon.

ISSUE:
WON the lower court erred in not holding petitioners claims as preferred credits?

RULING:
NO, deposits on current account in the bank now under liquidation are considered
ordinary credits only. Gopoco Grocery, et. al., themselves, admit that the bank owes them interest which
should have been paid to them before it was declared in a state of liquidation. This fact undoubtedly
destroys the character which they nullifies their contention that the same be considered as irregular
deposits, because the payment of interest only takes place in the case of loans. The so-called current
account and savings deposits have lost their character of deposits and are convertible into simple
commercial loans because, in cases of such deposits, the bank has made use thereof in the ordinary
course of its transactions as an institution engaged in the banking business
, not because it so wishes, but precisely because of the authority deemed to have been granted to it by
Gopoco Grocery, Et Al to enable them to collect the interest which they had been and they are now
collecting, and by virtue further of the authority granted to it by Corporation Law and Banking Law.

GENERAL GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP

A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC
[MAY 01, 2003]
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC
[MAY 01, 2003]
RE: PROPOSED RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS
RESOLUTION
Acting on the letter of the Chairman of the Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court submitting for this Courts consideration and
approval the Proposed Rule on Guardianship of Minors, the Court Resolved to APPROVE the same.
The Rule shall take effect on May 1, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not later than April 15, 2003.
April 1, 2003.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, AustriaMartinez, Corona, Carpio-Moralez,Callejo Sr., Azcuna, JJ., concur

RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS

Section 1. Applicability of the Rule. This Rule shall apply to petitions for guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a
minor.
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the person and property of their unemancipated common
child without the necessity of a court appointment. In such case, this Rule shall be suppletory to the provisions of the Family Code
on guardianship.
Sec. 2. Who may petition for appointment of guardian. On grounds authorized by law, any relative or other person on behalf of a
minor, or the minor himself if fourteen years of age or over, may petition the Family Court for the appointment of a general guardian
over the person or property, or both, of such minor. The petition may also be filed by the Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development and by the Secretary of Health in the case of an insane minor who needs to be hospitalized.
Sec. 3. Where to file petition. A petition for guardianship over the person or property, or both, of a minor may be filed in the Family
Court of the province or city where the minor actually resides. If he resides in a foreign country, the petition shall be flied with the
Family Court of the province or city where his property or any part thereof is situated.
Sec. 4. Grounds of petition. - The grounds for the appointment of a guardian over the person or property, or both, of a minor are the
following:
(a) death, continued absence, or incapacity of his parents;
(b) suspension, deprivation or termination of parental authority;
(c) remarriage of his surviving parent, if the latter Is found unsuitable to exercise parental authority; or
(d) when the best interests of the minor so require.
Sec. 5. Qualifications of guardians. In appointing a guardian, the court shall consider the guardians:
(a) moral character;
(b) physical, mental and psychological condition;
(c) financial status;
(d) relationship of trust with the minor;
(e) availability to exercise the powers and duties of a guardian for the full period of the guardianship;
(f) lack of conflict of interest with the minor; and
(g) ability to manage the property of the minor.
Sec. 6. Who may be appointed guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor. In default of parents or a court-appointed
guardian, the court may appoint a guardian of the person or property, or both, of a minor, observing as far as practicable, the
following order of preference:
(a) the surviving grandparent and In case several grandparents survive, the court shall select any of them taking Into account all
relevant considerations;
(b) the oldest brother or sister of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified;
(c) the actual custodian of the minor over twenty-one years of age, unless unfit or disqualified; and
(d) any other person, who in the sound discretion of the court, would serve the best interests of the minor.
Sec. 7. Contents of petition. A petition for the appointment of a general guardian must allege the following:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The name, age and residence of the prospective ward;
(c) The ground rendering the appointment necessary or convenient;
(d) The death of the parents of the minor or the termination, deprivation or suspension of their parental authority;
(e) The remarriage of the minors surviving parent;
(f) The names, ages, and residences of relatives within the 4th civil degree of the minor, and of persons having him in their care and
custody;
(g) The probable value, character and location of the property of the minor; and
(h) The name, age and residence of the person for whom letters of guardianship are prayed.
The petition shall be verified and accompanied by a certification against forum shopping. However, no defect in the petition or
verification shall render void the issuance of letters of guardianship.
Sec. 8. Time and notice of hearing. When a petition for the appointment of a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and
place for its hearing, and shall cause reasonable notice to be given to the persons mentioned in the petition, including the minor if he
is fourteen years of age or over, and may direct other general or special notice to be given.
Sec. 9. Case study report. The court shall order a social worker to conduct a case study of the minor and all the prospective
guardians and submit his report and recommendation to the court for its guidance before the scheduled hearing. The social worker
may intervene on behalf of the minor if he finds that the petition for guardianship should be denied.
Sec. 10. Opposition to petition. Any interested person may contest the petition by filing a written opposition based on such
grounds as the majority of the minor or the unsuitability of the person for whom letters are prayed, and pray that the petition be
denied, or that letters of guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable person named in the opposition.
Sec. 11. Hearing and order for letters to issue. At the hearing of the petition, it must be shown that the requirement of notice has
been complied with. The prospective ward shall be presented to the court. The court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support
of their respective allegations. If warranted, the court shall appoint a suitable guardian of the person or property, or both, of the
minor.
At the discretion of the court, the hearing on guardianship may be closed to the public and the records of the case shall not be
released without its approval.
Sec. 12. When and how a guardian of the property for non-resident minor is appointed; notice. When the minor resides outside the
Philippines but has property in the Philippines, any relative or friend of such minor, or any one interested in his property, in
expectancy or otherwise, may petition the Family Court for the appointment of a guardian over the property.

Notice of hearing of the petition shall be given to the minor by publication or any other means as the court may deem proper. The
court may dispense with the presence of the non-resident minor.
If after hearing the court is satisfied that such non-resident is a minor and a guardian is necessary or convenient, it may appoint a
guardian over his property.
Sec. 13. Service of final and executory judgment or order. The final and executory judgment or order shall be served upon the
Local Civil Registrar of the municipality or city where the minor resides and the Register of Deeds of the place where his property or
part thereof is situated shall annotate the same in the corresponding title, and report to the court his compliance within fifteen days
from receipt of the order.
Sec. 14. Bond of guardian; amount; conditions. - Before he enters upon the execution of his trust, or letters of guardianship issue,
an appointed guardian may be required to post a bond in such sum as the court shall determine and conditioned as follows:
(a)
To make and return to the court, within three months after the issuance of his letters of guardianship, a true and complete
Inventory of all the property, real and personal, of his ward which shall come to his possession or knowledge or to the possession or
knowledge of any other person in his behalf;
(b)
To faithfully execute the duties of his trust, to manage and dispose of the property according to this rule for the best interests
of the ward, and to provide for his proper care, custody and education;
(c)
To render a true and Just account of all the property of the ward in his hands, and of all proceeds or interest derived
therefrom, and of the management and disposition of the same, at the time designated by this rule and such other times as the court
directs; and at the expiration of his trust, to settle his accounts with the court and deliver and pay over all the property, effects, and
monies remaining in his hands, or due from him on such settlement, to the person lawfully entitled thereto; and
(d)

To perform all orders of the court and such other duties as may be required by law.

Sec. 15. Where to file the bond; action thereon. The bond posted by a guardian shall be filed in the Family Court and, In case of
breach of any of its conditions, the guardian may be prosecuted in the same proceeding for the benefit of the ward or of any other
person legally interested in the property.
Whenever necessary, the court may require the guardian to post a new bond and may discharge from further liability the sureties on
the old bond after due notice to interested persons, if no injury may result therefrom to those interested in the property.
Sec. 16. Bond of parents as guardians of property of minor. If the market value of the property or the annual Income of the child
exceeds P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall furnish a bond In such amount as the court may determine, but in no case less
than ten per centurn of the value of such property or annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for
general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be flied in the Family Court of the place where the child resides or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the Family Court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding In which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the
obligations of a general guardian shall be heard and resolved.
Sec. 17. General duties of guardian. A guardian shall have the care and custody of the person of his ward and the management of
his property, or only the management of his property. The guardian of the property of a nonresident minor shall have the
management of all his property within the Philippines.
A guardian shall perform the following duties:
(a) To pay the just debts of the ward out of the personal property and the income of the real property of the ward, If the same is
sufficient; otherwise, out of the real property of the ward upon obtaining an order for its sale or encumbrance;
(b) To settle all accounts of his ward, and demand, sue for, receive all debts due him, or may, with the approval of the court,
compound for the same and give discharges to the debtor on receiving a fair and just dividend of the property and effects; and to
appear for and represent the ward in all actions and special proceedings, unless another person is appointed for that purpose;
(c) To manage the property of the ward frugally and without waste, and apply the income and profits thereon, insofar as may be
necessary, to the comfortable and suitable maintenance of the ward; and if such income and profits be insufficient for that purpose,
to sell or encumber the real or personal property, upon being authorized by the court to do so;
(d) To consent to a partition of real or personal property owned by the ward jointly or in common with others upon authority granted
by the court after hearing, notice to relatives of the ward, and a careful investigation as to the necessity and propriety of the
proposed action;
(e) To submit to the court a verified inventory of the property of his ward within three months after his appointment, and annually
thereafter, the rendition of which may be required upon the application of an interested person;
(f) To report to the court any property of the ward not included in the inventory which is discovered, or succeeded to, or acquired by
the ward within three months after such discovery, succession, or acquisition; and
(g) To render to the court for its approval an accounting of the property one year from his appointment, and every year thereafter or
as often as may be required.
Sec. 18. Power and duty of the court The court may:
(a) Request the assistance of one or more commissioners in the appraisal of the property of the ward reported in the initial and
subsequent inventories;
(b) Authorize reimbursement to the guardian, other than a parent, of reasonable expenses incurred in the execution of his trust, and
allow payment of compensation for his services as the court may deem just, not exceeding ten per centum of the net income of the
ward, if any; otherwise, in such amount the court determines to be a reasonable compensation for his services; and

(c) Upon complaint of the guardian or ward, or of any person having actual or prospective interest in the property at the ward,
require any person suspected of having embezzled, concealed, or disposed of any money, goods or interest, or a written instrument
belonging to the ward or his property to appear for examination concerning any thereof and issue such orders as would secure the
property against such embezzlement, concealment or conveyance.
Sec. 19. Petition to sell or encumber property. - When the income of a property under guardianship is insufficient to maintain and
educate the ward, or when it is for his benefit that his personal or real property or any part thereof be sold, mortgaged or otherwise
encumbered, and the proceeds invested in safe and productive security, or in the improvement or security of other real property, the
guardian may file a verified petition setting forth such facts, and praying that an order issue authorizing the sale or encumbrance of
the property.
Sec. 20. Order to show cause. If the sale or encumbrance is necessary or would be beneficial to the ward, the court shall order his
next of kin and all person/s interested in the property to appear at a reasonable time and place therein specified and show cause
why the petition should not be granted.
Sec. 21. Hearing on return of order; costs. At the time and place designated in the order to show cause, the court shall hear the
allegations and evidence of the petitioner and next of kin, and other persons interested, together with their witnesses, and grant or
deny the petition as the best interests of the ward may require.
Sec. 22. Contents of order for sale or encumbrance and its duration; bond. If, after full examination, it is necessary, or would be
beneficial to the ward, to sell or encumber the property, or some portion of it, the court shall order such sale or encumbrance the
proceeds of which shall be expended for the maintenance or the education of the ward, or invested as the circumstances may
require. The order shall specify the grounds for the sale or encumbrance and may direct that the property ordered sold be disposed
of at public sale, subject to such conditions as to the time and manner of payment, and security where a part of the payment is
deferred. The original bond of the guardian shall stand as security for the proper appropriation of the proceeds of the sale or
encumbrance, but the court may, if deemed expedient, require an additional bond as a condition for the sale or encumbrance. The
authority to sell or encumber shall not extend beyond one year, unless renewed by the court.
Sec. 23. Court may order investment of proceeds and direct management of property. The court may authorize and require the
guardian to invest the proceeds of sales or encumbrances, and any other money of his ward in his hands, in real or personal
property, for the best interests of the ward, and may make such other orders for the management, investment, and disposition of the
property and effects, as circumstances may warrant.
Sec. 24. Grounds for removal or resignation of guardian. When a guardian becomes insane or otherwise incapable of discharging
his trust or is found thereafter to be unsuitable, or has wasted or mismanaged the property of the ward, or has failed to render an
account or make a return for thirty days after it is due, the court may, upon reasonable notice to the guardian, remove him as such
and require him to surrender the property of the ward to the person found to be lawfully entitled thereto.
The court may allow the guardian to resign for justifiable causes.
Upon the removal or resignation of the guardian, the court shall appoint a new one.
No motion for removal or resignation shall be granted unless the guardian has submitted the proper accounting of the property of
the ward and the court has approved the same.
Sec. 25. Ground for termination of guardianship. The court motu proprio or upon verified motion of any person allowed to file a
petition for guardianship may terminate the guardianship on the ground that the ward has come of age or has died. The guardian
shall notify the court of such fact within ten days of its occurrence.
Sec. 26. Service of final and executory judgment or order. The final and executory judgment or order shall be served upon the
Local Civil Registrar of the municipality or city where the minor resides and the Register of Deeds of the province or city where his
property or any part thereof is situated. Both the Local Civil Registrar and the Register of Deeds shall enter the final and executory
judgment or order in the appropriate books in their offices.
Sec. 27. Effect of the rule. This Rule amends Rules 92 to 97 inclusive of the Rules of Court on guardianship of minors.
Guardianship of incompetents who are not minors shall continue to be under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and governed by
the Rules of Court.
Sec. 28. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on May 1, 2003 following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation not
later than April 15, 2003.

CASE 1
Nery v. Lorenzo
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
Ponente: Fernando, J.:

Facts:
A parcel of land was sold to vendee spouses Nery by the widow of the deceased Leoncio
Lorenzo. The vendor was Bienvenida (widow), guardian of the decedent's minor children. Two
(2) of whom later assailed the validity of the said transaction. The latter contended that despite

the order of the guardianship court authorizing the sale of the lot, they were not informed of
the move. Further, they contended that the guardianship proceeding was conducted without
notifying the two older siblings although they were already more than 14 years of age at that
time.
The spouses Nery appealed to the Court of Appeals which declared the deed of sale to the
spouses as valid, without prejudice to the children demanding from their mother their
participation in the proceeds. Not being satisfied with the appellate court's decision, the
spouses Nery, the children of the deceased, and Bienvenida filed these petitions.

Issue: Whether or not the probate court could have validly authorized the sale of the property

Ruling:
No, the jurisdictional infirmity is clear. The Court of Appeals failed to give due weight to the
jurisdictional defect that the minors over 14 years age were not notified. The probate court is
therefor correct in not having authorized the sale due to this clear jurisdictional infirmity. The
rights of the young should never be ignored and it does not matter if their guardian is their
mother, as even in some cases, the interest of the mother is opposed to that of the children.
Finally, when minors are involved, the state being the parens patriae has the duty to protect
the rights of persons or individuals who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position.
CASE 2
Almayri v. Pabale
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J.:

Facts:
Almayri petitions the court to set aside the CAs decision.
Cesnando Fernando, representing Fernando Realty Corp, filed an action for Specific
Performance with Damages against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land which the former
alleged was the subject of a 'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave allegedly reneged on
their agreement when she refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando. The said lot was
instead sold to the Pabale siblings.
Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended by virtue of a guardianship proceedings. In
June 1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompetent.
The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale agreements on the ground that Nave was
found incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings intervened. The Court of Appeals granted

the appeals of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld the validity of the Deed of
Sale executed by Nelly Nave in1984. Hence this petition.
Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially determined to be an incompetent, all contracts
that she subsequently entered into should be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether or not the declaration of incompetency constitutes res judicata

Ruling: No. There was no identity of parties and issues between the special proceeding on the
guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision on the former on her incompetency
should not therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgement the finding in the latter case (civil
case) that Nave was competent and had capacity when she entered into the contract of sale
over the subject lot in favor of the Pabale siblings.
Also, the Court expounded on the difference between the two rules on res judicata, namely; 1)
bar by previous judgment, and 2) conclusiveness of judgement. Bar by previous judgement
means that the judgement in the first case will bar the second case due to the identity of
parties, subject-matter, and cause of action. While a bar by virtue of conclusiveness of
judgement bars the re-litigation in a second case of a fact or question already settled in a
previous case. Hence, even if there is identity of parties, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgement can be conclusive only as to the those matters actually controverted and
determined and not as to matters merely involved

RULE 93: APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS

1) SEE: A.M. NO. 03-02-05-SC UNDER GUARDIANS AND GUARDIANSHIP
2) ARTS 220,225 FAMILY CODE
Art. 220. The parents and those exercising parental authority shall have with the respect to their unemancipated children on wards
the following rights and duties:
(1) To keep them in their company, to support, educate and instruct them by right precept and good example, and to provide for
their upbringing in keeping with their means;
(2) To give them love and affection, advice and counsel, companionship and understanding;
(3) To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance, inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, self-reliance, industry and
thrift, stimulate their interest in civic affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of citizenship;
(4) To furnish them with good and wholesome educational materials, supervise their activities, recreation and association with
others, protect them from bad company, and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to their health, studies and morals;
(5) To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
(6) To demand from them respect and obedience;
(7) To impose discipline on them as may be required under the circumstances; and
(8) To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon parents and guardians. (316a)

Art. 225. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated common child
without the necessity of a court appointment. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial
order to the contrary.

Where the market value of the property or the annual income of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be required
to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may determine, but not less than ten per centum(10%) of the value of the property or
annual income, to guarantee the performance of the obligations prescribed for general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of the
obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or the
guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply. (320a)

RULE 96:GENERAL POWERS AND DUTIES OF

GUARDIANS
CASE 1

Cui De Ramas vs. Piccio

G.R. No. L-5131, July 31, 1952
Ponente:

Montemayor,

J.:

Facts: Don Mariano Cui sold three of his lots to three of his children in equal shares. However,
one was not able to pay, so Mariano shared ownership with his two other children, Antonio and
Mercedes. The two children borrowed money from Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, subject
to mortgage of the land. Mariano allowed the mortgage, with the condition that all the rentals
will go to him. He did not participate with the payment of the loan. Nearly a year later, his other
children filed a guardianship proceeding, which the court granted. Cuis other children tried to
nullify the sale to Antonio and Mercedes, which was still pending. When they asked the court to
deliver the rental payments to them, Judge Piccio granted it.

Issue: Whether Piccio acted in grave abuse of discretion in allowing such delivery of rental
payments to the ward

Ruling: Yes. Under Sec 6 of Rule 97, the ward may ask the guardian court to deliver an actual or
prospective interest which was owned by the ward, and was embezzled, concealed, or
conveyed by another. In the case at hand, Sec 6 of Rule 97 does not apply, since the rental
payments Is still a subject of controversy, as to who really owns such payments. This must be
litigated in a ordinary civil action, to which a guardian court does not have jurisdiction.

RULE 97: TERMINATION OF GUARDIANSHIP

CASE 1 (unassigned)
CASE 2 (unassigned)