Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
1.
Nature of dissolution
Signifies the extinguishment of its franchise and the termination of its
corporate existence or business purpose.
May be either de jure or de facto
o De jure: one adjudged and determined by administrative or judicial
sentence or brought about by an act of the sovereign power
o De facto: one which takes place in substance and in fact when the
corporation by reason of insolvency, cessation of business, or suspension
of all its operations, goes into liquidation, still retaining its primary
franchise to be a corporation
Cause of dissolution
Defn of dissolution: the corporation ceases to be a juridical person and
consequently can no longer continue transacting its business, but may
continue its corporate existence for a period of 3 years from such dissolution
for the purpose of winding up and liquidation
Defn of winding up: collection of all assets, payment of all creditors,
distribution of all remaining assets (if any) among the SHs
Defn of liquidation: the settlement of the affairs of the corporation which
consists of adjusting the debts and claims, that is, of collecting all that is due
Sec 120
120: corporation automatically dissolved upon the happening of either
of two events:
1
Sec 119
Sec 118
SEC may direct the manner in which liquidation of corporate assets should
be made by assigning the task to the corporation itself or to a receiver
o SEC retains supervision in either case
Vote of 2/3 OCS is required to signify corporations intent to dissolve
o GR: No member may prevent such dissolution
o Exception: majority SH acted in BF or for the purpose of freezing out
the minority
the minority SHs have nor right and personality to maintain an action for
dissolution, that right belonging only to the State.
H: GR: minority SHs of a corporation cannot sue and demand dissolution.
Exception: if they are unable to obtain redress and protection of their rights
within the corporation (Hall v Piccio). Even the existence of a de jure
corporation may be terminated in a private suit for its dissolution by SHs without
the intervention of the State. The question of the right of minority SHs to ask for
dissolution in Hall was held not to affect the courts jurisdiction over the case,
and that the remedy by the party dissatisfied was to appeal.
Sec 122
4.
GR: minority SHs cannot ask for dissolution in a private suit, and that action
should be brought by the government through its legal officer. Exception: cases
wherein the intervention of the State cannot be obtained because the complaint
is a matter strictly between the SH and the corporation and does not involve
issues which involve acts/omissions warranting a quo warranto. When such
action is brought, the TC has jurisdiction and has discretion to grant the prayer
or not. Having such jurisdiction, the appointment of e receiver pendent elite is
left to the sound discretion of the TC. In Angeles v Santos, it was held that it is
within the power of the court upon proper showing to appoint a receiver
pendente lite once the action is properly brought and court acquires jurisdiction.
5.
steps as necessary to endow the legal entity with the capacity to transact
the legitimate business for which it was created
organization: the systematization and orderly arrangement of the internal
and managerial affairs and organs of the corporation
commence business: perform preparatory acts geared towards the
fulfillment of the purposes for which it was established such as but not
limited to:
o entering into contracts or negotiations for lease or sale of properties
o making plans for and the construction of the factory
o taking steps to expedite construction
involuntary dissolution
Sec 121
a corporation may be dissolved by the SEC upon a filing of a
verified complaint and after notice and hearing
Grounds for involuntary dissolution:
a. Does not formally organize and commence business within 2
years from date of incorporationcorporate power ceases and
corporation is deemed dissolved
b. Subsequently becomes continuously inoperative after
commencing business for at least 5 years
c. Failure to adopt by-laws
d. Offended against a provision of law for its creation or renewal
e. Commission/omission of an act tantamount to a surrender of
corporate rights and privileges
f. Misuse of a right, privilege, franchise conferred by law or the
exercise of the same in contravention of law
g. Continuance of business would not be feasible or profitable
nor work to the best interests of SHs, parties, creditors,
general public
i. Based on findings and recommendations of a
management committee or receiver
h. Guilty of fraud in procuring certificate of registration
i. Guilty of serious misrepresentation
j. Refusal to comply or defiance to a lawful order of the SEC
k. Failure to file required reports
Sec 22
by-laws must be adopted within one month of receipt of notice of the
issuance of the certificate of incorporation, otherwise the certificate may
be suspended or revoked
corporate business must be commenced within 2 years, otherwise
corporation deemed dissolved and corporate powers will cease
o corporation would neither be a de jure or de facto corporation
transacting business implies a continuity of acts or dealings in the
accomplishment of the purpose for which the corporation was formed
(Mentholatum case infra)
o even a single act would be sufficient if it is intended to be a series of
acts in pursuance of the corporate business
o but must take place within the 2-year period
Art 3 of Code of Commerce: presumption of habituality
o Rebuttable
Sec 22: corporate powers will cease, and corporation will be deemed
dissolved if not complied with the 2-year requirement
If corporation commenced its business within 2 years but discontinues for
at least 5 continuous years, certificate of incorporation may be revoked by
SEC
o No automatic dissolution
o SEC proceeding necessary
o Notice must be given to the corporation and opportunity to be heard
(1)
(2)
board and 2/3 SHs acceded to the request to dissolve as the most feasible
remedy to its problems. Republic moves that the matter of implementation of
the dissolution be submitted to the TC for judgment. Cuenco concurs but urges
the appointment of a receiver. Directors not Cuenco filed a motion to withdraw
its previous motion for judgment on consent on the ground that the conditions to
which motion was subject had not been accepted. Cuenco opposes withdrawal
and pressed for appointment of receiver. TC denied motion to withdraw.
Corporation appeals. SolGen Barredo moved to dismiss quo warranto
proceedings, to which Cuenco opposed. TC grants Republics motion but
denies Cuencos crossclaim.
I: W/N the TC should have ordered dissolution upon its motion and not the
Republics, as it amounted to a confession of judgment.
H; A motion for judgment on consent is not to be equated with judgment by
confession. There must be an unqualified agreement among the parties to the
action entered in the record with leave of court. A judgment by confession is not
a plea but an affirmative and voluntary act of the defendant himself. In this
case, there was no meeting of the minds among the parties with respect to the
motion for judgment on consent. Corporation wanted its liquidation to be
effected by its Board. Cuenco wanted the appointment of a receiver in agreeing
to dissolution, and after his cross-claims were considered. Before the parties
could come to an unqualified agreement, the corporation moves to withdraw its
motion for judgment on consent. It is clear that the parties could not agree as to
the terms of dissolution, and the TC correctly rendered judgment dissolving the
corporation.
I: W/n TC was wrong in not granting quo warranto because the evidence
presented fails to constitute grounds for quo warranto
H: TC found that the alleged misuse of funds were committed more particularly
by Dr Manuel Cuenco with the cooperation of Velez, for which they are
personally liable. The alleged illegal corporate acts had not resulted in
substantial injury to the public, nor were they willful and clearly obdurate. It
found that the controversy between the parties was more personal than
anything else and did not at all affect public interest. Such private controversies
can be ventilated in appropriate SHs suit which do not have to occupy the time
and attention of government officials. The SolGen himself admits that his
reason for the MTD is to take the State out of an unnecessary court litigation.
P 289,260.88. the spouses prayed that the real estate mortgage be cancelled,
and that Philsucom and SRA be required jointly and severally to reimburse the
petitioners the amount of P 289,260.88 + damages. The RPBank, Philsucom
and herein respondent SRA moved to dismiss the complaint upon the ground of
lack of cause of action. Philsucom and respondent SRA through the Solicitor
General, denied any obligation on the part of the Philsucom to return any
amount to petitioners on account of allegedly unauthorized deductions from the
proceeds of petitioners' sugar sold by the Philsucom. For its part, the SRA also
noted that while the deductions complained of were made by the Philsucom
during the period from 1980 to 1984, the SRA itself had been created by
Executive Order No. 18 only on 18 May 1986 and that it was not a party to the
real estate mortgage between petitioners and the RPBank.
H: Executive Order No. 18, promulgated on 28 May 1986, abolished the
Philsucom, created the SRA and authorized the transfer of assets from
Philsucom to SRA. Although the Philsucom is hereby abolished, it shall
nevertheless continue as a juridical entity for three years after the time when it
would have been so abolished, for the purpose of prosecuting and defending
suits by or against it and enabling it to settle and close its affairs, to dispose of
and convey its property and to distribute its assets, but not for the purpose of
continuing the functions for which it was established, under the supervision of
the Sugar Regulatory Administration. (Emphasis supplied). We note that
Executive Order No. 18 did not provide for universal succession, as it were, of
SRA to Philsucom, or more specifically to the assets and liabilities of
Philsucom. The SRA has been authorized to determine which of the assets and
records of Philsucom are required for the carrying out of the activities which the
SRA is to carry on or undertake. The succession of the SRA to the assets and
records of the Philsucom is thus limited in nature; the extent of such succession
is left to the discretionary determination of the SRA itself. More importantly,
Executive Order No. 18 is silent as to the liabilities of Philsucom; it does not
speak of assumption of such liabilities by the SRA.
Petitioners have noted in this connection that the three (3) year period provided
for in the third paragraph of Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18 is about to
expire. There is nothing to prevent Philsucom from appointing a trustee SRA for
instance and conveying all its properties to such trustee, for the benefit of the
Government, creditors and other persons in interest, following at least by
analogy the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 122 of the
Corporation Code. Should Philsucom decline to so appoint SRA as trustee, the
principles set forth above would of course apply, mutatis mutandis, in respect of
whichever public agency may find itself actually holding the assets and records
of Philsucom.
That the assets of the Philsucom must respond for payment of lawful obligations of
Philsucom, does not appear to require demonstration. The assets which, in
accordance with the second paragraph of Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18,
may be taken over by the SRA can thus be only net or residual assets, assets
remaining after payment of the valid and enforceable liabilities of Philsucom has
been made or been adequately provided for. We believe, in other words, that
Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18 is not to be interpreted as authorizing
respondent SRA to disable Philsucom from paying Philsucom's demandable
obligations by simply taking over Philsucom's assets and immunizing them from
legitimate claims against Philsucom. The right of those who have previously
contracted with, or otherwise acquired lawful claims against, Philsucom, to have
the assets of Philsucom applied to the satisfaction of those claims, is a substantive
right and not merely a procedural remedy. Section 13 cannot be read as permitting
the SRA to destroy that substantive right. We think that such an interpretation
would result in Section 13 of Executive Order No. 18 colliding with the nonimpairment of contracts clause of the Constitution insofar as contractual claims are
concerned, and with the due process clause insofar as the non-contractual claims
are concerned. 5 To avoid such a result, we believe and so hold that should the
assets of Philsucom remaining in Philsucom at the time of its abolition not be
adequate to pay for all lawful claims against Philsucom, respondent SRA must be
held liable for such claims against Philsucom to the extent of the fair value of
assets actually taken over by the SRA from Philsucom, if any. To this extent,
claimants against Philsucom do have a right to follow Philsucom's assets in the
hands of SRA or any other agency for that matter. This result appears no more
than a dictate of elementary fairness, particularly when one takes into account that
under Section 11 of Executive Order No. 18, the SRA will continue, "until otherwise
provided, as directed and ordered by the President of the Philippines," to collect
and receive the proceeds of "levies, charges and other impositions as [then]
granted by law, decree and/or executive order, to the [Philsucom]." Whether the
deductions here assailed by petitioners are included among the "levies, charges
and other impositions" then made by Philsucom and now continued by SRA must
be determined by the trial court.
to its SHs.
Termination of life of a juridical entity does not by itself imply the diminution or
extinction of rights demandable against a juridical entity. Consequently, when the
assets of a dissolved entity are taken over by another entity, the successor entity
must be held liable for the obligations of the dissolved entity pertaining to the
assets so assumed, to the extent of the fair value of assets actually taken over.
Sec 122
1.
suits by and against it and to enable it to settle and close its affairs, culminating in
the disposition and distribution of its remaining assets. It may, during the three-year
term, appoint a trustee or a receiver who may act beyond that period.
Pore moved to dismiss on the ground that the corporation had no legal capacity
to sue, it having been abolished by EO 372. Corporation contends that the EO
also stipulates that it shall continue as a body corporate for 3 years from date of
effectivity of the EO, for the purpose of defending and prosecuting suits and
enabling the Board of Liquidators to settle and close all its affairs.
At any time during the said three (3) years, the corporation is authorized and
empowered to convey all of its properties to trustees for the benefit of stockholders,
members, creditors, and other persons in interest. From and after any such
conveyance by the corporation of its properties in trust for the benefit of its
stockholders, members, creditors and others in interest, all interest which the
corporation had in the properties terminates the legal interest vests in the trustees,
and the beneficial interest in the stockholders, members, creditors or other persons
in interest.
Upon the winding up of the corporate affairs, any asset distributable to any creditor
or stockholder or member, who is unknown or cannot be found, shall be escheated
to the city or municipality where such assets are located.
W/m the TC was correct in dismissing motion. NO. should have granted the
motion
H: GR: pending actions by or against a corporation are abated upon the
expiration of the period allowed by law for liquidation. The old corpo law
contains no provision authorizing a corporation after 3 years from expiration of
its lifetime, to continue in its corporate name actions instituted by it within a
period of 3 years. It provides that it will continue as a body corporate for 3 years
after the time when it would have been dissolved, for purposes of prosecuting
and defending suit by or against it. During the time which the corporation,
through its officers, may conduct the liquidation of assets and sue and be sued
as a corporation is limited to 3 years from the time period of dissolution
commences, but that there is no time limit within which trustees must complete
a liquidation placed in their hands. The conveyance to the trustees must be
made within the 3 year period. It may be found impossible to complete the work
of liquidation within the 3 year period or to reduce dispute claims to judgment.
Suits by or against a corporate abate when it ceased to be an entity capable of
suing or being sued; but trustees to whom the corporate assets have been
The termination of the life of a corporate entity does not by itself cause the
extinction or diminution of the rights and liabilities of such entity. If the three-year
extended life has expired without a trustee or receiver having been expressly
designated by the corporation, within that period, the board of directors (or
trustees) itself, may be permitted to so continue as "trustees" by legal implication to
complete the corporate liquidation.
National Abaca v Pore. F: National Abaca Corp sued Apolonia Pore to recover
money advanced for the purchase of hemp for the account of the corporation for
which she failed to account therefor. Pore in defense, contends that she made an
accounting of the advances received by her. TC held her accountable and ordered
to her to pay the corporation.
conveyed pursuant to the authority of the code may sue and be sued as such in all
matters connected with the liquidation. The effect of conveyance is to make the
trustees legal owners of the property conveyed, subject to the beneficial interest
therein of creditors and SHs. The complete loss of Abacas corporate existence
after the expiration of 3 year period is what impelled the creation of the Board of
Liquidators, to continue the management of pending matters.
executory contracts
executory contracts are not extinguished by dissolution
all rights and obligations in an executory contract pass on to a
liquidating trustee or receiver
Sec 145
3.
methods of liquidation
122
manner of liquidation or winding up may be stipulated in the by-laws
three methods of liquidation:
a. liquidation by the corporation itself through the Boardthe
normal procedure is for directors and officers to have charge of
the winding up operations, though there is the alternative method
of assigning the property to the trustees for the benefit of creditors
and SHs. While the appointment of a receiver rests with the
sound discretion of the court, such discretion must be exercised
with caution and governed by legal and equitable principles
(China Bank v Michelin)
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if three year period expires, a creditor may still sue the trustee or
follow the corporate assets in the hands of SHs who may have
received the same as liquidating dividends
4.
China Banking Corporation v. Michelin & Co. F: George OFarrel & Cie Inc is
a domestic corporation acting as agent and representative of the M Michelin &
Cie, a foreign corporation engaged in the sale and distribution of Michelin tires.
Michelin decided to discontinue their business relations, and it was discovered
that O Farrel failed to account for an amount representing the price of tires sold
by the latter. Michelin claims the money was disposed by O Farrel for its own
use and benefit and without the authority or consent of Michelin. Gaston
OFarrel (the person) and Sanchez executed a mortgage on the house of
OFarrel and shares owned by both to guarantee payment of the amount to the
Michelin, but left a balance which the latter seeks to recover. The board of
OFarrel filed a petition for its dissolution and sought the appointment of Gaston
as receiver and liquidator, which was granted by TC. Michelin filed its claim
against OFarrel Corp with a prayer that its claim be allowed as a preferred one
against the latter. TC grants motion of Michelin. Nobody except Michelin and
Gaston was notified of the order. China Bank intervened and moved that
Michelins claim be allowed as an ordinary one under the Insolvency Law and
sought the nullification of the TC orders.
H: Claims against a corporation in the hands of a receiver should not be
approved and paid without some formal and regular proceeding after a
reasonable opportunity is given to all parties in interest.
The SC held that the provisions of the Insolvency Law should operate. There is
no reason for the corporation to resort to the court for a decree of voluntary
dissolution. If the corporation was under such a financial condition as alleged,
and did not desire to continue doing business, there is no necessity for judicial
intervention in the winding up of affairs coupled with the appointment for a
receiver to deal with creditors as though they were creditors of an insolvent
corporation. Under the old corpo law, with respect to decrees of dissolution
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upon voluntary application, the court may appoint receivers to collect and take
charge of the assets. It is permissive and not mandatory, because in cases of
voluntary dissolution there is no occasion for the appointment of a receiver except
under special circumstances. Such discretion on the part of the court to appoint
must be exercised with caution. IT does not empower the court to hear and pass
upon the claims of creditors of the corporation at first hand. In such cases, the
receiver does not act as a receiver of an insolvent corporation. Since liquidation
consists of collecting all that is due the corporation, all claims must be presented
for allowance to the receiver or trustees during winding up, within 3 years as
provided in Corpo Law. The rulings of the receiver are subject to judicial review by
the court which appointed him.
The normal method is for directors/officers to have charge of the winding up,
though there is the alternative method of assigning property of the corporation to
trustees. The law authorizing voluntary dissolutions are generally held to apply only
to dissolutions brought about by the SHs themselves.
China Banks motion was filed 13 months after the decree of dissolution was
entered, thus the motion was flied on time to have its claim reviewed by the court.
The appointment of Gaston as the receiver, who was also the principal promoter of
the corporation and at one time the majority SH, president, and GM, lends itself to
serious suspicion. His administration of the business left much to be desired and
that he alone ought to be blamed for the shortage claimed by Michelin, but to save
himself he made the corporation shoulder the burden of obligations in exchange for
a simulated conveyance of his house and shares to the corporation. Once
delinquent, Gaston resorted to a judicial proceeding of voluntary dissolution in an
attempt to settle Michelin claim and to free himself from any liability, and allowed
the claim to be a preferred claim without informing or notifying interested parties,
such as China Bank, which also had a claim.
Michelins claim cannot be allowed as a preferred claim, because the merchandise
was no longer in the corporations possession. The rubber tires consigned were to
be sold on order, and the claim for the advance seems to be in the nature of a
current account between the two companies more than anything else.
But there is nothing in the provision which bars an action for recovery of debts
of the corporation against the liquidator himself, after the lapse of the 3-year
period
thus the beneficiaries of the defunct corporation and should be held liable to
pay the taxes, but only in proportion to their respective shares in the distribution
of assets.
Tan Tiong Bio v CIR. F: Tan Tiong Bio et al are incorporators and directors (some
are officersPresident and treasurer) of the Central Syndicate. The company
realized a net profit of close to P300K, and sale of goods was the only transaction
undertaken by it. BIR sues the Tan Tiong et al for deficiency sales taxes and
surcharges on surplus goods purchased by the corporation from the Foreign
Liquidation Commission. Corporation was dissolved, and Tan Tiong and company
substituted themselves as parties, thereby becoming successors-in-interests in the
corporate assets after liquidation. TC rules ifo BIR, and Tan Tiong et al appeals,
claiming that they cannot be held liable for tax liability there being no law
authorizing the government to proceed against SHs of a defunct corporation as
transferees of the corporate assets upon liquidation. If they were liable, it is only to
the extent of the benefits derived by them, and that the action is barred by
prescription due to the 3-year limit in the corpo Law.
I: W/n the sales tax can be enforced against the corporations successors-ininterest, even if corporation has been dissolved by expiration of corporate
existence.
--YES
Even after the 3 year period of liquidation, corporate creditors can still
pursue their claims against corporate assets against the officers or SHs
who have taken over the properties of the corporation
SC held that the State cannot insist on making tax assessments against a
corporation that no longer exists and then turn around and oppose the
appeal questioning the legality of the assessment precisely on the same
ground that the corporation is non-existent
The remedy of corporate creditors after the 3-year period is to race where
the corporate assets have gone, wherever they rested, be he a SH or a
non-SH. Cause of action is to file an action against that person who has
control over the corporate assets.
Method
Initiating party
Action to be taken
Voluntary
SHs
Amendment
of
AOI
(shorten term)
Petition for dissolution
with creditors consent
Involuntary
Minority/majority SHs
State
Creditors
Inaction
SEC
Revocation of certificate
of registration
The creditor of a dissolved corporation may follow its assets once they passed into
the hands of a SH. The dissolution of a corporation does not extinguish debts due
or owing to it. A creditor of a dissolved corporation may follow its assets, as in the
nature of a trust fund, into the hands of the SHs. The hands of government cannot
collect taxes from a defunct corporation, it loses thereby none of its rights to
assess taxes due, and to collect the taxes due from the corporation from persons
who by reason of transactions with the corporation, hold property against which the
tex may be enforced. Court ruled that the net profit remained intact and was
distributed among the SHs immediately after sale of surplus. Tan Tiong et al are
SIR:
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2.
3.
3-yr period
Board of Trustees
collation of property/assets
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3.
Secs 76-80
Procedures in Merger or Consolidation:
Plan of Merger or Consolidation
o Under Sec 76, the board is expressly empowered to approve a
plan of merger or consolidation which shall set forth the ff:
Names of constituent corporations
Terms of the merger and mode of carrying it into
effect
A statement of changes in the AOI of the surviving
corporation in case of merger; all statements required
to be set forth in the AOI in the case of consolidation
Such other provisions as are deemed necessary
o Approval by majority vote of the board
SHs approval
o at separate corporate meetings of SHs of each corporation
o notice given to all SHs at least 2 weeks prior to the meetings
o vote of 2/3 of OCS
Appraisal right
Nature; distinction
The power to merge or consolidate is not among the inherent powers
of corporations and must be expressly granted by law
2.
Effects of merger:
o All constituent corporations, except the surviving corporation in
case of merger, shall be dissolved
o There is no winding up or liquidation of assets of the absorbed
absorbing automatically acquires rights, privileges, powers and
liabilities
o Creditors rights are not impaired
4.
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legal requirements
sale of all or substantially all assets: one which will render the
corporation incapable of continuing the business or accomplishing the
purpose= SH action required
short of substantially all= no SH action required
2.
4.
3.
Reyes v. Blouse et al. F: Minority SHs of the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co file an
action to enjoin Blouse et al from executing its resolution approved by 99 % of
SHs to consolidate the properties and franchises of Laguna Tayabas with
Batangas Transport. Blouse believes it is merely an exchange of properties and not
a consolidation.
I: W/n the real purpose of the resolution is merger or consolidation, and if so,
whether it can be carried out under the old Corpo Law.
H: The questioned resolution charges the board of Laguna to consolidate
properties and franchises thereof with that of Batangas Transport. Both
corporations have passed similar resolutions to take steps to effect the
consolidation. It is apparent that the purpose of the resolution is not to dissolve but
to merely transfer its assets to a new corporation in exchange for its shares. This
comes within the purview of the old corporation law, which provides that a
corporation may sell, exchange, lease or otherwise dispose of all its property and
assets when authorized by affirmative vote of 2/3 of SHs. The phrase otherwise
dispose of covers mergers and consolidations. The transaction in this case cannot
be considered, strictly speaking, as a merger or consolidation because a merger
implies the termination or cessation of the merged corporations and not merely a
merger of assets and properties. The two companies will not lose their corporate
existence but will continue to exist after consolidation. What is intended to be
managed and operated by a new corporation, and not a merger.
H: GR: where the corporation sells or otherwise transfers all of its assets to
another corporation, the latter is not liable for the debts and liabilities of the
former.
Exception: (1) purchaser expressly or impliedly assumes such debts; (2)
transaction amounts to a consolidation or merger; (3) purchasing corporation is
merely a continuation of the selling corp; (4) there is fraud to escape liability for
the debts
In the present case, no proof was submitted that Pacific expressly agreed to
assume the debts of Insular or that it is a continuation of Insular, or that the
transaction was tainted in fraud of creditors, or that the two parties merged or
consolidated. In fact, the sales took place, not only over 6 months before
judgment, but also over a month before the filing of the case. Pacific also
purchased the shares as the highest bidder at an auction sale held at the
instance of a bank to which shares have been pledged as security by Insular.
Nell Cos theory that Pacific is the alter ego of Insular negates the fact of
consolidation/merger, because a corporation cannot be its own alter ego.
As to the allegation that the selling price of the assets of P10K was grossly
inadequate and thus tainted with fraud, the SC held that the sale was approved
by the SEC and that it should be presumed that the price was fair and
reasonable, and should be a matter litigated in another venue.
The court added that the merger/consolidation (if any) would still be carried out
under the Public Service Law. It does not impose any qualification other that it shall
be done with the approval of the PSC.
SC: since there is neither proof nor allegation that the transferee-corporation
expressly or impliedly agreed to assume the debt of the corporation, or that the
sale of either the shares or the assets to the appellee has been entered into
fraudulently, in order to escape liability for the debt of the subject corporation,
there was no basis to hold the transferee liable for the debts and liabilities of the
subject corporation
Edward Nell Company v Pacific Farms Inc. F: The Edward Nell Co secured a
judgment representing the unpaid balance of the price of a pump sold to Insular
Farms. Pacific Farms then purchased all or substantially all of shares of stock as
well as real and personal property of Insular, selling the shares to certain
individuals who reorganized Insular. The board of the reorganized Insular then sold
its assets to be sold to Pacific for P10000. The writ of execution was returned,
stating that Insular had no leviable property. Nell Co sued Pacific Farms, on the
ground as a result of the purchase of all or substantially all assets of Insular, Pacific
became the alter ego of Insular Farms.
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3.
Exchange of stocks
yet another method of corporate combination
acquisition of all or substantially all stock of one corporation from SHs
in exchange for stock of another corporation
o SHs of the acquiring become SHs of the acquired
o Once completed, acquired corp becomes a subsidiary of the
acquiring (parent)
Right of dissenting SHs: depends on whether the mother decides to
retain the acquired corporation as a subsidiary, merges with it, or buys
all its assets
o If parent retains as subsidiary:
No appraisal right
No express provision in the Code, but
Campos: SH can sell his stocks to another
corporation, but may be liable for damages if in BF or if it
damages the corporation
o If parent merges or purchases: provisions of the Code
Same rights as dissenting SHs in a merger or sale
appraisal right
Merger/Consolidation
1. dissolution/organization and establishment of new corporation
2. consolidation of equity ownership
3. transfer/conveyance of assets + unconditional assumption of liabilities
SIR:
You have to comply with the provisions of the Code to legally effect
mergers/consolidations; short of that, no merger, no consolidation!
Parties to a merger/consolidation are the corporations, not the SHs!
Merger: marriage of assets and assumption of liabilities
SHs of absorbing become SHs of the absorbed
Isa lang ang patay; or maraming patay pero buhay and kumain!
Consolidation: lahat ng sumali, patay! Why? Objective is to put up a new one,
which shall own all combined assets and is the successor-in-interest to all
obligations
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