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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013

Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

Starter Pack--- Cuba Aff/Neg


***1AC***..............................................................................................................................................3
1ACInherency......................................................................................................................................4
1ACPlan...............................................................................................................................................5
1ACLatinAmericaAdvantage.............................................................................................................6
1ACSoftPowerAdvantage................................................................................................................10
1ACSolvency.....................................................................................................................................15
***Inherency/Solvency***...................................................................................................................17
InherencyExtA2RelationsNow....................................................................................................18
***Latin America Advantage***........................................................................................................19
RelationsUniqueness..........................................................................................................................20
RelationsUniquenessNowKey......................................................................................................22
RelationsUniquenessA2ObamaAppeal........................................................................................23
RemovingEmbargoSolvesRelations.................................................................................................24
RemovingEmbargoSolvesRelationsA2RegionalInfluences.......................................................26
LatinAmericaRelationsChinaCompetition...................................................................................27
A2AppeasementTurnGeneral.......................................................................................................28
A2AppeasementTurnEconomics..................................................................................................29
LatinAmericaImpactGlobalInstability.........................................................................................30
EconCollapseCausesWar.................................................................................................................31
ProliferationCausesWar....................................................................................................................32
***Soft Power Advantage***..............................................................................................................34
SoftPowerUniquenessGeneral......................................................................................................35
SoftPowerUniquenessCubaKey...................................................................................................36
AffSolvesSoftPower.........................................................................................................................38
SoftPowerKeytoHegemony.............................................................................................................39
A2SoftPowerFails............................................................................................................................41
A2HardPowerSolves........................................................................................................................42
A2GovPoliciesNotKey....................................................................................................................44
HegSolvesWar..................................................................................................................................45
HegSustainableCatchAll..............................................................................................................46
HegSustainableSoftPower............................................................................................................49
HegSustainableEconomicPower...................................................................................................50

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

A2SmoothTransition.........................................................................................................................51
***Solvency***.....................................................................................................................................53
SolvencyReform.............................................................................................................................54
SolvencyObamaLeadershipKey...................................................................................................55
***2AC/Miscellaneous***...................................................................................................................56
2ACTerrorismAddOn......................................................................................................................57
A2NoCapability/Motive....................................................................................................................60
A2PoliticsLink..................................................................................................................................62
A2PoliticsLinkA2CubanAmericans...........................................................................................64
A2CritiqueLiftingEmbargo=DRule...........................................................................................65
***Negative***.....................................................................................................................................66
1NCLatinAmericaRelationsDefense...............................................................................................67
2NCLatinAmericaRelationsDefense...............................................................................................68
CubaRelationsDefense......................................................................................................................70
1NCLatinAmericaImpactDefense...................................................................................................71
2NCLatinAmericaImpactDefense...................................................................................................72
1NCSoftPowerDefense....................................................................................................................73
2NCSoftPowerDefense....................................................................................................................74
1NCHegImpactDefense...................................................................................................................75
2NCHegImpactDefense...................................................................................................................76
1NC/2NCProlifDefense....................................................................................................................77
1NC/2NCEconDefense.....................................................................................................................78
1NCPoliticsLink................................................................................................................................81

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

***1AC***

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

1AC Inherency
Contention 1: Inherency
Obama has moved to ease restrictions on engagement with
Cuba but full lift of the embargo is key
Bechtel 2011 (Marilyn Bechtel, activist and author, January 31, 2011, Time to normalize

relations with Cuba, Peoples World, http://www.peoplesworld.org/time-to-normalize-relations-withcuba/)


It's safe to say that no issue in U.S. foreign policy has lingered so long,

fundamentally unchanged, as our country's economic blockade and


draconian restrictions on other relations with a very near neighbor, Cuba.
President Obama's recent moves to ease those restrictions , including those
announced in mid-January, are a promising start to a long-overdue normalization
of U.S. relations with our island neighbor. Begun in October 1960 - just months after the Cuban
people overthrew U.S.-backed dictator Fulgencio Batista - the blockade and other bans have been
strengthened several times over the decades. Besides severely restricting trade with Cuba and
imposing penalties on other countries' trade with the island, successive U.S. administrations have
imposed onerous conditions on travel there by U.S. citizens. Soon after becoming

president, Barack Obama signaled a new opening toward Cuba by greatly


easing restrictions on travel to Cuba by Cuban Americans, and on their
sending remittances to family members in Cuba. In mid-January the
president again moved to ease travel restrictions, this time reopening the way for
educational and cultural exchanges and enabling all Americans to send financial support to people in
Cuba, as well as expanding the number of U.S. airports that can receive flights from Cuba. Longtime

supporters of normalizing relations are calling the measures a promising


step, and urging that full diplomatic and economic relations be
reestablished . "I am extremely gratified to see the series of positive changes to come from this
administration, first in 2009 with its new policies for reuniting families and increasing
telecommunications and humanitarian aid to Cuba, and today with the announcement of these
encouraging policy changes," said U.S. Rep. Barbara Lee, D-Calif., in a Jan. 14 statement. Lee headed a
2009 Congressional delegation to Cuba, which on its return called for positive changes in relations
between the two countries. Noting that Cuba is the only country in the world where Americans are
forbidden to travel, Lee called the blockade "one of the nation's longest-held foreign policy failures,"
and expressed the hope that the administration's latest announcement was "just

one more step" toward normalized relations.

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

1AC Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should
substantially increase its economic engagement toward the
Republic of Cuba by lifting its economic embargo on the
Republic of Cuba.

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

1AC Latin America Advantage


Advantage ____ : Latin America Relations
The Cuba embargo costs the US international credibility and
dooms Latin American relations--- Plan solves
Birns 2013 (Larry Birns, COHA Director, and, Frederick B. Mills, COHA Senior Research Fellow,

January 30, 2013, Best Time for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-foru-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
In addition to being counter-productive and immoral, U.S. policy towards Havana is also
anachronistic. During the excesses of the cold war, the U.S. sought to use harsh and unforgiving
measures to isolate Cuba from its neighbors in order to limit the influence of the Cuban revolution on a
variety of insurgencies being waged in the region. That narrative did not sufficiently recognize the
homegrown causes of insurgency in the hemisphere. Some argue that it inadvertently drove Cuba
further into the Soviet camp. Ironically, at the present juncture of world history, the

embargo is in some ways isolating the U.S. rather than Cuba. Washington
is often viewed as implementing a regional policy that is defenseless and
without a compass. At the last Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, member
states, with the exception of Washington, made it clear that they unanimously want Cuba to
participate in the next plenary meeting or the gathering will be shut down. There are new

regional organizations, such as the Community of Latin American and


Caribbean States (CELAC), that now include Cuba and exclude the U.S.
Not even Americas closest allies support the embargo. Instead, over the
years, leaders in NATO and the OECD member nations have visited Cuba
and, in some cases, allocated lines of credit to the regime. So it was no
surprise that in November of 2012, the United Nations General Assembly
voted overwhelmingly (188 3), for the 21st year in a row, against the US embargo.

Finally, while a slim majority of Cuban Americans still favor the measure, changing demographics are
eroding and outdating this support. As famed Cuban Researcher, Wayne Smith, the director of the
Latin America Rights & Security: Cuba Project, at the Center for International Policy, points out, There
are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba
(Washington Post, Nov. 9, 2012).

Aff boosts relations and solves regional stability--- Now is the


key time
White 2013 (Robert E. White, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy, United States
ambassador to Paraguay from 1977 to 1979 and to El Salvador from 1980 to 1981, March 7, 2013,
After Chvez, a Chance to Rethink Relations With Cuba, New York Times,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/opinion/after-chavez-hope-for-good-neighbors-in-latinamerica.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)

FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was
inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the
Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United
States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century,

our policies toward our southern neighbors have alternated between


intervention and neglect, inappropriate meddling and missed
opportunities. The death this week of President Hugo Chvez of Venezuela who along
with Fidel Castro of Cuba was perhaps the most vociferous critic of the United States among the
political leaders of the Western Hemisphere in recent decades offers an opportunity to

restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of
prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its
supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral, Cubas current
president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all);
President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from
Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba embargo would send a
powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new,
warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change
throughout the Americas.

Latin American instability escalates draws in great powers


Rochlin 1994 (James Francis Rochlin, Professor of Political Science at Okanagan University, 1994,
Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America, pages 130-131)
While there were economic motivations for Canadian policy in Central America, security considerations were
perhaps more important. Canada possessed an interest in promoting stability in the face of a potential decline
of U.S. hegemony in the Americas. Perceptions of declining U.S. influence in the region which had some credibility
in 1979-1984 due to the wildly inequitable divisions of wealth in some U.S. client states in Latin America, in
addition to political repression, under-development, mounting external debt, anti-American sentiment produced by

were linked to the


prospect of explosive events occurring in the hemisphere. Hence, the Central
American imbroglio was viewed as a fuse which could ignite a cataclysmic
process throughout the region. Analysts at the time worried that in a worst-case scenario,
instability created by a regional war, beginning in Central America and
spreading elsewhere in Latin America, might preoccupy Washington to the
extent that the U nited S tates would be unable to perform adequately its
important hegemonic role in the international arena a concern expressed by the
director of research for Canadas Standing Committee Report on Central America. It was feared that such a
predicament could generate increased global instability and perhaps even
a hegemonic war. This is one of the motivations which led Canada to become involved in efforts at
decades of subjugation to U.S. strategic and economic interests, and so on

regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

Latin American relations solve the economy and proliferation--Cuba policy is the key roadblock
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A
Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review,
Lexis)
Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril.

Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and
cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import
than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy,
climate change, proliferation of w eapons of m ass d estruction), addressing it
would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a
disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. 20 In order to

confront any of the major world issues facing the United States,
Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who
generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its
historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine
for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has
been absent for the last fifty years.

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

Proliferation makes nuclear war inevitable- 4 reasons its


destabilizing
Heisbourg 2012 (Franois Heisbourg, Chairman of the International Institute for Strategic
Studies and of the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, April 4, 2012, How Bad Would the Further
Spread of Nuclear Weapons Be?, Nonproliferation Policy Education Center,
http://www.npolicy.org/article.php?aid=1171&tid=4)

Human societies tend to lack the imagination to think through , and to act upon,
what have become known as black swan events (26): that which has never occurred

(or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) is deemed not be in the field of reality, and to
which must be added eventualities which are denied because their consequences are to awful to contemplate. The
extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11)
bear testimony to this hard-wired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of
growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945.

Non-use of nuclear weapons may be taken for granted rather than being
an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs
(27) may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent (and often
compelling) historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire which downplay the role of the atomic
bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the
intention (28). However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing (29) has removed for more
than three decades the periodic reminders which such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive

There is a real and growing risk that we forget what was


obvious to those who first described in 1941 the unique nature of yet-tobe produced nuclear weapons (30). The risk is no doubt higher in those states for which the history
nature of nuclear weapons.

of World War II has little relevance and which have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex

post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. Unsustainable

strains are possibly the single most compelling feature of contemporary


proliferation. Tight geographical constraints with, for instance, New Delhi and Islamabad
located within 300 miles of each other-; nuclear multi-polarity against the backdrop of
multiple, criss-crossing, sources of tension in the Middle East (as opposed to the relative
simplicity of the US-Soviet confrontation); the existence of doctrines (such as Indias cold start)
and force postures (such as Pakistans broadening array of battlefield nukes)which rest on the
expectation of early use; the role of non-state actors as aggravating or
triggering factors when they are perceived as operating with the
connivance of an antagonist state ( in the past, the assassination of the Austrian Archduke in
Sarajevo in 1914; in the future, Hezbollah operatives launching rockets with effect against Israel or Lashkar-e-Taiba

test crisis
management capabilities more severely than anything seen during the
Cold War with the partial exception of the Cuban missile crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear
commandos doing a Bombay redux in India?) : individually or in combination, these factors

arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons safety and security arrangements, were less of a
challenge: the US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting US and Soviet territory and
capitals at risk. It

may be argued that these risk factors are known to potential


protagonists and that they therefore will be led to avoid the sort of nuclear
brinksmanship which characterized US and Soviet behavior during the
Cold War in crises such as the Korean war, Berlin, Cuba or the Yom Kippur war. Unfortunately, the multiple
nuclear crises between India and Pakistan demonstrate no such prudence,
rather to the contrary. And were such restraint to feed into nuclear policy and crisis planning along the
lines of apparently greater US and Soviet nuclear caution from the mid-Seventies onwards-, the fact would
remain that initial intent rarely resists the strains of a complex, multiactor confrontation between inherently distrustful antagonists. It is also worth
reflecting on the fact that during the 1980s, there was real and acute fear in Soviet ruling circles that the West was
preparing an out-of-the-blue nuclear strike, a fear which in turn fed into Soviet policies and dispositions (31

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

Economic collapse causes nuclear conflicts


Burrows and Harris 2009 Mathew J. Burrows counselor in the National Intelligence

Council and Jennifer Harris a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future:
Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis The Washington Quarterly 32:2
https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and
indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking
forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than
ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely

to be repeated, the lessons to be drawn from that period include the


harmful effects on fledgling democracies and multiethnic societies (think
Central Europe in 1920s and 1930s) and on the sustainability of multilateral institutions
(think League of Nations in the same period). There is no reason to think that this
would not be true in the twenty-first as much as in the twentieth century.
For that reason, the ways in which the potential for greater conflict could
grow would seem to be even more apt in a constantly volatile economic
environment as they would be if change would be steadier. In surveying those risks, the report
stressed the likelihood that terrorism and nonproliferation will remain priorities even as resource
issues move up on the international agenda. Terrorisms appeal will decline if
economic growth continues in the Middle East and youth unemployment is reduced. For
those terrorist groups that remain active in 2025, however, the diffusion of technologies and
scientific knowledge will place some of the worlds most dangerous capabilities within their reach.
Terrorist groups in 2025 will likely be a combination of descendants of long established
groupsinheriting organizational structures, command and control processes, and training procedures
necessary to conduct sophisticated attacksand newly emergent collections of the angry and
disenfranchised that become self-radicalized, particularly in the absence of economic outlets that
would become narrower in an economic downturn. The most dangerous casualty of

any economically-induced drawdown of U.S. military presence would


almost certainly be the Middle East. Although Irans acquisition of nuclear weapons is
not inevitable, worries about a nuclear-armed Iran could lead states in the
region to develop new security arrangements with external powers,
acquire additional weapons, and consider pursuing their own nuclear
ambitions. It is not clear that the type of stable deterrent relationship that existed between the
great powers for most of the Cold War would emerge naturally in the Middle East with a nuclear Iran.

Episodes of low intensity conflict and terrorism taking place under a


nuclear umbrella could lead to an unintended escalation and broader
conflict if clear red lines between those states involved are not well established. The close

proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and
mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving
reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth

in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times,
and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on
preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of
conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort
to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries
to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could
result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy
resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their
regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime
security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as
Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for

The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may
be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions,
rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational
cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle
East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within
and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.

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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


Starter Pack

Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

1AC Soft Power Advantage


Advantage ____ : Soft Power
American soft power is collapsing due to baseless and
hypocritical policies like the Cuba embargo--- The aff solves the
key internal link
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A
Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review,
Lexis)

Anti-Americanism has become the political chant de jour for leaders


seeking long-term as well as short-term gains in Latin American elections.
In Venezuela, the anti-American rhetoric spewed by Hugo Chavez masks his otherwise autocratic
tendencies, while countries like Bolivia and Ecuador tilt further away from Washington, both
rhetorically and substantively. The former expelled the U.S. Ambassador in October 2008, and the
latter has refused to renew Washington's lease on an airbase traditionally used for counter-narcotics
missions. The systemic neglect for eight years during the Bush Administration meant that political
capital was never seriously spent dealing with issues affecting the region. Because of this, President
Bush was unable to get much headway with his proposal to reform immigration, and his free trade
agreement with Colombia encountered significant opposition in Congress. Recent examples of U.S.
unilateralism, disregard for international law and norms, and a growing financial crisis, have all been
seized by a new generation of populist Latin American leaders who stoke anti-American sentiment.

The region, however, is absolutely critical to our national interest and


security. Over thirty percent of our oil comes from Latin America - more
than the U.S. imports from the Middle East. Additionally, over half of the foreign-born
population in the United States is Latin American, meaning that a significant portion of American
society is intrinsically tied to the region. 1 These immigrants, as well as their sons and daughters, have
already begun to take their place amongst America's social, cultural, and political elite. Just south

of America's borders, a deepening polarization is spreading throughout


the entire region. In the last few years ideological allies in Bolivia,
Ecuador, and Venezuela have written and approved new constitutions that
have consolidated the power of the executive, while extending - or in
Venezuela's case eliminating - presidential term limits. In Venezuela the
polarization has been drawn along economic lines, whereby Chavez's base of support continues to be
poor Venezuelans. In Bolivia the polarization has been drawn along racial lines: the preamble to the
new Bolivian constitution, approved in January 2009, makes reference to the "disastrous colonial
times," a moment in history that Bolivians of Andean-descent particularly lament. Those regions in
Bolivia with the most people of European or mixed descent have consistently voted for increased
provincial autonomy and against the constitutional changes proposed by President Morales. Perhaps
due to its sweeping changes, the new Constitution was rejected by four of Bolivia's nine provinces. 2
Like Bolivia, Latin America is still searching for its identity. [*191] Traditionally the U.S. has

projected its influence by using varying combinations of hard and soft


power. It has been a long time since the United States last sponsored or
supported military action in Latin America, and although highly contextdependent, it is very likely that Latin American citizens and their
governments would view any overt display of American hard power in the
region negatively. 3 One can only imagine the fodder an American military excursion into Latin
America would provide for a leader like Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, or Evo Morales of Bolivia. Soft
power, on the other hand, can win over people and governments without
resorting to coercion, but is limited by other factors. The key to soft power is not
simply a strong military, though having one helps, but rather an enduring sense of
legitimacy that can then be projected across the globe to advance

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The Missouri State Debate Institute 2013


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Jeff Bess

particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible
actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long
way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when
it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. 4 In order to
effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its
image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding , not just Latin America's
leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship
between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin
America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and
cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up
legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba,
every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its
existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and
solutions, not lectures." 5 When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists

seek out " keystone species ." These are organisms that, despite their small
size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's
stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin
America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward
the region for decades. 6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's
reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. 7 For
fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves
to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and
the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba
litmus test of its own. 8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other
countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have

a reverberating effect throughout Latin America, and would go a long way


toward creating goodwill.

Soft power solves laundry list of global problems and is


necessary to sustain American primacy
Lagon 2011 (Mark P. Lagon, International Relations and Security Chair at Georgetown

University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama, World
Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama)

Despite large economic challenges, two protracted military expeditions,


and the rise of China, India, Brazil, and other new players on the
international scene, the United States still has an unrivaled ability to
confront terrorism , nuclear proliferation , financial instability , pandemic
disease , mass atrocity , or tyranny . Although far from omnipotent, the U nited
S tates is still, as former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright called it, the indispensible
nation. Soft power is crucial to sustaining and best leveraging this role
as catalyst.
That President Obama should have excluded it from his vision of Americas
foreign policy assetsparticularly in the key cases of Iran, Russia, and Egyptsuggests
that he feels the country has so declined, not only in real power but in the
power of example, that it lacks the moral authority to project soft power .
In the 1970s, many also considered the US in decline as it grappled with
counterinsurgency in faraway lands, a crisis due to economic stagnation,
and reliance on foreign oil. Like Obama, Henry Kissinger tried to manage decline in what he
saw as a multipolar world, dressing up prescriptions for policy as descriptions of immutable reality. In
the 1980s, however, soft power played a crucial part in a turnaround for
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US foreign policy. Applying it, President Reagan sought to transcend a nuclear


balance of terror with defensive technologies, pushed allies in the Cold
War (e.g., El Salvador, Chile, Taiwan, South Korea, and the Philippines) to liberalize for their
own good, backed labor movements opposed to Communists in Poland and
Central America, and called for the Berlin Wall to be torn downover
Foggy Bottom objections. This symbolism not only boosted the perception and the reality of
US influence, but also hastened the demise of the USSR and the Warsaw Pact.
For Barack Obama, this was the path not taken. Even the Arab Spring has not cured his acute allergy to
soft power. His May 20, 2011, speech on the Middle East and Northern Africa came four months after
the Jasmine Revolution emerged. His emphasis on 1967 borders as the basis for Israeli-Palestinian
peace managed to eclipse even his broad words (vice deeds) on democracy in the Middle East. Further,
those words failed to explain his deeds in continuing to support some Arab autocracies (e.g., Bahrains,
backed by Saudi forces) even as he gives tardy rhetorical support for popular forces casting aside
other ones.

To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power
without soft power is to be China. Even France, with its long commitment
to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and
implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the
American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft
power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss .

Soft power is key to leadership--- legitimizes hard power and


increases influence
Nye 2002 (Joseph S. Nve, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard

University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's
Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, p. 9-10, Google Books)
Of course, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. Both

are aspects of the ability to achieve our purposes by affecting the


behavior of others. Sometimes the same power resources can affect the entire
spectrum of behavior from coercion to attraction. 31 A country that suffers
economic and military decline is likely to lose its ability to shape the international agenda as well as its
attractiveness. And some countries may be attracted to others with hard power by the myth of
invincibility or inevitability. Both Hitler and Stalin tried to develop such myths. Hard power can

also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for
smaller states-witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. But soft power is not

simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States
in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it
invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to
grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some
countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is
greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such
as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the
unilateralists forget at their and our peril. Britain in the nineteenth century and

America in the second half of the twentieth century enhanced their power
by creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were
consistent with the liberal and democratic structures of British and
American capitalism -free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain, the International
Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and other institutions in the case of the United States. If a
country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will
encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are
attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international
rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to
change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries

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to channel or limit their activities in ways it prefers, it may not need as


many costly carrots and sticks.

Hard power is insufficient


Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
First, the costs of using or even threatening force among nuclear powers
have skyrocketed. Indeed, current leading scholarship in the field of security has proclaimed
that the nuclear revolution has been instrumental in creating a new age of

a security community, in which war between major powers is almost


unthinkable because the costs of war have become too great (Jervis 1988, 1993, 2002). Mueller
(1988) reinforces and modifies the nuclear deterrent argument by introducing the independent
deterrent of conventional war in an age of advanced technology. In short, the utility of respect,
admiration and cooperation (i.e., soft power) has increased relative to the utility of

coercion with respect to the usefulness of the instruments of statecraft.


Moreover, the exorbitant dangers that the hard resources of military
technology have produced require far greater use of the instruments of
soft power in order for nations to achieve sustainable security in the long
run.

US hegemony solves escalation of global hotspots- decline


causes hotspots to escalate worldwide
Brzezinski 2012 Zbigniew K. Brzezinski (CSIS counselor and trustee and cochairs the CSIS

Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C. He is cochair of the
American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus and a member of the International Advisory Board of
the Atlantic Council. He is a former chairman of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee. He was a
member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the
Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral
Commission from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976
presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President
Jimmy Carter. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the
normalization of U.S.-China relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national
security policies of the United States. He was also a member of the Presidents Chemical Warfare
Commission (1985), the National Security CouncilDefense Department Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy (19871988), and the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (19871989).
In 1988, he was cochairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, and in 2004, he was
cochairman of a Council on Foreign Relations task force that issued the report Iran: Time for a New
Approach. Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950) and Ph.D. from
Harvard University (1953). He was a member of the faculties of Columbia University (19601989) and
Harvard University (19531960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary degrees from Georgetown University,
Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross, Alliance College, the Catholic
University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and Vilnius University. He is the recipient of numerous honors
and awards) February 2012 After America
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,0

if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even
China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright
chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for
For

instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and
economic disorder,

a steady drift by America into increasingly pervasive decay or endlessly


widening warfare with Islam would be unlikely to produce, even by 2025, an effective
global successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that the world, upon the fall of
the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play: the leader of a new, globally cooperative world order.

More probable would be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive

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realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and
many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of
potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy
flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism,
and religion could ensue. RELATED 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species The leaders of the world's second-rank

India, Japan, Russia, and some European countries, are already


assessing the potential impact of U.S. decline on their respective national interests. The
powers, among them

Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe.
Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters

Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's
uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states
of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in
several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and
and China rises.

insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance

Others may move


more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres: Turkey in the area of the old
Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth. None of these countries,
however, will have the requisite combination of economic, financial,
technological, and military power even to consider inheriting America's
leading role. China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial
within the EU while preserving its special relationship with a declining United States.

lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its
overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing
international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success
depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power.

China is not yet ready to assume in full America's


role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important
measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and
developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the
United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of
modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been
restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership. At some stage,
however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's
international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally
mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -Moreover, the basic reality is that

India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole.

They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly
assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense,
especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's
neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia
of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker
states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international
status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made
significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position --

including Georgia, Taiwan, South Korea, Belarus, Ukraine, Afghanistan,


Pakistan, Israel, and the greater Middle East -- are today's geopolitical equivalents of
nature's most endangered species. Their fates are closely tied to the nature of the
international environment left behind by a waning America, be it ordered
and restrained or, much more likely, self-serving and expansionist. A
faltering United States could also find its strategic partnership with
Mexico in jeopardy. America's economic resilience and political stability have so far mitigated many of
the challenges posed by such sensitive neighborhood issues as economic dependence, immigration, and the
narcotics trade.

A decline in American power, however, would likely undermine

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the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems.
A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive
about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security,
and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development .
The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a
particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of

Another consequence of
American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative
management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes,
space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative
to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of
basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a
constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential
communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity
of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict .
territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.

None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global
insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an
argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such
supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as

the world after America would be increasingly complicated and chaotic, it is


imperative that the United States pursue a new, timely strategic vision for its foreign policy -- or start bracing itself
for a dangerous slide into global turmoil.

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1AC Solvency
Contention 2: Solvency
Lift the embargo--- its not working anyway
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant
to former US president Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, CATO
Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)

It is far past time to end the embargo. During the Cold War, Cuba offered
a potential advanced military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that
role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs
invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washingtons best strategy for ousting the Castro
dictatorship. However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba strategically

irrelevant . It is a poor country with little ability to harm the United States.
The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its survival has no
measurable impact on any important U.S. interest. The regime remains a
humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a
State Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not
the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is
virtually impossible for outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the
Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect.

The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power.
Indeed, it has consistently used the embargo to justify its own
mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton: It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the
embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States,
because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasnt happened in
Cuba in the last 50 years. Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group
argued that keeping the embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden
the hardliners.

Plan solves immediately


Holmes 2010 (G. Holmes, MA from Georgetown, SEIZING THE MOMENT,

https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?
sequence=1)

From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is
symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is
pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba
Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the
United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that
this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends
the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the
administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually
respected.
Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in
Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property
under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment
will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to
silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were
unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all

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countries to invest in Cuba again underscores the United States' position


of desiring for all countries to participate in the global market place . It is
difficult to imagine that the benefits of lifting the embargo will not be
immediate and substantial in regards to the United States reputation in
the world. Looking at the long-term benefits of removing the sanctions, the two benefits that stand out the
most are trade and fuel.

Aff is restores Latin America relations and international


credibility
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings

institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the
Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemi- sphere.
Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has
resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the is- land and has left
the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy
has become a bellwether , indicating the extent to which the United States
will act in partnership with the region or unilaterallyand ineffectually.
inevita- bly, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United
States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy to- ward
Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the polit- ical
and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is
that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within ; the type of government at the
helm of the islands future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass
the political, eco- nomic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in
and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the
United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that pro- mote the
well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban gov- ernment and
Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other govern- ments, the private
sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). in so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect
the hemispheres and our own desire to encourage the Cuban govern- ment to adopt international
standards of democ- racy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of
the Cu- ban governments policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in
Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. If the United

States is to play a positive role in Cubas future, it must not indulge in


hostile rhetoric nor obstruct a dialogue on issues that would advance
democracy, justice, and human rights as well as our broader national
interests. perversely, the policy of seeking to iso- late Cuba, rather than achieving its
objective, has contributed to undermining the well-being of the Cuban people
and to eroding U.S. influence in Cuba and Latin America. It has reinforced the
Cuban governments power over its citizens by increasing their dependence on it for every aspect of
their livelihood. By slowing the flow of ideas and information, we have unwittingly helped Cuban state
security delay Cubas political and economic evolution toward a more open and representa- tive
government. And, by too tightly embracing Cubas brave dissidents, we have provided the Cu- ban
authorities with an excuse to denounce their legitimate efforts to build a more open society.

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***Inherency/Solvency***

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Inherency Ext--- A2 Relations Now


Despite gestures to the contrary the Cuba embargo still
precludes relations and intercultural contact
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant
to former US president Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, CATO
Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)

The U.S. government has waged economic war against the Castro regime
for half a century. The policy may have been worth a try during the Cold
War, but the embargo has failed to liberate the Cuban people. It is time to
end sanctions against Havana. Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a revolt against a
nasty authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state,
targeted U.S. commerce, nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although
Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War magnified its perceived importance. Washington
reduced Cuban sugar import quotas in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports were limited, diplomatic
ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havanas American assets were
frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose
sanctions. These various measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cubas reliance on
the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress
banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it penalized foreign firms that
trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from
traveling to America. On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of

the embargo, but in general continued to tighten restrictions, even over


Cuban Americans. Enforcement is not easy, but Uncle Sam tries his best. For instance, according
to the Government Accountability Office, Customs and Border Protection increased its secondary
inspection of passengers arriving from Cuba to reflect an increased risk of embargo violations after the
2004 rule changes, which, among other things, eliminated the allowance for travelers to import a small
amount of Cuban products for personal consumption. Lifting sanctions would be a

victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread
liberty. Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban
Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and
Cuba. However, the law sharply constrains the presidents discretion.
Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will continue until Cuba is free.

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***Latin America Advantage***

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Relations Uniqueness
Our relations are bad now but Obama can fix them
LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about
Latin America, May 11, 2011, Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the
Misconceptions of Power, Sagepub)

Obamas campaign rhetoric blended an intention to reassert U.S. power in


areas where it had lost influence with a more positive commitment to
respect- ful multilateralism in which the nonmilitary dimensions of foreign policy would
underlie U.S. leadership. However, under the directives of Clinton-era advisers,
Obama has chosen, as many have noted in puzzlement and regret, to sustainand in fact
strengthenthe security strategies and policies of the Bush administration. In
practice, the recourse to militarism in Latin American policy echoes the
Obama administrations belief in the efficacy of military power in
Afghanistan and reveals the limitations of its foreign policy vision.6
According to Secretary of State Clintons (2010) description of the Obama administrations national
security strategy, Washington, although willing to accept a limited role for emerging powers, continues
to see a world in which great power is exercised by primarily one nation, the United States.

Though the United States may be able to hold sway over smaller countries
and achieve short-term objectives, in the long run it will earn the enmity
of most Latin Americans. More important, it will have squandered an
opportunity for constructive and mutually beneficial engagement with the
new political forces emerging in the region. This bellicose attitude will
reinforce the view that the United States still aspires to be an imperial
power and will undoubtedly acceler- ate growing efforts at regional
integration, the formation of alternative organiza- tions that do not
include the United States, and expanding relations with China.

Disappointment with the Obama administration was a major factor in the Latin American decision to
create a new regional organization that excludes the United States and Canada. On February 22, 2010,
hosted by Mexico in Cancn, 33 nations met to launch the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribenos (Latin American and Caribbean Community of StatesCLACS). Only Honduras was not
invited, a clear rejection of U.S. support for the Lobo government. The new community is an echo of
Simon Bolivars attempt to forge a Latin American confederation of nations. Obama still has the

opportu- nity to heed this and other manifestations of Latin American


dissatisfaction with his policies and chart a new course. However, just as in
domestic policy, he is faced with competing demands from his base and from
dominant interests. So far he has been unable or unwilling to seriously
challenge elite priorities despite their negative consequences for the
overwhelming majorities in the United States and Latin America.

Now is the key time for Latin American relations


Shifter 2012 (Michael Shifter, President of Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Remaking the
Relationship: The United States and Latin America, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious
juncture . In the past decade, most Latin American countries have made
enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing inequality and, especially,
poverty, within a democratic framework . These critical changes have brought greater autonomy,
expanded global links, and grow- ing self-confidence . It is now the United States that

is
in a sour mood, struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished
international stature and influence, and fractured politics at home . These

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While relations are today


cordial and largely free of the antagonisms of the past, they also seem
without vigor and purpose . Effective cooperation in the Americas, whether to deal with
recent changes have profoundly affected Inter-American relations .

urgent problems or to take advantage of new opportunities, has been disappointing . The InterAmerican Dialogues report is a call to all nations of the hemi- sphere to take stock, to rebuild
cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction . All governments in the hemisphere should be
more attentive to emerging opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues
ranging across economic integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and climate change .
The United States must regain its cred- ibility in the region by dealing seriously with an unfinished
agenda of problemsincluding immigration, drugs, and Cubathat stands in the way of a real
partnership . To do so, it needs the help of Latin America and the Caribbean . If the current

state of affairs continues, the strain between the United States and Latin
America could worsen, adversely affecting the interests and well- being of
all in the hemisphere . There is a great deal at stake . This report offers a realistic
assessment of the relationship within a changing regional and global context and sets out an agenda
of old and new business that need urgent attention . A collaborative effort should begin immediately at
the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia .

Now is the key to normalize relations


Ashby 2013 (Dr. Timothy Ashby, Senior Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs,

March 29, 2013, Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The
Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises, COHA, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stabilityin-cuba-timothy-ashby/#sthash.U0nrDoiq.dpuf

Cuba under Ral Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and
political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have
brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including
lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and
electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been
leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously
reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was
time for the gradual transfer of key roles to new generations, President Ral Castro announced
that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the
time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges

and opportunities for U.S. policy makers. Normalization of relations is


inevitable, regardless of timing, yet external and internal factors may
accelerate or retard the process. The death of Venezuelan President Hugo
Chvez is likely to undermine the already dysfunctional Cuban economy , if
it leads to reductions in oil imports and other forms of aid. This could bring social chaos,
especially among the islands disaffected youth. Such an outcome would
generate adverse consequences for U.S. national and regional security. To
maintain Cubas social and economic stability while reforms are maturing, the
United States must throw itself open to unrestricted bilateral trade with
all Cuban enterprises, both private and state-owned.

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Relations Uniqueness--- Now Key


Aff solves, now key
Barnes 2013 (Michael D. Barnes, represented Maryland in the House of Representatives as a

Democrat from 1979 to 1987, serving as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, March 4, 2013,
Time is ripe for a new approach to Cuba, Baltimore Sun, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-0304/news/bs-ed-cuba-20130304_1_cuba-question-current-cuba-policy-foreign-policy)

There is one international issue, however, on which genuine progress is


not only possible but is likely if the secretary of state and President
Barack Obama are prepared to make this issue a foreign policy priority.

Only 90 miles from America's shores is the small nation of Cuba, which today poses no military or
economic threat to the United States but is a continuing reminder of more than 50 years of failure by
Democratic and Republican administrations to achieve our stated objective of fostering democratic
change. Our current Cuba policy is an irritant in our relations with many

friends in this hemisphere who believe the policy of attempted isolation of


Cuba has been counterproductive. Our State Department has essentially been informed
that there will never be another summit of hemispheric leaders if Cuba is not included. Secretary
Kerry will remember the central role he played in the normalization of relations with Vietnam
by President Bill Clinton in the 1990s, and how normalizing relations with a communist
erstwhile foe can be a win-win. Most will agree that the politics of Vietnam were even more
complex, particularly with the emotionally lingering POW and MIA issue, than U.S.-Cuba politics. I am
advocating a series of engagements with Cuba on issues of mutual concern. Both countries are
concerned about drug trafficking, environmental issues (including hurricane tracking), migration, and
development of potentially lucrative oil and gas reserves in the Florida Straits. Recently, I heard
Cuba's senior representative in Washington, Ambassador Jose Cabanas, speak with considerable logic
about how his country could cooperate with the United States on energy production, which is now
being joint-ventured by Cuba with companies from many other countries, while our energy companies
are prohibited from participating. He noted that an oil spill, for example, off the coast of Cuba would
affect not only Cuba but almost immediately South Florida as well. The United States has had informal
contacts with Cubans on these and other mutual concerns. I am proposing that the Obama
administration, with the secretary of state taking the lead, move quickly to formalize arrangements
that will serve the unquestioned interests of both countries. Cuban officials have indicated they are
willing to do so, and we should test this assertion without preconditions. Although I do not propose
seeking immediate normalization of relations with Cuba, that could well be the ultimate result of the
phased steps I am advocating. The political landscape on the Cuba question is

shifting. About half of the Cuban-American vote in Florida in 2012 went for
President Obama. An encouraging report emerged in recent days that the State Department is
considering removing Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Many of the issues our
nation must confront seem almost beyond solution. In our own front yard
is one issue opening the door to better relations with Cuba that could
achieve the same kind of success that President Clinton and then-Senator
Kerry achieved in Vietnam less than two decades ago.

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Relations Uniqueness--- A2 Obama Appeal


Despite rhetoric hemispheric relations are bad
LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about

Latin America, May 11, 2011, Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the
Misconceptions of Power, Sagepub)
Meeting with the presidents of Latin America at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in
Trinidad in April 2009, Barack Obama pledged to recast relations with the
region. After years of hostile dealings with George W. Bush, Latin Americans eagerly

looked forward to a new era of relations with the United States and
welcomed Obamas declaration that every one of our nations has a right
to follow its own path and his pledge to engage the rest of the hemisphere on the basis of mutual respect and equality. At the halfway point in his
first term, however, there is little to distinguish Obama from his predeces- sor
George W. Bush (recognized even in mainstream analysis such as Tim Padgetts cogent appraisal
in Time [2009]).1 The promise of Obamas rhetoric in Trinidad failed to materialize
in concrete policies and, in retrospect, may have been a way to deflect attention from the fact

that his administration had no plans for fundamentally altering U.S. policy toward Latin America. Even
as he was announcing a new era in Trinidad, U.S. trade representatives were busy meeting with the
president of Colombia to revive prospects for the Bush- initiated free-trade agreement with that nation.
Candidate Obama had criti- cized Bush efforts to sign a free-trade agreement with a country where
trade unionists are persecuted, human rights are trampled, and the army kills peas- ants (called falsos
positivos) and passes them off as guerrillas to claim a reward.

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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

Removing Embargo Solves Relations


Aff has transformative effect on relations
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant
to former US president Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, CATO
Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)

Cuba policy should be a pressing issue for the Obama administration


because it offers a unique opportunity for the president to transform our
relations with the hemisphere . Even a slight shift away from hostility to
engagement will permit the United States to work more closely with the
region to effectively advance a common agenda toward Cuba. By announcing a

policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and
Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can under- line this
commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging
in dialogue with the regime, as prom- ised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving

our diplomatic relations with Cuba, we will enhance our understanding of


the island, its people, and its leaders. However, while these measures will promote

understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relation- ship
between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time. if the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a
new policy and a long- term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. If he is prepared to

discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of critical and
con- structive engagement, he and his administration will lay the
foundations for a new approach to- ward Cuba and the Latin America. like
his pre- decessors, president Obama has the authority to substantially modify embargo

regulations in order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with
the Cuban people and their government. He has the popular supportdomestic and internationalto
engage Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island

and recapture the high road in our relations with the hemisphere.

Lifting the embargo solves relations


Curtain 2008 (Joseph W. Curtain, MA Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008, ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REASONS WHY THE U.S. SHOULD NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA483591)

How can the U.S. minimize the triangular threat posed by Iran, Venezuela
and Cuba? How can this cycle of dependency, control and power be broken? Probably one of
the easiest solutions is normalizing relations with Cuba. The U.S. could be
processing nickel or drilling for oil in Cuba. The U.S. could easily surpass the E.U. and
China and lead all other countries in aggregate trade with Cuba. With U.S.
capital flowing through the Cuban economy, it could in time replace Cubas
dependency on Venezuela and thereby effectively negate Chavezs
influence. Given normalized relations with Cuba, if Chavez were able to create a Venezuelan-Cuban
confederation, it would be in name only because the U.S. could replace Venezuela as its benefactor.

And by normalizing relations with Cuba, the triangular threat would be


minimized to isolated and separate threats from Iran and Venezuela.

Aff key to Latin America relations


Shifter 2012 (Michael Shifter, President of Inter-American Dialogue, April 2012, Remaking the
Relationship: The United States and Latin America, IAD Policy Report,
http://www.thedialogue.org/PublicationFiles/IAD2012PolicyReportFINAL.pdf)

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Jeff Bess

Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United
States and Latin America . The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is
rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive
instrument . It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations .
Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax
restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle

its
severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba . Cuba is
one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin
American engagement . At the same time, Cubas authoritarian regime should be of utmost
concern to all countries in the Americas . At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party
elections, and its government fully controls the press . Latin American and Caribbean nations could be
instrumental in supporting Cubas eventual transition to democratic rule . An end to the US
policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights viola- tions,

would be an important first step .

Aff key to integrating the western hemisphere


LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about
Latin America, May 11, 2011, Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the
Misconceptions of Power, Sagepub)

The United States needs to conceptualize a new, win-win relationship with


Latin America. In the early history of Latin America the winners were
European colonialists and then later North American corporations and
their local dominant- class allies. The North sought to protect unequal exchange with a
powerful military and a secret CIA intervention apparatus. The masses of Latin America paid the price
in poverty and human rights abuses. Today, however, Latin Americans are claiming a more equal
situation. A civilized U.S. Latin American policy cannot be achieved with minor changes in regional
policy patterned on the bigotry and conceit of the past or be forged in isolation in offices in
Washington. The military interventions, coups, and destabilization programs, whether implemented by
the CIA or the National Endowment for Democracy, to overthrow nationalist regimes must be
abandoned. The extensive CIA appa- ratus inside Latin American countries must be dismantled. along
with repres- sive indoctrination programs that function within the United States. Mutuality in

decision making and experience sharing are needed. Inter- national policy
should become a hemispheric endeavor. It should not continue to be
mostly a U.S. thrust in the face of a weak Latin America. Collective policy making
may require new institutions and a new will to succeed. For exam- ple, a mechanism could be
established to produce a Social Charter of the Americas that formalizes a commitment to human rights
and core labor standards. Such collective policy making also requires a more formalized system for
deliberating on public policy, one that includes substantial mech- anisms, such as those promoted by
the World Social Forum, for bringing together grassroots movements and sharing local government
initiatives in a regularized way. The Western Hemisphere could strive for the

European Union model of the movement of labor across national borders


along with goods, services, and capital.

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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

Removing Embargo Solves Relations--- A2 Regional


Influences
Lifting embargo key to offset Venezuelan influence
Curtain 2008 (Joseph W. Curtain, MA Naval Postgraduate School, June 2008, ECONOMIC AND
SECURITY REASONS WHY THE U.S. SHOULD NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH CUBA,
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA483591)
What does the embargo have to do with it? The short answereverything. Cuban

dependence
on Venezuela and Venezuelas subsequent leverage over Cuba are aided
and abetted by the U.S.Cuban embargo. Due to the embargos trade restrictions,
Venezuela has in effect replaced the role the U.S. would have played in a
post Soviet Union globalized Cuban economy. Certainly Chavez is best known for his
incessant and irreverent anti-imperialist rhetoric which makes him, at times, hard to take seriously.
However a close look at his actions reveals what seems to be a deliberate plan to pose a significant
threat to the U.S. A quick run down of the facts are as follows: Chavez has recently spent $5 billion to
create the strongest military in Latin America, Venezuela is one of Cubas top creditors,

Cubas debt to Venezuela is $2.5 billion and rising, and the Cuban military
is helping complete Chavezs transformation of the Venezuelan military.
Add the facts to the Cuba-and-Venezuela-are-one-nation rhetoric, the
Venezuela needs a robust military to defend itself from the U.S. rhetoric,
the Venezuela should be able to pursue peaceful nuclear weapons
rhetoric and the narrow defeat of the constitutional reforms that would
have made Chavez possibly an indefinite president of a Cuba and
Venezuela confederation and the implications to U.S. security should be
quite obvious.

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Latin America Relations--- China Competition


Were in competition with China for power in Latin America
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A
Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review,
Lexis)

The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has
also given China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both
economically and politically, in regions all around the world, but
particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested a
tremendous amount of soft power in Latin America , where it is now the continent's
third largest trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. 115 American
disinterest in Latin America has convinced many countries to adopt a
"Pacific view," whereby China steps in to fill the gap left by America's absence. 116 After signing

a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest
export market. China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. 117 In
2000, trade between China and Latin America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number
had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at $ 140 billion. 118 Even despite
the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next five
years. China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly
assertive global political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of
Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new
policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010. 119 China also timed the
release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with President Hu's most
recent trip to the region. It charts China's growing relationship with Latin America and promises
increased cooperation in scientific and technological research, cross-cultural educational exchanges, as
well as political and economic exchanges. 120 As China's role in Latin America

increases, American clout correspondingly decreases in terms of relative


power. To be sure, the U.S. will remain the major powerbroker in the Americas for decades to
come, but will increasingly have to make room for a new player. Given this
diminishing economic position, Washington will have to rely more heavily
on diplomatic initiatives that shore up credibility rather than simply
economic incentives and disincentives, such as bilateral trade agreements.

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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

A2 Appeasement Turn--- General


Aff doesnt make Cuba a geopolitical threat
Johnson 2010 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor,
National Security Program Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, September 16, 2010, Third Way
Institute, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo__End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)
Peter Brookes, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense under George W. Bush, said that

lifting the embargo could lead to Cuba becoming a regional power, arguing
that the US [doesnt] need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a
serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbeanor beyond.14 While
Venezuela, for example, has challenged the US on some interests, its antiAmerican leadership has not been able to present a serious counterweight
to the US or have a significant impact on US security. Given that Venezuela is a much
bigger economic player than Cuba due to its oil revenues, it is highly
unlikely that Cuba would pose a significant geopolitical challenge to the
US, even if significant sums of money enter Cubas economy.

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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

A2 Appeasement Turn--- Economics


A2 it rewards Castro
Johnson 2010 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor,
National Security Program Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, September 16, 2010, Third Way
Institute, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo__End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)

Former Senator Mel Martinez has argued against lifting the embargo,
claiming that the US needs to support pro-democracy activists in Cuba,
not provide the Castro regime with a resource windfall.15 Florida Rep. Tom

Rooney has argued that lifting the embargo would serve to reward Cubas leadership for its decadeslong record of human rights abuses and allow the abuse to continue due to the absence of pressure
from the US.16 The US has used the embargo as an effort to pressure the

communist leadership for nearly fifty years, yet the status quo remains
unchanged. If a possible downside of lifting the embargo is that the situation will not change, then
the US has nothing to lose by making an effort to normalize relations with Cuba. By
refusing to engage Cuba and make efforts to move Cuba forward, the US is
in a weak position to criticize the Cuban leadership. Lifting the embargo
and normalizing relations would put the US in a stronger position to bring
about change through economic advancements that could in turn result in
domestic demands within Cuba for greater social and political freedoms.

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Jeff Bess

Latin America Impact--- Global Instability


Latin American instability goes global
Manwaring 2003 (Max G. Manwaring, Professor of Military Strategy at the U.S. Army War

College, retired U.S. Army colonel and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, March
2003, STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: LATIN AMERICA,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub289.pdf)

When what mattered most in U.S. national security policy toward the
hemisphere were military bases, preserving access to sea lines of communication, choke
points, and raw materials and hydrocarbonsand militarily denying those assets to the Soviet Union
and its surrogatesthe United States could ignore internal conditions in Latin
America. But, since the United States is now interested in the need for nonhostile
dispositions toward the country, the capacity of neighbors to buy American-made products, a
commitment to international economic cooperation, the continued development of democratic and
free market institutions and human rightsthe United States must concern itself with the

internal conditions that spawn subnational, national, regional, and global


insecurity and instability.16 This dilemma is critical. Continued neglect and
indifference to Latin Americas stability problems will profoundly affect
the health of the U.S. economyand the concomitant power to act in the
international security arena. At the same time, increasing instability in the
hemisphere will likely increase direct security threats from terrorists to
U.S. interests in the region and to the United States. Much is at risk. 17

Major threat to the US--- failed states


Hammons 2008 (Stewart A. Hammons, masters from Joint Advanced Warfighting School, April
4, 2008, Latin American Instability: A Major Threat To The US, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?
verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA487122)
Political, economic, and social instability is seen throughout Latin America. The case examples
provided were chosen to highlight how delicate and intertwined the problems of instability can be.
Every country in Latin America has significant levels of instability, not just the three chosen as case
examples. Instability is indicative of weak states and can turn into failed

states with minimal additional external influences from non-sates and substate actors. The worst-case scenario for the US is the development of
numerous failed states within Latin America. The threat from narcoterrorists and Islamic fundamentalists may be the most critical from a
safety and security perspective but is just the tip of the iceberg. The
linked nature between the various countries within Latin America as well
as the effects on the US are critical to economic prosperity, security, social
equality, and rule of law.

Biggest threat to the US


Hammons 2008 (Stewart A. Hammons, masters from Joint Advanced Warfighting School, April
4, 2008, Latin American Instability: A Major Threat To The US, http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?
verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA487122)
The US has always approached Latin America on an as needed basis. Unfortunately the conditions
and stakes have changed especially since 9/11. Latin America, because of its proximity

to the US along with its instability, is the largest current threat to the US.
It all comes down to a simple concept: Pay for the security now at a relatively small cost to the US or
pay for it later at a much higher cost in terms of American lives and security.

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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess

Econ Collapse Causes War


Global economic crisis causes war and great power
transitions--- best studies
Royal 2010 (Jedediah Royal, Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction at the U.S. Department of
Defense, 2010, Economic Integration, Economic Signaling and the Problem of Economic Crises, in
Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal and Political Perspectives, ed. Goldsmith and Brauer, p.
213-214)
Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of
external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to
the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behaviour of interdependent states.
Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable
contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompsons
(1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding that rhythms in the global economy are

associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often
bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next . As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution
of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power
balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a
declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic
cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium,
and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic
conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copelands (1996,2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that future expectation of trade is a significant variable in
understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that

interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long
as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the
expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as
energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined
to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be
the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers
protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between
economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002)

find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict,


particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between
internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict
tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a

recession tends to amplify the extent to which international and external


conflicts self-reinforce each other. (Blomberg & Hess, 2002, p.89). Economic decline has
also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg, Hess, & Weerapana, 2004),
which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises
generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. Diversionary theory suggests

that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting


governments have increased incentives to create a rally round the flag
effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blomberg, Hess and Thacker (2006) find supporting
evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi
(1997) Miller (1999) and Kisanganie and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards
diversionary tactics are greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that
democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of
domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak

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economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are
statistically linked to an increase in the use of force .

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Jeff Bess

Proliferation Causes War


Prolif wont be peaceful
Elhefnawy 2008 (Nader Elhefnawy, PhD, Army War College, August 2008, The Next Wave of

Nuclear Proliferation, Parameters, online)


It is inconceivable that anything like this distribution will continue in a world turning heavily to nuclear
energy, a fact that has already laid the foun- dation for a broadening of production and use in East and
South Asia.8 We should also expect a large-scale, rapid establishment of

nuclear energy produc- tion in areas where it has been virtually absent,
for example, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. To

approximate Frances current level of nuclear energy reliance, for instance, Iran alone would require
roughly 18 operational reactors; Saudi Arabia, 20. More extensive substitution of nuclear energy for
other sources of power, or future economic expansion (such as de- scribed above), will require a
commensurate growth in the number of reactors.9 All of this may sound abstract, but moves in this
direction are al- ready well under way. Some 40 developing nations have expressed interest in starting
nuclear energy programs, and many have moved beyond vague state- ments of intentions.10 The
United Arab Emirates, for instance, has already struck a deal for two reactors, the only one of 11
nations in this region (thus far) to have announced such plans.11 Assessing the Danger As outlined
above, a future in which the world as a whole turned to nuclear energy will
mean not just an expansion of nuclear energy production, but substantial changes in
production impacting mainland Asia, Africa, and Latin America. An assessment
of the associated proliferation risk involved devolves basically into an examination of two dimensions,
capabilities and intentionswhat widened nuclear energy use will mean for the access of these states
to nuclear weapons technology; and the impact that this new envi ronment will have on a
governments motivation to actually use that access to produce nuclear weaponry. Technological
Access The increase in nuclear energy production described above will mean greater production,
trading, and consumption of the fissile materials and other technologies that are part of the nuclear
fuel cycle. The specifics differ according to reactor type, but every reactor uses uranium in the production of its fuel and produces plutonium in its waste, extractable in the fuel re- processing procedure,
and in such a manner that every type of reactor poses a measure of proliferation risk.12 Gas-cooled
and heavy-water reactors use natural uranium as fuel, but are ideal for
producing weapons-grade plutonium. Fast-neutron reactors use fissile material (such
as highly enriched uranium or plutonium) at the very start of their fuel cycle, and Fast Breeder
Reactors in particular produce more fissile material than they consume. Even Light Water Reactors
(LWRs), which have been described as proliferation-resistant (two of which were provided to North
Korea under the Agreed Framework), are no exception.13 They use low-enriched uranium, which is not
useful for making weapons, but which is produced in the same en- richment process used to
manufacture weapons. Additionally, low-enriched uranium can be seen as halfway to weapons grade,
since it can be more rapidly enriched to the needed level than stock natural uranium. At the same
time, while these reactors produce relatively smaller quantities of lower quality plu- tonium than other
types, it has been estimated that a 1,000-megawatt LWR can still generate enough weapons-usable
plutonium for up to 50 bombs a year.14 The response on the part of those seeking to limit
proliferation has, accordingly, been to encourage as many nuclear energy users as possible not to
develop the entire fuel cycle; that is, to forgo building up their own fuel en- richment and reprocessing
capabilities. Instead, it is proposed that they buy fuel and reprocessing services on the world market,
as proposed in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership of February 2006. There are, however,
widespread doubts about the initiatives likely cost and effectiveness, concerns articulated in a letter
signed by a number of control organizations, including the Federation of American Scientists, the Union
of Concerned Scientists, and the Arms Control Association.15 Their objections, however, fail to include
one important pointthat states have been partly dissuaded from developing the full nuclear fuel
cycle for eco- nomic reasons, a fact that may not remain operative in any massive expansion of
nuclear energy use. Simply put, it is cheaper for a small nuclear program to buy nuclear fuel on the
world market than to build and operate the facilities required to en- rich uranium domestically. This has
resulted in only eight of some 30 nuclear energy producers actually engaging in enrichment on an
industrial scale.16 The same is true for fuel reprocessing facilities, especially given the relatively low
cost of newly mined uranium. Accordingly, only a handful of states (Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and
India) actually practice civil reprocessing.17 Any significant growth in nuclear energy production would

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Many of todays small programs would become equal


in size to those now considered large-scale, and for that reason their
investments in enrichment and reprocessing less impractical. Additionally, with
more programs large and small operational, there would be a larger, more lucrative
market for fuel production and fuel recycling services; the latter would in
all likelihood grow more attractive as enlarged uranium consumption
tightens supplies and drives up prices. (Indeed, as the situation currently stands, many
change those economics.

uranium exporters not regarded as likely proliferatorsincluding Australia and Canadaare interested
in enrichment technology because enriching their uranium before export would increase
profitability.)18 Certainly if ura- nium prices were to rise, there would be more interest in Fast Breeder
Reac- tors, which one analyst suggests can extract more than 60 times as much energy per ton of
mined ore as a conventional nuclear plant when operated in a closed circuit with thermal reactors
and reprocessing facilities.19 In short, the economic incentives for states to refrain

from developing the full nuclear fuel cycle will almost certainly weaken,
while the particularly worrisome fast-neutron reactors will become more
attractive. At the same time, the heightened dependence on nuclear energy, and the experience
of en- ergy scarcity, will continue to reinforce the search for energy independence and energy
security, contributing to the pressure that the nonproliferation re- gime is already experiencing, as the
result of being a ratifier of unequal ac- cess to nuclear technology.20 In any event, such changes
enormously increase the already substantial burden of monitoring and securing the storage and
movement of the supplies associated with nuclear power generation, not to mention the political costs
of maintaining the regime.21 Motivation As outlined previously, any plausible combination of political
ar- rangements and technological innovations is likely to have uneven results. Determined

states are likely to find it easier to acquire the means for produc- ing
fissile material, which raises the other key dimension of the issuethe
motivation for acquiring these weapons in the first place. Longestablished research strongly indicates that the motivation to build
nuclear weapons is more of a factor than simply achieving the
technological capacity.22 Indeed, it is due to this excessive focus on capacity that ear- lier
predictions about the speed and the extent of nuclear proliferation (which projected 25 to 50 nuclearweapon states by the year 2000) proved wrong.23 The relative ease with which the weapons might be
built is proof of this; a pro- gram to develop a minimal capability from scratch could cost as little as
$500 million, less than the price of a modern warship.24 In short, were capacity the only issue, there
would be far more nu- clear powers in the world, though of course access to the means cannot be
ruled out as a factor in decisionmaking. When much of the infrastructure for developing a nuclear
arsenal is already in place, as may be the case in several advanced countries, the decision to do so
entails lower costs; and given the speed with which these programs can be initiated, the nations in
question are also less susceptible to preventative action than countries starting from scratch.25 A
particular danger is that having such facilities in place provides them with the option of diverting
material from the fuel cycle for covert weapon programs.26 The rationale driving the shift
to nuclear energy in the first place (en- ergy and climate stress) will increasingly

translate into greater motivation on the part of some actors to pursue a


nuclear capability. Broad economic disrup- tion is nearly certain as the
result of the tightening of oil supplies and the cli- mate changes this
scenario anticipates. Politically, this may translate into changes in the
distribution of international power depending on individual states ability
to cope (as with wealthier nations, or ones with energy-efficient economies), or even profit
from these conditions (for instance, oil exporters); while the most vulnerable
states may collapse, creating even greater prob- lems for the international
community (havens for crime, terrorism, or refugee flows).27 Intensified conflict over
territory and waters rich in energy and other resources will become
increasingly likely. Alliances, trading relationships, and other
arrangements will be in flux, and when combined with the associated anxiety and
vulnerability may exacer- bate a desire on the part of certain states to

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minimize their vulnerability. A goal which nuclear weapons have long been viewed as a
cheap way of achieving. The nuclearization of a single state can induce a chain
reaction across a region. The nuclearization of China spurred India and in turn Pakistan to
follow suit, and the Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear programs fed off one another. Today the possibility that a nuclear North Korea may lead South Korea or Japan to acquire nu- clear weapons is often
discussed.28 In the Middle East there are signs that Saudi Arabia is reviewing its nuclear options, and a
nuclear-armed Iran may encourage the Saudis and others in the region to continue down this path.29

With nuclear technology more widely available these actions can be taken
much more rapidly and at less cost. Those pursuing this course of action
will find it a simple matter to amass large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It
is also worth noting that even were the development of actual nuclear weapons to remain a rarity,

virtual arsenals could be more common, leaving the nu- clear weapons
status of a longer list of countries uncertain, in many cases deliberately
so, with a detrimental impact on the security environment. 30

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***Soft Power Advantage***

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Soft Power Uniqueness--- General


Soft power is low and ineffective now
Glassman 2013 (James K. Glassman, May 6, 2013, President Obama surprisingly ineffective

at using soft power, The Hill, http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/298077-president-obama-surprisinglyineffective-at-using-soft-power-)


So hows it working for you? In my view, not particularly well. Look at the last 100 days. The

revolt against the Syrian regime has become one of the most brutal
repressions in decades. The situation has grown worse, with the almost certain use of
chemical weapons crossing what the president drew as a red line. North Korea, developing
nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them over long distances, has denigrated
America and threatened to attack us. And, speaking of nukes and the goal of nuclear
nonproliferation Iran remains undeterred as well, with its own red line in doubt.
Meanwhile, the United States suffered its first terrorist bombing since
9/11, with three killed and more than 200 wounded an event that occurred eight months after the

attack on our consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where a U.S. ambassador was killed for the first time in 33
years. The problem of America being reviled in many parts of the world is

vastly overblown, but it has surely not been remedied. Europeans and the
Japanese like us more, but they were pretty fond of us to start with. Muslims,
according to the Pew Research Center, like us less. In Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the
average favorability rating for the United States in 2012 was 21 percent; in 2008, it was 26 percent.

Foreign policy is not easy. The challenges are unpredictable, which is why
the best policy rests on a solid foundation of principle and a clear
strategy. The George W. Bush administrations national security strategy
was simple: keep America safe and promote freedom. These goals are linked; free
nations rarely threaten the United States or their own neighbors. Achieving both these goals
requires leadership a consistency that reassures our allies and deters
our enemies.

US soft power is waning--- new initiatives are necessary


Lagon 2010 (Mark P. Lagon, Sep/Oct 2010, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama,

World Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama)

One irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power.
The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W.
Bushs perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessors hard-edged counterterrorism
tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in
Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian
casualties, kept Guantnamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral
fashion. What he hasnt accomplished to any great degree is what most

observers assumed would be the hallmark of his approach to foreign


affairsa full assertion of the soft power that makes hard power more
effective. His 2008 campaign centered on a critique of President Bushs overreliance on hard

power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these
excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made freshstart statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue,
respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change
minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US
approach to the worldand that he would quickly remedy that defect. Yet President Obamas

conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has

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made it most efficacious in the pastthe values dimension . This may seem
odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto the audacity of
hope and his deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored

the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of
diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals
of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension
renders soft power a hollow concept.

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Soft Power Uniqueness--- Cuba Key


Our Cuba policy costs us soft power
Iglesias 2012 (Commander Carlos Iglesias, October 3, 2012, United States Security Policy
Implications of a Post-Fidel Cuba, US Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?
AD=ADA560408)
Finally, U.S. international legitimacy and influence have a great deal to

gain
from a more inclusive and less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N.
anti-embargo resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt from General
Assembly scrutiny have had longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically

undercut Americans legitimacy and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New
York City and across the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have

netted few if any national objectives, all the while depleting substantial
national soft power . The cost- benefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain
exceedingly unfavorable, if not outright counter-productive.

Embargo is universally unpopular


Koenig 2010 (Colonel Lance Koenig, November 3, 2010, TIME FOR A NEW CUBA POLICY,

US
Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)
Internationally, the world is nearly unanimous in its opposition to the United
States policy towards Cuba. In fact, on 28 October 2009, the United Nations

General Assembly voted on a non-binding resolution to lift the embargo


with 187 votes in favor of the resolution, three votes against (the United States, Israel,
and Palau) and two abstentions (Federated States of Micronesia, and the Marshall Islands). 29 The
nearly universal unpopularity of this policy takes away from the soft
power of the United States and is an obstacle to the bilateral relations
between the United States and numerous other nations. The United
States requires a policy that will lead to better relations between the United States and
Cuba, increase the soft power of the United States in the Latin American
world, and pull the Cuban government towards a more representative
form of governance. These conditions will contribute to the national security of the United
States as well as to the western hemisphere. So with this in mind, what are our likely options?

Embargo is unsustainable--- Maintaining the status quo dooms


our soft power
Koenig 2010 (Colonel Lance Koenig, November 3, 2010, TIME FOR A NEW CUBA POLICY, US
Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)
Strengthen the current policy. Eliminate the billions of dollars per year in remittances from CubanAmericans to relatives within Cuba. Work multi- laterally with other countries to increase the
effectiveness of the current embargoes on trade and travel. Fully implement the Powell Commission
Report recommendations to end the trading with Cuba and 10 restrict the ability of EU citizens to
travel to Cuba. The EU nations provide a great opportunity to make up for lost trade with the United
States and have a large population of potential tourists for Cuban beaches. The United States must
deter actions by the Organization of American States to work closer with Cuba. The Organization of
American States should also warn its members to limit the scope of bilateral relations with Cuba in
order to support the efforts of the United States. The United States must use Radio and TV Marti to
inform the Cuban people of the true cause of their economic difficulty, the dysfunctional communist
centrally controlled economy vice economic sanctions. And finally, tighten the noose around the
economy and government of Cuba to attempt to bring down the government in a shorter period of
time. This option assumes that our current policy is the correct policy , but
needs to be strengthened. It eliminates half Castro dictatorship and undermine the succession
strategy.31 The Powell Commission Report seeks to reverse the recent economic gains to put added

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pressure on the government of Cuba. 32 Additionally, pressure the European Union to stop measures
and contradicting policies to produce a more powerful embargo with devastating effect on the Cuban
dictatorship. The risk is that the United States will become further isolated

from the world in regards to its Cuba policy and will create additional
sympathy for Cuba. This could result in open disregard for the embargo by
the European Union and other countries interested in trade with Cuba,
with a collapse of the effectiveness of the embargo. The soft power of the
United States would suffer with possibly no gain. The United States could
lose all possible influence over the future direction of the Cuban
government as the Castro regime is replaced.

Aff boosts soft power


Koenig 2010 (Colonel Lance Koenig, November 3, 2010, TIME FOR A NEW CUBA POLICY,

US

Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)

The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as
relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in
Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should
be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the Cinco Heroes and
their plight is well known.37 So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the
Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo
Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The
foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. The future of the Guantanamo
base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a
democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter
into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under
mutually agreeable terms.38 The United States Congress should soften the

language referring to a democratically elected government and instead


substitute that a representative form of government is required before
entering into negotiations for the Guantanamo base. Once Cuba makes changes
towards a representative form of government the United States can start working on democratic
reforms. The carrot is to offer Cuba, in exchange for changes to a democratic form of government,
support for their return to the Organization of American States (OAS). Until Cuba makes changes
towards democracy, the United States should block the request of several member states to let Cuba
into the organization. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton said it well in a recent interview. Many
member countries originally sought to lift the 1962 suspension and allow Cuba to return immediately,
without conditions, others agreed with us that the right approach was to replace the suspension
which has outlived its purpose after nearly half a century with a process of dialogue and a future
decision that will turn on Cubas commitment to the organizations values. 39 These values include
promoting democracy and defending human rights.

The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The
Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the
lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the
ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the

new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in
the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive
of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make
real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft

power, gain an additional economic trading partner, and have a chance to


influence the type of changes in the Cuban government as the Castro
influence wanes. Clearly, support to the Cuban people will indirectly provide support to the
Cuban government, but that could work against the regime as well if the people realize that
improvements in their living conditions are not the result of communism, but from the interaction with
the capitalist world.

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Aff Solves Soft Power


Aff increases credibility, soft power, etc.
Hinderdael 2011 (Klaas Hinderdael, M.A. candidate at SAIS Bologna Center, concentrating in

American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment, June 11, 2011, Breaking the
Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by
http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true)
Conclusion The two countries histories have long been intertwined , particularly
after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the
hemispheres protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castros revolution, Cuba provided

a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and
foreign policies. In the context of Ral shifting course in Cuba, the Obama
administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the
use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts
that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic
reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political
leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make
concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The
United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further
engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only
where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the
United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving

relations, America can enhance its own influence on the islands political
structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt

rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy
foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While USCuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as commerce
seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a
new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the countrys approach to its
neighboring island.52 At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban
relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a
post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead
provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic
embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50
years. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap

the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies
toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations
with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once
Americas traditional adversaries unclench their fists.

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Soft Power Key to Hegemony


Soft Power is key to sustaining U.S. hegemony and its more
important than all other factors.
Fraser 2003 Matthew Fraser, 2003, PhD in political science from Institut d' Etudes Politiques de
Paris, former Editor-in-Chief of National Post, Weapons of Mass Distraction: Soft Power and American
Empire, p.9-13, Google Books

The central thesis in the pages that follow may seem outlandish, controversial, and provocative. It will be argued

while U.S. military and economic power is indispensable to


America's superpower status, soft power historically has been a key
strategic resource in U.S. foreign policy. During the First World War, one of America's most
here that,

powerful ambassadors was Charlie Chaplin. When the Second World War broke out two decades later, Mickey Mouse

Today, in
the Information Age of the Internet, soft power has become increasingly
instrumental in the emerging world order dominated by an American
Empire. The notion of "empire" is admittedly contentious, even among American leaders. President George W.
Bush declared: "America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish." And yet , when President Bush
demonstrated the awesome force of American hard power against
despicable regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, it suddenly became
fashionable to discuss, even if disapprovingly, Americas imperialist
ambitions. When U.S. bombs obliterated targeted sections of Baghdad,
the United States was referred to as a "smart bomb imperium." Despite claims
and Donald Duck conducted Disneyland diplomacy to spread American values throughout the world.

that America is a reluctant hegemon, the new global reality of a Pax Americana is a fact that cannot easily be

Recognition of
America as a "hyperpower" is usually based on material factsspecifically,
the superiority of American hard power. Yet America's global domination
has been achieved largely through non-military means in short, through
the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. If hard power, by
definition, is based on facts, soft power is based on values. American hard
power is necessary to maintain global stability. American soft power movies,
pop music, television, fast food, fashions, theme parksspreads, validates, and reinforces
common norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Hard power threatens; soft
power seduces. Hard power dissuades; soft power persuades. Ironically, many
Americans are only vaguely aware of the global impact of U.S. soft power. Yet America's adversaries
have never underestimated its effects. Mao Zedong once warned that American pop cultural
contradicted. Today, no nation disputes America's status as the planet's sole superpower.

products were "candy-coated bullets." He was wrong on only one point: their impact is much more powerful. One
can only imagine how Mao would react today upon learning that one of his successors, Jiang Zemin, succumbed to
the allures of American soft power. In1998, the Chinese leader confessed he'd seen, and enjoyed, the Hollywood
movie Titanic. Jiang Zemin even recommended the movie to members of his communist Politburo. Reactions to
American soft power are diverse and ambiguous. Soft power incites awe and envy, but also provokes resentment
and hostility. Anti-globalization protestors condemn the United States as a cultural juggernaut driven by the
commercial values of "Brand America." Hostile passions are easily inflamed against American cultural symbols,
which are associated with a cosmopolitanism that incites deep-seated anxieties. In France, Hollywood and
McDonalds are bitterly resented among eliteswho denounce "Coca-colonization"despite profound historical
affinities with America as an enlightened republic founded on the same universal values. Even in Canada, the most
American nation outside the United States itself, local patriotism is tinged with deep-seated anti-American
sentiments. In the non-Western world, American cultural icons and U.S. corporate brandsfrom MTV to McDonald's
are resented precisely because they are so seductive. If American-style cultural globalization is considered
subversive, it's because its powerful messages are so efficiently transmitted and readily received. When Islamic
ayatollahs invoked the Koran to ban MTV from their local television screens, their interdictions were symbolic
declarations of war against America. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia, benefit from the protection of American
hard power, yet banish the symbols of American soft powerdespite a predilection among their elites for Cadillacs
and Gulfstreams. In North Korea, communist dictator Kim Jong-Il idolizes Michael Jordan and is a fan of Hollywood
movies, and yet his regime provokes America with the threat of nuclear arms. These

intense and

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contradictory reactions to American soft power pose a serious challenge


to America's overwhelming presence in the world. Traditionally, U.S. foreign policy
has been torn between the cold calculations of self-interested realism and the high-minded mission of
moral idealism. As Franklin Roosevelt once declared: "Our chief purpose to humanity rests on our
combining power with high purpose." Today, in the early years of the 21st century, U.S. foreign policy
appears to be inspired by a more assertive unilateralismor what has been called the Bush Doctrine.
The Bush Doctrine was born on September 11, 2001, when the entire planet watched in horrified
disbelief as New York's gleaming World Trade Center collapsed into a colossal heap of twisted metal
onto lower Manhattan. Osama bin Laden's space-age barbarians perpetrated their terrorist violence
not against the United States, but against an entire system of values and beliefs. The Islamic terrorists
had no specific demands. Their cause professed greater ambitions: the destruction of Western
civilization. And the West's leader was the Great Satan: America. When the United States retaliated
against the Taliban regime, which was harboring bin Laden's Al Qaeda operation, U.S. military strikes in
Afghanistan immediately provoked violent counter reprisals throughout the Islamic world. America's
fanatical enemies, powerless to counter American hard power, targeted the usual symbols of American
soft power: McDonald's, Coca-Cola, Pizza Hut, KFC, and Burger King. No American pop cultural icon was
safe from hysterical acts of fundamentalist vandalism. The impact of these spontaneous outbursts was
immediately felt around the world. international tourism ground to a panic-stricken halt. Major airlines
were driven close to bankruptcy. Stock markets plummeted, wiping out billions in wealth. The Walt
Disney Company, fearing more terrorist attacks, closed its Disneyland theme parks. Mickey Mouse, it
seemed, was hastily retreating to a Disney hunker to escape the wrath of Allah. It did not take long,
however, for the U.S. military to retaliate and reassert American power. When President Bush declared
that America would embark on a full-scale "crusade" to rid the world of evil, his word choice
denounced by criticsevoked medieval Christian expeditions to recapture the Holy Land from the
heathens. Ominous predictions about a looming "clash of civilizations" seemed prescient. America's
decimation of bin Laden's terrorist regime in Afghanistan was the first demonstration of the Bush
Doctrines broad reach. The overthrow of Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein sent an even more powerful
message to the world that America was prepared, even unilaterally, to impose its will on the world. Yet
once again, the assertion of U.S. hard power met with fierce reactions against symbols of American
soft power. The Golden Arches, in particular, became the target of anti-American violence from Buenos
Aires and Quito to Seoul and Manila. For America's adversaries, McDonalds has become a preferred
substitute for U.S. embassies. Make no mistake, America's global domination is based mainly on the
superiority of U.S. hard power. But the influence, prestige, and legitimacy of the

emerging American Empire will depend on the effectiveness of its soft


power. No empire-- Greek, Roman, French, Ottoman, British has been
indifferent to the effects of its soft-power resources . The endurance of the
American Empire, too, will depend on the effectiveness of its soft power.
This book provides a detailed analysishistorical and contemporary" of the complex role played by soft power in
the emergence of an American Empire. Divided into four main sections: movies, television, pop music, and fast food
the pages that follow will trace the origins, history, and current role of soft-power resources in U.S. foreign policy.

America's soft-power arsenal


contains awesome weapons of mass distraction.
By the end of this book, it will have been demonstrated that

Only soft power allows us to harness inevitable globalization to


increase hegemony.
Nye 2002 Joseph S. Nve, 2002, Former Assistant Secretary of Defense and Dean of Harvard
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's
Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, p. 110, Google Books
On balance, Americans have benefited from globalization. To the extent that we wish
to continue to do so, we will need to deal with its discontents. This cannot be accomplished
by resorting to slogans of sovereignty, unilateral policies, or drawing inward, as the
unilateralists and sovereigntists suggest: "If we can't do it our way, then we just won't do it. But at
least we the people, the American people, will remain masters of our ship." This prescription mistakes
the abstractions of sovereignty for the realities of power. 96 The result would be to

undermine our soft power and Americas ability to influence others'


responses to globalization. Instead, the United States should use its

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current preeminence to help shape institutions that will benefit both


Americans and the rest of the world as globalization evolves. Americans
will have to factor multilateral institutions and governance into a broader
conception of our national interests, as we shall see in chapter 5.

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A2 Soft Power Fails


Changing geopolitical landscape makes soft power more
important than hard power
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)

Greater attention to soft and smart power itself reflects the changing
landscape of international relations. It is no coincidence that such sources of power have
been embraced by Neoliberalism and Constructivism, paradigms that have underscored the changing
nature of world politics. In this case, theory has been influenced by events. While history has

shown soft power always to have been an important source of national


influence (certainly the case studies n hard and soft power do), changes in modern world
politics have raised its utility all the more (Gallarotti 2010a and 2010b).4 Indeed
the world has become and is continuing to evolve into a softer and
smarter world. World politics in the modern age has been undergoing changes that have
changed the potential for both soft and hard power in ways challenge leaders in their quest to optimize
national influence. In this transformed international system, smart power will be a crucial element in
enhancing influence over international outcomes because it has become more difficult to

compel nations and non-state actors through the principal levers of hard
power (i.e., threats and force). The world stage has become less amenable to
instruments of hard power like force and threats, and more amenable to
actors that are sensitized to the limitations of hard and the opportunities
of soft power created by this new global environment.

Soft power solves even if hard power is still necessary


Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)

Much of the present emphasis on smart power is a reaction to a long


tradition of decisonmaking that has neglected the benefits of soft power
and over-relied on hard power. And consequently the literature on smart power has been

more demonstrative about using more soft power than about how the two kinds of power (hard and
soft) can be optimally combined. So the emphasis has been more on appreciating the utility of soft
power than on appreciating the virtues of all useful power resources. In short the narrative has
underscored reallocation but has fallen well short of sufficiently considering the goal of a more
systematic identification of an optimal diversification among differing power resources. The
prescriptions and warnings of over-reliance on one set of power resources cut both ways. They are as
applicable to over-using soft power as they are to depending too much on hard power strategies. In
this respect, the greatest possible influence a nation can achieve would be

obtained through some optimal diversification among soft and hard power
resources. While this diversification has always proved a superior
strategy, it is all the more important in the world of the present and
future. Indeed the changes in international politics highlighted above suggest that indeed it is
becoming a more complex and sophisticated world order (i.e., a cosmopolitan
world order) in which the brut forces of hard power have diminished in their
importance relative to soft power. This more cosmopolitan world requires very different
strategies for optimizing influence in world politics. It requires a concomitantly sophisticated theory
that can effectively accommodate such changes in articulating a theory of power. Indeed, it

requires a cosmopolitan theory of power that is much more in keeping


with the times.

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A2 Hard Power Solves


Hard power fails--Spread of democracy
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
Second, the growth of democracy in the world system has served to

compound the disutility of coercion and force as the actors bearing the
greatest burden of such coercion and force (the people) have political power
over decisionmakers. In this respect, the process of democratic peace has altered power
relations among nations (Doyle 1997, Russett and Oneal 2001, and Ray 1995). As individuals
become politically empowered, they can generate strong impediments to
the use of force and coercion. But even beyond the enfranchisement effect, democratic
cultural naturally drives national leaders towards the liberal principles
manifest in the cannons of soft power. Hence, national leaders are much more
constrained to work within softer foreign policy boundaries, boundaries
that limit the use of force, threat and bribery. Rather, outcomes are engineered
through policies more consistent with liberal democratic legitimacy.

Interdependence
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
Third, the diminishing utility of hard power is partly the result of a specific

political, social and economic context created by modernization: that


context is interdependence (Herz 1957, Osgood and Tucker 1967, Keohane and Nye 1989,
and Nye 2004a). Using sticks, or whatever kinds of coercive methods, generate
considerable costs in an interdependent world. Indeed in such an
interpenetrated world, punishing or threatening other nations is
tantamount to self-punishment. In such an environment strategies for
optimizing national wealth and influence have shifted from force and coercion to
cooperation. But even more elusive than the quest to limit the fallout from coercion and force in
such an environment, is the quest to impose some specific outcomes onto targeted actors. In an
interpenetrated world, targeted actors have many more avenues of escape. Transnational actors and
national leaders could avoid being compelled by carrots or sticks because of their free reign and
access to the international political economy. They can merely escape coercion or buy-offs by taking
refuge in numerous possible international havens. In one important respect, this modern day

economic feudalism created by interdependence is shifting the nexus of


power from the territorial state to transnational networks (Nye 2002, p. 75).

Social and political shifts


Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
Fourth, social and political changes have made modern populations more

sensitive to their economic fates, and consequently far less enamored of a

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warrior ethic (Jervis 2002 and Nye 2004b, p. 19). This prosperous society has
compounded the influence of economics and made economic
interdependence that much more compelling as a constraint to the utility
of hard power. With the rise of this welfare/economic orientation and the spread of democracy,
national leaders have been driven more by the economic imperative and less by foreign adventurism
as a source of political survival (Gallarotti 2000 and Ruggie 1983). This prosperous society, through the
political vehicle of democracy, has shifted not only domestic but also foreign policy orientations. The

economic welfare concern has put a premium on cooperation that can


deliver economic growth and employment, and worked against hard power
policies that might undercut such goals.

International institutions
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
Finally, the growth of international organization and regimes in the post-war
period has embedded nations more firmly in networks of cooperation: in effect
nations are increasingly functioning in a world of law and norms. In such a world, unilateral
actions that disregard these institutions become far more costly. Such
institutions have effectively raised the minimum level of civil behavior in international politics, and
consequently raised the importance of soft power significantly. Consequently, the networks

of cooperation have made nations far less likely to extract compliance in


what are considered illegitimate ways, i.e., through force, coercion, or
bribery (Krasner 1983 and Keohane and Nye 1989).

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A2 Gov Policies Not Key


Government actions influence soft power and are the lynchpin
of other determinants
Wallin 2013 (Matthew Wallin, April 29, 2013, War of the Soft Powers, American Security

Project, http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2013/war-of-the-soft-powers/)
In Foreign Policy today, Joseph Nye penned an article discussing China and Russias desire to increase
their soft power. As originator of the term, Nye explains that neither China nor Russia understands
exactly how to do this. Though Nye is correct in identifying China and Russias difficulty with soft
power, he neglects to get down to the core issue on why this is difficult. As soft power is the

ability to attract rather than coerce or pay-off, the ability to grow and use
soft power is a bit more nebulous. Unlike hard power, soft power is not
something that can simply be bought, constructed or traded like a
tangible object. Rather, soft power results from the collective attributes of a nation, through
action, history, culture and rhetoric. It cannot be applied like a fragrance to freshen a rotten product.

Despite the ebb and flow of American Soft power since the turn of the
century, it remains overall fairly strong. Nye contends that much of
Americas soft power is produced by civil society everything from
universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture not from the
government. While this is arguably true, I would not remove government as a
major variable in the soft power equation. Much of what Hollywood,
academia, and civil society are able to do is enabled directly by our
principles of government . Certainly, what can only be described as dysfunction in the

American government right nowespecially in regards to the fiscal situationhas an eroding effect on
U.S. soft power. Though internal bickering may result in an inability to pass a budget, no amount of
cooperation gives Congress the ability pass a measure to requisition more soft power, or contract a
company to design it. But it can pass legislation that frees it to grow on its own. Rather than

trying to use more soft power, Russia and China must first act to earn it.
Moral leadership, technological leadership, financial leadership, and foreign policy leadership and
setting standards for individual rights are all factors that can help to increase soft power. In the case of
Russia and China, making more deliberate efforts to resolve issues on the international scene could
make a difference. Russia should distance itself from its support of the Assad regime in Syria. China
should pursue diplomacy to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. Both countries should work to
increase freedom of the individual within their borders. Thats how you increase your soft power. For
America, technological and scientific leadership have long been a strong factor in its soft power
reserve. Yet we are at risk of losing this. For example, recent cuts in fusion energy researchone of
Americas most challenging, yet promising research fieldsmay cause this country to lag behind.
Explaining the harm this can cause, ASPs Nick Cunningham and Theodore MacDonald recently wrote
in AOL Energy today: As other countries invest more heavily in fusion power, Americas leadership in
this field will soon come to an end. Ceding a new high-tech industry to competitors will result in a
decline in Americas competitive edge, and its best and brightest scientists will be lured by more
advanced facilities abroad. If America wants to maintain its competitive edge in soft power, it needs to
take the action necessary to do it. That means continuing to make those scientific breakthroughs that
so many admire this nation for. That means continuing to uphold the principles enshrined in our
founding documents. Thus, it is in our interest to attract the best and brightest from overseas.
Historically, those minds have contributed greatly to all aspects of American society. And is it their
contribution to building this country through their intellect and hard work in a framework of economic
and cultural freedom that forms the basis of American soft power. Are we in danger of losing

our soft power edge to Russia and China? At this point, the answer is no.
Should we be frightened by their efforts to augment and enhance their
soft power? The answer is also no. Soft power is not a zero-sum game
one country cannot attack and weaken anothers soft power. The only way

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America risks losing its soft power edge is by pursuing negative actions
and neglecting the very things that make it so strong.

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Heg Solves War


U.S. hegemony prevents global war, arms races and
genocides***
Thayer 2007 Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic

Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, Reply to Christopher Layne p
108
The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the

United States creates stability in international politics. That is vitally


important for the world, but easily forgotten. Harvard professor Joseph Nye often compares
the security provided by the United States to oxygen. If it were taken away, a person would think of
nothing else. If the security and stability provided by the United States were

taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and arms races,
vicious security competition, and wars would result . It would be a world without
NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional
rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan
and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that
world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair
that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to
what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post-Cold War world
dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability .

American hegemony solves WMD war


Brzezinski 2004 Zbigniew Brzezinski (Counselor at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies and a professor of foreign policy @ Johns Hopkins) 2004 The Choice: Global Domination or
Global Leadership p xi
This book is thus partially predictive and partially prescriptive. Its point of departure is that the

recent revolution in advanced technologies, especially in communications,


promotes the progressive emergence of a global community of
increasingly shared interest with America at its center. But the potential selfisolation of the only super-power could plunge the world into escalating
anarchy, made all the more ominous by the dissemination of weaponry of
mass destruction. With Americagiven the contradictory roles it plays in the world
fated to be the catalyst either for a global community or for global chaos,
Americans have the unique historical responsibility to determine which of
the two will come to pass. Our choice is between dominating the world and leading it.

American hegemony prevents major power wars.


Thayer 2007 Bradley A. Thayer (Associate Professor in the Dept. of Defense and Strategic

Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, Reply to Christopher Layne p
108
So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the

American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces


the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the
presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the
likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers,

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know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and
win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are
unlikely to do so directly. 'This means that there will be no wars between great
powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state
(the United States). But there will be intense security competitionboth China and the United States
will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other,
their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their
militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in
fact, is its "normal" condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But
right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep;
it never takes a rest.

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Heg Sustainable--- Catch-All


Sustainableecon and militaryshort term snapshots are
insufficient
Kagan 2012 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow
at Brookings Inst. January 11, 2012, The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)

sense of decline may be, however, it deserves a more rigorous


examination. Measuring changes in a nations relative power is a tricky business, but there are
some basic indicators: the size and the influence of its economy relative to that of other powers; the
magnitude of military power compared with that of potential adversaries; the degree of political influence
Powerful as this

it wields in the international systemall of which make up what the Chinese call comprehensive national power.

the matter of time. Judgments based on only a few years


evidence are problematic. A great powers decline is the product of fundamental
changes in the international distribution of various forms of power that usually occur over longer
stretches of time. Great powers rarely decline suddenly. A war may bring them down, but even that is
usually a symptom, and a culmination, of a longer process. The decline of the British Empire, for instance,
occurred over several decades. In 1870, the British share of global manufacturing was over 30
And there is

percent. In 1900, it was 20 percent. By 1910, it was under 15 percentwell below the rising United States, which
had climbed over the same period from more than 20 percent to more than 25 percent; and also less than
Germany, which had lagged far behind Britain throughout the nineteenth century but had caught and surpassed it
in the first decade of the twentieth century. Over the course of that period, the British navy went from unchallenged
master of the seas to sharing control of the oceans with rising naval powers. In 1883, Britain possessed more
battleships than all the other powers combined. By 1897, its dominance had been eclipsed. British officials
considered their navy completely outclassed in the Western hemisphere by the United States, in East Asia by
Japan, and even close to home by the combined navies of Russia and Franceand that was before the threatening

clear-cut, measurable, steady declines in two of


the most important measures of power over the course of a half-century .
SOME OF THE ARGUMENTS for Americas relative decline these days would be more potent if
they had not appeared only in the wake of the financial crisis of 2008. Just as one swallow
does not make a spring, one recession, or even a severe economic crisis, need not mean the
beginning of the end of a great power. The United States suffered deep and prolonged economic
crises in the 1890s, the 1930s, and the 1970s. In each case, it rebounded in the
following decade and actually ended up in a stronger position relative to other powers than
growth of the German navy. These were

before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.
Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of Americas decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the
historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on the rise and fall of the great
powers, America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great disparity of power as
between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that no other great power had held such
formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of
American power was unprecedented. In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying
a comprehensive uni-polarity unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing
about the post-American world and the rise of the rest, and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the

Did the fundamentals of Americas relative power shift


so dramatically in just a few short years? The answer is no . Lets start with the basic indicators.
In economic terms, and even despite the current years of recession and slow growth, Americas position
in the world has not changed. Its share of the worlds GDP has held remarkably steady, not
only over the past decade but over the past four decades. In 1969, the United States produced
roughly a quarter of the worlds economic output. Today it still produces roughly a quarter, and it
remains not only the largest but also the richest economy in the world. People are rightly
mesmerized by the rise of China, India, and other Asian nations whose share of the global economy has
been climbing steadily, but this has so far come almost entirely at the expense of Europe and
Japan, which have had a declining share of the global economy. Optimists about Chinas development predict
inevitability of American decline.

that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This
could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the

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sheer size of

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economy is not by itself a good measure of overall power within the


If it were, then early nineteenth-century China, with what was then
the worlds largest economy, would have been the predominant power
instead of the prostrate victim of smaller European nations. Even if China does reach this pinnacle
againand Chinese leaders face significant obstacles to sustaining the countrys growth
indefinitelyit will still remain far behind both the United States and Europe in terms of
per capita GDP. Military capacity matters, too, as early nineteenth-century China learned and
an

international system.

Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, military strength underpins hegemony. Here the

United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the
world has ever known, and there has been no decline in Americas relative military
capacityat least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more
than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment
in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next

4 percent of GDP annuallya


lower than the 10 percent of GDP that
the United States spent on defense in the mid-1950s and the 7 percent it spent in the late 1980s. The
superior expenditures underestimate Americas actual superiority in military capability. American land and air
forces are equipped with the most advanced weaponry, and are the most
experienced in actual combat. They would defeat any competitor in a head-to-head battle.
couple of years.) They do so, moreover, while consuming a little less than
higher percentage than the other great powers, but in historical terms

American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures,

United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empires relative decline
began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height
of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not
at least, the

yet arrived.

Declines not inevitable, but a choicethe when is essential


Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at
Brookings Inst. January 11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)

danger. It is that in the meantime, while the nation continues to struggle,


Americans may convince themselves that decline is indeed inevitable, or that the United
BUT THERE IS a

States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many Americans,
accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them
since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States

underlying assumption of such a course is


the present world order will more or less persist without American power, or
at least with much less of it; or that others can pick up the slack; or simply that the
benefits of the world order are permanent and require no special exertion by anyone.
Unfortunately, the present world orderwith its widespread freedoms, its general prosperity, and its absence
of great power conflictis as fragile as it is unique. Preserving it has been a
struggle in every decade, and will remain a struggle in the decades to come. Preserving the present world
order requires constant American leadership and constant American commitment.
In the end, the decision is in the hands of Americans. Decline , as Charles Krauthammer
has observed, is a choice. It is not an inevitable fateat least not yet. Empires and great powers rise
and fall, and the only question is when. But the when does matter. Whether the United States begins to
decline over the next two decades or not for another two centuries will matter a
great deal, both to Americans and to the nature of the world they live in.
was rich, powerful, and not responsible for world order. The
that

Resiliency and adaptation like the aff solves all your warrants
Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at
Brookings Inst. January 11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)

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PERHAPS THE GREATEST concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether
the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of
solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have
asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twentyfirst-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at

have experienced this unease before, and many


previous generations have also felt this sense of lost vigor and lost virtue: as long
ago as 1788, Patrick Henry lamented the nations fall from past glory, when the American spirit was in its
youth. There have been many times over the past two centuries when the political system was
dysfunctional, hopelessly gridlocked, and seemingly unable to find solutions to crushing national problems
least some reason to be hopeful. Americans

from slavery and then Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century
and the crisis of social welfare during the Great Depression, to the confusions and paranoia of the early Cold War
years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, and the energy crisis,

cannot really believe that our present difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does
not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence: the
American system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity
to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical
competitors. This undoubtedly has something to do with the relative freedom of American society,
which rewards innovators, often outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and

with the relatively open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to
influence the behavior of the political establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the
Founders designed it that way, with a federal structure, checks and balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of

possesses a remarkable ability to undertake changes


just when the steam kettle looks about to blow its lid. There are occasional critical
Rightsbut the system also

elections that allow transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble
problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without

on many big issues throughout their history, Americans have found a way of achieving and
implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of the
war. But

American superpower back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to

overcome what had appeared to him in 1987 as an insoluble long-term economic


crisis. American businessmen and politicians reacted strongly to the debate about
decline by taking action: cutting costs, making companies leaner and meaner, investing in newer
tech nologies, promoting a communications revolution, trimming government deficits, all of which helped to
produce significant year-on-year advances in productivity. It is possible to imagine that Americans may rise
to this latest economic challenge as well. It is also reasonable to expect that other nations
will, as in the past, run into difficulties of their own. None of the nations currently enjoying economic
miracles is without problems. Brazil, India, Turkey, and Russia all have bumpy
histories that suggest the route ahead will not be one of simple and smooth ascent. There is a real question
whether the autocratic model of China, which can be so effective in making some strategic decisions about
the economy in the short term, can over the long run be flexible enough to permit adaptation to
a changing international economic, political, and strategic environment. In sum: it may be more than good
fortune that has allowed the United States in the past to come through crises and
emerge stronger and healthier than other nations while its various competitors have faltered. And it may
be more than just wishful thinking to believe that it may do so again.

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Heg Sustainable--- Soft Power


US is not in irreversible decline--- Soft power solves
Bev 2012 (Jennie S. Bev, Associate Partner of Fortune PR Indonesia, May 23, 2012, The Power of
American Soft Power, Forbes, http://www.forbes.com/sites/85broads/2012/05/23/the-power-ofamerican-soft-power/2/)
Almost four years since the beginning of the Great Recession, signified by the
implosion of the financial industry and the fall of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the United
States is recovering. In fact, some sectors have grown to new heights. Thus, a

declining USA is no more than a myth. This myth is likely to continue


for a while despite the recession officially ending in June 2009 as the high
unemployment and on-going foreclosure crisis have cloaked significant
economic improvements. In the last four years, declinism and declinists have been spreading

paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel Dr. Doom Roubinis the perfect storm
forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. Daniel Gross best-selling
book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books
that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than discouraging views of Americas
future. The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of ones fall that lingers in
mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet
creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day
our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life
with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just
how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked

with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasnt yet created a lasting
mental image. Good news, American soft power is more powerful than
any fiscal policy and political maneuver. Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy
School of Government says soft power refers to the ability to get through
attraction rather than coercion or payments. By to get it means to receive favorable
treatments based upon attractiveness of a countrys culture, ideals, and policies. For instance,
inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan
aspire to study medicine at an American university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair
trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. Soft power can be hardcore
power. And the American brand is still the best out there.

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Heg Sustainable--- Economic Power


Economic strength
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis
of Global Power, google books)

The first crucial asset is Americas overall economic strength. America is


still the worlds largest national economy by a good margin. Only the economically

united European region slightly surpasses the United States, but even so the Western European model
exhibits higher structural unemployment and lower rates of growth. More significant for future trends is
the fact that the U nited S tates, despite Asias rapid economic growth, has

maintained for several decades its major share of the worlds GDP (see Figure
2.3). Its 2010 GDP of over $14 trillion accounted for just around 25% of global output, while its closest
competitor, China, made up over 9% of global output with a close to $6 trillion GDP. The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace estimates that the United States will go from having a $1.48 trillion
smaller GDP than the EU in 2010 to a $12.03 trillion larger GDP than the EU in 2050; and in terms of
per capita GDP, the United States will increase its lead over the EU from $12,723 in 2010 to $32,266 in
2050. It is true that according to current forecasts, China, largely due to its
overwhelming population base, will surpass the U nited S tates in total economic

size sometime in the twenty-first century; the Carnegie Endowment puts that date around 2030. For
similar reasons, although not at the same speed, India should climb up the global GDP ranks over
the next forty years as well. But neither China nor India will come even close to
US levels in per capita GDP (see Figure 2.4). Thus, neither China, nor India, nor Europe
can match the U nited S tates in its potent economic mix of overall size and
high per capita GDP. This economic advantageassuming America also exploits its
other assetscan preserve Americas global economic clout and systemic appeal,
as well as its suction effect on global talent.

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A2 Smooth Transition
No smooth transition
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis
of Global Power, google books)

If America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single


preeminent successor, such as China. While a sudden and massive crisis of the American system would
produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and economic chaos, a steady drift by
America into increasingly pervasive decay and/or into endlessly widening warfare with Islam would be
unlikely to produce, even by 2025, the coronation of an effective global
successor. No single power will be ready by then to exercise the role that
the world, upon the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, expected the United States to play. More probable would

be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic realignments of both global and regional power,
with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal
risks to global well-being. What follows analyzes the implications of that historically ominousthough certainly not
predeterminedif. In

the absence of a recognized leader, the resulting uncertainty is


likely to increase tensions among competitors and inspire self-serving
behavior. Thus, international cooperation is more likely to decline, with some powers seeking
to promote exclusive regional arrangements as alternative frameworks of stability for the enhancement of their own

Historical contenders may vie more overtly, even with the use of
force, for regional preeminence. Some weaker states may find themselves in serious jeopardy, as
interests.

new power realignments emerge in response to major geopolitical shifts in the global distribution of power. The
promotion of democracy might yield to the quest for enhanced national security based on varying fusions of
authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion. The global commons could suffer from passive indifference or
exploitation produced by a defensive concentration on narrower and more immediate national concerns. Some

key international institutions, such as the World Bank or the IMF, are already under
increasing pressure from the rising, poorer, but highly populated stateswith China and India in the
forefrontfor a general rearrangement of the existing distribution of voting rights, which is
currently weighted toward the West. That distribution has already been challenged by some states in the G-20 as
unfair. The obvious demand is that it should be based to a much greater degree on the actual populations of
member states and less on their actual financial contributions. Such a demand, arising in the context of greater
disorder and percolating unrest among the worlds newly politically awakened peoples, could gain popularity among
many as a step toward international (even though not domestic) democratization. And before long, the heretofore
untouchable and almost seventy- year-old UN Security Council system of only five permanent members with
exclusive veto rights may become widely viewed as illegitimate. Even if a downward drift by America unfolds in a
vague and contradictory fashion, it is likely that the leaders of the worlds second-rank powers, among them Japan,
India, Russia, and some EU members, are already assessing the potential impact of Americas demise on their

the prospects of a post-America scramble may


already be discreetly shaping the planning agenda of the chancelleries of the major
foreign powers even if not yet dictating their actual policies. The Japanese, fearful of an assertive China
respective national interests. Indeed,

dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may well be
considering closer political and even military cooperation as a hedge in case America falters and China rises.

Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (or even in schadenfreude) about Americas uncertain
prospects, may well have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union as
initial targets of its enhanced geopolitical influence. Europe, not yet cohesive, would
likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial
interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter EU, and Great Britain seeking to
manipulate a balance within the EU while continuing to preserve a special relationship with a declining United

Others still may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres:
Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth.
None of the foregoing, however, have or are likely to have the requisite
combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power to even consider
inheriting Americas leading role. Japan is dependent on the United States for military protection
States.

and would have to make the painful choice of accommodating China or perhaps of allying with India in joint

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opposition to it. Russia is still unable to come to terms with its loss of empire, is fearful of Chinas meteoric
modernization, and is unclear as to whether it sees its future with Europe or in Eurasia. Indias aspirations for major
power status still tend to be measured by its rivalry with China. And Europe has yet to define itself politically while
remaining conveniently dependent on American power. A genuinely cooperative effort by all of them to accept joint
sacrifices for the sake of collective stability if Americas power were to fade is not likely.

Decline collapses US extended deterrence- Causes tons of


proliferation and instability
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis
of Global Power, google books)

American decline would impact the nuclear domain most profoundly by


inciting a crisis of confidence in the credibility of the American nuclear
umbrella. Countries like South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey, and even Israel, among
others, rely on the United States extended nuclear deterrence for security. If they
were to see the United States slowly retreat from certain regions, forced by circumstances
to pull back its guarantees, or even if they were to lose confidence in standing US
guarantees, because of the financial, political, military, and diplomatic consequences of an American decline,
then they will have to seek security elsewhere. That elsewhere security could originate from only two
sources: from nuclear weapons of ones own or from the extended deterrence of another
powermost likely Russia, China, or India. It is possible that countries that feel
threatened by the ambition of existing nuclear weapon states, the
addition of new nuclear weapon states, or the decline in the reliability of
American power would develop their own nuclear capabilities. For cryptonuclear powers like Germany and Japan, the path to nuclear weapons would be easy and
fairly quick, given their extensive civilian nuclear industry, their financial success, and their technological
acumen. Furthermore, the continued existence of nuclear weapons in North Korea and the
potentiality of a nuclear-capable Iran could prompt American allies in the Persian Gulf
or East Asia to build their own nuclear deterrents. Given North Koreas increasingly
An

aggressive and erratic behavior, the failure of the six-party talks, and the widely held distrust of Irans

the guarantees offered by a declining Americas nuclear


umbrella might not stave off a regional nuclear arms race among smaller
powers.
megalomaniacal leadership,

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***Solvency***

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Solvency--- Reform
A2 Cant change Cuba
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings

institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

The prospect of significant revenues from oil, natural gas, and sugarcane
ethanol in the next five years could further integrate Cuba into global
and regional markets. While in the short term Cuba will continue to be heavily dependent on

Venezu- ela for subsidized fuel, in five years offshore oil reserves, developed with Brazil, Spain,
Norway, and Malaysia, combined with the potential for ethanol production with Brazil, may increase
net annual financial flows to Cuba by $3.8 billion (at $50 per barrel of oil and $2.00 gallon of ethanol).

If democratic countries increase their economic stakes in Cuba, they will


simultaneously enhance their political influence with its current and future
leaders. To be relevant to Cuba, the Obama ad- ministration will need to shape its policies now.

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Solvency--- Obama Leadership Key


Presidential leadership is key
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings

institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

The presidents leadership in carrying out a new Cuba policy is essential


because by law and prac- tice it is his responsibility to determine the overall conduct of U.S. foreign policy. in the case of Cuba, he has ample executive
authority to put in place a policy of engagement. if he wishes, he can expand
bilateral diplomatic relations, re- move Cuba from the list of terrorist countries, and rescind the current
policy that grants im- mediate legal residency to Cubans who enter the United States without visas.

Should bilateral re- lations improve, he could choose to negotiate the


unresolved expropriated property claims of U.S. citizens and review the
status of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base.

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***2AC/Miscellaneous***

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2AC Terrorism Add-On


Lifting the embargo key to WOT
Johnson 2010 (Andy Johnson, Director, National Security Program Kyle Spector, Policy Advisor,
National Security Program Kristina Lilac, National Security Program, September 16, 2010, Third Way
Institute, http://content.thirdway.org/publications/326/Third_Way_Memo__End_the_Embargo_of_Cuba.pdf)

Keeping the embargo in place requires that the US government devote


time and resources to fighting a Cold War-era threat. Senator Chris Dodd argued in
a 2005 op- ed that the US spends extraordinary resources each year to
enforce the sanctions instead of devoting such resources to the fight
against terrorism.4 While the financial resources dedicated to enforcing the embargo may be
limited compared to resources dedicated to other causes, lifting the Cuban embargo could
put the US in a better position to fight terrorist organizations by freeing
up resources currently enforcing the embargo. For example, the Treasury
Departments Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which governs travel and trade
between the US and Cuba, is also responsible for maintaining sanctions against
truly problematic countries, including Iran and North Korea. OFAC also is
responsible for responding to economic threats posed by terrorist organizations and narcotics
traffickers. By ending OFACs need to regulate the Cuban embargo, OFAC

could instead devote those resources to respond to the current threats


posed by rogue states and terrorist networks. Cuba also remains on the State

Departments state sponsor of terrorism list along with Iran, Syria, and Sudan,5 despite claims by
experts such as former National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism Richard Clarke that
Cuba is only on the list for domestic political reasons.6 A 1998 report by the US Intelligence
Community determined that Cuba does not pose a threat to US national security,7 yet the State
Department continues to keep Cuba on the list. By normalizing relations with Cuba and

removing Cuba from the list, the State Department could better focus on
actual state sponsors of terror and instead use resources in the Western Hemisphere
bureau to initiate a new path for engaging Cuba.

Terrorism causes miscalculation that draws in great powers


and culminates in extinction- also causes rising alert levels
Ayson 2010 (Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for

Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear
Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available
Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in
the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed,
there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be
regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn
here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or
more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst
terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside
considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must
be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of
nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange
taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa
non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily
separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear

terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive

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exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess
them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during
the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising
the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were
considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the socalled n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially
plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear
war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be
wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because
they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist
groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist
behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do
suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered
that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if
for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that
nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation
by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a
wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a
wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials
used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American
officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)

suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out


Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as
well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of
North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage
would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In
particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing
tension in Washingtons relations with Russia and /or China, and at a time when
threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political
leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this

occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of
limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance
in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse
might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or
China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could
Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to
consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might
also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with
Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate

aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be


expected to place the countrys armed forces, including its nuclear
arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when
careful planning runs up against the friction of reality , it is just possible that
Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S.
intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them. In that
situation, the temptations to preempt such actions might grow , although it
must be admitted that any preemption would probably still meet with a devastating response. As part
of its initial response to the act of nuclear terrorism (as discussed earlier) Washington might

decide to order a significant conventional (or nuclear) retaliatory or


disarming attack against the leadership of the terrorist group and/or
states seen to support that group. Depending on the identity and especially the location
of these targets, Russia and/or China might interpret such action as being far too

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close for their comfort, and potentially as an infringement on their spheres of


influence and even on their sovereignty. One far-fetched but perhaps not impossible
scenario might stem from a judgment in Washington that some of the main aiders and abetters of the
terrorist action resided somewhere such as Chechnya, perhaps in connection with what Allison claims
is the Chechen insurgents long-standing interest in all things nuclear.42 American pressure on
that part of the world would almost certainly raise alarms in Moscow that might require a degree of
advanced consultation from Washington that the latter found itself unable or unwilling to provide.
There is also the question of how other nuclear-armed states respond to the act of nuclear terrorism
on another member of that special club. It could reasonably be expected that following a nuclear
terrorist attack on the United States, both Russia and China would extend immediate sympathy and
support to Washington and would work alongside the United States in the Security Council. But there
is just a chance, albeit a slim one, where the support of Russia and/or China is less automatic in some
cases than in others. For example, what would happen if the United States wished to discuss its right
to retaliate against groups based in their territory? If, for some reason, Washington found the
responses of Russia and China deeply underwhelming, (neither for us or against us) might it also
suspect that they secretly were in cahoots with the group, increasing (again perhaps ever so slightly)
the chances of a major exchange. If the terrorist group had some connections to groups in Russia and
China, or existed in areas of the world over which Russia and China held sway, and if Washington felt
that Moscow or Beijing were placing a curiously modest level of pressure on them, what conclusions
might it then draw about their culpability? If Washington decided to use, or decided to threaten the
use of, nuclear weapons, the responses of Russia and China would be crucial to the chances of
avoiding a more serious nuclear exchange. They might surmise, for example, that while the act of
nuclear terrorism was especially heinous and demanded a strong response, the response simply had
to remain below the nuclear threshold. It would be one thing for a non-state actor to have broken the
nuclear use taboo, but an entirely different thing for a state actor, and indeed the leading state in the
international system, to do so. If Russia and China felt sufficiently strongly about that prospect, there
is then the question of what options would lie open to them to dissuade the United States from such
action: and as has been seen over the last several decades, the central dissuader of the use of
nuclear weapons by states has been the threat of nuclear retaliation. If some readers find this simply
too fanciful, and perhaps even offensive to contemplate, it may be informative to reverse the tables.
Russia, which possesses an arsenal of thousands of nuclear warheads and that has been one of the
two most important trustees of the non-use taboo, is subjected to an attack of nuclear terrorism. In
response, Moscow places its nuclear forces very visibly on a higher state of alert and declares that it is
considering the use of nuclear retaliation against the group and any of its state supporters. How would
Washington view such a possibility? Would it really be keen to support Russias use of nuclear
weapons, including outside Russias traditional sphere of influence? And if not, which seems quite
plausible, what options would Washington have to communicate that displeasure? If China had been
the victim of the nuclear terrorism and seemed likely to retaliate in kind, would the United States and
Russia be happy to sit back and let this occur? In the charged atmosphere immediately

after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond
to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The
phrase how dare they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind.
Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy
or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear
restraint.

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A2 No Capability/Motive
Al Qaeda has the capability
Lawlor 2011 (Major General Bruce Lawlor, served on the White Houses Homeland Security Council and
was the first chief of staff for the Department of Homeland Security and currently director with Virginia Tech's
Simulation and Decision Informatics Laboratory, December 15, 2011, The Black Sea: Center of the nuclear black
market, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-black-sea-center-of-thenuclear-black-market)
Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom has published a comprehensive report on this threat, combining several

several terrorist groups, particularly Al


Qaeda, have been trying to get their hands on a nuclear weapon for years.
Osama bin Laden referred to it as a "religious duty" and embraced the idea of an American Hiroshima. Al
Qaeda operatives have consulted with nuclear experts, tested
conventional explosives for use in nuclear bombs, and attempted to
purchase working nuclear devices. There is nothing to suggest that bin
Laden's death has ended this quest. Second, the Harvard study notes that if a
sophisticated terrorist group acquired sufficient weapon-grade material, it
would be able to build at least a crude, gun-type atomic bomb (WMD
well-known facts to create an unsettling picture. First,

Commission, 2005). A nuclear device of this type wouldn't be transported to the target by a sophisticated delivery
system; its more likely delivery mode would be a rental truck. Third, although terrorist groups may not be able to
manufacture the plutonium or weapon-grade uranium to make a crude bomb, it is not beyond their ability to buy or
steal it. And fourth, nuclear smuggling is very difficult to combat. Globalization, huge profit margins, and organized
crime have created a multibillion-dollar illicit-trafficking market that is producing ever more sophisticated methods
of keeping contraband from being discovered. Nuclear contraband has become a part of that illicit market.

They have the capability


Hashmi 2012 (Muhammad Jawad Hashmi, defense analyst, M.Phil in Defence and Strategic Studies,
January 29, 2012, Al Qaeda In Pursuit Of Nuclear Weapons/Radiological Material Analysis, Eurasia Review,
http://www.eurasiareview.com/29012012-al-qaeda-in-pursuit-of-nuclear-weaponsradiological-material-analysis/)

The pursuit of nuclear weapons and material by sub national groups has
been an alarming challenge to deal with. This article will examine groups like al Qaeda
that are said to have the ability and motivation to pursue nuclear
capabilities. This study simultaneously provides an insight into the issues related to the demand for these
weapons capabilities and their supply. According to Daniel Metraux, on the demand side
of the nuclear market there are small national groups working with
political or religious belief structures that may be stirred to pursue
massive devastation. Some of these groups have large financial and
organizational resources, together with the physical assets. Some of these
groups also enjoy sanctuary either in a lawless grey zone or as guests of
the local rulers where they can pursue their plans. On the other hand, in Japan,
extensive legal protections for religious organizations operate in a very permissive environment without much state
interference.

Theyll WMD attack the US in the next 2 years- Neg evidence


underestimates their capability
Kanani 2011 (Rahim Kanani, founder and editor-in-chief of World Affairs Commentary, Citing

Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Directors
Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, June 29th, New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong
Nuclear Intent, Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahirihas-strong-nuclear-intent/)

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We should be especially worried about the threat of nuclear terrorism


under Zawahiris leadership. In a recent report titled Islam and the Bomb: Religious
Justification For and Against Nuclear Weapons, which I researched for and contributed to, lead author
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, former director of intelligence and counterintelligence

at the U.S. Department of Energy, argues that al-Qaedas WMD ambitions


are stronger than ever. And that this intent no longer feels theoretical,
but operational. I believe al-Qaeda is laying the groundwork for a large
scale attack on the United States, possibly in the next year or two , continues
Mowatt-Larssen in the opening of the report issued earlier this year by the Belfer Center for Science
and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School. The attack may or may not involve the use of
WMD, but there are signs that al-Qaeda is working on an event on a larger scale than the 9/11 attack.
Most will readily dismiss such claims as implausible and unlikely , and we hope
they are right, but after spending months with Mowatt-Larssen , who also

served as the former head of the Central Intelligence Agencys WMD and
terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiris 268-page
treatise published in 2008 titled Exoneration, the analytics steered us
towards something far more remarkable than expected. As I read the text
closely, in the broader context of al-Qaedas past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this
treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of preparing for an impending attack, states MowattLarssen. As Osama bin Ladens fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack,

Ayman Zawahiris fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for alQaedas next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaedas
modus operandi holds true, we are in the middle of an attack cycle. Among
several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages, sources and religious
justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi
cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing
short of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americans and a
lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we must take seriously with
Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. The time may have come for al-Qaedas new CEO to leave a
legacy of his own. Concluding the authors note, Mowatt-Larssen states, Even if this theory

proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under estimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spent that they
are incapable of carrying out another 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct,
for which I harbor grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next
attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and dismiss
what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.

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A2 Politics Link
Now is the right time to remove the embargo
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant
to former US president Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, CATO
Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)

The embargo survives largely because of Floridas political importance.


Every presidential candidate wants to win the Sunshine States electoral votes, and the Cuban
American community is a significant voting bloc. But the political environment is

changing. A younger, more liberal generation of Cuban Americans with no


memory of life in Cuba is coming to the fore. Said Wayne Smith, a diplomat who

served in Havana: for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy. And

there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a
more sensible approach to Cuba. Support for the Republican Party also is
falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community
in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent
of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States. Barack Obama increased his

votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island.
He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be
essential politically. Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though

Republican vice-presidential nominee Paul Ryan has defended the


embargo in recent years, that appears to reflect ambition rather than
conviction. Over the years he voted at least three times to lift the
embargo , explaining: The embargo doesnt work. It is a failed policy. It was probably justified
when the Soviet Union existed and posed a threat through Cuba. I think its become more of a crutch
for Castro to use to repress his people. All the problems he has, he blames the American embargo.
There is essentially no international support for continuing the embargo. For instance, the European
Union plans to explore improving relations with Havana. Spains Deputy Foreign Minister Gonzalo de
Benito explained that the EU saw a positive evolution in Cuba. The hope, then, is to move forward in
the relationship between the European Union and Cuba. The administration should move

now, before congressmen are focused on the next election. President


Obama should propose legislation to drop (or at least significantly loosen) the
embargo. He also could use his authority to relax sanctions by, for instance, granting more licenses
to visit the island.

Bipartisan support for repeal


Litvinsky 2009 (Marina Litvinsky, reporter for The Global Information Network, Penny Worthy
Being Saved, Global Information Network, April 1, 2009, Proquest)

bipartisan group of U.S. senators and interest


groups is backing a bill that would end the long economic embargo
against Cuba, including travel restrictions to the island. The 'Freedom to Travel to Cuba
Act' was introduced Tuesday by Senators Byron Dorgan, a North Dakota
Democrat and Senate Democratic Policy Committee chair, and Michael
Enzi, a Republican from Wyoming. They were joined by 20 cosponsors,
including influential Senators Christopher Dodd and Richard Lugar, the
American Farm Bureau Federation, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and
Human Rights Watch (HRW). "The people of Cuba ought to be free," said
Senator Dorgan, pointing to the U.S.'s failed Cuba policy in achieving this.
The nearly 50-year-old embargo on Cuba is only "punishing American
people," he said. If passed, the bill would prohibit the president from regulating or prohibiting travel to or
WASHINGTON, Mar. 31, 2009 (IPS/GIN) - A

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from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel, except in
time of war or armed hostilities between the United States and Cuba, or of imminent danger to the public health or
the physical safety of U.S. travellers. The Cuban embargo, introduced in 1961 and subsequently tightened further,
prohibits travel to and business dealings with Cuba for all U.S. citizens. Many have argued that this policy actually
thwarts U.S. interests and further strengthens the government there. "The

U.S. embargo on Cuba is


a 50-year failure, and lifting the ban on travel is a good first step toward a
more rational policy," said Myron Brilliant, senior vice president for International Affairs at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce. "The embargo was implemented to try to bring freedom to Cuba, but it made a martyr out
of a tyrant and actually has helped prop up the regime."

Sponsors of the bill include

agricultural associations who believe the lifting of travel restrictions to Cuba will increase U.S.

agricultural sales of such commodities as poultry, wheat and soybeans. Agricultural sales to Cuba have averaged
400 million dollars annually since 2000. "In

the long term we need to do more to open up


channels of trade (in Cuba), like we do in other countries," said Bob Stallman, president of the
American Farm Bureau Federation. Proponents of the legislation point out that the 47-year-old
embargo has done nothing to promote democracy or force the Cuban
government to obey human rights standards. "Human Rights Watch has been monitoring
human rights in Cuba for nearly two decades and the dismal state of human rights has not improved," said Jose
Miguel Vivanco, executive director of the Americas Division at HRW

Congress wants to repeal the embargo


Congress Daily 2009 (GAO Report Gives Road Map for Lifting Cuban Embargo, Congress

Daily/ A.M., October 2, 2009, Proquest)


Three House lawmakers led by Ways and Means Chairman Charles Rangel offered a plan
Thursday for ending the Cuban trade embargo that has been in effect since 1962. Rangel
and Reps. Barbara Lee , D-Calif., and Jeff Flake , R-Ariz., released a GAO report outlining
steps that could be taken to end the embargo, which Rangel called "a failed and

outdated policy that has not resulted in any advances for the Cuban or
American people."

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A2 Politics Link--- A2 Cuban Americans


A2 Cuban Americans hate the plan
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings

institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)

The majority of Cuban Americans now agree with the American public that
our half-century-old policy toward Cuba has failed. For the first time since
Florida international University (FiU) began polling Cuban American residents in 1991, a
December 2008 poll found that a majority of Cuban American voters favor
ending current restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, and support a bilateral dialogue and
normal diplomatic relations with the Cuban regime by substantial margins.

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A2 Critique--- Lifting Embargo = D Rule


Moral obligation to end the embargo
Birns 2013 (Larry Birns, COHA Director, and, Frederick B. Mills, COHA Senior Research Fellow,

January 30, 2013, Best Time for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-foru-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf

Besides being counter-productive, there are also strong moral arguments


for ending the embargo. From a utilitarian point of view, the policy is
objectionable because it has brought about needless suffering without
convincing evidence of praiseworthy results. One illustration of this is what happened

during what Havana calls the special period in time of peace. This refers to the economic crisis,
hydrocarbon energy shortages, and food insecurity that followed the collapse of Soviet Bloc (1989
1991) which was Cubas main trading partner and the source of vital subsidies. The embargo took an
especially harsh toll during the special period. According to a 1997 report Denial of Food and Medicine:
The Impact of the Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba by The American Association for World
Health: the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and
nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens. The report also observed
that the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and even

deaths-in Cuba. The special period, including a serious food shortage in


1993, did not lead to the countrys surrender, but to the decisive
restructuring of the agricultural sector, a number of economic reforms,
and the diversification of trade. A more recent report by Human Rights Watch also points

to the needless suffering caused by the embargo: The United States economic embargo on Cuba, in
place for more than half a century, continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on Cubans, and has
failed to improve human rights in the country. (2012 Report on Cuba) The embargo, then,

has harmed those whom it purportedly meant to benefitthe average


Cuban. A benevolent foreign policy towards Cuba would collaterally seek
to benefit the Cuban people, not bring hunger, hardship, and in some
cases death to an innocent civilian population. Since it is unlikely that the majority of
Cubans would willingly impose such adversity on themselves or their kith and kin for over fifty years,
such a punitive and coercive measure fails another important test of moral acceptability.

H.O.V.A.
Guzman 2013 (Sandra Guzman, May 8, 2013, Jay-Z and Beyonc's trip to Cuba isn't the

problem, the embargo is, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/07/opinion/guzman-beyonce-jay-z-cuba)

When does a romantic anniversary trip with your hubby to celebrate five
years of marital bliss become an international kerfuffle, complete with
calls for you to be prosecuted for treason? Well, when it's Cuba, where Americans are
banned from traveling to for tourism, thanks to one of the most enduring embargoes in the history of
mankind. Yesterday, Beyonc stopped by ABC's "Good Morning America" and

confessed the outcry over her and Jay Z's trip to Havana was "quite
shocking." Welcome to the land of cray cray, Bey. Emotions run deep,
high, and very bizarre when it comes to the subject of Cuba. When photos
of the celebrity couple strolling Havana were released, a political tumult
of epic proportions erupted in Florida. Sen. Marco Rubio and a small band
of conservative Cuban-American politicos released a statement
vociferously demanding an investigation of the trip by the president and
the Treasury Department. One anti-Castro activist went as far as to threaten to file a petition

against the celebrity couple to be formally prosecuted. Hova and Beyonc's crime? Chilling in Havana.

There's little doubt the collateral damage and suffering on both sides of
the Florida Straits -- families divided, innocents killed, fortunes lost -- has

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been profound. But it's high time we stop the madness and bring sanity to
this debate .

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***Negative***

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1NC Latin America Relations Defense


Incompatible political views impede relationslifting the
embargo wont solve
Hanson and Lee 13Stephanie Hanson is associate director and coordinating editor at

CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political
development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31,
2013, U.S.-Cuba Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]

What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations?


A fundamental incompatibility of political views stands in the way of
improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the U nited
States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban
government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an
assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research
Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such
as Venezuelan President Hugo Chvez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S.
policy in the region.

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2NC Latin America Relations Defense


Bad relations inevitable--- its not a priority
Hakim 2011 (Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, The United

States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal
of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
During the following ten years, US foreign policy attention turned sharply to the Middle East. Washington's
integrationist strategy for the Americas unravelled as its weaknesses and inconsistencies became increasingly
visible. For their part, Latin American governments became increasingly independent and assertive in their foreign
policies, diversified in their international relations, and more inclined to challenge US leadership and initiative. The
United States has not yet come fully to grips with this changing context of hemispheric relations. The G.W. Bush and
Obama administrations remained, at least rhetorically, wedded to the idea of partnerships and shared
responsibilities with Latin America, but these concepts seem less and less relevant to the region's evolving context.

What the past two decades of USLatin American relations may have most
clearly revealed is how difficult it is for Washington to define and execute
a coherent policy in the regionwith officials constrained by domestic
politics, far more urgent demands on its foreign policy resources, and an
increasingly independent and self-assured Latin America. The fact is that
US policies toward Latin American and the Caribbean are almost invariably
derivative policies. They tend not to be the result of a careful calculation of
US interests and values and a clear view of what it will take to advance them .
Instead, they tend to be mostly shaped by US domestic political
considerations or by the demands of global issues.

Several alt causes


Hakim 2011 (Peter Hakim, President Emeritus of the Inter-American Dialogue, The United

States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal
of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
The electoral triumph of Barack Obama was enthusiastically welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 The
spirited reaction to Obama's election made it clear that Latin Americans wanted a good relationship with the United
States, but that they also wanted the United States to pursue a different approach to the region and to foreign
policy generally. Expectations for the new administration were high throughout the region.
In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in
the hemisphere. Instead, he saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce
discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation. Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasis
fundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of the United States and Latin
American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the
stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.

Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin
America, but his administration has not managed to improve the quality of USLatin American relations or
develop more productive regional ties.

The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin
America. Foreign policy has generally taken a back seat to the US' economic
problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin America has had no
chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy
attention with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle.
The intense and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem.
Neither Democrats nor Republicans have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of

immigration reform, which remains the highest priority issue for Mexico
and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean .16 Though the US Congress

finally ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the
House voted for both pacts. A Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation
of Cuba policy.

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Finally, an increasingly assertive and politically divided Latin America has


also complicated US policymaking. Only a few countries are openly hostile
to Washington, but across the region, governments have demonstrated a
growing independence from the US. They have built diverse relations
internationally, and increasingly resisted US approaches. These are natural trends
for a region of middle income countries that is expanding economically, more confident of its ability to resolve its
own problems, and developing a significant global presence. They do not necessarily represent a setback for the

today they
are a major source of friction in USLatin American relations, which have
been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore
Cuba to OAS membership, South American opposition to the USColombia
defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other nations .
United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric partnerships. But,

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Cuba Relations Defense


Bad relations with Cuba are inevitable
Hanson 2013 (Stephanie Hanson, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, and
Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, U.S.-Cuba Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations?


Experts say these issues include: Human rights violations . In March 2003,
the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists,
sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of
conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for
Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government
has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the
street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights

Guantanamo Bay .
Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the U nited States brought
prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban
officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of
terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the
rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered
Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of
January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an
extended period. Cuban exile community . The Cuban-American community
in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with
Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an
important swing state in presidential elections.
record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.

The aff is insufficient


Hanson 2013 (Stephanie Hanson, associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org, and
Brianna Lee, Senior Production Editor at CFR, January 31, 2013, U.S.-Cuba Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113)

What is the status of U.S.-Cuba relations? They are virtually nonexistent .


There is a U.S. mission in Havana, Cuba's capital, but it has minimal communication with the Cuban government.

Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged :
economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly

enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once
every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just
$300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to
undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances
to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the
trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies
exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports
since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural
deals with Cuba in recent years. Tension

between Cuba and the United States flared in


with Cuba's arrest of Alan Gross, a USAID subcontractor who
traveled to the country to deliver communications equipment and arrange
Internet access for its Jewish community. Cuban authorities alleged Gross
was attempting to destabilize the Cuban regime through a USAIDsponsored "democracy promotion" program, and he was subsequently
sentenced to fifteen years in prison. Despite initial optimism over Obama's election, Cuban
December 2009

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politicians and citizens are less hopeful of a positive relationship


developing between the two countries. Ral and Fidel Castro have both
criticized the Obama administration. In a 2009 speech, Ral Castro accused the United
States of "giving new breath to open and undercover subversion against
Cuba."

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1NC Latin America Impact Defense


Latin American instability is inevitable and theres no impact
American intervention checks.
del Vago 2006 El Rincon del Vago, 2006 or later, http://html.rincondelvago.com/international-

conflict.html
On the other hand, Donald Nuechterlein claimed that the fundamental national interest of the United
States is the defence and the well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional
system. (3, Pg. 310) The Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised to resist what she called the
growth of anti-democratic populism in Latin America (4). While asserting that some rhetoric
defined as populist is constructive, Rice said that in Latin America, that normally is not the case. The
U.S. agenda's vital interest is to push back a multilateral programme between the Venezuelan
government and the axis of evil that could shatter the flimsy Latin America
stability. In other words, under unipolarity dominated by a democratic pole we

are likely to see more attempts to create or advance regional security


arrangements (5, Pg. 282), and this is being threatened by Hugo Chavez's new
ideologies. According to the logic of the balance-of-threat theory (Walt, 1987), a hegemonic state
can preserve its unipolar position by using policies of accommodation and reassurance in its dealing
with status quo states. The dominant state should reinforce their sense of security and should also
provide opportunities for these states to demonstrate power or enhance prestige without challenging
the existing order. It should also try to take steps to integrate `undecided' states more fully into the
existing order, thus turning then into status quo states (Mastanduno, 1999: 148-9 (5, Pg.286)). Other
reasons why the U.S. government is deciding to strike against Venezuela is related to its oil.
Venezuelan reserves are 78 billion barrels plus the new reserves founded on the Orinoco: 300 billion
are making this the biggest Oil reserve on the planet, and they are geographically located under the
United States front door, with no direct threats to be exported until Hugo Chavez's rise to power. Based
on those facts, the U.S. International policy against terrorism and such threats apply to Venezuela;
Hugo Chavez is not a trustworthy leader, he has not been afraid to set back approach from the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). This is where the American government is taking action, looking for
sanctions based on Hugo Chavez antidemocratic deeds, and using the Inter-American Democratic
Charter to aisle the Venezuelan government. If this is not enough, the U.S. government
might start using the policy of direct intervention (First military option, with a low
intensity). This phase is identified by a low profile of paramilitary actions, sabotages, and others small
war strategies. If their attitude remains aggressive and fearless, that is when
the complete U.S. military power starts taking action . In contrast, Hugo Chavez
had already strike the U.S., not as a terrorist but as a people's person, his strategy is completely
unusual, he is given free oil using CITGO Company, a subsidiary of Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA),
that is located is the U.S., to the people who are living in shelters, and subsidizing up to 40 per cent of
the oil market price for the people with low income. This strategy is making him to be recognized as a
hero on the east coast of the U.S. But this is not everything, the resulting savings from this initiative,
known as Low Income Heating Oil Program, are being used to pay the rent of the people with the
lowest income in those communities. Also is dividing politicians, in one side John Negroponte said
`Chavez is using Venezuelan petrodollars to finance an extravagant international policy, with no
direct reference to the generosity with the poor of U.S.', on the other side Charles Rangel, a Democrat,
says `This gesture is an example, more Americans are complaining and asking for help to tackle the
high price of heat their places (status quo disruption) (6). This strategy have been a complete success,
his populism has strike the heart of the United States. Hugo Chavez is following also the scholarship of
Griecco: `Dealing with the danger of domination, at the same time, the very

wide power disparities with the hegemon create a constant fear of


domination and entrapment. The overwhelming power of the hegemon
threatens mainly the foreign policy autonomy of the regional states , and also
raises the danger of being pulled into unnecessary adventures on its behalf. This also creates for
regional states a strong incentive to organize on a regional level. A
regional arrangement can be formed in order to be able to maintain a

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reasonable degree of independence and `voice' within its sphere on


influence (Griecco, 1995). While the ability of each individual state to influence the hegemon is
limited, by working collectively they can have greater influence, and can make more credible and
meaningful threats to raise the cost of certain policies the hegemon may wish to pursue.' (5, Pg. 289).
And that is the accord that Hugo Chavez is building in Latin America. This agreement is their first steps
between Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, and Argentina as a regional enclave to step out from the American
economic domain, and with the indirect-direct help from the Colombian Revolution Army Forces (FARC,
with more than 35,000 men) in case of an eventual attack from the U.S. Army against Venezuela. As
well, the Venezuelan Army reserves are three times the size of the American counterpart.

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2NC Latin America Impact Defense


No great powers
Chipman 2009 (Dr John Chipman, March 5, 2009, International Institute for Strategic Studies,

Strategic Challenges in Latin America http://www.iiss.org/conferences/strategic-perspectives-on-latinamerica/speeches/strategic-challenges-in-latin-america-dr-john-chipman/)


Overall, the broad assessment must be that the diplomatic, economic and military interests of

outside powers in Latin America do not pose the sort of geopolitical


challenge that could have a major security impact. While natural resources and the

economic realities of globalisation have drawn more countries to Latin America, perhaps reducing the
relative isolation of Latin America from the rest of the world, it is fanciful to read into this a

prospective great game for influence and control. The need for the
region to defend against an external threat is not there in a way that
should seriously affect defence policy or the sizing of armed forces.

No escalation
Dominguez et al 2003 (Jorge I. Dominguez, Clarence Dillon Professor of International

Relations and director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, David
Mares, Manuel Orozco, David Scott Palmer, Francisco Rojas Aravena, Andres Serbin, United States
Institute of Peace, August, Peaceworks No. 50, http://www.usip.org/publications/boundary-disputeslatin-america)
Since the start of 2000, five Latin American boundary disputes between neighboring states have
resulted in the use of force, and two others in its deployment. These incidents involved ten of the
nineteen independent countries of South and Central America. In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war,
resulting in more than a thousand deaths and injuries and significant economic loss. And yet, by

international standards the Americas were comparatively free from


interstate war during the twentieth century. Latin Americans for the most
part do not fear aggression from their neighbors. They do not expect their
countries to go to war with one another. The puzzle that this paper seeks to solve is

how to explain the following unusual cluster of traits in the hemisphere: Territorial, boundary, and
other disputes endure. Interstate conflict over boundaries is relatively frequent. Disputes
sometimes escalate to military conflict because states recurrently employ low levels of force to shape
aspects of bilateral relations. Such escalation rarely reaches full-scale war.
Interstate war is infrequent indeed. Solving this puzzle may help point the way toward
more effective prevention and resolution of conflicts about borders and territory. It is encouraging to
note that some of the longest-lasting and most serious boundary disputes in
South America have been settled since 1990Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru,
Chile and Peru, Brazil and all its neighbors. At the same time, however, similar border disputes have
been exacerbated in the cases of Guyana, Venezuela, and Colombia and in Central America. Each of
this second set of countries has been involved in at least one militarized interstate dispute since 1990.
Nicaragua tops the list, having had militarized disputes with four states. Venezuela and Honduras have
each had militarized disputes with three neighboring states. El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, and
Colombia have each had militarized disputes with two neighbors. Since 1990 militarized interstate
disputes have been frequent, therefore, yet only the dispute between Ecuador and

Peru in 1995 escalated to war.

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1NC Soft Power Defense


Soft power is ineffective
Ford 2012 (Christopher A. Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology
and Global Security at Hudson Institute, May 17, 2012, American 'Soft Power': Allure and Confusion,
Hudson Institute, http://rs.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9096)

When viewed through this prims of usability, I suggest that U.S. "soft
power" stacks up much less well than is usually alleged vis--vis the ability of a
Leninist soft power "competitor" such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) to manipulate, if it
wishes, most aspects of its multifaceted interactions with the outside world. Making the situation
worse, I suggest that the Obama Administration has fallen into the trap of

putting faith in the supposedly transformative aspects of America's "soft"


impact at the expense of its willingness to employ those relatively few
usable elements of "soft power" that actually are available to the leaders
of a free and democratic society that by virtue of this very freedom can do
little to twist and skew their country's economic and socio-cultural
interactions in the service of political and propaganda objectives. The administration, I
suggest, has thus relied upon "soft power" as a kind of magical balm for all
sorts of policy problems, turning it from one potentially useful policy tool
into a recipe for evading difficult choices.

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2NC Soft Power Defense


Obama cant project soft power
Ford 2012 (Christopher A. Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology
and Global Security at Hudson Institute, May 17, 2012, American 'Soft Power': Allure and Confusion,
Hudson Institute, http://rs.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9096)

The current U.S. administration certainly talks big about the virtues "soft
power," but when it comes to actually trying to use it as opposed to simply

placing one's trust in vague notions of globalization-facilitated socio-economic convergence that will
make everything come out alright whether or not one faces up to difficult policy trade-offs and actually
exerts effort to bring about changes in the world Washington is remarkably

ambivalent. One hears grandiose talk of "navigating by our values" and


leveraging these values into "soft power," but the Obama Administration has
been strangely reticent about actually promoting those values overseas.
Indeed, President Obama himself has said that he sees nothing particularly
exceptional about the very American values by which we are expected to "navigate" and

which we are supposedly to model for others in the world. (Everyone, we are told, believes themselves
special.) Could one imagine a more absurd foundation for ideational "soft
power" projection than such politically-correct relativism?

Our competitors are more effective soft powers than us


Ford 2012 (Christopher A. Ford, formerly Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Technology
and Global Security at Hudson Institute, May 17, 2012, American 'Soft Power': Allure and Confusion,
Hudson Institute, http://rs.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=9096)

Not everybody in the contemporary world, however, has such a passive


approach to "soft power." Indeed, one can perhaps see in contemporary
China the polar counterpoint to the Obama Administration's lassitude.
Moreover, thanks to the extent to which the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
still penetrates so much of Chinese society being able to exert considerable control,

when it wants to, over business, financial, media, and cultural institutions (the most significant of
which are still actually run directly by the state and supervised by the Party anyway) the modern

PRC is conspicuous in the degree to which its system combines (a) the
capacity to exert a real degree of purposive control over the facets of
China's social and political engagement with the outside world with (b) a
notable willingness to use such tools in pursuit of national objectives.
When such a conjunction occurs in a country having the considerable (and
still growing) economic weight of the modern PRC, "soft power" in the
sense of usability that I emphasize in my article can be quite real indeed.

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1NC Heg Impact Defense


Heg doesnt solve war
Barbara Conry (former associate policy analyst, was a public relations consultant at Hensley Segal

Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the
CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior
fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform
Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 47. US Security Strategy CATO Handbook for Congress,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf

Another rationale for attempting to manage global security is that a world


without U.S. hegemony would soon degenerate into a tangle of chaos and
instability, in which weapons proliferation, genocide, terrorism, and other
offensive activities would be rampant. Prophets of such a development hint
that if the United States fails to exercise robust political and military
leadership today, the world is condemned to repeat the biggest mistakes
of the 20th centuryor perhaps do something even worse. Such thinking is
seriously flawed. First, instability in the international system is nothing
new, and most episodes do not affect U.S. vital interests. Furthermore, to
assert that U.S. global leadership can stave off otherwise inevitable global
chaos vastly overstates the power of any single country to influence world
events. Indeed, many of the problems that plague the world today, such as civil
wars and ethnic strife, are largely impervious to external solutions. There is little
to back up an assertion that only Washingtons management of international
security can save the world from political, economic, or military
conflagration.

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2NC Heg Impact Defense


Empirically proven
Christopher J. Fettweis (Professor of national security affairs @ U.S. Naval War College) 2010
Threat and Anxiety in US Foreign Policy, Survival, Volume 52, Issue 2 April 2010 , pages 59 82

One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed
fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited
evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising
power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the
relative level of American activism and international stability. During the
1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly
substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on
defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists,
defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace
dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of
American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and
Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much
too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30
And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more
peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe
that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least
none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were
enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove
insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world
acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern,
despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States
was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the
United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept
declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up.
Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace
and US military expenditure are unrelated.

International system resilient no conflict


Christopher Preble (director of foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute) August 2010 U.S.
Military Power: Preeminence for What Purpose? http://www.cato-at-liberty.org/u-s-military-powerpreeminence-for-what-purpose/
Most in Washington still embraces the notion that America is, and forever will be, the worlds
indispensable nation. Some scholars, however, questioned the logic of hegemonic
stability theory from the very beginning. A number continue to do so today. They advance
arguments diametrically at odds with the primacist consensus. Trade routes need not be

policed by a single dominant power; the international economy is complex


and resilient. Supply disruptions are likely to be temporary, and the costs
of mitigating their effects should be borne by those who stand to lose or
gain the most. Islamic extremists are scary, but hardly comparable to the threat posed by a
globe-straddling Soviet Union armed with thousands of nuclear weapons. It is frankly absurd that we
spend more today to fight Osama bin Laden and his tiny band of murderous thugs than we spent to
face down Joseph Stalin and Chairman Mao. Many factors have contributed to the

dramatic decline in the number of wars between nation-states; it is


unrealistic to expect that a new spasm of global conflict would erupt if the

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United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military
power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own
defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are
credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed
social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The
people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe.
The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the
United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.

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1NC/2NC Prolif Defense


No cascade of proliferation its all alarmist rhetoric
Muthia Alagappa, pub. date: 2008, Distinguished Senior Fellow, East-West Center, The Long
Shadow: Nuclear Weapons and Security in 21st Century Asia, accesed: 1-6-09, p. 521-2, Google
Books

It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the
domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventative action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of
these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On

the domino effect, Indias and Pakistans nuclear weapon programs have
not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Irans quest for nuclear
weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that countrys security
concerns about the U ntied S tates and Tehrans regional aspirations. The North Korean test has
evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its
reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program
but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan
security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark
on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought
reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has
firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security
circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could
still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains
or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not

The point is that each


countrys decision to embark on and sustain nuclear weapon programs is
contingent on its particular security and other circumstances. Through
appealing, the domino theory is not predictive; often it is employed to
justify policy on the basis of alarmist predictions. The loss of South Vietnam, for example, did not
spurred Taiwan or Mongolia to develop nuclear weapon capability.

lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that sub region (Lord 1993, 1996). In

nuclear programs of China, India, and Pakistan were part


of a security chain reaction, not mechanically falling dominos. However, as observed
earlier the Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear tests have thus far not
had the domino effect predicted by alarmist analysts and policy makers.
Great caution should be exercised in accepting at face value the
sensational predictions of individuals who have a vested interest in
accentuating the dangers of nuclear proliferation. Such analysts are now focused on the dangers of
the nuclear arena, the

a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of
the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.

Robust statistical studies prove prolif decreases war and


escalation
Victor Asal and Kyle Beardsley, pub. date: 2007, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci. SUNY Albany,

and Kyle Beardsley, Asst. Prof. Pol. Sci. Emory Univ., Journal of Peace Research, Proliferation and
International Crisis Behavior, accessed: 12-18-09, http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139
The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict.
The optimists argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are
unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument,
contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does
not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication
from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and
the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will

show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear

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weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the
results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to
end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved
increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust
even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear
capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in
crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not
suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can prevent war, and they cannot
speak to other proliferation risks

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1NC/2NC Econ Defense


Econ collapse doesnt cause war prefer our studies
Samuel Bazzi (Department of Economics at University of California San Diego) and Christopher
Blattman (assistant professor of political science and economics at Yale University) November
2011 Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices

http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The
state is not a prize?Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential
models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet

we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at
the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by
extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if
anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and
length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more

than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war
onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and
Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political
economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be
taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive
and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should
provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more
abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other
time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations

with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and


generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take
the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?State

prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored
or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political
science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times
permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring
political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current
revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state
capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive
commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly.
The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a
large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation
is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out.
Opportunity cost: Victory by default?Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war
intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the
relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state
capacity view. Moreover, we shouldnt mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and
incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with
psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories
of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to
distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result. Ultimately, however, the
fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict
onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be
less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed . One
possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk,
costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset.
In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so

fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may
trigger war even in the absence of a price shock . The same argument has been
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made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing
nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings

should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict


literature. Our results run against a number of published results on
commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples,
misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most
importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences,
there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001).
Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when

there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships;


there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models;
and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance.
The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most
worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or
publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that
the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and
not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a file
drawer problem (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results
that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees)
worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If
further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the
aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for
initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

Economic collapse doesnt cause war no causal connection

Barnett (senior managing director of Enterra Solutions LLC and a


contributing editor/online columnist for Esquire magazine) August 2009 The New Rules:
Thomas P.M.

Security Remains Stable Amid Financial Crisis http://www.aprodex.com/the-new-rules-security-remains-stable-amid-financial-crisis-398-bl.aspx

When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was
ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing
conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as

global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is
the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's

first truly worldwide recession has had virtually no impact whatsoever on


the international security landscape. None of the more than three-dozen
ongoing conflicts listed by GlobalSecurity.org can be clearly attributed to the
global recession. Indeed, the last new entry (civil conflict between Hamas and Fatah in the

Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in
the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the
Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically
timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important
external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost twodecade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the

various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of
civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements.

Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South
Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process
wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied
down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our
involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the
onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military
exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else

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we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn , occasionally pressing the
Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to
anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick
in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like
Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts
(in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused
(and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great
improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new
nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by
the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious

efforts by any rising great power to challenge that Leviathan or supplant


its role. (The worst things we can cite are Moscow's occasional deployments of strategic assets to
the Western hemisphere and its weak efforts to outbid the United States on basing rights in
Kyrgyzstan; but the best include China and India stepping up their aid and investments in Afghanistan
and Iraq.) Sure, we've finally seen global defense spending surpass the previous world record set in the
late 1980s, but even that's likely to wane given the stress on public budgets created by all this
unprecedented "stimulus" spending. If anything, the friendly cooperation on such stimulus packaging
was the most notable great-power dynamic caused by the crisis. Can we say that the world has
suffered a distinct shift to political radicalism as a result of the economic crisis? Indeed, no. The world's
major economies remain governed by center-left or center-right political factions that remain decidedly
friendly to both markets and trade. In the short run, there were attempts across the board to insulate
economies from immediate damage (in effect, as much protectionism as allowed under current trade
rules), but there was no great slide into "trade wars." Instead, the World Trade
Organization is functioning as it was designed to function, and regional efforts toward free-trade
agreements have not slowed. Can we say Islamic radicalism was inflamed by the economic crisis? If it
was, that shift was clearly overwhelmed by the Islamic world's growing disenchantment with the
brutality displayed by violent extremist groups such as al-Qaida. And looking forward, austere
economic times are just as likely to breed connecting evangelicalism as disconnecting
fundamentalism. At the end of the day, the economic crisis did not prove to be
sufficiently frightening to provoke major economies into establishing global
regulatory schemes, even as it has sparked a spirited -- and much needed, as I argued last week -discussion of the continuing viability of the U.S. dollar as the world's primary reserve currency.
Naturally, plenty of experts and pundits have attached great significance to this debate, seeing
in it the beginning of "economic warfare" and the like between "fading" America and
"rising" China. And yet, in a world of globally integrated production chains and

interconnected financial markets, such "diverging interests" hardly


constitute signposts for wars up ahead. Frankly, I don't welcome a world in which
America's fiscal profligacy goes undisciplined, so bring it on -- please! Add it all up and it's fair to say
that this global financial crisis has proven the great resilience of America's post-World War II
international liberal trade order. Do I expect to read any analyses along those lines in the blogosphere
any time soon? Absolutely not. I expect the fantastic fear-mongering to proceed apace. That's what the
Internet is for.

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1NC Politics Link


Plan costs capital
Birns 2013 (Larry Birns, COHA Director, and, Frederick B. Mills, COHA Senior Research Fellow,

January 30, 2013, Best Time for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-foru-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf

There would probably be a political price to pay by the Obama


administration for taking steps towards reconciliation with Havana, but if

Obamas election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a
dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration
can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted

some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now
allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on the island.
The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on
January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh
terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which
toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act,
however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign
Relations Committee, and her counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who

is
about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro
Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures
advocated here as a capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued,
a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, but might in fact be advanced
by dtente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history may very well
be that it ought never to have been started.

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