[Type text]

CONTENTS:
La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn v. Ramos Case Digest
G.R. No 127882
Government v. Springer
G.R. No. L-26979
April 1, 192750 Phil. 259
Lerias v. HRET
G.R. No. 97105
October 15, 1991
Guevara vs. Inocentes
16 SCRA 379
March 15, 1966
Rubi Vs. Provincial Board Of Mindoro
39 Phil 660
March 7, 1919
RAMON A. GONZALES v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. L-28224
November 9, 1967
US v. Pons
34 Phil. 729
1916
Bondoc v. Pineda
201 SCRA 792
1991
Central Capiz v. Ramirez
G.R. No. 16197
March 12, 1920
Vivo v. Ganzon
G.R. No. L-23453
May 31, 1974

[Type text]

[Type text]

Tan vs Del Rosario

G.R. No. 109289
October 3, 1994
Lopez v. Roxas
17 SCRA 769
1966
Aytona v. Castillo
4 SCRA 1
1962
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. EASTERN SEA TRADING
G.R. No. L-14279
October 31, 1961
People v Inting
187 SCRA 788
1990
Martinez v. Festin
44 SCRA 22
1972
Osmena v. COA
G.R. No. 98355
March 2, 1994
EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
15 SCRA 569
1965
Pamatong V. comelec
G.R. No. 16187
April 13, 2004

[Type text]

[Type text]

La Bugal-B'Laan Tribal Assn v. Ramos Case Digest

G.R. No 127882
FACTS:
The Petitioners demanded DENR Secretary Victor Ramos to stop the implementation of
RA 7942 and DAO No. 9640 being unconstitutional. The DENR has not responded after
fifteen days from the receipt thereof, thus the present petition for prohibition and
mandamus.
Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and
pray for an issuance order to Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any
application
for
Financial
or
Technical
Assistance
Agreements
and
Declare the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942, the Implementing
Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR Administrative
Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and
null and void; and Cancel the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to
Western Mining Philippines, Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942, DENR AO 96-40 and FTAA are
unconstitutional and void.
RULING: The petition is granted. The court hereby declares unconstitutional and void:
1.The following provisions of Repeblic Act No. 7942: a) Section 3 (aq), b) Section 23,
c)Section 33 to 41, d) Section 56, e) Second and Third paragraphs of Section 81, and f)
Section 90.
2. All provisions of Department of Environment and Natural Resources Administrative
Order 96-40, s. 1996 which are not in conformity with this decision, and
3. The Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and WMC Philippines, Inc.
When the parts of the statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief
that the legislature intended them as a whole, and that if all could not be carried into
effect, the legislature would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the provisions which are thus dependent, conditional, or
connected, must fall with them.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Government v. Springer
G.R. No. L-26979
April 1, 192750 Phil. 259
FACTS:
In the 1900s, the Philippine Congress created the National Coal Company (NCC). The law
created it provides that:
The voting power shall be vested exclusively in a committee consisting of the
Governor-General, the President of the Senate, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
Sometime in November 1926, the Governor-General issued E.O. No. 37 which divested
the voting rights of the Senate President and House Speaker in the NCC. The EO
emphasized that the voting right should be solely lodged in the Governor-General who
is the head of the government. A copy of the said EO was furnished to the Senate
President and the House Speaker. However, in December 1926, NCC held its elections
and the Senate President as well as the House Speaker, notwithstanding EO No. 37 and
the objection of the Governor-General. Thereafter, aquo warranto proceeding in behalf
of the government was filed against Springer et al questioning the validity of their
election into the Board of NCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate President as well as the House Speaker can validly
elect the Board Members of NCC.
RULING: No. E.O. No 37 is valid and therefore the power to appoint is vested in the
Governor-General, not in Senate and Congress.
It is in accordance with the doctrine of separation of powers. The Supreme Court
emphasized that the legislature creates the public office but it has nothing to do with
designating the persons to fill the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
essentially executive. The NCC is a government owned and controlled corporation. It
was created by Congress. To vest the powers of the congress allowing the Senate
President and the House Speaker to appoint the members is an invasion of executive
powers.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Lerias v. HRET
G.R. No. 97105
October 15, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioner Lerias an official candidate of UPP-KBL as representative for the lone district
of Southern Leyte in May 11, 1996 elections appealed to the COMELEC the canVass of
votes excluding the certificate of canvass from Municipality of Libagon which declared
Mercado as the winner by 314 votes.
After a recapitulation of votes conducted by the Tribunal, Lerias protest was dismissed
and Mercado was declared as duly elected lone district representative of the Province of
Southern Leyte by plurality of 46 votes. Lerias filed a motion for reconsideration and
was denied. Hence, this judicial intervention.
ISSUE: Whether the HRET committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the
protest and declared Mercado as the winner by slim number of votes.
RULING: Yes. The decision of HRET is reversed and set aside. The court declares the
petitioner Lerias as duly elected representative of the Lone District of Southern Leyte.
Considering the indubitable evidence on record the 400 votes fraudulently taken away
from Lerias should be returned to her. So that in the entire municipality of Libagon, she
received 1,811 votes. From the original 35,539 votes, Lerias should be credited with ,939
votes as against the 35,793 votes of Mercado giving her a margin of 146 votes.
Whatever the results of the review of the ballots in the counter-protested precincts
would be, wherein Mercado won by 67 votes according to the majority, or as found by
the dissenting members, Lerias won by 12 votes (dissent of J. Herrera) or by 20 votes
(dissent of Rep. Cerilles) Lerias would still be the winner.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Guevara vs. Inocentes

16 SCRA 379
March 15, 1966
FACTS:
The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as
Undersecretary of Labor by the former Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath
of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive issued Memorandum
Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made
by the former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress
at about midnight of January 22, 1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended
an ad interim appointment for the same position by the incumbent Executive on January
23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto seeking to
be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor
under Art. VII Sec. 10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution.
The respondent contended that the petitioners ad interim appointment as well as other
made under similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last
special session. The petitioner stated that (1) the specific provision in the Constitution
which states that: until the next adjournment of Congress means adjournment of a
regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate
adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966 and the House of the Representative
merely suspended its session and to be resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM.
ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioners contention regarding the next adjournment of
Congress specifically provides for regular session only and that congress is still in
continuous session?
RULING. NO. The phrase until the next adjournment of Congress does not make any
reference to specific session of Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-know
Latin maxim is statutory construction stated that when the law does not distinguish we
should not distinguish. Ubilex non distinguitnecnosdistingueredebemus. It is safe to
conclude that the authors of the 1935 Constitution used the word adjournment had in
mind either regular or special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner
contended.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Rubi Vs. Provincial Board Of Mindoro

39 Phil 660
March 7, 1919
Facts:
The petitioner, Rubi and other Manguianes alleged that the provincial government
headed by Gov. Morente illegally deprived their liberty against their will by virtue of a
resolution which oblige them to live in one place for permanent settlement. In the
resolution, the Governor is empowered to select their habitation sites on unoccupied
public lands as approved by the provincial board. Mangyans may solicit homesteads
only per recommendation of the provincial governor. The said resolution was approved
by the Secretary of Interior in 1917. Any Manyan who shall refuse to comply with the
order shall be convicted of imprisonment not exceeding sixty days in accordance with
section 2759 of revised Administrative code.
There arise constitutional questions on delegation of Legislative power to provincial
authorities, religious discrimination, deprivation of liberty, slavery and involuntary
servitude and abuse of police power and the legislative intent.
Issue:
Whether or not laissez fare doctrine or unrestricted freedom be granted to Rubi and
other manguianes.
Ruling:
No. Rubi and other manguianes are restrained for their own good and the general good
of the Philippines. Pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative code, the action of the
governor does not deprive a manguinaes of their liberty and did not deny them equal
protection of the laws and that the confinement in reservations in accordance with said
section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The AO is constitutional
and therefore Habeas Corpus cannot be issued.

[Type text]

[Type text]

RAMON A. GONZALES v COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

G.R. No. L-28224
November 9, 1967
Facts:
On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following
resolutions:
1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the
Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to increase the membership of the
House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present
Constitution, to a maximum of 180, to be apportioned among the several provinces as
nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;
2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the
convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates from each representative
district, to be elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of
November, 1971; and
3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be
amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the House of Representatives to
become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting
their respective seats in Congress.
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the
present Constitutional Convention invoke what they consider to be the protection of the
above constitutional provision.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: This is an exemption; petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity. They can
be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace. Treason exists when the
accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies giving them aid and
comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the peace covers any
offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special statute. It is a wellsettled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained and any breach
thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution..

[Type text]

[Type text]

US v. Pons
34 Phil. 729
1916
Facts:
Pons and Beliso were trading partners. On 5 Apr 1914, the steamer Lopez y Lopez
arrived at Manila from Spain and it contained 25 barrels of wine. The said barrels of
wine were delivered to Beliso. Beliso subsequently delivered 5 barrels to Pons house.
On the other hand, the customs authorities noticed that the said 25 barrels listed as
wine on record were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so
the customs officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels
of wine actually contained tins of opium. Since the Act of trading and dealing opium is
against Act 2381, Pons and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing
and introducing such contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the
sentence arguing that Act 2381 was not approved while the Philippine Commission
(Congress) was not in session. He said that his witnesses claim that the said law was
passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the special session of the Commission was
adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is the case, Act 2381 should be null and
void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine
if Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD:
The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC refused
to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are conclusive on
the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine Legislature,
when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the letter
and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of
the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on
February 28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go
behind these journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this
particular case.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Bondoc v. Pineda
201 SCRA 792
1991
Facts:
In the elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano Pineda of the LDP and Emigdio Bondoc
of the NP were candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of
Pampanga. Pineda was proclaimed winner. Bondoc filed a protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET), which is composed of 9 members, 3 of whom
are Justices of the SC and the remaining 6 are members of the House of Representatives
(5 members belong to the LDP and 1 member is from the NP). Thereafter, a decision had
been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda. Congressman Camasura of the LDP
voted with the SC Justices and Congressman Cerilles of the NP to proclaim Bondoc the
winner of the contest.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Camasura
received a letter informing him that he was already expelled from the LDP for allegedly
helping to organize the Partido Pilipino of Eduardo Cojuangco and for allegedly inviting
LDP members in Davao Del Sur to join said political party. On the day of the
promulgation of the decision, the Chairman of HRET received a letter informing the
Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP, the House of Representatives
decided to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura
to the HRET.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives, at the request of the dominant
political party therein, may change that partys representation in the HRET to thwart the
promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein
Ruling:
The resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is null and void. As judges,
the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality and independence even independence from the
political party to which they belong. Hence, disloyalty to party and breach of party
discipline are not valid grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. THE HRET
committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice and a violation of the Constitution.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Central Capiz v. Ramirez

G.R. No. 16197
March 12, 1920
Facts:
In July 1, 1919, Ana Ramirez contracted with the Central Capiz to supply to it for a term
of 30 years all sugar cane produced upon her plantation. Knowing her obligation,
Ramirez refused to do so upon the fact that more than 61% of the capital stock of the
petitioner is held and owned by persons who are not citizens of the Philippines or of
United States. The land involved is a private agricultural land.
Issue:
Whether or not Act No. 2874, also known as Public Land Act is applicable t agricultural
lads which are privately owned
Ruling:
Public Land Act is inapplicable to the lands of the respondents
Ratio: The title of the act was An Act to Amend and Compile the Laws Relating to Lands
of the Public Domain and Other Purposes. Section 1 of the act provides that the short
title of the act shall be The Public Land Act. Section2 provides that the provisions of
this act shall apply to lands of the public domain. The and for other purposes in the
title is non-existent. Agricultural lands in private ownership constitute no part of the
public domain.
The title may indicate the legislative intent to extend or restrict the scope of the law and
a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be construed to conform to the
legislative intent as disclosed in its title.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Vivo v. Ganzon
G.R. No. L-23453
May 31, 1974
FACTS:
The petitioner applied for the writ of habeas corpus to secure his release from detention
and confinement ordered by the Senate Committee for contempt. Vivo refused to
testify contending that the Senate was not in quorum and that the order of confinement
has lost any juridical basis even on the assumption that it had when issued the impress
validity.
Vivo filed a petition and obtained provisional liberty upon posting a bond.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Senate has the power to detain and confine the petitioner for
contempt under the 1973 Constitution.
RULING:
The provisional release under bail is declared permanent and the order of detention
issued by the respondent to be without any force or effect.
The court held that instead of passing on the issues presented, a more appropriate case,
if it arises under the following provision that the The National Assembly or any of its
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure, should be awaited.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Tan vs Del Rosario

G.R. No. 109289
October 3, 1994
FACTS:
These two consolidated special civil actions for prohibition challenge, in G.R. No.
109289, the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7496, also commonly known as the
Simplified Net Income Taxationn Scheme (SNIT), amending certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Regulations No. 293, promulgated by public respondents
pursuant to said law.
Petitioner intimates that Republic Act No. 7496 desecrates the constitutional
requirement that taxation shall be uniform and equitable in that the law would now
attempt to tax single proprietorships and professionals differently from the manner it
imposes the tax on corporations and partnerships. Petitioners claim to be taxpayers
adversely affected by the continued implementation of the amendatory legislation.
ISSUES:
1. Is Republic Act No. 7496 a misnomer or, at least, deficient for being merely entitled,
Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of their Profession (Petition in G.R. No. 109289)
2. Does Republic Act No. 7496 violate the Constitution for imposing taxes that are not
uniform and equitable.
HELD:
The Petition is dismissed. Uniformity of taxation, like the kindred concept of equal
protection, merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are
to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities (Juan Luna Subdivision vs. Sarmiento,
91 Phil. 371).
The plea of petitioner to have the law declared unconstitutional for being violative of
due process must perforce fail. The due process clause may correctly be invoked only
when there is a clear contravention of inherent or constitutional limitations in the
exercise of the tax power.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Lopez v. Roxas
17 SCRA 769
1966
Facts:
Fernando Lopez and Gerardo Roxas were the candidates for Vice President in the 1965
elections. Lopez won the election. Roxas appealed his loss before the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal (PET). The PET was created by RA 1793. It is provided in the law that:
There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal . . . which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the presidentelect and the Vice-president elect of the Philippines.
In effect, a losing candidate would have the right to appeal his loss. Lopez assailed the
law and he sought to enjoin Roxas and the PET from proceeding with the case. Lopez
averred that the PET is unconstitutional for it was not provided for in the constitution.
Also, since the PET is composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten members of the
SC any decision of the PET cannot be validly appealed before the SC or that there may
be conflict that may arise once a PET decision is appealed before the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the PET is a valid body.
HELD: Yes. In coming up with the PET, the Congress merely conferred a new function to
the Supreme Court. Such is within its power, the Constitution allowed Congress to
determine which body should decide controversies relating to the election of the
President or the Vice President. RA 1793 did not create another court within the SC for
pursuant to the Constitution, the Judicial power shall be vested in one SC and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law
The Supreme Court went on to emphasize that the fundamental law vests in the judicial
branch of the government, not merely some specified or limited judicial power, but
the judicial power under our political system, and, accordingly, the entirety or all of
said power, except, only, so much as the Constitution confers upon some other agency,
such as the power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the Senate and those of the House of Representatives,
which is vested by the fundamental law solely in the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the
House Electoral Tribunal, respectively.
The SC ruled that the PET is not in conflict with the constitution. RA 1793 merely added
the courts jurisdiction and such can be validly legislated by Congress. It merely
conferred upon the SC additional functions i.e., the functions of the PET. This is valid
because the determining of election contests is essentially judicial.
[Type text]

[Type text]

Aytona v. Castillo
4 SCRA 1
1962
Facts:
December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner
(DominadorAytona) as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the
correspondingoath.
On the same day, at noon, President-elect DiosdadoMacapagal assumed office; and
onthe next day, he issued administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing,
andcancelling all ad interim appointments made by former President Garcia. There were
allin all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the former President
Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo (respondent
herein) as adinterim Governor of the Central Bank.
At first, both exercised the powers of their office; however, later on Castillo
wasprevented from holding the office in the Central Bank. He, petitioner, instituted a
case (quo warranto) against respondent, contending that hewas validly appointed, thus
the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the newPresident, should be considered
void. Castillo replies that the appointment of Aytona had been revoked by
administrativeorder no. 2.
Issue: Whether or not the 350 midnight appointments of former President Garcia were
valid.
Held:
No it is not. Such appointments must be decline. Ratio: After the proclamation of then
Pres. Macapagal, precedent President Garcia administration was no more than a caretaker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the orderly transfer of
authority to the incoming President, and he should not do acts which ought to know,
would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. An ad interim appointment is
exercised by the president as hes special prerogative and is bound to be prudent to
insure approval of his selection either previous consultation with the members of the
Commission on Appointments or by thereafter explaining to them the reason such
selection. It is expected that the President should exercise double care in extending such
appointments. In the case at bar, it is hard to believe that in signing 350 appointments
in one night, President Garcia exercised double care; and therefore, such appointments
fall beyond the intent and spirit of the constitutional provision granting the Executive
authority to issue ad interim appointments
[Type text]

[Type text]

LANSANG VS. GARCIA

42 SCRA 448; L-33964;
11 Dec 1971
Facts:
In the evening of August 21, 1971, at about 9 p.m., while the Liberal Party of the
Philippines was holding a public meeting at Plaza Miranda, Manila, for the presentation
of its candidates in the general elections scheduled for November 8, 1971, two hand
grenades were thrown at the platform where said candidates and other persons were.
Eight persons were killed and many more injured. Proclamation 889 was issued by the
President suspending privilege of writ of habeas corpus stating that there is a conspiracy
of rebellion and insurrection in order to forcibly seize political power. Petitions for writ
of habeas corpus were filed by persons (13) who have been arrested without a warrant.
The privilege was suspended in eighteen (18) provinces and sub-provinces and 2 cities.
Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 889 did not declare the existence of actual
"invasion insurrection or rebellion or imminent danger thereof and that public safety did
not require the issuance of proclamations. A resolution was issued by majority of the
Court having tentatively arrived at a consensus that it may inquire in order to satisfy
itself of the existence of the factual bases for the proclamations. Now the Court resolves
after conclusive decision reached by majority.
Issue:
(1) Whether or Not the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen requiring
suspension (of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus) belongs to the President and
his decision is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons.
Held:
Yes. The President has authority however it is subject to judicial review. Two conditions
must concur for the valid exercise of the authority to suspend the privilege to the writ
(a) there must be "invasion, insurrection, or rebellion" or "imminent danger thereof,"
and (b) "public safety" must require the suspension of the privilege. President has three
(3) courses of action: (a) to call out the armed forces; (b) to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus; and (c) to place the Philippines or any part thereof under martial
law. He had, already, called out the armed forces, proved inadequate. Of the two other
alternatives, the suspension of the privilege is the least harsh.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Bacolod Murcia Milling Co v. Henares

GR No. L-13505
March 30, 1960
FACTS:
In November 1946, Atty. Nolan appeared as counsel in an action of foreclosure of
mortgage instituted by the Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc against Fidel Henares as
Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the late Esteban Henares. The Court sentenced
Henares to pay the plaintiff with legal interest plus 10% of the total indebtedness as
attorneys lien.
In 1953, Atty. Nolan filed a notice of lawyers lien with the Court claiming his title to
attorneys lien in Civil Case No. 546. On Nov 1953, a writ of execution was issued in the
foreclosure suit, the mortgaged properties was sold at public auction Atty. Nolan
petitioned the plaintiff to pay him the sum of P4,407.23. Plaintiff filed an opposition that
the sale of mortgage property extinguishes his claim and that the lower court has no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition by Nolan.
The RTC ordered the plaintiff to turn over to the Provincial sheriff the sum of P4,407.23
representing the amount of attorneys lien, hence this appeal by the Bacolod-Murcia.
Issue: Whether or not the satisfaction of a judgment in a foreclosure suit, by the
purchase of the judgment creditor in a judicial sale of the property mortgage,
extinguishes attorneys lien.
Ruling:
An attorney may cause a statement of his claim to be registered even before the
rendition of any judgement, because the purpose of recording his lien is merely toe
stablish his right thereto, as distinguished from the enforcement of the lien which takes
place only after the judgement is secured in favor of the client (Palanca vs. Pecson, 94,
Phil., 419; 50 Off. Gaz.,1585).
Atty. Nolan Could not have lost his right to enforce the lien during the sale at public
auction was made since he had filed notice of the lien as far back as 1953.
Wherefore the ordered appealed from is affirmed.

[Type text]

[Type text]

THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS v. EASTERN SEA TRADING

G.R. No. L-14279
October 31, 1961
FACTS:
Petition for review of a judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals reversing a decision of the
Commissioner of Customs.
Respondent Eastern Sea Trading was the consignee of several shipments of onion and
garlic which arrived at the Port of Manila from August 25 to September 7, 1954. Some
shipments came from Japan and others from Hong Kong. In as much as none of the
shipments had the certificate required by Central Bank Circulars Nos. 44 and 45 for the
release thereof, the goods thus imported were seized and subjected to forfeiture
proceedings for alleged violations of section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code,
in relation to the aforementioned circulars of the Central Bank. In due course, the
Collector of Customs of Manila rendered a decision on September 4, 1956, declaring
said goods forfeited to the Government and the goods having been, in the meantime,
released to the consignees on surety bonds, filed by the same, as principal, and the Alto
Surety & Insurance Co., Inc., as surety, in compliance with orders of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, in Civil Cases Nos. 23942 and 23852 thereof directing that the
amounts of said bonds be paid, by said principal and surety, jointly and severally, to the
Bureau of Customs, within thirty (30) days from notice.
On appeal taken by the consignee, said decision was affirmed by the Commissioner of
Customs on December 27, 1956. Subsequently, the consignee sought a review of the
decision of said two (2) officers by the Court of Tax Appeals, which reversed the decision
of the Commissioner of Customs and ordered that the aforementioned bonds be
cancelled and withdrawn. Hence, the present petition of the Commissioner of Customs
for review of the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Issue: Whether or not the Central Bank has no authority to regulate transactions not
involving foreign exchange
RULING:

[Type text]

[Type text]

UST VS BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

Create Courts
Facts:
In 1950, the University of Santo Tomas was assessed a deficiency tax on its income from
tuition fees. UST opposed such assessment but it paid it under protest. UST then
submitted to the Secretary of Finance a memorandum regarding the matter. UST avers
that the tax was illegally collected. The Secretary of Finance then advised UST to file a
petition for review with the Board of Tax Appeals (BTA) regarding their protest. UST
complied but after filing the petition, UST filed a motion questioning the jurisdiction of
the BTA. UST assailed EO 401-A which gave BTA the jurisdiction to hear cases involving
illegally collected taxes. UST avers that this effectively deprives the regular courts of law
their jurisdiction to take cognizance of recovery of illegally collected taxes.
ISSUE: Whether or not UST is correct.
HELD: Yes. EO 401-A gave the BTA exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all appeals
and petitions of decisions rendered by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. Indeed,
such provision effectively divests the regular courts of law of their jurisdiction. It is true
that through RA 442, the president was given the authority to organize the different
departments, bureaus, and offices under the executive department, but such is only
limited in scope. It is also admitted that the BTA is under the Department of Finance but
the grant to it of such power and jurisdiction by the questioned EO is an encroachment
by the executive of the legislatures power. Under the Constitution, Congress alone has
the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts.
Needless to say, Congress cannot even delegate this power.

[Type text]

[Type text]

People v Inting
187 SCRA 788
1990
Facts:
On 6 February 1988, Mrs. Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-Mayor Dominador
S. Regalado Jr. of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
for allegedly transferring her, a permanent Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office
of theMunicipal Mayor to a very remote barangay and without obtaining prior
permission or clearance from COMELEC as required by law.
Acting on the complaint, COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election
Supervision of Dumaguete City to conduct preliminary investigation. Atty. Lituanas
found a prima facie case. Hence, on 26 September 1988, he filed with the Regional Trial
Court (Branch 38. DumagueteCity) a criminal case for violation of section 261, Paragraph
(h), Omnibus Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.
The RTC stated that it will give due course to the information filed in this case if the same has the
written approval of the Provincial Fiscal after which the prosecution of the case shall be under
the supervision and control of the latter. In another order dated 22 November 1988, the court
gave Atty. Lituanas 15 days from receipt to file information charging the same offense
with the written approval of the Provincial Fiscal. Atty. Lituana failed to comply with the
order. Hence, in an order dated 8 December 1988, the trial court quashed the
information. A motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the petition.
Issue: Whether the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is necessary before the information
filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor may be given due course by the trial court.
RULING:
The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous but
unwarranted. Pursuant to Circular No. 12 of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
dated June 30, 1987 and considering thar after a personal examination of the evidence
submitted by the Provincial Election Supervisor III, there is reasonable ground for this
court to rely on the Information that a probable cause exist.
The petition was granted, the questioned orders were reversed and set aside and the
respondent court is ordered to proceed hearing the case with deliberate speed until its
termination.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 87676
December 20, 1989
FACTS:
The employees of National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) who are affiliated
with the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services staged a stake at the Rizal
park, Fort Santiago, alleging unfair labor practices by NPDC. NPDC filed a complaint
against the union in the RTC alleging that the strike is illegal, the strikers being a
government employee no right to strike although they may form a union.
The lower court dismissed the complaint. Petitioner went to the Court of appeals. The
CA confirmed the order of the trial court, hence this review.
ISSUE: Whether the petitioner, National Parks Development Committee (NPDC), is a
government agency, or a private corporation.
RULING: NPDC is a government agency. Therefore its employees are covered by civil
service rules and regulations (Sec. 2, Article IX, 1987 Constitution). While employees are
allowed under the 1987 constitution to organize and join unions of their choice, there is
yet no law permitting them to strike. In case of labor dispute between the employees
and the government, Section 15 of Executive Order No. 180 dated June 1, 1987 provides
that the Public Sector Labor Management Council, not the Department of Labor and
Employment, shall hear the dispute.
Wherefore the petition for review is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby set aside.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Martinez v. Festin
44 SCRA 22
1972
FACTS:
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the
present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the
protection of the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article
145 of the Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during
the sessions of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than
prision mayor. For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to
the parliamentary immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are
facing criminal prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y
Festin for falsification of a public document and two informations against petitioner
Fernando Bautista, Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General,
on behalf of the respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a
contention on the ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal
prosecution being merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference
being that insofar as a provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an
immunity, it would be unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the
utmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no
other force except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in
free speech should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however,
it would amount to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if
notwithstanding their liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune
during their attendance in Congress and in going to and returning from the same. To the
fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly
go after legislators belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the
safeguards thrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an
individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The
presumption of course is that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say
that in each and every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the
essence. Petitioners cannot claim their claim to immunity.

[Type text]

[Type text]

JM Tuazon & Co. v CA

38 SCRA 429
1971
Facts:
On July 15, 1987, spouses Tomas S. Tuazon and Natividad S. Tuazon sold to John Siy Lim
(Lim) a 650 square meter conjugal lot covered by Transfer Certificate Title No. 860,[3]
along A. del Mundo Street, 7th Avenue, Kaloocan City, with a two-storey building and
Apartment Units Nos. 161 and 163 existing thereon.
Atty. Crisostomo, lawyer of the Tuazons, drafted the Absolute Deed of Sale, which was
duly registered. By virtue of the said deed, TCT No. 860 in the name of the Tuazons was
cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 152621 was issued in the name of John Siy F. Lim.
On October 1, 1990, the Tuazons brought a Complaint for Reformation of Contract,
Quieting of Title with Damages against John Siy F. Lim, docketed as Civil Case No. C14542 before Branch 131 of Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City; the Tuazons
theorizing that the real intention of the parties was to enter into a loan accommodation.
On November 15, 1990, Lim filed his answer, theorizing that the Deed of Absolute Sale
expressed the true intention of the parties.
Issue: Whether or not the transaction between the petitioner and the respondent was
to be an absolute sate and not an equitable mortgage.
Ruling:
The real meaning of the contract must be resolved against the person who drafted the
instrument and is responsible for the ambiguity thereof.[27] Prepared by the lawyer of
the herein petitioner, Tomas See Tuazon, subject Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
July 15, 1987 is couched in clear terms and conditions. John Siy Lim had no hand in its
preparation. Besides, the voluntary, written and unconditional acceptance of
contractual commitments negates the theory of equitable mortgage.
Private respondents payment of realty taxes after the consummation of the sale,
though not conclusive evidence of ownership, bolsters his right over the property in
dispute. He religiously paid the taxes thereon, as evidenced by Tax Declaration Receipts
The Petition is DENIED; and the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40167,
dated March 31, 1995, AFFIRMED.

[Type text]

[Type text]

MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO v. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORPORATION,

INC. & PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION
GR. No. 111097
July 20, 1994
FACTS:
The Sangguniang Panlunsod enacted Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the operation of
casino followed by Ordinance No. 3375-93 providing penalty therefor. Petitioners also
attack gambling as intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the Constitution
and several decisions of this Court expressive of the general and official disapprobation
of the vice. They invoke the State policies on the family and the proper upbringing of the
youth.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ordinace No. 3355 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the
SangguniangPanlunsod of Cagayan de Oro City are valid.
HELD:
NO. Petition was denied. Decision of respondent Court of Appeals was affirmed.
The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se. While it
is generally considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is nothing in the
Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it sees fit. In the
exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allow
it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte
but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress
has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting
theories.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Osmena v. COA
G.R. No. 98355
March 2, 1994
Facts:
In 1985, the city of cebu entered into a contract thru its mayor Hon. Duterte with H.
Franco Construction Company, Inc. (HFCCI) amounting to 8, 368,920.00 for the
construction of a modern abattoir. In 1986, Sen. John Osmena, the Officer-in-charge of
the city of cebu ordered the suspension of the project and review of the contract by the
COA. HFCCI already claimed the first installment due and filed a civil action to claim the
balance.
The city of cebu contends that the contract was null and void as declared by COA in its
audit, therefore whatever amount due is the sole liability of the officers who entered
into said contract.
ISSUE: Whether or not the compromise agreement entered into by Osmena in his
capacity as the city mayor of Cebu with HFCCI is valid.
RULING: The contract is void. The compromise agreement entered into between the city
of cebu, through its mayor, Tomas Osmena is void being merely a derivative of a
previously void Abattoir Contract, and thus becomes a personal liability of the officer
who entered into it pursuant to Sec. 87 & 103 of PD.1445.

[Type text]

[Type text]

EMMANUEL PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL

15 SCRA 569
1965
FACTS
In 1964, President Ferdinand Marcos issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities
this was purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code . The
then Vice President, Emmanuel Pelaez, as a taxpayer, filed a special civil action to
prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said
municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs was unconstitutional. He said that Section 68
of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that
barrios may not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed
except by Act of Congress.
The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal and that only barrios were
barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and
that a municipality can be created without creating barrios. He further maintains that
through Sec. 68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to create municipalities
to the President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the
President by virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD: No. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement
or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein
the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a
standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which
the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68
lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate
would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and,
without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with
reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his
authority.

[Type text]

[Type text]

Pamatong V. comelec
G.R. No. 16187
April 13, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent
COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as nuisance candidates who could not wage
a nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by a political party or are not
supported by a registered political party with a national constituency.
Pamatong filed a Petition For Writ of Certiorari with the Supreme Court claiming that
the COMELEC violated his right to "equal access to opportunities for public service"
under Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, by limiting the number of qualified
candidates only to those who can afford to wage a nationwide campaign and/or are
nominated by political parties. The COMELEC supposedly erred in disqualifying him since
he is the most qualified among all the presidential candidates, i.e., he possesses all the
constitutional and legal qualifications for the office of the president, he is capable of
waging a national campaign since he has numerous national organizations under his
leadership, he also has the capacity to wage an international campaign since he has
practiced law in other countries, and he has a platform of government.
ISSUE: Is there a constitutional right to run for or hold public office?
RULING:
No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the Constitution is merely a privilege
subject to limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows such a right nor elevates the
privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of
the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.
The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled
"Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are
generally considered not self-executing, and there is no plausible reason for according a
different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies
enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable
constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action.
The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the
courts.

[Type text]