Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Starter Pack
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
A2SmoothTransition.........................................................................................................................51
***Solvency***.....................................................................................................................................53
SolvencyReform.............................................................................................................................54
SolvencyObamaLeadershipKey...................................................................................................55
***2AC/Miscellaneous***...................................................................................................................56
2ACTerrorismAddOn......................................................................................................................57
A2NoCapability/Motive....................................................................................................................60
A2PoliticsLink..................................................................................................................................62
A2PoliticsLinkA2CubanAmericans...........................................................................................64
A2CritiqueLiftingEmbargo=DRule...........................................................................................65
***Negative***.....................................................................................................................................66
1NCLatinAmericaRelationsDefense...............................................................................................67
2NCLatinAmericaRelationsDefense...............................................................................................68
CubaRelationsDefense......................................................................................................................70
1NCLatinAmericaImpactDefense...................................................................................................71
2NCLatinAmericaImpactDefense...................................................................................................72
1NCSoftPowerDefense....................................................................................................................73
2NCSoftPowerDefense....................................................................................................................74
1NCHegImpactDefense...................................................................................................................75
2NCHegImpactDefense...................................................................................................................76
1NC/2NCProlifDefense....................................................................................................................77
1NC/2NCEconDefense.....................................................................................................................78
1NCPoliticsLink................................................................................................................................81
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
***1AC***
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1AC Inherency
Contention 1: Inherency
Obama has moved to ease restrictions on engagement with
Cuba but full lift of the embargo is key
Bechtel 2011 (Marilyn Bechtel, activist and author, January 31, 2011, Time to normalize
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
1AC Plan
Plan: The United States federal government should
substantially increase its economic engagement toward the
Republic of Cuba by lifting its economic embargo on the
Republic of Cuba.
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
January 30, 2013, Best Time for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-foru-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
In addition to being counter-productive and immoral, U.S. policy towards Havana is also
anachronistic. During the excesses of the cold war, the U.S. sought to use harsh and unforgiving
measures to isolate Cuba from its neighbors in order to limit the influence of the Cuban revolution on a
variety of insurgencies being waged in the region. That narrative did not sufficiently recognize the
homegrown causes of insurgency in the hemisphere. Some argue that it inadvertently drove Cuba
further into the Soviet camp. Ironically, at the present juncture of world history, the
embargo is in some ways isolating the U.S. rather than Cuba. Washington
is often viewed as implementing a regional policy that is defenseless and
without a compass. At the last Summit of the Americas in Cartagena in April 2012, member
states, with the exception of Washington, made it clear that they unanimously want Cuba to
participate in the next plenary meeting or the gathering will be shut down. There are new
Finally, while a slim majority of Cuban Americans still favor the measure, changing demographics are
eroding and outdating this support. As famed Cuban Researcher, Wayne Smith, the director of the
Latin America Rights & Security: Cuba Project, at the Center for International Policy, points out, There
are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a more sensible approach to Cuba
(Washington Post, Nov. 9, 2012).
FOR most of our history, the United States assumed that its security was
inextricably linked to a partnership with Latin America. This legacy dates from the
Monroe Doctrine, articulated in 1823, through the Rio pact, the postwar treaty that pledged the United
States to come to the defense of its allies in Central and South America. Yet for a half-century,
restore bonds with potential allies who share the American goal of
prosperity. Throughout his career, the autocratic Mr. Chvez used our embargo as a
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
wedge with which to antagonize the United States and alienate its
supporters. His fuel helped prop up the rule of Mr. Castro and his brother Ral, Cubas current
president. The embargo no longer serves any useful purpose (if it ever did at all);
President Obama should end it, though it would mean overcoming powerful opposition from
Cuban-American lawmakers in Congress. An end to the Cuba embargo would send a
powerful signal to all of Latin America that the United States wants a new,
warmer relationship with democratic forces seeking social change
throughout the Americas.
regional conflict resolution, such as Contadora, as will be discussed in the next chapter.
Latin American relations solve the economy and proliferation--Cuba policy is the key roadblock
Perez 2010 (David A. Perex, J.D. Yale Law Schoo, America's Cuba Policy: The Way Forward: A
Policy Recommendation for the U.S. State Department, Spring, 2010, Harvard Latino Law Review,
Lexis)
Third, the Obama Administration ignores Latin America at its own peril.
Latin America's importance to the United States is growing by the day, and
cannot be overstated. While the issue of U.S.-Cuba relations is obviously of smaller import
than many other issues currently affecting the world (i.e., the ailing economy,
climate change, proliferation of w eapons of m ass d estruction), addressing it
would also involve correspondingly less effort than those issues, but could potentially lead to a
disproportionately high return by making regional cooperation more likely. 20 In order to
confront any of the major world issues facing the United States,
Washington must find a way to cooperate with its neighbors, who
generally view U.S. policy toward Cuba as the most glaring symbol of its
historic inability to constructively engage the region. These three reasons combine
for a perfect storm: to the extent that a healthy U.S.-Cuban relationship would mean a healthier U.S.Latin America relationship, the former should be pursued with an unprecedented vigor, one that has
been absent for the last fifty years.
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Human societies tend to lack the imagination to think through , and to act upon,
what have become known as black swan events (26): that which has never occurred
(or which has happened very rarely and in a wholly different context) is deemed not be in the field of reality, and to
which must be added eventualities which are denied because their consequences are to awful to contemplate. The
extremes of human misconduct (the incredulity in the face of evidence of the Holocaust, the failure to imagine 9/11)
bear testimony to this hard-wired trait of our species. This would not normally warrant mention as a factor of
growing salience if not for the recession into time of the original and only use of nuclear weapons in August 1945.
Non-use of nuclear weapons may be taken for granted rather than being
an absolute taboo. Recent writing on the reputedly limited effects of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs
(27) may contribute to such a trend, in the name of reducing the legitimacy of nuclear weapons. Recent (and often
compelling) historical accounts of the surrender of the Japanese Empire which downplay the role of the atomic
bombings in comparison to early research can produce a similar effect, even if that may not have been the
intention (28). However desirable it has been, the end of atmospheric nuclear testing (29) has removed for more
than three decades the periodic reminders which such monstrous detonations made as to the uniquely destructive
of World War II has little relevance and which have not had the will or the opportunity to wrestle at the time or ex
post facto with the moral and strategic implications of the nuclear bombing of Japan in 1945. Unsustainable
test crisis
management capabilities more severely than anything seen during the
Cold War with the partial exception of the Cuban missile crisis. Even the overabundant battlefield nuclear
commandos doing a Bombay redux in India?) : individually or in combination, these factors
arsenals in Cold War Central Europe, with their iffy weapons safety and security arrangements, were less of a
challenge: the US and Soviet short-range nuclear weapons so deployed were not putting US and Soviet territory and
capitals at risk. It
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Council and Jennifer Harris a member of the NICs Long Range Analysis Unit Revisiting the Future:
Geopolitical Effects of the Financial Crisis The Washington Quarterly 32:2
https://csis.org/files/publication/twq09aprilburrowsharris.pdf
Increased Potential for Global Conflict Of course, the report encompasses more than economics and
indeed believes the future is likely to be the result of a number of intersecting and interlocking
forces. With so many possible permutations of outcomes, each with ample opportunity for unintended
consequences, there is a growing sense of insecurity. Even so, history may be more instructive than
ever. While we continue to believe that the Great Depression is not likely
proximity of potential nuclear rivals combined with underdeveloped surveillance capabilities and
mobile dual-capable Iranian missile systems also will produce inherent difficulties in achieving
reliable indications and warning of an impending nuclear attack. The lack of strategic depth
in neighboring states like Israel, short warning and missile flight times,
and uncertainty of Iranian intentions may place more focus on
preemption rather than defense, potentially leading to escalating crises.Types of
conflict that the world continues to experience, such as over resources,
could reemerge, particularly if protectionism grows and there is a resort
to neo-mercantilist practices. Perceptions of renewed energy scarcity will drive countries
to take actions to assure their future access to energy supplies. In the worst case, this could
result in interstate conflicts if government leaders deem assured access to energy
resources, for example, to be essential for maintaining domestic stability and the survival of their
regime. Even actions short of war, however, will have important geopolitical implications. Maritime
security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and modernization efforts, such as
Chinas and Indias development of blue water naval capabilities. If the fiscal stimulus focus for
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
these countries indeed turns inward, one of the most obvious funding targets may
be military. Buildup of regional naval capabilities could lead to increased tensions,
rivalries, and counterbalancing moves, but it also will create opportunities for multinational
cooperation in protecting critical sea lanes. With water also becoming scarcer in Asia and the Middle
East, cooperation to manage changing water resources is likely to be increasingly difficult both within
and between states in a more dog-eat-dog world.
10
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
11
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
particular policies. The key to this legitimacy is a good image and a reputation as a responsible
actor on the global and regional stage. A good reputation and image can go a long
way toward generating goodwill, which ultimately will help the U.S. when
it tries to sell unpopular ideas and reforms in the region. 4 In order to
effectively employ soft power in Latin America, the U.S. must repair its
image by going on a diplomatic offensive and reminding , not just Latin America's
leaders, but also the Latin American people, of the important relationship
between the U.S. and Latin America. Many of the problems facing Latin
America today cannot be addressed in the absence of U.S. leadership and
cooperation. Working with other nations to address these challenges is the best way to shore up
legitimacy, earn respect, and repair America's image. Although this proposal focuses heavily on Cuba,
every country in Latin America is a potential friend. Washington will have to not only strengthen its
existing relationships in the region, but also win over new allies, who look to us for "ideas and
solutions, not lectures." 5 When analyzing ecosystems, environmental scientists
seek out " keystone species ." These are organisms that, despite their small
size, function as lynchpins for, or barometers of, the entire system's
stability. Cuba, despite its size and isolation, is a keystone nation in Latin
America, having disproportionately dominated Washington's policy toward
the region for decades. 6 As a result of its continuing tensions with Havana, America's
reputation [*192] in the region has suffered, as has its ability to deal with other countries. 7 For
fifty years, Latin American governments that hoped to endear themselves
to the U.S. had to pass the Cuba "litmus test." But now the tables have turned, and
the Obama Administration, if it wants to repair America's image in the region, will have to pass a Cuba
litmus test of its own. 8 In short, America must once again be admired if we are going to expect other
countries to follow our example. To that end, warming relations with Cuba would have
University's Master of Science in Foreign Service Program and adjunct senior fellow at the Council on
Foreign Relations, September/October 2011, The Value of Values: Soft Power Under Obama, World
Affairs Journal, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/value-values-soft-power-under-obama)
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
To use soft power without hard power is to be Sweden. To use hard power
without soft power is to be China. Even France, with its long commitment
to realpolitik, has overtaken the United States as proponent and
implementer of humanitarian intervention in Libya and Ivory Coast. When the
American president has no problem with France combining hard and soft
power better than the United States, something is seriously amiss .
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's
Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone, p. 9-10, Google Books)
Of course, hard and soft power are related and can reinforce each other. Both
also be used to establish empires and institutions that set the agenda for
smaller states-witness Soviet rule over the countries of Eastern Europe. But soft power is not
simply the reflection of hard power. The Vatican did not lose its soft power when it lost the Papal States
in Italy in the nineteenth century. Conversely, the Soviet Union lost much of its soft power after it
invaded Hungary and Czechoslovakia, even though its economic and military resources continued to
grow. Imperious policies that utilized Soviet hard power actually undercut its soft power. And some
countries such as Canada, the Netherlands, and the Scandinavian states have political clout that is
greater than their military and economic weight, because of the incorporation of attractive causes such
as economic aid or peacekeeping into their definitions of national interest. These are lessons that the
unilateralists forget at their and our peril. Britain in the nineteenth century and
America in the second half of the twentieth century enhanced their power
by creating liberal international economic rules and institutions that were
consistent with the liberal and democratic structures of British and
American capitalism -free trade and the gold standard in the case of Britain, the International
Monetary Fund, World Trade Organization, and other institutions in the case of the United States. If a
country can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will
encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are
attractive, others more willingly follow. If it can establish international
rules that are consistent with its society, it will be less likely to have to
change. If it can help support institutions that encourage other countries
13
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Advisory Board. He is also the Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the School of
Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, in Washington, D.C. He is cochair of the
American Committee for Peace in the Caucasus and a member of the International Advisory Board of
the Atlantic Council. He is a former chairman of the American-Ukrainian Advisory Committee. He was a
member of the Policy Planning Council of the Department of State from 1966 to 1968; chairman of the
Humphrey Foreign Policy Task Force in the 1968 presidential campaign; director of the Trilateral
Commission from 1973 to 1976; and principal foreign policy adviser to Jimmy Carter in the 1976
presidential campaign. From 1977 to 1981, Dr. Brzezinski was national security adviser to President
Jimmy Carter. In 1981, he was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom for his role in the
normalization of U.S.-China relations and for his contributions to the human rights and national
security policies of the United States. He was also a member of the Presidents Chemical Warfare
Commission (1985), the National Security CouncilDefense Department Commission on Integrated
Long-Term Strategy (19871988), and the Presidents Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (19871989).
In 1988, he was cochairman of the Bush National Security Advisory Task Force, and in 2004, he was
cochairman of a Council on Foreign Relations task force that issued the report Iran: Time for a New
Approach. Dr. Brzezinski received a B.A. and M.A. from McGill University (1949, 1950) and Ph.D. from
Harvard University (1953). He was a member of the faculties of Columbia University (19601989) and
Harvard University (19531960). Dr. Brzezinski holds honorary degrees from Georgetown University,
Williams College, Fordham University, College of the Holy Cross, Alliance College, the Catholic
University of Lublin, Warsaw University, and Vilnius University. He is the recipient of numerous honors
and awards) February 2012 After America
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/01/03/after_america?page=0,0
if America falters, the world is unlikely to be dominated by a single preeminent successor -- not even
China. International uncertainty, increased tension among global competitors, and even outright
chaos would be far more likely outcomes. While a sudden, massive crisis of the American system -- for
For
instance, another financial crisis -- would produce a fast-moving chain reaction leading to global political and
economic disorder,
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realignments of both global and regional power, with no grand winners and
many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of
potentially fatal risks to global well-being. Rather than a world where dreams of democracy
flourish, a Hobbesian world of enhanced national security based on varying fusions of authoritarianism, nationalism,
and religion could ensue. RELATED 8 Geopolitically Endangered Species The leaders of the world's second-rank
Japanese, fearful of an assertive China dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe.
Leaders in India and Japan may be considering closer political and even military cooperation in case America falters
Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (even schadenfreude) about America's
uncertain prospects, will almost certainly have its eye on the independent states
of the former Soviet Union. Europe, not yet cohesive, would likely be pulled in
several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial interests, France and
and China rises.
insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter European Union, and Britain toward manipulating a balance
lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its
overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing
international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success
depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power.
India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole.
They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly
assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense,
especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's
neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia
of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -violent and bloodthirsty. At the same time, the security of a number of weaker
states located geographically next to major regional powers also depends on the international
status quo reinforced by America's global preeminence -- and would be made
significantly more vulnerable in proportion to America's decline. The states in that exposed position --
15
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the health and good judgment of the U.S. economic and political systems.
A waning United States would likely be more nationalistic, more defensive
about its national identity, more paranoid about its homeland security,
and less willing to sacrifice resources for the sake of others' development .
The worsening of relations between a declining America and an internally troubled Mexico could even give rise to a
particularly ominous phenomenon: the emergence, as a major issue in nationalistically aroused Mexican politics, of
Another consequence of
American decline could be a corrosion of the generally cooperative
management of the global commons -- shared interests such as sea lanes,
space, cyberspace, and the environment, whose protection is imperative
to the long-term growth of the global economy and the continuation of
basic geopolitical stability. In almost every case, the potential absence of a
constructive and influential U.S. role would fatally undermine the essential
communality of the global commons because the superiority and ubiquity
of American power creates order where there would normally be conflict .
territorial claims justified by history and ignited by cross-border incidents.
None of this will necessarily come to pass. Nor is the concern that America's decline would generate global
insecurity, endanger some vulnerable states, and produce a more troubled North American neighborhood an
argument for U.S. global supremacy. In fact, the strategic complexities of the world in the 21st century make such
supremacy unattainable. But those dreaming today of America's collapse would probably come to regret it. And as
16
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1AC Solvency
Contention 2: Solvency
Lift the embargo--- its not working anyway
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant
to former US president Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, CATO
Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)
It is far past time to end the embargo. During the Cold War, Cuba offered
a potential advanced military outpost for the Soviet Union. Indeed, that
role led to the Cuban missile crisis. With the failure of the U.S.-supported Bay of Pigs
invasion, economic pressure appeared to be Washingtons best strategy for ousting the Castro
dictatorship. However, the end of the Cold War left Cuba strategically
irrelevant . It is a poor country with little ability to harm the United States.
The Castro regime might still encourage unrest, but its survival has no
measurable impact on any important U.S. interest. The regime remains a
humanitarian travesty, of course. Nor are Cubans the only victims: three years ago the regime jailed a
State Department contractor for distributing satellite telephone equipment in Cuba. But Havana is not
the only regime to violate human rights. Moreover, experience has long demonstrated that it is
virtually impossible for outsiders to force democracy. Washington often has used sanctions and the
Office of Foreign Assets Control currently is enforcing around 20 such programs, mostly to little effect.
The policy in Cuba obviously has failed. The regime remains in power.
Indeed, it has consistently used the embargo to justify its own
mismanagement, blaming poverty on America. Observed Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton: It is my personal belief that the Castros do not want to see an end to the
embargo and do not want to see normalization with the United States,
because they would lose all of their excuses for what hasnt happened in
Cuba in the last 50 years. Similarly, Cuban exile Carlos Saladrigas of the Cuba Study Group
argued that keeping the embargo, maintaining this hostility, all it does is strengthen and embolden
the hardliners.
https://repository.library.georgetown.edu/bitstream/handle/10822/553334/holmesMichael.pdf?
sequence=1)
From an image stand point repealing the sanctions and removing the embargo is
symbolic. It shows Cuba and the world that although the United States is
pro democracy, it does not wish to impose its values on other nations. The Cuba
Democracy Act was an attempt to force democratic changes in Cuba.10 By repealing the act the
United States, illustrates that it respects the sovereignty of nations. Considering that
this Act did allow for the application of U.S. law in a foreign country11, repealing it not only sends
the message about U.S. views on sovereignty but also shows that the
administration is taking steps to ensure that sovereignty is actually
respected.
Repealing the Helms-Burton Law will certainly stimulate foreign investment in
Cuba as well. Many foreign countries were leery of investing in Cuba out of fear of being sued or losing property
under the provisions established by the Helms-Burton Act.12 This return of foreign investment
will further secure Cuba's place in the global marketplace. It also will help to
silence skeptics who will question U.S. intentions. Since the sanctions against Cuba were
unilateral U.S. actions, an unsolicited change in course will undoubtedly spark speculation. Allowing all
17
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Jeff Bess
institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
U.S. policy toward Cuba should advance the democratic aspirations of the
Cuban people and strengthen U.S. credibility throughout the hemi- sphere.
Our nearly 50-year old policy toward Cuba has failed on both counts: it has
resulted in a downward spiral of U.S. influence on the is- land and has left
the United States isolated in the hemisphere and beyond. Our Cuba policy
has become a bellwether , indicating the extent to which the United States
will act in partnership with the region or unilaterallyand ineffectually.
inevita- bly, strategic contact and dialogue with the Cuban government will be necessary if the United
States seeks to engage the Cuban people. This paper proposes a new goal for U.S. policy to- ward
Cuba: to support the emergence of a Cuban state where the Cuban people determine the polit- ical
and economic future of their country through democratic means. A great lesson of democracy is
that it cannot be imposed; it must come from within ; the type of government at the
helm of the islands future will depend on Cubans. Our policy should therefore encompass
the political, eco- nomic, and diplomatic tools to enable the Cuban people to engage in
and direct the politics of their country. This policy will advance the interests of the
United States in seeking stable relationships based on common hemispheric values that pro- mote the
well-being of each individual and the growth of civil society. To engage the Cuban gov- ernment and
Cuban people effectively, the United States will need to engage with other govern- ments, the private
sector, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). in so doing, U.S. policy toward Cuba would reflect
the hemispheres and our own desire to encourage the Cuban govern- ment to adopt international
standards of democ- racy, human rights, and transparency. Engagement does not mean approval of
the Cu- ban governments policies, nor should it indicate a wish to control internal developments in
Cuba; legitimate changes in Cuba will only come from the actions of Cubans. If the United
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Jeff Bess
***Inherency/Solvency***
19
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Jeff Bess
The U.S. government has waged economic war against the Castro regime
for half a century. The policy may have been worth a try during the Cold
War, but the embargo has failed to liberate the Cuban people. It is time to
end sanctions against Havana. Decades ago the Castro brothers lead a revolt against a
nasty authoritarian, Fulgencio Batista. After coming to power in 1959, they created a police state,
targeted U.S. commerce, nationalized American assets, and allied with the Soviet Union. Although
Cuba was but a small island nation, the Cold War magnified its perceived importance. Washington
reduced Cuban sugar import quotas in July 1960. Subsequently U.S. exports were limited, diplomatic
ties were severed, travel was restricted, Cuban imports were banned, Havanas American assets were
frozen, and almost all travel to Cuba was banned. Washington also pressed its allies to impose
sanctions. These various measures had no evident effect, other than to intensify Cubas reliance on
the Soviet Union. Yet the collapse of the latter nation had no impact on U.S. policy. In 1992, Congress
banned American subsidiaries from doing business in Cuba and in 1996, it penalized foreign firms that
trafficked in expropriated U.S. property. Executives from such companies even were banned from
traveling to America. On occasion Washington relaxed one aspect or another of
victory not for Fidel Castro, but for the power of free people to spread
liberty. Three years ago, President Barack Obama loosened regulations on Cuban
Americans, as well as telecommunications between the United States and
Cuba. However, the law sharply constrains the presidents discretion.
Moreover, UN Ambassador Susan Rice said that the embargo will continue until Cuba is free.
20
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21
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Relations Uniqueness
Our relations are bad now but Obama can fix them
LAP 2011 (Latin American Perspectives Editorial Board, peer-reviewed academic journal about
Latin America, May 11, 2011, Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the
Misconceptions of Power, Sagepub)
Though the United States may be able to hold sway over smaller countries
and achieve short-term objectives, in the long run it will earn the enmity
of most Latin Americans. More important, it will have squandered an
opportunity for constructive and mutually beneficial engagement with the
new political forces emerging in the region. This bellicose attitude will
reinforce the view that the United States still aspires to be an imperial
power and will undoubtedly acceler- ate growing efforts at regional
integration, the formation of alternative organiza- tions that do not
include the United States, and expanding relations with China.
Disappointment with the Obama administration was a major factor in the Latin American decision to
create a new regional organization that excludes the United States and Canada. On February 22, 2010,
hosted by Mexico in Cancn, 33 nations met to launch the Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y
Caribenos (Latin American and Caribbean Community of StatesCLACS). Only Honduras was not
invited, a clear rejection of U.S. support for the Lobo government. The new community is an echo of
Simon Bolivars attempt to forge a Latin American confederation of nations. Obama still has the
Relations between the United States and Latin America are at a curious
juncture . In the past decade, most Latin American countries have made
enormous progress in managing their economies and reducing inequality and, especially,
poverty, within a democratic framework . These critical changes have brought greater autonomy,
expanded global links, and grow- ing self-confidence . It is now the United States that
is
in a sour mood, struggling with a still weak economic recovery, diminished
international stature and influence, and fractured politics at home . These
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urgent problems or to take advantage of new opportunities, has been disappointing . The InterAmerican Dialogues report is a call to all nations of the hemi- sphere to take stock, to rebuild
cooperation, and to reshape relations in a new direction . All governments in the hemisphere should be
more attentive to emerging opportunities for fruitful collaboration on global and regional issues
ranging across economic integration, energy security, protection of democracy, and climate change .
The United States must regain its cred- ibility in the region by dealing seriously with an unfinished
agenda of problemsincluding immigration, drugs, and Cubathat stands in the way of a real
partnership . To do so, it needs the help of Latin America and the Caribbean . If the current
state of affairs continues, the strain between the United States and Latin
America could worsen, adversely affecting the interests and well- being of
all in the hemisphere . There is a great deal at stake . This report offers a realistic
assessment of the relationship within a changing regional and global context and sets out an agenda
of old and new business that need urgent attention . A collaborative effort should begin immediately at
the sixth Summit of the Americas in Cartagena, Colombia .
March 29, 2013, Preserving Stability in Cuba After Normalizing Relations with the United States The
Importance of Trading with State-Owned Enterprises, COHA, http://www.coha.org/preserving-stabilityin-cuba-timothy-ashby/#sthash.U0nrDoiq.dpuf
Cuba under Ral Castro has entered a new period of economic, social, and
political transformation. Reforms instituted within the past few years have
brought the expansion of private sector entrepreneurial activity, including
lifting restrictions on the sales of residential real estate, automobiles, and
electronic goods. Additional reforms included, more than a million hectares of idle land has been
leased to private farmers, where citizens have been granted permission to stay in hotels previously
reserved for tourists, and freedom being granted for most Cubans to travel abroad. Stating that it was
time for the gradual transfer of key roles to new generations, President Ral Castro announced
that he will retire by 2018, and named as his possible successor a man who was not even born at the
time of the Cuban Revolution. [1] The twilight of the Castro era presents challenges
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Jeff Bess
Democrat from 1979 to 1987, serving as chairman of the House Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs, senior fellow at the Center for International Policy in Washington, March 4, 2013,
Time is ripe for a new approach to Cuba, Baltimore Sun, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-0304/news/bs-ed-cuba-20130304_1_cuba-question-current-cuba-policy-foreign-policy)
Only 90 miles from America's shores is the small nation of Cuba, which today poses no military or
economic threat to the United States but is a continuing reminder of more than 50 years of failure by
Democratic and Republican administrations to achieve our stated objective of fostering democratic
change. Our current Cuba policy is an irritant in our relations with many
shifting. About half of the Cuban-American vote in Florida in 2012 went for
President Obama. An encouraging report emerged in recent days that the State Department is
considering removing Cuba from its list of state sponsors of terrorism. Many of the issues our
nation must confront seem almost beyond solution. In our own front yard
is one issue opening the door to better relations with Cuba that could
achieve the same kind of success that President Clinton and then-Senator
Kerry achieved in Vietnam less than two decades ago.
24
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Latin America, May 11, 2011, Dangerous Complacencies : Obama, Latin America, and the
Misconceptions of Power, Sagepub)
Meeting with the presidents of Latin America at the Fifth Summit of the Americas in
Trinidad in April 2009, Barack Obama pledged to recast relations with the
region. After years of hostile dealings with George W. Bush, Latin Americans eagerly
looked forward to a new era of relations with the United States and
welcomed Obamas declaration that every one of our nations has a right
to follow its own path and his pledge to engage the rest of the hemisphere on the basis of mutual respect and equality. At the halfway point in his
first term, however, there is little to distinguish Obama from his predeces- sor
George W. Bush (recognized even in mainstream analysis such as Tim Padgetts cogent appraisal
in Time [2009]).1 The promise of Obamas rhetoric in Trinidad failed to materialize
in concrete policies and, in retrospect, may have been a way to deflect attention from the fact
that his administration had no plans for fundamentally altering U.S. policy toward Latin America. Even
as he was announcing a new era in Trinidad, U.S. trade representatives were busy meeting with the
president of Colombia to revive prospects for the Bush- initiated free-trade agreement with that nation.
Candidate Obama had criti- cized Bush efforts to sign a free-trade agreement with a country where
trade unionists are persecuted, human rights are trampled, and the army kills peas- ants (called falsos
positivos) and passes them off as guerrillas to claim a reward.
25
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
policy of critical and constructive engagement at the April Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and
Tobago, the president can prove that he has been listening to the region. He can under- line this
commitment by removing all restrictions on travel and remittances on Cuban Americans, and engaging
in dialogue with the regime, as prom- ised during his campaign. By reciprocally improving
understanding, improve the lives of people on the island, and build support for a new relation- ship
between our countries, they are insufficient to ensure the changes needed to result in normal diplomatic relations over time. if the president is to advance U.S. interests and principles, he will need a
new policy and a long- term strategic vision for U.S. relations with Cuba. If he is prepared to
discard the failed policy of regime change and adopt one of critical and
con- structive engagement, he and his administration will lay the
foundations for a new approach to- ward Cuba and the Latin America. like
his pre- decessors, president Obama has the authority to substantially modify embargo
regulations in order to advance a policy of engagement that would broaden and deepen contacts with
the Cuban people and their government. He has the popular supportdomestic and internationalto
engage Cuba, and, by so doing, to staunch our diminishing influence on the island
and recapture the high road in our relations with the hemisphere.
How can the U.S. minimize the triangular threat posed by Iran, Venezuela
and Cuba? How can this cycle of dependency, control and power be broken? Probably one of
the easiest solutions is normalizing relations with Cuba. The U.S. could be
processing nickel or drilling for oil in Cuba. The U.S. could easily surpass the E.U. and
China and lead all other countries in aggregate trade with Cuba. With U.S.
capital flowing through the Cuban economy, it could in time replace Cubas
dependency on Venezuela and thereby effectively negate Chavezs
influence. Given normalized relations with Cuba, if Chavez were able to create a Venezuelan-Cuban
confederation, it would be in name only because the U.S. could replace Venezuela as its benefactor.
26
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Cuba, too, poses a significant challenge for relations between the United
States and Latin America . The 50-year-old US embargo against Cuba is
rightly criticized throughout the hemisphere as a failed and punitive
instrument . It has long been a strain on US-Latin American relations .
Although the United States has recently moved in the right direction and taken steps to relax
restrictions on travel to Cuba, Washington needs to do far more to dismantle
its
severe, outdated constraints on normalized relations with Cuba . Cuba is
one of the residual issues that most obstructs more effective US-Latin
American engagement . At the same time, Cubas authoritarian regime should be of utmost
concern to all countries in the Americas . At present, it is the only country without free, multi-party
elections, and its government fully controls the press . Latin American and Caribbean nations could be
instrumental in supporting Cubas eventual transition to democratic rule . An end to the US
policy of isolating Cuba, without setting aside US concern about human rights viola- tions,
decision making and experience sharing are needed. Inter- national policy
should become a hemispheric endeavor. It should not continue to be
mostly a U.S. thrust in the face of a weak Latin America. Collective policy making
may require new institutions and a new will to succeed. For exam- ple, a mechanism could be
established to produce a Social Charter of the Americas that formalizes a commitment to human rights
and core labor standards. Such collective policy making also requires a more formalized system for
deliberating on public policy, one that includes substantial mech- anisms, such as those promoted by
the World Social Forum, for bringing together grassroots movements and sharing local government
initiatives in a regularized way. The Western Hemisphere could strive for the
27
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
dependence
on Venezuela and Venezuelas subsequent leverage over Cuba are aided
and abetted by the U.S.Cuban embargo. Due to the embargos trade restrictions,
Venezuela has in effect replaced the role the U.S. would have played in a
post Soviet Union globalized Cuban economy. Certainly Chavez is best known for his
incessant and irreverent anti-imperialist rhetoric which makes him, at times, hard to take seriously.
However a close look at his actions reveals what seems to be a deliberate plan to pose a significant
threat to the U.S. A quick run down of the facts are as follows: Chavez has recently spent $5 billion to
create the strongest military in Latin America, Venezuela is one of Cubas top creditors,
Cubas debt to Venezuela is $2.5 billion and rising, and the Cuban military
is helping complete Chavezs transformation of the Venezuelan military.
Add the facts to the Cuba-and-Venezuela-are-one-nation rhetoric, the
Venezuela needs a robust military to defend itself from the U.S. rhetoric,
the Venezuela should be able to pursue peaceful nuclear weapons
rhetoric and the narrow defeat of the constitutional reforms that would
have made Chavez possibly an indefinite president of a Cuba and
Venezuela confederation and the implications to U.S. security should be
quite obvious.
28
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
The absence of a strong American presence over the last eight years has
also given China the opportunity to step in as a major player, both
economically and politically, in regions all around the world, but
particularly in Latin America. The Chinese government has invested a
tremendous amount of soft power in Latin America , where it is now the continent's
third largest trading partner, with an annual trade growth of 30% since 2001. 115 American
disinterest in Latin America has convinced many countries to adopt a
"Pacific view," whereby China steps in to fill the gap left by America's absence. 116 After signing
a free trade agreement with Chile, China quickly displaced the United States as that country's largest
export market. China also [*224] recently displaced the U.S. as Brazil's biggest trading partner. 117 In
2000, trade between China and Latin America hovered around $ 13 billion, but in 2007, that number
had increased to $ 102 billion, and by 2008 total trade was valued at $ 140 billion. 118 Even despite
the current financial crisis, trade between China and Latin America is likely to grow during the next five
years. China's interest in Latin America is also based on its increasingly
assertive global political agenda. In 2007, Costa Rica dropped its diplomatic recognition of
Taiwan, a move heavily courted by Chinese officials. In 2008, President Hu rewarded Costa Rica's new
policy by visiting San Jose and signing a free trade agreement in 2010. 119 China also timed the
release of a new policy paper on Sino-Latin American relations to coincide with President Hu's most
recent trip to the region. It charts China's growing relationship with Latin America and promises
increased cooperation in scientific and technological research, cross-cultural educational exchanges, as
well as political and economic exchanges. 120 As China's role in Latin America
29
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
lifting the embargo could lead to Cuba becoming a regional power, arguing
that the US [doesnt] need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a
serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbeanor beyond.14 While
Venezuela, for example, has challenged the US on some interests, its antiAmerican leadership has not been able to present a serious counterweight
to the US or have a significant impact on US security. Given that Venezuela is a much
bigger economic player than Cuba due to its oil revenues, it is highly
unlikely that Cuba would pose a significant geopolitical challenge to the
US, even if significant sums of money enter Cubas economy.
30
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Former Senator Mel Martinez has argued against lifting the embargo,
claiming that the US needs to support pro-democracy activists in Cuba,
not provide the Castro regime with a resource windfall.15 Florida Rep. Tom
Rooney has argued that lifting the embargo would serve to reward Cubas leadership for its decadeslong record of human rights abuses and allow the abuse to continue due to the absence of pressure
from the US.16 The US has used the embargo as an effort to pressure the
communist leadership for nearly fifty years, yet the status quo remains
unchanged. If a possible downside of lifting the embargo is that the situation will not change, then
the US has nothing to lose by making an effort to normalize relations with Cuba. By
refusing to engage Cuba and make efforts to move Cuba forward, the US is
in a weak position to criticize the Cuban leadership. Lifting the embargo
and normalizing relations would put the US in a stronger position to bring
about change through economic advancements that could in turn result in
domestic demands within Cuba for greater social and political freedoms.
31
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
College, retired U.S. Army colonel and Adjunct Professor of Political Science at Dickinson College, March
2003, STRATEGIC EFFECTS OF THE CONFLICT WITH IRAQ: LATIN AMERICA,
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub289.pdf)
When what mattered most in U.S. national security policy toward the
hemisphere were military bases, preserving access to sea lines of communication, choke
points, and raw materials and hydrocarbonsand militarily denying those assets to the Soviet Union
and its surrogatesthe United States could ignore internal conditions in Latin
America. But, since the United States is now interested in the need for nonhostile
dispositions toward the country, the capacity of neighbors to buy American-made products, a
commitment to international economic cooperation, the continued development of democratic and
free market institutions and human rightsthe United States must concern itself with the
states with minimal additional external influences from non-sates and substate actors. The worst-case scenario for the US is the development of
numerous failed states within Latin America. The threat from narcoterrorists and Islamic fundamentalists may be the most critical from a
safety and security perspective but is just the tip of the iceberg. The
linked nature between the various countries within Latin America as well
as the effects on the US are critical to economic prosperity, security, social
equality, and rule of law.
to the US along with its instability, is the largest current threat to the US.
It all comes down to a simple concept: Pay for the security now at a relatively small cost to the US or
pay for it later at a much higher cost in terms of American lives and security.
32
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
associated with the rise and fall of pre-eminent power and the often
bloody transition from one pre-eminent leader to the next . As such,
exogenous shocks such as economic crises could usher in a redistribution
of relative power (see also Gilpin, 10981) that leads to uncertainty about power
balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a
relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive
environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a
declining power (Werner, 1999). Seperately, Polllins (1996) also shows that global economic
cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium,
and small powers, although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic
conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level, Copelands (1996,2000)
theory of trade expectations suggests that future expectation of trade is a significant variable in
understanding economic conditions and security behavior of states. He argues that
interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long
as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the
expectation of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as
energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases , as states will be inclined
to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be
the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers
protectionist moves by interdependent states. Third, others have considered the link between
economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002)
33
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
economic performance in the United States, and thus weak presidential popularity, are
statistically linked to an increase in the use of force .
34
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
nuclear energy produc- tion in areas where it has been virtually absent,
for example, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America. To
approximate Frances current level of nuclear energy reliance, for instance, Iran alone would require
roughly 18 operational reactors; Saudi Arabia, 20. More extensive substitution of nuclear energy for
other sources of power, or future economic expansion (such as de- scribed above), will require a
commensurate growth in the number of reactors.9 All of this may sound abstract, but moves in this
direction are al- ready well under way. Some 40 developing nations have expressed interest in starting
nuclear energy programs, and many have moved beyond vague state- ments of intentions.10 The
United Arab Emirates, for instance, has already struck a deal for two reactors, the only one of 11
nations in this region (thus far) to have announced such plans.11 Assessing the Danger As outlined
above, a future in which the world as a whole turned to nuclear energy will
mean not just an expansion of nuclear energy production, but substantial changes in
production impacting mainland Asia, Africa, and Latin America. An assessment
of the associated proliferation risk involved devolves basically into an examination of two dimensions,
capabilities and intentionswhat widened nuclear energy use will mean for the access of these states
to nuclear weapons technology; and the impact that this new envi ronment will have on a
governments motivation to actually use that access to produce nuclear weaponry. Technological
Access The increase in nuclear energy production described above will mean greater production,
trading, and consumption of the fissile materials and other technologies that are part of the nuclear
fuel cycle. The specifics differ according to reactor type, but every reactor uses uranium in the production of its fuel and produces plutonium in its waste, extractable in the fuel re- processing procedure,
and in such a manner that every type of reactor poses a measure of proliferation risk.12 Gas-cooled
and heavy-water reactors use natural uranium as fuel, but are ideal for
producing weapons-grade plutonium. Fast-neutron reactors use fissile material (such
as highly enriched uranium or plutonium) at the very start of their fuel cycle, and Fast Breeder
Reactors in particular produce more fissile material than they consume. Even Light Water Reactors
(LWRs), which have been described as proliferation-resistant (two of which were provided to North
Korea under the Agreed Framework), are no exception.13 They use low-enriched uranium, which is not
useful for making weapons, but which is produced in the same en- richment process used to
manufacture weapons. Additionally, low-enriched uranium can be seen as halfway to weapons grade,
since it can be more rapidly enriched to the needed level than stock natural uranium. At the same
time, while these reactors produce relatively smaller quantities of lower quality plu- tonium than other
types, it has been estimated that a 1,000-megawatt LWR can still generate enough weapons-usable
plutonium for up to 50 bombs a year.14 The response on the part of those seeking to limit
proliferation has, accordingly, been to encourage as many nuclear energy users as possible not to
develop the entire fuel cycle; that is, to forgo building up their own fuel en- richment and reprocessing
capabilities. Instead, it is proposed that they buy fuel and reprocessing services on the world market,
as proposed in the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership of February 2006. There are, however,
widespread doubts about the initiatives likely cost and effectiveness, concerns articulated in a letter
signed by a number of control organizations, including the Federation of American Scientists, the Union
of Concerned Scientists, and the Arms Control Association.15 Their objections, however, fail to include
one important pointthat states have been partly dissuaded from developing the full nuclear fuel
cycle for eco- nomic reasons, a fact that may not remain operative in any massive expansion of
nuclear energy use. Simply put, it is cheaper for a small nuclear program to buy nuclear fuel on the
world market than to build and operate the facilities required to en- rich uranium domestically. This has
resulted in only eight of some 30 nuclear energy producers actually engaging in enrichment on an
industrial scale.16 The same is true for fuel reprocessing facilities, especially given the relatively low
cost of newly mined uranium. Accordingly, only a handful of states (Britain, France, Russia, Japan, and
India) actually practice civil reprocessing.17 Any significant growth in nuclear energy production would
35
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
uranium exporters not regarded as likely proliferatorsincluding Australia and Canadaare interested
in enrichment technology because enriching their uranium before export would increase
profitability.)18 Certainly if ura- nium prices were to rise, there would be more interest in Fast Breeder
Reac- tors, which one analyst suggests can extract more than 60 times as much energy per ton of
mined ore as a conventional nuclear plant when operated in a closed circuit with thermal reactors
and reprocessing facilities.19 In short, the economic incentives for states to refrain
from developing the full nuclear fuel cycle will almost certainly weaken,
while the particularly worrisome fast-neutron reactors will become more
attractive. At the same time, the heightened dependence on nuclear energy, and the experience
of en- ergy scarcity, will continue to reinforce the search for energy independence and energy
security, contributing to the pressure that the nonproliferation re- gime is already experiencing, as the
result of being a ratifier of unequal ac- cess to nuclear technology.20 In any event, such changes
enormously increase the already substantial burden of monitoring and securing the storage and
movement of the supplies associated with nuclear power generation, not to mention the political costs
of maintaining the regime.21 Motivation As outlined previously, any plausible combination of political
ar- rangements and technological innovations is likely to have uneven results. Determined
states are likely to find it easier to acquire the means for produc- ing
fissile material, which raises the other key dimension of the issuethe
motivation for acquiring these weapons in the first place. Longestablished research strongly indicates that the motivation to build
nuclear weapons is more of a factor than simply achieving the
technological capacity.22 Indeed, it is due to this excessive focus on capacity that ear- lier
predictions about the speed and the extent of nuclear proliferation (which projected 25 to 50 nuclearweapon states by the year 2000) proved wrong.23 The relative ease with which the weapons might be
built is proof of this; a pro- gram to develop a minimal capability from scratch could cost as little as
$500 million, less than the price of a modern warship.24 In short, were capacity the only issue, there
would be far more nu- clear powers in the world, though of course access to the means cannot be
ruled out as a factor in decisionmaking. When much of the infrastructure for developing a nuclear
arsenal is already in place, as may be the case in several advanced countries, the decision to do so
entails lower costs; and given the speed with which these programs can be initiated, the nations in
question are also less susceptible to preventative action than countries starting from scratch.25 A
particular danger is that having such facilities in place provides them with the option of diverting
material from the fuel cycle for covert weapon programs.26 The rationale driving the shift
to nuclear energy in the first place (en- ergy and climate stress) will increasingly
36
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
minimize their vulnerability. A goal which nuclear weapons have long been viewed as a
cheap way of achieving. The nuclearization of a single state can induce a chain
reaction across a region. The nuclearization of China spurred India and in turn Pakistan to
follow suit, and the Argentinean and Brazilian nuclear programs fed off one another. Today the possibility that a nuclear North Korea may lead South Korea or Japan to acquire nu- clear weapons is often
discussed.28 In the Middle East there are signs that Saudi Arabia is reviewing its nuclear options, and a
nuclear-armed Iran may encourage the Saudis and others in the region to continue down this path.29
With nuclear technology more widely available these actions can be taken
much more rapidly and at less cost. Those pursuing this course of action
will find it a simple matter to amass large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. It
is also worth noting that even were the development of actual nuclear weapons to remain a rarity,
virtual arsenals could be more common, leaving the nu- clear weapons
status of a longer list of countries uncertain, in many cases deliberately
so, with a detrimental impact on the security environment. 30
37
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
38
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
revolt against the Syrian regime has become one of the most brutal
repressions in decades. The situation has grown worse, with the almost certain use of
chemical weapons crossing what the president drew as a red line. North Korea, developing
nuclear weapons and the capacity to deliver them over long distances, has denigrated
America and threatened to attack us. And, speaking of nukes and the goal of nuclear
nonproliferation Iran remains undeterred as well, with its own red line in doubt.
Meanwhile, the United States suffered its first terrorist bombing since
9/11, with three killed and more than 200 wounded an event that occurred eight months after the
attack on our consulate in Benghazi, Libya, where a U.S. ambassador was killed for the first time in 33
years. The problem of America being reviled in many parts of the world is
vastly overblown, but it has surely not been remedied. Europeans and the
Japanese like us more, but they were pretty fond of us to start with. Muslims,
according to the Pew Research Center, like us less. In Pakistan, Egypt, Jordan, Turkey and Lebanon, the
average favorability rating for the United States in 2012 was 21 percent; in 2008, it was 26 percent.
Foreign policy is not easy. The challenges are unpredictable, which is why
the best policy rests on a solid foundation of principle and a clear
strategy. The George W. Bush administrations national security strategy
was simple: keep America safe and promote freedom. These goals are linked; free
nations rarely threaten the United States or their own neighbors. Achieving both these goals
requires leadership a consistency that reassures our allies and deters
our enemies.
One irony of the Obama presidency is how much it relies on hard power.
The president came into office proposing a dramatic shift from George W.
Bushs perceived unilateralism, and most of his predecessors hard-edged counterterrorism
tactics and massive deployments in wars abroad. Yet after three years, Obama has escalated forces in
Afghanistan, embraced the widespread use of unmanned drones to kill terrorists at the risk of civilian
casualties, kept Guantnamo open, and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in a thoroughly unilateral
fashion. What he hasnt accomplished to any great degree is what most
power. Obama suggested he would rehabilitate the damaged image of America created by these
excesses and show that the United States was not a cowboy nation. Upon taking office, he made freshstart statements, such as his June 2009 remarks in Cairo, and embraced political means like dialogue,
respectful multilateralism, and the use of new media, suggesting that he felt the soft power to change
minds, build legitimacy, and advance interests was the key element missing from the recent US
approach to the worldand that he would quickly remedy that defect. Yet President Obamas
conception of soft power has curiously lacked the very quality that has
39
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
made it most efficacious in the pastthe values dimension . This may seem
odd for a leader who is seen worldwide as an icon of morality, known for the motto the audacity of
hope and his deployment of soaring rhetoric. Yet his governance has virtually ignored
the values dimension of soft power, which goes beyond the tradecraft of
diplomacy and multilateral consultation to aggressively assert the ideals
of freedom in practical initiatives. The excision of this values dimension
renders soft power a hollow concept.
40
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
gain
from a more inclusive and less unilateral approach. U.S. retort to U.N.
anti-embargo resolutions that bilateral relations are exempt from General
Assembly scrutiny have had longstanding blowback. This rhetoric has historically
undercut Americans legitimacy and wasted political capital on this central world stage. Outside of New
York City and across the globe, decades-long sanctions against the island have
netted few if any national objectives, all the while depleting substantial
national soft power . The cost- benefit analysis to U.S. national foreign policy will remain
exceedingly unfavorable, if not outright counter-productive.
US
Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a518130.pdf)
Internationally, the world is nearly unanimous in its opposition to the United
States policy towards Cuba. In fact, on 28 October 2009, the United Nations
41
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
pressure on the government of Cuba. 32 Additionally, pressure the European Union to stop measures
and contradicting policies to produce a more powerful embargo with devastating effect on the Cuban
dictatorship. The risk is that the United States will become further isolated
from the world in regards to its Cuba policy and will create additional
sympathy for Cuba. This could result in open disregard for the embargo by
the European Union and other countries interested in trade with Cuba,
with a collapse of the effectiveness of the embargo. The soft power of the
United States would suffer with possibly no gain. The United States could
lose all possible influence over the future direction of the Cuban
government as the Castro regime is replaced.
US
The United States will gain leverage with the Cuban government as
relations improve, and that will be the time to address human rights in
Cuba. The return of the Cuban Five, a group of Cuban spies arrested and convicted in Florida, should
be worth some human rights concessions. In Cuba, these men are known as the Cinco Heroes and
their plight is well known.37 So what leverage do we have now that we have unilaterally given the
Cuban government most of what they have wanted? Offer to return back to Cuba the Guantanamo
Naval Base after the government of Cuba shifts towards a representative form of government. The
foundation for this action has already been laid with the Libertad Act. The future of the Guantanamo
base, a provision in the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996 states that once a
democratically elected Cuban government is in place, United States policy is to be prepared to enter
into negotiations either to return the base to Cuba or to renegotiate the present agreement under
mutually agreeable terms.38 The United States Congress should soften the
The window of opportunity is open now for this type of change. The
Obama administration has taken some steps in this direction with the
lifting of remittance limits, unlimited visits to relatives in Cuba, and the
ability to provide cell phones to relatives in Cuba. The other recent change is the
new majority of Cuban-Americans, in Florida, that support removal of the embargo. Based on votes in
the United Nations and the European Union it is clear that world opinion would definitely be supportive
of this action. The combination of the above mentioned events now points to an opportunity to make
real progress that will benefit both nations. The United States would gain in soft
42
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
43
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
American Foreign Policy and Energy, Resources, and Environment, June 11, 2011, Breaking the
Logjam: Obama's Cuba Policy and a Guideline for Improved Leadership, by
http://bcjournal.org/volume-14/breaking-the-logjam.html?printerFriendly=true)
Conclusion The two countries histories have long been intertwined , particularly
after the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 gave rise to the American belief that it would become the
hemispheres protector. Until the immediate aftermath of Fidel Castros revolution, Cuba provided
a testing ground for the promotion of American ideals, social beliefs, and
foreign policies. In the context of Ral shifting course in Cuba, the Obama
administration has the opportunity to highlight the benefits of both the
use of soft power and a foreign policy of engagement. As evidence mounts
that the United States is ready to engage countries that enact domestic
reforms, its legitimacy and influence will grow. Perhaps future political
leaders, in Iran or North Korea for example, will be more willing to make
concessions knowing that the United States will return in kind. The
United States should not wait for extensive democratization before further
engaging Cuba, however. One legacy of the Cold War is that Communism has succeeded only
where it grew out of its own, often nationalistic, revolutions. As it has with China and Vietnam, the
United States should look closely at the high payoffs stemming from engagement. By improving
relations, America can enhance its own influence on the islands political
structure and human rights policies. At home, with the trade deficit and national debt
rising, the economic costs of the embargo are amplified. Recent studies estimate that the US economy
foregoes up to $4.84 billion a year and the Cuban economy up to $685 million a year.50 While USCuban economic interests align, political considerations inside America have shifted, as commerce
seems to be trumping anti-Communism and Florida ideologues.51 Clearly, public opinion also favors a
new Cuba policy, with 65 percent of Americans now ready for a shift in the countrys approach to its
neighboring island.52 At this particular moment in the history of US-Cuban
relations, there is tremendous promise for a breakthrough in relations. In a
post-Cold War world, Cuba no longer presents a security threat to the united States, but instead
provides it with economic potential. American leaders cannot forget the fact that an economic
embargo, combined with diplomatic isolation, has failed to bring democracy to Cuba for over 50
years. American policymakers should see Cuba as an opportunity to reap
the political, economic, and strategic rewards of shifting its own policies
toward engagement. By ending the economic embargo and normalizing diplomatic relations
with the island, President Obama would indicate that he is truly willing to extend his hand once
Americas traditional adversaries unclench their fists.
44
Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
The central thesis in the pages that follow may seem outlandish, controversial, and provocative. It will be argued
powerful ambassadors was Charlie Chaplin. When the Second World War broke out two decades later, Mickey Mouse
Today, in
the Information Age of the Internet, soft power has become increasingly
instrumental in the emerging world order dominated by an American
Empire. The notion of "empire" is admittedly contentious, even among American leaders. President George W.
Bush declared: "America has no empire to extend or utopia to establish." And yet , when President Bush
demonstrated the awesome force of American hard power against
despicable regimes in Afghanistan and Iraq, it suddenly became
fashionable to discuss, even if disapprovingly, Americas imperialist
ambitions. When U.S. bombs obliterated targeted sections of Baghdad,
the United States was referred to as a "smart bomb imperium." Despite claims
and Donald Duck conducted Disneyland diplomacy to spread American values throughout the world.
that America is a reluctant hegemon, the new global reality of a Pax Americana is a fact that cannot easily be
Recognition of
America as a "hyperpower" is usually based on material factsspecifically,
the superiority of American hard power. Yet America's global domination
has been achieved largely through non-military means in short, through
the extension, assertion, and influence of its soft power. If hard power, by
definition, is based on facts, soft power is based on values. American hard
power is necessary to maintain global stability. American soft power movies,
pop music, television, fast food, fashions, theme parksspreads, validates, and reinforces
common norms, values, beliefs, and lifestyles. Hard power threatens; soft
power seduces. Hard power dissuades; soft power persuades. Ironically, many
Americans are only vaguely aware of the global impact of U.S. soft power. Yet America's adversaries
have never underestimated its effects. Mao Zedong once warned that American pop cultural
contradicted. Today, no nation disputes America's status as the planet's sole superpower.
products were "candy-coated bullets." He was wrong on only one point: their impact is much more powerful. One
can only imagine how Mao would react today upon learning that one of his successors, Jiang Zemin, succumbed to
the allures of American soft power. In1998, the Chinese leader confessed he'd seen, and enjoyed, the Hollywood
movie Titanic. Jiang Zemin even recommended the movie to members of his communist Politburo. Reactions to
American soft power are diverse and ambiguous. Soft power incites awe and envy, but also provokes resentment
and hostility. Anti-globalization protestors condemn the United States as a cultural juggernaut driven by the
commercial values of "Brand America." Hostile passions are easily inflamed against American cultural symbols,
which are associated with a cosmopolitanism that incites deep-seated anxieties. In France, Hollywood and
McDonalds are bitterly resented among eliteswho denounce "Coca-colonization"despite profound historical
affinities with America as an enlightened republic founded on the same universal values. Even in Canada, the most
American nation outside the United States itself, local patriotism is tinged with deep-seated anti-American
sentiments. In the non-Western world, American cultural icons and U.S. corporate brandsfrom MTV to McDonald's
are resented precisely because they are so seductive. If American-style cultural globalization is considered
subversive, it's because its powerful messages are so efficiently transmitted and readily received. When Islamic
ayatollahs invoked the Koran to ban MTV from their local television screens, their interdictions were symbolic
declarations of war against America. Some countries, like Saudi Arabia, benefit from the protection of American
hard power, yet banish the symbols of American soft powerdespite a predilection among their elites for Cadillacs
and Gulfstreams. In North Korea, communist dictator Kim Jong-Il idolizes Michael Jordan and is a fan of Hollywood
movies, and yet his regime provokes America with the threat of nuclear arms. These
intense and
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Greater attention to soft and smart power itself reflects the changing
landscape of international relations. It is no coincidence that such sources of power have
been embraced by Neoliberalism and Constructivism, paradigms that have underscored the changing
nature of world politics. In this case, theory has been influenced by events. While history has
compel nations and non-state actors through the principal levers of hard
power (i.e., threats and force). The world stage has become less amenable to
instruments of hard power like force and threats, and more amenable to
actors that are sensitized to the limitations of hard and the opportunities
of soft power created by this new global environment.
more demonstrative about using more soft power than about how the two kinds of power (hard and
soft) can be optimally combined. So the emphasis has been more on appreciating the utility of soft
power than on appreciating the virtues of all useful power resources. In short the narrative has
underscored reallocation but has fallen well short of sufficiently considering the goal of a more
systematic identification of an optimal diversification among differing power resources. The
prescriptions and warnings of over-reliance on one set of power resources cut both ways. They are as
applicable to over-using soft power as they are to depending too much on hard power strategies. In
this respect, the greatest possible influence a nation can achieve would be
obtained through some optimal diversification among soft and hard power
resources. While this diversification has always proved a superior
strategy, it is all the more important in the world of the present and
future. Indeed the changes in international politics highlighted above suggest that indeed it is
becoming a more complex and sophisticated world order (i.e., a cosmopolitan
world order) in which the brut forces of hard power have diminished in their
importance relative to soft power. This more cosmopolitan world requires very different
strategies for optimizing influence in world politics. It requires a concomitantly sophisticated theory
that can effectively accommodate such changes in articulating a theory of power. Indeed, it
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compound the disutility of coercion and force as the actors bearing the
greatest burden of such coercion and force (the people) have political power
over decisionmakers. In this respect, the process of democratic peace has altered power
relations among nations (Doyle 1997, Russett and Oneal 2001, and Ray 1995). As individuals
become politically empowered, they can generate strong impediments to
the use of force and coercion. But even beyond the enfranchisement effect, democratic
cultural naturally drives national leaders towards the liberal principles
manifest in the cannons of soft power. Hence, national leaders are much more
constrained to work within softer foreign policy boundaries, boundaries
that limit the use of force, threat and bribery. Rather, outcomes are engineered
through policies more consistent with liberal democratic legitimacy.
Interdependence
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
Third, the diminishing utility of hard power is partly the result of a specific
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warrior ethic (Jervis 2002 and Nye 2004b, p. 19). This prosperous society has
compounded the influence of economics and made economic
interdependence that much more compelling as a constraint to the utility
of hard power. With the rise of this welfare/economic orientation and the spread of democracy,
national leaders have been driven more by the economic imperative and less by foreign adventurism
as a source of political survival (Gallarotti 2000 and Ruggie 1983). This prosperous society, through the
political vehicle of democracy, has shifted not only domestic but also foreign policy orientations. The
International institutions
Gallarotti 2013 (Giulio Gallarotti, Professor of Government Wesleyan University Department of
Government John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, February 12, 2013, Smart Power: what it is, why its
important, and the conditions for its effective use, Wesleyan University, google)
Finally, the growth of international organization and regimes in the post-war
period has embedded nations more firmly in networks of cooperation: in effect
nations are increasingly functioning in a world of law and norms. In such a world, unilateral
actions that disregard these institutions become far more costly. Such
institutions have effectively raised the minimum level of civil behavior in international politics, and
consequently raised the importance of soft power significantly. Consequently, the networks
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Project, http://americansecurityproject.org/blog/2013/war-of-the-soft-powers/)
In Foreign Policy today, Joseph Nye penned an article discussing China and Russias desire to increase
their soft power. As originator of the term, Nye explains that neither China nor Russia understands
exactly how to do this. Though Nye is correct in identifying China and Russias difficulty with soft
power, he neglects to get down to the core issue on why this is difficult. As soft power is the
ability to attract rather than coerce or pay-off, the ability to grow and use
soft power is a bit more nebulous. Unlike hard power, soft power is not
something that can simply be bought, constructed or traded like a
tangible object. Rather, soft power results from the collective attributes of a nation, through
action, history, culture and rhetoric. It cannot be applied like a fragrance to freshen a rotten product.
Despite the ebb and flow of American Soft power since the turn of the
century, it remains overall fairly strong. Nye contends that much of
Americas soft power is produced by civil society everything from
universities and foundations to Hollywood and pop culture not from the
government. While this is arguably true, I would not remove government as a
major variable in the soft power equation. Much of what Hollywood,
academia, and civil society are able to do is enabled directly by our
principles of government . Certainly, what can only be described as dysfunction in the
American government right nowespecially in regards to the fiscal situationhas an eroding effect on
U.S. soft power. Though internal bickering may result in an inability to pass a budget, no amount of
cooperation gives Congress the ability pass a measure to requisition more soft power, or contract a
company to design it. But it can pass legislation that frees it to grow on its own. Rather than
trying to use more soft power, Russia and China must first act to earn it.
Moral leadership, technological leadership, financial leadership, and foreign policy leadership and
setting standards for individual rights are all factors that can help to increase soft power. In the case of
Russia and China, making more deliberate efforts to resolve issues on the international scene could
make a difference. Russia should distance itself from its support of the Assad regime in Syria. China
should pursue diplomacy to resolve disputes in the South China Sea. Both countries should work to
increase freedom of the individual within their borders. Thats how you increase your soft power. For
America, technological and scientific leadership have long been a strong factor in its soft power
reserve. Yet we are at risk of losing this. For example, recent cuts in fusion energy researchone of
Americas most challenging, yet promising research fieldsmay cause this country to lag behind.
Explaining the harm this can cause, ASPs Nick Cunningham and Theodore MacDonald recently wrote
in AOL Energy today: As other countries invest more heavily in fusion power, Americas leadership in
this field will soon come to an end. Ceding a new high-tech industry to competitors will result in a
decline in Americas competitive edge, and its best and brightest scientists will be lured by more
advanced facilities abroad. If America wants to maintain its competitive edge in soft power, it needs to
take the action necessary to do it. That means continuing to make those scientific breakthroughs that
so many admire this nation for. That means continuing to uphold the principles enshrined in our
founding documents. Thus, it is in our interest to attract the best and brightest from overseas.
Historically, those minds have contributed greatly to all aspects of American society. And is it their
contribution to building this country through their intellect and hard work in a framework of economic
and cultural freedom that forms the basis of American soft power. Are we in danger of losing
our soft power edge to Russia and China? At this point, the answer is no.
Should we be frightened by their efforts to augment and enhance their
soft power? The answer is also no. Soft power is not a zero-sum game
one country cannot attack and weaken anothers soft power. The only way
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America risks losing its soft power edge is by pursuing negative actions
and neglecting the very things that make it so strong.
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Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, Reply to Christopher Layne p
108
The fourth critical fact to consider is that the security provided by the power of the
taken away, most countries would be much worse off, and arms races,
vicious security competition, and wars would result . It would be a world without
NATO or other key U.S. alliances. We can imagine easily conflict between traditional
rivals like Greece and Turkey, Syria and Israel, India and Pakistan, Taiwan
and China, Russia and Georgia, Hungary and Romania, Armenia and
Azerbaijan, and an intense arms race between China and Japan. In that
world, the breakup of Yugoslavia would have been a far bloodier affair
that might have escalated to become another European war. In contrast to
what might occur absent U.S. power, we see that the post-Cold War world
dominated by the United States is an era of peace and stability .
Studies at Missouri State University) 2007 American Empire: A Debate, Reply to Christopher Layne p
108
So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the
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know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and
win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant country, but are
unlikely to do so directly. 'This means that there will be no wars between great
powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state
(the United States). But there will be intense security competitionboth China and the United States
will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other,
their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their
militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in
fact, is its "normal" condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But
right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep;
it never takes a rest.
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it wields in the international systemall of which make up what the Chinese call comprehensive national power.
percent. In 1900, it was 20 percent. By 1910, it was under 15 percentwell below the rising United States, which
had climbed over the same period from more than 20 percent to more than 25 percent; and also less than
Germany, which had lagged far behind Britain throughout the nineteenth century but had caught and surpassed it
in the first decade of the twentieth century. Over the course of that period, the British navy went from unchallenged
master of the seas to sharing control of the oceans with rising naval powers. In 1883, Britain possessed more
battleships than all the other powers combined. By 1897, its dominance had been eclipsed. British officials
considered their navy completely outclassed in the Western hemisphere by the United States, in East Asia by
Japan, and even close to home by the combined navies of Russia and Franceand that was before the threatening
before the crisis. The 1910s, the 1940s, and the 1980s were all high points of American global power and influence.
Less than a decade ago, most observers spoke not of Americas decline but of its enduring primacy. In 2002, the
historian Paul Kennedy, who in the late 1980s had written a much-discussed book on the rise and fall of the great
powers, America included, declared that never in history had there been such a great disparity of power as
between the United States and the rest of the world. Ikenberry agreed that no other great power had held such
formidable advantages in military, economic, technological, cultural, or political capabilities.... The preeminence of
American power was unprecedented. In 2004, the pundit Fareed Zakaria described the United States as enjoying
a comprehensive uni-polarity unlike anything seen since Rome. But a mere four years later Zakaria was writing
about the post-American world and the rise of the rest, and Kennedy was discoursing again upon the
that it will overtake the United States as the largest economy in the world sometime in the next two decades. This
could mean that the United States will face an increasing challenge to its economic position in the future. But the
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sheer size of
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international system.
Chinese leaders know today. As Yan Xuetong recently noted, military strength underpins hegemony. Here the
United States remains unmatched. It is far and away the most powerful nation the
world has ever known, and there has been no decline in Americas relative military
capacityat least not yet. Americans currently spend less than $600 billion a year on defense, more
than the rest of the other great powers combined. (This figure does not include the deployment
in Iraq, which is ending, or the combat forces in Afghanistan, which are likely to diminish steadily over the next
American naval power remains predominant in every region of the world. By these military and economic measures,
United States today is not remotely like Britain circa 1900, when that empires relative decline
began to become apparent. It is more like Britain circa 1870, when the empire was at the height
of its power. It is possible to imagine a time when this might no longer be the case, but that moment has not
at least, the
yet arrived.
States can take a time-out from its global responsibilities while it gets its own house in order. To many Americans,
accepting decline may provide a welcome escape from the moral and material burdens that have weighed on them
since World War II. Many may unconsciously yearn to return to the way things were in 1900, when the United States
Resiliency and adaptation like the aff solves all your warrants
Kagan 12 (Not Fade Away The myth of American decline. Robert Kagan senior fellow at
Brookings Inst. January 11, 2012 | 5:04 pm; The New Republic, http://goo.gl/SEyOM)
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PERHAPS THE GREATEST concern underlying the declinist mood at large in the country today is not really whether
the United States can afford to continue playing its role in the world. It is whether the Americans are capable of
solving any of their most pressing economic and social problems. As many statesmen and commentators have
asked, can Americans do what needs to be done to compete effectively in the twentyfirst-century world? The only honest answer is, who knows? If American history is any guide, however, there is at
from slavery and then Reconstruction, to the dislocations of industrialization at the end of the nineteenth century
and the crisis of social welfare during the Great Depression, to the confusions and paranoia of the early Cold War
years. Anyone who honestly recalls the 1970s, with Watergate, Vietnam, stagflation, and the energy crisis,
cannot really believe that our present difficulties are unrivaled. Success in the past does
not guarantee success in the future. But one thing does seem clear from the historical evidence: the
American system, for all its often stultifying qualities, has also shown a greater capacity
to adapt and recover from difficulties than many other nations, including its geopolitical
competitors. This undoubtedly has something to do with the relative freedom of American society,
which rewards innovators, often outside the existing power structure, for producing new ways of doing things; and
with the relatively open political system of America, which allows movements to gain steam and to
influence the behavior of the political establishment. The American system is slow and clunky in part because the
Founders designed it that way, with a federal structure, checks and balances, and a written Constitution and Bill of
elections that allow transformations to occur, providing new political solutions to old and apparently insoluble
problems. Of course, there are no guarantees: the political system could not resolve the problem of slavery without
on many big issues throughout their history, Americans have found a way of achieving and
implementing a national consensus. When Paul Kennedy was marveling at the continuing success of the
war. But
American superpower back in 2002, he noted that one of the main reasons had been the ability of Americans to
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paralyzing dystopian analyses. Combine this with Nouriel Dr. Doom Roubinis the perfect storm
forecast in 2013 and you probably would become even more paralyzed. Daniel Gross best-selling
book Better, Stronger, Faster released in May 2012 is an exception. It is probably one of the first books
that presents encouraging facts in this recovery period rather than discouraging views of Americas
future. The mammoth has gotten back up, but it is always the memory of ones fall that lingers in
mind. We all remember that one fateful day when we attended the 341(a) bankruptcy hearing to meet
creditors and not the thousands of days of financial stability. Just like we all remember vividly the day
our loved one was buried six-feet under when he died and not the beautiful decades he shared his life
with us. Failure and losing hurt, thus they are recorded for eternity in our long-term memory. It is just
how our brain works, thanks to millions of years of evolution. The world was so shocked
with the fall of USA, that its gradual rise hasnt yet created a lasting
mental image. Good news, American soft power is more powerful than
any fiscal policy and political maneuver. Joseph Nye of Harvard University Kennedy
School of Government says soft power refers to the ability to get through
attraction rather than coercion or payments. By to get it means to receive favorable
treatments based upon attractiveness of a countrys culture, ideals, and policies. For instance,
inspired by TV series about medical doctors, some children in Taiwan
aspire to study medicine at an American university. Infatuated by the idea of a fair
trial, an Indonesian dissident aspires to become a lawyer. Soft power can be hardcore
power. And the American brand is still the best out there.
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united European region slightly surpasses the United States, but even so the Western European model
exhibits higher structural unemployment and lower rates of growth. More significant for future trends is
the fact that the U nited S tates, despite Asias rapid economic growth, has
maintained for several decades its major share of the worlds GDP (see Figure
2.3). Its 2010 GDP of over $14 trillion accounted for just around 25% of global output, while its closest
competitor, China, made up over 9% of global output with a close to $6 trillion GDP. The Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace estimates that the United States will go from having a $1.48 trillion
smaller GDP than the EU in 2010 to a $12.03 trillion larger GDP than the EU in 2050; and in terms of
per capita GDP, the United States will increase its lead over the EU from $12,723 in 2010 to $32,266 in
2050. It is true that according to current forecasts, China, largely due to its
overwhelming population base, will surpass the U nited S tates in total economic
size sometime in the twenty-first century; the Carnegie Endowment puts that date around 2030. For
similar reasons, although not at the same speed, India should climb up the global GDP ranks over
the next forty years as well. But neither China nor India will come even close to
US levels in per capita GDP (see Figure 2.4). Thus, neither China, nor India, nor Europe
can match the U nited S tates in its potent economic mix of overall size and
high per capita GDP. This economic advantageassuming America also exploits its
other assetscan preserve Americas global economic clout and systemic appeal,
as well as its suction effect on global talent.
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A2 Smooth Transition
No smooth transition
Brzezinski 2012 (Zbigniew Brzezinski, Robert E. Osgood Professor of American Foreign Policy at the
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, 2012, Strategic Vision: America and the Crisis
of Global Power, google books)
be a protracted phase of rather inconclusive and somewhat chaotic realignments of both global and regional power,
with no grand winners and many more losers, in a setting of international uncertainty and even of potentially fatal
risks to global well-being. What follows analyzes the implications of that historically ominousthough certainly not
predeterminedif. In
Historical contenders may vie more overtly, even with the use of
force, for regional preeminence. Some weaker states may find themselves in serious jeopardy, as
interests.
new power realignments emerge in response to major geopolitical shifts in the global distribution of power. The
promotion of democracy might yield to the quest for enhanced national security based on varying fusions of
authoritarianism, nationalism, and religion. The global commons could suffer from passive indifference or
exploitation produced by a defensive concentration on narrower and more immediate national concerns. Some
key international institutions, such as the World Bank or the IMF, are already under
increasing pressure from the rising, poorer, but highly populated stateswith China and India in the
forefrontfor a general rearrangement of the existing distribution of voting rights, which is
currently weighted toward the West. That distribution has already been challenged by some states in the G-20 as
unfair. The obvious demand is that it should be based to a much greater degree on the actual populations of
member states and less on their actual financial contributions. Such a demand, arising in the context of greater
disorder and percolating unrest among the worlds newly politically awakened peoples, could gain popularity among
many as a step toward international (even though not domestic) democratization. And before long, the heretofore
untouchable and almost seventy- year-old UN Security Council system of only five permanent members with
exclusive veto rights may become widely viewed as illegitimate. Even if a downward drift by America unfolds in a
vague and contradictory fashion, it is likely that the leaders of the worlds second-rank powers, among them Japan,
India, Russia, and some EU members, are already assessing the potential impact of Americas demise on their
dominating the Asian mainland, may be thinking of closer links with Europe. Leaders in India and Japan may well be
considering closer political and even military cooperation as a hedge in case America falters and China rises.
Russia, while perhaps engaging in wishful thinking (or even in schadenfreude) about Americas uncertain
prospects, may well have its eye on the independent states of the former Soviet Union as
initial targets of its enhanced geopolitical influence. Europe, not yet cohesive, would
likely be pulled in several directions: Germany and Italy toward Russia because of commercial
interests, France and insecure Central Europe in favor of a politically tighter EU, and Great Britain seeking to
manipulate a balance within the EU while continuing to preserve a special relationship with a declining United
Others still may move more rapidly to carve out their own regional spheres:
Turkey in the area of the old Ottoman Empire, Brazil in the Southern Hemisphere, and so forth.
None of the foregoing, however, have or are likely to have the requisite
combination of economic, financial, technological, and military power to even consider
inheriting Americas leading role. Japan is dependent on the United States for military protection
States.
and would have to make the painful choice of accommodating China or perhaps of allying with India in joint
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opposition to it. Russia is still unable to come to terms with its loss of empire, is fearful of Chinas meteoric
modernization, and is unclear as to whether it sees its future with Europe or in Eurasia. Indias aspirations for major
power status still tend to be measured by its rivalry with China. And Europe has yet to define itself politically while
remaining conveniently dependent on American power. A genuinely cooperative effort by all of them to accept joint
sacrifices for the sake of collective stability if Americas power were to fade is not likely.
aggressive and erratic behavior, the failure of the six-party talks, and the widely held distrust of Irans
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***Solvency***
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Solvency--- Reform
A2 Cant change Cuba
Pascual 2009 (Carlos Pascual, Vice president and Director of Foreign policy The Brookings
institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
The prospect of significant revenues from oil, natural gas, and sugarcane
ethanol in the next five years could further integrate Cuba into global
and regional markets. While in the short term Cuba will continue to be heavily dependent on
Venezu- ela for subsidized fuel, in five years offshore oil reserves, developed with Brazil, Spain,
Norway, and Malaysia, combined with the potential for ethanol production with Brazil, may increase
net annual financial flows to Cuba by $3.8 billion (at $50 per barrel of oil and $2.00 gallon of ethanol).
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institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
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***2AC/Miscellaneous***
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Departments state sponsor of terrorism list along with Iran, Syria, and Sudan,5 despite claims by
experts such as former National Coordinator for Security and Counterterrorism Richard Clarke that
Cuba is only on the list for domestic political reasons.6 A 1998 report by the US Intelligence
Community determined that Cuba does not pose a threat to US national security,7 yet the State
Department continues to keep Cuba on the list. By normalizing relations with Cuba and
removing Cuba from the list, the State Department could better focus on
actual state sponsors of terror and instead use resources in the Western Hemisphere
bureau to initiate a new path for engaging Cuba.
Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, After a Terrorist Nuclear
Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July, Available
Online to Subscribing Institutions via InformaWorld)
A terrorist nuclear attack, and even the use of nuclear weapons in response by the country attacked in
the first place, would not necessarily represent the worst of the nuclear worlds imaginable. Indeed,
there are reasons to wonder whether nuclear terrorism should ever be
regarded as belonging in the category of truly existential threats. A contrast can be drawn
here with the global catastrophe that would come from a massive nuclear exchange between two or
more of the sovereign states that possess these weapons in significant numbers. Even the worst
terrorism that the twenty-first century might bring would fade into insignificance alongside
considerations of what a general nuclear war would have wrought in the Cold War period. And it must
be admitted that as long as the major nuclear weapons states have hundreds and even thousands of
nuclear weapons at their disposal, there is always the possibility of a truly awful nuclear exchange
taking place precipitated entirely by state possessors themselves. But these two nuclear worldsa
non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchangeare not necessarily
separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear
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exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess
them. In this context, todays and tomorrows terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during
the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising
the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were
considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the socalled n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially
plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lead to such a massive inter-state nuclear
war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be
wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because
they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist
groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist
behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do
suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered
that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if
for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that
nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation
by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be spread over a
wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a
wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials
used and, most important some indication of where the nuclear material came from.41
Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American
officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all)
occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of
limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance
in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse
might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or
China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could
Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to
consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack?
Washingtons early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might
also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with
Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate
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after a nuclear terrorist attack, how would the attacked country respond
to pressure from other major nuclear powers not to respond in kind? The
phrase how dare they tell us what to do immediately springs to mind.
Some might even go so far as to interpret this concern as a tacit form of sympathy
or support for the terrorists. This might not help the chances of nuclear
restraint.
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A2 No Capability/Motive
Al Qaeda has the capability
Lawlor 2011 (Major General Bruce Lawlor, served on the White Houses Homeland Security Council and
was the first chief of staff for the Department of Homeland Security and currently director with Virginia Tech's
Simulation and Decision Informatics Laboratory, December 15, 2011, The Black Sea: Center of the nuclear black
market, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/web-edition/features/the-black-sea-center-of-thenuclear-black-market)
Harvard's Project on Managing the Atom has published a comprehensive report on this threat, combining several
Commission, 2005). A nuclear device of this type wouldn't be transported to the target by a sophisticated delivery
system; its more likely delivery mode would be a rental truck. Third, although terrorist groups may not be able to
manufacture the plutonium or weapon-grade uranium to make a crude bomb, it is not beyond their ability to buy or
steal it. And fourth, nuclear smuggling is very difficult to combat. Globalization, huge profit margins, and organized
crime have created a multibillion-dollar illicit-trafficking market that is producing ever more sophisticated methods
of keeping contraband from being discovered. Nuclear contraband has become a part of that illicit market.
The pursuit of nuclear weapons and material by sub national groups has
been an alarming challenge to deal with. This article will examine groups like al Qaeda
that are said to have the ability and motivation to pursue nuclear
capabilities. This study simultaneously provides an insight into the issues related to the demand for these
weapons capabilities and their supply. According to Daniel Metraux, on the demand side
of the nuclear market there are small national groups working with
political or religious belief structures that may be stirred to pursue
massive devastation. Some of these groups have large financial and
organizational resources, together with the physical assets. Some of these
groups also enjoy sanctuary either in a lawless grey zone or as guests of
the local rulers where they can pursue their plans. On the other hand, in Japan,
extensive legal protections for religious organizations operate in a very permissive environment without much state
interference.
Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Senior Fellow, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, John F. Kennedy
School of Government, Harvard University, former Director of the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence, U.S. Department of Energy, former Chief of the Weapons of Mass Destruction
Department, Counter-terrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency, recipient of the CIA Directors
Award, graduate of the U.S. Military Academy, June 29th, New al-Qaeda Chief Zawahiri Has Strong
Nuclear Intent, Forbes, http://blogs.forbes.com/rahimkanani/2011/06/29/new-al-qaeda-chief-zawahirihas-strong-nuclear-intent/)
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served as the former head of the Central Intelligence Agencys WMD and
terrorism efforts, scrutinizing and cross-referencing Zawahiris 268-page
treatise published in 2008 titled Exoneration, the analytics steered us
towards something far more remarkable than expected. As I read the text
closely, in the broader context of al-Qaedas past, my concerns grew that Zawahiri has written this
treatise to play a part in the ritualistic process of preparing for an impending attack, states MowattLarssen. As Osama bin Ladens fatwa in 1998 foreshadowed the 9/11 attack,
Ayman Zawahiris fatwa in 2008 may have started the clock ticking for alQaedas next large scale strike on America. If the pattern of al-Qaedas
modus operandi holds true, we are in the middle of an attack cycle. Among
several important findings, Zawahiri sophisticatedly weaves identical passages, sources and religious
justifications for a nuclear terrorist attack against the United States previously penned by radical Saudi
cleric Nasir al Fahd. Indeed, the language used, research cited, and arguments put forth are nothing
short of detailed and deliberate. Reading as both a religious duty to kill millions of Americans and a
lengthy suicide note together, this piece of literature is something we must take seriously with
Zawahiri now at the helm of al-Qaeda. The time may have come for al-Qaedas new CEO to leave a
legacy of his own. Concluding the authors note, Mowatt-Larssen states, Even if this theory
proves to be wrong, it is better to overestimate the enemy than to under estimate him. Conventional wisdom holds that al-Qaeda is spent that they
are incapable of carrying out another 9/11. Leaving aside whether this view is correct,
for which I harbor grave doubts, we will surely miss the signs of the next
attack if we continue to overestimate our own successes, and dismiss
what terrorists remain capable of accomplishing when they put their minds to it.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
A2 Politics Link
Now is the right time to remove the embargo
Bandow 2012 (Doug Bandow, senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a former special assistant
to former US president Ronald Reagan, December 11, 2012, Time to End the Cuba Embargo, CATO
Institute, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/time-end-cuba-embargo)
served in Havana: for the first time in years, maybe there is some chance for a change in policy. And
there are now many more new young Cuban Americans who support a
more sensible approach to Cuba. Support for the Republican Party also is
falling. According to some exit polls Barack Obama narrowly carried the Cuban American community
in November, after receiving little more than a third of the vote four years ago. He received 60 percent
of the votes of Cuban Americans born in the United States. Barack Obama increased his
votes among Cuban Americans after liberalizing contacts with the island.
He also would have won the presidency without Florida, demonstrating that the state may not be
essential politically. Today even the GOP is no longer reliable. For instance, though
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Jeff Bess
from Cuba by U.S. citizens or legal residents or any of the transactions ordinarily incident to such travel, except in
time of war or armed hostilities between the United States and Cuba, or of imminent danger to the public health or
the physical safety of U.S. travellers. The Cuban embargo, introduced in 1961 and subsequently tightened further,
prohibits travel to and business dealings with Cuba for all U.S. citizens. Many have argued that this policy actually
thwarts U.S. interests and further strengthens the government there. "The
agricultural associations who believe the lifting of travel restrictions to Cuba will increase U.S.
agricultural sales of such commodities as poultry, wheat and soybeans. Agricultural sales to Cuba have averaged
400 million dollars annually since 2000. "In
outdated policy that has not resulted in any advances for the Cuban or
American people."
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Jeff Bess
institution, and Vicki Huddleston, Visiting Fellow The Brookings institution, April 2009, CUBA: A New
policy of Critical and Constructive Engagement, Brookings,
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/reports/2009/4/cuba/0413_cuba.pdf)
The majority of Cuban Americans now agree with the American public that
our half-century-old policy toward Cuba has failed. For the first time since
Florida international University (FiU) began polling Cuban American residents in 1991, a
December 2008 poll found that a majority of Cuban American voters favor
ending current restrictions on travel and remittances to Cuba, and support a bilateral dialogue and
normal diplomatic relations with the Cuban regime by substantial margins.
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Jeff Bess
January 30, 2013, Best Time for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-foru-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
during what Havana calls the special period in time of peace. This refers to the economic crisis,
hydrocarbon energy shortages, and food insecurity that followed the collapse of Soviet Bloc (1989
1991) which was Cubas main trading partner and the source of vital subsidies. The embargo took an
especially harsh toll during the special period. According to a 1997 report Denial of Food and Medicine:
The Impact of the Embargo on Health and Nutrition in Cuba by The American Association for World
Health: the U.S. embargo of Cuba has dramatically harmed the health and
nutrition of large numbers of ordinary Cuban citizens. The report also observed
that the U.S. embargo has caused a significant rise in suffering-and even
to the needless suffering caused by the embargo: The United States economic embargo on Cuba, in
place for more than half a century, continues to impose indiscriminate hardship on Cubans, and has
failed to improve human rights in the country. (2012 Report on Cuba) The embargo, then,
H.O.V.A.
Guzman 2013 (Sandra Guzman, May 8, 2013, Jay-Z and Beyonc's trip to Cuba isn't the
When does a romantic anniversary trip with your hubby to celebrate five
years of marital bliss become an international kerfuffle, complete with
calls for you to be prosecuted for treason? Well, when it's Cuba, where Americans are
banned from traveling to for tourism, thanks to one of the most enduring embargoes in the history of
mankind. Yesterday, Beyonc stopped by ABC's "Good Morning America" and
confessed the outcry over her and Jay Z's trip to Havana was "quite
shocking." Welcome to the land of cray cray, Bey. Emotions run deep,
high, and very bizarre when it comes to the subject of Cuba. When photos
of the celebrity couple strolling Havana were released, a political tumult
of epic proportions erupted in Florida. Sen. Marco Rubio and a small band
of conservative Cuban-American politicos released a statement
vociferously demanding an investigation of the trip by the president and
the Treasury Department. One anti-Castro activist went as far as to threaten to file a petition
against the celebrity couple to be formally prosecuted. Hova and Beyonc's crime? Chilling in Havana.
There's little doubt the collateral damage and suffering on both sides of
the Florida Straits -- families divided, innocents killed, fortunes lost -- has
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Jeff Bess
been profound. But it's high time we stop the madness and bring sanity to
this debate .
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Jeff Bess
***Negative***
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Jeff Bess
CFR.org. She manages the editorial production of the website and covers economic and political
development in Africa and Latin America. Brianna Lee is Senior Production Editor at CFR [January 31,
2013, U.S.-Cuba Relations, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113]
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Jeff Bess
States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal
of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
During the following ten years, US foreign policy attention turned sharply to the Middle East. Washington's
integrationist strategy for the Americas unravelled as its weaknesses and inconsistencies became increasingly
visible. For their part, Latin American governments became increasingly independent and assertive in their foreign
policies, diversified in their international relations, and more inclined to challenge US leadership and initiative. The
United States has not yet come fully to grips with this changing context of hemispheric relations. The G.W. Bush and
Obama administrations remained, at least rhetorically, wedded to the idea of partnerships and shared
responsibilities with Latin America, but these concepts seem less and less relevant to the region's evolving context.
What the past two decades of USLatin American relations may have most
clearly revealed is how difficult it is for Washington to define and execute
a coherent policy in the regionwith officials constrained by domestic
politics, far more urgent demands on its foreign policy resources, and an
increasingly independent and self-assured Latin America. The fact is that
US policies toward Latin American and the Caribbean are almost invariably
derivative policies. They tend not to be the result of a careful calculation of
US interests and values and a clear view of what it will take to advance them .
Instead, they tend to be mostly shaped by US domestic political
considerations or by the demands of global issues.
States and Latin America: The Neighbourhood has Changed, The International Spectator: Italian Journal
of International Affairs, Volume 46, Issue 4, 2011)
The electoral triumph of Barack Obama was enthusiastically welcomed in Latin America and the Caribbean.15 The
spirited reaction to Obama's election made it clear that Latin Americans wanted a good relationship with the United
States, but that they also wanted the United States to pursue a different approach to the region and to foreign
policy generally. Expectations for the new administration were high throughout the region.
In contrast to many of his predecessors, Obama did not present a grand vision or a broad strategy for US policy in
the hemisphere. Instead, he saw his presidency as an opportunity to solve some long-standing problems, reduce
discord and friction, and encourage greater cooperation. Most of all, he promised a change in style and emphasis
fundamentally a turn to multilateralism and partnership, and a closer alignment of the United States and Latin
American policy agendas. This would be a time to reinvigorate US relations in the hemisphere and perhaps set the
stage for a new approach to regional affairs, not to embark on major new initiatives.
Obama himself remains widely admired and extremely well liked in Latin
America, but his administration has not managed to improve the quality of USLatin American relations or
develop more productive regional ties.
The new president's overcrowded agenda has left little room for Latin
America. Foreign policy has generally taken a back seat to the US' economic
problems, health reform and myriad other domestic challenges. Latin America has had no
chance of competing successfully for Washington's limited foreign policy
attention with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Iran's nuclear ambitions and China's expanding global muscle.
The intense and bitter partisanship of Washington has compounded the problem.
Neither Democrats nor Republicans have been eager to take on the politically volatile challenge of
immigration reform, which remains the highest priority issue for Mexico
and most nations of Central America and the Caribbean .16 Though the US Congress
finally ratified the long-stalled free trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, only one in six Democrats in the
House voted for both pacts. A Republican majority in the lower house of Congress now blocks any further relaxation
of Cuba policy.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
today they
are a major source of friction in USLatin American relations, which have
been strained by disagreements over Honduras, regional efforts to restore
Cuba to OAS membership, South American opposition to the USColombia
defence pact, and Iran's ties to Brazil and other nations .
United States. Over time, they might well allow for more productive hemispheric partnerships. But,
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Guantanamo Bay .
Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the U nited States brought
prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban
officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of
terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the
rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered
Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of
January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an
extended period. Cuban exile community . The Cuban-American community
in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with
Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an
important swing state in presidential elections.
record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006.
Since 1961, the official U.S. policy toward Cuba has been two-pronged :
economic embargo and diplomatic isolation. The George W. Bush administration strongly
enforced the embargo and increased travel restrictions. Americans with immediate family in Cuba could visit once
every three years for a maximum of two weeks, while family remittances to Cuba were reduced from $3,000 to just
$300 in 2004. However, in April 2009, President Obama eased some of these policies. He went further in 2011 to
undo many of the restrictions imposed by the Bush administration, thus allowing U.S. citizens to send remittances
to non-family members in Cuba and to travel to Cuba for educational or religious purposes. Congress amended the
trade embargo in 2000 to allow agricultural exports from the United States to Cuba. In 2008, U.S. companies
exported roughly $710 million worth of food and agricultural products to the island nation, according to the U.S.Cuba Trade and Economic Council. However, that number fell by about 50 percent in 2012. Total agricultural exports
since 2001 reached $3.5 billion as of February 2012. Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Texas have all brokered agricultural
deals with Cuba in recent years. Tension
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Jeff Bess
conflict.html
On the other hand, Donald Nuechterlein claimed that the fundamental national interest of the United
States is the defence and the well-being of its citizens, its territory, and the U.S. constitutional
system. (3, Pg. 310) The Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice promised to resist what she called the
growth of anti-democratic populism in Latin America (4). While asserting that some rhetoric
defined as populist is constructive, Rice said that in Latin America, that normally is not the case. The
U.S. agenda's vital interest is to push back a multilateral programme between the Venezuelan
government and the axis of evil that could shatter the flimsy Latin America
stability. In other words, under unipolarity dominated by a democratic pole we
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
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Jeff Bess
economic realities of globalisation have drawn more countries to Latin America, perhaps reducing the
relative isolation of Latin America from the rest of the world, it is fanciful to read into this a
prospective great game for influence and control. The need for the
region to defend against an external threat is not there in a way that
should seriously affect defence policy or the sizing of armed forces.
No escalation
Dominguez et al 2003 (Jorge I. Dominguez, Clarence Dillon Professor of International
Relations and director of the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University, David
Mares, Manuel Orozco, David Scott Palmer, Francisco Rojas Aravena, Andres Serbin, United States
Institute of Peace, August, Peaceworks No. 50, http://www.usip.org/publications/boundary-disputeslatin-america)
Since the start of 2000, five Latin American boundary disputes between neighboring states have
resulted in the use of force, and two others in its deployment. These incidents involved ten of the
nineteen independent countries of South and Central America. In 1995, Ecuador and Peru went to war,
resulting in more than a thousand deaths and injuries and significant economic loss. And yet, by
how to explain the following unusual cluster of traits in the hemisphere: Territorial, boundary, and
other disputes endure. Interstate conflict over boundaries is relatively frequent. Disputes
sometimes escalate to military conflict because states recurrently employ low levels of force to shape
aspects of bilateral relations. Such escalation rarely reaches full-scale war.
Interstate war is infrequent indeed. Solving this puzzle may help point the way toward
more effective prevention and resolution of conflicts about borders and territory. It is encouraging to
note that some of the longest-lasting and most serious boundary disputes in
South America have been settled since 1990Argentina and Chile, Ecuador and Peru,
Chile and Peru, Brazil and all its neighbors. At the same time, however, similar border disputes have
been exacerbated in the cases of Guyana, Venezuela, and Colombia and in Central America. Each of
this second set of countries has been involved in at least one militarized interstate dispute since 1990.
Nicaragua tops the list, having had militarized disputes with four states. Venezuela and Honduras have
each had militarized disputes with three neighboring states. El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, and
Colombia have each had militarized disputes with two neighbors. Since 1990 militarized interstate
disputes have been frequent, therefore, yet only the dispute between Ecuador and
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
When viewed through this prims of usability, I suggest that U.S. "soft
power" stacks up much less well than is usually alleged vis--vis the ability of a
Leninist soft power "competitor" such as the People's Republic of China (PRC) to manipulate, if it
wishes, most aspects of its multifaceted interactions with the outside world. Making the situation
worse, I suggest that the Obama Administration has fallen into the trap of
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
The current U.S. administration certainly talks big about the virtues "soft
power," but when it comes to actually trying to use it as opposed to simply
placing one's trust in vague notions of globalization-facilitated socio-economic convergence that will
make everything come out alright whether or not one faces up to difficult policy trade-offs and actually
exerts effort to bring about changes in the world Washington is remarkably
which we are supposedly to model for others in the world. (Everyone, we are told, believes themselves
special.) Could one imagine a more absurd foundation for ideational "soft
power" projection than such politically-correct relativism?
when it wants to, over business, financial, media, and cultural institutions (the most significant of
which are still actually run directly by the state and supervised by the Party anyway) the modern
PRC is conspicuous in the degree to which its system combines (a) the
capacity to exert a real degree of purposive control over the facets of
China's social and political engagement with the outside world with (b) a
notable willingness to use such tools in pursuit of national objectives.
When such a conjunction occurs in a country having the considerable (and
still growing) economic weight of the modern PRC, "soft power" in the
sense of usability that I emphasize in my article can be quite real indeed.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
Rentschler and an expert on security issues in the Middle East, Western Europe, and Central Asia at the
CATO Institute) and Charles V. Pena (Senior Fellow at the Independent Institute as well as a senior
fellow with the Coalition for a Realistic Foreign Policy, and an adviser on the Straus Military Reform
Project at the CATO Institute) 2003 47. US Security Strategy CATO Handbook for Congress,
http://www.cato.org/pubs/handbook/hb108/hb108-47.pdf
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Jeff Bess
One potential explanation for the growth of global peace can be dismissed
fairly quickly: US actions do not seem to have contributed much. The limited
evidence suggests that there is little reason to believe in the stabilising
power of the US hegemon, and that there is no relation between the
relative level of American activism and international stability. During the
1990s, the United States cut back on its defence spending fairly
substantially. By 1998, the United States was spending $100 billion less on
defence in real terms than it had in 1990, a 25% reduction.29 To internationalists,
defence hawks and other believers in hegemonic stability, this irresponsible 'peace
dividend' endangered both national and global security. 'No serious analyst of
American military capabilities', argued neo-conservatives William Kristol and
Robert Kagan in 1996, 'doubts that the defense budget has been cut much
too far to meet America's responsibilities to itself and to world peace'.30
And yet the verdict from the 1990s is fairly plain: the world grew more
peaceful while the United States cut its forces. No state seemed to believe
that its security was endangered by a less-capable US military, or at least
none took any action that would suggest such a belief. No militaries were
enhanced to address power vacuums; no security dilemmas drove
insecurity or arms races; no regional balancing occurred once the stabilising presence of the US military was diminished. The rest of the world
acted as if the threat of international war was not a pressing concern,
despite the reduction in US military capabilities. Most of all, the United States
was no less safe. The incidence and magnitude of global conflict declined while the
United States cut its military spending under President Bill Clinton, and kept
declining as the George W. Bush administration ramped the spending back up.
Complex statistical analysis is unnecessary to reach the conclusion that world peace
and US military expenditure are unrelated.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
United States were to modestly refocus its efforts, draw down its military
power, and call on other countries to play a larger role in their own
defense, and in the security of their respective regions. But while there are
credible alternatives to the United States serving in its current dual role as world policeman / armed
social worker, the foreign policy establishment in Washington has no interest in exploring them. The
people here have grown accustomed to living at the center of the earth, and indeed, of the universe.
The tangible benefits of all this military spending flow disproportionately to this tiny corner of the
United States while the schlubs in fly-over country pick up the tab.
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
It will be useful at this juncture to address more directly the set of instability arguments advanced by certain policy makers and scholars: the
domino effect of new nuclear weapon states, the probability of preventative action against new nuclear weapon states, and the compulsion of
these states to use their small arsenals early for fear of losing them in a preventive or preemptive strike by a stronger nuclear adversary. On
the domino effect, Indias and Pakistans nuclear weapon programs have
not fueled new programs in South Asia or beyond. Irans quest for nuclear
weapons is not a reaction to the Indian or Pakistani programs. It is grounded in that countrys security
concerns about the U ntied S tates and Tehrans regional aspirations. The North Korean test has
evoked mixed reactions in Northeast Asia. Tokyo is certainly concerned; its
reaction, though, has not been to initiate its own nuclear weapon program
but to reaffirm and strengthen the American extended deterrence commitment to Japan. Even if the U.S.-Japan
security treaty were to weaken, it is not certain that Japan would embark
on a nuclear weapon program. Likewise, South Korea has sought
reaffirmation of the American extended deterrence commitment, but has
firmly held to its nonnuclear posture. Without dramatic change in its political, economic, and security
circumstances, South Korea is highly unlikely to embark on a covert (or overt) nuclear weapon program as it did in the 1970s. South Korea could
still become a nuclear weapon state by inheriting the nuclear weapons of North Korea should the Kim Jong Il regime collapse. Whether it retains
or gives up that capability will hinge on the security circumstances of a unified Korea. The North Korean nuclear test has not
lead to the predicted domino effect in Southeast Asia and brought about a fundamental transformation in that sub region (Lord 1993, 1996). In
a nuclear Iran. A nuclear Iran may or may not have destabilizing effects. Such claims must be assessed on the basis of an objective reading of
the drivers of national and regional security in Iran and the Middle East.
and Kyle Beardsley, Asst. Prof. Pol. Sci. Emory Univ., Journal of Peace Research, Proliferation and
International Crisis Behavior, accessed: 12-18-09, http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/44/2/139
The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict.
The optimists argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are
unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument,
contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does
not discourage war but rather makes war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication
from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and
the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will
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weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the
results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to
end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved
increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust
even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear
capability. In confirming that nuclear weapons tend to increase restraint in
crises, the effect of nuclear weapons on strategic behavior is clarified. But the findings do not
suggest that increasing the number of nuclear actors in a crisis can prevent war, and they cannot
speak to other proliferation risks
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4
VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The
state is not a prize?Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential
models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet
we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at
the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by
extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if
anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and
length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more
than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war
onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and
Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political
economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be
taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive
and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should
provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more
abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other
time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations
prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored
or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political
science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times
permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring
political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current
revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state
capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive
commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly.
The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a
large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation
is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out.
Opportunity cost: Victory by default?Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war
intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the
relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state
capacity view. Moreover, we shouldnt mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and
incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with
psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories
of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to
distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result. Ultimately, however, the
fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict
onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be
less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed . One
possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk,
costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset.
In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so
fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may
trigger war even in the absence of a price shock . The same argument has been
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made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing
nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings
When the global financial crisis struck roughly a year ago, the blogosphere was
ablaze with all sorts of scary predictions of, and commentary regarding, ensuing
conflict and wars -- a rerun of the Great Depression leading to world war, as it were. Now, as
global economic news brightens and recovery -- surprisingly led by China and emerging markets -- is
the talk of the day, it's interesting to look back over the past year and realize how globalization's
Palestine) predates the economic crisis by a year, and three quarters of the chronic struggles began in
the last century. Ditto for the 15 low-intensity conflicts listed by Wikipedia (where the latest entry is the
Mexican "drug war" begun in 2006). Certainly, the Russia-Georgia conflict last August was specifically
timed, but by most accounts the opening ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was the most important
external trigger (followed by the U.S. presidential campaign) for that sudden spike in an almost twodecade long struggle between Georgia and its two breakaway regions. Looking over the
various databases, then, we see a most familiar picture: the usual mix of
civil conflicts, insurgencies, and liberation-themed terrorist movements.
Besides the recent Russia-Georgia dust-up, the only two potential state-on-state wars (North v. South
Korea, Israel v. Iran) are both tied to one side acquiring a nuclear weapon capacity -- a process
wholly unrelated to global economic trends. And with the United States effectively tied
down by its two ongoing major interventions (Iraq and Afghanistan-bleeding-into-Pakistan), our
involvement elsewhere around the planet has been quite modest, both leading up to and following the
onset of the economic crisis: e.g., the usual counter-drug efforts in Latin America, the usual military
exercises with allies across Asia, mixing it up with pirates off Somalia's coast). Everywhere else
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Jeff Bess
we find serious instability we pretty much let it burn , occasionally pressing the
Chinese -- unsuccessfully -- to do something. Our new Africa Command, for example, hasn't led us to
anything beyond advising and training local forces. So, to sum up: * No significant uptick
in mass violence or unrest (remember the smattering of urban riots last year in places like
Greece, Moldova and Latvia?); * The usual frequency maintained in civil conflicts
(in all the usual places); * Not a single state-on-state war directly caused
(and no great-power-on-great-power crises even triggered); * No great
improvement or disruption in great-power cooperation regarding the emergence of new
nuclear powers (despite all that diplomacy); * A modest scaling back of international policing efforts by
the system's acknowledged Leviathan power (inevitable given the strain); and * No serious
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Cuba Aff/Neg
Jeff Bess
January 30, 2013, Best Time for US-Cuba Rapprochement is Now, http://www.coha.org/best-time-foru-s-cuba-rapprochement-is-now/#sthash.ZisN1pQb.dpuf
Obamas election to a second term means that there is to be a progressive dividend, surely such a
dividend ought to include a change in US policy towards the island. Mirabile dictu, the Administration
can build on the small steps it has already taken. Since 2009, Washington has lifted
some of the restrictions on travel between the US and Cuba and now
allows Cuban Americans to send remittances to relatives on the island.
The Cuba Reconciliation Act (HR 214) introduced by Representative Jose Serrano (D-NY) on
January 4, 2013, and sitting in a number of congressional committees, would repeal the harsh
terms of the Cuban Democracy Act of 1992 and the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, both of which
toughened the embargo during the special period in Cuba. The Cuba Reconciliation Act,
however, is unlikely to get much traction, especially with ultra-hardliner
Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL), chairing the House Foreign
Relations Committee, and her counterpart, Robert Menendez (D-NJ), who
is
about to lead the Senate Foreign Relations Body. Some of the anti-Castro
Cuban American community would likely view any of the three measures
advocated here as a capitulation to the Castro brothers. But as we have argued,
a pro-democracy and humanist position is not in any way undermined, but might in fact be advanced
by dtente. An end to the embargo has been long overdue, and the judgment of history may very well
be that it ought never to have been started.
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