ADMINISTRATIVE LAW CASE DOCTRINES

By Olive Cachapero
Prof. Antonio G.M. La Via
MEMORIZE:
1987 Constitution, Art. 8, Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.

Doctrine of Separation of Powers

* Book II, Administrative Code of 1987
PLANAS VS. GIL
(Extensive authority over the public service is granted the President)
Non-interference Rule: The acts of the Chief Executive performed within the limits
of his jurisdiction are his official acts and courts will neither direct nor restrain
executive action in such cases.
But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily follow that we are precluded from
making an inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his acts when these are
properly challenged in an appropriate legal proceeding. The classical separation of
governmental powers is a relative theory of government. There is more truism and
actuality in interdependence than in independence and separation of powers, for as
observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay down "with
mathematical precision and divide the branches into watertight compartments" not
only because "the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide
fields of black and white" but also because "even the more specific of them are found
to terminate in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other."
(Springer vs. Government [1928], 277 U. S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845, 852.) As far as
the judiciary is concerned, while it holds "neither the sword nor the purse" it is by
constitutional placement the organ called upon to allocate constitutional boundaries,
and to the Supreme Court is entrusted expressly or by necessary implication the
obligation of determining in appropriate cases the constitutionality or validity of any
treaty, law, ordinance, or executive order or regulation. (Sec. 2 [1], Art. VIII,
Constitution of the Philippines.) In this sense and to this extent, the judiciary
restrains the other departments of the government and this result is one of the
necessary corollaries of the "system of checks and balance" of the government
established.

GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. SPRINGER

(The appointment of managers of property or a business in which the government is
interested essentially an executive act)
ISSUE: Where does the power to appoint to Public Office reside? W/N section 4 of
Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is constitutional and valid.
HELD: (1) The right to appoint to office has been confided, with certain well
defined exceptions, by the Government of the United States to the executive branch
of the government which it has set up in the Philippines; (2) Section 4 of Act No.
2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822 is unconstitutional and void
RATIO: The applicable legal doctrines are found in the Organic Law, particularly
in the Organic Act, the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, and in statutes enacted
under authority of that Act, and in decisions interpretative of it. It is true that the
Organic Act contains no general distributing clause. But the principle is clearly
deducible from the grant of powers. It is expressly incorporated in our
Administrative Code. It has time and again been approvingly enforced by this court.
No department of the Government of the Philippine Islands may legally exercise any
of the powers conferred by the Organic Law upon any of the others. Again it is true
that the Organic Law contains no such explicit prohibition. But it is fairly implied by
the division of the Government into three departments. The effect is the same
whether the prohibition is expressed or not. It has repeatedly been announced by this
court that each of the branches of the Government is in the main independent of the
others.
The Organic Act vests the:
a.) EXECUTIVE POWER in the Governor- General of the Philippine Islands.
execute the law
power of appointment; membership in the voting committee in
question is an office or executive function
he is given general supervision and control of all the departments
and bureaus of the government of the Philippine Islands as far as is
not inconsistent with the provisions of this act.
made responsible for the faithful execution of the laws of the
Philippine Islands and of the United States operative within
Philippine Islands.
By the Administrative Code, "the Governor-General, as chief
Executive of the Islands, is charged with the executive control of
the Philippine Government, to be exercised in person or through
the Secretaries of Departments, or other proper agency, according
to law."

b.) LEGISLATIVE POWER except as otherwise provided therein to the

Philippine Legislature.
make the law.
c.) JUDICIAL POWER is conferred on the Supreme Courts, Courts of First
Instance, and inferior courts.
construe the law
Doctrine of separation of powers
the Supreme Court emphasized that the power of appointment in the
Philippines appertains, with minor exceptions, to the executive department;
that membership in the voting committee in question is an office or
executive function; that the NCC and similar corporations are
instrumentalities of the Government; that the duty to look after government
agencies and government property belongs to the executive department; that
the placing of members of the Philippine Legislature on the voting
committee constitutes an invasion by the Legislative Department of the
privileges of the Executive Department. Under a system of government of
delegated powers, under which delegation legislative power vests in the
Philippine Legislature and executive power vests in the Governor-General,
and under which Governor-General and a specified power of appointment
resides in the Philippine Legislature, the latter cannot directly or indirectly
perform functions of an executive nature through the designation of its
presiding officers as majority members of a body which has executive
functions. That is the meaning we gather from the tri-partite theory of the
division of powers. That is the purport of the provisions of the Organic
Law.
Section 4 of Act No. 2705, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 2822, as purports to
vest the voting power of the government-owned stock in the National Coal Company
in the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, is
unconstitutional and void. However, the Supreme Court notes that indeed there are
exceptions to this rule where the legislature may appoint persons to fill public office.
Such exception can be found in the appointment by the legislature of persons to
fill offices within the legislative branch this exception is allowable because it does
not weaken the executive branch.

ARTICLE VIII
1987 Constitution, Art. 7 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law.

whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987
BOOK 2 Chapter 4 JUDICIAL POWER Sec. 16. Judicial Power. - The judicial
power shall be vested in one (1) Supreme Court, and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. Such lower courts include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan,
Court of Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari's District Courts, Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari'a
Circuit Courts and they shall continue to exercise their respective jurisdiction until
otherwise provided by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and, in cases
prescribed by law, to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.
BOOK 3 POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT
Sec. 1. Power of Control.- The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Chapter 5 POWER OF APPOINTMENT Sec. 16. Power of Appointment. - The
President shall exercise the power to appoint such officials as provided for in the
Constitution and laws.
Chapter 6 GENERAL SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL GOVERNMENTS Sec.
18. General Supervision Over Local Governments. - The President shall exercise
general supervision over local governments.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT

Besides the constitution, the powers of the President of the Philippines are
specifically outlined in Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987. The following powers are:
1. Power of control over the executive branch
The President of the Philippines has the mandate of control over all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. This includes restructuring, reconfiguring, and
appointments of their respective officials. The Administrative Code also provides for
the President to be responsible for the abovementioned offices strict implementation
of laws.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
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2. Power ordinance power

The President of the Philippines has the power to give executive issuances, which are
means to streamline the policy and programs of an administration. There are six
issuances that the President may issue. They are the following as defined in the
Administrative Code of 1987:
Executive orders Acts of the President providing for rules of a general or
permanent character in implementation or execution of constitutional or
statutory powers shall be promulgated in executive orders.
Administrative orders Acts of the President which relate to particular
aspects of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as the
administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders.
Proclamations Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a status or
condition of public moment or interest, upon the existence of which the
operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
Memorandum orders Acts of the President on matters of administrative
detail, or of subordinate or temporary interest which only concern a
particular officer or government office shall be embodied in memorandum
orders.
Memorandum circulars Acts of the President on matters relating to
internal administration, which the President desires to bring to the attention
of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus, or offices of the
government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandum circulars.
General or special orders Acts and commands of the President in his
capacity as commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
shall be issued as general or special orders.
It is important to note that during the term of President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he used
executive issuances known as presidential decrees as a form of legislation. These
decrees have the full force and effect of laws because at the time the legislature did
not exist and, when the 1973 Constitution was put into full force and effect, it gave
the power to the President to do as such. This continued until the first year of
President Corazon C. Aquinos term. However, President Aquino opted to used
executive orders instead of presidential decrees. President Aquinos executive orders,
however, still had the full force and effect of laws until the ratification of the 1987
Constitution.
3. Power over aliens
The President of the Philippines has the power over non-Filipinos in the Philippines.
The powers he may exercise over foreigners in the country are as follows:
The chief executive may have an alien in the Philippines deported from the
country after due process.

The President may change the status of a foreigner, as prescribed by law,

from a non-immigrant status to a permanent resident status without
necessity of visa.
The President may choose to overrule the Board of Commissioners of the
Bureau of Immigration before their decision becomes final and executory
(after 30 days of the issuance of the decision). The Board of Commissioners
of the Bureau of Immigration has jurisdiction over all deportation cases.
The president is also mandated by the Administrative Code of 1987 to
exercise powers as recognized by the generally accepted principles of
international law.

4. Powers of eminent domain, escheat, land reservation and recovery of ill-gotten

wealth
The President of the Philippines has the authority to exercise the power of eminent
domain. The power of eminent domains means the state has the power to seize or
authorize the seizure of private property for public use with just compensation. There
are two constitutional provisions, however, that limit the exercise of such power:
Article III, Section 9 (1) of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived
of his/her life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Furthermore, Article
III, Section 9 (2), provides that private property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
Once the aforementioned conditions are met, the President may exercise the power
of eminent domain which are as follows:
Power of eminent domain The President shall determine when it is
necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in
behalf of the national government, and direct the solicitor general, whenever
he deems the action advisable, to institute expropriation proceedings in the
proper court.
Power to direct escheat or reversion proceedings The President shall
direct the solicitor general to institute escheat or reversion proceedings over
all lands transferred or assigned to persons disqualified under the
constitution to acquire land.
Power to reserve lands of the public and private domain of the
government
1) The president shall have the power to reserve for settlement or public
use, and for specific public purposes, any of the lands of the public
domain, the use of which is not otherwise directed by law. The reserved
land shall thereafter remain subject to the specific public purpose
indicated until otherwise provided by law or proclamation.
2) He shall also have the power to reserve from sale or other disposition
and for specific public uses or purposes, any land belonging to the
private domain of the government, or any of the friar lands, the use of
which is not otherwise directed by law, and thereafter such land shall
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be used for the purposes specified by such proclamation until otherwise

provided by law.
Power over ill-gotten wealth The President shall direct the solicitor
general to institute proceedings to recover properties unlawfully acquired by
public officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or
transferees.

Within the period fixed in, or any extension thereof authorized by, the constitution,
the President shall have the authority to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the
leaders and supporters of the previous regime, and protect the interest of the people
through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts.
5. Power of appointment
The President may appoint officials of the Philippine government as provided by the
constitution and laws of the Philippines. Some of these appointments, however, may
need the approval of the Committee on Appointments (a committee composed of
members from the House of Representatives and the Senate of the Philippines).
6. Power of general supervision over local governments
The President of the Philippines, as chief executive, has the mandate to supervise
local governments in the Philippines, despite their autonomous status as provided by
Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991.
Traditionally, this is done by the Department of the Interior and Local Government,
headed by a cabinet secretaryan alter ego of the President.
7. Other powers
Aside from the aforementioned powers of the President of the Philippines, he can
also exercise powers enumerated in the constitution, and powers given to him by
law.
OCCENA VS. COMELEC
(Delegating to administrative agencies the power to make rules and regulations.)
ISSUES:
(1) WON The 1973 Constitution and Javellana Ruling is Valid.
(2) WON The Interim Batasang Pambansa has the power to propose such
amendments.

HELD:
It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect."Such a
statement served a useful purpose. It could even be said that there was a need for it.
It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that, as of January 17, 1973, the

present Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the
Supreme Court and with the recognition of the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor
for instability was removed.
The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as simple as that. What cannot be
too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a
negative aspect.
Petitioners were unable to demonstrate that the challenged resolutions are tainted by
unconstitutionality.
The existence of the power of the Interim Batasang Pambansa is indubitable. The
applicable provision in the 1976 Amendments is quite explicit. Insofar as pertinent it
reads thus: "The Interim Batasang Pambansa shall have the same powers and its
Members shall have the same functions, responsibilities, rights, privileges, and
disqualifications as the interim National Assembly and the regular National
Assembly and the Members thereof."
One of such powers is precisely that of proposing amendments. The 1973
Constitution in its Transitory Provisions vested the Interim National Assembly with
the power to propose amendments upon special call by the Prime Minister by a vote
of the majority of its members to be ratified in accordance with the Article on
Amendments therefore, the Interim Batasang Pambansa, upon the call of the
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos, met as a constituent body it acted
by virtue Of such impotence Its authority to do so is clearly beyond doubt. It could
and did propose the amendments embodied in the resolutions now being assailed.

Creation,
Agencies

Reorganization

and

Abolition

of

Administrative

SEC. OF DOTC VS. MABALOT

(Power of the president to reorganize the government)
ISSUE: WON the administrative issuances by the DOTC Secretary valid.
HELD:
YES. The President through his duly constituted political agent and alter ego, the
DOTC Secretary in the present case may legally and validly decree the
reorganization of the Department, particularly the establishment of DOTC-CAR as
the LTFRB Regional Office at the Cordillera Administrative Region with the
concomitant transfer and performance of public functions and responsibilities
appurtenant to a regional office of the LTFRB.

Public Office may be created through any of the ff. modes:

1) by the Constitution,
2) by law, or
3) by authority of law.
The creation and establishment of LTFRB-CAR Regional Office was made pursuant
to the third mode which could be decreed for instance, through and Executive Order
issued by the President or an order of an administrative agency such as the Civil
Service Commission under the Administrative Code. In the case at bar, the DOTC
Secretary issued the assailed Memorandum and Department Order pursuant to
Administrative Order No. 36 of the President establishing the regional officer in the
CAR.
The said Administrative Order did not merely authorize but directed the various
departments and agencies of government to immediately undertake the creation and
establishment of their regional offices in the CAR.
What law then gives the President the power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree
No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly
grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government. In fine, the designation and subsequent establishment of
DOTC-CAR as the Regional Office of LTFRB in the Cordillera Administrative
Region and the concomitant exercise and performance of functions by the former as
the LTFRB-CAR Regional Office, fall within the scope of the continuing authority
of the President to effectively reorganize the Department of Transportation and
Communications.
Reorganization is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith, and, as a
general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of
economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient.
EUGENIO VS. CSC
(Power of congress to abolish)
FACTS: Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research
Institute. In 1993, Aida Eugenio passed the Career Executive Service Eligibility
(CES). She was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a
CESO rank by the Career Executive Service Board. But her appointment to said rank
was impeded when in the same year, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) abolished
the Career Executive Service Board (CESB).
CESB is the office tasked with promulgating rules, standards, and procedures on the
selection, classification and compensation of the members of the Career Executive
Service.
Eugenio then assailed the resolution which abolished CESB. She averred that the
CSC does not have the power to abolish CESB because the same was created by law

(P.D. 1). CSC on the other hand argued that it has the power to do so pursuant to the
Administrative Code of 1987 which granted the CSC the right to reorganize the
CSC.
ISSUE: WON the Civil Service Commission may validly abolish the Career
Executive Service Board.
HELD:
NO. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1. It cannot be
disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by
the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and
abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function In the petition at bench,
the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB.
On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the
legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission,
however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. But as
well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read
together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the
respondent Commission. As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that
respondent Commissions power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control
as enumerated in Section 16..
From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view
the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.
The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is
to attain policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit: Attachment. (a) This
refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its equivalent and
attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination. The
coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a
member, with or without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the
attached corporation or agency comply with a system of periodic reporting which
shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department or its
equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which
5

shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the attached corporation or
agency.
LARIN VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
(Power of the president to dismiss)
ISSUE: WON the President has the power to dismiss.
HELD:
NONE. Under the law, Career Executive Service Officers, namely Undersecretary,
Assistant Secretary, Bureau director, Assistant Bureau Director, Regional Director,
Assistant Regional Director, Chief of Department Service and other officers of
equivalent rank as may be identified by the Career Executive Service Board, are all
appointed by the President.
Being a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the
President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power to remove is
inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution.
This power of removal, however, is not an absolute one which accepts no
reservation. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under
the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of
security of tenure, as contra-distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is
co-terminus with that of the appointing or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a
period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose
the employment was made. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to
security of tenure. No less than the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of security
of tenure of the employees of the civil service. Specifically, Section 36 of P.D. No.
807, as amended, otherwise known as Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, is
emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure
may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words,
the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing
authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact
that he is likewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of
tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with
procedural due process.

Powers of Administrative Agencies

PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. VS. TORRES, ET AL
(Rule-making power of administrative body)
FACTS: DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series
of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. As a result of the department order

DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound
workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest organization of private employment and
recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the
business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a
petition for prohibition to annul the afore mentioned order and to prohibit
implementation.
ISSUES:
1) WON respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of
their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;
2) WON the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the
Constitution, areunreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and
3) WON the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the
National Administrative Register were not complied with.
HELD:
FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave
abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor
Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36.
Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and
regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage
of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is here by
authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the
objectives and implement the provisions of this title.
SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in
administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities
of the modern society.
THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The
reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National
Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2.
Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the
Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and
other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this
Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after
announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections
3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:
Sec. 3. Filing. (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the
date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not
6

thereafterbe the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book
VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)
Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law
not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days
from thedate of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or
specified in therule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare,
the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The
agency shall takeappropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons
who may be affectedby them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987). Prohibition granted
MATEO V. COURT OF APPEALS
(RTC without jurisdiction over civil action involving employee of quasi public
corporation)
ISSUE: WON the RTC of Rizal has jurisdiction over the case involving dismissal of
an employee of quasi-public corporation.
HELD: No.
RATIO: MOWAD is a quasi-public corporation created pursuant to PD No. 198,
known as the provincial Water Utilities Act of 1973, as amended. In Davao City
Water District v. Civil Service Commissions, the Court en banc ruled that employees
of GOCCs with original charter fall under the jurisdiction of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC).
The established rule is that the hiring and firing of employees of GOCCs are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Service Law and Rules and Regulations. PD
No. 807, EO 292, and Rule II section 1 of Memorandum Circular No. 44 series of
1990 of the Civil Service Commission spell out the initial remedy of private
respondent against illegal dismissal. They categorically provide that the party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency of the government
involving termination of services may appeal to the Commission within fifteen (15)
days. Thereafter, private respondent could go on certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC
if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.
Sec. 7. Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order,
or ruling of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by
the party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
The CSC under the Constitution, is the single arbiter of all contests relating to the
Civil service and as such, its judgments are unappealable and subject only to this
Court's Certiorari judgment. Regional Trial Courts have no jurisdiction to entertain
cases involving dismissal of officers and employees covered by the Civil Service
Law.

CARINO V. CAPULONG
(Authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational institution a
discretionary duty)
ISSUES:
1) WON the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
the writ of preliminary injunction
2) WON the authority to grant permit by DECS to applicant educational
institution is a discretionary duty?
HELD:
(1)Yes
(2) Yes
RATIO:
(1) In the case at bar, private respondents' application for a permit to operate
AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution was denied by the petitioners.
Otherwise stated, the private respondents do not have a permit to operate or a
certificate of recognition from the government to undertake educational or school
operations. In fine, the private respondents do not have any existing right that needed
to be protected during the pendency of their principal action for mandamus. Hence,
the "closing" and/or "padlocking" of AMACC-Davao City would not and did not
violate any right of the private respondents.
Moreover, it is not the function of the WPI to restrain a public officer from
performing a duty imposed by law or to permit the doing of that which is declared
unlawful. Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 232 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, the establishment and operation of schools are subject to the prior
authorization of the government. And, as sanctions for operating without permit, the
DECS is authorized either to impose the total closure of school and/or to disqualify
the school from conferring title or degree in the non-recognized program or course of
studies. In ordering the total closure of AMACC-Davao City, the petitioners were
only performing their duties as public officers; hence, the respondent Judge should
not have issued the writ of preliminary injunction. In issuing the writ, he allowed the
private respondents to continue the operation of AMACC-Davao City as an
educational institution without a permit or certificate of government recognition,
thereby sanctioning the act which is unlawful.
(2) The action filed by the private respondents in the court below is a petition for
mandamus to compel the petitioners to approve their application to operate
AMACC-Davao City as an educational institution. As a rule, mandamus will lie only
to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a discretionary function. A
ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for the
exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is
that which by nature requires the exercise of judgment.
7

In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of
the petitioners. It is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners
because it had to be exercised in accordance with and not in violation of the
law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits
is governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant
permit is vested upon the judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports, which prescribes the rules and regulations governing the recognition on
private schools (Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of
Education, Culture and Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised
in accordance with the rules and regulations prescribed.
In the case at bar, petitioner has been operating a school without a permit in blatant
violation of law. Public respondent has no ministerial duty to issue to petitioner a
permit to operate a school in Davao City before petitioner has even filed an
application or before his application has been first processed in accordance with the
rules and regulations on the matter. Certainly, public respondent is not enjoined by
any law to grant such permit or to allow such operation without a permit, without
first processing an application. To do so is violation of the Educational Act

powers all at the same time and in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents
of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by
the Constitution or law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that
he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of the
Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the
acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in the
regular course of business, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
are presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive.
The placing of NAPOLCOM and PNP under the reorganized DILG is merely an
administrative realignment that would bolster a system of coordination and
cooperation among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated law enforcement
agencies and public safety agencies.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as the independent
Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other constitutionally created
independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human Rights.

CARPIO V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

ISSUE: WON RA 6975 violates Section 6, Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution,
which states that The State shall establish and maintain one police force, which stall
be national in scope and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a
national police commission. The authority of local executives over the police units in
their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

It thus becomes all too apparent then that the provision herein assailed precisely
gives muscle to and enforces the proposition that the national police force does not
fall under the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. This is necessarily so
since the police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the AFP.
As a civilian agency of the government, it properly comes within, and is subject to,
the exercise by the President of the power of executive control.

HELD:
NO.
This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government extends
over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk and has been
held by us, in the landmark case of Mondano vs. Silvosa, to mean "the power of [the
President] to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
with that of the latter." It is said to be at the very "heart of the meaning of Chief
Executive."

Consequently, Section 12 does not constitute abdication of commander-in-chief

powers. It simply provides for the transition period or process during which the
national police would gradually assume the civilian function of safeguarding the
internal security of the State. Under this instance, the President, to repeat, abdicates
nothing of his war powers. It would bear to here state, in reiteration of the
preponderant view, that the President, as Commander-in-Chief, is not a member of
the Armed Forces. He remains a civilian whose duties under the Commander-inChief provision "represent only a part of the organic duties imposed upon him. All
his other functions are clearly civil in nature." 31 His position as a civilian
Commander-in-Chief is consistent with, and a testament to, the constitutional
principle that "civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military." (Article
II, Section 3, 1987 Constitution)

SC held that the President has control of all executive departments, bureaus, and
offices. This presidential power of control over the executive branch of government
extends over all executive officers from Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. As a
corollary rule to the control powers of the President is the Doctrine of Qualified
Political Agency. As the President cannot be expected to exercise his control

Finally, petitioner submits that the creation of a "Special Oversight Committee"

under Section 84 of the Act, especially the inclusion therein of some legislators as
8

members (namely: the respective Chairmen of the Committee on Local Government

and the Committee on National Defense and Security in the Senate, and the
respective Chairmen of the Committee on Public Order and Security and the
Committee on National Defense in the House of Representatives) is an
"unconstitutional encroachment upon and a diminution of, the President's power of
control over all executive departments, bureaus and offices."
But there is not the least interference with the President's power of control under
Section 84. The Special Oversight Committee is simply an ad hoc or transitory body,
established and tasked solely with planning and overseeing the immediate "transfer,
merger and/or absorption" into the Department of the Interior and Local
Governments of the "involved agencies." This it will undertake in accordance with
the phases of implementation already laid down in Section 85 of the Act and once
this is carried out, its functions as well as the committee itself would cease
altogether. 32 As an ad hoc body, its creation and the functions it exercises, decidedly
do not constitute an encroachment and in diminution of the power of control which
properly belongs to the President. What is more, no executive department, bureau or
office is placed under the control or authority, of the committee. 33
As a last word, it would not be amiss to point out here that under the Constitution,
there are the so-called independent Constitutional Commissions, namely: The Civil
Service Commission, Commission on Audit, and the Commission on Elections.
(Article IX-A, Section 1)
As these Commissions perform vital governmental functions, they have to be
protected from external influences and political pressures. Hence, they were made
constitutional bodies, independent of and not under any department of the
government. 34 Certainly, they are not under the control of the President.
The Constitution also created an independent office called the "Commission on
Human Rights." (Article XIII, Section 17[1]).However, this Commission is not on
the same level as the Constitutional Commissions under Article IX, although it is
independent like the latter Commissions. 35 It still had to be constituted thru
Executive Order No. 163 (dated May 5, 1987).
In contrast, Article XVI, Section 6 thereof, merely mandates the statutory creation of
a national police commission that will administer and control the national police
force to be established thereunder.
This commission is, for obvious reasons, not in the same category as
the independent Constitutional Commissions of Article IX and the other
constitutionally created independent Office, namely, the Commission on Human
Rights.
By way of resume, the three Constitutional Commissions (Civil Service, Audit,
Elections) and the additional commission created by the Constitution (Human

Rights) are all independent of the Executive; but the National Police Commission is
not. In fact, it was stressed during the CONCOM deliberations that this commission
would be under the President, and hence may be controlled by the President, thru his
or her alter ego, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government.
BLAQUERA V. ALCALA
(Presidential power of control over executive departments)
ISSUE: WON AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise of presidential
control over executive departments.
HELD:
YES. Implementation of the Employee Suggestions and Incentive Award System has
been decentralized to the President or to the head of each department of agency -
In accordance with rules, regulations, and standards promulgated by the
Commission, the President or the head of each department or agency is authorized
to incur whatever necessary expenses involved in the honorary recognition of
subordinate officers and employees of the government who by their suggestions,
inventions, superior accomplishment, and other personal efforts contribute to the
efficiency, economy, or other improvement of government operations, or who
perform such other extraordinary acts or services in the public interest in connection
with, or in relation to, their official employment.
The President is the head of the government. Governmental power and authority are
exercised and implemented through him. His power includes the control over
executive departments The president shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed (Section 17, Article VII, 1987 Constitution)
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute
judgment of the former for that of the latter.
President was only exercising his power of control.
When the President issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,
enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits without
prior approval from him, and directing the refund of the excess over the prescribed
amount, the President was just exercising his power of control over executive
departments. This is decisively clear from the WHEREAS CLAUSES of AO 268
and AO 29. The President was only exercising his power of control by modifying the
acts of the respondents who granted incentive benefits to their employees without
appropriate clearance from the Office of the President, thereby resulting in the
uneven distribution of government resources. The President did not encroached upon
the authority of the CSC to grant benefits in issuing AO 29 and AO 268
9

Delegation of Power
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC VS. POEA
(Undue delegation of legislative authority)
ISSUE: WON the issuance of Memorandum Circular No. 2 is a violation of nondelegation of powers
HELD: YES.
In questioning the validity of the memorandum circular, Eastern Shipping Lines
contended that POEA was given no authority to promulgate the regulation, and even
with such authorization, the regulation represents an exercise of legislative discretion
which, under the principle, is not subject to delegation.
What Can Be Delegated:
Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated.
What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of
the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature
to the delegate.
GR: Non-delegation of powers.
E: It is true that legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot
be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may
be enforced, not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by
the legislature to the delegate.
Two Tests of Valid Delegation of Legislative Power (MEMORIZE!)
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power,
1.) COMPLETENESS TEST - the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the
delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
2.) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - there must be adequate guidelines or
stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates authority and
prevent the delegation from running riot.
Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
power essentially legislative.
Xxx The delegation of legislative power has become the rule and its non-delegation
the exception.

Rationale for Delegation of Legislative Power

The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of government and the growing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the myriad problems demanding its
attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and
sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be expected to reasonably
comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. Too many of
the problems attendant upon present-day undertakings, the legislature may not have
the competence to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say, specific
solutions. These solutions may, however, be expected from its delegates, who are
supposed to be experts in the particular fields.
Power of Subordinate Legislation
The reasons given above for the delegation of legislative powers in general are
particularly applicable to administrative bodies. With the proliferation of specialized
activities and their attendant peculiar problems, the national legislature has found it
more and more necessary to entrust to administrative agencies the authority to issue
rules to carry out the general provisions of the statute. This is called the power of
subordinate legislation.
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity
or competence to provide. Memorandum Circular No. 2 is one such administrative
regulation.
Power Of Subordinate Legislation:
With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down
in a statute by filling in the details which the Congress may not have the
opportunity or competence to provide. This is effected by their promulgation of what
are known as supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules issued by
the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations have the force
and effect of law.
Accepted Sufficient Standards:
1) public interest;
2) justice and equity;
3) public convenience and welfare;
4) simplicity, economy and efficiency;
5) sense and experience of men; and
6) national security.
ECHEGARAY VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
Tests Of Delegation
(1) COMPLETENESS TEST - what is to be examined:
a) subject matter (what is delegated)
b) scope of the subject matter or measure
c) what job must be done
10

d) authority (who is to do it)

e) scope of authority
(2) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST - what is to be examined:
a) legislative policy (whereas clauses)
b) specific administrative agency to apply the legislative policy
c) scope of the policy and the circumstances under which it is to be
carried out
TATAD VS. SECRETARY OF DEPT. OF ENERGY
We hold that the power and obligation of this Court to pass upon the constitutionality
of laws cannot be defeated by the fact that the challenged law carries serious
economic implications. This Court has struck down laws abridging the political and
civil rights of our people even if it has to offend the other more powerful branches of
government. There is no reason why the Court cannot strike down R.A. No. 8180
that violates the economic rights of our people even if it has to bridle the liberty of
big business within reasonable bounds.
PELAEZ VS. THE AUDITOR GENERAL
(Sufficiency of standards)
ISSUE:WON Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by
virtue of Sec. 68 of the RAC.
HELD:
NO. There was no delegation here. Although Congress may delegate to another
branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the
principle of separation of powers, that said law:
a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate and
b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of
his functions.
In this case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard. Indeed, without a statutory declaration
of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the
essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no
means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within
or beyond the scope of his authority.
Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause as the public welfare may
require which would mean that the President may exercise such power as the
public welfare may require is present, still, such will not replace the standard
needed for a proper delegation of power. In the first place, what the phrase as the
public welfare may require qualifies is the text which immediately precedes hence,

the proper interpretation is the President may change the seat of government within
any subdivision to such place therein as the public welfare may require. Only the
seat of government may be changed by the President when public welfare so requires
and NOT the creation of municipality.
The SC declared that the power to create municipalities is essentially and eminently
legislative in character not administrative (not executive).
DOCTRINES:
The power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of
jurisdiction
between
adjoining
municipalities,
may
partake
of
an administrative nature involving, as it does, the adoption of means and ways
to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities the authority to create
municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature. In the language of other
courts, it is "strictly a legislative function" or "solely and exclusively the exercise of
legislative power". As the Supreme Court of Washington has put it, "municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
The power of control under this provision implies the right of the President to
interfere in the exercise of such discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of
the executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national government, as well as
to act in lieu of such officers. This power is denied by the Constitution to the
Executive, insofar as local governments are concerned. With respect to the latter, the
fundamental law permits him to wield no more authority than that of checking
whether said local governments or the officers thereof perform their duties as
provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot interfere with local
governments, so long as the same or its officers act Within the scope of their
authority. He may not enact an ordinance which the municipal council has failed or
refused to pass, even if it had thereby violated a duty imposed thereto by law,
although he may see to it that the corresponding provincial officials take appropriate
disciplinary action therefor. Neither may he vote, set aside or annul an ordinance
passed by said council within the scope of its jurisdiction, no matter how patently
unwise it may be. He may not even suspend an elective official of a regular
municipality or take any disciplinary action against him, except on appeal from a
decision of the corresponding provincial board.
Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in effect,
remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including therein
the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would thereby
become vacant. Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new municipality
(if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local officials to submit to
his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the power of control denied to
him by the Constitution.

11

Then, also, the power of control of the President over executive departments, bureaus
or offices implies no more than the authority to assume directly the functions thereof
or to interfere in the exercise of discretion by its officials. Manifestly, such control
does not include the authority either to abolish an executive department or bureau, or
to create a new one. As a consequence, the alleged power of the President to create
municipal corporations would necessarily connote the exercise by him of an
authority even greater than that of control which he has over the executive
departments, bureaus or offices. In other words, Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code does not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate
above quoted. Instead of giving the President less power over local governments than
that vested in him over the executive departments, bureaus or offices, it reverses the
process and does the exact opposite, by conferring upon him more power over
municipal corporations than that which he has over said executive departments,
bureaus or offices.
In short, even if it did entail an undue delegation of legislative powers, as it certainly
does, said Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code, approved on
March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by the subsequent adoption of the
Constitution, in 1935, which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment.
ADDITIONAL CASES
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER VS. GARCIA, JR.,
An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by
filling in the details which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence
to provide. However, nowhere under the aforesaid provisions of law are the
regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a common carrier, a transport
operator or other public service.
Exception To The Exception:
The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range
over and above the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount
to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegate non delegari potest.
What has been delegated cannot be delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical
principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be
performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own judgment and not
through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would
indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the
delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus
operators to change and increase their fares at will would result not only to a chaotic
situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would leave the riding public at the
mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every day, every
month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it necessary
to do so.

NON-DELEGATION OF POWERS
The Congress cannot further delegate the power delegated to it by the people. This is
in keeping with the principle of non-delegation of powers which is applicable to all
the three branches of the government. The rule states that what has been delegated
cannot further be delegated potestas delegata non delegari potest. A delegated
power must be discharged directly by the delegate and not through the delegates
agent. It is basically an ethical principle which requires direct performance by the
delegate of an entrusted power. Further delegation therefore constitutes violation of
the trust reposed by the delegator on the delegate. The people, through the
Constitution, delegated lawmaking powers to the Congress, and as such, it cannot as
a rule delegate further the same to another.
Exceptions:
a) In order to address the numerous and complex demands of legislative
function, the Constitution provides exceptions to the rule. Further
delegation
is
permitted
in
the
following
cases:
a) Delegation to the people at large. The Congress further delegates its
legislative power by allowing direct legislation by the people in cases of
initiative and referendum;
b) Delegation of emergency powers to the President. Section 23 (2), Article VI
of the Constitution states that in times of war or other national emergency,
the Congress may, by law, authorize the President, for a limited period and
subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary
and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Emergency powers are
delegated to the President by the Congress to effectively solve the problems
caused by war or other crisis which the Congress could not otherwise solve
with more dispatch than the President;
c) Delegation of tariff powers to the President. Section 28 (2), Article VI of
the Constitution states that the Congress may, by law, authorize the
President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage
and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the
national development program of the Government. Tariff powers are
delegated to the President by the Congress to efficiently and speedily solve
economic problems posed by foreign trade which the Congress could not
otherwise address with more dispatch than the President;
d) Delegation to administrative bodies. The Congress delegates the so called
power of subordinate legislation to administrative bodies. Due to the
growing complexity of modern society, it has become necessary to allow
specialized administrative bodies to promulgate supplementary rules, so that
they can deal with technical problems with more expertise and dispatch than
the Congress or the courts. Regulations or supplementary rules passed by
the administrative bodies are intended to fill-in the gaps and provide details
to what is otherwise a broad statute passed by Congress. For the rules and
12

regulations to be valid and binding, they must be in accordance with the

statute on which they are based, complete in themselves, and fix sufficient
standards. If any of the requirements is not satisfied, the regulation will not
be allowed to affect private rights; and
Delegation to the local governments. This delegation is based on the
principle that the local government is in better position than the national
government to act on purely local concerns. Legislative power is therefore
given to them for effective local legislation.

modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulations, and the
increased difficulty of administering the law."

NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.

As an adjunct to the separation of powers principle, legislative power shall be
exclusively exercised by the body to which the Constitution has conferred the same.
In particular, Section 1, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states that such power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and
a House of Representatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the
provision on initiative and referendum.195 Based on this provision, it is clear that
only Congress, acting as a bicameral body, and the people, through the process of
initiative and referendum, may constitutionally wield legislative power and no other.
This premise embodies the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

The doctrine of presidential control over the executive department likewise furnishes
no basis to uphold the validity of EO 378. As distinguished from supervision, the
doctrine of control finds application in altering acts of the Presidents subordinates.
It does not sanction structural or functional changes even within the executive
department. This is apparent from the following canonical distinction of the two
doctrines: In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or
authority of an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. If the
latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step as
prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand,
means the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what
asubordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter.

e)

EXCEPTIONS TO NON-DELEGABILITY
a) delegated legislative power to local governments which, by immemorial
practice, are allowed to legislate on purely local matters; and
b) constitutionally-grafted exceptions such as the authority of the President to,
by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared
national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress
may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage
dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government.
NON-DELEGABILITY vs. RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY
Notably, the principle of non-delegability should not be confused as a restriction to
delegate rule-making authority to implementing agencies for the limited purpose of
either filling up the details of the law for its enforcement (supplementary rulemaking) or ascertaining facts to bring the law into actual operation (contingent rulemaking). The conceptual treatment and limitations of delegated rule-making were
explained in the case of People v. Maceren as follows:
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the
principle of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondelegation of
legislative powers. Administrative regulations or "subordinate legislation" calculated
to promote the public interest are necessary because of "the growing complexity of

xxxx
Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that the rule-making power must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has
been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory
requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the
statute cannot be sanctioned.

Quasi legislative power or Rule Making Power

ABELLA, JR.. V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
RATIO: Civil Service laws have expressly empowered the CSC to issue and enforce
rules and regulations to carry out its mandate. In the exercise of its authority, the
CSC deemed it appropriate to clearly define and identify positions covered by the
Career Executive Service. Logically, the CSC had to issue guidelines to meet this
objective, specifically through the issuance of the challenged Circular.
On petitioners averment that he was not afforded due process for CSCs alleged
failure to notify him of a hearing relating to the issuance of the challenged Circular,
is not convincing. The issuance of the circular was an exercise of a quasilegislative function as such, prior notice to and hearing of every affected party, as
elements of due process, are not required since there is no determination of past
events or facts that have to be established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior
notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of rules or regulations
promulgated to govern future conduct.
Since petitioner had no CES eligibility, the CSC correctly denied his permanent
appointment. The appointee need not have been previously heard, because the nature
of the action did not involve the imposition of an administrative disciplinary
13

measure. The CSC, in approving or disapproving an appointment, merely examines

the conformity of the appointment with the law and the appointees possession of all
the minimum qualifications and none of the disqualification. In sum, while petitioner
was able to demonstrate his standing to appeal the CSC Resolutions to the courts, he
failed to prove his eligibility to the position he was appointed to.
DOCTRINES:
1.) Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed
by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only
condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required
by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground
that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This
is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the
appointing authority can decide.
Significantly, the selection of the appointee -- taking into account the totality of his
qualifications, including those abstract qualities that define his personality -- is the
prerogative of the appointing authority. No tribunal, not even this Court, may
compel the exercise of an appointment for a favored person.
The CSCs disapproval of an appointment is a challenge to the exercise of the
appointing authoritys discretion. The appointing authority must have the right to
contest the disapproval. Thus, Section 2 of Rule VI of CSC Memorandum Circular
40, s. 1998 is justified insofar as it allows the appointing authority to request
reconsideration or appeal.
2.) The classification of positions in career service was a quasi-legislative, not
a quasi-judicial, issuance. This distinction determines whether prior notice
and hearing are necessary
In exercising its quasi-judicial function, an administrative body adjudicates the
rights of persons before it, in accordance with the standards laid down by the
law. The determination of facts and the applicable law, as basis for official
action and the exercise of judicial discretion, are essential for the performance of
this function. On these considerations, it is elementary that due process
requirements, as enumerated in Ang Tibay, must be observed. These
requirements include prior notice and hearing.
On the other hand, quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative
agencies through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines
of the granting statute and the doctrine of non-delegation of certain powers
flowing from the separation of the great branches of the government. Prior
notice to and hearing of every affected party, as elements of due process, are not
required since there is no determination of past events or facts that have to be
established or ascertained. As a general rule, prior notice and hearing are not

essential to the validity of rules or regulations promulgated to govern future

conduct.
Significantly, the challenged Circular was an internal matter addressed to heads of
departments, bureaus and agencies. It needed no prior publication, since it had been
issued as an incident of the administrative bodys power to issue guidelines for
government officials to follow in performing their duties.
SMART COMMUNICATION V. NTC
(Quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers distinguished)
Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasijudicial or administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making
power is the power to make rules and regulations which results in delegated
legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and the doctrine of nondelegability and separability of powers.
The rules and regulations that administrative agencies promulgate, which are the
product of a delegated legislative power to create new and additional legal provisions
that have the effect of law, should be within the scope of the statutory authority
granted by the legislature to the administrative agency. It is required that the
regulation be germane to the objects and purposes of the law, and be not in
contradiction to, but in conformity with, the standards prescribed by law. [17] They
must conform to and be consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order
for such rule or regulation to be valid. Constitutional and statutory provisions
control with respect to what rules and regulations may be promulgated by an
administrative body, as well as with respect to what fields are subject to regulation
by it. It may not make rules and regulations which are inconsistent with the
provisions of the Constitution or a statute, particularly the statute it is administering
or which created it, or which are in derogation of, or defeat, the purpose of a
statute. In case of conflict between a statute and an administrative order, the former
must prevail.
Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an
administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power. This
is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is
to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially
of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
14

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an

administrative agency, a party need not exhaust administrative remedies before going
to court. This principle applies only where the act of the administrative agency
concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. In Association of
Philippine Coconut Dessicators v. Philippine Coconut Authority, it was held:
The rule of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies before a party may seek
judicial review, so strenuously urged by the Solicitor General on behalf of
respondent, has obviously no application here. The resolution in question was issued
by the PCA in the exercise of its rule- making or legislative power. However, only
judicial review of decisions of administrative agencies made in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial function is subject to the exhaustion doctrine.
Even assuming arguendo that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies
apply in this case, the records reveal that petitioners sufficiently complied with this
requirement. Even during the drafting and deliberation stages leading to the issuance
of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000, petitioners were able to register their
protests to the proposed billing guidelines. They submitted their respective position
papers setting forth their objections and submitting proposed schemes for the billing
circular. After the same was issued, petitioners wrote successive letters dated July 3,
200 and July 5, 2000, asking for the suspension and reconsideration of the so-called
Billing Circular. These letters were not acted upon until October 6, 2000, when
respondent NTC issued the second assailed Memorandum implementing certain
provisions of the Billing Circular. This was taken by petitioners as a clear denial of
the requests contained in their previous letters, thus prompting them to seek judicial
relief.
In like manner, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the
administrative agency exercises its quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in
cases involving specialized disputes, the practice has been to refer the same to an
administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. The courts will not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that
question by the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of
sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and
services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of
fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the premises of the
regulatory statute administered. The objective of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
is to guide a court in determining whether it should refrain from exercising its
jurisdiction until after an administrative agency has determined some question or
some aspect of some question arising in the proceeding before the court. It applies
where the claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory
scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in

such case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view.
However, where what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or
regulation issued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasilegislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. The
determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative
agency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regular
courts. Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial
courts. This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the
courts to determine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political
departments. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
In the case at bar, the issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000
and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislative or
rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial
power of the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the
said issuances. In Drilon v. Lim, it was held:
We stress at the outset that the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the
constitutionality of Section 187, this authority being embraced in the general
definition of the judicial power to determine what are the valid and binding laws by
the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law. Specifically, B.P. 129 vests
in the regional trial courts jurisdiction over all civil cases in which the subject of the
litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation, even as the accused in a criminal
action has the right to question in his defense the constitutionality of a law he is
charged with violating and of the proceedings taken against him, particularly as they
contravene the Bill of Rights. Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
vests in the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over final judgments and orders of
lower courts in all cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
In their complaint before the Regional Trial Court, petitioners averred that the
Circular contravened Civil Code provisions on sales and violated the constitutional
prohibition against the deprivation of property without due process of law. These are
within the competence of the trial judge. Contrary to the finding of the Court of
Appeals, the issues raised in the complaint do not entail highly technical
matters. Rather, what is required of the judge who will resolve this issue is a basic
15

familiarity with the workings of the cellular telephone service, including prepaid
SIM and call cards and this is judicially known to be within the knowledge of a
good percentage of our population and expertise in fundamental principles of civil
law and the Constitution.
Hence, the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction to hear and decide Civil Case No.
Q-00-42221. The Court of Appeals erred in setting aside the orders of the trial court
and in dismissing the case.
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. VS. CA
(Nature of quasi-legislative power)
It is not an answer to say that E.O. No. 1088 should not be considered a statute
because that would imply the withdrawal of power from the PPA. What determines
whether an act is a law or an administrative issuance is not its form but its nature. Here
as we have already said, the power to fix the rates of charges for a service, including
pilotage service, has always been regarded as legislative in character.

power and authority as mandated by Sec. 10 (1), Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution,
which provides that the President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, exercises general supervision over all local
governments as may be provided by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.
Sec. 63 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that administrative acts and
commands of the President of the Philippines touching the organization or mode of
operation of the Government or rearranging or readjusting any of the district,
divisions, parts or ports of the Philippines, and all acts and commands governing the
general performance of duties by public employees or disposing of issues of general
concern shall be made in executive orders.

Its legislative purpose is the rationalization of pilotage service charges, through the
imposition of uniform and adjusted rates for foreign and coastwise vessels in all
Philippine ports. We conclude that E.O. No. 1088 is a valid statute and that the PPA is
duty bound to comply with its provisions. The PPA may increase the rates but it may
not decrease them below those mandated by E.O. No. 1088.

Sec 74 of the same Code provides that All executive functions of the government of
the Republic of the Philippines shall be directly under the Executive Departments
subject to the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines in matters of
general policy. The Departments are established for the proper distribution of the
work of the Executive, for the performance of the functions expressly assigned to
them by law, and in order that each branch of the administration may have a chief
responsible for its direction and policy. Each Department Secretary shall assume the
burden of, and responsibility for, all activities of the Government under his control
and supervision.

Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they
are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. It is axiomatic that an administrative
agency, like the PPA, has no discretion whether to implement the law or not. Its duty
is to enforce it. Unarguably, therefore, if there is any conflict between the PPA circular
and a law, such as EO 1088, the latter prevails.

Sec. 79-A of the same Code provides, in part, that executive orders, regulations,
decrees and proclamations relative to matters under the supervision or jurisdiction of
a Department, the promulgation whereof is expressly assigned by law to the
President of the Philippines, shall as a general rule, be issued upon proposition and
recommendation of the respective Department."

ARANETA VS. GATMAITAN

(Administrative regulation must be reasonable)
ISSUE: WON the President is empowered by law to issue the executive orders.

The Presidents exercise of such authority does not constitute undue delegation of
powers of Congress because

HELD:
YES. The words found in Secs. 6, 13 and 75 of Act 4003 (The Fisheries Law), as
amended by Sec. 1 of CA 471, clearly declare unlawful and fixes the penalty for the
taking, except for scientific or educational purposes or propagation, destroying or
killing of any fish or fish eggs. Said provisions authorize the Agriculture and Natural
Resources Secretary to promulgate regulations restricting the use of any fish net or
fishing device for the protection of fry or fish eggs, and establish reservations/fish
refuges and sanctuaries to be administered in the manner he prescribes. Hence, with
or without the questioned Executive Orders, the restriction and banning of trawl
fishing are within the powers of the Agriculture and Natural Resources Secretary.
The President, being the head of the Executive Department, can exercise the same

The true distinction between delegation of the power to legislate and the conferring
of authority or discretion as to the execution of law consists in that the former
necessarily involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, while in the latter the
authority or discretion as to its execution has to be exercised under and in pursuance
of the law. The first cannot be done; the latter can be done.
The Legislature cannot delegate legislative power to enact any law. If a law is a law
unto itself, and it does nothing more than to authorize the official to make rules and
regulations to carry it into effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no
delegation of power and it is valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not
define a crime and is not complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to
make it a law or a crime, the doing of which is vested in the office, the act is
delegation of legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
16

THE POWER TO DELEGATE. The Legislature cannot delegate legislative

power to enact any law. If Act No. 2868 is a law unto itself, and it does nothing more
than to authorize the Governor-General to make rules and regulations to carry it into
effect, then the Legislature created the law. There is no delegation of power and it is
valid. On the other hand, if the act within itself does not define a crime and is not
complete, and some legislative act remains to be done to make it a law or a crime,
the doing of which is vested in the Governor-General, the act is delegation of
legislative power, is unconstitutional and void.
TAYUG RURAL BANK VS. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILS
(Administrative rule with penal sanction)
ISSUE: WON the Central Bank can validly impose the 10% penalty on Appellee's
past overdue loans beginning July 4, 1965, by virtue of Memorandum Circular No.
DLC-8 dated December 23, 1964.
HELD:
NO. Administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law. There are,
however, limitations to the rule-making power of administrative agencies. A rule
shaped out by jurisprudence is that when Congress authorizes promulgation of
administrative rules and regulations to implement given legislation, all that is
required is that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the
standards that the law prescribes. The rule delineating the extent of the binding force
to be given to administrative rules and regulations was explained by the Court
in Teoxon v. Member of the Board of Administrators (33 SCRA 588), thus: "The
recognition of the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in the
implementation of the statute, as necessarily limited to what is provided for in the
legislative enactment.
The Court held in the same case that "A rule is binding on the courts so long as the
procedure fixed for its promulgation is followed and its scope is within the statute
granted by the legislature, even if the courts are not in agreement with the policy
stated therein or its innate wisdom ...." On the other hand, "administrative
interpretation of the law is at best merely advisory, for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means." Indeed, it cannot be otherwise as the Constitution
limits the authority of the President, in whom all executive power resides, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. No lesser administrative, executive office,
or agency then can, contrary to the express language of the Constitution, assert for
itself a more extensive prerogative. Necessarily, it is bound to observe the
constitutional mandate. There must be strict compliance with the legislative
enactment. Hence an administrative agency cannot impose a penalty not so provided
in the law authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations, much less one
that is applied retroactively.

Quasi-Judicial Power
DOLE PHILIPPINES INC. V. ESTEVA
(Nature of quasi-judicial power)
ISSUE/S: WON the DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasijudicial power.
HELD:
YES. The DOLE Secretary is in the nature of having/exercising quasi-judicial power.
It is obvious that the visitorial and enforcement power granted to the DOLE
Secretary is in the nature of a quasi-judicial power. Quasi-judicial power has been
described by this Court in the following manner
Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the other hand is the power
of the administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the
power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. The administrative body exercises its
quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manner an act which is essentially
of an executive or administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner is
incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the
administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them
as basis for their official action and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since
rights of specific persons are affected it is elementary that in the proper exercise of
quasi-judicial power due process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
The DOLE Secretary, under Article 106 of the Labor Code, as amended, exercise
quasi-judicial power, at least, to the extent necessary to determine violations of labor
standards provisions of the Code and other labor legislation. He can issue
compliance orders and writs of execution for the enforcement of his orders. As
evidence of the importance and binding effect of the compliance orders of the DOLE
Secretary, Article 128 of the Labor Code, as amended, further provides
ART. 128. Visitorial and enforcement power.
xxxx
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person or entity to obstruct, impede, delay or
otherwise render ineffective the orders of the Secretary of Labor or his duly
authorized representatives issued pursuant to the authority granted under this article,
and no inferior court or entity shall issue temporary or permanent injunction or
restraining order or otherwise assume jurisdiction over any case involving the
enforcement orders issued in accordance with this article.

17

The Orders of DOLE Regional Director Parel, dated 19 September 1993, and of
DOLE Undersecretary Trajano, dated 15 September 1994, consistently found that
CAMPCO was engaging in labor-only contracting. Such finding constitutes res
judicata in the case filed by the respondents with the NLRC.
It is well-established in this jurisdiction that the decisions and orders of
administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have
upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the
purview of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata, which forbids the
reopening of a matter once judicially determined by competent authority, applies as
well to the judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative
officers and boards acting within their jurisdiction as to the judgments of courts
having general judicial powers. The orderly administration of justice requires that the
judgments or resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial body must reach a point of
finality set by the law, rules and regulations, so as to write finis to disputes once and
for all. This is a fundamental principle in the Philippine justice system, without
which there would be no end to litigations.
Res judicata has dual aspects, "bar by prior judgment" and "conclusiveness of
judgment." This Court has previously clarified the difference between the two
Section 49, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the dual aspects of
res judicata in actions in personam. to wit:
"Effect of judgment. - The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court or
judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order,
may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly
adjudged or as to any other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in interest by title subsequent to
the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity;
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that
only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto."
Section 49(b) enunciates the first concept of res judicata known as "bar by prior
judgment," whereas, Section 49(c) is referred to as "conclusiveness of judgment."
There is "bar by former judgment" when, between the first case where the judgment
was rendered, and the second case where such judgment is invoked, there is identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action. When the three identities are present,
the judgment on the merits rendered in the first constitutes an absolute bar to the

subsequent action. But where between the first case wherein Judgment is rendered
and the second case wherein such judgment is invoked, there is only identity of
parties but there is no identity of cause of action, the judgment is conclusive in the
second case, only as to those matters actually and directly controverted and
determined, and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is what is termed
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The second concept of res judicata, conclusiveness of judgment, is the one
applicable to the case at bar.
CUENCA VS. ATAS
(Cardinal primary requirements of procedural due process)
ISSUE: WON the Petitioner is right when he challenged the CA decision on the
ground that he was denied due process.
HELD:No.
RATIO: In administrative and quasi-judicial proceedings where the magistrates or
tribunals hearing the case are not bound by the niceties and finer points of judicial
due process, the CARDINAL PRIMARY REQUIREMENTS OF
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS:
1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. x x x
2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case
and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must considerthe evidence presented. x x x
3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to
decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be
disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. x x x
4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or
conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G. R. No. 45844,
promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O.G. 1335), but
the evidence must be substantial. x x x
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected. x x x
6) The [c]ourt x x x or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or
his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in
arriving at a decision. x x x
7) [The court] should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions
18

rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the

authority conferred upon it.

Indeed, the rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on
substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority.
It is well-settled that factual findings of administrative agencies are generally held to
be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the
records of the case. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over
again the evidence and the credibility of witnesses presented before the lower court,
tribunal, or office, as we are not a trier of facts. Our jurisdiction is limited to
reviewing and revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latters findings
of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court.
VIVO vs. PAGCOR
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very
heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process is to be heard,
and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and
reasonable opportunity to explain ones side, or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Administrative due
process cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense,
for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and
technical rules of procedure are not strictly applied.
LEDESMA V. COURT OF APPEALS
Doctrine of due process in administrative proceedings
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all
situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied when a
person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to
explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings, the filing of
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to
answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements
of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side,
or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of.

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with

"judicial process" for a trial in court is not always essential to due
process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since
they rest upon different principles. The due process clause
guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are

not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative

character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due
process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is
met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before
the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial
and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the
making of such determination may be raised and considered. One
adequate hearing is all that due process requires.
SANTIAGO VS. ALIKPALA
First requirement of procedural due process, namely, the existence of the court or
tribunal clothed with judicial, or quasi-judicial, power to hear and determine the
matter before it.
There is the express admission in the statement of facts that respondents, as a courtmartial, were not convened to try petitioner but someone else, the action taken
against petitioner being induced solely by a desire to avoid the effects of
prescription; it would follow then that the absence of a competent court or tribunal is
most marked and undeniable. Such a denial of due process is therefore fatal to its
assumed authority to try petitioner.
FABELLA vs. CA
In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the
following:
1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of
proceedings which may affect a respondents legal rights;
2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of
counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to
defend ones rights;
3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as
to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee
of honesty as well as impartiality; and
4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or
contained in the records or made known to the parties affected.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the
administrative charges against private respondents did not include a representative
of the local or, in its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers
organization as required by Section 9 of RA 4670. Accordingly, these committees
were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus, all proceedings undertaken
by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the suspension
or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal.
It was this requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to
19

be heard. Indeed, in any proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is

embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.
MADENILLA vs. CSC
Due process of law implies the right of the person affected thereby to be present
before the tribunal which pronounces judgment upon the question of life, liberty, and
property in its most comprehensive sense; to be heard, by testimony or otherwise,
and to have the right of controverting, by proof, every material fact which bears on
the question of the light in the matter involved."
The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. The presence of a party is
not always the cornerstone of due process. In the case at bar, any defect was cured by
the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
SEC VS. GMA NETWORK, INC.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC
by R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits
the courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and
within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily
infringes on a persons right to property.

LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a
legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character.

CARINO VS. CHR

The CHR has the power to investigate but not to adjudicate alleged human right
violation.
Investigate means to examine, inquire, explore.
Adjudicate to resolve, rule, settle, decide.
MEGAWORLD GLOBUS ASIA VS. DSM CONSTRUCTION
Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are
generally accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

LUPANGCO vs. CA
Quasi-judicial is defined as a term applied to the action, discretion, etc., of public
administrative officers or bodies required to investigate facts, or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for
their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. To expound
thereon, quasi-judicial adjudication would mean a determination of rights, privileges
and duties resulting in a decision or order which applies to a specific situation . This
does not cover rules and regulations of general applicability issued by the
administrative body to implement its purely administrative policies and functions
like Resolution No. 105 which was adopted by the respondent PRC as a measure to
preserve the integrity of licensure examinations.
SCENARIOS, INC. VS. VINLUAN
(Technical rules not applicable)
ISSUE: WON Scenarios Inc., was denied of procedural due process.
HELD: NO. Service of notices and resolutions, including summons, in cases filed
before the labor arbiters is governed by Sections 5 and 6 of Rule III of the New
NLRC Rules of Procedure.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule that unless the contrary is proven, official duty is
presumed to have been performed regularly and judicial proceedings regularly
conducted. This presumption of the regularity of the quasi-judicial proceedings
before the NLRC includes the presumption of regularity of service of summons and
other notices. It is therefore incumbent upon herein petitioners to rebut that legal
presumption with competent and proper evidence, for the return of the registered
mail as unclaimed is prima facie proof of the facts indicated therein.

PISON-ARCEO AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

VS. NLRC
(Procedural rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed)
ISSUE: WON the NLRC decision is valid and binding upon petitioner PADC even
when it was not impleaded in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the subsequent
appeal to the NLRC.
HELD: Yes.
RATIO:The Supreme Court stressed that in quasi-judicial proceedings, procedural
rules governing service of summons are not strictly construed. Substantial
compliance thereof is sufficient. Also, in labor cases, punctilious adherence to
stringent technical rules may be relaxed in the interest of the working man; it should
not defeat the complete and equitable resolution of the rights and obligations of the
20

parties. The Court said that it is ever mindful of the underlying spirit and intention of
the Labor Code to ascertain the facts of each case speedily and objectively without
regard to technical rules of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. So
long as there is a substantial compliance, a party can be placed under the jurisdiction
of the labor court.
In the case at bar, there is substantial compliance when summons was served to Jose
Edmundo Pison who was also the administrator of the Hacienda. Petitioner is
therefore adequately represented by Pison in the proceedings in the labor tribunal. If
at all, the non-inclusion of the corporate name of PADC in the case before the
executive labor arbiter was a mere procedural error which did not at all affect the
jurisdiction of the labor tribunals.
PASCUAL VS BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS
(Right against self-incrimination)
UNITED PEPSI-COLA SUPERVISORY UNION VS. LAGUESMA
SEC. 3. Employees' Right to Self-Organization. -- Employees shall have the right to
self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing
for the purpose of collective bargaining through representatives of their own
choosing and to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid and protection. Individuals employed as supervisors
shall not be eligible for membership in a labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may form separate organizations of their own.
For its part, the Supreme Court upheld in several of its decisions the right of
supervisors to organize for purposes of labor relations.
Although it had a definition of the term "supervisor," the Industrial Peace Act did not
define the term "manager." But, using the commonly-understood concept of
"manager," as above stated, it is apparent that the law used the term "supervisors" to
refer to the sub-group of "managerial employees" known as front-line managers. The
other sub-group of "managerial employees," known as managers per se, was not
covered.
However, in Caltex Filipino Managers and Supervisors Association v. Court of
Industrial Relations, the right of all managerial employees to self-organization was
upheld as a general proposition, thus:
It would be going too far to dismiss summarily the point raised by respondent
Company - that of the alleged identity of interest between the managerial staff and
the employing firm. That should ordinarily be the case, especially so where the
dispute is between management and the rank and file. It does not necessarily follow
though that what binds the managerial staff to the corporation forecloses the
possibility of conflict between them. There could be a real difference between what

the welfare of such group requires and the concessions the firm is willing to
grant. Their needs might not be attended to then in the absence of any organization
of their own. Nor is this to indulge in empty theorizing. The record of respondent
Company, even the very case cited by it, is proof enough of their uneasy and
troubled relationship. Certainly the impression is difficult to erase that an alien firm
failed to manifest sympathy for the claims of its Filipino executives. To predicate
under such circumstances that agreement inevitably marks their relationship,
ignoring that discord would not be unusual, is to fly in the face of reality.
. . . The basic question is whether the managerial personnel can organize. What
respondent Company failed to take into account is that the right to self-organization
is not merely a statutory creation. It is fortified by our Constitution. All are free to
exercise such right unless their purpose is contrary to law. Certainly it would be to
attach unorthodoxy to, not to say an emasculation of, the concept of law if managers
as such were precluded from organizing. Having done so and having been duly
registered, as did occur in this case, their union is entitled to all the rights under
Republic Act No. 875. Considering what is denominated as unfair labor practice
under Section 4 of such Act and the facts set forth in our decision, there can be only
one answer to the objection raised that no unfair labor practice could be committed
by respondent Company insofar as managerial personnel is concerned. It is, as is
quite obvious, in the negative.
Right of Self-Organization of Managerial Employees under the Labor Code
Thus, the dictum in the Caltex case which allowed at least for the theoretical
unionization of top and middle managers by assimilating them with the supervisory
group under the broad phrase "managerial personnel," provided the lynchpin for later
laws denying the right of self-organization not only to top and middle management
employees but to front line managers or supervisors as well. Following the Caltex
case, the Labor Code, promulgated in 1974 under martial law, dropped the
distinction between the first and second sub-groups of managerial
employees. Instead of treating the terms "supervisor" and "manager" separately, the
law lumped them together and called them "managerial employees," as follows:
ART. 212. Definitions . . . .
(k) "Managerial Employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off,
recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees, or to effectively recommend such
managerial actions. All employees not falling within this definition are considered
rank and file employees for purposes of this Book.
The definition shows that it is actually a combination of the commonly understood
definitions of both groups of managerial employees, grammatically joined by the
phrase "and/or."

21

This general definition was perhaps legally necessary at that time for two reasons.
First, the 1974 Code denied supervisors their right to self-organize as theretofore
guaranteed to them by the Industrial Peace Act. Second, it stood the dictum in the
Caltex case on its head by prohibiting all types of managers from forming unions.
The explicit general prohibition was contained in the then Art. 246 of the Labor
Code.

held a strike. Thereafter, ACCO and FEDLU filed a case in the Court of Industrial
Relations. The CIR found Atlantic Container Corporation and Jacinto guilty of unfair
labor practice and ordering them to cease and desist from further committing the
same and to reinstate complaints striking members. They filed motions to reconsider
the said decision, presumably for the reinstatement of all the petitioners, but the CIR
denied the motions.

The practical effect of this synthesis of legal concepts was made apparent in the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which the Department of Labor
promulgated on January 19, 1975. Book V, Rule II, 11 of the Rules provided:

The petitioners again filed a charge with the CIR alleging that the named respondents
established a corporation which was an alter ego of Atlantic and which was allegedly
organized to engage in the identical business as Atlantic Container, absorbing all the
assets including the facilities and machineries.

Supervisory unions and unions of security guards to cease operation. - All existing
supervisory unions and unions of security guards shall, upon the effectivity of the
Code, cease to operate as such and their registration certificates shall be deemed
automatically cancelled. However, existing collective agreements with such unions,
the life of which extends beyond the date of effectivity of the Code, shall be
respected until their expiry date insofar as the economic benefits granted therein are
concerned.

When the CIR was abolished, the case was transferred to NLRC which ordered the
reinstatement of complainants. Only 86 out of the 136 petitioners were ordered
reinstated. The appeal was dismissed, based on the ground of Res Judicata.
Petitioners appealed to the Minister of Labor through respondent Deputy Minister
Inciong who affirmed the NLRC decision.
ISSUE: WON the cause of action was barred by the principle of Res Judicata

Members of supervisory unions who do not fall within the definition of managerial
employees shall become eligible to join or assist the rank and file labor organization,
and if none exists, to form or assist in the forming of such rank and file
organization. The determination of who are managerial employees and who are not
shall be the subject of negotiation between representatives of the supervisory union
and the employer. If no agreement is reached between the parties, either or both of
them may bring the issue to the nearest Regional Office for determination.
The Department of Labor continued to use the term "supervisory unions" despite the
demise of the legal definition of "supervisor" apparently because these were the
unions of front line managers which were then allowed as a result of the statutory
grant of the right of self-organization under the Industrial Peace Act. Had the
Department of Labor seen fit to similarly ban unions of top and middle managers
which may have been formed following the dictum in Caltex, it obviously would
have done so. Yet it did not, apparently because no such unions of top and middle
managers really then existed.
DELFIN VS. INCIONG
(Res Adjudicata)
FACTS: The 136 petitioners herein are former employees of private respondent
Atlantic Container Corporation, organized themselves into Atlantic Container
Employees Organization (ACCO) and affiliated with the Federation of Democratic
Labor Unions (FEDLU).
Claiming that Atlantic and its General Manager, private respondent Roberto Jacinto,
refused to implement the Collective Bargaining Agreement, petitioners and FEDLU

HELD: Yes.
RATIO: While it is true that the complainant in the first charge was the union, in
reality it had no material interest in the outcome of the case. The real party who
stands to be benefited or defeated by the case brought in the name of the union is the
union members themselves. Since the judgment therein had become final and
executory, the subsequent filing of another charge against Atlantic for the same
violations committed during its existence is barred by Res Judicata. The bringing of
the same action in the name of the individual members of the union will not take out
the case from the ambit of the principle of Res Judicata.
JUDGE BASILLA VS. BECAMON (additional)
Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present
administrative case becomes dismissible. The Court held that applied the principle of
res judicata or bar by prior judgment. Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been
adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally
and conclusively settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same
parties and for the same cause. It provides that a final judgment on the merits
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the
parties and their privies; and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the
ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has
litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction,
and should not be permitted to litigate it again. This principle frees the parties from
undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the
22

same time, it prevents the clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata
stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.
ABELITA VS. DORIA (additional)
For res judicata to apply, the following requisites must be present:
a. the former judgment or order must be final;
b. it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after
a consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at
the trial of the case;
c. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
d. there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter, and of cause of action; this requisite is satisfied if the two
actions are substantially between the same parties.
ADDITIONAL CASES
QUASI JUDICIAL
The Court has classified the functions the COMELEC exercises into the quasijudicial, quasi-legislative, and administrative in Bedol v. Commission on
Elections, to wit:
The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred
upon it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code,
may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and quasijudicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC embraces the
power to resolve controversies arising from the enforcement of
election laws, and to be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections, returns,
and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative power refers to the issuance
of rules and regulations to implement the election laws and to
exercise such legislative functions as may expressly be delegated
to it by Congress. Its administrative function refers to the
enforcement and administration of election laws. In the exercise of
such power, the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the
Omnibus Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC
to issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.
The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is
the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines Inc. v.
Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory

power on the other hand is the power of the
administrative agency to adjudicate the rights of
persons before it. It is the power to hear and determine
questions of fact to which the legislative policy is to
apply and to decide in accordance with the standards
laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an
executive or administrative nature, where the power to
act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably
necessary for the performance of the executive or
administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their
quasi-judicial functions the administrative officers or
bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the
existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official
action and exercise of discretion in a judicial
nature. Since rights of specific persons are affected, it
is elementary that in the proper exercise of quasijudicial power due process must be observed in the
conduct of the proceedings.
I emphasize without hesitation that in order to properly proceed against the
COMELEC, an aggrieved party must choose the proper remedy. The choice depends
on which function quasi-judicial, quasi-legislative, and administrative
the COMELEC has discharged in doing the assailed action. It is true that
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court,[3] the remedy of an aggrieved
party against a judgment or final order or resolution of the COMELEC is a special
civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 brought in the Supreme Court. In Macabago
v. Commission on Elections,[4] however, the Court has clarified that Rule 64 applies
only to the judgments or final orders or final resolutions rendered by the COMELEC
in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function (that is, the power to resolve
controversies arising from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge
of all pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to the elections,
returns, and qualifications).
Meaning and Characteristics of Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power
1) adjudicatory power involves specific parties
2) exercise of the power is done in a judicial manner
3) exercised by a person or body other than a judge
4) requires notice and hearing
5) set different requirements before going to court
23

6) when a body is exercising quasi-judicial function, it is co-equal with the

RTC
SANADO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or
revoking, a license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and
necessity is administrative or quasi-judicial. The act is not purely administrative but
quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent upon the ascertainment of facts by
the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made and rights and
liabilities determined.
Quasi-Judicial Function
As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of
quasi-judicial functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts
and co-equal bodies have no power to control the other. However, although under
B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgmentof
regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14 specifically provides in
section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all such
cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive
and original jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or
challenge the Commission's acts or orders in such cases must seek recourse in the
same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with exclusive and original
jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject to
review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.
PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. VS. SEC OF EDUCATION
CULTURE AND SPORTS
QUASI-LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a
legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character.
REQUIREMENTS FOR VALID EXERCISE
(1) Jurisdiction
Q: How is jurisdiction determined?
A: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and by the Constitution. Thus, in order to
determine who has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, one only needs to look
at the law whether or not it confers jurisdiction on the body.

Q: How do you resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between a quasi-judicial body

and the court?
A: First, determine what the controversy is all about. Is the plaintiff questioning
whether an administrative body has a certain power? Or is he questioning how said
power was exercised? In the first, the particular law creating the body must be
considered in order to determine whether or not the administrative body has
authority. If the law has been entrusted to that body for its implementation and such
law vests authority in said body, then it has jurisdiction. Upon the other hand, if the
case puts in issue, not whether the body has authority, but the questionable manner it
is exercised, then the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether or not in the
exercise of such powers rights and obligations have been impaired.
(2) Due Process
Q: What is meant by opportunity to be heard?
A: It is the essence of due process. Due process in administrative proceedings
includes the opportunity to be heard OR the opportunity to explain ones side OR the
opportunity to seek reconsideration UNLESS administrative rules on proceeding do
not allow such motion for reconsideration. Thus, an opportunity to be heard does
not require physical presence; for as long as the party is provided a remedy with
which he can appeal his case or seek relief from an adverse judgment, then due
process is complied with.
Res judicata in administrative decisions
OCHO VS. CALOS,
The doctrine of res judicata applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings.
The doctrine actually embraces two concepts: the first is bar by prior judgment and
the second is conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept is explained thus: The general rule precluding the relitigation of
material facts or questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are
commonly applied to all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of
litigation. Thus it extends to questions necessarily involved in an issue, and
necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment, although no
specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters
were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment
could not have been rendered without deciding the particular matter, it will be
considered as having settled that matter as to all future actions between the parties,
and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as conclusive as
the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all
the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or
decided by the court leading up to the final conclusion upon which such conclusion
is based is as effectually passed upon as the ultimate question which is solved.
24

QUASI LEGISLATIVE
Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation; Limitations
rule-making power
cannot contravene a statute or the Constitution
rules are not laws but have the force and effect of laws - partakes of the
nature of statute
enjoy presumption of legality - therefore courts should respect and apply
them UNLESS declared invalid; all other agencies should likewise respect
them
Q: Distinguish between Legislative and Quasi-Legislative power.
A:
Legislative
Quasi-Legislative
vested in the Legislature
power is in the nature of subordinate
legislation or the rule-making power
delegated to administrative bodies
plenary
not plenary and therefore subject to
limitations e.g. Constitution, statute,
and administrative law limitations such
as the tests for valid delegation.
includes the power to determine what the includes the power to determine how the
law is and how it shall be applied.
law is to be applied but not what the law
is;
administrative
bodies
cannot
determine the legality or illegality of an
act, NOT UNLESS they are duly
authorized by Congress
Q: Distinguish between Judicial and Quasi-Judicial power.
Judicial
Quasi-Judicial
is original, vested in the judiciary
is derivative, a product of valid
delegation of power to administrative
bodies.
includes the determination of rights and temporary in nature as courts have the
obligations conclusively
final say
a primary power exercised by the is incidental to the primary function of
judiciary
administrative bodies of implementing
and enforcing laws.
(NOTA BENE: It is called quasi-judicial because it is a power that belongs to the
judiciary but is exercised by a non-judicial body. In addition, it is only incidental to
the primary function of implementation and enforcement of laws.)
Q: Why is it important to distinguish between quasi-legislative and quasijudicial power?

A: It is important to distinguish between these two powers of administrative bodies

because there are certain rules and principles in administrative law, which apply to
one but not to the other. Thus, the requirements of due process (notice & hearing)
apply when the administrative body is exercising quasi-judicial functions because
such power includes the determination of rights and obligations. On the other hand,
there is generally no need of prior notice & hearing in the exercise of quasilegislative power. Likewise the prior exhaustion of remedies and the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction do not apply in quasi-legislative processes, and only in the
exercise of quasi-judicial functions. And finally, a body exercising quasi-judicial
functions is considered equivalent to a regional trial court. Hence, one can seek relief
from its judgment by appealing to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,
depending on the mode of appeal. A body exercising quasi-legislative functions is
not considered equivalent to a court. Hence, one can resort to the regional trial court
to obtain relief.
Administrative Appeal and Review
SUYAT JR. VS. TORRES
(Appeal to the president)

TAN VS. DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY

(Appeal To The President)
FACTS: Tan submitted his application for the bidding of a land. Questions arose as
to the wisdom of having the area declared as a forest reserve or allow the same to be
awarded to the most qualified bidder. Meanwhile, Tan won the bidding process.
However, President Garcia directed the declaration of the subject land as watershed
forest land, hence not available for exploitation. As a result, Director of Forestry
revoked the award to Tan. Tan filed a case in court.
ISSUE: WON the appeal to the court is the proper remedy.
HELD: No.
Petitioner-appellant did not appeal the order of the respondent Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to the President of the Philippines, who issued
Executive Proclamation No. 238 withdrawing the area from private exploitation, and
establishing it as the Olongapo Watershed Forest Reserve. Considering that the
President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of the respondentsappellees, the failure of the petitioner-appellant to take that appeal is failure on his
part to exhaust his administrative remedies. Thus, this Court, in the case of Calo vs.
Fuertes, held that:
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President
25

and his acts or decisions are also those of the latter, he need not
appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to the latter, and
that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of
the Director of Lands he had exhausted the administrative
remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the
Philippines is tantamount to not appealing all thereto. Such
withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the President is the last
step he should take in an administrative case.
In 1912, in the case of Lamb vs. Phipps, this Court stressed the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies, thus:
When a plain, adequate and speedy remedy is afforded by and
within the executive department of the government the courts will
not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. The
administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted
before resort can be had to the courts, especially when the
administrative remedies are by law exclusive and final. Some
matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and
absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive
department of the government. When the law confers exclusive
and final jurisdiction upon the executive department of the
government to dispose of particular questions, their judgments or
the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable
by the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are
subject to be reviewed and modified by them.
Moreover, this being a special civil action, petitioner-appellant must allege and prove
that he has no other speedy and adequate remedy. In the case at bar, petitionerappellant's speedy and adequate remedy is an appeal to the President of the
Philippines.

The proper remedy is an appeal to the OPRES. When a plain, adequate and speedy
remedy is afforded by and within the executive department of the government the
courts will not interfere until at least that remedy has been exhausted. The
administrative remedies afforded by law must first be exhausted before resort can be
had to the courts, especially when the administrative remedies are by law exclusive
and final. Some matters and some questions are by law delegated entirely and
absolutely to the discretion of particular branches of the executive department of the
government. When the law confers exclusive and final jurisdiction upon the
executive department of the government to dispose of particular questions, their
judgments or the judgments of that particular department are no more reviewable by

the courts than the final judgment or decisions of the courts are subject to be
reviewed and modified by them"
CALO VS. FUERTES
(Withdrawal of appeal)
At any rate, the appellant's contention that, as the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources is the alter ego of the President and his acts or decisions are also
those of the latter, he need not appeal from the decision or opinion of the former to
the latter, and that, such being the case, after he had appealed to the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources from the decision or opinion of the Director of
Lands he had exhausted all the administrative remedies, is untenable.
The withdrawal of the appeal taken to the President of the Philippines is tantamount
to not appealing at all thereto. Such withdrawal is fatal, because the appeal to the
President is the last step he should take in an administrative case.
Furthermore, a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court lies only when "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." In the case at bar, appeal from an
opinion or order by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources to the
President of the Philippines is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to the
petitioner.
law library
The judgment appealed from already had become final and cannot be reviewed. The
appeal is dismissed, with costs against the petitioner-appellant.

Doctrine of Finality of Administrative Action

FORTICH VS. CORONA
(Failure to file motion for reconsideration)
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the
Philippines are embodied in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof
provides:
SEC. 7. Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15)
days from receipt of a copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period.
Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and
entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious cases.
It is further provided for in Section 9 that The Rules of Court shall apply in a
suppletory character whenever practicable.
26

When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23,1997 declaring the
Decision of March 29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a
motion for reconsideration thereto, the said Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open
the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its jurisdiction, the Office of the
President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for reconsideration
filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the
assailed Win-Win Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and
Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion
for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the Decision of March 29, 1996. And
even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in
exceptionally meritorious cases, as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7
of AO 18, still the said motion should not have been entertained considering that the
first motion for reconsideration was not seasonably filed, thereby allowing the
Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of the Office of the
President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29,1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of
the rules and basic legal precept that accord finality to administrative
determinations.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION VS. BATHANVELASCO
(Finality of factual determination by administrative body)
ISSUE: WON SSSEA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies before resorting
to the courts.

Judicial Review
MACAILING, ET AL VS. ANDRADA, ET AL
(Mere silence of a statute on availability of judicial review does not necessarily
imply that it is unavailable)
In the matter of judicial review of administrative decisions, some statutes especially
provide for such judicial review; others are silent. Mere silence, however, does not
necessarily imply that judicial review is unavailable. Modes of judicial review vary
according to the statutes; appeal, petition for review or a writ of certiorari. No
general rule applies to all the various administrative agencies. Where the law stands
mute, the accepted view is that the extraordinary remedies in the Rules of Court are
still available
The pertinent statutory provision, Section 44 (h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, reads:
"Courts of First Instance shall have original jurisdiction ... (h) Said court and their
judges, or any of them, shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus,
certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective provinces
and district in the manner provided in the Rules of Court." Complementary thereto is
Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court,4 providing that: "The petition may be filed ... if it
relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation, board, officer
or person, in a Court of First instance having jurisdiction thereof."

HELD: Yes.

Citing several cases, even if the action done is not within the jurisdiction of the CFI,
"The Preliminary injunction that may be granted by a court of first instance under
said Section 2 [Rule 58] is, in its application, co-extensive with the territorial
boundaries of the province or district in which the said court sits

RATIO: When a party fails to exhaust all administrative remedies, a premature

resort to the courts would result in the dismissal of the petition.

OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR VS. LOPEZ

(Quantum required is substantial evidence)

Moreover, the issues raised by SSSEA in its special civil action for certiorari involve
a review of the factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations.

Rule 133 of the Revised Rules of Court. Weight and Sufficiency of

Factual issues are not proper subjects of an original petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court, as its power to review is limited to questions of jurisdiction, or grave
abuse of discretion of judicial or quasi-judicial tribunals or officials. Judicial review
does not extend to an evaluation of the sufficiency of the evidence upon which the
proper labor officer or office based his or its determination.

Evidence
Section 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases, the party
having burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. In
determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the issues
involved lies, the court may consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the
witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which there are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they
testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony, their interest or want of
interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear
upon the trial. The court may also consider the number of witnesses, though the
preponderance is not necessarily with the greater number.
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Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the accused is

entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility
of error, produces absolute certainly. Moral certainly only is required, or that degree
of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
Section 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or quasijudicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by substantial
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
DELA CRUZ vs. MALUNAO
The weight of evidence required in administrative investigations is substantial
evidence. In Rule 133, Section 5 of the Rules of Court, substantial evidence is
defined:
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount
of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as adequate to
justify a conclusion.

Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt

is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by
preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.
For these reasons, only substantial evidence is required to find Malunao guilty of the
administrative offense. In the hierarchy of evidentiary values, substantial evidence,
or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable man might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion, is the lowest standard of proof provided under the
Rules of Court. In assessing whether there is substantial evidence in administrative
investigations such as this case, the Court is not bound by technical rules of
procedure and evidence.
MARCELO V. BUNGUBUNG,
Substantial evidence and laid down guidelines relative to the conduct of judicial
review of decisions rendered by administrative agencies in the exercise of their
quasi-judicial power, viz:
x x x Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of
evidence. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise.
Second, in reviewing administrative decisions of the executive
branch of the government, the findings of facts made therein are to

be respected so long as they are supported by substantial evidence.

Hence, it is not for the reviewing court to weigh the conflicting
evidence, determine the credibility of witnesses, or otherwise
substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency with
respect to the sufficiency of evidence. Third, administrative
decisions in matters within the executive jurisdiction can only be
set aside on proof of gross abuse of discretion, fraud, or error of
law.
These
principles
negate
the
power of the reviewing court to re-examine the sufficiency of the
evidence in an administrative case as if originally instituted therein,
and do not authorize the court to receive additional evidence that
was not submitted to the administrative agency concerned.

Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

GONZALES VS. CA
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the courts
must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions and discharge
their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective competence. It is
presumed that an administrative agency, if afforded an opportunity to pass upon a
matter, will decide the same correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its
forum. Furthermore, reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from
entertaining cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of action of the
petitioner.
The proper procedure which the petitioner should have taken is to move for a
reconsideration of the orders of the Regional Director, or to go directly to the
DARAB, or to its executive adjudicator in the region, the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (RARAD). Prior resort to these administrative bodies will not only
satisfy the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, but may likewise prove
advantageous to the parties as the proceedings will be conducted by experts, and will
not be limited by the technical rules of procedure and evidence. From there, the
petitioner has yet another forum available--the Special Agrarian Courts which are the
final determinants of cases involving land valuation or determination of just
compensation.
Thus, the procedural short-cut taken by the petitioner which finds no justification
both in law and in jurisprudence must be considered fatal to the petitioner's cause of
action. Accordingly, we rule that the CA committed no error in dismissing the
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

NFA VS. CA
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The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is not a hard and fast rule. It
is subject to some limitations and exceptions. In this case, private respondents
contracts were terminated in the midst of bidding preparations and their replacements
hired barely five days after their termination. In fact, respondent Masada, a
prequalified bidder, submitted all requirements and was preparing for the public
bidding only to find out that contracts had already been awarded by negotiation.
Indeed, an appeal to the NFA Board or Council of Trustees and the Secretary of
Agriculture pursuant to the provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987 was not a
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law. The urgency of
the situation compelled private respondents to go to court to stop the implementation
of these negotiated security contracts.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V. NAVARRO

Exceptions: Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

VDA. DE TAN VS. VETERANS BACKPAY COMMISSION
FACTS: Maria Natividad Vda. de Tan filed before the CFI a petition for mandamus
seeking an order to compel the respondent: (1) to declare deceased Lt. Tan Chiat Bee
alias Tan Lian Lay, a Chinese National. Entitled to back pay rights, privileges, and
prerogatives under R.A. No. 304, as amended by R.A. No. 897; and (2) to give due
course to the claim of the petitioner, as the widow of the said veterans, by issuing to
her the corresponding back pay certificate of indebtedness.
The lower court granted the petition and ordered the respondent Commission to give
due course to the claim of herein petitioner to the back pay to which her husband was
entitled as member of a duly recognized guerrilla organization. However, respondent
avers in this appal that the petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative
remedies.
ISSUE: Is the petitioner required to exhaust available administrative remedies in the
present case?
HELD: No.
RATIO:The respondent Commission is n estoppel to invoke the rule on the
exhaustion of administrative remedies, considering that in its resolution, it declared
that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice were Advisory in nature, which may
either be accepted or ignored by the office seeking the opinion, and any aggrieved
party has the court for recourse, thereby leading the petitioner to conclude that only
a final judicial ruling in her favor wold be accepted by the Commission.
BORDALLOVS. PROFESSIONAL REGULATIONS COMMISSION

As a rule, where the law provides for the remedies against the action of an
administrative board, body, or officer, relief to courts can be sought only after
exhausting all remedies provided. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
is not absolute but admits of exceptions. One of these exceptions is when the
question is purely legal, such as the one presented in the case at bar. The failure of
petitioners to appeal to the PRC, therefore, is not fatal to petitioners cause.
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG
BAGONG
PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA,IINC. VS. DOMINGUEZ
ISSUE:Whether or not suit brought by KBMBPM is premature due to nonexhaustion of administrative remedies, on the ground that KBMBPM should have
petitioned directly the Secretary of Agriculture to reverse the Order stripping the
KBMBPM Board of its authority
HELD:
No.
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this
requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures
speedy access to the courts when most needed. There was no need then to appeal the
decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts could be had
immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, suchas when the question involved is purely legal, as in
the instant case, or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or
oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.

Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction

INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC. VS.CA
Primary jurisdiction involves matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies. It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is also judicial
in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the
expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies
because technical matters or intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must
first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of a court.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the question
of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be
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granted coal operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination
by the BED as the administrative agency in possession of the specialized expertise to
act on the matter. The Trial Court does not have the competence to decide matters
concerning activities relative to the exploitation, development and extraction of
mineral resources like coal. These issues preclude an initial judicial determination. It
behooves the courts to stand aside even when apparently they have statutory power
to proceed in recognition of the primary jurisdiction of an administrative agency.
ROXAS AND COMPANY INC. VS. CA
(Inapplicability of the doctrine)
However, failure of respondent DAR to comply with the requisites of due process in
the acquisition proceedings does not give this Court the power to nullify the CLOAs
already issued to the farmer beneficiaries. Respondent DAR is in a better position to
resolve petitioner's application for conversion, being primarily the agency possessing
the necessary expertise on the matter.
To assume the power is to short-circuit the administrative process, which has yet to
run its regular course. Respondent DAR must be given the chance to correct its
procedural lapses in the acquisition proceedings. In Hacienda Palico alone, CLOA's
were issued to 177 farmer beneficiaries in 1993. Since then until the present, these
farmers have been cultivating their lands. It goes against the basic precepts of justice,
fairness and equity to deprive these people, through no fault of their own, of the land
they till.

PIMENTEL, ., ET AL VS. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE ENRILE
FACTS:
Senator Villar stated he will answer the accusations before the Senate, and not with
the Ethics Committee. Senator Lacson, then chairperson of the Ethics Committee,
then moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be transferred to the
Senate as a Committee of the Whole, which was approved by the majority. In the
hearings of such Committee, petitioners objected to the application of the Rules of
the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole. They also questioned
the quorum, and proposed amendments to the Rules. Senator Pimentel raised the
issue on the need to publish the rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
HELD:
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The issues presented
here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of respondent for
their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which are
within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court.
GSIS vs. COA (additional)

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction would ordinarily preclude us from resolving the
matter, which calls for a ruling to be first made by the Board. It is the latter that is
vested by law with exclusive and original jurisdiction to settle any dispute arising
under RA 8291, as well as other matters related thereto.
However, both the GSIS and respondents have extensively discussed the merits of
the case in their respective pleadings and did not confine their arguments to the issue
of jurisdiction. Respondents, in fact, submit that we should resolve the main issue on
the ground that it is a purely legal question. Respondents further state that a remand
of the case to the Board would merely result in unnecessary delay and needless
expense for the parties.
SEC. OF DPWH VS. ARNULFO AQUINO (ADDITIONAL)
There is a question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is
on a certain state of facts, and not as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged facts.
Said question at best could be resolved only tentatively by the administrative
authorities. The final decision on the matter rests not with them but with the courts of
justice.

GUY VS. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF

IMMIGRATION (additional)
Judicial intervention, however, should be granted in cases where the claim of
citizenship is so substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
claim is correct in deportation proceeding.
PRIMARY JURISDICTION and EXHAUSTION OF REMEDIES
It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes
into play whenever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which,
under a regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an
administrative agency.[9] In such a case, the court in which the claim is sought to be
enforced may suspend the judicial process pending referral of such issues to the
administrative body for its view or, if the parties would not be unfairly
disadvantaged, dismiss the case without prejudice.
Corollary to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The Court, in a long line of cases,[11] has held that before a
party is allowed to seek the intervention of the courts, it is a pre-condition that he
avail himself of all administrative processes afforded him. Hence, if a remedy within
the administrative machinery can be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
every opportunity to decide on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction, then such
remedy must be exhausted first before the courts power of judicial review can be
sought. The premature resort to the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
30

Accordingly, absent any finding of waiver or estoppel, the case may be dismissed for
lack of cause of action.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system of
administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and dispose of
the case.
True, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies
are subject to certain exceptions, to wit:
a) where there is estoppel on the part of the party invoking the doctrine;
b) where the challenged administrative act is patently illegal, amounting to
lack of jurisdiction;
c) where there is unreasonable delay or official inaction that will irretrievably
prejudice the complainant;
d) where the amount involved is relatively so small as to make the rule
impractical and oppressive;
e) where the question involved is purely legal and will ultimately have to be
decided by the courts of justice;
f) where judicial intervention is urgent;
g) where the application of the doctrine may cause great and irreparable
damage;
h) where the controverted acts violate due process;
i) where the issue of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies has been
rendered moot;
j) where there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy;
k) where strong public interest is involved; and
l) in quo warranto proceedings.

Lastly, it would seem that the main prayer of the complaint, that is,
to compel the respondent mayor to issue a business license for the
year 1994, by the passage of time during which this case pends,
had already become moot and academic. A new application is
necessary for the year 1995 and the year 1996 which is about to
end. And in the grant or denial of such application for business
permits or licenses, the respondent mayor must examine closely
the circumstances prevailing and again use her discretion in the
exercise of her official function. Accordingly, the issue at hand is
already academic and it is well established that courts will not
adjudicate moot cases nor hear a case when the object sought is not
attainable and it will decline jurisdiction over moot cases which
must involve only actual interests.
Indeed, Courts will not determine a moot question in a case in which no
practical relief can be granted. It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced. However, we are constrained to render judgment herein pursuant
to our symbolic function of educating the bench and the bar. For another,
this case comes within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise
moot and academic if it is capable of repetition yet evading review.
On Discretion
The crux of the instant controversy is whether respondent mayor can be compelled
by a writ of mandamus to grant petitioners application for a renewal of a business
permit to operate an arrastre service at the Municipal Port of Hilongos in Leyte.
Ostensibly, it is petitioners contention that respondent mayors power to issue
permits as contained in the aforesaid law is ministerial; hence, mandamus lies.

Book VII, Administrative Code of 1987

Executive Order No. 26 - Prescribing procedure and sanctions to ensure
speedy disposition of administrative cases

It bears to reiterate this Courts ruling on the nature of the writ of

mandamus. The writ of mandamus serves to compel a respondent who fails to
perform a legal duty or unlawfully excludes another from the enjoyment of an
entitled right or office to do the act required to be done to protect the rights of the
petitioner. Otherwise stated, mandamus is issued to command the performance of a
ministerial, but not a discretionary duty.

DISCRETIONARY vs. MINISTERIAL

ROBLE ARRASTRE, INC. vs. VILLAFLOR and the CA
On Mootnes
At the outset, we state our concurrence with the Court of Appeals when it entered a
new judgment dismissing Special Civil Action No. H-237 on the ground of
mootness. The appellate court ratiocinated, to wit:

It may be true, as argued by petitioner, that Resolution No. 93-27, which was enacted
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Hilongos, is not an ordinance but merely a
resolution. A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a
law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a
lawmaking body on a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature. Additionally, the two

Administrative Procedure

31

are enacted differently - a third reading is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a
resolution, unless decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian members.
However, the fact that Resolution No. 93-27 is a mere resolution can do nil to
support petitioners cause. As stated earlier, the proper action is certiorari to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion had been committed on the part of
respondent mayor in the refusal to grant petitioners application. Petitioners petition
for mandamus is incompetent against respondent mayors discretionary
power. Thus:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law or acting officially, under certain
circumstances, uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. A
purely ministerial act or duty in contradiction to a discretional act is one
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a
prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without
regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer
and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed,
such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only
when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official
discretion or judgment
DISCRETION DEFINED.
Discretion may be defined as "the act or the liberty to decide according to the
principles of justice and one's ideas of what is right and proper under the
circumstances, without wilfullness or favor." (standard Dictionary, ed. 1911.) Mr.
Webster defines discretion as the "freedom to act according to one's own judgment;
unrestrained exercised of choice or will."
Mr. Black in his valuable law dictionary says:
Discretion, when applied to public functionaries, means a power or right
conferred upon them by law of acting officially in certain circumstances,
according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience,
uncontrolled by the judgment or conscience of others. . . .
Mr. Bouvier defines discretion as follows:
That part of the judicial function which decides questions arising in the trial
of a cause, according to the particular circumstances of each case, and as to
which the judgment of the court is uncontrolled by fixed rules of law. The
power exercised by courts to determine question to which no strict law is
applicable but which, from their nature, and the circumstances of the case,
are controlled by the personal judgment of the court.
Judge Sanborn, in his article on mandamus (26 Cyc., 161) defines discretion, when
applied to public functionaries, as the power or right conferred upon them by law

acting officially under certain circumstances, according to the dictates of their own
judgment or conscience and not controlled by the judgment or conscience of others.

MINISTERIAL DUTY DEFINED.

A purely ministerial act, in constradistinction to a discretional act, is one which an
officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his
own judgment upon the propriety of impropriety if the act done. A ministerial act is
one as to which nothing is left to the discretion of the person who must perform. It is
a simple, definite duty arising under conditions admitted or proved to exist and
imposed by law. It is a precise act accurately marked out, enjoined upon particular
officers for a particular purpose. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and
gives him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, the duty is
discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.

CODILLA, SR. V. DE VENECIA

The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well
delineated. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in
obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act
done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty
is discretionary and notministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion or
judgment.
MALLARI vs. BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS
Examples:
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public
auction is a ministerial act. We agree with the contention of the
petitioners that it was the ministerial duty of the trial court to
approve the notice of appeal. It must be observed that the
petitioners had filed within the prescribed period a notice of
appeal on December 1, 1987 when the petition in question was
denied by the trial court in an order dated November 9, 1987, a
copy of which was received by the petitioners on November 27,
1987. The refusal of the trial court, therefore, to accept the said
notice filed by petitioners in pursuance of their statutory right to
appeal is clearly enforceable by mandamus.
32

Ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as

to leave no room for the exercise of discretion in its
performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is
that which by its nature requires the exercise of
judgment. A purely ministerial act or duty is one in
which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the
mandate of legal authority, without regard to or the
exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety of the
act done. But if the law imposes a duty upon a public
officer and gives him the right to decide how or when the
duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and
not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the
discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of
official discretion nor judgment.

The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving

the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard
and decided by the Court unless there is compliance with the legal
REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL INQUIRY, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity
of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity ; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES:
Government Agencies
Consitutional Commission (COA, COMELEC, CSC)
National Commission
o Commission on Human Rights (CHR)
o National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP)
o National Commission on the Filipino Language
Office of the President
Office of the Vice President
Senate of the Philippines
House of Representatives
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Department of Agrarian Reform
Department of Agriculture
Department of Budget and Management
Department of Education
Department of Energy
Department of Environment and Natural Resources

Department of Finance
Department of Foreign Affairs
Department of Health
Department of Interior and Local Government
Department of Justice
Department of Labor and Employment
Department of National Defense
Department of Science and Technology
Department of Social Welfare and development
Department of Tourism
Department of Trade and Industry
Department of Public Works and Highways
Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA)
Social Security System (SSS)
Government Service Insurane System (GSIS)
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council
Pag-IBIG Fund
Career-Executive Service Board
Local Water Utilities Administration
National Commission for Culture and the Arts
National Youth Commission (NYC)
Professional Regulation Commission
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas

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