List of Cases in Constitutional Law I

1. La BUgal-BLaan v. Ramos, GR 127882, Dec 1 2004

2. Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 SCRA 792 (1991)
3. Aytona v. Castillo 4 SCRA 1 (1962)
4. Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 (1993)
5. Sambeli v. Province of Isabela GR 922\79, June 18, 1992
6. PRC v. De Guzman, GR 134629, Aug 31, 1999
7. PHILCONSA v. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 (1966)
8. Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992)
9. Sinon V. CSC, 215 SCRA 410 (1992)
10. Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 462
11. Tan v. COMELEC, 142 SCRA 727 (1986)
12. Compana General de Tobaccos v. Board of Public Utility, 34 Phil 136 (1916)
13. Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales , 214 SCRA 789 (1992)
14. Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451 (1939)
15. People v. Gacott, Jr. GR. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
16. Supangan, Jr. v. Santos, GR 84663, August 24, 1990
17. Tanada v. Angara GR No. 118295, May 2, 1997
18. Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil 192
19. Herrera v. Board of Tax Assessment Appeals, 3SCRA 186
20. PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806 (1955)
21. Salazar v. COMELEC, 184 SCRA 433 (1990)
22. In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 (1961)
23. Tobias v. Abalos , 239 SCRA 106
24. Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)
25. Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987)
26. Lapinid v. CSC, 197 SCRA 106 (1991)
27. Garcia et al. vs COMELEC G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993
28. In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA 382
29. Morales v. Subido, 27 SCRA 131 (1969)
30. Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)

garyjune04

La Bugal-BLaan v. Ramos G.R. No. 127882 December 1, 2004

Topic: Government Powers /Functions; Justiciable and Political Questions
FACTS:
The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the constitutionality of
(1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its Implementing Rules and Regulations;
and (3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA), executed by the government with
Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc. (WMCP).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over the
exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of our natural resources?
HELD:
The Chief Executive is the official constitutionally mandated to enter into agreements with
foreign owned corporations. On the other hand, Congress may review the action of the President
once it is notified of every contract entered into. In contrast to this express mandate of the President
and Congress in the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of natural resources, Article XII of
the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary. However, should the President and/or Congress
gravely abuse their discretion in this regard, the courts may -- in a proper case -- exercise their residual
duty under Article VIII. Clearly then, the judiciary should not inordinately interfere in the exercise of
this presidential power of control over the EDU of our natural resources.
Under the doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate
branches of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and must
allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of our country and in
securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate the grinding poverty of our people and answer
their cry for viable employment opportunities in the country. The judiciary is loath to interfere with
the due exercise by coequal branches of government of their official functions.
The Constitution should be read in broad, life-giving strokes. It should not be used to
strangulate economic growth or to serve narrow, parochial interests. Rather, it should be construed to
grant the President and Congress sufficient discretion and reasonable leeway to enable them to attract
foreign investments and expertise, as well as to secure for our people and our posterity the blessings
of prosperity and peace. The Court fully sympathize with the plight of La Bugal Blaan and other tribal
groups, and commend their efforts to uplift their communities. However, the Court cannot justify the
invalidation of an otherwise constitutional statute along with its implementing rules, or the
nullification of an otherwise legal and binding FTAA contract. On the basis of this control standard, the
Court upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules and
Regulations - insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements - as well as the subject
Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA).

Bondoc v. Pineda G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); HRET Removal of a Member
FACTS:
Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals for a Congressional seat in the 4 th District of
Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the LDP while Bondoc was a member of NP. Pineda won the
election. However, Bondoc contested the result in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Bondoc won in the protest and was subsequently declared the winner by the HRET.
Meanwhile, one member of the HRET, Congressman Juanito Camasura, Jr. who was a member
of LDP confessed to Rep. Jose Cojuangco, LDPs leader, that he voted for Bondoc even though Bondoc
was a member of the NP. He confessed that he believed in his conscience that Bondoc truly won the
election. This resulted to Camasuras expulsion from the LDP. Pineda then moved that they withdraw
Camasura from the HRET. They further prayed that a new election be held and that the new LDP
representative be appointed in the HRET. This new representative will be voting for Pineda in the
reopening of the election contest. Camasura was then removed by HRETs chairwoman Justice
Ameurfina Herrera. Naturally, Bondoc questioned such action before the Supreme Court (SC).
Pineda contends that the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court because
Camasuras removal is an official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine of separation of powers,
the judiciary may not interfere.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Supreme Court may inquire upon the validity of the act of the House of
Representatives which interfere with the disposition of an election contest in the HRET through
the ruse of "reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal without violating the doctrine of
separation of powers?
HELD:
Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at bar without encroaching upon the function
of the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET. The issue here is a judicial question. It must be
noted that what is being complained of is the act of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a decision has already been made, members of the tribunal
have already voted regarding the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc wherein Bondoc won.
The LDP cannot withdraw their representative from the HRET after the tribunal has already reached a
decision. They cannot hold the same election since the issue has already become moot and academic.
LDP is merely changing their representative to change the outcome of the election. Camasura should
be reinstated because his removal was not due to a lawful or valid cause. Disloyalty to party is not a
valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET. Expulsion of Camasura violates his right to
security of tenure.
The 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate and the House of Representatives shall each
have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of their respective members.
3

Aytona vs Castillo 4 SCRA 1 G.R. No. L-19313 January 19 1962

Topic: Executive Powers/Limitations [Midnight Appointment]
FACTS:
On December 29, 1961, Outgoing President Carlos Garcia appointed petitioner Dominador
Aytona as ad interim Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona took the corresponding oath. On the same
day, at noon, President-elect Diosdado Macapagal assumed office; and on the next day, he issued
administrative order no. 2 recalling, withdrawing, and cancelling all ad interim appointments made by
former President Garcia. There were all-in all, 350 midnight or last minute appointments made by the
former President Garcia. On January 1, President Macapagal appointed Andres Castillo as ad interim
Governor of the Central Bank. Aytona instituted a case (quo warranto) against Castillo, contending that
he was validly appointed, thus the subsequent appointment to Castillo by the new President, should be
considered void.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appointment of Aytona is valid as part of the Executive powers of an
Outgoing President who will be leaving his office on the day the said appointment was made?
RULING:
No. After the proclamation of the election of President Macapagal, previous President Garcias
administration was no more than a care-taker administration. He was duty bound to prepare for the
orderly transfer of authority the incoming President, and he should not do acts which he ought to
know, would embarrass or obstruct the policies of his successor. It was not for him to use powers as
incumbent President to continue the political warfare that had ended or to avail himself of presidential
prerogatives to serve partisan purposes. The filling up vacancies in important positions, if few, and so
spaced to afford some assurance of deliberate action and careful consideration of the need for the
appointment and the appointee's qualifications may undoubtedly be permitted. But the issuance of
350 appointments, including that of the petitioner, in one night and planned induction of almost all of
them a few hours before the inauguration of the new President may, with some reason, be regarded
by the latter as an abuse Presidential prerogatives, the steps taken being apparently a mere partisan
effort to fill all vacant positions irrespective of fitness and other conditions, and thereby deprive the
new administration of an opportunity to make the corresponding appointments.
Had the appointment of Aytona been done in good faith then he would have the right to
continue office. Here, even though Aytona is qualified to remain in his post as he is competent enough,
his appointment can nevertheless be revoked by the president. Garcias appointment is hurried
maneuvers to subvert the incoming administration and is set to obstruct the policies of the next
president. As a general rule, once a person is qualified his appointment should not be revoked but in
the case at bar, it may be, since his appointment was grounded on bad faith, immorality and
impropriety. In public service, it is not only legality that is considered but also justice, fairness and
righteousness.

Kilosbayan v. Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110 (1993)

Topic: Judicial: Legal Standing; - Business Organization Corporation Law PCSOs Charter
FACTS:
In 1993, the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office decided to put up an on-line lottery system
which will establish a national network system that will in turn expand PCSOs source of income.
A bidding was made. Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) won it. A contract of
lease was awarded in favor of PGMC.
Kilosbayan opposed the said agreement between PCSO and PGMC as it alleged that: PGMC
does not meet the nationality requirement because it is 75% foreign owned (owned by a Malaysian
firm Berjaya Group Berhad); PCSO, under Section 1 of its charter (RA 1169), is prohibited from holding
and conducting lotteries in collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association,
company or entity; The network system sought to be built by PGMC for PCSO is a telecommunications
network. Under the law (Act No. 3846), a franchise is needed to be granted by the Congress before any
person may be allowed to set up such; PGMCs articles of incorporation, as well as the Foreign
Investments Act (R.A. No. 7042) does not allow it to install, establish and operate the on-line lotto and
telecommunications systems.
PGMC and PCSO, through Teofisto Guingona, Jr. and Renato Corona, Executive Secretary and
Asst. Executive Secretary respectively, alleged that PGMC is not a collaborator but merely a contractor
for a piece of work, i.e., the building of the network; that PGMC is a mere lessor of the network it will
build as evidenced by the nature of the contract agreed upon, i.e., Contract of Lease.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PGMC has a legal standing to become a contractor/collaborator for the PCSOs
telecommunications network project?
RULING:
No. Although PGMCs foreign ownership was reduced to 40% though, Section 1 of R.A. No.
1169, as amended by B.P. Blg. 42, prohibits the PCSO from holding and conducting lotteries in
collaboration, association or joint venture with any person, association, company or entity, whether
domestic or foreign. There is undoubtedly a collaboration between PCSO and PGMC and not merely a
contract of lease. The relations between PCSO and PGMC cannot be defined simply by the designation
they used, i.e., a contract of lease. Pursuant to the wordings of their agreement, PGMC at its own
expense shall build, operate, and manage the network system including its facilities needed to operate
a nationwide online lottery system. PCSO bears no risk and all it does is to provide its franchise in
violation of its charter. Necessarily, the use of such franchise by PGMC is a violation of Act No. 3846.

SAMBELI vs. PROVINCE OF ISABELA, ET. AL. GR. No. 92279 June 18, 1992
Topic: The Commission on Audit: Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority
FACTS:
On October 2, 1987, an agreement was entered into by and between the Province of Isabela
and ECS Enterprises, herein petitioner, for the purchase of 300 units of wheelbarrows, 837 pieces of
shovels and 1 set of radio communication equipment. Out of the items to be delivered, a partial
delivery of 150 units of wheelbarrows and 419 pieces of shovels were made in which the Provincial
Auditor allowed the payment of only 50% or P190,338.20 "pending receipt of the reply to the query to
the Price Evaluation Division, COA. A second delivery of 150 units of wheelbarrows and 418 pieces of
shovels was made and payment of 50% of P380,400.00 was allowed by the Provincial Auditor, bringing
the total payments made to P380,538.20 or 50% of P761,077.20 (the total cost of 300 units of
wheelbarrows and 837 pieces of shovels).
Based on the findings of the Price Evaluation Division, COA Technical Service Office, Quezon
City, the Provincial Auditor advised the Provincial Treasurer that an overprice in the total amount of
P619,042.20 exists out of the total price of P761,077.20 offered by ECS Enterprises or an overpayment
of P195,893.10.
The Provincial auditor forwarded the matter to the COA Regional Director who formally
endorsed the stand of the Provincial Auditor. ECS Enterprises appealed to the respondent Commission
on Audit. In a letter dated December 12, 1989, the said Commission denied the appeal and affirmed
the position of the Provincial Auditor and the COA Regional Director. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not EXCS Enterprises, after being proven to have overpriced, can compel the COA
to authorize the payment of the balance because to act otherwise will constitute an impairment of
contract?
RULING:
The Court rejects petitioner's contention. In the exercises of the regulatory power vested upon
it by the Constitution, the Commission on Audit adheres to the policy that government funds and
property should be fully protected and conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or
extravagant expenditures or uses of such funds and property should be prevented. On the proposition
that improper or wasteful spending of public funds or immoral use of government property, for being
highly irregular or unnecessary, or scandalously excessive or extravagant, offends the sovereign
people's will, it behooves the Commission on Audit to put a stop thereto. (Tantuico, State Audit Code
Philippines, p. 235)
No less than the Constitution has ordained that the COA shall have exclusive authority to define
the scope of its audit and examination, establish the techniques and methods required therefor, and
promulgate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary excessive, extravagant or unconscionable expenditures or use of
government funds and properties (Art. IX D, Sec. 2 (2) 1987 Constitution of the Philippines.
6

PRC v. De Guzman, GR 134629, Aug 31, 1999

Topic: Principles and Policies Pursued; Priority of Education, Science, Technology
FACTS:
The respondents are all graduates of the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela City, Metro
Manila. They passed the Physician Licensure Examination conducted in February 1993 by the Board of
Medicine (Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) then released their names as
successful examinees in the medical licensure examination. Shortly thereafter, the Board observed that
the grades of the seventy-nine successful examinees from Fatima College in the two most difficult
subjects in the medical licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem) and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OBGyne), were unusually and exceptionally high. Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in Bio-Chem and
ten got 100% in OB-Gyne, another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and twenty-one scored 99% in OBGyne.
For its part, the NBI found that the questionable passing rate of Fatima examinees in the 1993
Physician Examination leads to the conclusion that the Fatima examinees gained early access to the
test questions.
ISSUE:
Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a valid exercise of police power?
RULING:
Yes, it is true that this Court has upheld the constitutional right of every citizen to select a
profession or course of study subject to a fair, reasonable, and equitable admission and academic
requirements. But like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their exercise may be so
regulated pursuant to the police power of the State to safeguard health, morals, peace, education,
order, safety, and general welfare of the people. Thus, persons who desire to engage in the learned
professions requiring scientific or technical knowledge may be required to take an examination as a
prerequisite to engaging in their chosen careers.

Philippine Constitution Association, Inc.(PHILCONSA) vs. Mathay G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Composition/qualification
FACTS:
Petitioner has filed a suit against the former Acting Auditor General of the Philippines and the
Auditor of the Congress of the Philippines seeking to permanently enjoin them from authorizing or
passing in audit the payment of the increased salaries authorized by RA 4134 to the Speaker and
members of the House of Representatives before December 30, 1969.
The 1965-1966 Budget implemented the increase in salary of the Speaker and members of the
House of Representatives set by RA 4134, approved just the preceding year 1964. Petitioner contends
that such implementation is violative of Article VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution. The reason
given being that the term of the 8 senators elected in 1963, and who took part in the approval of RA
4134, would have expired only on December 30, 1969; while the term of the members of the House
who participated in the approval of said Act expired on December 30, 1965.
ISSUE:
Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the members
of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must have fully expired
before the increase become effective?
RULING:
Yes. The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it will have expired.
In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased compensation for
legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to all members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a single unit, without distinction or
separation between them. This unitary treatment is emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks
of the expiration of the full term of the Senators and Representatives that approved the measure,
using the singular form and not the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both
houses for the purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term
in the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and the
House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the fundamental
consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that enacted the measure
must have expired before the increase in compensation can become operative.

Bengzon v. Drilon, 208 SCRA 133 (1992) 208 SCRA 133

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); Bills to Laws-Veto Power of the President
FACTS:
In 1990, Congress sought to reenact laws, particularly RA 1797, that were repealed during the
time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These laws provided certain retirement benefits to retired
judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions. Congress contemplated on the need
to restore the laws in order to standardize retirement benefits among government officials. However,
President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not
give preferential treatment to certain or select government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court
asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D.
No. 644) because the said PD was not published which one of the subjects of the case of Taada v.
Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication. The Supreme Court then
readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992,
Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the
allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund Adjustment;
included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different branches of the government;
among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297. This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired
judges and justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President
was represented by then Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations bill is
constitutional that provides the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary?
RULING:
No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to them in
accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside
and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the power to enact or
amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to
veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the same
item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule
is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an entire line item
in its entirety or not at all.
9

SINON VS. CSC, ET. AL. G.R. No. 101251 November 5, 1992
Topic: Judicial; Nature
FACTS:
The following are the bases of the petition for certiorari of petitioner Sinon: Resolution No. 97
dated August 23, 1989, issued by respondent DARAB which revoked petitioner's permanent
appointment as Municipal Agriculture Officer (MAO) and appointed, in his stead, private respondent
Juana Banan (Rollo 17); 2. Resolution dated February 8, 1991 issued by the respondent CSC affirming
the aforementioned Resolution of respondent DARAB (Rollo 22); Resolution dated July 11, 1991 issued
by the respondent CSC which denied petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the respondent
Commission's Resolution dated February 8, 1991.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CSC committed grave abuse discretion in reviewing and re-evaluating the
ring or qualification of the petitioner Sinon?
RULING:
The Court disagree. The Placement Committee's function is recommendatory in nature. The
agency's Reorganization Appeals Board was specially created and conferred with authority to review
appeals and complaints of officials and employees affected by the reorganization. The decision of the
agency RAB has the imprimatur of the Secretary of that agency and is therefore controlling in matters
of and is therefore controlling in matters of appointment.
Contrary to the allegations of the petitioner, the Court do not find any evidence of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the CSC when it issued Resolution dated 8 February 1991 which in effect
approved the appointment of respondent Banan over petitioner Sinon. By grave abuse of discretion is
meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Clearly, the Placement Committee was charged with the duty of exercising the same
discretionary functions as the appointing authority in the judicious selection and placement of
personnel when the law empowered it to "assist" the appointment authority. The same law also
allows any officer or employee aggrieved by the appointments to file an appeal with the appointing
authority.
Hence, for as long as the re-evaluation of the qualification filed by Banan was pending, the
petitioner cannot claim that he had been issued with a "complete" appointment. The fact that the
DARAB is capable of re-evaluating the findings of the Placement Committed only to find that Sinon is
not qualified should not be taken as a grave abuse of discretion.
The Court cannot subscribe to petitioner Sinon's insistence that the public respondent CSC had
disregarded the findings of the Placement Committee. The truth is, these findings were re-evaluated
and the report after such re-evaluation was submitted to and approved by the Secretary of Agriculture.
The CSC affirmed the findings of the DARAB.
For as long as the CSC confines itself within the limits set out by law and does not encroach
upon the prerogatives endowed to other authorities, this Court must sustain the Commission.
10

SANCHEZ VS. COMELEC 114 SCRA 454, 1987

Topic: The Commission on Elections; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority
FACTS:
Candidate Sanchez filed a petition praying that Comelec after due hearing, be directed to
conduct a recount of the votes cast in the 1987 senatorial elections to determine the true number of
votes to be credited to him and prayed further for a restraining order directing the Comelec to
withhold the proclamation of the last four (4) winning senatorial candidates on the ground that votes
intended for him were declared as astray votes because of the sameness of his surname with that of
disqualified candidate Gil Sanchez, whose name had not been crossed out from the Comelec election
returns and other election forms.
On July 16, 1987, the COMELEC, by a vote of four to three, promulgated its decision dismissing
petitioner Sanchez petition for recount. On July 24, 1987, however, respondent Comelec, by a vote of
five to two, reversed its order of dismissal and granted Sanchez petition for recount and/or reappreciation of ballots.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of ballots filed with the
COMELEC may be considered a summary pre-proclamation controversy or an election protest?
HELD:
The Court rules that Sanchez petition for recount and/or re-appreciation of the ballots cast in
the senatorial elections does not present a proper issue for a summary pre-proclamation controversy.
The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under sec. 243
of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may be raised in preproclamation controversy, is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of any clear showing or proof that
the election returns canvassed are incomplete or contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have
been tampered with, falsified or prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the
votes credited to any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236),
which are the only instances where a pre-proclamation recount maybe resorted to, granted the
preservation of the integrity of the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez petition must fail. The
complete election returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid
for the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
The law and public policy mandate that all pre-proclamation controversies shall be heard
summarily by the Commission after due notice and hearing and just as summarily decided.
The allegation of invalidation of Sanchezs votes intended for him bears no relation to the
correctness and authenticity and correctness of the election returns canvassed. Furthermore,
COMELEC has no power to look beyond the face of the ballots once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes
vs Comelec).
11

TAN vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 73155 July 11, 1986

Topic: Local Government; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority
FACTS:
This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New
Province in the Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3,
1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante,
Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto proposed to belong to the new
province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January
3, 1986. Petitioners opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is
unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the Local Government Code because: The voters of
the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new
province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite; The area which would comprise the
new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the
minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the
Constitution?
RULING:
No. SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity. Whenever a
province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the
approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained.
The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division
and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first
would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially
altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtracted from the mother
province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling
precedent. Rather, the dissenting view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the
municipality if the municipality is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or
more municipalities if there be a merger.
The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial
alteration of the boundaries of the parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it
might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the petitioners.
12

Compania General de Tabaccos vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); Limitation-Delegation of Powers
FACTS:
Petitioner, Compania General de Tabaccos, alleges that it is a foreign corporation organized
under the laws of Spain and engaged in business in the Philippines as a common carrier of passengers
and merchandise by water. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners ordered petitioner to show
cause why it should not be required to present detailed annual reports of its finances and operations
of its vessels. After a hearing, the Board ordered respondent to present annually a detailed report of
finances and operations of such vessels operated in the Philippines.
The Board relied on Sec. 16 of Act No. 2307 for its authority which states that: The board shall
have power, after hearing, upon notice, by order in writing, to require every public utility as herein
defined to furnish annually a detailed report of finances and operations, in such form and containing
such matters as the Boars may from time to time by order prescribe.
Petitioner questioned the Boards authority to require the report on the ground that Act No.
2307 was invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to delegate legislative
power to the Board. Moreover, the petitioner contends that the Boards requirements were
cumbersome and unnecessarily prolix and that it would entail an immense amount of clerical work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Act is invalid as constituting an unlawful attempt on the part of Legislature to
delegate power to the Board?
RULING:
Yes. The provision conferring authority on the board is very general and comprehensive. A
statute which authorizes a Board of Public Utility Commissioners to require detailed reports from
public utilities, leaving the nature of the report, its contents, guidelines it shall follow and the principle
upon which it shall succeed, to the exclusive discretion of the board, is not expressing its own will or
the will of the State with respect to the public utilities to which it refers. The Legislature delegated to
the Board all its powers over a given subject-matter in a manner almost absolute and without laying
down a rule or even making a suggestion by which that power is to be directed, guided or applied.
Act No. 2307 failed to lay down the general rules of action under which the Board was to
proceed, and did not prescribe in detail the contents the reports should contain. Everything was left to
the judgment and discretion of the Board which is unrestrained as to when, why, how, to what extent
or what it shall act upon.
In Interstate Commerce Commission vs Goodrich Transit, the general rules had been laid down for
the guidance of the commission, the latter only having to carry out the details. Thus, the court held
that The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative powers to a commission, but, having laid
down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may require of that
commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the investigation of facts, with a
view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules laid down by the Congress.
13

Guingona, Jr. v. Gonzales , 214 SCRA 789 (1992)

Topic: Legislative (Article VI); The Commission on Appointments- Composition
FACTS:
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators, 5 NPC senators,
3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house
must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional formula: (No. of
Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of Senators elected. The results of such a formula
would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5
member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their
party because he rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same
party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed
that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and
one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the said compromise. He alleged
that the compromise is against proportional representation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Taada as members
of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the provision of Section 18 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution?
HELD:
No. It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political parties. A
literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the parties is
entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half membership into a whole
membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so doing one
other partys fractional membership was correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in
the Commission on Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is
clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political parties.
The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced the representation
of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for
every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a
party which has only one member senator cannot constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve
such, the parties may coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional representation
especially since one party may have affiliations with the other party.

14

Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451 (1939)

Topic: Executive; Chief Executive Control Power Supervision Suspension of a Local Government
Official Power to suspend comes with the power to remove
FACTS:
Jose Villena was the then mayor of Makati in the 1930s. After investigation, the Secretary of
Interior recommended the suspension of Villena with the Office of the president who approved the
same. The Secretary then suspended Villena. Villena averred claiming that the Secretary has no
jurisdiction over the matter. The power or jurisdiction is lodged in the local government [the governor]
pursuant to sec 2188 of the Administrative Code.
Further, even if the respondent Secretary of the Interior has power of supervision over local
governments, that power, according to the constitution, must be exercised in accordance with the
provisions of law and the provisions of law governing trials of charges against elective municipal
officials are those contained in sec 2188 of the Administrative Code as amended. In other words, the
Secretary of the Interior must exercise his supervision over local governments, if he has that power
under existing law, in accordance with sec 2188 of the Administrative Code, as amended, as the latter
provisions govern the procedure to be followed in suspending and punishing elective local officials
while sec 79 (C) of the Administrative Code is the genera law which must yield to the special law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Interior can suspend an LGU official under investigation?
HELD:
Yes. There is no clear and express grant of power to the secretary to suspend a mayor of a
municipality who is under investigation. On the contrary, the power appears lodged in the provincial
governor by sec 2188 of the Administrative Code which provides that The provincial governor shall
receive and investigate complaints made under oath against municipal officers for neglect of duty,
oppression, corruption or other form of maladministration of office, and conviction by final judgment of
any crime involving moral turpitude.
The fact, however, that the power of suspension is expressly granted by sec 2188 of the
Administrative Code to the provincial governor does not mean that the grant is necessarily exclusive
and precludes the Secretary of the Interior from exercising a similar power. For instance,
Villena admitted in the oral argument that the President of the Philippines may himself suspend the
petitioner from office in virtue of his greater power of removal (sec. 2191, as amended, Administrative
Code) to be exercised conformably to law.
Indeed, if the President could, in the manner prescribed by law, remove a municipal official; it
would be a legal incongruity if he were to be devoid of the lesser power of suspension. And the
incongruity would be more patent if, possessed of the power both to suspend and to remove a
provincial official (sec. 2078, Administrative Code), the President were to be without the power to
suspend a municipal official. The power to suspend a municipal official is not exclusive. Preventive
suspension may be issued to give way for an impartial investigation.
15

People vs. Gacott, Jr. G.R. No. 116049, July 13, 1995
Topic: Judicial; Rules of Procedure/Admission to the Bar/Discipline
FACTS:
For failure to check the citations of the prosecution, the order of respondent RTC Judge
Eustaquio Gacott, Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the SC. The respondent judge was also
sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of P10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law. The judgment
was made by the Second Division of the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in granting the motion to
quash; whether or not the Second Division of the SC has the competence to administratively discipline
the respondent judge?

RULING:
Yes. The error committed by respondent judge in dismissing the case is quite obvious in the
light of P.D. No. 1, LOI No. 2 and P.D. No. 1275 aforementioned. To support the Courts ruling, Justice
Regalado relied on his recollection of a conversation with former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
who was the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of the 1986 Constitutional Commission of
which Regalado was also a member.
The very text of the present Sec. 11, Art. VIII of the Constitution clearly shows that there are
actually two situations envisaged therein. The first clause which states that the SC en banc shall have
the power to discipline judges of lower courts, is a declaration of the grant of that disciplinary power
to, and the determination of the procedure in the exercise thereof by, the Court en banc. It was not
therein intended that all administrative disciplinary cases should be heard and decided by the whole
Court since it would result in an absurdity.
The second clause, which refers to the second situation contemplated therein and is
intentionally separated from the first by a comma, declares on the other hand that the Court en banc
can order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the
deliberations on the issues in the case and voted therein. In this instance, the administrative case
must be deliberated upon and decided by the full Court itself.
Pursuant to the first clause which confers administrative disciplinary power to the Court en
banc, a decision en banc is needed only where the penalty to be imposed is the dismissal of a judge,
officer or employee of the Judiciary, disbarment of a lawyer, or either the suspension of any of them
for a period of more than 1 year or a fine exceeding P10, 000.00 or both.
Indeed, to require the entire Court to deliberate upon and participate in all administrative
matters or cases regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed, would result in a congested docket
and undue delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court, especially in administrative matters, since
even cases involving the penalty of reprimand would require action by the Court en banc.
16

Supangan, Jr. v. Santos (G.R. No. 84663)

Topic: Local Government; Composition/ Qualifications
FACTS:
The validity and legality of the designations/appointments made by the Secretary of the
Department of Local Government (DLG) of members/sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies
were assailed in the cases which were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In G.R. No 84663, petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr. was elected KB Chairman of the said
municipality of Mabini, Pangasinan. In that same year he was elected KB Provincial Federation President of
the province of Pangasinan. The petitioner was appointed by then President Marcos as member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Pangasinan representing the youth sector. He accordingly
assumed office, discharged his functions and participated in the deliberations of the said body.
However, on a session hall of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, respondent Marissa Domantay
presented a letter written by respondent Secretary Luis T. Santos advising the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
that respondent "Marissa Domantay has been named as member thereof to replace Johnny D. Supangan.
Claiming that Sec. Santos has no legal authority to designate private respondent Marissa Domantay
representing the youth sector because (a) respondent Marissa Domantay has never been elected a basic
qualification for representing the youth sector, and (b) respondent Secretary has no legal authority in
issuing his letter dated August 3, 1988 because the term of office of petitioner Johnny D. Supangan, Jr. has
not yet expired nor his successor, if any, been elected/appointed and qualified.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government has the authority to designate/appoint
members/sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies without an enabling law?
RULING:
This argument is untenable. Contrary to petitioners' theory, the phrase "as may be prescribed by
law is not prospective. Article X, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution commands that all legislative bodies of local
governments must have sectoral representatives among its members, and the appointment or designation
of individuals thereto must be done in accordance with provisions of law, whether that law exists or has
still to be passed. In this case that law already exists in B.P. Blg. 337 particularly Sections 146 and 173. In
any event it is still operative, even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, because the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) provides for the continued operation of all existing laws, not inconsistent with it.
The phrase "as may be prescribed by law" does not and cannot, by its very wording, restrict itself to
the uncertainty of future legislation. Such interpretation would defeat the very purpose of immediately
including sectoral representatives in the local law-making bodies. Otherwise, in the interregnum,
from the ratification of the Constitution until the passage of the appropriate statute, the sectors would
have no voice in the formulation of legislation that would directly affect their individual members.
Hence, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the statute in force, at the time of the passage of the Constitution and
which provides for the appointment of local sectoral representatives by the President or by the Secretary of
Interior, as the former's alter ego, must be enforced. However, prior determination by the Sanggunian itself
as to its necessity is a condition sine qua non to a valid appointment. Further, a sectoral representative
must actually belong to the sector which he/ she purports to represent, otherwise there can be no true
representation.

17

TANADA v. ANGARA 272 SCRA 18, May 2, 1997

Topic: Principles and Policies Pursued; Priority of education, science, technology self-reliant and
independent economic order
FACTS:

:
This is a petition seeking to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Agreement. Petitioners question the concurrence of herein respondents acting in their
capacities as Senators via signing the said agreement.
The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products. Thus, provides new
opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting and more
investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and as
viewed by the signatory Senators, a free market espoused by WTO.
Petitioners on the other hand viewed the WTO agreement as one that limits, restricts and
impair Philippine economic sovereignty and legislative power. That the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution was taken for granted as it gives foreign trading intervention.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence of the said WTO agreement?
RULING:
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. In its Declaration of Principles and state policies, the
Constitution adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity , with all
nations. By the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered automatically part of our own laws. Pacta sunt servanda
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty is not a mere moral obligation but
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties.
Through WTO the sovereignty of the state cannot in fact and reality be considered as absolute
because it is a regulation of commercial relations among nations. Such as when Philippines joined the
United Nations (UN) it consented to restrict its sovereignty right under the concept of sovereignty as
autolimitation. What Senate did was a valid exercise of authority. As to determine whether such
exercise is wise, beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. The act of
signing the said agreement is not a legislative restriction as WTO allows withdrawal of membership
should this be the political desire of a member. Also, it should not be viewed as a limitation of
economic sovereignty. WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral trading and the
veritable forum for the development of international trade law. Its alternative is isolation, stagnation if
not economic self-destruction. Thus, the people be allowed, through their duly elected officers, make
their free choice.

18

JOSE O. VERA, ET AL vs. JOSE A. AVELINO, ET AL. G.R. No. L-543 August 31, 1946
Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Nature
FACTS:
COMELEC submitted last May 1946 to the President and the Congress of the Philippines a
report regarding the national elections held the previous month. It stated that by reason of certain
specified acts of terrorism and violence in the province of Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan and Tarlac,
the voting in said region did not reflect the true and free expression of the popular will.
During the session, when the senate convened on May 25, 1946, a pendatum resolution was
approved referring to the report ordering that Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose E. Romero who
had been included among the 16 candidates for senator receiving the highest number of votes,
proclaimed by the Commissions on Elections shall not be sworn, nor seated, as members of the
chamber, pending the termination of the of the protest lodged against their election.
Petitioners thus immediately instituted an action against their colleagues responsible for the
resolution, praying for an order to annul it and compelling respondents to permit them to occupy their
seats and to exercise their senatorial prerogative. They also allege that only the Electoral Tribunal had
jurisdiction over contests relating to their election, returns and qualifications. Respondents assert the
validity of the pendatum resolution.
ISSUES:
1.Whether the Commission on Elections has the jurisdiction to determine whether or not votes cast in
the said provinces are valid.
2.Whether administration of oath and the sitting of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno and Jose Romero
should be deferred pending hearing and decision on the protests lodged against their elections.
RULING:
Case dismissed. The Supreme Court refused to intervene, under the concept of separation of
powers, holding that the case was not a contest, and affirmed the inherent right of the legislature to
determine who shall be admitted to its membership.
Granting that the postponement of the administration of the oath amounts to suspension of
the petitioners from their office, and conceding arguendo that such suspension is beyond the power of
the respondents, who in effect are and acted as the Philippine Senate (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil.,
83, 88),this petition should be denied. As was explained in the Alejandrino case, we could not order
one branch of the Legislature to reinstate a member thereof. To do so would be to establish judicial
predominance, and to upset the classic pattern of checks and balances wisely woven into our
institutional setup.

19

Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of Assessment Appeals

GR L-15270, 30 September 1961
Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Power to Tax
FACTS:
In 1952, the Director of the Bureau of Hospitals authorized Jose V. Herrera and Ester
Ochangco Herrera to establish and operate the St. Catherines Hospital. In 1953, the Herreras sent a
letter to the Quezon City Assessor requesting exemption from payment of real estate tax on the
hospital, stating that the same was established for charitable and humanitarian purposes and not for
commercial gain. The exemption was granted effective years 1953 to 1955. In 1955, however, the
Assessor reclassified the properties from exempt to taxable effective 1956, as it was ascertained
that out 32 beds in the hospital, 12 of which are for pay-patients. A school of midwifery is also
operated within the premises of the hospital.
ISSUE:
Whether St. Catherines Hospital is exempt from reallty tax.
RULING:
Yes. The admission of pay-patients does not detract from the charitable character of a hospital,
if all its funds are devoted exclusively to the maintenance of the institution as a public charity. The
exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purpose is not limited to
property actually indispensable therefore, but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purpose, such as in the case of hospitals a
school for training nurses; a nurses home; property used to provide housing facilities for interns,
resident doctors, superintendents and other members of the hospital staff; and recreational facilities
for student nurses, interns and residents. Within the purview of the Constitution, St. Catherines
Hospital is a charitable institution exempt from taxation.
Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages, or convents appurtenant thereto, mosques, and
non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings and improvements actually, directly and exclusively used
for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation (Sec.28 (3), Art. III,1987
Constitution). Important principles in tax exemption of properties: a. Exemption of religious, charitable
and educational institutions apply to real property tax only, the test is usage, not ownership; and the
(b) the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of said purposes, such as school for training nurses, nurses' home, and recreational
facilities.

20

PACU v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil 806 (1955)

Topic: Judicial; Declaratory Relief/Justiciable Controversy Civic Efficiency
FACTS:
The Philippine Association of Colleges and Universities (PACU) assailed the constitutionality
of Act No. 2706 as amended by Act No. 3075 and Commonwealth Act No. 180. These laws sought to
regulate the ownership of private schools in the country. It is provided by these laws that a permit
should first be secured from the Secretary of Education before a person may be granted the right to
own and operate a private school. This also gives the Secretary of Education the discretion to ascertain
standards that must be followed by private schools. It also provides that the Secretary of Education can
and may ban certain textbooks from being used in schools.
PACU contends that the right of a citizen to own and operate a school is guaranteed by the
Constitution, and any law requiring previous governmental approval or permit before such person
could exercise said right, amounts to censorship of previous restraint, a practice abhorrent to our
system of law and government. PACU also avers that such power granted to the Secretary of Education
is an undue delegation of legislative power; that there is undue delegation because the law did not
specify the basis or the standard upon which the Secretary must exercise said discretion; that the
power to ban books granted to the Secretary amounts to censorship.
On the other hand, the defendant Legal Representative submitted a memorandum contending
that 1) the matters presented no justiciable controversy exhibiting unavoidable necessity of deciding
the constitutional question; 2) Petitioners are in estoppels to challenge the validity of the said act and
3) the Act is constitutionally valid. Thus, the petition for prohibition was dismissed by the court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Act No. 2706 as amended and whether or not there is judicial controversy that
needs to be resolved?
RULING:
The Petitioner suffered no wrong under the terms of law and needs no relief in the form they seek
to obtain. Moreover, there is no justiciable controversy presented. PACU did not show that it suffered
any injury from the exercise of the Secretary of Education of such powers granted to him by the said
law. The State has the power to regulate, in fact control, the ownership of schools. The Constitution
provides for state control of all educational institutions even as it enumerates certain fundamental
objectives of all education to wit.
Furthermore, the power of the courts to declare a law unconstitutional arises only when the
interest of litigant require the use of judicial authority for their protection against actual interference.
As such, Judicial Power is limited to the decision of actual cases and controversies. The court finds the
defendant position to be sufficiently sustained and state that the petitioner remedy is to challenge the
regulation not to invalidate the law. On this phase of the litigation the court conclude that there has
been no undue delegation of legislative power even if the petitioners appended a list of circulars and
memoranda they fail to indicate which of such official documents was constitutionally objectionable
for being capricious or pain nuisance.
21

JESUS F. SALAZAR, JR. vs. COMELEC AND BENJAMIN IMPERIAL G.R. No. 85742 April 19, 1990
Topic: The Commission on Elections; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority
FACTS:
Petitioner SALAZAR and respondent IMPERIAL were candidates for Mayor of Legaspi City in the
1988 elections. In the course of the canvass, SALAZAR registered objections to the admission of 165
election returns allegedly due to massive irregularities. The City Board of Canvassers (the City Board,
for short) overruled the objections.
SALAZAR filed before the COMELEC a Petition for "Declaration of Failure of Election and Holding
of New Election, or annulment of Disputed Election Returns, and/or Appeal from the Rulings of the City
Board of Canvassers of Legaspi City." In the alternative, Petitioner Salazar asked the COMELEC to order
a recount of the votes cast, or to annul the affected returns; and in either case, to set aside the
appealed rulings of the Board.
Respondent IMPERIAL filed his Answer denying the alleged irregularities and contending that the
Petition stated no cause of action, and that Petitioner SALAZAR's proper recourse was an election
protest to ventilate the alleged wholesale irregularities, none of which had ever been reported to the
authorities previously. Acting on the verified petition, COMELEC lifted the suspension of proclamation
or the effects thereof, and ordered the City Board of Canvassers to reconvene and proclaim the winning
candidate for City Mayor. Respondent IMPERIAL took his oath on the same day, 2 March 1988.
Salazar filed this Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside COMELECs Resolution which authorized the
City Board to proclaim the winning candidate for the position of City Mayor and also prayed that
Respondent IMPERIAL be enjoined from discharging the functions.
ISSUE:
Whether or not irregularities as enumerated constitute pre-election controversy which can be
invoked to declare failure of election?
RULING:
We sustain the challenged Resolutions/Decision of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
dated 26 February 1988, 21 October 1988, 3 March 1989, and 5 June 1989, and thus uphold the
proclamation of Respondent Benjamin S. IMPERIAL.
Cognizance should be taken of the fact that some of the irregularities enumerated are proper
grounds in an election contest but may not, as a rule, be invoked to declare a failure of election.
Neither, they are proper issues in a pre-proclamation controversy as enunciated in Sections 233, 234,
235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code.
In finding in the same Resolution that a proclamation having been made, a pre-proclamation
controversy is no longer viable. It cannot justifiably argued that the COMELEC was devoid of
jurisdiction to do so, the matter of jurisdiction, meaning the light of a tribunal to act in a particular
case, being governed by law, since it involves an election controversy generally governed by its own
procedural rules.
22

In Re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 (1961)

Topic: Principles and Policies Pursued: Adoption of International Law
FACTS:
Arturo Garcia applied for admission to the practice of law in the Philippines without submitting
to the required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers that he is a Filipino citizen born in
Bacolod City, of Filipino parentage. He had taken and finished the course of Bachillerato Superior in
Spain and was approved, selected and qualified by the Insitututo de Cervantes for admission to the
Central University of Madrid where he studied and finished the law course, graduating there as
Licenciado en derecho. Thereafter he was allowed to practice the law profession in Spain. He claims
that under the provisions of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise of Profession between
the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish State, he is entitled to the practice the law profession
in the Philippines without submitting to the required bar examinations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the Philippine Bar?
RULING:
The Court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the Treaty on Academic Degrees and
the Exercise of Professions between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish state cannot be
invoked by the applicant. Said Treaty was intended to govern Filipino citizens desiring to practice the
legal profession in Spain, and the citizens of Spain desiring to practice the legal profession in the
Philippines. Applicant is a Filipino citizen desiring to practice the legal profession in the Philippines. He
is therefore subject to the laws of his own country and is not entitled to the privileges extended to
Spanish nationals desiring to practice in the Philippines. The privileges provided in the Treaty invoked
by the applicant are made expressly subject to the laws and regulations of the contracting state in
whose territory it is desired to exercise the legal profession.
The aforementioned Treaty, concluded between the Republic of the Philippines and the Spanish
state could not have been intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines, for reason that the Executive Department may not encroach upon
the constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules for admission to the practice
of law in the Philippines, and the power to repeal, alter or supplement such rules being reserved only
to the Congress of the Philippines.

23

Tobias v Abalos 239 SCRA 106 G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Structure/Rules
FACTS:
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An
Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City
of Mandaluyong. Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong
and San Juan belonged to only one legislative district.
The petitioners contend on the following: (1) Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675
contravenes from the "one subject-one bill" rule provided in the Constitution by involving 2 subjects in
the bill namely (a) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (b) the division of
the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.
(2) The division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under
Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution.
(3) The said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements.
(4) That Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5(4) of the Constitution stating that within three years following the return
of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standard provided in this section.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA No. 7675 is unconstitutional?
RULING:
No. The aforesaid law is not unconstitutional. The Court dismissed the petition due to lack of
merit. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for
Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly
urbanized city but is a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
The Court ruled that RA No. 7675 followed the mandate of the "one city-one representative" proviso in
the Constitution stating that each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of
representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section
5(1), as aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute with the phrase
"unless otherwise provided by law."
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, it was the Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted
the assailed law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which
pertains to itself.
24

Garcia v. Mata, 65 SCRA 517 (1975)

Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Appropriation
FACTS:
Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed an
action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and readjust his
rank and pay emoluments.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the
reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no
relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600 was
an appropriation law for 1956-57).
ISSUE:
Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?
HELD:
No. Section 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him. The
incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of Republic Act 1600 has no relevance or
pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein. Section 11 of RA
1600 fails to disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the
operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling to
active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.
It violated Art. VI, Sec. 19, Paragraph 2 of 1935 Constitution: embracing provisions or
enactments relating specifically to appropriation. It also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, Paragraph 1 which
provides for bills not embracing more than one subject expressed in the title. It is meant to preclude
the insertion of riders in legislation, Riders are provisions not germane to the subject matter of the bill
violating the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in the title
of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, as
expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
Non-appropriation items inserted in an appropriation measure shall be unconstitutional, invalid
and inoperative, therefore, it confers no right and affords no protection.

25

Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 272 (1987)

Topic: Executive : Executive Clemency Pardon Not Subject to Judicial Review/Scrutiny
FACTS:
In 1978, Wilfredo Torres was convicted of Estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
with the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. In 1982, Torres was charged with
multiple crimes of Estafa. In 1986, then Chairman of the Board of Paroles Neptali Gonzales petitioned
for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the
issue before the Supreme Court averring that the Executive Department erred in convicting him for
violating the conditions of his pardon because the Estafa charges against him were not yet final and
executory as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before a person
can be validly rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and
accordingly to serve the balance of his original sentence.
RULING:
The SC affirmed the following:
1. The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional
pardon are purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.
2. The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny
under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for
and conviction of violation of a conditional pardon under Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code. Where
the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code, no judicial
pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional
pardon.
3. Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally
pardoned convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the
offense for which he was conditionally pardoned, Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code is
not afflicted with a constitutional vice.
In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to
have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive Department has two options: (i) to proceed
against him under Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code; or (ii) to proceed against him
under Article 159 of the RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional, minimum period, upon
a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of the
conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of the Presidents
executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
26

Renato Lapinid Vs.CSC, Philippine Ports Authority and Juanito Junsay G.R. NO. 96298 MAY 14, 1991
Topic: The Civil Service; Scope of Authority
FACTS:
Petitioner Renato M. Lapinid was appointed by the Philippine Ports Authority to the position of
Terminal Supervisor at the Manila International Container Terminal. This appointment was protested
by private respondent Juanito Junsay, who reiterated his earlier representations with the Appeals
Board of the PPA for a review of the decision of the Placement Committee. He contended that he
should be designated terminal supervisor, or to any other comparable position, in view of his
preferential right thereto.
Complaining that the PPA had not acted on his protest, Junsay went to the Civil Service
Commission and challenged Lapinid's appointment on the same grounds he had earlier raised before
the PPA. In a resolution dated February 14, 1990, the Commission disposed as follows: After a careful
review of the records of the case, the Commission finds the appeal meritorious. Foregoing premises
considered, it is directed that Appellants Juanito Junsay and Benjamin Villegas be appointed as
Terminal Supervisor (SG 18) vice protestees Renato Lapinid and Antonio Dulfo respectively who may be
considered for appointment to any position commensurate and suitable to their qualifications, and
that the Commission be notified within ten (10) days of the implementation hereof.
Upon learning of the said resolution, Lapinid, who claimed he had not been informed of the appeal
and had not been heard thereon, filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied. PPA also filed
its own motion for reconsideration twice which were both denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the
ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding,
order his replacement by the latter?
RULING:
No. Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in
which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the
ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political
question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.
The only function of the CSC in cases of this nature is to review the appointment in the light of the
requirements of the Civil Service Law, and when it finds the appointee to be qualified and all other
legal requirements have been otherwise satisfied, it has no choice but to attest to the appointment.
The determination of who among several candidates for a vacant position has the best
qualifications is vested in the sound discretion of the Department Head or appointing authority and not
in the CSC. The CSC cannot substitute its judgment for that of the Head of Office in this regard.

27

Garcia et al. vs COMELEC G.R. No. 111511 October 5, 1993

Topic: Local Government; Powers/Functions/ Scope and limitations of Authority- Recall proceeding
FACTS:
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vicemayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province
constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner
Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall proceedings. COMELEC scheduled
the recall election for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction
to annul the Resolution of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and
procedural requirement" laid down in Section 70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991).
The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2) modes of initiating the
recall from office of local elective officials who appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate.
One of these modes is recall through the initiative of a preparatory recall assembly. In the case at
bench, petitioners assail this mode of initiatory recall as unconstitutional.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings?
RULING:
No. There is nothing in the Constitution that suggest that the people have the "sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding, the Constitution did not provide for
any mode, of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution
is for Congress to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and
accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization with effective
mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum . . ." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was
clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
The law instituted safeguards to assure that the initiation of the recall process by a preparatory
recall assembly will not be corrupted by extraneous influences. We held that notice to all the members
of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to the validity of its proceedings. The law also
requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly members to convene in session and
in a public place. Needless to state, compliance with these requirements is necessary, otherwise, there
will be no valid resolution of recall which can be given due course by the COMELEC.
In sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people, particularly
their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials thru recall elections. If the petition would
succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall elections which Congress found
should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a preparatory recall
assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to remove impediments to the effective
exercise by the people of their sovereign power to check the performance of their elected officials. The
power to determine this mode was specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the
Constitution.
28

In Re: Laureta and Maravilla, 148 SCRA 382

Topic:

Government Powers /Functions; Interdependence; check and balance

Facts:
In almost identical letters dated 20 October 1986, personally sent to Justices Andres R. Narvasa,
Ameurfina M. Herrera, and Isagani A. Cruz, and a fourth letter, dated 22 October 1986 addressed to
Justice Florentino P. Feliciano, all members of the First Division of this COURT, in feigned ignorance of
the Constitutional requirement that the Court's Divisions are composed of, and must act through, at
least five (5) members, and in a stance of dangling threats to effect a change of the Court's adverse
resolution, petitioner Eva Maravilla Ilustre wrote in part: Please forgive us for taking the Liberty of
addressing you this letter which we do hope you will read very carefully. The letter called the attention
of the magistrates for the dismissal of her case, thus, considering the three minute-resolution: the first
dated 14 May 1986; the second, dated 9 July 1986; and the third, 3 September 1986, railroaded with
such hurry/ promptitude unequaled in the entire history of the Supreme Court under circumstances
that have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethic.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner could be liable for contempt in court and her counsel be imposed of
grave professional misconduct?
RULING:
Ilustre has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment
of the orderly administration of justice in her letters addressed to the individual Justices; in the
language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan; in her statements, conduct, acts and charges
against the Supreme Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned and her ascription of
improper motives to them; and in her unjustified outburst that she can no longer expect justice from
the Supreme Court. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as
a shield for contemptuous acts against the Court.
Also, Atty. Laureta has committed acts unbecoming an officer of the Court for his stance of
dangling threats of bringing the matter to the "proper forum" to effect a change of the Court's adverse
Resolution; for his lack of respect for and exposing to public ridicule, the two highest Courts of the land
by challenging in bad faith their integrity and claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgments;
for authoring, or at the very least, assisting and/or abetting and/or not preventing the contemptuous
statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of his client, Ilustre, notwithstanding his disclaimer
that he had absolutely nothing to do with them, which we find disputed by the facts and circumstances
of record as above stated; for totally disregarding the facts and circumstances and legal considerations
set forth in the Supreme Court's Resolutions; for making it appear that the Justices of the Supreme
Court and other respondents before the Tanodbayan are charged with "graft and corruption" all with
the manifest intent to bring the Justices of this Court and of the Court of Appeals into disrepute and to
subvert public confidence in the Courts.
Accordingly, respondent Eva Maravilla ilustre is hereby held in contempt and Atty. Wenceslao
Laureta is found guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to continue to be
entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, and is hereby
suspended from the practice of law until further Orders, the suspension to take effect immediately.
29

Morales v. Subido G.R. No. L-29658 November 29, 1968

Topic: Legislative (Article VI): Records and Journals:
FACTS:
In the Senate, the Committee on Government Reorganization, to which House Bill 6951 was
referred, reported a substitute measure. It is to this substitute bill that Section 10 of the Act owes its
present form and substance.
It is be noted that the Rodrigo amendment was in the nature of an addition to the phrase 'who
has served the police department of a city for at least 8 years with the rank of captain and/or higher,'
under which the petitioner herein, who is at least a high school graduate (both parties agree that the
petitioner finished the second year of the law course) could possibly qualify. However, somewhere in
the legislative process the phrase "who has served the police department of a city or" was dropped
and only the Rodrigo amendment was retained."
The present insistence of the petitioner is that the version of the provision, as amended at
the behest of Sen. Rodrigo, was the version approved by the Senate on third reading, and that when
the bill emerged from the conference committee the only change made in the provision was the
insertion of the phrase "or has served as chief of police with exemplary record."
In support of this assertion, the petitioner submitted certified photostatic copies of the
different drafts of House Bill 6951 showing the various changes made. In what purport to be the page
proofs of the bill as finally approved by both Houses of Congress. It is unmistakable up to this point
that the phrase, "who has served the police department of a city or," was still part of the provision, but
according to the petitioner the House bill division deleted the entire provision and substituted what
now is Section 10 of the Police Act of 1966.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can inquire upon the records or the journal of the legislature to
determine whether there was an alteration of a provision in an enrolled bill?
RULING:
Accordingly, the motions for reconsideration are denied. The respect due to the other branches
of the Government demands that we act upon the faith and credit of what the officers of the said
branches attest to as the official acts of their respective departments. Otherwise we would be cast in
the unenviable and unwanted role of a sleuth trying to determine what actually did happen in the
labyrinth of lawmaking, with consequent impairment of the integrity of the legislative process.
The investigation which the petitioner would like this Court to make can be better done in
Congress. After all, House cleaning the immediate and imperative need for which seems to be
suggested by the petitioner can best be effected by the occupants thereof. If there has been any
mistake in the printing of the bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and approved by
the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of separation of
powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the remedy is by
amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree."
30

Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)

Topic: Executive; Powers/Limitations
FACTS:
The petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense
punishable under the Constitution and under RA 3019 and PD 807. The petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition in this Court questioning the jurisdiction of the "Tanodbayan" to file the
information without the approval of the Ombudsman. The Court annulled the information. Upon the
annulment, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it. The
Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that "some changes be made in the information previously
filed."
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the Sandiganbayan 1for
which the petitioner filed a "Motion to Quash" . The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash, and
the Special Prosecutor filed a "Motion to Suspend Accused Pendente Lite".
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration for his suspension was also denied by the Court. The
petitioner contends that as the preliminary investigation that was conducted prior to the filing of the
original information in Criminal Case No. 12766 was nullified by this Court, another preliminary
investigation should have been conducted before the new information in Criminal Case No. 12893 was
filed against him. The denial of his right to such investigation allegedly violates his right to due process
and constitutes a ground to quash the information.
The public respondent argues that another preliminary investigation is unnecessary because
both old and new information involves the same subject matter a violation and the petitioner allegedly
waived the second preliminary investigation by his failure to comply with the Court's Order.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion: In denying the petitioner's
motion to quash the information in Criminal Case No. 12893; and in suspending the petitioner from
office despite the President's having previously approved his indefinite leave of absence?
RULING:
Petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand
Criminal Case No. 12893 to the Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in
abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation, denying the motion to
quash. A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only because
the first was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right.
The preventive suspension of the petitioner is hereby lifted. Since the petitioner is an
incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the
Constitution and the laws (RA 3019 and PD 807), the law's command that he "shall be suspended from
office" pendente lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence is not a bar to his preventive
suspension for. Since his preventive suspension has exceeded the reasonable maximum period of
ninety (90) days provided in Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines (P.D. 807), it
should now be lifted.
31