Medieval Philosophy Prof. Dr. Robert C.

Koons
http://www.utexas.edu/cola/depts/philosophy/faculty/koons/phl349/syllabus.htm

Lecture # 11: Plato and Aristotle on Proofs of Gods Existence

Were Plato and Aristotle monotheists or polytheists? They were, in a sense, both. Both thought there was a
single supreme intellect, from which everything else derives its energy or activity. However, both also
thought that were divine intelligences associated with the sphere of the stars, the sun, and the planets.
Jewish, Christian and Muslim thinkers were able to reconcile these philosophical hypotheses with the
biblical tradition by identifying the celestial intelligenes with angels.
Another point of convergence: not only did Plato and Aristotle agree with the Bible on the existence of one
God, they also agreed with the apostle Paul (in Romans 1) in thinking that we can demonstrate the existence
of God by the rational examination of nature. Both Plato and Aristotle endorse some kind of first cause
argument: that natural phenomena demand causes, that this chain of causation cannot be supposed to run
infinteily backward, and that the first cause of the chain of natural causation must be a supreme intelligence
or soul, a living and knowing thing.
Platos sketch of the first cause argument occurs in Book X of The Laws. The Laws is a very late work of
Platos. Like the Republic, it purports to sketch the constitution of an ideal state. Many of the most radical
elements of the Republic have been omitted in the Laws: communism of property, the abolition of marriage
and communal nurseries (all of which applied to the upper class, the guardians of the Republic), sexual
equality, the total ban on poetry. The government of the Laws is a kind of gerontocracy: everyone over 50
years old is able to vote. The constitution of the Laws also seems to be concerned with guarding against
tyranny by avoiding too much concentration of power through checks and balances, division of powers, and
a written constitution. However, Plato believes that a virtuous society can survive only if its citizens believe
in a God who is intimately concerned with the affairs of men, and who demands justice and punishes vice.
Plato believes that all men should be raised believing in God unquestioningly, but he believes that this is not
sufficient to guard the state against the dangers of atheism. Consequently, he suggests that a philosophical
demonstration of Gods existence be included in the preamble to the constitution,
Plato is especially concerned about the effects of scientific materialism (the physical investigators of his
day), who seek to explain all natural phenomena in terms of matter and chance. These materialists see the
activities of art (the intentional, purposeful actions of human beings) as the products of blind natural
forces, and they attribute the origins of religion (and, hence, of the gods themselves) to this same source. In
contrast, Plato argues that it is art that is prior to nature and chance: that all the world is the product of an
intelligent and purposeful power,
Plato uses the concept of soul as his middle term. Human art is the product of the human soul, which
moves itself into action for the sake of some purpose. Plato proposes that being a self-mover of this kind is
the essence or philosophically correct definition of the soul. Plato notices that the world contains both things
at rest (in a state of equilibrium) and things in motion (any kind of change, of which locomotion is only one
case). Plato assumes a causal principle: every thing that moves (changes) is either moved (caused to change)
by itself or by something else. The chain of things that do not move themselves cannot regress to infinity: so
there must be some self-movers. In fact, all movement (including the rotation of the heavens) is ultimately
the result of the primordial motion of self-movers. Since all self-movers are, by definition, souls, it is soul,
rather than matter, that is the first principle of all natural phenomena.
At this point, Plato shifts to a kind of design argument. He argues that the unity and harmony of the world
(especially the heavens) demonstrates that one soul, a soul of great wisdom and power, is ultimately
responsible for nearly all of nature. This is similar to the Demiurge of the Timaeus, except that the Demiurge
was responsible for the formedness of nature, while the God of the Laws is responsible for the ongoing
activity and motion that makes of the life of nature. In the Laws, Plato describes Soul as the first origin and
moving power of all that changes, which suggests that God both created the world at some point in time
and continues to maintain its ongoing activity and change. Without Gods continued re-energizing of
creation, Plato assumes that all natural change and motion would grind to a halt. He also suggests that the
material world was created in time: the soul is prior to the body, and the body is second and comes
afterwards, and is born to obey the soul

Aristotles view of God, expressed most clearly in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, is significantly
different. The main difference is this: Aristotle is convinced that the physical universe has always existed
and always will exist: it is everlasting, beginningless and endless. His main arguments for this conclusion are
in his book on Physics. There Aristotle argues that time itself can have no beginning or end, since time
consists of a succession of nows, and each now is simultaneously the boundary of the past and the
future later than all past moments, and earlier than all future moments. This means that there cannot be a
first or a last moment, since that moment would have to be a dividing line between its past and its future,
but a first moment would have no past, and a last moment would have no future.
Second, Aristotle argues that time is nothing more than the measure of motion or change. So, if there were
no motion or change, then there would be no time. Since time is everlasting, motion and change must be
everlasting. Finally, motion and change are possible only for things that have the potential to change, the
potential to become something they are not. This potential for being something else is what Aristotle calls
matter. Hence, changeable things are material things. Since change is everlasting and without beginning,
so is matter itself.
Nonetheless, Aristotle accepts Platos first-cause argument about the origin of motion. One important
difference: Aristotle rejects the idea that the soul is a self-mover. In fact, he thinks that the idea of a selfmover is absurd and self-contradictory. The human soul is always moved into action by something else: for
example, I begin to think as a result of sensory stimulation, or I decide to initiate bodily movement because
of a change in my appetite. Aristotle points out that Plato seems to contradict himself here, because Plato
calls the soul as self-mover (in the Laws) but also describes it as set in motion by the sensation and the
circular motions of the animal spirits (in the Timaeus). In any case, Aristotle argues, nothing can literally
move itself. Its possible for a composite thing to have two parts, one of which moves the other. A simple
self-mover is impossible, however, since it would have to be simultaneously moving (so as to produce the
motion in itself) and unmoving (so as to be the recipient of the motion). Instead, Aristotle argues that the
regress of causation must terminate in an unmoved mover, something that produces movement or change in
something else without changing at all in its intrinsic character.
Some similarities between Platos argument and Aristotles:
1. In both cases, the first cause is immaterial and spiritual: soul (Plato) or intellect (Aristotle).
2. In both cases the first cause is in the category of pure being unchangeable, beyond mere potential.
3. Both are concerned with the ultimate explanation of motion, change.
4. Both appeal to a principle of causation, and both reject the possibility of an infinite causal regress.
Aristotles first-cause argument aims to show, not just that an unmoved mover exists, but that there exists
something that is essentially an unmoved mover: something whose very being consists in being in act (an
actual energizer of things), not merely something with the potential to move others. This thing must not
only be unmoved, but unmoveable, unchangeable, by virtue of being devoid of any kind of intrinsic
potentiality. This lack of mere potentiality entails a kind of simplicity: the unmoved mover must be
indivisible, without parts or magnitude. It must exist eternally and always remain active in exactly the same
way. How does Aristotle reach this conclusion?
1. It is a matter of metaphysical necessity that change is eternal.
2. All change is the result of activity (the exercise of active power).
3. Therefore, it is a matter of metaphysical necessity that activity occur. (from 1.2)
4. If all active things are potentially non-active, then they could all be inactive at the same time.
5.If all active things were inactive at the same time, then all activity would cease.
6. Therefore, some active things are necessarily active. (from 3-5)
7. If something is necessarily active, then it exists necessarily, and either its activity is intrinsic to its own
being, or it is necessarily receptive of activity from something else that is necessarily active.
8. No chain of activity-reception can regress infinitely.
9.Therefore, there is something that exists necessarily and whose activity is intrinsic to its own being, and
there is another thing that exists necessarily and is necessarily receptive of the activity of the first thing. (The
unmoved mover and the first moveable.) (from 6-8)

Step 2 is a crucial assumption. One might wonder why there couldnt exist two things that oscillate eternally
between being mover and moved. A moves B, and then B moves A, and so on forever. I think Aristotles
objection to this possibility would be to point out that it presupposes that there are two possible states for
each of A and B the active states A+ and B+, and the passive states A- and B-. The oscillation proceeds:
(A+,B-), (A-B+), (A+,B-), etc. However, since each object has two possible states, it seems that the state (A-,B) would be a possible state of the universe (even if one that never occurs). However, if (A-,B-) were to have
occurred, the universe would be frozen in a changeless state, which is metaphysically impossible. A possible
state of the universe cannot entail an impossibility, hence the state (A-,B-) must be impossible, It is not,
however, contrary to the natures of A of B, so the objector is left with no explanation of its impossibility.
Another thought-experiment: an infinitely long row of dominoes perpetually in a state of falling down. At
each moment, infinitely many have already fallen down, infinitely many are still standing erect, and one or
two are in the process of falling down. In such a set-up, change is everlasting, but again we can imagine two
possible world-states: one in which all the dominoes are upright, and one in which all are lying down. Each
of theses states is compatible with each of the intrinsic natures of the dominoes. What then explains why the
universe was not always in either of these two states? If nothing exists but the collection of dominoes, then
either of these states is possible. Yet, neither is in fact possible, since in neither case would change be
everlasting. Hence, the universe must contain more than just the moveable dominoes. (In addition, Aristotle
would object to the existence of an infinite collection of substances.)
Aristotles analysis of time and change entails that motion must be eternal, but this metaphysical necessity
cannot itself be the source or explanation of the necessarily eternal motion. Rather, it points to something
else, namely, the unmoved mover, as the metaphysically necessary source of motion.
Suppose one argued that it is the being of the pair A-B (or the being of the whole set of dominoes) to be the
source of motion. Aristotle would argue that, if neither A nor B by itself, nor any of the dominoes, is active
by nature, then the whole aggregate, which consists of nothing over and above its parts, cannot be active by
nature, either. If the whole is active by nature, it must be that there is some third thing, in addition to A and
B, that accounts for the natural or essential character of the motion, and it is that third thing that must be
identified as the unmoved mover.
Can Aristotle show that there is only one unmoved mover? Couldnt there be two or more? The argument
above seems to show only that there must be at least one, not exactly one. Here the text is somewhat
confusing, In Lambda, chapter 8, Aristotle uses an analysis of Ptolemaic astronomy to reach the conclusion
that there are fifty-five (or perhaps forty-three) unmoved movers. But then he goes on to argue that there
can be only one unmoved mover, since the unmoved mover is immaterial, and where there is no matter
there can be no differentiation between different members of the same species or kind. However, the
unmoved movers belong to a single, unique species (one in definition), and consequently they must also
be one in number. Aristotle uses this uniqueness of the unmoved mover to explain why there is only one
sky (heaven). Probably the best interpretation is that there are 55 unmoved movers, but that one of these is
primary, because it is responsible for the first motion of the heavens (the daily rotation of the stars around
the earth). A more charitable interpretation, however, might suggest that there is only one unmoved mover,
but that this mover influences in distinct ways each of the 55 celestial intelligences.
What would an unmoved mover be like? How can something affect other things without undergoing any
change itself? Aristotle argues that it can do so only by being the object of desire and understanding. E.g.,
the number 3 moves our mathematical understanding into action (in recognizing, for example that 2 < 3), but
3 itself undergoes no change in doing so. Similarly, beauty creates the desire to keep on viewing the
beautiful object, but this involves no change in the object. Thus, God (the unmoved mover) is an object of
the intellectual understanding of the celestial spirits, inspiring them into the attempt to imitate God by
generating an eternal, unchanging circular motion. In addition, God must be simple and immaterial,
without any magnitude. This requires that God be an intellect.
Some commentators have wondered why the unmoved mover needs to be a real thing, as opposed to a
fiction or idealization. Why couldnt the celestial intelligences simply dream up the idea of a God, and be
inspired by their imagined construct into emulating the divine divinity? Aristotle assumes, I think, there is a
kind of dependency of the mind and the desire upon their objects, so that, at least in the case of our most

fundamental acts of understanding and desiring, there must be something real that attracts and forms the
mind. The celestial intellects apprehend God directly not via sense, imagination or abstraction.
Moreover, God must be active. Aristotle argues that the only kind of activity that occur without change is
pure thought, contemplation. In fact, Aristotle describes God as self-thinking thought. God eternally
thinks about himself, in a state of changeless intellectual activity. God is his own object of understanding
and desire. Since God eternally possesses himself, he is in a state of everlasting bliss: at least as good as the
best moments in our life (as Aristotle puts it).
Finally, does Aristotles argument depend on his assumption that time is eternal? Maimonides and Aquinas
argued, No. First, they argued that Aristotle was in error in thinking that time couldnt have a beginning.
Aquinas claimed that the beginning of time is not itself a moment of time. Thus, Aristotle was right in
thinking that every moment of time separates a past from a future, but he erred in thinking that, if time had
a beginning, there had to be a first moment of time. The beginning is not the first moment of time: it is that
which precedes all moments of time, just as, if time will have an end, the end will be something that occurs
after every moment of time.
Second, even if we suppose that time might not be everlasting, we can still use Aristotles argument to prove
that change must occur at every moment of time, and therefore conclude that something exists that is
necessarily active at every moment of time (if there are any moments of time). The revised proof might go
something like this:
1. It is a matter of metaphysical necessity that change occur at every moment of time.
2. All change is the result of activity (the exercise of active power).
3. Therefore, it is a matter of metaphysical necessity that activity occur at every moment of time. (from 1.2)
4. If all active things are potentially non-active, then they could all be inactive at the same time.
5.If all active things were inactive at the same time, then there would be a moment of time devoid of activity.
6. Therefore, some active things are necessarily active at every moment of time. (from 3-5)
7. If something is necessarily active at every moment of time, then it exists necessarily at every moment of
time, and either its activity is intrinsic to its own being, or it is necessarily receptive of activity from
something else that is necessarily active at every moment of time.
8. No chain of activity-reception can regress infinitely.
9.Therefore, there is something that exists necessarily at every time and whose activity is intrinsic to its own
being, and there is another thing that exists necessarily at every moment of time and is necessarily receptive
at every moment of time of the activity of the first thing. (The unmoved mover and the first moveable.) (from
6-8)
If time is necessarily eternal as Aristotle thought, then the unmoved mover must exist eternally. If time could
have a beginning or an end, then there must be something that causes time itself to begin or to end to exist.
Lets call this thing Chronos. In order to be able to cause time to be finite (by imposing either a beginning or
an end to it), must be the cause of time itself, which must therefore be the cause of each moment of time. If
Chronos causes each moment of time, then it is necessarily active at each moment of time, and we can
identify Chronos with the unmoved mover. Since Chronos causes time itself, Chronos must be eternal.
Therefore, if time is necessarily everlasting, then the unmoved mover is everlasting, and if time is possibly
finite, then the unmoved mover is eternal (outside or beyond time).
Aristotles picture of God assumes that God cannot exist without being active or without actively causing
activity in other things. When adapted to the Judeo-Christian setting, this seems to put some limit to Gods
free will. Aristotles God is constitutionally unable to create and sustain a universe that is dead and static,
even for an instant. Ibn Sina and Aquinas would explain this in terms of Gods goodness and wisdom: God
wouldnt want to create such a lifeless period. Philosophers in the kalam tradition (al-Ghazzali,
Boneventure) and some later philosophers (Scotus, Ockham) would find this unacceptable. Since God is
sovereign and all-powerful, He must be capable of creating any kind of world, including an eternally static
one. The problem for theistic Aristotelians is that by using what is essentially a physical argument for Gods
existence, they end up treating God as a kind of physical principle, which works only insofar as Gods
freedom is limited.