I.

NATURE OF THE CONSTITUTION

IMBONG VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-32432; G.R. No. L-32443; September 11, 1970
Ponente: Makasiar, J.
RELATED LAWS:
Resolution No 2 (1967) -Calls for Constitutional Convention to be
composed of 2 delegates from each representative district who shall
be elected in November, 1970.
RA 4919 -implementation of Resolution No 2
Resolution 4 (1969)-amended Resolution 2: Constitutional
Convention shall be composed of 320delegates a proportioned
among existing representative districts according to the population.
Provided that each district shall be entitled to 2 delegates.
RA 6132-Concon Act 1970, repealed RA 4919, implemented Res No. 2
& 4.
Sec 4: considers all public officers/employees as resigned when they
file their candidacy
Sec 2: apportionment of delegates
Sec 5: Disqualifies any elected delegate from running for any public
office in the election or from assuming any appointive office/position
until the final adournment of the ConCon.
Par 1 Sec 8: ban against all political parties/organized groups from
giving support/representing a delegate to the convention.

FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2

separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to
the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA
6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law
Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional

Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is
constitutional.

HOLDING:
The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional
Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific
provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional.

RATIO:
- Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of
Constitution
-Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132:
Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to
propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes
and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4
- Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is
enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable.
Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case
granted more representatives to provinces with less population and
vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I
other provinces with more population.
- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to
qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification
is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political
figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more
time to the Constituional Convention.
- Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and
also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must
now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political
parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any
particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.

TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. L-34150; October 16, 1971
Ponente: Barredo, J.

FACTS:
After the election of delegates to the Constitutional Convention held
on November 10, 1970, the convention held its inaugural session on
June 1, 1971. On the early morning of September 28, 1971, the
Convention approved Organic Resolution No. 1 which seeks to
amend Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution, lowering the voting
age to 18. On September 30, 1971, COMELEC resolved to inform the
Constitutional Convention that it will hold the plebiscite together with
the senatorial elections on November 8, 1971. Arturo Tolentino filed a
petition for prohibition against COMELEC and prayed that Organic
Resolution No. 1 and acts in obedience to the resolution be null and
void.

ISSUE:
1.

Does the court have jurisdiction over the case?

2.

Is the Organic Resolution No. 1 constitutional?

HELD:
1. The case at bar is justiciable. As held in Gonzales vs. Comelec,
the issue whether or not a resolution of Congress, acting as a
constituent assembly, violates the constitution is a justiciable one
and thus subject to judicial review. The jurisdiction is not because
the Court is superior to the Convention but they are both subject to
the Constitution.
2. The act of the Convention calling for a plebiscite on a single
amendment in Organic Resolution No. 1 violated Sec. 1 of Article XV
of the Constitution which states that all amendments must be

submitted to the people in a single election or plebiscite. Moreover,

the voter must be provided sufficient time and ample basis to assess
the amendment in relation to the other parts of the Constitution, not
separately but together.
Almario vs Alba
Amendment to the Constitution
As provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, the Filipino electorate
will go to the polls on January 27, 1984 to either approve or reject
amendments to the Constitution proposed by Resolution Nos. 104,
105, 110, 111, 112, and 113 of the Batasang Pambansa. The proposed
amendments are embodied in four (4) separate questions to be
answered by simple YES or NO answers. Petitioners herein seek to
enjoin the submission on January 27, 1984 of Question Nos. 3
(grant as an additional mode of acquiring lands belonging to the
public domain) and 4 (the undertaking by the government of a land
reform program and a social reform program), which cover
Resolution Nos. 105 and 113, to the people for ratification or rejection
on the ground that there has been no fair and proper submission
following the doctrine laid down in Tolentino v. COMELEC. The
petitioners do not seek to prohibit the holding of the plebiscite but
only ask for more time for the people to study the meaning and
implications of Resolution Nos. 105 and 113 until the nature and
effect of the proposals are fairly and properly submitted to the
electorate.

ISSUE: Whether or not Questions 3 and 4 can be presented to the

people on a later date.

HELD: The necessity, expediency, and wisdom of the proposed

amendments are beyond the power of the courts to adjudicate.
Precisely, whether or not "grant" of public land and "urban land
reform" are unwise or improvident or whether or not the proposed
amendments are unnecessary is a matter which only the people can
decide. The questions are presented for their determination.
Assuming that a member or some members of this Court may find
undesirable any additional mode of disposing of public land or an
urban land reform program, the remedy is to vote "NO" in the

plebiscite but not to substitute his or their aversion to the proposed

amendments by denying to the millions of voters an opportunity to
express their own likes or dislikes. The issue before us has nothing
to do with the wisdom of the proposed amendments, their
desirability, or the danger of the power being abused. The issue is
whether or not the voters are aware of the wisdom, the desirability, or
the dangers of abuse. The petitioners have failed to make out a case
that the average voter does not know the meaning of "grant" of
public land or of "urban land reform."

SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC

[270 SCRA 106; G.R. No.127325; 19 Mar 1997]
FACTS: Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin, president of Peoples
Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with
COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to lift the term limits of
elective officials, through Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on
Article XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which provides for the right of
the people to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued an order directing the
publication of the petition and of the notice of hearing and thereafter set
the case for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP, DemokrasyaIpagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors. Senator Roco
filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin petition on the ground that one which is
cognizable by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator Santiago,
Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin filed this civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the Delfin
petition rising the several arguments, such as the following: (1) The
constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by Congress. No such law has
been passed; (2) The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the term limits constitutes a
revision, therefore it is outside the power of peoples initiative. The
Supreme Court granted the Motions for Intervention.
Issue:
Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the 1987 Constitution is a self-executing
provision.

Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 regarding the conduct of

initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the
absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
Whether the lifting of term limits of elective officials would constitute a
revision or an amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not self executory, thus, without
implementing legislation the same cannot operate. Although the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right, the people cannot
exercise it if Congress does not provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 which prescribes rules and
regulations on the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution,
is void. It has been an established rule that what has been delegated,
cannot be delegated (potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being invalid, the latter cannot
validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right to peoples initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be that of a revision, as it would
affect other provisions of the Constitution such as the synchronization of
elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be
done by initiative. However, considering the Courts decision in the above
Issue, the issue of whether or not the petition is a revision or amendment
has become academic.

LAMBINO VS. COMELEC

[G.R. No. 174153; 25 Oct 2006]
FACTS:
Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an
initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a petition with
the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition
under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of
6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution.
Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of
Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes

will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to

unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of
enabling law governing initiative petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs.
Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative
petitions.
Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Groups initiative petition complies with
Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on amendments to the
Constitution through a peoples initiative.
Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA
6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions
to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.
Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying due course to the Lambino Groups petition.
Held:
According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic
requirements for conducting a peoples initiative. The Court held that the
COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino
petition.
1.The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People The petitioners failed
to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the
time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is
deceptive and misleading which renders the initiative void.
2.The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution
Disallowing Revision through Initiatives The framers of the
constitution intended a clear distinction between amendment and
revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of
the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution.
Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.
3.A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary Even assuming
that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the
present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must
first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735

4.Petition is dismissed.

GONZALES VS. COMELEC

[21 SCRA 774; G.R. No. L-28196; 9 Nov 1967]
FACTS:
The case is an original action for prohibition, with preliminary injunction.
The main facts are not disputed. On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the
House of Representatives passed the following resolutions: 1. R. B. H.
(Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of
the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the
membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as
provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be
apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according
to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each province shall
have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said
Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to
be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same
Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned
constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the
President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing
that the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned
Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections which shall be held on November 14, 1967.
Issue:
Whether or Not a Resolution of Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the Constitution.
Held:

Inasmuch as there are less than eight (8) votes in favor of declaring
Republic Act 4913 and R. B. H. Nos. 1 and 3 unconstitutional and invalid,
the petitions in these two (2) cases must be, as they are hereby, dismiss
and the writs therein prayed for denied, without special pronouncement as
to costs. It is so ordered.
As a consequence, the title of a de facto officer cannot be assailed
collaterally. It may not be contested except directly, by quo warranto
proceedings. Neither may the validity of his acts be questioned upon the
ground that he is merely a de facto officer. And the reasons are obvious:
(1) it would be an indirect inquiry into the title to the office; and (2) the acts
of a de facto officer, if within the competence of his office, are valid, insofar
as the public is concerned.
"The judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be
called upon to determine the proper allocation of powers between the
several departments and among the integral or constituent units thereof."
Article XV of the Constitution provides:
. . . The Congress in joint session assembled, by a vote of three-fourths of
all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives voting
separately, may propose amendments to this Constitution or call a
contention for that purpose. Such amendments shall be valid as part of this
Constitution when approved by a majority of the votes cast at an election
at which the amendments are submitted to the people for their ratification.
From our viewpoint, the provisions of Article XV of the Constitution are
satisfied so long as the electorate knows that R. B. H. No. 3 permits
Congressmen to retain their seats as legislators, even if they should run for
and assume the functions of delegates to the Convention.

MABANAG VS LOPEZ VITO

FACTS: Petitioners include 3 senators and 8 representatives. The three senators were
suspended by senate due to election irregularities. The 8 representatives were not
allowed to take their seat in the lower House except in the election of the House
Speaker. They argued that some senators and House Reps were not considered in
determining the required vote (of each house) in order to pass the Resolution
(proposingamendments to the Constitution) which has been considered as an
enrolled bill by then. At the same time, the votes were already entered into the
Journals of the respective House. As a result, the Resolution was passed but it could

have been otherwise were they allowed to vote. If these members of Congress had
been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the proposed amendment would have
been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of Congress. Petitioners
filed or the prohibition of the furtherance of the said resolution amending the
constitution. Respondents argued that the SC cannot take cognizance of the case
because the Court is bound by the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill or resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court can take cognizance of the issue at bar. Whether or not
the said resolution was duly enacted by Congress.
HELD: As far as looking into the Journals is concerned, even if both the journals from
each House and an authenticated copy of the Act had been presented, the disposal of
the issue by the Court on the basis of the journals does not imply rejection of the
enrollment theory, for, as already stated, the due enactment of a law may be proved in
either of the two ways specified in section 313 of Act No. 190 as amended. The SC
found in the journals no signs of irregularity in the passage of the law and did not
bother itself with considering the effects of an authenticated copy if one had been
introduced. It did not do what the opponents of the rule of conclusiveness advocate,
namely, look into the journals behind the enrolled copy in order to determine the
correctness of the latter, and rule such copy out if the two, the journals and the copy,
be found in conflict with each other. No discrepancy appears to have been noted
between the two documents and the court did not say or so much as give to understand
that if discrepancy existed it would give greater weight to the journals, disregarding
the explicit provision that duly certified copies shall be conclusive proof of the
provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.
**Enrolled Bill that which has been duly introduced, finally passed by both houses,
signed by the proper officers of each, approved by the president and filed by the
secretary of state.
Section 313 of the old Code of Civil Procedure (Act 190), as amended by Act No. 2210,
provides: Official documents may be proved as follows: . . . (2) the proceedings of the
Philippine Commission, or of any legislatives body that may be provided for in the
Philippine Islands, or of Congress, by the journals of those bodies or of either house
thereof, or by published statutes or resolutions, or by copies certified by the clerk of
secretary, or printed by their order; Provided, That in the case of Acts of the Philippine
Commission or the Philippine Legislature, when there is an existence of a copy signed
by the presiding officers and secretaries of said bodies, it shall be conclusive proof of
the provisions of such Acts and of the due enactment thereof.

The SC is bound by the contents of a duly authenticated resolution (enrolled bill) by the
legislature. In case of conflict, the contents of an enrolled bill shall prevail over those
of the journals.

II. CONSTITUTION AND THE COURTS

JOVITO R. SALONGA vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ

PAO
GR 59524. February 18, 1985.

FACTS:
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September
and October of 1980. On September 1980, one Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born
American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger
brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA
building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession by police and military authorities were
several pictures taken sometime in May 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman
Raul Daza held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Jovito R. Salonga and his
wife were among those whose likenesses appeared in the group pictures together with other
guests, including Lovely. As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought
by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna Hospital)where he was
place in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of
General Fabian Ver, head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly
afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar Lovely where charged with
subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property. Bombs once again
exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who
was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a
number of persons. The President's anniversary television radio press conference was
broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely, Romeo, was presented during the
conference. The next day, newspapers came out with almost identical headlines stating in
effect that Salonga had been linked to the various bombings in Metro Manila. Meanwhile,
Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col.
Madella where he was held incommunicado for some time. More bombs were reported to
have exploded at 3 big hotels in Metro Manila. The bombs injured 9 people. A meeting of the
General Military Council was called for 6 October 1980. Minutes after the President had
finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American Society of
Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, as mall bomb exploded.
Within the next 24 hours, arrest, search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against
persons, including Salonga, who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of
bombings in Metro Manila. Elements of the military went to the hospital room of Salonga at

the Manila Medical Center where he was confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of
bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed Salonga the
ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court may still elaborate on a decision when the lower courts have dropped the
case against petitioner Salonga.

HELD:
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas
reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual as constitutionally protected spheres where
even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the
Court's functions. The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling
constitutional principles, precepts,doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of
educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees. In
dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail
bond as excessive and,therefore, constitutionally void, escaped from the provincial jail while
his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we
nonetheless rendered a decision. In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the
Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive order was
mooted by Presidential Decree 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's
legislative powers under martial law. Still, the Court discussed the constitutional mandate on
the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national identity. In the habeas
corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile (59 SCRA183), during the pendency of the case, 26
petitioners were released from custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining
petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of firearms. The
fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent the Court in the exercise of its
symbolic function from promulgating one of the most voluminous decision sever printed in
the Reports. Herein, the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case
against Salonga, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the
government or as an officer or leader of any subversive organization. The respondents have
taken the initiative of dropping the charges against Salonga. The Court reiterates the rule,
however, that the Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of
evidence against Salonga found in the records.

Kilosbayan, Incorporated, et. al. vs. Teofisto Guingona, PCSO and PGMC
05 May 1994

G.R. No. 113375

FACTS:
The PCSO decided to establish an online lottery system. the Berjaya Group Berhad,
with its affiliate, the International Totalizator Systems, Inc. became interested to

offer its services and resources to PCSO. Considering the citizenship requirement,
the PGMC claims that Berjaya Group undertook to reduce its equity stakes in. An
open letter was sent to President Ramos strongly opposing the setting up of an
online lottery system due to ethical and moral concerns, however the project pushed
through.
ISSUES:
Whether the petitioners have locus standi (legal standing
HELD:
YES. The petitioners have locus standi due to the transcendental importance to the
public that the case demands. The ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect
the social, economic and moral well-being of the people. The legal standing then of
the petitioners deserves recognition, and in the exercise of its sound discretion, the
Court brushes aside the procedural barrier.

KILOSBAYAN vs. MANUEL L. MORATO

G.R. No. 118910. November 16, 1995.

FACTS:
In Jan. 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA) wherein
PGMC leased online lottery equipment and accessories to PCSO. (Rental of 4.3% of the
gross amount of ticket or at least P35,000 per terminal annually). 30% of the net receipts is
allotted to charity. Term of lease is for 8 years. PCSO is to employ its own personnel and
responsible for the facilities. Upon the expiration of lease, PCSO may purchase the
equipment for P25 million. Feb. 21, 1995. A petition was filed to declare ELA invalid because
it is the same as the Contract of Lease Petitioner's Contention: ELA was same to the
Contract of Lease.. It is still violative of PCSO's charter. It is violative of the law regarding
public bidding. It violates Sec. 2(2) of Art. 9-D of the 1987 Constitution. Standing can no
longer be questioned because it has become the law of the case Respondent's reply: ELA is
different from the Contract of Lease. There is no bidding required. The power to determine if
ELA is advantageous is vested in the Board of Directors of PCSO. PCSO does not have
funds. Petitioners seek to further their moral crusade. Petitioners do not have a legal
standing because they were not parties to the contract
ISSUES:
Whether or not the petitioners have standing?
HELD:
NO. STARE DECISIS cannot apply. The previous ruling sustaining the standing of the
petitioners is a departure from the settled rulings on real parties in interest because no
constitutional issues were actually involved. LAW OF THE CASE cannot also apply. Since
the present case is not the same one litigated by theparties before in Kilosbayan vs.
Guingona, Jr., the ruling cannot be in any sense be regarded as the law of this case. The

parties are the same but the cases are not. RULE ON CONCLUSIVENESS cannot still
apply. An issue actually and directly passed upon and determine in a former suit cannot
again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a
different cause of action. But the rule does not apply to issues of law at least when
substantially unrelated claims are involved. When the second proceeding involves an
instrument or transaction identical with, but in a form separable from the one dealt with in the
first proceeding, the Court is free in the second proceeding to make an independent
examination of the legal matters at issue. Since ELA is a different contract, the previous
decision does not preclude determination of the petitioner's standing. STANDING is a
concept in constitutional law and here no constitutional question is actually involved. The
more appropriate issue is whether the petitioners are REAL PARTIES in INTEREST.

DUMLAO VS. COMELEC

[95 SCRA 392; G.R. No.L-52245; 22 Jan 1980]
FACTS: Petitioner Dumlao questions the constitutionality of Sec. 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg 52 as discriminatory and contrary to equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Sec. 4 provides that any
retired elective provincial or municipal official who has received payments
of retirement benefits and shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall
not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has
retired. According to Dumlao, the provision amounts to class legislation.
Petitioners Igot and Salapantan Jr. also assail the validity of Sec. 4 of
Batas Pambansa Blg 52, which states that any person who has committed
any act of disloyalty to the State, including those amounting to subversion,
insurrection, rebellion, or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified for any
of the offices covered by the act, or to participate in any partisan activity
therein: provided that a judgment of conviction of those crimes shall be
conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges for the
commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such fact.
Issue:
Whether or Not the aforementioned statutory provisions violate the
Constitution and thus, should be declared null and void
Whether or not the requisites of judicial review are complied with
Held:

No constitutional question will be heard and decided by the Court unless

there is compliance with the requisites of a judicial inquiry, which are: 1)
There must be an actual case or controversy; 2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; 3) The constitutional
question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and 4) The
decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the
determination of the case itself.
As to (1), Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of the
provision. His question is posed merely in the abstract, and without the
benefit of a detailed factual record. As to (2), neither Igot nor Salapantan
has been charged with acts of loyalty to the State, nor disqualified from
being candidates for local elective positions. They have no personal nor
substantial interest at stake. Igot and Salapantan have institute the case as
a taxpayers suit, but the institution of a taxpayers suit per se is no
assurance of judicial review. As to (4), there is no cause of action in this
particular case. Therefore, the necessity for resolving the issue of
constitutionality is absent.
In regards to the unconstitutionality of the provisions, Sec. 4 of BP Blg 52
remains constitutional and valid. The constitutional guarantee of equal
protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. One class can be
treated differently from another class. In this case, employees 65 years of
age are classified differently from younger employees. The purpose of the
provision is to satisfy the need for new blood in the workplace. In regards
to the second paragraph of Sec. 4, it should be declared null and void for
being violative of the constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed
to an accused.
PHILCONSA v. Villareal 52 SCRA 477
This is a petition to compel the Speaker of the House of Representatives to
produce the books of accounts of that body in which were recorded the
amount appropriated by the legislators for their allowances. Before the
case could be decided, however, the 1973 Constitution became effective
and the Congress of the Philippines was consequently abolished. The
Supreme Court thereupon dismissed the petition, holding that the same
had already become moot and academic.

OPOSA VS. FACTORAN, JR.

[224 SCRA 792; G.R. No. 101083; 30 Jul 1993]
FACTS: Principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by
their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the
Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and nonprofit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in
concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural
resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S.
Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new
Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon
proper motion by the petitioners. The complaint was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who are
equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so
numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a
Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two grounds, namely: the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and, the issue raised by the
plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the legislative or
executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the
Motion, the petitioners maintain that, the complaint shows a clear and
unmistakable cause of action, the motion is dilatory and the action
presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. In the said order, not only was the
defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him
and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge
further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the
land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind and set
aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the

latter in this case.

Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a
cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations concerning their right to
a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code
(Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating
the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the
concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of
man's inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied
in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's correlative
obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged
grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs)
to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial
question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's nonimpairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in
this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even
if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when the public interest so
requires.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi.
Whether or not the petiton is in a form of a class suit.
Whether or not the TLAs can be out rightly cancelled. Whether or not the
petition should be dismissed.
Held:
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that
the same cannot be done by the State without due process of law. Once
issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for
twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be
revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry
laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs

indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative

of the requirements of due process.
The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not
just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since
the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally
impossible, to bring all of them before the court. The plaintiffs therein are
numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class
suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an
incident to the former.
Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Nature means the created world in its
entirety. Every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful
ecology. The minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure
the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our nation's
constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.
Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under the Bill of
Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and
political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different
category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than selfpreservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the
petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need
not even be written in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from
the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the
fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are
mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting
their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn
obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the

day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the
present generation, but also for those to come generations which stand to
inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology
and the right to health, as well as the other related provisions of the
Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of
the country's natural resources, then President Corazon C. Aquino
promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, Section 4 of which expressly
mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
"shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's environment
and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral,
resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands
of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable
sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and
future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following
statement of policy:
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound
ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically
speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular
reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher
authority.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to the
"environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June
1977, P.D. No. 1151 and P.D. No. 1152 were issued. Thus, the right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's
duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance
the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty
or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a cause of action.
Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was
done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further
TLAs should be renewed or granted.
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the

ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action; the question
submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts
alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for
the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. Policy formulation or
determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is
not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of
a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It
must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political question doctrine is no
longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from
judicial inquiry or review.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an executive
issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber
licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked.
Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be
stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by
its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in
the exercise of the police power of the state for the purpose of advancing
the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health and enhancing the general welfare.
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin the
respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or
approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract
would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect
to renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent
Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as
defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license
agreements.

SANLAKAS VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[421 SCRA 656; G.R. No. 159085; 3 Feb 2004]
FACTS: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior
officers and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command
and direction of known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood
Building in Makati. Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP
and declared their withdrawal of support for the government, demanding
the resignation of the President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief.
These acts constitute a violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
and by virtue of Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the
Philippines was declared under the State of Rebellion. Negotiations took
place and the officers went back to their barracks in the evening of the
same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and General Orders
were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of the State
of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS
AND PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
petitioners contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not
require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that
there is no factual basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v.
Hon. Executive Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the
proclamation is a circumvention of the report requirement under the same
Section 18, Article VII, commanding the President to submit a report to
Congress within 48 hours from the proclamation of martial law. Finally,
they contend that the presidential issuances cannot be construed as an
exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not delegated any such
power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President MacapagalArroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that there
was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that
the declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the
unconstitutional implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of
rebellion.
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional? Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or
locus standi to bring suit?
Held:

The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly
prohibit declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its
Commander-in-Chief Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive
powers. It is not disputed that the President has full discretionary power to
call out the armed forces and to determine the necessity for the exercise of
such power. While the Court may examine whether the power was
exercised within constitutional limits or in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have, by way of proof,
supported their assertion that the President acted without factual basis.
The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of
usurpation of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since
the President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed
forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested
on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI.
The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since any person may be
subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a crime
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges
"such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of Issue upon
which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas and PM, and SJS
Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only petitioners Rep.
Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have standing
to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of
Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.

III. POLICE POWER

GASTON VS REPUBLIC PLANTERS BANK
Facts: Petitioners are sugar producers and planters and millers filed a MANDAMUS to
implement the privatization of Republic Planters Bank, and for the transfer of the shares
in the government bank to sugar producers and planters. (because they are allegedly the
true beneficial owners of the bank since they pay P1.00 per picul of sugar from the
proceeds of sugar producers as STABILIZATION FEES)
The shares are currently held by Philsucom / Sugar Regulatory Admin.
The Solgen countered that the stabilization fees are considered government funds and that
the transfer of shares to from Philsucom to the sugar producers would be irregular.
Issue: What is the nature of the P1.00 stabilization fees collected from sugar producers?
Are they funds held in trust for them, or are they public funds? Are the shares in the bank
(paid using these fees) owned by the government Philsucom or privately by the different
sugar planters from whom such fees were collected?
Held: PUBLIC FUNDS. While it is true that the collected fees were used to buy shares in
RPB, it did not collect said fees for the account of sugar producers. The stabilization fees
were charged on sugar produced and milled which ACCRUED TO PHILSUCOM, under
PD 338.
The fees collected ARE IN THE NATURE OF A TAX., which is within the power of the
state to impose FOR THE PROMOTION OF THE SUGAR INDUSTRY. They constitute
sugar liens. The collections accrue to a SPECIAL FUNDS. It is levied not purely for
taxation, but for regulation, to provide means TO STABILIZE THE SUGAR
INDUSTRY. The levy is primarily an exercise of police powers.
The fact that the State has taken money pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as
STATE FUNDS, even though held for a special purpose. Having been levied for a special
purpose, the revenues are treated as a special fund, administered in trust for the purpose
intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance will be
transferred to the general funds of govt.
It is a special fund since the funds are deposited in PNB, not in the National Treasury.
The sugar planters are NOT BENEFICIAL OWNERS. The money is collected from them
only because they it is also they who are to be benefited from the expenditure of funds
derived from it. The investing of the funds in RPB is not alien to the purpose since the
Bank is a commodity bank for sugar, conceived for the sugar industry growth and
development.
Revenues derived from taxes cannot be used purely for private purposes or for the
exclusive benefit of private persons. The Stabilization Fund is to be utilized for the
benefit of the ENTIRE SUGAR INDUSTRY, and all its components, stabilization of

domestic and foreign markets, since the sugar industry is of vital importance to the
countrys economy and national interest.