Sie sind auf Seite 1von 40

TANADA v.

TUVERA
Facts:
A number of presidential decrees had not been
published, thus, the petitioners herein invoked due process
for the disclosure of such decrees. The government argues
that said decrees need not be published, it was so when it
was unless otherwise provided as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were effective immediately
upon approval.
The decision of the lower court orders the
respondent to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuance that are of general application. Unless
so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
Issue/s:
(1) Can laws take effect without publication?
(2) Do courts have the power to repeal or modify
the law?
Held:
Article 2 of the Civil code states that, Laws shall
take effect fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the official Gazette unless it is otherwise
provided. This act shall take effect one year after such
publication.
It is very clear that publication is indispensable in
every case; however, the legislature has the discretion on
when the said law should take effect. Therefore, all statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin
fifteen (15) days after publication unless a different effectivity
date is fixed by the legislature.
The publication must be in full or it is no
publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of
the contents of the law.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant.
Facts:
Po Lay was accused of violating Circular No. 20 of
the Central Bank compelling those who had foreign currency
to sell the same to the Central Bank. Po Lay alleged that as
the circular had not yet been published in the Official
Gazette before he committed the act, the circular should
have no effect on his act and therefore, he should be
acquitted.
Issue/s:
Is Po Lays claim valid?
Held:
Yes. Po Lay is correct for the circular has the
force of law, and should have been published. Moreover, as
a rule, circulars which prescribe a penalty for their violation
should be published before becoming effective. This is
based on the general principle and theory that before the
public is bound by its contents, especially its penal
provisions, a law, a regulation or circular must first be
published, and the people officially and specifically informed
of said contents and the penalties for violation thereof.
GARCIA v. RECIO
Facts:
On March 1, 1987, Roderick Recio, Filipino,
married Editha Samson, an Australian citizen. Two years
after, they divorced. After becoming an Australian citizen in
1992, Roderick married Grace Garcia in Cabanatuan City.
On March 1998, Garcia filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage. She claimed that Roderick was guilty of bigamy,
because according to Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family
Code, Roderick was required to present his divorce decree
upon filing for a marriage license in 1994. Because he did
not present this decree, Garcia claimed that Recio was
considered to still be married to his first wife.
Respondent claimed that his first divorce decree
from Australia was valid and therefore, he was legally free to

remarry. Furthermore, in July 1998, Roderick was able to


obtain a divorce decree for his marriage to Garcia from the
Australian courts.
The trial court declared that their marriage has
already been dissolved, based on the validity of the divorce
decree from Australia. Since Australian courts had ended the
marriage, then the court merely validated their decision. The
case was appealed.
Issue:
(1) Is Roderick required to comply with Articles 11, 13
and 54 of the Philippine Family Code in order to obtain a
marriage license for his marriage with Garcia?
(2) Since Roderick did not comply with the said
Articles, is his marriage, then, considered valid?
Held:
The court found that Roderick, being an Australian
citizen at the time of his second marriage, was not required to
follow the registration requirements of our Family Code. Those
personal laws are only binding upon citizens of the Philippines
(Article 15, Civil Code).
Based on that decision, the case then rested on the question of
whether the respondent was legally allowed to remarry on the
basis of his divorce decree from Australia. The court finally
ruled that Rodericks divorce did not automatically imply that he
was free to remarry. The case was remanded to the trial court
for the purpose of obtaining more evidence.
DM CONSUNJI VS. CA (G.R. No. L-137873, April 20, 2001)
Facts:
Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M Consunji,
Inc. (DMCI) fell fourtenn (14) floors from the Renaissance
Tower, Pasig City to his death. SPO3 Rogelio Villanueva
investigated the tragedy and filed a report. Jose Juegos
widow, Maria, filed in the trial court of Pasig a complaint for
damages against DMCI the employer. DMCI raised the
widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance
fund.
The trial court rendered the decision in favor of the
widow. DMCI appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed of
the trial court decision.
DMCI now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on
the following grounds:
(1) The appellate court erred in holding that the
police report was admissible evidence of the alleged
negligence of petitioner;
(2) The appellate court erred in holding that the
doctrinal of res ipsa loquitur is applicable to prove negligence
of petitioner;
(3) The appellate court erred in holding that the
petitioner is presumed negligent under Article 2180 of the Civil
Code; and
(4) The appellate court erred in holding that
respondent is not precluded for recovering damages under the
Civil Code.
Issue:
(1) Is the contention of DMCI tenable?
(2) Is Joses widow still entitled to the civil damages
under the Civil Code after claiming benefits provided by the
ECC?
Held:
The law provides that, The exception is that a
claimant who has already been paid under the WCA may still
sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervising facts or developing occurring after he opted for the
first remedy.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that the
private respondent know of the remedies available to her when
the claim before the ECC was filed, and that she was not
aware of her rights. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot
be held against her. Thus, it exempts her from the general rule
of election for claiming damages.

Wherefore, this case is remanded to the trial court


for the determination whether the award decreed in its
decision is more than that of the ECC.
CUI VS. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY (G.R. No. L-15127, May
30, 1961)
Facts:
Emeterio Cui, plaintiff, took up preparatory law
course in Arellano University, herein defendant. After
finishing his preparatory law course, he enrolled in the
College of Law in the same university, where he was
awarded scholarship grants for scholastic merit and made to
sign a contract waiving his right to transfer to another school
without refunding to the university the amounts extended to
him through the scholarship grants in cash. On the last
semester of his law studies, he transferred to Abad Santos
University. After graduation, he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar, he
requested for his transcript of records from Arellano
University. The defendant refused to release his transcript
unless he paid back P1, 033.87, which the defendant
refunded to him on the last semester he was enrolled in the
said University. Cui paid the said amount for him to get his
transcript and be able to take the bar exam.
A case was filed before the trial court of Manila,
asking to recover the amount mentioned from the defendant.
The case was dismissed due to insufficiency of proof.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Is the contract (waiver) entered into by Cui and
Arellano University valid?
Held:
Memorandum No. 38 issued in 1949 clearly
explainted that scholarships are awarded in recognition of
merit and not to keep outstanding students in school to
bolster its prestige. The defendants understanding of the
purpose of their scholarship grant, i.e., a business scheme
designed to increase the business potential of their
educational institution is not only inconsistent with sound
policy but also good morals, good customs, generally
accepted principles of morality which have received some
kind of social and practical confirmation.
Therefore, the decision of the lower court is
hereby reversed sentencing the defendant to pay plaintiff the
sum of P1,033.87 with interest thereon, as well as the costs.
MICIANO VS. BRIMO (G.R. No. 02295, November 01,
1924)
Facts:
A will was executed by the deceased Joseph Brimo, a
Turkish national, with respect to the partition of the
estate left by him. Andre Brimo, brother of the
deceased opposed the petition based on the fact that
the partition was not in accordance with the national
laws of the deceased as sated in Article 16 of the Civil
Code.
Issue:
What laws will govern in the above case?
Philippine laws or the national laws of the person whose
succession is in consideration?
Held:

The Turkish Laws, which is the national law of the


deceased will apply pursuant to Article 16 of the New Civil
Code of the Philippines.
(CHECK)
PILAPIL VS. IBAY-SOMERA (G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989)
Facts:
On September 7, 1979, Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a
Filipino citizen and Erick Ekkehard Geiling, a German national,
were married in Germany. The couple lived together in Malate,
Manila and had a daughter, Isabella Pilapil Geiling. After about
three and a half years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce
against Pilapil in Germany. On the other hand, Pilapil filed for
legal separation before the trial court of Manila. On January
15, 1986, divorce was granted by the Federal Government of
Germany. Custody of the child was granted to Pilapil.
Five (5) months after the issuance of the divorce
decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery against Pilapil
alleging that, while they were married, Pilapil had an affair with
a certain William Lhia and Jesus Chua. Pilapil petitioned for a
temporary restraining order on the ground that the court is
without jurisdiction to try and decide to charge of adultery since
the complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as an offended
spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his
country prior to his filing the criminal complaint.
Issue:
(1) Does Geiling have the locus standi, or the status or
legal capacity to file a complaint of adultery against Pilapil
after having obtained the divorce decree from Germany?
(2) Does the Philippine court have jurisdiction over
the criminal complaint against the petitioner?
Held:
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of
adultery, as well as four other crimes against chastity,
cannot be prosecuted except upon a swore written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. Now the law
specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and
concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint
should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. In other
words, only the offended spouse and no other, is
authorized by law to initiate the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the
criminal action.
In the case at bar, the fact that private respondent
obtained a valid divorce in his country, Germany, which is
recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons;
private respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner hence, had no legal standing to commence the
adultery case.
Therefore criminal complaint against petitioner is
dismissed for lack if jurisdiction.
ROEHR VS. RODRIGUEZ (G.R. No. 142820, June 20, 2003)
Facts:
Roehr, German, married Rodriguez, Filipina in
Germany. They had children, Carolynne and Alexandra.
Sometime in 1996, Rodriguez filed an annulment case before
the trial court of Makati. Roehr filed a motion for
reconsideration but was again denied by the same court. In
1997, Roehr filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals but it was denied by the Court of Appeals and the
cased was to the trial court.

Meanwhile, Roehr obtained a decree of divorce from


Germany dissolving the marriage and granting the custody
of their children to him. In 1999, Roehr filed a motion to
dismiss the annulment case on the ground that the trial court
has no jurisdiction over the subject matter as a decree of
divorce had already been promulgated. In the same year,
the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Rodriguez filed
for partial reconsideration for the purposes of determining
the issues on the custody of children and the distribution of
the properties between the petitioner and the respondent.
The respondent judge set aside her order for the
purpose of tackling the issues of property relations, support
and custody of their children.
Issue:
Did the respondent judge gravely abuse her
discretion in issuing an order modifying the prior order?
Held:
A judge can order partial reconsideration of a case
that has not yet attained finality. The legal effects of the
marriage between a Filipino and a foreigner performed
abroad and subsequently a decree of divorce obtained from
the same, for example, the custody, care and support if the
children must still be determined by our courts.
Therefore, the respondent judge may proceed to
determine the issue regarding the custody of the two
children born of the union between Roehr & Rodriguez. The
order of the trial court is hereby affirmed with modification.
GARCIA Vs. RECIO
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA VS. REYES (G.R. No. 154259,
February 28, 2005)
Facts:
Respondent Reyes was having coffee at the lobby
of Hotel Nikko when he was spotted and invited by a friend
who was also invited for a birthday party in the Hotel. At the
birthday party after a couple of hours, petitioner Lim, as the
Hotels Executive Secretary approached respondent and
reminded him to just finish eating his food and leave the
premises because he was not invited. A commotion ensued,
afterwards, the respondent was escorted by policemen.
Issue:
Did petitioner Lim act abusively in asking
respondent Reyes to leave the party where he was not
invited, thereby becoming liable under Articles 19 and 21 of
the Civil Code?
Held:
The party, in the case at bar, is a formal one, in a
posh, five-star hotel, for-invitation-only. The respondent,
who is uninvited, was spotted by the very person who
generated the guest list. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants
instruction in keeping the party intimate would naturally want
to get rid of the gatecrasher in a less conspicuous manner in
order not to call attention of the other guests. Failure to do
so will surely reflect negatively on Ms. Lim. Respondent
failed to prove why will Ms. Lim risk ruining the formal and
intimate affair. During the cross examination, there is an
unlikely situation that the petitioner would shout at
respondent in a very close distance. The Court ruled that
the petitioners twenty (20) years of experience in a business
wherein being polite and discreet is credible. Petitioner did
not abuse her right in asking respondent to leave the party
and therefore not liable to pay for damages. The petition is
granted.
QUISUMBING VS. MERALCO (G.R. No. 142943, April 3,
2002)
Facts:
Meralco inspectors conducted a routine inspection
of electric meters at Greenmeadows in 1995. Upon reaching
the home of the Quisumbing spouses, they found evidence
of tampering. Based on their procedures, they disconnected
the meter to conduct further testing, and they found that the

meter was indeed tampered with. The plaintiff was required to


pay Php 178,875.01, or risk disconnection. Plaintiffs electricity
was cut off, only to be reconnected after two hours. The trial
court decided in favor of the plaintiff due to the lack of time
given them to refute the findings. The Court of Appeals
reversed this ruling on the basis that disconnection was only
done after due process was observed. Plaintiff was asked to
pay the billing differential.
Issue:
(1) Was the disconnection of electricity implemented
with disregard for good customs and public policy?
(2) Did the plaintiffs loss qualify them for damages?
Held:
The petition was partly granted. The court found that
Meralcos disconnection was negligently implemented due to
the absence of an officer of the law (specifically, from the
Energy Regulatory Board) during the disconnection process, as
required by their own procedures. However, they may still
rightfully seek payment for the billing differential, which the
spouses Quisumbing truly owe. On the other hand, plaintiffs
petition for damages was granted, the court awarding nearly
the same amount they were to pay for the differential.
GASHEEM SHOKAT BAKSH VS. CA (G.R. No. 97336,
February 19, 1993)
Facts:
Private respondent filed with the lower court a
complaint for damages against the petitioner for the alleged
violation of their agreement to get married. The lower court
decision favored the private respondent and ordered the
petitioner to pay the respondent for damages. The Court of
Appeals also affirmed the ruling of the trial court.
Issue:
Is the petitioner liable for damages?
Held:
The breach of promise to marry, per se, is not an
actionable wrong. The award of damages pursuant to Article
21 is not because of such promise to marry but because of the
fraud and deceit behind it. The act of the petitioner was
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy. In short, Article 21 may be applied in a breach of
promise to marry where the women is a victim of moral
seduction.
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP. VS. COURT
OF APPEALS

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST v. JADER

PE v. PE
Facts:
Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one
Lolita Pe. At the time of her disappearance on April 14, 1957,
Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married
man and works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Ciagrette
Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying
with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an adopted
son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of
Lolitas father. Because of such fact and the similarity in their

family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who


regarded him as a member of their familyname, defendant
became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a
member of their family. Sometime in 1952, defendant
frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext; that he wanted
her to teach him how to pray the rosary. The two eventually
fall in love with each other and conducted clan, destine trysts
not only in the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita
used to teach in a barrio school. The rumors about their love
affair reached the ears of Lolitas parents sometime in 1955,
and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their
house and from seeing Lolita. The plaintiff even filed
deportation proceedings against defendants who is a
Chinese national. The affair between defendant and Lolita
continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with
her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espana
Extension, QC. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from
said house. After she left, her brothers and sisters checked
up her things and found that Lolitas clothes were gone.
However, plaintiffs found a note on a crumpled piece of
paper inside Lolitas aparador. Said note, written on a small
slip of paper approximately 4 by 3 in size, was in a
handwriting recognized to be that of defendant. It reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and thats
13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14 th, thats
Monday morning at 10 a.m. Reply Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the
police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is
no news or trace of her whereabouts.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant is liable to pay
damages to the plaintiff?
Ruling:
The decision appealed from is reversed.
Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P25,000.00 as attorneys fees
and expenses of litigation. Costs against appellee. For he
has committed an injury to Lolitas family in a manner
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
TENCHAVEZ vs. ESCANO
FACTS : Missing her late afternoon classes on 24 February
1948 in the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, where she
was then enrolled as a second year student of commerce.
Vicenta Escano, 27 years of age, from a socially prominent
Filipino family of Spanish ancestry, exchanged marriage
vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an engineer,
ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the
knowledge of her parents, before a Catholic chaplain, Lt.
Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said
city, The marriage was duly registered with the local civil
register. After the marriage was a plan of elopement, but it
was never done when the parents of Vicenta knew about the
clandestine nuptial. They were surprised and disgusted for
Pastor never asked for the hand of Vicenta. The Escano
spouses sought the advice of Father Reynes and so
suggested a recelebration to validate what he believed to be
an invalid marriage. Unluckily, the recelebration did not take
place for Vicenta did not agree. Vicenta lived with her
parents while Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Several
days passed by, the newlyweds became estranged. Vicenta
had gone to Jimenez, Misamis Occidental to escape from
the scandal that her marriage stirred in Cebu society. There,
a lawyer filed for her a petition, drafted by Senator
Emmanuel Pelaez, to annul her marriage. The case was
dismissed because of her non-appearance at the hearing.
On 24 June 1950, without the knowledge of her husband,
she applied for a passport, indicating she was single and her
purpose was to study, and to return after 2 years. It was
approved, so left for the States. On 22 August 1950, she
filed a verified complaint for divorce in the Second Judicial

District Court in Nevada, on the ground extreme cruelty,


entirely mental in character. On 21 October 1950, a decree of
divorce, final and absolute was issued by the tribunal. In 1951
Mamerto and Mena Escano filed a petition with the Archbishop
of Cebu to annul their daughters marriage to Pastor. On 10
Septermber 1954, Vicenta sought papal dispensation of her
marriage. On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an
American, Rusell Leo Moran, in Nevada, and has begotten
children, She acquired American citizenship on 8 August 1958.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the
proceedings at bar by a complaint in the Court of First Instance
in Cebu, and amended on 31 May 1956, against Vicenta and
her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escano, whom he charged
with having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining
her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman catholic Church, for having decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million
pesos in damages.
Vicenta claimed a valid divorce from plaintiff and an
equally valid marriage to her present husband; while her
parents denied that they had in any way influenced their
daughters acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the marriage of Vicenta and Pastor, being
held by a chaplain, is valid.
2. Whether or not Mamerto and Mena Escano are liable for
damages, as charged with having dissuaded and discouraged
Vicenta from joining her husband and alienating her affections.
3. Whether or not the divorce of Vicenta and Pastor is valid.
HELD:
1. It was decided valid, although held by a chaplain, who lacks
authorization from the parish priest, for it is only a formal
requirement and not essential to give civil effects. It is also, as
stated in Sec 27., that no marriage shall be declared invalid
because of the absence of one or several formal requirements
of this Act if, when it was performed, The spouses or one of
them believed in good faith that the person who solemnized the
marriage was actually empowered to do so, and that the
marriage was perfectly legal.
2.The decision under appeal sentenced appellant Pastor
Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escano and the
estate of his wife, the deceased Mena escano, P5,000 by way
of damages and attorneys fees. Tenchavez accusations
against the Escano spouses are not supported by credible
evidence. The testimony of Pastor Tenchavez about the
Escanos animosity toward him strikes to be merely conjecture
and exaggeration, and are belied by Pastors letter written
before the suit was begun, expressing apology for misjudging
them and for the great unhappiness caused by his impulsive
blunders and sinful pride, effrontery and audacity.
3. The court did not recognize the foreign divorce between
Vicenta and Pastor neither the marriage of Vicenta to Rusell
Leo Moran, for absolute divorce is not admitted, as written in
the Civil Code of the Phil.. Instead, it only provided legal
separation, on the ground of adultery of the wife Vicenta,
having married Leo Moran, as her previous union with
Tenchavez declared to be existent and undissolved.
ST. LOUIS REALTY CORP v. CA

SPOUSES YU v. PCIB

DONATO v. LUNA

QUIMIGING c. ICAO
Facts: Appellant Carmen Quimiguing sued Felix Icao in the
court below. In her complaint it was averred that the parties
were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and
confidential relations; that defendant Icao, although married,
succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several
times by force and intimidation, and without her consent; that
as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying.
Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages
and attorney's fees.On the other hand, defendant Icao
moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the
complaint did not allege that the child had been born; and
after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained
defendant's motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter,
plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a
result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later given birth to a
baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection,
ruled that no amendment was allowable, since the original
complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff
appealed directly to this Court.
Issue: Can a conceived child, although not yet born, be
given legal personality?
Ruling: Yes, a conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore,
has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of the
defendant-appellee. Article 40 provides that "the conceived
child shall be considered born for all purposes that are
favorable to it", "provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article" (i.e., that the fetus be alive
at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb). Hence, the orders under appeal are reversed and
set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs
against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
Geluz vs CA
Facts: Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant, Geluz,
for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula Yambot.
In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband
before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her
pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her
aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After her
marriage with Oscar Lazo, she again became pregnant. As
she was then employed in the Commission on Elections and
her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself
aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. She again

became pregnant on February 21, 1955, and again repaired to


the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez streets in
Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita
was again aborted, of a two-month old foetus, in consideration
of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. Lazo was at this
time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election
to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his
consent, to the abortion. It is the third and last abortion that
constitutes Lazo's basis in filing this action and award of
damages. The litigation was commenced in the Court of First
Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the husband of
Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
The trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and
ordering Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00
attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of
Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a
majority vote of three justices as against two. Hence, this
petition for certiorari filed by Geluz.
Issue: Whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician
who caused the same?
Ruling: The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the
award of damages upon the provisions of the initial paragraph
of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we
believe to be error, for the said article does not cover the case
of an unborn fetus that is not endowed with personality. Since
an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury
or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see
that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf
of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no
such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or
heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of
the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on
that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the
provisional personality of a conceived under Article 40 of the
Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child
should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, there is
no dispute that the child was dead when separated from its
mother's womb. Hence, the decision appealed from is
reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday the twenty
sixth day of July nineteen hundred and ninety three.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6809
AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM
TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress assembled:

of

SECTION 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the


Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"ART. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of
majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority
commences at the age of eighteen years."
SEC. 2. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby
amended to read as follows:

ART. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental


authority over the person and property of the child
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life, save the exceptions established
by existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require
consent until the age of twenty-one."

parental

"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to


derogate from the duty of responsibility of parents
and guardians for children and wards below
twenty-one years of age mentioned in the second
and third paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil
Code."
SEC. 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills,
bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar
instruments references and provisions favorable to minor will
not retroact to their prejudice.
SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
DE JESUS VS. SYQUIA (G.R. No. 39110, November 28,
1933)
Facts:
Antonia de Jesus sought to establish the paternity
of her children, Ismael and Pacita Loanco, for the purpose of
receiving support from Cesar Syquia, as well as damages for
a breach of promise to marry. Syquia and de Jesus lived
together from the time of the birth of Ismael, until the time
Pacita was conceived, when the two separated. Prior to the
birth of Ismael, Syquia had written a note to a priest
acknowledging the baby due in June is mine. This note,
along with other letters written to Antonia, were used by the
trial court of Manila, in granting support to Ismael at the rate
of fifty (50) pesos per month.
Issue:
Is the note sufficient in establishing paternity, given
that it was written prior to the birth of Ismael?
Held:
A conceived child is considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it. In this case, Ismael
Loanco had all the rights of a natural person when Cesar
Syquia acknowledged his paternity, which is a favorable act.
The note written to a priest is sufficient to establish the
paternity of Ismael, which entitles him to support. There is
no evidence to show that Pacita is the child of Syquia, which
is why she was not granted support. Antonia de Jesus was
not granted damages, which is normally not awarded for a
mere breach of promise to marry, unless money was
advanced by the petitioner.
LIMJOCO VS. FRAGANTE (G.R. No. L-770, April 27,
1948)
Facts:
Pedro O. Fragrante applied for a certificate of
public convenience to operate an ice plant. Pending his
application, he died. The Deputy Commissioner of the
Public Service Commission, finding that Fragante was a
Filipino citizen and that his estate is financially capable of
maintaining the proposed service, issued the certificate
authorizing said estate through its administrator to operate
an ice plant. Angel Limjoco, petitioner, in behalf of Ice and
Cold Storage Industries of the Philippines Incorporated,
questioned the validity of the issuance. He contended that
the death of Fragante disqualified him from obtaining the
certificate and it was erroneous to allow the administrator to
substitute for the deceased as applicant.
Issue:

Is the issuance of the certificate in favor of the estate


of Fragante valid?
Held:
The Supreme Court pointed out that according to the
Rules of Court, any action affecting the rights of a deceased
person which may be brought by or against him if he was alive
may also be instituted by or against the administrator unless by
its very nature, death extinguishes such right. Fragantes right
was not extinguished by his death and such right acquired by
him forms part of his estate. That being the case, the
substitution in question was valid.
There are only two requisites for the issuance of the
certificate of public convenience: (1) citizenship and (2)
economic ability to maintain and operate the service. The
Supreme Court held that the Filipino citizenship of Fragrante
extended to his Estate, it being a juridical person. Likewise, it
was also found that his estate satisfied the second
requirement.
The issuance of the Certificate of public
Convenience was therefore valid.
DUMLAO VS. QUALITY PLASTICS (G.R. No. L-27956, April
30, 1976)
Facts:
On February 28, 1962, the trial court of Pangasinan
rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven,
Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino Sumalbag and
Juana Darang to pay solidarily Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
the sum of Php 3,667.03 plus the legal rate of interest from
November 1958. When the defendants failed to pay, the lower
court ordered the foreclosure and the sale of the land of Pedro
Oria which he had given as security.
However, it turned out that Oria died on April 23,
1959 or long before June 13, 1960 when the action was filed.
Oria's death was not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc.,
nor were the representatives of Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
were aware that in the same Tayug court special Proceeding
No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro Oria, was
pending.
The documents related to the complaint for the five
defendants had been personally served by a deputy sheriff on
Soliven, who acknowledged such service by signing on the
back of the original summons in his behalf and again signing
for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963, Orias heirs sued Quality Plastic
Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the
judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (the
administrator also sued for Orias testate estate).
It was only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc.
received the summons that it learned that Oria was already
dead at the time the prior case was filed. Quality Plastic
Products, Inc. in its answer alleged that Oria's heirs were
aware of the suit against Soliven and his sureties and that the
said heirs were estopped to question the court's jurisdiction
over Oria. The lower court held that it acquired jurisdiction over
Soliven and the other defendants by reason of their voluntary
appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith
because he did not apprise the court that Oria was dead.
Issue:
Does the lower court have jurisdiction over the
person of the deceased Oria?
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the judgment against him is
void for lack of jurisdiction over his person. He was not, and he
could not have been, validly served with summons. In pursuant
to Articles 27 and 42 of the New Civil Code, he had no more
civil personality and his juridical capacity was lost through
death. Summons cannot be served upon a deceased litigant
since a person's juridical capacity, which is his fitness to be the
subject of legal relations, is lost through death; that since no
valid service of summons can be effected, jurisdiction over him
cannot be acquired; and that the principle of estoppel has no
application to this case.

The trial court's decision is reversed and set aside.


The case against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of
jurisdiction. The sale of Oria's land is also void.
MOY YA LIM v. COMM. OF IMMIGRATION

FRIVALDO vs COMELEC
FACTS:
Juan G. Frivaldo, who unquestionably obtained
the highest number of votes in three successive elections for
the position of governor of Sorsogon but who was twice
declared by this Court to be disqualified to hold such office
due to his alien citizenship, and who now claims to have reassumed his lost Philippine citizenship thru repatriation. On
the third repatriation, he already gained Philippine
citizenship. Raul Lee contends that, at the time Frivaldo filed
his certificate of candidacy, he was not a Filipino citizen.
Frivaldo also alleged that his repatriation shall be given
retroactive effect because hes a Filipino citizen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he is a Filipino citizen at the time
he filed his certificate of candidacy.
RULING:
The court allowed his repatriation to retroact at the
time he filed his certificate of candidacy. According to the
court, the governing election contest must be liberally
construed to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely
expressed thru the ballot. The court also stated that
Frivaldos case is unique because Frivaldo sought American
citizenship only to escape the clutches of dictatorship. At the
first opportunity, returned to our country and sought to serve
the people. Also, the people of Sorsogon voted for him three
times and his determination to acquire his Filipino
citizenship. His loyalty and love for our country cannot be
lost on this court of justice and equity. He therefore deserves
every liberal interpretation of the law which can be applied in
his favor and to the popular mandate of the people of
Sorsogon.
Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
Facts:
On 8 March 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed
her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte, indicating that
she was a resident of said constituency for seven months.
Faced with petition for cancellation and disqualification by
the incumbent representative Cirilo Roy Montejo, Marcos
filed an amended certificate changing the entry seven
months to since childhood. The Commission on Elections,
on 24 April, ordered the disqualification of Marcos from
running for the congressional seat of the First District of
Leyte. It appears however, that Marcos garnered the most
votes in the 8 May election. The Commission on Elections,
thus, suspended her proclamation.
Issue:
Whether or not the statement in the certificate of
candidacy (seven) determines whether an individual
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement, to warrant Marcos disqualification.
Held:
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitutions residency qualification requirement. It must be
noted again that residence is used to indicate a place of
abode, whether permanent or temporary, while domicile
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent,
one has the intention of returning. Residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

FAMILY CODE
PT&T VS. NLRC (G.R. No. 118978, May 23, 1997)
Facts:
Grace de Guzman was hired by petitioner company
as a reliever for another employee who went on maternity
leave. She was a "Supernumerary Project Worker," for a fixed
period from November 21, 1990 until April 20, 1991. Under the
areement she signed, her employment was to be immediately
terminated upon expiration of the agreed period. On
September 2, 1991, private respondent was once more asked
to join the company as a probationary employee, the
probationary period to cover one hundred fifty (150) days. In
the job application form, she indicated that she was single
although she had contracted marriage on May 26, 1991.
Thereafter, she was sent a memorandum asking her to explain
the discrepancy. She was also reminded about the company's
policy of not accepting married women for employment.
Private respondent stated that she was not aware of PT&T's
policy regarding married women at the time, and all along she
had not deliberately hidden her true civil status. PT&T was not
convinced and dismissed her from the company. The Labor
Arbiter handed a decision that Grace de Guzman was illegally
dismissed by the petitioner. NLRC affirmed the decision and
ordered a three (3)-month suspension for Grace de Guzman.
Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Was the private respondent illegally dismissed when she
contracted marriage, which is contrary to PT&Ts policy?
Held:
Yes. The Court ruled that the policy of PT&T strikes
at the very essence, ideas, and purpose of marriage as an
inviolable institution and the family as a foundation of the nation
as provided in Article 1 of the Family Code. While it is true that
the parties to a contract may establish any agreements, terms,
and conditions that they may deem convenient, the same
should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order, or public policy. The petitioner's policy against legitimate
marital bonds would encourage illicit or common-law relations.
The Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit with double
costs against petitioner.
ART 2 SEC 12, CONSTITUTION

ESTRADA vs ESCRITOR
FACTS:
Soledad Escritor and Luciano Quilapio are both
separated in fact but met each other for they are both part of
Jehovahs witnesses religious group. Under the laws of such
religious group, when a couple has been living together for 10
years, they are allowed to execute a declaration of pledging
faithfulness. Alejandro Estrada wrote to the presiding judge
where Escritor was working. In that letter, Estrada alleged that
Escritor is living with a man other than her husband. The judge
asked the office of the court administrator to investigate the
alleged immorality. After the investigation, the office of the court
administrator recommended the removal of Escritor from
government services.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Escritor should be found guilty of the
administrative charge of gross and immoral conduct.
RULING:
The court ruled that Escritors marriage should be
covered by the constitutional right of religious freedom. Since
marriage is a special contract protected by the State, the
presumption of validity should always be in favor of the
marriage. In this case, Escritors marriage under the rule of

Jehovahs witnesses should be allowed to be presented as


approved of the validity of their marriage. Also, the solicitor
general should present evidence to show why Escritors
religious belief and practice should not be taken into
consideration and to show that the means that the State
adopts in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to
Escritors religious freedom. Therefore, the case is
remanded to the office of the court administrator.
Goitia vs. Campos Rueda
Facts:
Plaintiff, Eloisa Goitia Y De La Camara, was
married to the defendant, Jose Campos Rueda, on January
7, 1915. The defendant, after the marriage, on several
times, demanded of his wife that she perform unchaste and
lascivious acts on his genital organ. The plaintiff spurned the
obscene demands of the defendant and refused to perform
any of the acts other than legal and valid cohabitation.
Because the plaintiff refused to perform the said acts,
defendant maltreated the plaintiff, by words and deeds and
inflicting injuries in some parts of her body. When the
plaintiff was unable to induce the repugnant desires and
maltreatment of the defendant, plaintiff was obliged to leave
the conjugal abode and take refuge in the home of her
parents.
Issue:
Whether or not the plaintiff can constitute a cause of action
for separate maintenance.
Held:
Yes. A husband, cannot by his own wrongful acts,
relieve himself from the duty to support his wife imposed by
law; and where a husband, by wrongful, illegal, and
unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the domicile fixed
by him, he cannot take advantage of her departure to
abrogate the law applicable to the marital relation and
repudiate his duties there under.
The wife, who is forced to leave the conjugal
abode by her husband without fault on her part, may
maintain an action against the husband for separate
maintenance when she has no other remedy,
notwithstanding the provision of article 149 of the Civil Code
giving the person who is obliged to furnish support the option
to satisfy it either by paying a fixed pension or by receiving
and maintaining in his own home the one having the right to
the same.
The complaint of the wife which alleges
unbearable conduct and treatment on the part of the
husband is sufficient to constitute a cause of action for
separate maintenance.
BALOGBOG v. CA

SEC 444, LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE

ENRIQUEZ v. VELEZ

Cosca vs Palaypayon
Facts:
Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr. solemnized
marriages of 6 couples without marriage license as the
license numbers were not reflected in the contracts. He

signed the marriage certificate even if there was no date stated


on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar did not
have a copy of the marriage certificate. He did not also sign
the marriage certificates until 10 days after the licenses were
submitted by the parties. The judge blamed his personnel as it
is his official duty to furnish the parties with a copy of their
marriage contract.
Issue:
Whether or not the marriages solemnized by the
judge are valid
Held:
No. The law declares that the absence of any
essential or formal requisites of marriage shall generally render
the marriage void ab initio and while an irregularity in the formal
requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party
responsible for their irregularity shall be civilly, criminally, and
administratively liable.
With respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of
marriages, it does appear that Judge Palaypayon actually
trifled with the law's concern for the institution of marriage and
the legal effects flowing from civil status. This, and his
undeniable participation in the other offenses charged
constitutes serious degree of misconduct and of gross
negligence in the performance of judicial duties as to ineludibly
require a higher penalty. The Court imposes a fine of
P20,000.00 on Judge Palaypayon.
Francisco X. Velez vs. Beatriz P. Wassmer December 26,
1964.
Facts:
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer decided
to get married on September 4, 1954. Two days before the
wedding, Velez left a note for his bride-to-be, stating that they
will have to postpone wedding because his mother opposes it.
But the next day, he sent her a telegram telling her that
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY
SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE. Thereafter Velez did
not appear nor was he heard from again. Invitations were
printed and distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances.
Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower girl were
prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought.
Bridal showers were given and gifts received. The prospective
bride was already in church waiting for the marriage to be
solemnized. The wedding feast was already going on at her
home. The marriage however did not take pace because the
prospective bridegroom had already eloped with another
girlfriend.
Issue:
Whether or not the defendant can be held for
damages
Held:
Yes. A mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through
all the preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. The act
of the defendant is certainly contrary to good morals and
customs for which he can be held for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorneys fees.
NAVARRO VS. DOMAGTOY (A. M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July
19, 1996)
Facts:
Rodolfo Navarro, the municipal mayor of Dapa,
Surigao Del Norte, filed an administrative complaint against the
Municipal Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, on the
following acts, which he considered as gross misconduct and
ignorance of the law and inefficiency in office:
(1) solemnizing the marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and
Arlyn Borga even if respondent judge knows that the man is
merely separated from his wife; and (2) solemnizing the
marriage of Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario beyond
his court jurisdiction.

In response to the charges, the respondent judge


claimed that an affidavit was submitted to him by Tagadan,
showing that his legal wife, Ida Penaranda has not shown
herself for seven (7) years. With this affidavit, the
respondent judge contended that Penaranda is already
presumed dead and Tagadan can now remarry.
In the case of Sumaylo and Del Rosario,
respondent judge contended that he did not violate Article 7,
paragraph 1 of the Family Code.
Issue:
Are the complaints against the respondent judge
valid?
Held:
Yes. On the first charge, the affidavit submitted to
the respondent judge will not suffice to render the first wife
presumably dead. Based on Article 41 of the Family Code, a
summary proceeding must be instituted for the presumptive
death of Tagadans spouse be declared.
On the second charge, the respondent judge
solemnized the wedding out of his jurisdiction. Based on
Article 7, the member of the judiciary solemnizing the
marriage must do it within his courts jurisdiction. From
Article 8, a judge is allowed to solemnize a marriage outside
of his jurisdiction only in cases when it is contracted at point
of death or in a remote area.
With the above valid complaints, the respondent
judge is slapped with a 6-month suspension and issued a
stern warning that a repetition of the said act will be dealt
with more severely.
Araes vs. Occiano
Facts:
Mercedita Mata Araes filed a complaint against
Judge Salvador M. Occiano of the Municipal Trial Court of
Baltan, Camarines Sur, with gross ignorance of the law for
solemnizing her marriage to Dominador B. Orobia, without
the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction. When the husband
of the petitioner passed away, the rights to inherit vast
properties left by his husband was not recognized since the
marriage was void.
In the comment of the respondent judge,
respondent averred that he was requested to solemnize the
marriage of the parties having been assured that all
documents to the marriage were complete. On the day of
the wedding, petitioner was informed that Orobia had a
difficulty in walking and could not stand the rigors of
traveling.
The respondent judge agreed to solemnize
marriage in Nabua, Camarines Sur.
Before proceeding with the ceremony, respondent
examined the documents and later discovered that the
parties did not posses the requisite marriage license. He
then refused to solemnize the marriage. However, due to
the earnest pleas of the parties, and the condition of Mr.
Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he proceeded out of
human compassion but reiterated that failure to provide
marriage license would render it void.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage was void
Held:
A marriage which preceded the issuance of such
license is void, and that the subsequent issuance of such
license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to
the marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the
solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a marriage
The territorial jurisdiction of the respondent judge
is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His
act of solemnizing the marriage of the petitioner and Orobia
in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and
subject him to administrative liability
LIM TANHU v. RAMOLETE

Vda de Chua vs. CA


Facts:
During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of
wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up
to 1981. Out of this union the couple begot two illegitimate
children, namely Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride
Alonzo.
On 28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao
City.
On 2 July 1992, private respondent filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City a Petition which is
reproduced hereunder:
COMES NOW the petitioner assisted by counsel and
unto this Honorable Court most respectfully states:
1. That she is of legal age, Filipino, married but
separated from her husband and residing at Quezon Avenue,
Cotobato City, Philippines;
2. That sometime from 1970 up to and until late 1981
your petitioner lived with Roberto Lim Chua as husband and
wife and out of said union they begot two (2) children, namely,
Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua who was born in General Santos
City on April 28, 1977 and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua who
was born in Davao City on August 30, 1978.
A xerox
copy of the birth certificate of each child is hereto attached
as annex A and B, respectively.
3. That the aforementioned children who are still
minors today are both staying with herein petitioner at her
address at Quezon Avenue, Cotabato City;
4. That Roberto Lim Chua, father of the abovementioned minors, died intestate on May 28, 1992 in Davao
City.
5. That the aforementioned deceased left properties
both real and personal worth P5,000,000.00 consisting of the
following:
6. That deceased Roberto Lim Chua died single and
without legitimate descendants or ascendants, hence, the
above
named minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, his children
with herein
petitioner shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
(Article 988 of the Civil Code of the Philippines).
6. That considering the fact that the aforementioned
minors by operation of law are to succeed to the entire estate
of Roberto Lim Chua under the provisions of Article 988 of
the New Civil Code of the Philippines, it is necessary that
for the protection of the rights and interest of Robert Rafson
Alonzo Chua and Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua, both minors and
heirs of deceased Roberto Lim Chua, a guardian over the
persons and properties of said minors be appointed by this
Honorable Court.
7. That herein petitioner being the mother and natural
guardian of said minors is also competent and willing to act as
the guardian of minors Robert Rafson Alonzo Chua and
Rudyard Pride Alonzo Chua both staying and living with her;
that petitioner possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications of a guardian.

At the hearing of the motion to dismiss on


August 19, 1992, counsel for movant Antonietta G. Chua
presented 18 Exhibits in support of her allegation that
she was the lawful wife of the decedent and that the
latter resides in Davao City at the time of his death.
Exh. 1 was the xerox copy of the alleged marriage
contract between the movant and the petitioner.
. Exhibit 2 through 18 consist among others of
Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of
Roberto L. Chua married to Antonietta Garcia, and a
resident of Davao City; Residence Certificates from
1988 and 1989 issued at Davao City indicating that he
was married and was born in Cotabato City; Income Tax
Returns for 1990 and 1991 filed in Davao City where the
status of the decedent was stated as married;
passport of the decedent specifying that he was
married and his residence was Davao City.
Issue:
WON Petioner is the lawful wife of the deceased
Roberto Lim Chua, to be able to claim HEIRSHIP,
GUARDIANSHIP
OVER
THE
PERSONS
AND
PROPERTIES OF MINORS ROBERT RAFSON ALONZO
and RUDYARD PRIDE ALONZO,
Ruling:
This cannot be admitted in evidence on the ground
of the timely objection of the counsels for petitioner that the
best evidence is the original copy or authenticated copy
which the movant cannot produce. Further, the counsels
for petitioner in opposition presented the following: a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that no
such marriage contract was ever registered with them; a
letter from Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to
have solemnized the alleged marriage that he has not
solemnized such alleged marriage.
Petitioner through
counsels, objected to the admission in evidence of
Exhibits 2 through 18 if the purpose is to establish the
truth of the alleged marriage between the decedent and
Antonietta Garcia.
The best evidence they said is the
marriage contract. They do not object to the admission of
said exhibit if the purpose is to show that Davao City was the
business residence of the decedent.
It is clear from the foregoing that the movant failed to
establish the truth of her allegation that she was the lawful
wife of the decedent. The best evidence is a valid
marriage contract which the movant failed to produce.
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
passports and other similar documents cannot prove
marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that the
alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from the
judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that he has
not solemnized said alleged marriage. Consequently, she
has no personality to file the subject motion to dismiss.
Transfer Certificates of Title, Residence Certificates,
passports and other similar documents cannot prove
marriage especially so when the petitioner has submitted a
certification from the Local Civil Registrar concerned that
the alleged marriage was not registered and a letter from
the judge alleged to have solemnized the marriage that
he has not solemnized said alleged marriage.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
petitioner Antoinetta Chua is hereby denied.
Republic vs. CA and Castro (Art.25)
Facts:

petition of

On June 24,1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F.


Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The
marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of Castro's
parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the
processing of the documents required for the celebration of the
marriage, including the procurement of the marriage license. In
fact, the marriage contract itself states that marriage license
no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties
on June 24, 1970 in Pasig, Metro Manila. The couple did not
immediately live together as husband and wife since the
marriage was unknown to Castros parents. On October 19,
1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's
brother, with the consent of Cardenas. The baby is now in the
United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted
to put in order her marital status before leaving for the States.
She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar,
regarding the possible annulment of her marriage. Through her
lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage
license issued to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their
marriage. Castro filed a case seeking a judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. As proof, Angelina
Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register
of Pasig, Metro Manila. It reads:
'February 20, 1987
"TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and
ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly married in the
Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged
(s)upportive marriage license no. 3196182 allegedly issued in
the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said
license no. 3196182 does not appear from our records.
Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Anatacio.
(Sgd) CENONA D. QLTINTOS
The trial court denied the petition. It held that the above
certification was inadequate to establish the alleged nonissuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the
marriage between the parties. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted
that the certification from the local civil registrar sufficiently
established the absence of a marriage license. The CA
reversed the decision of the trial court. Hence a petition filed for
certiorari by petitioner, Republic of the Philippines. Petitioner
insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of
private respondent are insufficient to overthrow the legal
presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.
Issue: Whether or not the documentary evidence presented by
private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage
license was issued by the Civil Registrar?
Ruling: The law provides that no marriage shall be solemnized
without a marriage license first issued by a local civil registrar.
Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage,
absence of a license would render the marriage void ab initio.
Under Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
"Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record-A written statement signed by
an officer having custody of an official record or by his deputy,
that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor
is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a
certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that
the records of his office contain. The certification of "due search
and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage
license. Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and
pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently
proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties. In fine, we hold that, under

the circumstances of the case, the documentary evidence


presented by private respondent Castro sufficiently
established the absence of the subject marriage license.
Petition is denied
GARCIA v. RECIO
PILAPIL v. IBAY-SOMERA
Van Dorn vs. Romillo
Facts:
This is a petition for certiotari and prohibition.
Alicia, a citizen of the Philippines, and Richard, a citizen of
the US, were married in 1972. On 1982, they were divorced
in Nevada. On June 1983, private respondent filed suit
against Alice stating that the latters business in Manila is
conjugal property and that he, Richard should be given the
right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is
barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings
before the Nevada court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community
property. The trial Court denied the motion to dismiss stating
that because the property is located in the Philippines, the
divorce decree has no bearing.
Issue:
1. WON the court erred in denying the motion to
dismiss.
2. WON the said business is a conjugal
property.
Ruling:
The vital fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of
the parties. Richard explicitly stated in the power of attorney
he executed to the law firm to represent him in the divorce
proceeding, that there is no community of property to be
adjudicated by the court. Another contention is that although
Article 15 of the Civil Code only covers public policy against
absolute divorce of Philippine nationals, aliens who obtain
divorce decree abroad may be recognized here in our
country which dissolves marital and conjugal bonds of the
parties. Respondent is no longer the husband of the
petitioner and cannot therefore sue as petitioners husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. The petition
is granted and the former complaint of the respondent is
ordered to be dismissed.
Republic vs Cipriano Obrecido III
Facts:
In 1981, Cipriano and Lady Miros got married and they were
blessed with two children. Lady Miros and one of her
children went to the USA, became an American citizen. This
was later on learned by the husband. Then, she divorced
him. Again, he learned it from his son. Thereafter, she got
married to a certain Innocent Standby. He filed a petition with
the RTC for authority to marry invoking paragraph 2 of Article
26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed, hence, the
court granted the same. The OSG representing the Republic
filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied, hence a
petition for certiorari was filed with the Supreme Court
contending that paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
is not applicable to Cipriano because it applies only to a valid
mixed married, that is a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien. Cipriano, on the other hand,
contended and admitted that the law is not directly
applicable to his case but insisted that when his naturalized
wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated by
operation of law to remarry, then, he should likewise be
capacitated to remarry.
Issue:
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino
citizens, where one party is naturalized as a foreign citizen
and obtained a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her

to re-marry, can the Filipino spouse likewise re-marry under the


Philippine law?
Held:
Yes. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
should be interpreted to include cases involving parties, who, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino
citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other
party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the
marriage.
NIAL VS. BAYADOG (G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000)
Facts:
Pepito Nial married Teodulfa Bellones on
September 26, 1974. They had begotten five (5) children,
herein petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito and died on
April 24, 1985. On December 11, 1986, one year and eight (8)
months thereafter, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got
married without any marriage license. Instead, they executed
an affidavit stating that they had lived together as husband and
wife for at least five (5) years and were thus exempt from
securing a marriage license. On February 19, 1997, Pepito
died in a car accident. After their father's death, petitioners
filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito
to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a
marriage license. The case was filed under the assumption
that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect
petitioner's successional rights. Norma filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action
since they are not among the persons who could file an action
for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.
The lower court ruled that petitioners should have
filed the action to declare null and void their father's marriage to
respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of
the Family Code which enumerates the time and the persons
who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage. Hence,
this petition for review.
Issue:
(1) Are the petitioners estopped from questioning the
validity of the second marriage after the death of Pepito?
(2) What is the nature of the five (5)-year
cohabitation period of exemption from getting a marriage
license?
Held:
No. The Court ruled that the cohabitation
contemplated in Article 76 of the Civil Code is one without any
legal impediment. Since the basis for the second marriage was
cohabitation for more than five (5) years was unacceptable, the
marriage is void ab initio. It was only at the time of Teodulfas
death when the cohabitation without legal impediment began.
Thus, Pepito and Norma were not qualified to be exempt from
obtaining a marriage license. Article 40 of the Family Code
expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of
the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can
be based only on a final judgment to that effect. This article
may be invoked for purposes other than marriage such as
determination of heirship. The action or defense for the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The Court granted the petition and ordered case to be
reinstated. It reversed and set aside the decision of the lower
court.
MANZANO v. SANCHEZ

COSCA v. PALAYPAYON
MARIATEGUI VS. CA (G.R. No. 57062, January 24, 1992)

Facts:
On June 26, 1953, Lupo Mariategui contracted
three marriages. He had four children with first wife Eusebia
Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904. They were
Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo.
Baldomera died but, was survived by her eight (8) children.
Ireneo also died and left a son.
With Flaviana Montellano, Lupo had a daughter
named Cresencia who was born on May 8, 1910. And with
Felipa Velasco, Lupo had three children. Lupo died on June
26, 1953, without a will and left certain properties that he
acquired when he was single.
His descendants by his first and second marriages
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition of some lots. Upon
learning of such deed, Lupos descendants by his third
marriage filed a complaint claiming that such deed deprived
them of their shares in the lots. They prayed for partition of
the estates of their father and annulment of the deed
executed by their co-heirs.
Cresencia Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui
Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the complaint
as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit
as plaintiffs although they acknowledged the status and
rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the partition of the
parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits.
The defendants, now petitioners filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
prescription. They argued that the complaint was for
recognition of natural children. It was dismissed and denied
by the court.
Issue/s:
Did prescription bar their right to demand the
partition of the estate of Lupo Mariategui?
Held:
Prescription did not bar the petitioners claim since
they filed the complaint barely two months after learning of
such deed. The evidence also proved that the petitioners
were legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui.
REPUBLIC v. DAYOT

Domingo v. CA (Article 40)


Facts:
Delia and Roberto were married. Unknown to Delia, Roberto
was previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz and only knew
about this when Emerlinda sued them for Bigamy. Hence,
she filed for a declaration of nullity of the second marriage.
Roberto was unemployed and totally dependent on Delia as
she was working in Saudi Arabia. In one of her annual
month-long vacations home, she discovered that he was
cohabiting with another woman and he was disposing their
properties without her consent. Roberto filed a Motion to
Dismiss on the ground that the petition for the declaration of
nullity of the second marriage stated no cause of action and
that it was superfluous and unnecessary since the second
marriage was void from the beginning. The motion was
denied for lack of merit. Instead of answering, he filed a
special civil action for certiorari and mandamus which the
Court of Appeals dismissed.
Issue:
WON a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is
necessary. If yes, should it be filed only for purposes of
remarriage?
Ruling:
Yes, it is necessary. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contradicting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable

in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity


is the final declaration of the previous marriage void.
To answer the second question, it must be clear that the word
solely in Article 40 which states, The absolute nullity of a
previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous
marriage void. refers to final judgment and not on for
purposes of remarriage. Hence, judicial declaration of nullity
could be for other purposes.
Wherefore, the instant petition is DENIED.
NINAL v. BAYADOG
Republic of the Philippines, petitioner v. CA and Roridel
Olaviano-Molina, respondents
G.R. No. 108763. February 13, 1997
Facts: The case was commenced on August 16, 1990 with the
filing by respondent Roridel O. Molina of a verified petition for
declaration of nullity of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina. The
petition alleged that Roridel and Reynaldo fell in love in college
and went out for a year before they broke up due to differences
in their personalities. Five years later, they rekindled their love
affair and after going out for two more years, got married on
April 14, 1985 in Manila; that a son, Andre O. Molina was born;
that after a year of marriage, Reynaldo showed signs of
immaturity and irresponsibility as a husband and a father
since he preferred to spend more time with his friends on
whom he squandered his money; that he depended on his
parents for aid and assistance, and was never honest with his
wife in regard to their finances, resulting in frequent quarrels
between them; that sometime in February 1986, Reynaldo was
relieved of his job in Manila, and since then Roridel had been
the sole breadwinner of the family; that in October 1986 the
couple had a very intense quarrel, as a result of which their
relationship was estranged; that in March 1987, Roridel
resigned from her job in Manila and went to live with her
parents in Baguio City; that a few weeks later, Reynaldo left
Roridel and their child, and had since then abandoned them
(he has a mistress and their child at present); that Reynaldo
had thus shown that he was psychologically incapable of
complying with the essential marital obligations and was a
highly immature and habitually quarrelsome individual; and that
it would be to the couples best interest to have their marriage
declared null and void in order to free them from what
appeared to be an incompatible marriage from the start.
In his Answer, Reynaldo admitted that he and Roridel
could no longer live together as husband and wife, but
contended that their frequent quarrels were due to (1) Roridels
strange behavior of insisting on maintaining her group of
friends even after their marriage; (2) Roridels refusal to
perform some of her marital duties such as cooking meals; and
(3) Roridels failure to run the household and handle their
finances.
The parties are separated-in-fact for more than three
years and that Roridel has the custody of their son and she is
not asking for support for her and her child. Evidence for herein
respondent wife consisted of her own testimony, that of her
friends Rosemarie as well as of a social worker, and of a
psychiatrist. She also submitted documents marked as Exhibits
A to E-1. Reynaldo did not present any evidence as he
appeared only during the pre-trial conference.

On May 14, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment


declaring the marriage void. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the lower courts decision.
Issue: Whether or not psychological incapacity on the
part of Reynaldo may be invoked as a valid ground for the
nullity of his marriage to Roridel.
Ruling: Assailed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The marriage subsists and is still VALID.
Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a
mental, and not physical incapacity. The intendment of the
law has been to confine its meaning to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning to the marriage.
The psychological condition must exist at the time the
marriage is celebrated and must be characterized by (a)
gravity; (b) judicial antecedence and (c) incurability. There is

underwent a training program under the auspices of the Armed


Forces of the Philippines from 01 April up to 25 August 1990,
he desperately tried to locate, or to somehow get in touch with,
Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Having failed to get Julia to somehow come home, Leouel filed
with the regional trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch 30, a
complaint for "Voiding of marriage Under Article 36 of the
Family Code" (docketed, Civil Case No. 9814). On 31 May
1991, respondent Julia, in her answer (through counsel),
opposed the complaint and denied its allegations, claiming, in
main, that it was the petitioner who had, in fact, been
irresponsible and incompetent. On 25 October 1991, after pretrial conferences had repeatedly been set, albeit
unsuccessfully, by the court, Julia ultimately filed a
manifestation, stating that she would neither appear nor submit
evidence. On 06 November 1991, the court a quo finally
dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. Leouel appealed to
the Court of Appeal. The latter affirmed the decision of the trial
court. The petition should be denied not only because of its
non-compliance with Circular 28-91, which requires a
certification of non-shopping, but also for its lack of merit.
Leouel argues that the failure of Julia to return home, or at the
very least to communicate with him, for more than five years
are circumstances that clearly show her being psychologically
incapacitated to enter into married life.

no showing that the psychological defect spoken of is an


incapacity but appears to be more of a difficulty in the
performance of some marital obligations. There is also no
showing that Reynaldos alleged personality traits were
constitutive of psychological incapacity. While some effort
was made to prove that there was a failure to fulfill prenuptial impressions of thoughtfulness and gentleness on
Reynaldos part and of being conservative, homely and
intelligent on the part of Roridel, such failure of expectations
is not indicative of antecedent psychological incapacity.
Leouel Santos vs. CA and Julia Rosario Bedia-Santos,
G.R. No. 112019
Facts:
It was in Iloilo City where Leouel, who then held
the rank of First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, first met
Julia. The meeting later proved to be an eventful day for
Leouel and Julia. On 20 September 1986, the two
exchanged vows before Municipal Trial Court Judge Cornelio
G. Lazaro of Iloilo City, followed, shortly thereafter, by a
church wedding. Leouel and Julia lived with the latter's
parents at the J. Bedia Compound, La Paz, Iloilo City. On 18
July 1987, Julia gave birth to a baby boy, and he was
christened Leouel Santos, Jr. The ecstasy, however, did not
last long. It was bound to happen, Leouel averred, because
of the frequent interference by Julia's parents into the young
spouses family affairs. Occasionally, the couple would also
start a "quarrel" over a number of other things, like when and
where the couple should start living independently from
Julia's parents or whenever Julia would express resentment
on Leouel's spending a few days with his own parents.
On 18 May 1988, Julia finally left for the United Sates of
America to work as a nurse despite Leouel's pleas to so
dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, or on 01
January 1989, Julia called up Leouel for the first time by long
distance telephone. She promised to return home upon the
expiration of her contract in July 1989. She never did. When
Leouel got a chance to visit the United States, where he

ISSUE: WON is the petition of Leouel Santos to his wife be of


cause to psychologically incapacitated.
RULING: Thus, the fact that respondent wife left her husband
and baby two years after her marriage to work as a nurse in the
U.S. and never returned, and that her husband desperately
tried to locate her in the U.S. but all his efforts to find her failed,
were considered by the High Court not sufficient for the wife to
be considered psychologically incapacitated under Art. 36 of
the Family Code. The Court recognized that petitioner husband
had been aggrieved, but held that the factual setting of his case
does not come close to the standards required to declare a
nullity of marriage.
REPUBLIC VS. QUINTERO-HAMANO (G.R. No. 149498,
May 20, 2004)
Facts:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano and To-Shio started living a
common-law relationship in Japan. Later on, they got married.
After marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised to
return but he never did. She wrote several times but he never
responded. She learned that Toshio visited the Philippines but
he did not bother to visit her and their child.
Lolita filed a complained for the declaration of nullity
of her marriage to her husband on the ground of psychological
incapacity. The trial court granted the complaint and declared
the marriage null & void.
The Solicitor General appealed to the Court of
Appeals but was denied.
Issue:
Was there psychological incapacity?
Held:
In the case at bar, there is none. Our Constitution
provides protection to strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of
the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
validity of the marriage.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by:
(a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.
Abandonment does not constitute psychological incapacity
though it is a ground for legal separation.
CHOA v. CHOA

ANTONIO v. REYES

Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal


principle that procreation of children through sexual
cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant nonfulfillment of this obligation will destroy the integrity and
wholeness of the marriage.
TE v. TE

Chi Ming Tsoi vs Court of Appeals


On May 22, 1988, Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao got married at
the Manila Cathedral. After the celebration of the wedding
the newlyweds proceeded to the house of the defendants
mother. There they slept together for the first night of their
married life. Contrary to Gina Laos expectations, that as
newlyweds they were supposed to enjoy making love, or
having sexual intercourse, with each other, the defendant
just went to bed and slept, then turned his back and went to
sleep. There was no sexual intercourse between them
during the 1st night up until the 4th night. The newlyweds went
to Baguio City in order for them to celebrate their
honeymoon. But the Gina was with her mother and her
uncle, and her husband was with his mother and his
nephew. Again there was no sexual intercourse between
them, since the defendant avoided her by taking long walks
during siesta time or just by sleeping at the living room. They
have slept together since May 22, 1988 until March 15,
1989. But during this period there was no attempt of sexual
intercourse between. She did not even see her husbands
private parts or has he seen hers. They submitted
themselves to a medical examination and the results of their
physical examinations were that she is a healthy, normal and
still a virgin while her husbands examination was kept
confidential. No medicine was prescribed for her, but the
doctor prescribed medications for her husband which was
also kept confidential. Her husband was asked to return but
he never did.
The plaintiff claims that the defendant is impotent and a
closet homosexual as he did not show his penis. She had
observed that her husband uses an eyebrow pencil and
sometimes he uses the cleansing cream of his mother. The
defendant only married her because she is a Filipino citizen
and he wants to maintain his residency status here in the
country and to publicly maintain his appearance of a normal
man. The defendant admitted that there was no sexual
contact between them. The reason for this is every time he
wants to have sex with his wife, she always avoided him.
The defendant also said that he forced his wife to have sex
with him only once but he did not continue because she did
not like it. He then submitted himself to a physical
examination. The result was that from the original size of his
penis of 2 inches or 5 centimeters it only lengthened by 1
inch and 1 centimeter. The doctor also said that the
defendant only had a soft erection which is why his penis is
not in its full length, but the defendant was capable of having
sexual intercourse with a woman.
Issue: WoN the trial courts ruling of psychological incapacity
is of merit
Ruling:
The defendants petition was denied for lack of merit. This
Court, finding the gravity of the failed relationship in which
the parties found themselves trapped in it s mire of unfulfilled
vows and unconsummated marital obligation can do no less
but sustain the studied judgment of respondent appellate
court. One of the essential marital obligations under the

MORIGO VS. PEOPLE (G.R. No. 145226, February 6, 2004)


Facts:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were acquaintances
from 1974 and their friendship was rekindled in 1984 through
letters while Lucia was in Singapore. Lucia then moved to
Canada and in 1990, she and Lucio got married in the
Philippines. Upon her return to Canada, Lucia eventually filed
for divorce in an Ontario court, which took effect in February
1992. In October of the same year, Lucio married Maria
Lumbago. One year later, Lucio filed for a judicial declaration
of nullity of marriage at the RTC. Before any decision had
been reached, the trial court charged Lucio with bigamy, for
which he was convicted. Lucios petition for a declaration for
nullity was granted, on the basis that there was no marriage
ceremony, only a signing of the marriage contract, without even
the presence of a solemnizing officer. His first marriage was
ruled void ab initio. The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the trial
courts decision, pointing out that the eventual ruling nullifying
his first marriage does not nullify his act of contracting a
subsequent marriage while still married. The CA also did not
give any weight to the Canadian courts divorce decree.
Lucios argument of good faith was set aside.
Issue:
Is Lucio guilty of the crime of bigamy?
Held:
Lucios first marriage is considered void from the
beginning, since there was no actual marriage ceremony that
was conducted in front of an authorized solemnizing officer and
witnesses. The marriage that took place between Lucio and
Lucia is not in accordance with the requirements of Articles 3
and 4 of the Family Code.
The court made a distinction of this case to Mercado
vs. Tan, wherein the facts were very similar. Mercados first
marriage was celebrated by a solemnizing officer twice; even if
such marriage was later deemed void ab initio as well. The
main difference between the two cases is that Lucio filed a
petition for nullity of marriage before the bigamy case was filed,
while Mercado filed for nullity after he was charged with
bigamy. Mercado was convicted for bigamy in that case.
Considering the facts given, there was actually no
marriage to speak of, and therefore, Lucio was acquitted of the
crime of bigamy.
LILIA OLIVA WIEGEL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY (as presiding
judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Caloocan City) and KARL HEINZ WIEGEL, respondents.
In an action (Family Case No. 483) filed before the erstwhile
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Caloocan City, herein
respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel (plaintiff therein) asked for the
declaration of Nullity of his marriage (celebrated on July, 1978
at the Holy Catholic Apostolic Christian Church Branch in
Makati, Metro Manila) with herein petitioner Lilia Oliva Wiegel
(Lilia, for short, and defendant therein) on the ground of Lilia's
previous existing marriage to one Eduardo A. Maxion, the
ceremony having been performed on June 25, 1972 at our

Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon City. Lilia, while admitting


the existence of said prior subsisting marriage claimed that
said marriage was null and void, she and the first husband
Eduardo A. Maxion having been allegedly forced to enter
said marital union. In the pre-trial that ensued, the issue
agreed upon by both parties was the status of the first
marriage (assuming the presence of force exerted against
both parties): Was said prior marriage void or was it
merely voidable? Contesting the validity of the pre-trial
order, Lilia asked the respondent court for an opportunity to
present evidence(1) that the first marriage was vitiated by force exercised
upon both her and the first husband; and
(2) that the first husband was at the time of the marriage in
1972 already married to someone else.
Respondent judge ruled against the presentation of evidence
because the existence of force exerted on both parties of the
first marriage had already been agreed upon. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari assailing the following Orders of
the respondent Judge(1) the Order dated March 17, 1980 in which the parties
were compelled to submit the case for resolution based on
"agreed facts;" and
(2) the Order dated April 14, 1980, denying petitioner's
motion to allow her to present evidence in her favor.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no need for petitioner to prove that her first
marriage was vitiated by force committed against both
parties because assuming this to be so, the marriage will not
be void but merely viodable (Art. 85, Civil Code), and
therefore valid until annulled. Since no annulment has yet
been made, it is clear that when she married respondent she
was still validly married to her first husband, consequently,
her marriage to respondent is VOID (Art. 80, Civil Code).
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the
existing prior marriage of her first husband at the time they
married each other, for then such a marriage though void still
needs according to this Court a judicial declaration of such
fact and for all legal intents and purposes she would still be
regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her
marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded
VOID under the law.
WHEREFORE, this petition is hereby DISMISSED
TERRE v. TERRE

VALDES vs RTC (260 SCRA 221)


Facts:

Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married Jan


5,1971. Begotten during the marriage were 5 children. Jan.
1992, Valdez sought declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant
to Art.36 of Family Code. In the July 1994 decision of the SC,
as follows:
1. marriage between Valdez and Gomez declared null and
void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity.
2. 3 older children, Carlos, Antonio and Angela to choose
which parent they want to stay with.
3. Stella and Joaquin shall be in the custody of their mom.
Valdez having visitation rights over the children.
4. the petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common properties
as defined by Art.147 of family Code, and to comply with
the provisions of Art 50, 51 and 52 of the same code
within 30 days from notice.
The petitioner asked for clarification of that portion of the
judgment and, in response, the court maintained that property
regime between the parties was that of co-ownership. In effect,
the marriage tie between the parties was declared inexistent;
but they remained connected as co-owners over their
properties.
Issue: whether or not art.147 does not apply to cases where
the parties are psychologically incapacitated
Articles 50,51 and 52 in relation to art. 102 and 129
of the family code govern disposition of the family dwelling in
cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio, including
marriage declared by reason of psychological incapacity
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and held that a
court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters such as on the coownership of the parties over their properties.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties common property, trial court was not
imprudent. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling that
petitioner and private respondent own the family home and all
their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co ownership
under the civil code, not art. 50,51 and 52 in relation to art 102
and 129 of family code should aptly prevail. The 1st paragraph
of art 50 applying par (2), (3), (4) and of art 43 relates only by
its explicit terms to voidable marriages and exceptionally to
void marriages under art. 40.In all other cases, it is not to be
assumed that the law has also meant to have coincident
property relations and common law spouses or spuses of void
marriage, leaving to ordain, on the latter case, the ordinary
rules on co ownership subject to the provisions of the family
code on the family home, the provisions found in title v, chap.2
of Family code, remain in force regardless of property regime
of spouses
Orders of trial court affirmed.
People of the Philippines vs. Abelo Aragon
Facts:
The defendants in the above case is charged in the
court of First Instance of Cebu with the crime of bigamy, having
contracted a second marriage with one Efigenia C. Palomer on
September 21, 1947, while his previous valid marriage with
Martinez Godinez was still subsisting and had not been
diddolved. The information is dated May 22, 1951, while the
case was pending trial, Palomer filed a civil action in the same
Court of First Instance of Cebu against the defendantappellant, alleging that the latter by means of force, threats and
intimidation of bodily harm, forced plaintiff to marry him, and
praying that the marriage that their marriage on September 21,
1947 be annulled.
Thereupon and on April 30, 1952, defendantappeallant filed a motion on the criminal case of bigamy, and
praying that the criminal charge be provisionally dismissed, on
the ground that the civil action for annulment of the second

marriage is a prejudicial question. The court denied this


motion on the ground that the validity of the second marriage
may be determined in the very criminal action for bigamy.
Against this order this appeal has been presented to this
court.
Issue:
WON defendant contracted a bigamous marriage
even if said marriage is purported to be null and void.
Ruling:
The SC held that there is no question that if the
allegations of the complaint on time the marriage contracted
by defendant-appeallant with Efigenia Palomer is illegal and
void.
Its nullity however, is no defense to the criminal
action for bigamy filed against him. The supposed use of
force and intimidation against the woman, Palomer, even if it
were true, is not a bar or defense to said action. Palomer
were she the one charged with bigamy, could perhaps raise
said force and intimidation as a defense, because she may
not be considered as having freely and voluntarily committed
the act if she was forced to the marriage by intimidation, but
not the other party, who used the force or intimidation. The
latter may not use his own malfeasance to defeat the action
based on his criminal act.
MERCADO VS. TAN (G.R. No. 137110, August 01, 2000)
Facts:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan in 1991.
After one year, Tan filed a case against Mercado for bigamy,
contending that he had a previous marriage in 1976. Such
previous marriage was celebrated twice, first civilly, then in
church. One month after the filing of the bigamy case,
Mercado filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage against
his first wife, Thelma Oliva. The trial court later on granted
Mercados petition, declaring his first marriage void ab initio.
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled that the
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage should have been
contracted before the celebration of his subsequent
marriage, not after. The courts also ruled that such
declaration was only made after a case of bigamy had
already been filed.
Issue/s:
(1) If Mercados first marriage was void from the
beginning, was his subsequent marriage to Consuelo Tan
considered to be bigamous?
(2) Is a declaration of nullity of a first marriage a
defense in bigamy?
Held:
The declaration of nullity of Mercados first
marriage was issued only after the crime of bigamy had
been committed, as well as after a case for bigamy had been
filed in court against him. Such declaration of nullity, even
as his first marriage was deemed never to have taken place,
is not an adequate defense for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code states that, The
absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such marriage void."
This case is distinguished from Morigo vs. People
wherein the facts were very similar, except that Morigos first
marriage was never solemnized, and he filed for a
declaration of nullity for his first marriage before a case for
bigamy was filed against him. Thus, his first marriage was
also declared void ab initio. Morigo was acquitted of bigamy
in that case.
REPUBLIC VS. NOLASCO (G.R. No. 94053, March 17,
1993)
Facts:
Gregorio Nolasco, a seaman, met Janet Monica
Parker in 1980 during a port call in a bar in England. They
married in 1982 in Antique. Thereafter, while Nolasco was

overseas, he was told that Janet had given birth to their son.
Fifteen (15) days later, Janet left Antique, and her whereabouts
remained unknown. Nolasco returned to Antique nine (9)
months later where he claimed to have searched for his wife,
then proceeded to London to look for her there. In 1988,
Nolasco filed a petition for the declaration of presumptive death
for his wife before the trial court of Antique, where his petition
was granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial court though the Office of the Solicitor General contended
that there was no well-founded belief that Janet Monica Parker
was already dead, since Nolasco did not diligently search for
his missing wife.
Issue:
Is there a well-founded belief that Janet Monica
Parker is already dead?
Held:
The court believed that Nolasco was not that diligent
in searching for his missing wife, as he did not even contact
local authorities and authorities in London that his wife was
missing. There were no other testimonies supporting Nolascos
claim that Parker could already be dead. In this case, since
Nolasco did not comply with the third requirement for a
declaration of presumptive death (that the present spouse has
a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead), the court
reversed the earlier decision, thereby denying Nolascos
petition for a declaration of presumptive death.
LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. L-8492, February 29,
1956)
Facts:
Lourdes Lukban filed for a declaration of presumptive
death for her husband, Francisco Chuidian who had been
missing for more than twenty (20) years. Seventeen (17) days
after their marriage, Chuidian left Lukban in 1933 and had
never been heard from since then. Lukban wished to remarry,
but the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court)
denied her petition on the grounds that such declaration was
not authorized by law.
Issue:
Is it necessary to obtain a declaration of presumptive
death for a missing spouse in order for the present spouse to
remarry?
Held:
Considering the year that this case was filed, i.e., in
1956, the New Civil Code only required that the missing
spouse be absent for seven (7) consecutive years before the
present spouse can remarry. Such length of time was
sufficient to assume that the missing spouse is dead and
therefore, Lukban is already allowed to remarry.
CALISTERIO VS. CALISTERIO (G.R. No. 136467, April 6,
2000)
Facts:
Marietta Calisterio married James Willam Bounds in
1946. James disappeared the following year. Eleven (11)
years later, Marietta married Teodorico Calisterio, without first
obtaining a declaration of presumptive death for James.
Teodorico died without a will in 1992, and his estate was
challenged by his sister, Antonia Armas, who claimed that she
was Teodoricos legal heir, as he and Marietta were not validly
married. Marietta appealed on the grounds that a declaration
of presumptive death is required only in the Family Code, while
it was the New Civil Code that was in force at the time of her
marriage to Teodorico in 1958.
Issue/s:
(1) Which Code should be applied to the marriage of
Teodorico and Marietta celebrated in 1958, the Family Code
which was implemented in August 3, 1988, or the Civil Code
which was implemented in August 30, 1950?
(2) Having established the above question, was a
declaration of presumptive death then necessary for Mariettas
marriage to Teodorico to be considered valid?
(3) Who is Teodoricos legal heir, Antonia, the sister,
or Marietta?

Held:
The Civil Code was the law in force at the time of
Mariettas marriage to Teodorico, which did not require a
declaration of presumptive death in order to contract a
subsequent marriage, so long as all the other requirements
are present. Teodoricos marriage to Marietta is considered
valid and therefore, she is the legal heir to his estate.
REPUBLIC v. CALLEJO

Valdes VS Regional Trial Court, Br. 102, Quezon City


G.R. No. 122749, July 31, 1996
Facts:
According to the facts of this case, it shows that
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez married each other
and begotten five children. The husband sought for the
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of
psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage
null and void. In effect proceedings for the liquidation of
community properties were started. The wife asserted that
the Family Code has no provision on procedure for
liquidation of properties in union without marriage. The Trial
Court held that rules of co-ownership shall apply. The
petitioner contends that Article 50, 51, 52 of the Family Code
should apply.
Issue:
Whether or not rules of co-ownership should apply
in the liquidation of property of a void marriage?
Held:
The court ruled that in a void marriage, the
property relations of the parties during the period of
cohabitation are governed by the provision of Article 147 and
148 of the Family Code. The Court affirmed the decision of
RTC in applying the rules of co-ownership on liquidation of
properties.
Anaya vs. Palaroan
Facts: Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married
on Dec. 4, 1953. Thereafter, Fernando filed for annulment on
the ground that his consent was obtained through force and
intimidation. The complaint was dismissed, but Auroras
counterclaim that 1) Fernando divulged to her that he had
pre-marital relations with a close relative of his several
months prior to the marriage, as well as that 2) he married
her (Aurora) but only pretended to love her and had no
intention of complying with his marital duties and obligations,
was upheld. She prayed also for annulment as well as moral
damages. Fernando denied the allegations. The court,
however, realized that Auroras allegations of fraud were
insufficient to invalidate the marriage and dismissed her
complaint. Hence the appeal.

brought the complaint within four years after the marriage.


Since the wedding was celebrated in 1953 and the ground was
only pleaded in 1966, it must be declared already barred. Thus,
the appeal is denied and the judgment of the lower court is
affirmed.
BUCCAT VS. BUCCAT (G.R. No. 47101, April 25, 1941)
Facts:
The plaintiff requested for the annulment of his marriage with
Luida Buccat celebrated on November 26, 1938 in the City of
Baguio. He was assured by Luida that she was a virgin. After
being married for 89 days, the Luida gave birth to a boy on
February 23, 1939. Thereafter, Godofredo abandoned Luida.
A case was filed with the lower court to annul their
marriage based on the ground that he married the defendant
because of her assurance that she was still a virgin. The
appellant alleged that he was not aware that the defendant was
almost seven (7) months pregnant at the time marriage was
celebrated. The lower court denied the petition and was raised
to the Supreme Court for an appeal.
Issue:
Is the appeal for the reversal of the decision of the lower court
tenable?
Held:
No. The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court. For a
marriage to be annulled, one has to give clear and unassailable
proof, which did not exist in this case. The appellants claim
that he did not even suspect the pregnancy of the defendant
was held to be unbelievable. It has been proven that the latter
was already in the advanced stage of pregnancy at almost
seven (7) months, so there is no place to consider the fraud
that the appellant claims. Furthermore, the appellant was in his
first year in law school.
AQUINO VS. DELIZO (G.R. No. L-15853, July 27, 1960)
Facts:
Fernando Aquino, petitioner, filed a complaint against
her wife, Conchita Delizo, for annulment of marriage. Aquino
alleged that at the time of their marriage, Delizo concealed to
him the fact that she was four months pregnant. He claimed
that he did not suspect that the respondent was in her fourth
month of pregnancy, since the latter was naturally plump, or fat.
Issue:
Does the evidence presented by the petitioner
enough to warrant the annulment of their marriage?
Held:
Yes. Under Article 85, paragraph 4 (in relation to
Article 86, paragraph 3) of the New Civil Code (now Article 45
paragraph 3, in relation to Article 46, paragraph 2),
concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of marriage,
she was pregnant by a man other than her husband constitutes
fraud and is a ground for annulment of marriage. In the case at
bar, it cannot be said that the petitioners claim is unbelievable,
since at the fourth month stage of pregnancy, the enlargement
of the abdomen is still hardly noticeable, especially that the
respondent is naturally plump or fat.
JIMENEZ v. CANIZARES

Issue: Whether or not the non-disclosure to a wife by her


husband of his pre-marital relationship with another woman
is a ground for annulment?
Ruling: For fraud to be a valid ground for annulment, it must
fall under the kinds of fraud specifically enumerated by Art.
46 of the Family Code (previously Art. 86 of the Civil Code).
No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute such
fraud. Since Auroras first allegation does not fall within the
purview of said article, it cannot constitute a ground for
annulment. As for her second allegation, she should have

Sin v Sin
Facts: After a two-year courtship and engagement, Florence
and respondent Philipp T. Sin, a Portuguese citizen, were
married at St. Jude Catholic Parish Manila. Afterwards,
Florence filed a complaint for "declaration of nullity of marriage"
against Philipp. Trial ensued and the parties presented their
respective documentary and testimonial evidence. After which
the Trial Court dismissed Florences petition. Florence filed with

the trial court a notice of appeal to the Court of Appeals. C.A.


affirmed lower courts ruling, petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration. C.A. denied. Hence, the appeal to SC.
Issue: Whether the decision is right since there was no
presence of a fiscal in relation to Article 48.
Held: Throughout the proceedings in the lower court, the
State did not participate in the proceedings through the
appearance of a fiscal. Although he appeared a few times,
he did not actively participate therein. The requirement of a
fiscals participation is mandated by Article 48 of the Family
Code which states In all cases of annulment or declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on
behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed It can however be argued that
since the lower court dismissed the petition, the evil that was
to be prevented did not come about, hence the lack of
participation was cured. However, this is not the case
because the task of protecting marriage as an inviolable
social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation
and not mere pro-forma compliance. The records are bereft
of any evidence that the State participated in the prosecution
of the case not just at the trial level but on appeal with the
Court of Appeals as well.
Having so ruled, we decline to rule on the factual disputes of
the case, this being within the province of the trial court upon
proper re-trial. The court reverses and sets aside the
decision of C.A. Remanded to the back to the lower court.
Ocampo v. Florenciano
Facts:
Jose de Ocampo and Serafina were married in April 5, 1938
and had lived thereafter as husband and wife and had
several children. In March, 1951, plaintiff discovered on
several occasions that his wife was betraying his trust by
maintaining illicit relations with one Jose Arcalas. Having
found this plaintiff sent her to Manila in June 1951 to study
beauty culture, where she stayed for one year. Again,
plaintiff discovered that while in the said city defendant was
going out with several other men, aside from Jose Arcalas.
Towards the end of June, 1952, when defendant had
finished studying her course, she left plaintiff and since then
they had lived separately.
On June 18, 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act of
having illicit relations with another man by the name of
Nelson Orzame. Plaintiff signified his intention of filing a
petition for legal separation, to which Serafina agreed
provided she is not charged with adultery in a criminal
action. Accordingly, plaintiff filed on July 5, 1955, a petition
for legal separation."
Interpreting these facts virtually to mean a confession of
judgment the Appellate Court declared that under Art. 101,
legal separation could not be decreed, since according to
par. 2 Art. 48 of the Family Code, no judgment shall be
based upon a stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
As we understand the article, it does not exclude, as
evidence, any admission or confession made by the
defendant outside of the court. It merely prohibits a decree of
separation upon a confession of judgment. Confession of
judgment usually happens when the defendant appears in
court and confesses the right of plaintiff to judgment or files a
pleading expressly agreeing to the plaintiff's demand.
Issue:

Whether or not the court erred in not granting the plaintiff a


decree of legal separation , holding there was confession of
judgment, plus condonation or consent to the adultery and
prescription.
Ruling:
Supposing that the above statement of defendant constituted
practically a confession of judgment, inasmuch as there is
evidence of the adultery independently of such statement, the
decree may and should be granted, since it would not be
based on her confession, but upon evidence presented by
the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment based
exclusively or mainly on defendant's confession.
Also, we do not think plaintiff's failure actively to search for
defendant and take her home (after the latter had left him in
1952) constituted condonation or consent to her adulterous
relations with Orzame. It will be remembered that she "left" him
after having sinned with Arcalas and after he had discovered
her dates with other men. Consequently, it was not his duty to
search for her to bring her home. Hers was the obligation to
return.
A decree of Legal Separation granted.
Lapuz vs. Eufemio
Facts:
Petitioner, Carmen Lapuz Sy, who is married to
respondent, Eufemio S. Eufemio, filed for a decree of legal
separation on the grounds of abandonment and cohabitation
with a certain Go Hiok, who respondent claimed he also
married. In a twist of faith, Carmen died in a vehicular accident
before the trial could be completed. Thus, a petition to dismiss
was filed by the respondent and motion for substitution by
Macario Lapuz.
Issue:
Whether or not the death of the plaintiff before the
final decree in an action for legal separation decrease the
action and if it does, will abatement apply if the action involves
property rights?
Ruling:
An action for legal separation, being personal in
character follows that the death of one party to the action
causes the death of the action itself.
A further reason why an action for legal separation is
abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are
involved, is that these rights are mere effects of a decree of
separation, their source being the decree itself, without the
decree itself, without the decree such rights do not come into
existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims
are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the
pendency of the action, no decree can be forthcoming, death
producing a more radical and definitive separation, and the
expected consequential rights and claims would necessarily
remain unborn.
Gandionco v. Peraranda
(Art. 55)
Facts: Private respondent Teresita Gandionco filed separate
criminal and civil complaints for legal separation against her
husband Froilan on the ground of concubinage, with a petition
for support and payment of damages. Respondent Judge
Seren Peraranda ordered the payment of support. Petitioner
Froilan Gandionco, on the other hand, contends that his
conviction for concubinage will have to be first secured before
the action for legal separation can prosper or succeed, as the
basis of the action for legal separation is his alleged offense of
concubinage.

Issue: Must a conviction for concubinage be obtained first


before an action for legal separation can commence?
Held: Petitioners contention is erroneous. A decree of legal
separation, on the ground of concubinage, may be issued
upon proof by preponderance of evidence in the action for
legal separation. No criminal proceeding or conviction is
necessary. A civil action for legal separation, based on
concubinage, may proceed ahead of, or simultaneously with,
a criminal action for concubinage, because said civil action is
not one "to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense"
even if both the civil and criminal actions arise from or are
related to the same offense. Such civil action is one intended
to obtain the right to live separately, with the legal
consequences thereof, such as, the dissolution of the
conjugal partnership of gains, custody of offsprings, support,
and disqualification from inheriting from the innocent spouse,
among others.
*Note: Under Art. 55 of the Family Code, sexual infidelity or
perversion of either spouse has replaced adultery on the part
of the wife and concubinage on the part of the husband as
defined by the Revised Penal Code (Art. 97, New Civil Code)
as one of the grounds for legal separation.
BUGAYONG VS. GINEZ (G.R. No. L-10033, December 28,
1956)
Facts:
The spouses Benjamin Bugayong and Leonila
Ginez lived with the sisters of the latter when they got
married but later on, they moved to Sampaloc, Manila. After
some time, Leonila left their dwelling, informing her husband
that she will be staying with her mother in Pangasinan. In
July 1951, Benjamin started receiving letters from the
defendants sister-in-law informing him of the adulterous acts
of his wife. Leonila also sent him a letter which seemed to
confirm such allegation. The plaintiff then went to
Pangasinan to join her wife. After sleeping with her several
times, Benjamin asked Leonila about her alleged adulterous
acts. The latter did not respond, and such reaction led the
defendant to file a petition for legal separation. However, the
action was dismissed upon on the ground that the act
charged have been condoned by husband when he slept
with her.
Issue:
Is the dismissal of Benjamins petition for legal
separation valid?
Held:
Yes. As stated in Article 100 of the Family Code,
The legal separation may be claimed only by the innocent
spouse, provided there has been no condonation of or
consent to the adultery or concubinage. Where both
spouses are offenders, a legal separation cannot be filed by
either of them. Collusion between the parties to obtain legal
separation shall cause the dismissal of the petition. The act
of sleeping with the wife after learning of acts of infidelity
actually implies condonation. Condonation of the act is
implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of infidelity.
PACETE VS. CARRIAGA (G.R. No. L-53880, March 17,
1994)
Facts:
On October 29, 1979, Concepcion Alanis filed a complaint
for the declaration of nullity of the marriage between her
previous husband Enrico L. Pacete and Clarita de la
Concepcion, as well as for legal separation between her and
Pacete. She maintained that she was married to Pacete.
Pacete consequently contracted a bigamous marriage with
Clarita. During her marriage to Pacete, the latter acquired
vast property consisting of large tracts of land, fishponds and
several motor vehicles. Pacete deceptively placed a number
of pieces of property either in his name and Clarita or in the
names of his children with Clarita. She also averred that
reconciliation between her and Pacete was impossible since

he clearly favored to maintain living with Clarita. The


defendants were each served with summons on November 15,
1979. They filed a motion for an extension of twenty (20) days
from November 30, 1979. The court granted the motion. On
December 18, 1979, the defendants filed a second motion for
an extension of another thirty (30) days. On January 7, 1980,
the lower court granted the motion but only for twenty (20)
days. Still unaware of the court order, the defendants, on
February 5, 1980, again filed another motion for an extension
of fifteen (15) days. The following day, the court denied the last
motion. The plaintiff thereupon filed a motion to declare the
defendants in default, which the court forthwith granted. On
March 17, 1980, the court granted the decree of legal
separation.
Issue:
Should the decree of legal separation issued by the court be
nullified with regard to Article 58 of the Family Code?
Held:
An action for legal separation must in no case be tried before
six (6) months shall have elapsed since the filing of the petition,
clearly in order to bestow the parties a "cooling-off" period. The
court should take steps toward getting the parties to reconcile.
The six (6) months cooling-off period is mandatory. The
proceedings are nullified and set aside.
Macadangdang vs. CA
Facts: Antonio and Filomena Macadangdang were married in
1946. The spouses started some businesses which eventually
became successful. Unfortunately the spouses became
estranged and lived separately. Filomena came back and
discovered that Antonio had illicit relations while they were
separated. She filed a petition for legal separation, which was
granted by the court, reserving the decree for the dissolution
and liquidation of community properties since there was no
complete list of the community properties to be divided
presented in court. While the dissolution and liquidation of the
community property was still pending, Filomena filed a motion
for her appointment as an administrator of the community
property, which Antonio strongly contested. Subsequently, the
trial court promulgated an order for administration of the said
community property. Antonio contends that the order for
administration should not be given since the decree of legal
separation is not yet final and executory because the
dissolution and liquidation of the community property is still
pending.
Issue: Whether or not the decree of legal separation issued by
the trial court is final and executoy
Ruling: Petition has no merit. The decree of legal separation is
final and executory notwithstanding the fact that the community
property has not yet been dissolved and liquidated. Such
dissolution and liquidation are necessary consequences of the
final decree. This legal effect of the decree of legal separation
ipso facto or automatically follows, as an inevitable incident of,
the judgment decreeing legal separation for the purpose of
determining the share of each spouse in the conjugal assets.
The legal separation between then spouses Antonio
Macadangdang and Filomena Gaviana Macadangdang had
long become final and executory and the division of the
conjugal property in a "supplemental decision" is a mere
incident of the decree of legal separation. Petition dismissed.

Potenciano vs. CA
Facts: Erlinda Ilusorio filed a petition for habeas corpus to gain
custody of her old and sick husband, Potenciano Ilusorio.
Erlinda contends that her daughters, private respondents
herein, were illegally restraining her husband so that they can
take advantage of his weak state and gain properties for

themselves. She also contends that under Article 68 of the


Family Code, spouses are obliged to live together.

arising from breach of marital obligations are not provided by


our laws.

Issue: Whether or not Article 68 of the Family Code gives a


justiciable right to compel one spouse to live with the other

"Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid


marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed.

Ruling: Although, Article 68 of the Family Code emphatically


states that husbands and wives are duty bound to live
together and care for each other, the provision does not
create any justiciable right. The sanction therefor is the
"spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order" to enforce
consortium. Obviously, there was absence of empathy
between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano, having separated
from bed and board since 1972. We defined empathy as a
shared feeling between husband and wife experienced not
only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union is a two-way
process.

"In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the


subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended party shall
extinguish the criminal action or the penalty: Provided, That the
crime shall not be extinguished or the penalty shall not be
abated if the marriage is void ab initio.
ILUSORIO v. BILDNER

Goitia vs. Campos-Rueda


Facts: Eloisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married
in 1915. One month after their marriage, Jose demanded of
Eloisa that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genital organs, which Eloisa refused to do. Jose repeated
the demands and when Eloisa still refused, he started to
maltreat her which prompted Eloisa to leave the house and
return to her parents. As a result, Eloisa filed a petition for
support which the lower court denied stating that there was
no cause of action. Jose also contends that Eloisa is no
longer entitled for support since she left their house and
joined her parents.
Issue: Whether or not Eloisa is still entitled for support
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled that Eloisa is still entitled
for support. According to the old civil code, spouses are
obliged to assist and support each other and that the one
who is obliged to give support has an option in satisfying it,
either by paying the pension that may be fixed or by
receiving and maintaining in his own home the person
having the right to the same. In the present case, the second
option is no longer available because the wife has already
left the house, not because of her own will but because of
the husbands immoral demands. Logically, the only option
left for him to give support is through by a fixed pension.
Ty vs. CA (Article 68)
Facts: Edgardo Reyes filed a petition to declare her
marriage with Ofelia Ty as null and void ab initio. According
to Edgardo, their marriage was contracted at the time his
first marriage, which was also void ab initio, was still
subsisting and that there was no judicial declaration of
absolute nullity granted by the court regarding his first
marriage. The trial court and the Court of Appeals rendered
judgment in favor of Edgardo. On appeal to the Supreme
Court, Ofelia asked for the reversal of the decision rendered
by the Court of Appeals and counterclaim against his
husband for damages.
Issue: Whether or not the counterclaim asked by Ofelia
should be given
Ruling: The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the trial
court and the Court of Appeals regarding the declaration of
nullity of their marriage but maintained that the damages
asked by Ofelia can not be given since it would be
incongruent with the law. The Court stated that a husband
paying his wife for damages from conjugal or common funds
would be absurd. Also, the Court stated that damages

Article 69 Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC


Facts: On 8 March 1995, Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, indicating that she was a resident of
said constituency for seven months. Faced with petition for
cancellation and disqualification by the incumbent
representative Cirilo Roy Montejo, Marcos filed an amended
certificate changing the entry seven months to since
childhood. The Commission on Elections, on 24 April, ordered
the disqualification of Marcos from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte. It appears
however, that Marcos garnered the most votes in the 8 May
election. The Commission on Elections, thus, suspended her
proclamation.
Issue: Whether or not the statement in the certificate of
candidacy (seven) determines whether an individual satisfied
the constitutions residency qualification requirement, to
warrant Marcos disqualification.
Held: It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate
of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether
or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions residency
qualification requirement. It must be noted again that
residence is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary, while domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. Residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
Article 73 - Ayala Investments vs C.A.
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM), obtained a loan from
the Ayala and Investment Development Corporation (AIDC). As
an added security, Aflredo Ching, executive vice-president of
PBM, executed security agreements, which made him jointly
and severally answerable for PBMs indebtedness to AIDC.
PBM failed to pay the loan, AIDC filed case for sum of money
against PBM and Aflredo Ching. The court therefore, ordered
PBM and Alfredo Ching to jointly and severally pay the amount
of P 50, 300, 000.00 with interests. Alfredo Ching and PBM,

private respondents, filed a case of injunction to enjoin the


auction sale alleging that petitioners cannot enforce the
judgment against the conjugal partnership on the ground
that, the subject loan did not redound to the benefit of the
said conjugal partnership. The lower court granted the
petition. AIDC file a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. Court of Appeals granted the petition so it paved
way for the scheduling of the respondent-spouses conjugal
properties. The auction took place with AIDC as the bidder.
AIDC filed for a motion to dismiss the petition for injunction
because the sale was already consummated, therefore
becoming moot and academic. Respondents filed their
motion to oppose, since two of the real properties are in the
name of Encarnacion Ching, a non-party to the civil case.
The lower court denied to dismiss and declared the sale of
execution null and void. Petitioners appealed to C.A. which
affirmed the decision of the lower court. Petitioner filed for a
Motion of Reconsideration which was denied, hence the
instant petition. Petitioners stated that private respondent
contracted the debt which redounded for the benefit of the
partnership.

his legal wife Carlina, with whom they begotten a daughter


named Herminia. Instead, the 63 year old Miguel Palang chose
to live with Erlinda who was then only 19 years old. During the
cohabitation of Miguel and Erlinda, they decided to purchase a
riceland which was made in favor of both of them. Erlinda also
purchase a house and lot issued only in her name. Miguel and
Erlindas cohabitation produced a son named, Kristopher
Palang. Four years later, Miguel died. Carlina Palang and her
daughter Herminia Palang-dela Cruz, instituted a case at bar in
action for recovery of ownership to get back the riceland and
the house and lot allegedly purchased by Miguel during his
cohabitation with Erlinda. Erlindas defense was that she
contributed money to purchase the riceland with Miguel and
that the money used to purchase the house and lot was from
her own business of buy and sell and sari-sari store. The court
ruled in favor of Carlina Palang. Erlina appealed claiming that
the Court of Appeals erred in not sustaining the validity of two
deeds of absolute sale covering the ricelang made in favor of
Miguel and Erlinda, and the house and lot made in favor of
Erlinda alone.
ISSUE:

Issue: Whether or not the obligation incurred by the


respondent redound to the benefit of the conjugal
partnership of private respondent.

Whether or not Erlinda can be considered as a coowner in the purchase of riceland and house and lot.
RULING:

Ruling: The court held that the said debt did not redound to
the benefit of the family. Furthermore, the court did not agree
that the terms redounded to the benefit and for the benefit
of are the same. The former require that actual benefit must
be realized, while the latter requires only that the transaction
should be one which normally would produce benefit to the
partnership, regardless whether or not actual benefit
accrued. Moreover, the alleged benefits that the petitioners
assert that private respondent will acquire or has acquired
are not one directly resulting from the loan but is a byproduct or a spin-off of the loan itself. The petition was
denied for lack of merit.
Ayala Investments vs. CA
Facts: Philippine Blooming Mills (PBM) obtained a
P50,300,000.00 loan from Ayala Investments and
Development Corporation, with Alfredo Ching, its Executive
Vice-President as surety, making himself jointly and severally
liable with PBMs indebtedness to AIDC. The former failed to
pay, hence, the latter filed a suit for sum of money against
PBM and Ching. After the trial, the 2 defendants were held
jointly liable for the indebtedness. A writ of execution was
issued where conjugal properties of Ching and his wife were
levied upon.
Issues: The basic issued were the following: (1) What debts
and obligations contracted by husband alone are considered
for the benefit of the conjugal partnership which are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership? (UNDER ART.
94 & 121) (2) Is a surety agreement entered into by the
husband in favor of his employer within the contemplation of
the said provision?
Held: If the husband is the principal obligor in the contract
that contract falls under obligations for the benefit of the
conjugal partnership. Here, no actual benefit may be
proved. It was shown that Ching signed as surety. It is
incumbent upon PBM to prove that Chings acting as surety
redounded as benefit of the conjugal partnership. Absent
such proof, the conjugal partnership is not liable.
AGAPAY vs. PALANG
FACTS: Miguel Palang contracted a subsequent bigamous
marriage with Erlinda Agapay. Miguel refused to cohabit with

No, Erlinda cannot be considered as a co-owner of


the two deeds. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual
joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. This provision is applicable for a man and a
woman not capacitated to marry each other with the
relationship exclusively as husband and wife. Miguel and
Erlinda are not capacitated to marry each other due to the fact
that Miguels earlier marriage with Carlina is still subsisting. In
this case, actual contribution of Erlina on the purchase of the
riceland and the house and lot was not proven. Considering the
fact that Erlina has her business of buy and sell and sari-sari
store, it is unrealistic to believe that a 20 years old woman
could give a share of a big money to buy a large parcel of land
with a 64 years pensioner of the U.S government. Actual
contribution is required by Art. 148 of the Family code in
contrast with Art. 147 of Family Code which states that efforts
in the care and maintenance of the family and household are
regarded as contributions to the acquisition to the common
property by one who ha no salary or income, work or industry. If
actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no
co-ownership.
AGAPAY VS. PALANG (G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997)
Facts: Carlina Palang and her daughter, Herminia, filed a case
to recover the ownership and possession with damages
against Erlinda Agapay, of two properties acquired during the
cohabitation of the latter with the formers husband, Miguel
Palang. Carlina and Miguel were legally married and they sired
a daughter, Herminia. They lived together for a few years after
Herminia was born, and after that, he chose to stay at another
place, no in their conjugal home. After a number of years of
living separately with his family, Miguel married Erlinda Agapay.
After their marriage, they acquired two parcels of land, one
agricultural and the other with a house already constructed in it.
The house and lot was acquired representing Erlinda Agapay
as purchaser.
Miguel and Erlindas relationship produced a son,
Kristopher. Later on, Carlina filed a case of concubinage
against Miguel and Erlinda, and they were convicted. After two
years, Miguel died.

Issue: Can Carlina and Herminia claim ownership of the


said two properties?

(1) May Gilda Jardeleza assume sole powers of


administration of their conjugal properties in light of her

Held: Yes. Article 148 of the Family Code, which provides


for cases of cohabitation when a man or woman who are not
capacitated to marry live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife, states that parties who acquire properties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall own them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. The actual contribution must be
proved, otherwise there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Miguel and Erlindas marriage is
obviously void, being contracted at the time Miguel and
Carlinas marriage is still subsisting. Their relationship is just
a mere cohabitation, which subjects it to the provisions of
Article 148 of the Family Code.
Erlinda was not able to prove that she actually
contributed in the acquisition of the property, considering her
age and financial circumstances during that time. She was
not able to show that she made actual contributions in
purchasing the property.
As to the second property, the house and lot, the
transaction was properly a donation by Miguel to Erlinda, but
one that was clearly void and inexistent by express provision
of law since it was made between persons guilty of adultery
or concubinage. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation
between spouses now applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would
turn out to be better than those in legal union.
With the foregoing provisions of the law, Carlina
and Herminia can rightfully claim ownership of the said
properties.

husbands comatose condition?


(2) Does Article 124 of the Family Code apply in the
case at bar?
Held: Article 124 of the Family Code does not apply to the case
of Gilda Jardeleza because her spouse is neither absent nor
separated from her. In this case, Dr. Jardeleza is
incapacitated, which means his wife should not apply for sole
administratorship of their conjugal properties. The proper
remedy would be to apply for judicial guardianship, which was
applied for but which procedures were not complied with.
Because due process was denied to Ernesto Jardeleza, the
sale of their conjugal properties is declared void ab initio. Gilda
Jardeleza may not dispose of any of their properties until she
has been validly declared as the guardian of their conjugal
properties.
DELA CRUZ VS. DELA CRUZ (G.R. No. L-19565, January
30, 1968)
Facts:
Estrella Dela Cruz, plaintiff, filed a case against her
husband, Severino Dela Cruz alleging that Severino
abandoned her and mismanaged their conjugal properties.
The plaintiff prayed for the separation of properties, payment of
monthly support and the payment of attorneys fees and related
costs.
In response to the plaintiffs accusations, the
defendant claimed that despite his prolonged absence from the
conjugal home from 1955 to 1958, he did not fail to give
financial support to the plaintiff and to their children. As to the
mismanagement of their conjugal properties, defendant
claimed that through his hardwork and zeal, he was able to
increase the value of their conjugal assets to over a million
pesos during those times.

ARCABA v. TABANCURA Vda DE BATOCAEL


Issue:
Does the defendants separation from his family
constitute abandonment in law that will justify a separation of
their conjugal partnership properties?
Held:

UY VS. COURT OF APPEALS (G.R. No. 109557,


November 29, 2000)
Facts: Dr. Ernesto Jardeleza Sr. had a stroke and was
comatose. His wife, Gilda, petitioned the trial court to allow
her to dispose of their conjugal properties by selling one
piece of real property to their daughter, Glenda Uy, to pay for
Dr. Jardelezas medical bills. Their son, Teodoro Jardeleza,
contested the transaction because his father did not approve
the sale and was denied his rights to due process under a
judicial proceeding for guardianship. In the meantime, Gilda
proceeded to sell the lot to her daughter, as the lower court
had granted the petition. The decision was revoked by the
Court of Appeals.
Issue/s:

No. The defendant is not guilty of abandonment of


his wife, nor he was abusive of his powers of administration of
the conjugal partnership properties as to warrant the division of
the conjugal assets. To entitle the plaintiff of the remedies
under Article 178 of the Civil Code, there must be real
abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment
must not only be physical estrangement but it should also
accompany financial and moral desertion. In the case at bar, is
showed that the defendant continued his support to his family
despite of his absence in the conjugal home. This negates any
intent on his part not to return on the conjugal abode and
resume his marital duties and rights.
On the allegation that the defendant mismanaged the
conjugal partnership property, there was no sufficient proof to
show that he squandered the conjugal assets. On the contrary,
defendant was able to show that he was able to increase the
worth of their assets through his hard work.

Considering the abovementioned facts, the


plaintiffs move for the separation of conjugal properties is
not justified.

BA FINANCE CORPORATION VS. CA (G.R. No. 61464,


May 28, 1988)
Facts:
Augusto Yulo, one of the respondents, secured
from BA Finance Corporation, the petitioner, a loan in the
amount of Php 591,003.59. To secure the said loan,
Augusto Yulo used a special power of attorney allegedly
executed by his wife, Lily Yulo, authorizing the former to sign
the promissory note. Two months prior to the loan, Augusto
Yulo had already left his wife and children. When the
obligation became due and demandable, Augusto Yulo failed
to pay the same.
The petitioner filed a case against the spouses,
and prayed for the attachment of their properties in payment
of the said loan. the spouses were also charged with fraud,
for failing to turn over to the petitioner the earnings of a
construction contract which was also one of the subjects in
the abovementioned loan.
In defense, Lily Yulo filed a counterclaim, alleging
that Augusto Yulo forged her signature on the special power
of attorney submitted by the latter to the petitioner. Lily Yulo
also claimed that Augusto Yulo had already abandoned her
and her children five (5) months before the filing of the
complaint. She also claimed that she never got a single
centavo from the proceeds of the loan.
The petitioner contended that even if the signature
of Lily Yulo was forged on the special power of attorney, the
spouses can still be made answerable to the obligation
because the said properties form part of the conjugal
partnership of the spouses Yulo.
Issue:
Is the conjugal property liable for the payment of
the obligation to the petitioner?
Held:
No. Although the subject properties of A&L
Industries is presumed to be conjugal, said property cannot
be held liable for the obligation if it has not redounded for the
benefit of the conjugal partnership, under Article 161 of the
Family Code. In the case at bar, the loan contracted by
Augusto Yulo was undoubtedly for his own benefit because
at the time he incurred the obligation, he had already
abandoned his family and had left their conjugal home.
Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his
wife on behalf of A&L Industries to procure such loan from
the petitioner.
JOHNSON & JOHNSON VS. CA AND VINLUAN
(G.R. No. 102692, September 23, 1996)
Facts:
Delilah Vinluan, wife of respondent Alejo vinluan,
is the sole onwer of Vinluan Enterprises that purchased
products from Johnson & Johnson, herein petitioner as she
was engaged as well in the business of retailing Johnson
products among others. As a result of this transaction, she
then incurred an obligation worth Php 235,880.89 to
petitioner which she had difficulty paying. Delilah was only
able to pay Php 5,000.00 that led the petitioner to file a
complaint for the collection of the principal obligation plus
interest and damages. The trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner and sentenced Delilah to be solely liable to pay the
obligation incurred from J&J. However, when the Provincial
Sheriff of Rizal executed the judgment on the properties of
the wife it included the spouses conjugal properties which
led respondent husband file a motion to quash levy on
execution on the ground that it didnt conform with the courts
final decision. The motion, however, was denied. The
husband elevated matter to the appellate court that ruled in

favor of private respondent and reversed the decision of the


trial court. Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Are the conjugal properties of the spouses liable for
the obligation incurred solely by the wife without the consent of
the husband?
Held:
The petition is denied. The appellate court, in the
first place, cannot reverse anymore a decision that was
rendered final and executory because a judgment that has
become final is already considered the law, which the parties
will have to conform to. The dispositive portion of the decision
in the trial court already declared that husband cannot be held
legally liable for wifes obligations given the fact that the latter
didnt give his consent to the said transaction with petitioner.
Hence, in levying on the properties that did not exclusively
belong to wife, the notices of levy failed to conform to the
decree of the decision, and are, therefore, irregular and
contrary to the Rules.

MALLILIN VS. CASTILLO (G.R.No.136803 June 16, 2000)


Facts:
Eustaquio Mallilin claimed that he and Elvira Castillo
lived together as husband and wife from 1979 to 1992 even
though they were still validly married to their respective
spouses. At the time of their union, Mallilin contended that he
and Castillo established a brokerage corporation, from which
profits they purchased several real and personal properties,
registered solely in the name of Castillo. The petitioner now
demanded his share in the subject properties that he claimed,
is due to him as a co-owner under Article 148 of the Family
Code. The respondent insisted that under Article 144 of the
Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of their union, only
unions without any legal impediment to marriage are covered
by the rules on co-ownership. Thus, as the sole registered
owner of the properties, Mallilin is not entitled to any share in
the properties.
Issue/s:
(1) Should the parties be considered as co-owners of
the properties in question, given that both were validly married
to other parties at the time of the acquisition?
(2) May the registration of Elvira Castillo alone as
owner of the properties in question be attacked in this petition
for partition?
Held:
It was ruled that Article 144 of the Civil Code was
repealed by Article 148 of the Family Code, giving even
persons in unions with an impediment to marriage certain rights
covered by the rules of co-ownership. Since both parties
contributed jointly to the acquisition of the properties, from the
profits of their brokerage corporation, co-ownership applies.
Despite the fact that Elvira Castillo alone was
registered as owner of the properties on the transfer certificate
of titles which was done by the arrangement of both parties at
the time of the acquisition, the petitioner is still a co-owner of
the properties. As such, he is entitled to his share in the
partition. The case was remanded to the trial court for further
proceedings.
VALDES vs RTC (260 SCRA 221)
Facts:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married Jan
5,1971. Begotten during the marriage were 5 children. Jan.
1992, Valdez sought declaration of nullity of marriage pursuant
to Art.36 of Family Code. In the July 1994 decision of the SC,
as follows:
5. marriage between Valdez and Gomez declared null and
void on the ground of mutual psychological incapacity.

6.

3 older children, Carlos, Antonio and Angela to choose


which parent they want to stay with.
7. Stella and Joaquin shall be in the custody of their mom.
Valdez having visitation rights over the children.
8. the petitioner and the respondent are directed to start
proceedings on the liquidation of their common
properties as defined by Art.147 of family Code, and to
comply with the provisions of Art 50, 51 and 52 of the
same code within 30 days from notice.
The petitioner asked for clarification of that portion of the
judgment and, in response, the court maintained that
property regime between the parties was that of coownership. In effect, the marriage tie between the parties
was declared inexistent; but they remained connected as coowners over their properties.
Issue: whether or not art.147 does not apply to cases where
the parties are psychologically incapacitated
Articles 50,51 and 52 in relation to art. 102 and
129 of the family code govern disposition of the family
dwelling in cases where a marriage is declared void ab initio,
including marriage declared by reason of psychological
incapacity
Ruling:
The Supreme Court upheld the lower court and held that a
court which had jurisdiction to declare the marriage a nullity
must be deemed likewise clothed with authority to resolve
incidental and consequential matters such as on the coownership of the parties over their properties.
In deciding to take further cognizance of the issue on the
settlement of the parties common property, trial court was
not imprudent. Nor did it commit a reversible error in ruling
that petitioner and private respondent own the family home
and all their common property in equal shares, as well as in
concluding that in the liquidation and partition of the property
owned in common by them, the provisions on co ownership
under the civil code, not art. 50,51 and 52 in relation to art
102 and 129 of family code should aptly prevail. The 1st
paragraph of art 50 applying par (2), (3), (4) and of art 43
relates only by its explicit terms to voidable marriages and
exceptionally to void marriages under art. 40.In all other
cases, it is not to be assumed that the law has also meant to
have coincident property relations and common law spouses
or spuses of void marriage, leaving to ordain, on the latter
case, the ordinary rules on co ownership subject to the
provisions of the family code on the family home, the
provisions found in title v, chap.2 of Family code, remain in
force regardless of property regime of spouses
Orders of trial court affirmed.
AGAPAY VS. PALANG (G.R. No. 116668, July 28, 1997)
Facts:
Carlina Palang and her daughter, Herminia, filed a
case to recover the ownership and possession with
damages against Erlinda Agapay, of two properties acquired
during the cohabitation of the latter with the formers
husband, Miguel Palang. Carlina and Miguel were legally
married and they sired a daughter, Herminia. They lived
together for a few years after Herminia was born, and after
that, he chose to stay at another place, no in their conjugal
home. After a number of years of living separately with his
family, Miguel married Erlinda Agapay. After their marriage,
they acquired two parcels of land, one agricultural and the
other with a house already constructed in it. The house and
lot was acquired representing Erlinda Agapay as purchaser.
Miguel and Erlindas relationship produced a son,
Kristopher. Later on, Carlina filed a case of concubinage
against Miguel and Erlinda, and they were convicted. After
two years, Miguel died.
Issue:
Can Carlina and Herminia claim ownership of the
said two properties?
Held:

Yes. Article 148 of the Family Code, which provides


for cases of cohabitation when a man or woman who are not
capacitated to marry live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife, states that parties who acquire properties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall own them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. The actual contribution must be
proved, otherwise there will be no co-ownership and no
presumption of equal shares.
In the case at bar, Miguel and Erlindas marriage is
obviously void, being contracted at the time Miguel and
Carlinas marriage is still subsisting. Their relationship is just a
mere cohabitation, which subjects it to the provisions of Article
148 of the Family Code.
Erlinda was not able to prove that she actually
contributed in the acquisition of the property, considering her
age and financial circumstances during that time. She was not
able to show that she made actual contributions in purchasing
the property.
As to the second property, the house and lot, the
transaction was properly a donation by Miguel to Erlinda, but
one that was clearly void and inexistent by express provision of
law since it was made between persons guilty of adultery or
concubinage. Moreover, Article 87 of the Family Code
expressly provides that the prohibition against donation
between spouses now applies to donations between persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage,
otherwise, the condition of those who incurred guilt would turn
out to be better than those in legal union.
With the foregoing provisions of the law, Carlina and
Herminia can rightfully claim ownership of the said properties.
JUANIZA VS. JOSE (G.R. No. 50127, March 30, 1979)
Facts:
Eugenio Jose was married to Socorro Ramos but he
had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo for sixteen (16) years.
He owned a passenger jeepney that collided with a freight train
of the Philippine National Railways that resulted to the death of
seven (7) passengers and physical injuries to the other five (5)
passengers. Thus, a case was filed against Eugenio for
damages. The decision of the court was in favor of Victor
Juaniza and the heirs of the deceased Josefa Leus and the
others who died in the accident. On appeal, Rosalia Arroyo
prayed for reconsideration insofar as it condemns her to pay
jointly with Eugenio. But, it was denied by the court based on
the provisions of Article 144 of the Civil Code. She then filed
for an appeal.
Issue/s:
(1) Is Article 144 of the Civil Code applicable in this
case? and whether or not Rosalia
(2) Is Rosalia, who is not the owner of the jeepney,
liable jointly and severally with Eugenio for damages?
Held:
Under the provision, the co-ownership contemplated
requires that the man and the woman living together must not
be incapacitated to marry each other. Hence, Article 144
cannot apply to this case. In the issue whether Rosalia is the
owner of the jeepney, Eugenio being married to Socorro
Ramos follows that the jeepney belongs to their conjugal
partnership. Hence, Rosalia Arroyo is not an owner and should
therefore be free from liability.
TUMLOS VS. SPOUSES FERNANDEZ (G.R. No. L-55332,
February 16, 1989)
Facts:
Guillerma Tumlos, petitioner, and Mario Fernandez,
respondent, cohabited for sometime as husband and wife and
stayed in the subject property. Thereafter, Mario and his legal
wife, Lourdes, filed an ejectment case against Guillerma.
Petitioner alleged that she is legally married to Mario and to
prove her claim, she presented a Contract to Sell. She
asserted that she is the co-owner of the property pursuant to
Article 144 of the Civil Code.
Issue:

Was the petitioners contention valid?


Held:
Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to a
relationship between a man and woman who are not
incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the
marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. It does
not apply to a cohabitation that amounts to adultery or
concubinage, for it would be absurd to create a coownership where there exists a prior conjugal
partnership/absolute community between the man and his
lawful wife. Evidence showed that Mario was incapacitated
to marry petitioner for he was legally married to Lourdes.
The petitioner thus cohabited with Mario in a state of
concubinage and as such, Article 144 of the Civil Code is not
applicable. Article148 of the Family Code governs their
relationship. In the case at bar, petitioner failed to show any
vested right over the subject property. As stated in Article
148 of the Family Code, properties acquired by both parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property and
industry shall be divided to them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Actual contribution requires
sufficient proof, otherwise, there will be no co-ownership and
no presumption of equal shares.
DOCENA VS. LAPESURA (G.R. No. 140153, March 28,
2001)
Facts: Respondent Casiano Hombria filed a complaint for
the recovery of a parcel of land against his lessees, the
spouses Docena, petitioners. The spouses contended that
they own the land since time immemorial. The decision of
the lower court was in favor of the spouses, but was
reversed on appeal. Order to vacate the land that has been
leased from the plaintiff was issued, excluding the part which
was reclaimed by the petitioner while paying the agreed
rental until the actual vacancy of the premises.
Issue: Is the petition meritorious?
Held: The petition is meritorious. The case was filed within
the sixty (60)-day period. It was also proven that the
signature of only one of the petitioners is acceptable
pursuant to Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court (Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition).
DOCENA vs. LAPESURA
FACTS: There was a writ of demolition issued against the
conjugal property of the appealing petitioner spouses
Antonio and Alfreda Docena. The spouses are just lessees
of the parcel of land of Casiano Hombria. However, the
petitioners claimed ownership of the land based on the time
immemorial. The court of appeals ordered the petitioners to
vacate the land they have leased. The petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition but the court of appeals
dismissed the petition on the ground that the attached
certification of non-forum shopping was signed by only one
of the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the signing of the attached certificate
of non-forum shopping by the husband alone could be a
ground for the dismissal for the petition of certiorari and
prohibition
RULING: No, the signing of the attached certificate of nonforum shopping only by the husband is not a fatal defect in
the dismissal for the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Under the Family Code, the administration of the conjugal
property belongs to the husband and wife jointly and
severally. However, unlike an act of alienation or
encumbrance where the consent of both spouses is
required, joint management and administration does not
require that the husband and wife should always act
together. Each spouse may validlyexercise full powerof
management alone, subject to the intervention of the court in
proper cases as provided under Article 124 of the Family
Code.
Article 12 Martinez v. Van Buskirk

FACTS: Carmen Ong Martinez was riding in a carromata on


Calle Real, district of Ermita in Manila in 1908 when a delivery
wagon belonging to defendant Van Buskirk to which a pair of
horses were attached, came along the street in the opposite
direction and ran into the carromata which plaintiff Martinez and
her child was occupying. The carromata was overturned and
damaged and the plaintiff was severely wounded. The facts
were not disputed but defendant Van Buskirk presented
evidence that the cochero who was driving his delivery wagon
was a good servant and was a safe and reliable cochero. The
cochero was unloading the forage when another vehicle drove
by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some other
noises which frightened the horses of defendants delivery
wagon and they ran away, throwing the cochero onto the
ground. The said delivery wagon then came into collision with
the carromata in which plaintiff Martinez was riding.
ISSUE: Whether or not defendant Van Buskirks cochero was
negligent in the act of leaving the horses unattended at the
time of the incident.
RULING: The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in
leaving the horses in the manner described by the evidence in
this case. It appears from the undisputed evidence that the
horses which caused the damage were gentle and tractable
and that the cochero was experienced and capable, having
driven one of the horses several years and the other five or six
months. The cochero had been in the habit, during all that time
of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the
day of the accident and that said horses had never run away
and there has never been an accident due to such practice.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof
that it is the universal of merchants to deliver merchandise of
the kind of that being delivered at the time of injury, in the
manner in which that was then being delivered; and that it is
the universal practice to leave the horses in the manner in
which they were left at the time of the accident. This has been
the custom and has not been productive of accidents or
injuries. The public has also acquiesced to it for years without
objection.
HONTIVEROS vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
FACTS: The spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a
complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio
Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The spouses alleged that they
are the owners of the parcel of land and that they were
deprived of income from the land as a result of filing of the land
registration case. Private respondents denied that they were
married since Gregorio is a widower and Teodora Ayson is
single. They also alleged that the poroperty in question had
already been transferred to the petitioners. Augusto Hontiveros
and Gregorio Hontiveros are brothers. They failed to prove that
they have complied with the requirement of the court that they
have made earnest efforts toward compromise before filing the
suit.
ISSUE: Whether or not Article 151 of the Family Code is
applicable to this case
RULING: No, Article 151 of the Family Code does not apply to
this case since the suit is not exclusively among family
members. Private respondent Ayson, who is described in the
complaint as the spouse of respondent Hontiveros and
petitioner Maria Hontiveros, who is admittedly the spouse of
petitioner Augusto Hontiveros are considered strangers to the
Hontiveros Family for the purposes of Article 151. Acording to
Article 151, No suit between members of the same family shall
prosper unless it should appear that the verified complaint or
petition that the earnest efforts toward a compromise have
been made but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no
such efforts were in fact were made, the case may be
dismissed. Religios relationship and relationship by affinity are
not given any legal effect in this jurisdiction. Since the spouses
of the Hontiveros brothers are included in the case,they are
considerd strangers to the Hontiveros Family. Article 151 is not
applicable to this case.
MANALO VS. CA (G.R. No. 129242, January 16, 2000)

Facts: Troadio Manalo, died intestate on February 14, 1992.


He was survived by his wife, Pilar S. Manalo and his eleven
(11) children who are all of legal age. At the time of his death
on February 14, 1992, Troadio Manalo left several real
properties located in Manila and in the province of Tarlac.
On November 26, 1992, herein respondents, who are eight
(8) of the surviving children of the late Troadio Manalo, filed
a petition with the respondent trial court of Manila for the
judicial settlement of the estate of their late father, Troadio
Manalo, and for the appointment of their brother, Romeo
Manalo, as administrator thereof. The court issued an order
denying the petition so petitioners filed for petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals but was denied by the
same court. Hence, this case.
Issue: Did the Court of Appeals err in upholding the
questioned orders of the respondent trial court which denied
their motion for the outright dismissal of the petition for
judicial settlement of Manalos estate?
Held: No. Article 222 of the Civil Code stipulates that No
suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the
same family unless it should appear that earnest efforts
toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed, subject to the limitations in Article 2035
(emphasis supplied).
The above-quoted provision of the law is
applicable only to ordinary civil actions. This is clear from
the term "suit" that it refers to an action by one person or
persons against another or others in a court of justice in
which the plaintiff pursues the remedy which the law affords
him for the redress of an injury or the enforcement of a right,
whether at law or in equity. A civil action is thus an action
filed in a court of justice, whereby a party sues another for
the enforcement of a right, or the prevention or redress of a
wrong. It is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic
spectacle than a litigation between members of the same
family. It is necessary that every effort should be made
toward a compromise before a litigation is allowed to breed
hate and passion in the family. It is known that lawsuit
between close relatives generates deeper bitterness than
strangers.
Wherefore, the petition in the above case, is
denied for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners.
ALBANO v. GAPUSAN

EXEMPTION FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY


IN CRIMES AGAINST PROPERTY
Art. 332. Persons exempt from criminal liability. No
criminal, but only civil liability, shall result from the
commission of the crime of theft, swindling or malicious
mischief committed or caused mutually by the following
persons:
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or
relatives by affinity in the same line.
2. The widowed spouse with respect to the
property which belonged to the deceased
spouse before the same shall have passed into
the possession of another; and
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers-in-law and
sisters-in-law, if living together.
The exemption established by this article shall not be
applicable to strangers participating in the commission
of the crime.

Mondequillo v. Breva

Manacop v. CA

Andal and Duenas vs. Macaraig


Facts: Minor Mariano Andal, supported by his mother Maria
Duenas filed a petition in the Court of First Instance for the
recovery of the parcel of land left by the deceased Emiliano
Andal, father of Mariano. Said land in question has been
acquired by Emiliano from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by
virtue of donation propter nuptias. However, due to the sick
condition of Emiliano Andal who was then suffering
tuberculosis, said land was taken back by Eduvigis Macaraig.
Mother of the deceased claimed that Mariano Andal is not a
legitimate son of Emiliano Andal since his mother had eloped
with Emilianos brother Felix and even left her husband with
that sick condition. Based on the facts presented, it was almost
six months after the death of Emiliano when Maria Duenas
gave birth to Mariano Andal. The lower court settled the dispute
by rendering a judgment in favor of Mariano Andal declaring
him the legitimate son of Emiliano Andal and thus giving him
the right to inherit said land in question.
Issue: Whether or not Mariano Andal is a legitimate son of
Emiliano Andal?
Ruling: Court held that since Mariano Andal was born within
three hundred days following the dissolution of marriage or the
death of Emiliano, then Mariano Andal is presumed to be the
legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife Maria Duenas. This
presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was
physically impossible for the husband to have access to his
wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceeding the
birth of the child. However, in the case at bar, there was no
evidences presented to claim such physical impossibility. Court
ruled that while it is true that Maria Duenas were indulging in
illicit intercourse and that Emiliano was already suffering from
serious tuberculosis, these instances still does not preclude
cohabitation between Emiliano and Maria. Furthermore, there
is neither evidence to show that Emiliano is suffering
impotency, patent, continuous and incurable nor imprisonment
and the fact that Maria Duenas committed adultery cannot still
overcome the presumption of legitimacy of the child. Thus,
court ruled that Mariano Andal is a legitimate son of spouses
Emiliano Andal and Maria Duenas.
Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals
229 SCRA 468 24 January 1994
Facts: Deceased spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned and left various properties intestate. It is for
this reason that private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar, Vicente's sister and nephew,
respectively and Marissa Benitez-Badua, who was raised and
cared by the deceased spouses since childhood are now
fighting against the administration of the said estate. Marissa
Benitez-Badua allegedly claim that she is the sole heir of the
deceased Vicente Benitez and presented evidences such as
birth and baptismal certificate and income tax return to support
her allegation. On the other hand, the respondents thru
testimonial evidence prove that the said spouses failed to have
a child during their marriage and that the late Isabel, then thirty
six years of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino
Manahan, a noted obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment.
Their primary witness, Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the
late Vicente, then 77 years of age, positively declared that
petitioner was not the biological child of the said spouses who

were unable to physically procreate. The trial court, relying


on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code, decided in favor
of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals however reversed
said decision and declared that Marissa Benitez is not the
biological daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian.
Issue: Whether or not Marissa Benitez is the biological
daughter of deceased spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian?
Ruling: Court held that Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the
Family Code is not applicable in the case at bar. Said articles
administer a situation where a husband denies as his own a
child of his wife and this legal provision refers to an action to
impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case because this
is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an
action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as
legal heirs of their deceased aunt. They do not claim that the
petitioner is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that
she is not the deceased spouses child at all.
Base on the evidences presented, it is very clear
that Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and,
therefore, never delivered a child proven by testimonies of
the neighbors that no one saw her pregnant. Moreover, the
court finds the birth certificate of petitioner highly
questionable and suspicious due to the odd circumstances
that surrounds the alleged birth of petitioner. Therefore, with
the findings presented by the respondents, the court ruled
that petitioner is not the biological daughter or child by
nature of the spouse Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian and, therefore, not a legal heir of the deceased
spouses. Thus, the decision of Court of Appeals is affirmed.
CONCEPCION v. CA

In Ivans answer, he admitted meeting Amelita at the


restaurant but denied having sexual intercourse with her. He
prayed for the dismissal of the case and payment for
exemplary damages and litigation expense including attorneys
fees for the filing of the malicious complaint.
On September 1, 1975, Amelita filed a motion for
leave to amend the complaint impleading as co-plaintiff her son
Michael Constantino who was born August 3, 1975. In an
answer to her amended complaint Ivan reiterated his previous
reply denying that Michael is his son. On June 21, 1976, the
court rendered the decision in favor of Amelita.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was
set aside and the complaint was dismissed. Hence, this
petition is for review.
Issue/s:
(1) Should Michael Constantino be considered as the
illegitimate child of Ivan Mendez?
(2) If yes, should help and support be given to him?
Held: The burden of proof to show that Michael is the son of
Ivan rests on Amelita; and in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence establishing paternity and filiation, the
complaint must be dismissed. As for her claim for damages,
the mere promise of marriage is not a basis for recovery and
will only be awarded if sexual intercourse is not a product of
voluntariness and mutual desire. Amelita admitted that she
was attracted to Ivan and it is the reason she surrendered her
womanhood. Their repeated sexual intercourse showed that
there is passion and it is not the promise to marriage that made
her surrender herself to Ivan. Therefore, the petition was
dismissed for lack of merit.
BERNABE v. ALEJO

JISON v. CA
LIYAO v. LIYAO

ECETA v. ECETA

CONSTANTINO VS. MENDEZ (G.R. No. 57227, May 14,


1992)
Facts: Amelita Constantino filed an action for
acknowledgment, support and damages against Ivan
Mendez. She alleged that sometime in August 1974, they
met at Tonys Restaurant where she worked as a waitress.
Ivan courted her at one of their dinners. On their way to
Amelitas place, Ivan brought her instead to his place making
her believe that he will just have to get something. Inside
Ivans place they had sexual intercourse with a promise of
marriage. After the sexual intercourse, Ivan later confessed
that he was married. Despite of the confessed, they
continued their sexual intercourse during the periods of
September and November. As a result, Amelita got
pregnant.
Amelita asked for help and support but Ivan failed
to give her the same. Amelita then filed a case against Ivan
for recognition of her child and payment of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs.

CONDE VS. ABAYA (G.R. No. 4275, March 23, 1909)


Facts: Casiano Abaya, unmarried, died intestate. Paula
Conde, as mother of the natural children Jose and Teopista
whom she states she had by Casiano, moved for the
settlement of the intestate succession. Meanwhile, Roman
Abaya, the deceaseds brother, claimed to be the sole heir of
Casiano, and to be therefore entitled to take possession of all
the property of the deceaseds estate. The trial court held that
Paula Conde should succeed to the hereditary rights of her
children with respect to the inheritance of their deceased
natural father. Thus, she was the only heir to the property of
the said intestate estate. Respondent Abaya contends that
after the death of the unacknowledged natural child the mother
of said child cannot bring an action to enforce the
acknowledgment of her deceased child in accordance with
Articles 135 and 137 of the Civil Code.
Issue: Can Paula Conde bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation of her child in order to
appear on the latters behalf to receive the inheritance from his
natural father?
Held: No. Article 137 of the Civil Code provides that the action
for the acknowledgment of natural children can be instituted
only during the lifetime of the presumed parents. Such action
for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be
exercised by the alleged natural child. It can not be transmitted
to his descendants, nor to his ascendants.

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twentysecond day of July, two thousand three.
Republic Act No. 9255

February 24 2004

AN ACT ALLOWING ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN TO USE


THE SURNAME OF THEIR FATHER, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 176 OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
NO. 209, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "FAMILY CODE
OF THE PHILIPPINES"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled:
SECTION 1. Article 176 of Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority
of their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if
their filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in the
civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the
right to institute an action before the regular courts
to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of
one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child."

(1) What is the effect of the death of the natural child


during the pendency of her action for recognition;
(2) What is the effect of the death of the putative
parent during the pendency of the same case?
Held: In the case at bar, it is evident that Bibiana was a natural
child. She was born out of wedlock of Eutoquio and Gregoria
and her death tolled the action since it was personal in nature
and not transmissible based on Article 285. On the second
issue, Article 173 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect since it will prejudice the vested rights of the
heirs of Eutoquio. Hence, the case was dismissed.
Marquino vs. Intermediate Appellate Court
Facts:
Respondent Bibiana Romano-Pagadora filed an
action for judicial declaration of filiation, annulment of partition,
support, and damages against Eutiquio Marquino. During the
pendency of the case, Bibiana died before she could present
her evidence of filiation to Eutiquio. The court ordered her heirs
to be substituted as plaintiff. Eutiquio filed a motion to dismiss
the case, which the lower court granted. Bibianas heirs
appealed to the IAC, but Eutiquio also died during its pendency.
The IAC set aside the order of the lower court and ordered the
continuation of the trial. Eutiquios heirs now contend that the
IAC erred in ruling that the death of the putative parent while
the case against him for recognition of his alleged child is
pending will not extinguish the action but the same can be
continued with the heirs substituted for said deceased parent.
Issue:
Whether or not the action for recognition of the
natural child can be continued against the heirs of the putative
father.
Ruling: No, it cannot be continued. The party in the best
position to oppose the action is the putative parent. Art. 285 of
the Civil Code provides only two exceptions when the action for
recognition transcends the death of the putative parent, and
neither of these exceptions obtains to the present case.
ANGELES v. TABILIRAN

SECTION 2. Repealing Clause. All laws, presidential


decrees, executive orders, proclamations, rules and
regulations, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
TEOTICO v. DEL VAL
SECTION 3. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days from its publication in the Official Gazette or
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
MARQUINO VS. IAC (G.R. No. 72078, June 27, 1994)
Facts: Bibiana Marquino, respondent was born on
December 2, 1926 at Piapi, Dumagete City of Gregoria
Romano and Eutoquio Marquino when he was still single.
When Bibiana grew up she became known as the
household helper of the family of her father. She received
financial assistance and claimed that she enjoyed
continuous possession of the status of an acknowledge
natural child by a direct and unequivocal acts of her father
and his family.
Bibiana filed an action for judicial filiation,
annulment of partition, support and damages against
petitioner Eutoquio Marquino and his family on January 10,
1971 at Negros Occidental.
Bibiana died on March 17, 1979 while her petition
was still pending and her heirs were ordered to be her
substitute parties. Petitioners averred that the action for
recognition filed by Bibiana is intransmissible to the heirs
being a personal act. The trial court dismissed the case.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. While the
appeal was pending, Eutoquio died on August 20, 1983.
The court set aside the previous decision and ordered the
court of origin for continuation of trial.
Issue:

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-eight


day of July, two thousand eight.
Republic Act No. 9523

March 12, 2009

AN ACT REQUIRING CERTIFICATION OF THE


DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL WELFARE AND DEVELOPMENT
(DSWD) TO DECLARE A "CHILD LEGALLY AVAILABLE
FOR ADOPTION" AS A PREREQUISITE FOR ADOPTION
PROCEEDINGS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8552, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE DOMESTIC ADOPTION ACT OF 1998,
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8043, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
INTER-COUNTRY ADOPTION ACT OF 1995, PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 603, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE CHILD
AND YOUTH WELFARE CODE, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled::

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the


policy of the State that alternative protection and assistance
shall be afforded to every child who is abandoned,
surrendered, or neglected. In this regard, the State shall
extend such assistance in the most expeditious manner in
the interest of full emotional and social development of the
abandoned, surrendered, or neglected child.
It is hereby recognized that administrative processes under
the jurisdiction of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development for the declaration of a child legally available
for adoption of abandoned, surrendered, or neglected
children are the most expeditious proceedings for the best
interest and welfare of the child.
Section. 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
(1) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) is the agency charged to
implement the provisions of this Act and shall have
the sole authority to issue the certification
declaring a child legally available for adoption.
(2) Child refers to a person below eighteen (18)
years of age or a person over eighteen (18) years
of age but is unable to fully take care of
him/herself or protect himself/herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of physical or mental disability or
condition.
(3) Abandoned Child refers to a child who has no
proper parental care or guardianship, or whose
parent(s) have deserted him/her for a period of at
least three (3) continuous months, which includes
a founding.
(4) Neglected Child refers to a child whose basic
needs have been deliberately unattended or
inadequately attended within a period of three (3)
continuous months. Neglect may occur in two (2)
ways:
(a) There is physical neglect when the
child is malnourished, ill-clad, and
without proper shelter. A child is
unattended when left by himself/herself
without proper provisions and/or without
proper supervision.
(b) There is emotional neglect when the
child is maltreated, raped, seduced,
exploited, overworked, or made to work
under conditions not conducive to good
health; or is made to beg in the streets
or public places; or when children are in
moral danger, or exposed to gambling,
prostitution, and other vices.
(5) Child Legally Available for Adoption refers to a
child in whose favor a certification was issued by
the DSWD that he/she is legally available for
adoption after the fact of abandonment or neglect
has been proven through the submission of
pertinent documents, or one who was voluntarily
committed by his/her parent(s) or legal guardian.

(6) Voluntarily Committed Child is one whose


parent(s) or legal guardian knowingly and willingly
relinquished parental authority to the DSWD or any
duly accredited child-placement or child-caring
agency or institution.
(7) Child-caring agency or institution refers to a
private non-profit or government agency duly
accredited by the DSWD that provides twenty-four
(24) hour residential care services for abandoned,
neglected, or voluntarily committed children.
(8) Child-placing agency or institution refers to a
private non-profit institution or government agency
duly accredited by the DWSD that receives and
processes applicants to become foster or adoptive
parents and facilitate placement of children eligible
for foster care or adoption.
(9) Petitioner refers to the head or executive director
of a licensed or accredited child-caring or childplacing agency or institution managed by the
government, local government unit, nongovernmental organization, or provincial, city, or
municipal Social Welfare Development Officer who
has actual custody of the minor and who files a
certification to declare such child legally available for
adoption, or, if the child is under the custody of any
other individual, the agency or institution does so
with the consent of the child's custodian.
(10) Secretary refers to the Secretary of the DSWD
or his duly authorized representative.
(11) Conspicuous Place shall refer to a place
frequented by the public, where by notice of the
petition shall be posted for information of any
interested person.
(12) Social Case Study Report (SCSR) shall refer to
a written report of the result of an assessment
conducted by a licensed social worker as to the
social-cultural economic condition, psychosocial
background, current functioning and facts of
abandonment or neglect of the child. The report shall
also state the efforts of social worker to locate the
child's biological parents/relatives.
Section 3. Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an
affidavit, subscribed and sworn to before any person authorized
by law to administer oaths. It shall contain facts necessary to
establish the merits of the petition and shall state the
circumstances surrounding the abandonment or neglect of the
child.
The petition shall be supported by the following documents:
(1) Social Case Study Report made by the DSWD,
local government unit, licensed or accredited childcaring or child-placing agency or institution charged
with the custody of the child;
(2) Proof that efforts were made to locate the
parent(s) or any known relatives of the child. The
following shall be considered sufficient:

(a) Written certification from a local or


national radio or television station that
the case was aired on three (3) different
occasions;
(b) Publication in one (1) newspaper of
general circulation;
(c) Police report or barangay
certification from the locality where the
child was found or a certified copy of a
tracing report issued by the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC), National
Headquarters (NHQ), Social Service
Division, which states that despite due
diligence, the child's parents could not
be found; and
(d) Returned registered mail to the last
known address of the parent(s) or
known relatives, if any.
(3) Birth certificate, if available; and
(4) Recent photograph of the child and photograph
of the child upon abandonment or admission to the
agency or institution.
Section 4. Procedure for the Filing of the Petition. The
petition shall be filed in the regional office of the DSWD
where the child was found or abandoned.
The Regional Director shall examine the petition and its
supporting documents, if sufficient in form and substance
and shall authorize the posting of the notice of the petition
conspicuous place for five (5) consecutive days in the
locality where the child was found.
The Regional Director shall act on the same and shall render
a recommendation not later than five (5) working days after
the completion of its posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of
his/her recommendation and records to the Office of the
Secretary within forty-eight (48) hours from the date of the
recommendation.
Section 5. Declaration of Availability for Adoption.
Upon finding merit in the petition, the Secretary shall issue a
certification declaring the child legally available for adoption
within seven (7) working days from receipt of the
recommendation.
Said certification, by itself shall be the sole basis for the
immediate issuance by the local civil registrar of a foundling
certificate. Within seven (7) working days, the local civil
registrar shall transmit the founding certificate to the National
Statistic Office (NSO).
Section 6. Appeal. The decision of the Secretary shall be
appealable to the Court of Appeals within five (5) days from
receipt of the decision by the petitioner, otherwise the same
shall be final and executory.
Section 7. Declaration of Availability for Adoption of
Involuntarily Committed Child and Voluntarily
Committed Child. The certificate declaring a child legally
available for adoption in case of an involuntarily committed

child under Article 141, paragraph 4(a) and Article 142 of


Presidential Decree No. 603 shall be issued by the DSWD
within three (3) months following such involuntary commitment.
In case of voluntary commitment as contemplated in Article 154
of Presidential Decree No. 603, the certification declaring the
child legally available for adoption shall be issued by the
Secretary within three (3) months following the filing of the
Deed of Voluntary Commitment, as signed by the parent(s) with
the DSWD.
Upon petition filed with the DSWD, the parent(s) or legal
guardian who voluntarily committed a child may recover legal
custody and parental authority over him/her from the agency or
institution to which such child was voluntarily committed when it
is shown to the satisfaction of the DSWD that the parent(s) or
legal guardian is in a position to adequately provide for the
needs of the child: Provided, That, the petition for restoration is
filed within (3) months after the signing of the Deed of
Voluntary Commitment.
Section 8. Certification. The certification that a child is
legally available for adoption shall be issued by the DSWD in
lieu of a judicial order, thus making the entire process
administrative in nature.
The certification, shall be, for all intents and purposes, the
primary evidence that the child is legally available in a domestic
adoption proceeding, as provided in Republic Act No. 8552 and
in an inter-country adoption proceeding, as provided in
Republic Act No. 8043.
Section. 9. Implementing Rules and Regulations. The
DSWD, together with the Council for Welfare of Children, InterCountry Adoption Board, two (2) representatives from licensed
or accredited child-placing and child-caring agencies or
institution, National Statistics Office and Office of the Civil
Registrar, is hereby tasked to draft the implementing rules and
regulations of this Act within sixty (60) days following its
complete publication.
Upon effectivity of this Act and pending the completion of the
drafting of the implementing rules and regulations, petitions for
the issuance of a certification declaring a child legally available
for adoption may be filled with the regional office of the DSWD
where the child was found or abandoned.
Section 10. Penalty. The penalty of One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) to Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) shall be imposed on any person, institution, or
agency who shall place a child for adoption without the
certification that the child is legally available for adoption issued
by the DSWD. Any agency or institution found violating any
provision of this Act shall have its license to operate revoked
without prejudice to the criminal prosecution of its officers and
employees.
Violation of any provision of this Act shall subject the
government official or employee concerned to appropriate
administrative, civil and/or criminal sanctions, including
suspension and/or dismissal from the government service and
forfeiture of benefits.
Section 11. Repealing Clause. Sections 2(c)(iii), 3(b), (e)
and 8(a) of Republic Act No. 8552, Section 3(f) of Republic Act
No. 8043, Chapter 1 of Title VII, and VIII of Presidential Decree
No. 603 and any law, presidential decree, executive order,

letter of instruction, administrative order, rule, or regulation


contrary to or inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby reprealed, modified or amended accordingly.
Section 12. Separability Clause. If any provision of this
Act is held invalid or unconstitutional, the other provisions
not affected thereby shall remain valid and subsisting.
Section 13. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days following its complete publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation or in the Official Gazette.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHELLE LIM, ET.
AL.

REPUBLIC VS. CA AND BOBILES (G.R. No. 92326,


January 24, 1992 )
Facts: In February 2, 1988, prior to the implementation of
the Family Code, Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to adopt six
(6)-year old Jason Condat. The petition was granted by the
trial court of Legaspi City and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, but was challenged by the state. The petitioner
claimed that a child must be adopted by both spouses, in
fulfillment of the requirements of the Family Code, and must
be applied retroactively. The petitioner contended that since
Zenaida alone adopted Jason Condat, the petition for
adoption violated Article 185 of the Family Code, and should
be dismissed outright.
Issue:
(1) Should the Family Code be applied
retroactively to the petition to adopt Jason Condat?
(2) Should the petition to adopt Jason Condat be
dismissed due to non-compliance of the requirement for both
spouses to adopt?
Held: The Family Code provides for retroactive effect of
appropriate provisions, but only if such provisions will not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. At the time of
the filing of the petition for adoption, Zenaida Bobiles
complied with all the requirements under the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which gave her the unconditional right to
adopt Jason Condat by herself. To apply the requirement for
joint adoption would prejudice that right.
Although Dioscoro Bobiles was not named as a petitioner in
the petition for adoption, he had attached an affidavit of
consent to the petitioner, stating that he equally desired to
adopt Jason. Consent was also given by the natural children
of the Bobiles spouses. To dismiss the petition at that point
would not be in the best interest of Jason Condat, who had
been raised by the Bobiles family since birth. In all adoption
cases, the best interest of the child should be of primary and
paramount consideration.
Republic vs. Court of Appeals and Bobiles
Facts:
Zenaida Bobiles was allowed to adopt Jason
Condat under the rules on adoption in the Child and Youth
Welfare Code. While the case was on appeal, the Family
Code took effect. Petitioner contends that the decree of
adoption should be nullified since under the Family Code,
joint adoption is mandated.

Issue:
Whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the Family
Code cannot be applied retroactively in the present case.
Ruling: The CA did not err in its decision to grant the decree of
adoption. If the provision on joint adoption under the Family
Code would retroact to the present case, the welfare of the
child Jason Condat will be affected and the vested right of
Bobiles under the Child and Youth Welfare Code will be
impaired.
Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals
Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, a 10-year old, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle, causing her death. During this time Adelberto
was staying with his natural parents, but prior to the incident, a
petition to adopt Adelberto was filed by the spouses Rapisura,
which was subsequently granted after the shooting incident.
Jennifers parents then filed a complaint for damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto. The latter avers that they are
not liable since parental authority has already shifted to the
adopting parents, the Rapisuras, as a result of the adoption.
Issue: Whether or not the adopting parents may be held liable
for acts committed by their adopted child when the latter was
still under the custody of his natural parents.
Ruling: Adoption has the effect of transferring parental
authority from the natural parents to the adopting parents.
However in this case, parental authority had not yet shifted to
the Rapisuras since Adelberto was still in the custody of his
natural parents at the time of the shooting. Art. 221 of the
Family Code states that parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority x x x.
Hence it is Adelbertos natural parents who are civilly liable for
Jennifers death.
Javier vs. Lucero
Facts:
In an action for alimony, respondent Judge Antonio
Lucero ordered Alfredo Javier to give a monthly allowance to
his wife Salud and their son Alfredo Junior. Javier challenged
the order, saying that Salud forfeited her right to support when
she accused him of bigamy, a charge from which he was
eventually acquitted. Furthermore, he contends that Alfredo Jr.
is no longer entitled to support since the latter is already over
21 years of age and thus no longer entitled to support.
Issue:
Is the contention of Javier correct?
Ruling: Javiers contention is incorrect. His acquittal from the
bigamy charges is no different from an acquittal on reasonable
doubt, which is not a ground for the forfeiture of his wifes right
to support. As regard his son Alfredo Jr., the latter is still
entitled to support even if he is already over 21 years of age
since he is still studying, and Art. 194 of the Family Code
mandates the continuation of support for the childs education
even if the latter is beyond the age of majority.
DE ASIS VS. DE ASIS (G.R. No. 127578, February 15, 1999)
Facts: Vircel Andres filed an action for maintenance and
support against Manuel De Asis, the alleged father of Glen De
Asis, a minor. In a reply sent by the respondent Manuel de
Asis, he denied the allegations and he claimed that he has no
obligations to the said minor. Both plaintiff and defendant
agreed to move for dismissal of the case.
On September 7, 1995, Glen de Asis as represented
by her mother filed a complaint for maintenance and support
against his alleged father, Manuel de Asis. Manuel moved to
dismiss the complaint on the ground that judgment from the
previous case has barred such case from prospering. But the
court ruled that renunciation of future support is prohibited by
law. Manuel filed a motion for reconsideration and it was
likewise dismissed. Then he filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari and it was likewise dismissed.
Issue: Can the action for maintenance and support be barred
by res judicata?
Held: The manifestation sent by Vircel in her first case was a
renunciation of the right of Glen. The agreement between her
and Manuel is in a nature of a compromise agreement that

cannot be countenanced. This is because it violates the


prohibition against compromise of the right to support.
Wherefore, Manuels request for certiorari was
dismissed and the decision of Court of Appeals was
affirmed.
ESPIRITU VS. CA (G.R. No. 105606, March 16, 1995)
Facts: Sometime on 1976, Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita
Masanding got acquainted with each other in Iligan, City.
Reynaldo was sent by his employer to the USA and Teresita
went to California, USA to work as a nurse. They began to
maintain a common law relationship and had a child named
Rosalind Therese. They returned to the Philippines and got
married. Not long after they returned to the US, Teresita
gave birth to their second child Reginald Vince. After that,
they separated.
Their marriage was severed on 1990. Teresita
filed at the trial court a petition for writ of habeas corpus,
seeking the custody of her children. It was dismissed and
she was granted only visitation rights over their children. On
her appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts
decision based on Article 213 of the Family Code, which
states that if a child is below seven (7) years of age, the
custody by the mother is preferred. But on one of the
psychological tests of Rosalind, she said that she saw her
mother hugging and kissing another man who lived in their
house.
Issue: Should the custody of the children be awarded to the
mother based on the paramount criterion of the childs best
interest?
Held: In matters of custody of a child, the best interest,
welfare and the good of the child must be determined.
The adulterous act of the mother is a compelling
reason to separate a child from the mother. Such separation
from the guilty spouse is based on the principle that he or
she is morally unfit to rear the children.
AMADORA VS. CA (G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988)
Facts:
On April 16, 1972. The seventeen-year old,
Alfredo Amadora and his classmates were at the auditorium
of their school at the Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos. His
classmate, Pablito Daffon, fired a gun that hit and killed
Afredo Amadora. Pablito was convicted of homicide.
The parents of Alfredo filed a civil action for
damages against the school, its rector, the principal, the
dean, the physics teacher, Pablito Daffon and two other
students through their parents. The case against the two
other students was dropped. The court granted the petition
of Alfredos parents but on appeal, the court reversed it and
all the defendants were absolved. Hence, Alfredos parents
appealed for certiorari.
Issue: Are the defendants are liable for the death of Alfredo
Amadora based on Article 2180?
Held:
No. The petition was denied on the following
bases:
(1) At the time Alfredo was shot he was with his
friends in the premises of the school.
(2) The rector, the high school principal and the
dean cannot be held liable because none of them was the
teacher in charge and that there was no clear showing who
was the teacher in charge at that time.
(3) Dicon, the teacher-in-charge, was not negligent
in enforcing discipline upon Daffon.
(4) Despite the fact that the dean confiscated a
gun, it was not clearly shown that it was the gun used to
shoot Alfredo.
(5) The school cannot be held liable because, only
the teacher or the head of the school of arts and trades is
made responsible for damage caused by students.
YLARDE VS. AQUINO (G.R. No. L-33722, July 28, 1997)
Facts: In 1963, private respondent Mariano Soriano was the
principal of a public primary educational institution and

private respondent Egardo Aquino was a teacher therein. At


that time the school was fittered with several concrete blocks
that proved to be serious hazards to the school children.
Aquino gathered eighteen (18) of his male pupils aged ten and
eleven and ordered them to dig beside a one-ton concrete
block to make a hole wherein the stone can be buried. The next
day, Aquino called out four children to continue the digging and
when the depth was right enough to accommodate the
concrete block, Aquino and his four pupils got out of the hole.
Before getting the key to the school to get some rope, he told
his students not to touch the stone. The students playfully
jumped into the pit. Then, without any warning at all a kid
jumped on top of the concrete block causing it to slide on time,
2 of the children were able to get out of the pit on time but the
Ylarde child was pinned by the block and sustained injuries.
Three days later, he died.
Issue: Can the school principal and the teacher be held liable
for damages for the negligence that caused the death of the
child?
Held: As regards to the principal, the Supreme Court ruled that
he cannot be made responsible for the death of the child, he
being the head of an academic school and not a school for the
arts and trades. In the previous case of Amadora vs. CA,
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, it is only the teacher not
the head of an academic school who can be held liable.
The private respondent Aquino can be held liable
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code as the teacher-in-charge of
the children for being negligent in his supervision over them
and his failure to take the necessary precautions to prevent any
injury on their persons.
ST. MARYS ACADEMY v. CARPITANOS

Tamargo vs. Court of Appeals


Facts: Adelberto Bundoc, a 10-year old, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle, causing her death. During this time Adelberto
was staying with his natural parents, but prior to the incident, a
petition to adopt Adelberto was filed by the spouses Rapisura,
which was subsequently granted after the shooting incident.
Jennifers parents then filed a complaint for damages against
the natural parents of Adelberto. The latter avers that they are
not liable since parental authority has already shifted to the
adopting parents, the Rapisuras, as a result of the adoption.
Issue: Whether or not the adopting parents may be held liable
for acts committed by their adopted child when the latter was
still under the custody of his natural parents.
Ruling: Adoption has the effect of transferring parental
authority from the natural parents to the adopting parents.
However in this case, parental authority had not yet shifted to
the Rapisuras since Adelberto was still in the custody of his
natural parents at the time of the shooting. Art. 221 of the
Family Code states that parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and
damages caused by the acts of their unemancipated children
living in their company and under their parental authority x x x.
Hence it is Adelbertos natural parents who are civilly liable for
Jennifers death.
LIBI VS. IAC (G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992)
Facts: For more than two years before their deaths, Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi were sweethearts until December
1978 when Julie Ann broke up with Wendell, after she found
him to be sadistic and irresponsible. During the first few weeks
of January 1979, Wendell kept pestering Julie Ann with
demands for reconciliation but the latter persisted in her
refusal, prompting the former to resort to threats against her.
To avoid him, Julie Ann stayed in the house of her best friend,
Malou Alfonso. On January 14, 1979, Julie Ann and Wendell
died, each from a single gunshot wound inflicted with the same

firearm, a Smith and Wesson revolver licensed in the name


of petitioner Cresencio Libi.
Petitioner Amelita Yap Libi, mother of Wendell,
testified that her husband, Cresencio Libi, owned a gun that
he kept in a safety deposit box inside a drawer in their
bedroom. Both of them held a key to the safety deposit box.
Amelita's key was always in her bag, all of which facts were
known to Wendell. She admitted, however, that on that
fateful night the gun was no longer in the safety deposit box.
As a result of the tragedy, the parents of Julie Ann
filed a civil case in the trial court of Cebu against the parents
of Wendell to recover damages. The judge dismissed the
plaintiffs' complaint for insufficiency of evidence.
Defendants' counterclaim is likewise denied for lack of
sufficient merit.
On appeal to respondent court, said judgment of
the lower court dismissing the complaint of therein plaintiffsappellants was set aside and another judgment was
rendered against defendants-appellees who, as petitioners
in the present appeal by certiorari, now submit for resolution
the issues in this case.
Issue: (1) Did the respondent court correctly reverse the trial
courts decision in accordance with established decisional
laws?
(2) Is Article 2180 of the Civil Code correctly
interpreted by the respondent court to make the petitioners
liable?
Held: Petitioners' defense that they had exercised the due
diligence of a good father of a family, hence they should not
be civilly liable for the crime committed by their minor son,
was not borne out by the evidence on record.
The court had serious doubts that petitioner
spouses had really been exercising the diligence of a good
father of a family by safely locking the fatal gun away.
Wendell could not have gotten hold thereof unless one of the
keys to the safety deposit box was negligently left lying
around or he had free access to the bag of his mother where
the other key was. It is still the duty of parents to know the
activity of their children. Had the defendants-appellees been
diligent in supervising the activities of their son, Wendell, and
in keeping said gun from his reach, they could have
prevented Wendell from killing Julie Ann Gotiong. Therefore,
appellants are liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
Republic Act No. 7610

June 17, 1992

AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE


AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD ABUSE,
EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
ARTICLE I
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."

Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and Principles. It is


hereby declared to be the policy of the State to provide special
protection to children from all firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty
exploitation and discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial
their development; provide sanctions for their commission and
carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of and crisis
intervention in situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on behalf of the child
when the parent, guardian, teacher or person having care or
custody of the child fails or is unable to protect the child against
abuse, exploitation and discrimination or when such acts
against the child are committed by the said parent, guardian,
teacher or person having care and custody of the
same.1awphi1@alf
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and rehabilitate
children gravely threatened or endangered by circumstances
which affect or will affect their survival and normal development
and over which they have no control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions,
courts of law, administrative authorities, and legislative bodies,
consistent with the principle of First Call for Children as
enunciated in the United Nations Convention of the Rights of
the Child. Every effort shall be exerted to promote the welfare
of children and enhance their opportunities for a useful and
happy life.
Section 3. Definition of Terms.
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen (18)
years of age or those over but are unable to fully
take care of themselves or protect themselves from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or
condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a
human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic
needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in
serious impairment of his growth and
development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
(c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or
endanger the survival and normal development of
children" include, but are not limited to, the following;

(1) Being in a community where there is


armed conflict or being affected by
armed conflict-related activities;
(2) Working under conditions hazardous
to life, safety and normal which unduly
interfere with their normal development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves in
the streets of urban or rural areas
without the care of parents or a guardian
or basic services needed for a good
quality of life;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous
cultural community and/or living under
conditions of extreme poverty or in an
area which is underdeveloped and/or
lacks or has inadequate access to basic
services needed for a good quality of
life;
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or
natural disaster or calamity; or
(6) Circumstances analogous to those
abovestated which endanger the life,
safety or normal development of
children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination" refers to the
coordinated program of services and facilities to
protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual
abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent
shows;
(4) Other acts of abuses; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or
endanger the survival and normal
development of children.1awphi1
ARTICLE II
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination
Section 4. Formulation of the Program. There shall be a
comprehensive program to be formulated, by the
Department of Justice and the Department of Social Welfare
and Development in coordination with other government
agencies and private sector concerned, within one (1) year
from the effectivity of this Act, to protect children against
child prostitution and other sexual abuse; child trafficking,
obscene publications and indecent shows; other acts of
abuse; and circumstances which endanger child survival and
normal development.

ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse.
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate or
induce child prostitution which include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of a
child prostitute by means of written or oral
advertisements or other similar means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence towards
a child to engage him as a prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration goods
or other pecuniary benefit to a child with
intent to engage such child in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
of lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse;
Provided, That when the victims is under twelve (12)
years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted
under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article
336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case
may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period;
and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage therefrom,
whether as manager or owner of the establishment
where the prostitution takes place, or of the sauna,
disco, bar, resort, place of entertainment or
establishment serving as a cover or which engages
in prostitution in addition to the activity for which the
license has been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. There is
an attempt to commit child prostitution under Section 5,
paragraph (a) hereof when any person who, not being a
relative of a child, is found alone with the said child inside the
room or cubicle of a house, an inn, hotel, motel, pension
house, apartelle or other similar establishments, vessel, vehicle
or any other hidden or secluded area under circumstances
which would lead a reasonable person to believe that the child
is about to be exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution, under


paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any person is
receiving services from a child in a sauna parlor or bath,
massage clinic, health club and other similar establishments.
A penalty lower by two (2) degrees than that prescribed for
the consummated felony under Section 5 hereof shall be
imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit the
crime of child prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper
case, under the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE IV
Child Trafficking
Section 7. Child Trafficking. Any person who shall
engage in trading and dealing with children including, but not
limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for money,
or for any other consideration, or barter, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua. The
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. There
is an attempt to commit child trafficking under Section 7 of
this Act:1awphi1@alf
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign country
without valid reason therefor and without
clearance issued by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or written permit or
justification from the child's parents or legal
guardian;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or childcaring institution recruits women or couples to
bear children for the purpose of child trafficking; or
(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or
employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or
any other person simulates birth for the purpose of
child trafficking; or
(e) When a person engages in the act of finding
children among low-income families, hospitals,
clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other childduring institutions who can be offered for the
purpose of child trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for the
consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be
imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit child
trafficking under this Act.
ARTICLE V
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows.
Any person who shall hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or
coerce a child to perform in obscene exhibitions and
indecent shows, whether live or in video, or model in
obscene publications or pornographic materials or to sell or
distribute the said materials shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or seller/distributor is
below twelve (12) years of age, the penalty shall be imposed
in its maximum period.

Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any capacity


with the care of a child who shall cause and/or allow such child
to be employed or to participate in an obscene play, scene, act,
movie or show or in any other acts covered by this section shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of
child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the
child's development including those covered by
Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his
company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or who
in ten (10) years or more his junior in any public or
private place, hotel, motel, beer joint, discotheque,
cabaret, pension house, sauna or massage parlor,
beach and/or other tourist resort or similar places
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
maximum period and a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000): Provided, That this
provision shall not apply to any person who is related
within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or
any bond recognized by law, local custom and
tradition or acts in the performance of a social, moral
or legal duty.
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer a
minor to any one prohibited by this Act to keep or
have in his company a minor as provided in the
preceding paragraph shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its medium period and a fine of not
less than Forty thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided,
however, That should the perpetrator be an
ascendant, stepparent or guardian of the minor, the
penalty to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its
maximum period, a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of parental
authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one entrusted
with the operation of any public or private place of
accommodation, whether for occupancy, food, drink
or otherwise, including residential places, who allows
any person to take along with him to such place or
places any minor herein described shall be imposed
a penalty of prision mayor in its medium period and a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000),
and the loss of the license to operate such a place or
establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or
intimidate a street child or any other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of
living;

(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in drug


trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall
suffer the penalty of prision correccional
in its medium period to reclusion
perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission of
acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262, paragraph 2,
and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of murder, homicide,
other intentional mutilation, and serious physical injuries,
respectively, shall be reclusion perpetua when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age. The penalty for the
commission of acts punishable under Article 337, 339, 340
and 341 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for the crimes of qualified seduction, acts of
lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party,
corruption of minors, and white slave trade, respectively,
shall be one (1) degree higher than that imposed by law
when the victim is under twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall be
entrusted to the care of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development.
ARTICLE VII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or Enterprises
which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct Activities
Constituting Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse,
Child Trafficking, Obscene Publications and Indecent
Shows, and Other Acts of Abuse. All establishments and
enterprises which promote or facilitate child prostitution and
other sexual abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications
and indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be
immediately closed and their authority or license to operate
cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or manager thereof
being prosecuted under this Act and/or the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, or special laws. A sign with the words
"off limits" shall be conspicuously displayed outside the
establishments or enterprises by the Department of Social
Welfare and Development for such period which shall not be
less than one (1) year, as the Department may determine.
The unauthorized removal of such sign shall be punishable
by prision correccional.
An establishment shall be deemed to promote or facilitate
child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child trafficking,
obscene publications and indecent shows, and other acts of
abuse if the acts constituting the same occur in the premises
of said establishment under this Act or in violation of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. An enterprise such as a
sauna, travel agency, or recruitment agency which: promotes
the aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists;
exhibits children in a lewd or indecent show; provides child
masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex and said
services include any lascivious conduct with the customers;
or solicits children or activities constituting the
aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have committed the
acts penalized herein.
ARTICLE VIII
Working Children

Section 12. Employment of Children. Children below fifteen


(15) years of age may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole
responsibility of his parents or legal guardian and
where only members of the employer's family are
employed: Provided, however, That his employment
neither endangers his life, safety and health and
morals, nor impairs his normal development:
Provided, further, That the parent or legal guardian
shall provide the said minor child with the prescribed
primary and/or secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation in
public & entertainment or information through
cinema, theater, radio or television is essential:
Provided, The employment contract concluded by the
child's parent or guardian, with the express
agreement of the child concerned, if possible, and
the approval of the Department of Labor and
Employment: Provided, That the following
requirements in all instances are strictly complied
with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection, health,
safety and morals of the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to prevent
the child's exploitation or discrimination taking into
account the system and level of remuneration, and
the duration and arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and implement,
subject to the approval and supervision of competent
authorities, a continuing program for training and skill
acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child may be
employed, the employer shall first secure, before engaging
such child, a work permit from the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall ensure observance of the above
requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate rules
and regulations necessary for the effective implementation of
this Section.
Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working Children.
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
promulgate a course design under its non-formal education
program aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational efficiency of working children who have not
undergone or finished elementary or secondary education.
Such course design shall integrate the learning process
deemed most effective under given circumstances.
Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of Children in
Certain Advertisements. No person shall employ child
models in all commercials or advertisements promoting
alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its
byproducts and violence.
Section 15. Duty of Employer. Every employer shall comply
with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and 109 of
Presidential Decree No. 603.

Section 16. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any


provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not
less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but not more than
Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or imprisonment of not less
than three (3) months but not more than three (3) years, or
both at the discretion of the court; Provided, That, in case of
repeated violations of the provisions of this Article, the
offender's license to operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLE IX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. In
addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this Act
and other existing laws, children of indigenous cultural
communities shall be entitled to protection, survival and
development consistent with the customs and traditions of
their respective communities.
Section 18. System of and Access to Education. The
Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall develop
and institute an alternative system of education for children
of indigenous cultural communities which culture-specific
and relevant to the needs of and the existing situation in their
communities. The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports shall also accredit and support non-formal but
functional indigenous educational programs conducted by
non-government organizations in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. The delivery of basic
social services in health and nutrition to children of
indigenous cultural communities shall be given priority by all
government agencies concerned. Hospitals and other health
institution shall ensure that children of indigenous cultural
communities are given equal attention. In the provision of
health and nutrition services to children of indigenous
cultural communities, indigenous health practices shall be
respected and recognized.
Section 20. Discrimination. Children of indigenous
cultural communities shall not be subjected to any and all
forms of discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of indigenous
cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of arresto mayor
in its maximum period and a fine of not less than Five
thousand pesos (P5,000) more than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000).
Section 21. Participation. Indigenous cultural
communities, through their duly-designated or appointed
representatives shall be involved in planning, decisionmaking implementation, and evaluation of all government
programs affecting children of indigenous cultural
communities. Indigenous institution shall also be recognized
and respected.
ARTICLE X
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. Children are
hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the
responsibility of the State and all other sectors concerned to
resolve armed conflicts in order to promote the goal of
children as zones of peace. To attain this objective, the
following policies shall be observed.

(a) Children shall not be the object of attack and shall


be entitled to special respect. They shall be protected
from any form of threat, assault, torture or other
cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines of
its civilian units or other armed groups, nor be
allowed to take part in the fighting, or used as
guides, couriers, or spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as
education, primary health and emergency relief
services shall be kept unhampered;
(d) The safety and protection of those who provide
services including those involved in fact-finding
missions from both government and non-government
institutions shall be ensured. They shall not be
subjected to undue harassment in the performance
of their work;
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools, hospitals
and rural health units shall not be utilized for military
purposes such as command posts, barracks,
detachments, and supply depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to facilitate the
reunion of families temporarily separated due to
armed conflict.
Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed Conflict.
Children shall be given priority during evacuation as a result
of armed conflict. Existing community organizations shall be
tapped to look after the safety and well-being of children during
evacuation operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that
children evacuated are accompanied by persons responsible
for their safety and well-being.
Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. Whenever
possible, members of the same family shall be housed in the
same premises and given separate accommodation from other
evacuees and provided with facilities to lead a normal family
life. In places of temporary shelter, expectant and nursing
mothers and children shall be given additional food in
proportion to their physiological needs. Whenever feasible,
children shall be given opportunities for physical exercise,
sports and outdoor games.
Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons
Related to Armed Conflict. Any child who has been arrested
for reasons related to armed conflict, either as combatant,
courier, guide or spy is entitled to the following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except where
families are accommodated as family units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the parents or
guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within
twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or

any responsible member of the community as


determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings the
court should find that the aforesaid child committed the acts
charged against him, the court shall determine the
imposable penalty, including any civil liability chargeable
against him. However, instead of pronouncing judgment of
conviction, the court shall suspend all further proceedings
and shall commit such child to the custody or care of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development or to any
training institution operated by the Government, or dulylicensed agencies or any other responsible person, until he
has had reached eighteen (18) years of age or, for a shorter
period as the court may deem proper, after considering the
reports and recommendations of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or the agency or responsible
individual under whose care he has been committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and supervision
by a representative of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development or any duly-licensed agency or such other
officer as the court may designate subject to such conditions
as it may prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can
appeal from the order of the court in the same manner as
appeals in criminal cases.
Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in
Situations of Armed Conflict. The chairman of the
barangay affected by the armed conflict shall submit the
names of children residing in said barangay to the municipal
social welfare and development officer within twenty-four
(24) hours from the occurrence of the armed conflict.
ARTICLE XI
Remedial Procedures
Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. Complaints on
cases of unlawful acts committed against the children as
enumerated herein may be filed by the following:

1986. In the regular performance of this function, the officer of


the Department of Social Welfare and Development shall be
free from any administrative, civil or criminal liability. Custody
proceedings shall be in accordance with the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 603.
Section 29. Confidentiality. At the instance of the offended
party, his name may be withheld from the public until the court
acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter or
columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or producer
in case of television and radio broadcasting, producer and
director of the film in case of the movie industry, to cause
undue and sensationalized publicity of any case of violation of
this Act which results in the moral degradation and suffering of
the offended party.Lawphi1@alf
Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. Cases involving
violations of this Act shall be heard in the chambers of the
judge of the Regional Trial Court duly designated as Juvenile
and Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary notwithstanding
and with the exception of habeas corpus, election cases, and
cases involving detention prisoners and persons covered by
Republic Act No. 4908, all courts shall give preference to the
hearing or disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions.
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender has
been previously convicted under this Act;
(b) When the offender is a corporation, partnership or
association, the officer or employee thereof who is
responsible for the violation of this Act shall suffer the
penalty imposed in its maximum period;

(a) Offended party;


(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the third
degree of consanguinity;1awphi1@ITC
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a
licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible
citizens where the violation occurred.
Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. The
offended party shall be immediately placed under the
protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56, series of

(c) The penalty provided herein shall be imposed in


its maximum period when the perpetrator is an
ascendant, parent guardian, stepparent or collateral
relative within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity, or a manager or owner of an establishment
which has no license to operate or its license has
expired or has been revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be
deported immediately after service of sentence and
forever barred from entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender is a
public officer or employee: Provided, however, That if
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or
reclusion temporal, then the penalty of perpetual or
temporary absolute disqualification shall also be
imposed: Provided, finally, That if the penalty
imposed is prision correccional or arresto mayor, the
penalty of suspension shall also be imposed; and

(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be


imposed and administered as a cash fund by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
and disbursed for the rehabilitation of each child
victim, or any immediate member of his family if
the latter is the perpetrator of the offense.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. Unless otherwise
provided in this Act, the Department of Justice, in
coordination with the Department of Social Welfare and
Development, shall promulgate rules and regulations of the
effective implementation of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 33. Appropriations. The amount necessary to
carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the year
following its enactment into law and thereafter.

"Art. 236. Emancipation shall terminate parental


authority over the person and property of the child
who shall then be qualified and responsible for all
acts of civil life, save the exceptions established by
existing laws in special cases.
"Contracting marriage shall require parental consent
until the age of twenty-one.
"Nothing in this Code shall be construed to derogate
from the duty or responsibility of parents and
guardians for children and wards below twenty-one
years of age mentioned in the second and third
paragraphs of Article 2180 of the Civil Code."
Section 4. Upon the effectivity of this Act, existing wills,
bequests, donations, grants, insurance policies and similar
instruments containing references and provisions favorable to
minors will not retroact to their prejudice.
Section 5. This Act shall take effect upon completion of its
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved: December 13, 1989

Section 34. Separability Clause. If any provision of this


Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the remaining
provisions not affected thereby shall continue in full force
and effect.
Section 35. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, or rules
inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 36. Effectivity Clause. This Act shall take effect
upon completion of its publication in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 17, 1992.lawphi1
Republic Act No. 6809

December 13, 1989

AN ACT LOWERING THE AGE OF MAJORITY FROM


TWENTY-ONE TO EIGHTEEN YEARS, AMENDING FOR
THE PURPOSE EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBERED TWO
HUNDRED NINE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives
of the Philippines in Congress assembled::
Section 1. Article 234 of Executive Order No. 209, the
Family Code of the Philippines, is hereby amended to read
as follows:
"Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the
attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided,
majority commences at the age of eighteen years."
Section 2. Articles 235 and 237 of the same Code are
hereby repealed.
Section 3. Article 236 of the same Code is also hereby
amended to read as follows:

LAPERAL VS. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. L-18008, October 30,


1962)
Facts: Elisea Laperal filed a petition on May 10, 1960 at the
Court of First Instance in Baguio to allow her to resume the use
of her maiden name again, Elisea Laperal. Prior to her filing of
the case, the court granted the decree of legal separation to
her husband, Enrique Santamaria, and said decree has
become final.
Issue: Can Elisa resume the use of her maiden name (Laperal)
after the decree of legal separation has been granted?
Held: No. The petition is dismissed because according to
Article 372 of the New Civil Code, "when legal separation has
been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and
surname employed before the legal separation." This is
because her legal separation does not affect the marital status,
there being no severance of the vinculum. It does not dissolve
the marriage. It involves nothing more than a bed-and-board
separation.
LLANETA VS. AGRAVA (G.R. No. L-132054, May 15, 1974)
Facts: Teresita is the daughter of Atanacia Llaneta with a man
other than her husband. After the birth of Teresita, Atanacia
brought her together with her brother to the house of Atanacias
mother-in-law. They were raised in the household of the
Ferrers, using the surname Ferrer.
She was granted scholarship by the Catholic
Charities and was required to submit a copy of her birth
certificate. Upon obtaining her birth certificate, she found out
that her registered surname is Llaneta and not Ferrer and that
she is an illegitimate child of an unknown father.
Teresita petitioned the court for change of her name
to Teresita Llaneta Ferrer which the trial the court denied. On
appeal, she stated that she has been using the surname Ferrer
in all her records and all people knew her as such. And even
Serafin Ferrers nearest kin, mother and relatives have
tolerated and have approved of her using the surname Ferrer
and are in support of such petition.
Issue: Should Teresita be allowed to use the surname Ferrer,
even if she is an illegitimate child of her mother?
Held: The court reversed its first decision and granted such
petition on the basis that those who possess the right of action
to prevent the surname Ferrer from being smeared are proud
to share it with her.

LUKBAN VS. REPUBLIC (G.R. No. L-8492, February 29,


1956)
Facts: Lourdes Lukban filed for a declaration of presumptive
death for her husband, Francisco Chuidian who had been
missing for more than twenty (20) years. Seventeen (17)
days after their marriage, Chuidian left Lukban in 1933 and
had never been heard from since then. Lukban wished to
remarry, but the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial
Court) denied her petition on the grounds that such
declaration was not authorized by law.
Issue: Is it necessary to obtain a declaration of presumptive
death for a missing spouse in order for the present spouse to
remarry?
Held: Considering the year that this case was filed, i.e., in
1956, the New Civil Code only required that the missing
spouse be absent for seven (7) consecutive years before the
present spouse can remarry. Such length of time was
sufficient to assume that the missing spouse is dead and
therefore, Lukban is already allowed to remarry.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7048 = AN ACT
ESTABLISHING A HIGH SCHOOL IN THE MUNICIPALITY
OF CALAUAG, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, TO BE KNOWN
AS THE CALAUAG HIGH SCHOOL, AND
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFORE
SECTION 1. There shall be established a high
school in the Municipality of Calauag, Province of
Quezon, to be known as the Calauag High School.
SECTION 2. The Secretary of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports shall issue such rules
and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the
purpose of this Act.
SECTION 3. The amount necessary to carry out the
provisions of this Act is hereby authorized to be
appropriated in the General Appropriations Act of the
year following its enactment into law and thereafter.
SECTION 4.
approval.

This Act shall take effect upon its

Approved: June 19, 1991


REPBLIC V. CAGANGDAHAN