6. GEORGE C. SOLATAN v. ATTYS. OSCAR A.

INOCENTES and
JOSE C. CAMANO

suspend Atty. Camano from the practice of law for 1 year and to
reprimand Atty. Inocentes for exercising command responsibility.

A.C. No. 6504, 9 August 2005, SECOND DIVISION (Tinga,J .)

ISSUE:

Atty. Jose A. Camano was an associate in the firm of Atty.

Oscar Inocentes. The Oscar Inocentes and Associates Law Office
was retained by spouses Genito, owners of an apartment complex
when the Genito Apartments were placed under sequestration by the
PCGG. They represented the spouses Genito before the PCGG and
the Sandiganbayan and in ejectment cases against non-paying
tenants occupying the Genito Apartments. Solatans sister was a
tenant of the Genito Apartments. She left the apartment to Solatan
and other members of her family.

1) Whether or not Atty. Camano violated the Code

of Professional Responsibility

A complaint for ejectment for non-payment of rentals was filed against

her and a decision was rendered in a judgment by default ordering her
to vacate the premises. Solatan was occupying said apartment when
he learned of the judgment. He informed Atty. Inocentes of his desire
to arrange the execution of a new lease contract by virtue of which he
would be the new lessee of the apartment. Atty.Inocentes referred him
to Atty. Camano, the attorney in charge of ejectment cases against
tenants of the Genito Apartments. During the meeting with Atty.
Camano, an verbal agreement was made in which complainant
agreed to pay the entire judgment debt of his sister, including awarded
attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Complainant issued a check in the name of Atty. Camano
representing half of the attorneys fees. Complainant failed to make
any other payment. The sheriff in coordination with Atty. Camano
enforced the writ of execution and levied the properties found in the
subject apartment. Complainant renegotiated and Atty. Camano
agreed to release the levied properties and allow complainant to
remain at the apartment. Acting on Atty. Camanos advice,
complainant presented an affidavit of ownership to the sheriff who
released the levied items. However, a gas stove was not returned to
the complainant but was kept by Atty. Camano in the unit of the
Genito Apartments where he was temporarily staying. Complainant
filed the instant administrative case for disbarment against Atty.
Camano and Atty. Inocentes. The IBP Board of Governors resolved to

2) Whether or not Atty. Inocentes violated the Code of

Professional Responsibility
HELD: All lawyers must observe loyalty in all transactions and
dealings with their clients.
An attorney has no right to act as counsel or legal representative for
a person without beingretained. No employment relation was offered
or accepted in the instant case.

Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires all

lawyers to observe loyalty in all transactions and dealings with their
clients. Unquestionably, an attorney giving legal advice to a party with
an interest conflicting with that of his client may be held guilty of
disloyalty. However, the advice given
by Atty. Camano in the context where the complainant was the rightfu
l owner of the incorrectly leviedproperties was in consonance with his
duty as an officer of the court. It should not be construed as being in
conflict with the interest of the spouses Genito as they have no
interest over the properties.
The act of informing complainant that his properties would be returned
upon showing proof of his ownership may hint at infidelity to his clients
but lacks the essence of double dealing and betrayal.2. Atty.
Inocentes failure to exercise certain responsibilities over matters
under the charge of his law firm is a blameworthy shortcoming. As
name practitioner of the law office, Atty. Inocentes is tasked with the
responsibility to make reasonable efforts to ensure that all lawyers in
the firm should act in conformity to the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Atty. Inocentes received periodic reports from Atty. Ca
mano on the latters dealings withcomplainant. This is the linchpin of
his supervisory capacity over Atty. Camano and liability by virtue
thereof. Partners and practitioners who hold supervisory capacities


are legally responsible to exert ordinary diligence in apprising
themselves of the comings and goings of the cases handled by
persons over which they are exercising supervisory authority and in
exerting necessary efforts to foreclose violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility by persons under their charge.

2
(b) writs of execution may not be issued against government funds
and properties to satisfy court judgments.
The trial court denied the motion to quash the writ of execution.
Defendants filed for MR but was Denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE:

7. GUMURU v. QUIRINO STATE COLLEGE

Facts:

(a) whether respondent state college was properly represented before

the trial court;

Gumaru Construction and Quirino State College entered into an

Agreement for the construction of the state colleges building in
Quirino Province. Construction was done in stages and was covered
by supplemental agreements, because funding depended on the state
colleges annual budget allocation and fund releases from the
government.

(b) if in the negative, whether the lack of proper legal representation

was enough to nullify the proceedings; and

On October 17, 1997, Constantino T. Gumaru, owner of the

Construction company, filed a complaint for damages the state college
and Julian A. Alvarez, asking for an amount of money for the expected
profits which he would have realized from the construction of an
unfinished portion of the project which was allegedly awarded by the
State College to another contractor in violation of his preferential right
to finish the project.

OSG is mandated to act as the law office of the government, its

agencies, instrumentalities, officials and agents in any litigation or
proceeding requiring the services of a lawyer.

Defendants, through their private counsel Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao,

moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue
which was subsequently denied by the trial court.
Defendants failed to appeal from the decision, and it became final
and executory, and plaintiff moved for the issuance of a writ of
execution.
Thereafter, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its
appearance for the first time as counsel for the defendants. At the
same time, it filed a Motion to Quash Writ of Execution on the
following grounds:
(a) defendants were not duly represented in court, since the OSG was
not notified of the proceedings; and

(c) whether the properties of respondent state college may be seized

under the writ of execution issued by the trial court.
HELD:

Therefore, the proper statutory counsel of respondent state college is

the OSG. Legal representation by Atty. Carlos T. Aggabao, a private
lawyer, was clearly improper. The Solicitor General is thus expected
to be the official who would best uphold and protect the legal interests
of the government. His non-representation of the government is
dangerous and should not be allowed.
The magnitude of the non-representation by the OSG is nowhere
more apparent than in the case at bar. Instead of having been
represented by an official learned in the law who will promote and
protect the public weal taking into consideration the vast concerns of
the sovereign which it is committed to serve, respondent state
college was instead represented by a private lawyer who made no
move to protect its interests except to file a motion to dismiss the
complaint filed against the state college, which was eventually denied
by the trial court.
Clear, therefore, was the utter failure of justice insofar as respondent
state college is concerned. It was as if it was not represented by


counsel at all. While it may be argued that the officials of respondent
state college should have informed the OSG of the suit filed against
the state college, and that it was their fault or negligence that the OSG
was not informed in the first place, it is settled, however, that the
principle of estoppel does not operate against the government for the
act of its agents or their inaction.
The State has to protect its interests and cannot be bound by,
or estopped by the mistakes or negligent acts of its officials or agents,
much more, non-suited as a result thereof.

8. MALIGAYA VS DORONILLA
FACTS: Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel for several military officers.
During a hearing, he said we had an agreement that if we withdraw
the case against him(Maligaya) he will also withdraw all the cases. Do
with that understanding, he even retired and he is now receiving
pension. Atty. Doronilla was then charge of misleading the court
through misrepresentation of facts resulting in obstruction of justice.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Doronilla guilt of purposely stating a falsehood in
violation of canon 10 of the code of professional responsibility.
RULING: by stating untruthfully in open court, Att. Doronilla breached
peremptory tenets of ethical conduct. Not only violated the lawyers
oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of an in court, but
also his acts infringed on every lawyers duty to never seek to
mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law. He was suspended from practice of law for
two months.

9. PALM v. ILEDAN, JR.

FACTS: The case is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca
J. Palm (complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for
revealing information obtained in the course of an attorneyclient relationship and for representing an interest which conflicted
with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions
Philippines, Inc. (Comtech). Complainant is the President of Comtech,

3
a corporation engaged in the business of computer software
development. From February 2003 to November 2003, respondent
served as Comtechs retained corporate counsel for the amount of
P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October
2003,complainant personally met with respondent to review corporate
matters, including potential amendments to the corporate by-laws. In
a meeting held on 1 October 2003, respondent suggested
that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow participation during
board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the Board
of Directors who were outside the Philippines. Prior to the completion
of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant
became uncomfortable with the close relationship between
respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director
of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing
unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, Comtech
decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective
November 2003.
In a stockholders meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent
attended as proxy for Gary
Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm,
members of the Board of Directors,were present through
teleconference. When the meeting was called to order, respondent
objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. Respondent asserted that
Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate in the meeting
because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow
teleconferencing. Comtechs new counsel sent a demand letter to
Soledad to return or account for the amount of P90,466.10
representing her unauthorized disbursements when she was the
Corporate Treasurer of
Comtech. On 22 April 2004, Comtech received Soledads reply,
signed by respondent. In July 2004, due to Soledads failure to comply
with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a complaint for
Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutors
Office. In the proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of
Makati, respondent appeared as Soledads counsel.


ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated the Confidentiality of
Lawyer-Client Relationship
HELD: No. Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client
Relationship Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
provides: Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relationship is
terminated. (Emphasis supplied) We agree with the IBP that in the
course of complainants consultations, respondent obtained
the information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to
allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board
meetings through teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted
this in his Answer.
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board
meeting but a stockholders meeting. Respondent attended the
meeting as proxy for Harrison. The physical presence of a stockholder
is not necessary in a stockholders meeting because a member may
vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of
incorporation or by-laws. Hence, there was no need for Steven and
Deanna Palm to participate through teleconferencing as they could
just have sent their proxies to the meeting. In addition, although the
information about the necessity to amend the corporate by-laws
may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a
confidential information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new
by-laws may be effected by "the board of directors or trustees, by
a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at least a majority of the
outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of a nonstock corporation."9 It means the stockholders are aware of the
proposed amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be
delegated to the board of directors or trustees, there is nothing in the
records to show that a delegation was made in the present case.
Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new by-laws is
made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the
securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the
original articles of incorporation and by-laws.10 The documents
are public records and could not be considered confidential.1avvphi1It
is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality.11 The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.12 Since the proposed amendments

4
must be approved by at least a majority of the stockholders, and
copies of the amended by- laws must be filed with the SEC, the
information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the
disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders meeting
could not be considered a violation of his clients secrets and
confidence within the contemplation of Canon 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan,
Jr. for lack of merit

10. LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO

Facts:
A complaint for disbarment was filed by Pedro Linsangan against Atty.
Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and encroachment of
professional services. Complaint alleged that respondent, with the
help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano, convinced his clients to transfer
legal representation. Respondent promised them financial assistance
and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire his
services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit
of James Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to
sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant and utilize
respondents services instead, in exchange for aloan of P50, 000.00.
Complainant also attached respondents calling card. Respondent,
in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
and circulation of the said calling card.
Issue:
Whether or not Tolentinos actions warrant disbarment.
Held:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer shall not do or
permit to be done any act designed primarily to solicit legal business.
Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or broker
s. Such actuation constitutesmalpractice, a ground for disbarment.


Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the
CPR which provides that lawyer, shall not for any corrupt motive or
interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any mans cause.
This rule proscribes ambulance chasing (the solicitation of almost
any kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an
agent in order to gain employment) as a measure to protect the
community from barratry and champerty. In the case at bar,
complainant presented substantial evidence (consisting of the sworn
statements of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred
to respondents office) to prove that respondent indeed solicited legal
business as well as profited from referrals suits. Through Labianos
actions, respondents law practice was benefited. Hapless seamen
were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labianos
word that respondent
could produce a more favorable result. Based on the foregoing, respo
ndent clearly solicited employmentviolating Rule 2.03, and Rule 1.03
and Canon 3 of the CPR and section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules
of Court. Any act of solicitations constitutes malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the Courtsdisciplinary powers. Violation of antisolicitation statues warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact
with a prospective client for the purpose of obtaining employment.
Thus in this jurisdiction, the Court adheres to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers
and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Canon 2: A lawyer shall make his
legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compati
ble with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of
the profession. Rule 2.03: A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done
any act designed primarily to solicit legal business

5
11. SERMIENTO v. OLIVIA
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by complainants against the
defendant Atty. Olivia.
Complainants alleged that they received, five postdated checks from
respondent as payment for the purchase of a P13 million Makati City
property. When presented to the drawee bank, two checks were
dishonored due to "closed account." Consequently, complainants sent
demand letters to respondent.
On May 20, 2004, respondent requested complainants to reduce his
obligation to P11 million. Complainants agreed. He gave a partial
down payment of P200,000 and issued four postdated Premier Bank
checks. Upon presentment, the first check was dishonored again due
to "closed account." On October 7, 2004, complainants again
demanded payment from respondent but the demand was ignored,
hence, this complaint which was originally filed with the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP).
Respondent, in his answer, claimed that this complaint was instituted
to harass him inasmuch as he had no outstanding financial obligation
to the complainants. He maintained that complainants had a buyer for
the property on installment. He issued the checks on the condition
that these would only be presented on approval and release of
proceeds of the loan as the buyer would issue his own checks to
cover payment in respondents name. Because the complainants
deposited the checks for clearing without informing him, they actually
violated their agreement.
The complaint was set for mandatory conference/hearing but
respondent repeatedly failed to appear at the scheduled hearings
despite due notice. He was thus deemed to have waived his right to
participate in further proceedings.
IBP found that respondent transferred the property to his name
despite giving complainants only P200,000. He took advantage of
complainants who trusted him and relied on his good faith.
Furthermore, he never appeared in any of the scheduled hearings.


The CBD thus recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for two years.1awphi1
The IBP Board of Governors approved and adopted the report and
recommendation of the CBD in toto and ordered respondent to
restitute the amount of P11 million to complainants.
ISSUE: Whether the order of suspension and restitution of 11 Million
to complainants are proper?
HELD:
Atty Olivia was already disbarred for a grave misconduct in 1994 [Libit
v. Attys. Edelson G. Oliva and Umali] prior to the present case.
Hence, not being a member of the bar, he cannot be suspended from
the practice of law.
Libit was never mentioned in the records of this case. Complainants
obviously had no knowledge of respondents disbarment in 1994.
Respondent must have represented himself to complainants as
a bona fide member of the bar. Furthermore, he never informed the
IBP of his prior disbarment. As a former lawyer, he knew that the
jurisdiction of the IBP is limited to members of the bar.
Since respondent himself made a positive misrepresentation to
complainants that he was still a lawyer and even submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the IBP, he is estopped from questioning the
jurisdiction of the IBP over him. For this reason the court find as
proper the recommendation of the IBP that respondent be required to
indemnify the complainants the amount of P11 million.
Respondent does not dispute that complainants were the owners of
the property before he had the title to the said property transferred in
his name. He cannot unduly enrich himself and enjoy ownership of the
property without compensating complainants.
Moreover, the Court has held that a disbarred lawyer, who continues
to represent himself as a lawyer with the authority to practice law
commits a contumacious act and is liable for indirect contempt.

6
12. PACANA v. ATTY. PASCUAL LOPEZ
This case stems from an administrative complaint filed by Rolando
Pacana, Jr. against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter
with flagrant violation of the provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Complainant alleges that respondent committed acts
constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence peddling, and
failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties
received by her from complainant.
Complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel Communications
Corporation (MCC) when he asked for legal advice from the
respondent because of overwhelming demand letters sent to his office
from its members and investors because of the failure of its
investment schemes.
From then on, complainant and respondent constantly communicated,
with the former disclosing all his involvement and interests in
Precedent and Precedents relation with Multitel. Respondent gave
legal advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard
quitclaims for creditors.
In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
established between him and respondent although no formal
document was executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement
dated January 15, 2003 was proposed by respondent.
Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement because
respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) as acceptance fee. Complainant found the proposed
fees to be prohibitive and not within his means. Hence, the retainer
agreement remained unsigned.
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information
regarding the persistent demands made by Multitel investors against
complainant. On these occasions, respondent impressed upon
complainant that she could closely work with officials of different
Government Agencies to resolve complainants problems.
Respondent also convinced complainant that in order to be absolved
from any liability with respect to the investment scam.


Respondent, in several occasions, asked money from complainant
allegedly for safekeeping to be used only for his case whenever
necessary among other things.

all the cash and properties entrusted to her. Based on these

grounds, the Investigating Commissioner recommended her
disbarment.

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to

handle his legal problems, complainant was advised by his family to
hire another lawyer.

Respondent believes that her act in helping complainant resolve his

legal problem did not violate any ethical standard and was, in fact, in
accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.37

About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with

complainant and his wife and told them that she has already
accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorneys fees.
Complainant tried to get in touch with the respondent but to no avail
so he wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full accounting of
all the money, documents and properties given to the latter.
Complainant repeated his request for an audited financial report of all
the properties turned over to her; otherwise, he will be constrained to
file the appropriate case against respondent.
Respondent replied, explaining that all the properties and cash turned
over to her by complainant had been returned to her clients who had
money claims against Multitel.
Still unsatisfied, complainant decided to file an affidavit-complaint
against respondent before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment of
respondent.
In her Answer-Affidavit, respondent vehemently denied being the
lawyer for Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was
executed between her and complainant. She claimed that she merely
helped complainant by providing him with legal advice and assistance
because she personally knew him, since they both belonged to the
same religious organization.
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez
issued a Report and Recommendation finding that a lawyer-client
relationship was established between respondent and complainant
despite the absence of a written contract. The Investigating
Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be
candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to
represent conflicting interests and failed to render a full accounting of

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondents contention that she did not violate any
ethical standard and that her act was in accord with Rule 2,02 of the
Code of Professional Conduct is tenable.
RULING:
No. Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and
actively communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was
beleaguered with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to
the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship which is contrary to
Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Conduct.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not
accept a case, he shall not refuse to render legal
advice to the person concerned if only to the extent
necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which
respondent should have done was either to advise complainant to
engage the services of another lawyer since she was already
representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for
complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because that would
amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility
provides:

8
Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all concerned
given after full disclosure of the facts.

This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste

and, more importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client
relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the clients
case, including its weak and strong points. Such knowledge must be
considered sacred and guarded with care. No opportunity must be
given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the confidence is
abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof. It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the clients confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then
can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers,
which is paramount in the administration of justice. It is for these
reasons that we have described the attorney-client relationship as one
of trust and confidence of the highest degree.
Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively
communicating with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered
with demands from investors of Multitel, eventually led to the
establishment of a lawyer-client relationship. Respondent cannot
shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by
simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was
only in the form of friendly accommodations, precisely because at
the time she was giving assistance to complainant, she was already
privy to the cause of the opposing parties who had been referred to
her by the SEC.
Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainants hapless
situation, initially, by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting
money and properties from him. Thereafter, respondent impressed
upon complainant that she had acted with utmost sincerity in helping
him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to absolve him
from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same
thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel,
that she was doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with
Multitel. Respondent herself admitted to complainant that without the
latters help, she would not have been able to earn as much and that,
as a token of her appreciation, she was willing to share some of her
earnings with complainant. Clearly, respondents act is shocking, as it

not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional

Responsibility, but also toyed with decency and good taste.

13. CAMARA v. ATTY REYES

Sometime in 2003, complainant hired the services of respondent to
handle her case. As partial acceptance fee, respondent received from
complainant P50,000.00 evidenced by a receipt placed on his calling
card. Respondent, however, took no steps to protect complainants
interest. As no service was rendered by respondent, complainant
asked that he return the amount given him so that she could use it in
repairing her house. Respondent offered that he would take charge of
repairing the house. Yet, he again failed to fulfill his promise, which
prompted the complainant to reiterate her demand for the return of the
money. As respondent failed to give back the amount demanded,
complainant initiated the instant case.
ISSUE: Whether theres attorney-client relationship
When respondent accepted the amount of P50,000.00 from
complainant, it was understood that he agreed to take up the latters
case, and that an attorney-client relationship between them was
established. From then on, it was expected that he would serve his
client, herein complainant, with competence, and attend to her cause
with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee for legal services in
handling complainants case and subsequently failing to render such
services is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall serve his client with
competence and diligence. Specifically, Rule 18.03 states:
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to
him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable.
A member of the legal profession owes his client entire devotion to the
latters genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and
defense of his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his best efforts
and ability to preserve his clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty


displayed to his client, likewise, serves the ends of justice. Verily, the
entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the corresponding
duties, not only to the client, but also to the court, to the bar and to the
public.
The fiduciary duty of a lawyer and advocate is what places the law
profession in a unique position of trust and confidence, and
distinguishes it from any other calling. Once this trust and confidence
is betrayed, the faith of the people, not only in the individual lawyer but
also in the legal profession as a whole, is eroded. To this end, all
members of the bar are strictly required at all times to maintain the
highest degree of public confidence in the fidelity, honesty and
integrity of their profession

14. ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO,

A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009,
In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with
enclosures, Antero J. Pobre invited the Courts attention to the
following excerpts of Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech
delivered on the Senate floor:

"x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am

homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I
am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in
a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief
Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I
am no longer interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be
surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not
in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x."

To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the

part of the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban
and the other members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of
court. Accordingly, Pobre asked that disbarment proceedings or other
disciplinary actions be taken against the lady senator.

9
In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator
Santiago, through counsel, did not deny making the aforequoted
statements. She, however, explained that those statements were
covered by the constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity,
being part of a speech she delivered in the discharge of her duty as
member of Congress or its committee. The purpose of her speech,
according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies
in governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred
that she wanted to expose what she believed to be an unjust act of
the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out public
invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent
justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt
that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that
non-sitting members of the Court, like her, would not be considered
for the position of Chief Justice.
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the
provision of Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides:
A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all
offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No member
shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any
speech or debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity to enable and
encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust
with firmness and success for it is indispensably necessary that he
should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should be
protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom
the exercise of that liberty may occasion offense, the Court said, citing
previous decided cases.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would
degenerate into a polite and ineffective debating forum. Legislators
are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited discharge of their
legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public
good. The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected
to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a
conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against them


based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
The Court said that it does not interfere with the legislature or its
members in the manner they perform their functions in the legislative
floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an unworthy purpose or of
the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of
the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority
of the assembly and the voters, not the courts, can properly
discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.
Although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative
lady senator was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary
proceeding under the Rules of Court, it felt, however, expressed its
deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of the
Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice.
To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of
decency and good professional conduct. It is at once apparent that
her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper in
substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted
to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme
Court of idiots.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the
courts should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary.
The Court stated that in this case, the lady senator clearly violated
Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
"Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings,
use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar
conduct by others."

It will be noted that Senator/Atty. Santiago was a former Regional Trial

10
Court judge, a law professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional
and international law, an author of numerous law textbooks, and an
elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as
a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, was dutybound to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain
the respect due its members. Lawyers in public service are keepers of
public faith and are burdened with the higher degree of social
responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual,
the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the
integrity of the courts.
The Court stressed that a careful re-reading of her foul and repulsive
utterances would readily show that her statements were expressions
of personal anger and frustration at not being considered for the post
of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside the
pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary
immunity must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule,
demean, and destroy the reputation of the Court and its magistrates,
nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed
that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the
individual members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal
benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the people and the
institution that represents them.
The Court stated that Senator Santiagos outburst was directly
traceable to what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had
taken in connection with her application for the position of Chief
Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as
the JBCs ex-officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate
candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court
is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of
critical and defamatory words against all of them.
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is
the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful
attitude, not for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial


office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That same
canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to
support the courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The
attorneys oath solemnly binds him to a conduct that should be with all
good fidelity to the courts.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an
instrument or agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to
uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity,
not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the
judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity of government and to the
attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it been said of a
lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty
to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.
The Court in a subtle way criticized the Senate itself for neglecting its
duty to discipline the respondent senator for her offensive language.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on
Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from
using, under any circumstance, offensive or improper language
against another Senator or against any public institution. But as to
Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate President
had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to
the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as
the Rules dictates under such circumstance. The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers
bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.

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15. RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED
RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF
THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGEOF LAW
ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND
MISREPRESENTATION IN THESUPREME COURT
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, June 7, 2011,
EN BANC
(Leonardo-De Castro, J.)
Last March 8, 2011 on A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, the Supreme
Court reminded University of the Philippines (UP) law professors
Tristan A. Catindig and Carina C. Laforteza and 35 other faculty
members of the UP College of Law, as well as admonishing Dean
Marvic Leonen for vio, Restoring Integrity, a
scathingmanifesto calling for SC Associate Justice Mariano del Castill
os resignation for the latters alleged plagiarism on his decision on the
case of Vinuya, et al .v. Executive Secretary
(G.R. No. 162230)promulgated last April 28, 2010.Consequently,
Motion for Reconsideration was filed by Catindig and Laforteza and a
manifestation filed by Dean Marvic M.V.F. Leonen and Prof. Theodore
O. Te, relying on the ground that the proceeding, while
docketed as an administrative matter, is premised on a finding
of indirect contempt and that they were not accorded
due process under indirect contempt proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not SC erred in finding that the respondents are in breach
of their ethical obligations for having issued the restoring integrity
statement
HELD: Contumacious speech and/or behaviour directed against the C
ourt on the partof a lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or
an ethical violation, or both in the discretion of the Court.
The petition was denied for No substantial arguments to warrant a
reconsideration of the Decision dated March 8, 2011 nor to justify the
grant of the reliefs prayed for in their motion. The
Manifestation,apart from being an expression of support for Professor
s Catindig and Lafortezas motion forreconsideration, did not raise any


new matter nor pray for any affirmative relief, the Court resolves to
merely note the same. Contumacious speech or conduct directed
against a court or judicial officer, if committed by a member of the Bar,
subject the offender to disciplinary proceedings under the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which prescribes that lawyers observe
and promote due respect for the courts.
In such
disciplinary cases, the sanctions are not penal but administrative such
as, disbarment, suspension, reprimand or admonition. Contumacious
speech and/or behaviour directed against the Court on the part of a
lawyer may be punishable either as contempt or an ethical violation,
or both in the discretion of the Court. When the Court initiates
contempt proceedings and/or disciplinary proceedings against lawyers
for intemperate and discourteous language and behaviour directed at
the courts, the evil sought to be prevented is the same the
degradation of the courts and the loss of trust in the administration of
justice. Verily, when the Court chooses to institute an administrative
case against a respondent lawyer, the mere citation
ordiscussion in the orders or decision in the administrative case
of jurisprudence involving contempt proceedings does not transform
the action from a disciplinary proceeding to one for contempt. Had this
Court opted to cite respondents for contempt of court, which is
punishable by imprisonment or fine, this Court would have initiated
contempt proceedings in accordance with the Rules of Court.

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