Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908 1918, by

Hasan Kayali
In the early 19th Century Arabic thinkers took up the questions, how had Islamic society fallen
behind and how might it flourish in the modern era? They contributed to a growing Arab consciousness
hearkening back to the golden era of Islam and employing rationalism to formulate answers in the Arabic
language. While the problems discussed were relevant to all of Islamic civilization and solutions were
proposed within the context of the Ottoman Empire, some historians have argued that these stirrings
represent the earliest signs of Arab Nationalism. Similarly, nationalist historians from the Middle East
tend to look back on recent events with an eye toward constituting the nationalist narrative, retelling the
last one hundred years from this point of view. European histories of the region likewise have claimed
that Turkish and Arab Nationalism can already be seen along the borders that their leverage in the region
would allow them to delineate after World War I. It is Hasan Kayalis position that neither Arabism nor
Turkism were at first nationalist urges. Rather, he posits that Arabism developed in the late Ottoman
period as a reaction to Istanbul policy, in the form of political demands to address local issues, for
expanded power, or cultural accommodation within the Ottoman context. Likewise, Kayali argues that
Turkism emerged as a cultural consciousness that became politicized overtime as it was referenced in
accusations of cultural imperialism against the Unionists by the Arab decentralists. In both instances, it is
Kayalis argument that neither current crystallized into nationalist political movements until the end of
World War I when the possibility of continuation of the Ottoman model was exhausted. According to
Kayali, in order to understand the evolution of both Arabism and Turkism to forms of nationalism at the
end of the war, one must examine Turco-Arab interaction through the lens of Ottoman policies such as
secularization and centralization and the resulting contestations, as well as the conditions created by the
pressures of foreign encroachments and loss of territories.
Throughout the Tanzimat, Young Ottoman and Young Turk eras, the Ottoman government
projected an inclusive policy of supranational identity for its subjects, eschewing the markers of language,
ethnicity and sometimes religion. Kayali argues that this is evidence of a lack of a nationalist sentiment

on the part of the Turks and further, that these policies did not spark nationalist sentiments in the Arab
provinces. Tanzimat reforms made Muslim and non-Muslim Ottomans equal before Ottoman law. While
this proved controversial for some Muslim subjects who already saw Christians benefiting from
capitulations, Kayali holds that Muslim notables utilized new local councils to channel their grievances
and sought resolutions within the Ottoman context. Following the trend of the Young Ottomans, Sultan
Adulhamid emphasized that Ottoman subjects were united against European Imperialism and revived the
notion of the Islamic character of the empire in order to firm up support from the Arab provinces. In the
Young Turk era, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) continued with this platform of equality for
all Ottoman subjects and sought to preempt the formation of ethnic constituencies by passing the Law of
Association in 1909. Later in the era, the Young Turks would again turn to an emphasis on Islam as the
European provinces were lost and the empire grew increasingly Muslim. Though some opposition and
organizing on the part of Arabs did occur in this period, particularly in Syria, Kayali argues that the
disruptions were either isolated, or connected to a concern for the continuation of Ottoman sovereignty,
concern we will treat later in this review.
Kayali holds that a careful examination of the CUPs centralization policies supports the
argument that neither an urge toward Turkish nationalism nor Arab separatist sentiments was present on a
large scale in the empire before World War I. However, he admits the disruption caused by the
implementation of some of the policies encouraged Aarb consciousness and instigated accusations of
Turkification. Kayali argues that the Ottoman governments policies under the Young Turks were in
many ways a continuation of those from the Abdulhamid era, and that the controversial language policies
were envisioned as a way to create more unity in the empire and to integrate its functions. The
requirements around the use of Turkish in governmental, educational and legal settings were put forward
to simplify the Ottoman bureaucracy and make it more uniform. These policies, like the secularizing ones
that came before them1, spurred controversy in the Arab provinces and heightened citizens identification
as a linguistic group. The governments use of Turkish and the teaching of it in upper level education
1

Earlier secularization trends spurred on the Islamic Modernist movement touched on in the introduction.

were not terribly controversial policies. However, changes in the courts and the overall sense of
marginalization generated much discontent and accusations that the central government was Turkifying
the Arab provinces. Kayali argues that Unionists could not have been acting from such an ideology
because they themselves identified as Ottomans. Further, he claims that the accusation was exploited by
Arabs who had wider decentralist agendas for which they sought public support. In addition to the
grievance of cultural marginalization, these wider concerns included the desire for power to remain in the
hands of local notables and for the empire to focus on Arab interests. Kayali holds that through this period
and into the reform era, Arab politicians continued to seek solutions inside the Ottoman context. That the
CUP later offered concessions supports the view that the central government was invested in the Arab
provinces despite the give and take it required. Likewise, Kayali explains isolated mobilizations and
uprisings such as protest against the Lynch concession or uprisings in Transjordan to be related to local
economic interests of urgent importance. The vocal opposition expressed in these cases sought change of
specific policies and did not reflect separatist aims.
Kayali argues that Arab Nationalism became a widely circulated idea only when the viability of
the Ottoman Empire was threatened, and garnered widespread commitment only when the dissolution of
the empire was a foregone conclusion. Likewise, the central government articulated and committed to a
program of Turkish nationalism only when retaining the Arab provinces became tenuous and complicated
and an existential crisis required it. Prior to the war period, the empires losses in European provinces,
Libya and the Balkan Wars tested Ottoman subjects faith in the central governments ability to stave off
foreign and internal threats. According to Kayali, after the war started, increasing vulnerability forced
Arab power brokers to contemplate extra-Ottoman destinies and that some explored arrangements with
European powers or pan Arab configurations. Further, the brutal crackdown against suspected disloyal
Arabs likely fueled an inclination towards Arab Nationalism, particularly in the military. And yet, Kayali
contends, even when a figure on the periphery, Sharif Husayn, instigated a revolt and aligned with the
British, other Arab constituencies did not follow suit but kept their inclinations under wraps and their
fortunes with the empire. At the close of the war when European designs on the region became clear,
3

Arabs and Turks continued to seek linked destinies through a model of independent states under Ottoman
sovereignty. Finally, the Turks adopted a nationalist stance out of a basic impulse for survival. For both
the Arabs and the Turks, commitment to nationalism was not cemented until European intervention made
it absolutely necessary.
Kayali argues that although Arab and Turkish cultural identities were negotiated between the
central government and the provinces along the lines of social and economic and cultural concerns, and
that conscious activities toward separatist or nationalist aims were no more than isolated incidences in the
empire until the onset of World War I. His analysis is successful in destabilizing nationalist narratives
that would posit Arab Nationalism as a political project born by the mid 19th Century. His careful
treatment of the Ottoman governance and policy apparatus also convincingly demonstrates the durability
of the Ottoman model for both Arabs and Turks in the midst of mounting external pressure and internal
tensions. While Kayalis thesis that the CUPs policies did not constitute Turkification because the
proponents identified with Ottomanism falls short because it does not account for the fact that this
Ottoman identity privileged aspects of Turkish culture. Further, his downplaying of a lack of Arab
representation in the first Parliaments on the basis of a lack of analyzable data and discounting the
continued prominence of earlier absorbed Turkish elites in the provinces was not a convincing rebuttal of
evidence of a project of Turkification. Another criticism is that while taking a nuanced approach to
locating the threshold for the expression of a complex socio-political phenomenon like Arab Nationalism
is an admirable endeavor, in this particular treatment, the Arab perspective may have been
disproportionately downplayed due to the privileging of sources that spoke to the central governments
activities. This muting of the Arab perspective was furthered by Kayalis approach of trying to
incorporate all non-occupied Arab provinces into his analysis which resulted in a piecemeal and
sometimes disjointed view of them. Despite these contentions, overall, the volume is worthwhile
scholarship that offers insight on the late Ottoman government and the state of affairs in the Arab
provinces on the eve the Colonialist era in the region.