Issues & Challenges of Intelligence Accountability in Democratic Societies

Geneva, 10-12 December 2007

Intelligence Cooperation: Dimensions, Activities and Actors Thorsten Wetzling

Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva Issues

Aims
� to provide a differentiated view on a complex subject
� to illustrate actors and activities for one selected dimension of intelligence liaison: i.e.
European counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation
� If time permits, to elaborate on promising and less promising means to establish democratic
control for concerted intelligence activity
Ways to classify intelligence cooperation:
- topic: counter-terrorism, economic, espionage, peacekeeping, etc.
- location : regional, global, sub-regional
- structure/ time: institutionalised or ad hoc
- membership: bilateral, multilateral, supranational
- authorship: exchange of nationally owned intelligence products // joint production of
intelligence
- scope: based on either reciprocity or availability, but: can also entail other trading options:
intel vs. goods/ access rights

Example: European Counter-terrorism intelligence cooperation

� Caveats
� Source Types
� academic articles
�reports by investigative journalists
�reports of parliamentary assemblies and national oversight committees
�reports by national executives
�annual reports by national intelligence services
�publications by or on former intelligence agents
�reports or press-releases by European organizations
�National judicial investigations / proceedings
�internet sources from a wide range of civil-society institutions

Actors /organisations:
� national intelligence and security services (foreign, domestic and military intelligence
services);
� the Club of Bern (CdB);
� the Middle European Conference (MEC);
� the Counter Terrorist Group (CTG);
� the Bureau de Liaison (also known as BDL network);
� the G-6;
� for the European Union: Situation Centre (SITCEN), the Satellite Centre (SATCEN) as well
as the Intelligence Division (INTDIV) within the EU Military Staff;
� coordinating bodies: the European Council’s Security Committee, the Terrorism Working
Group (TWG), the Working Party on Terrorism (COTER), the Standing Committee on Internal

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Security (COSI), the Article 36 Committee (CATS) as well as the no longer operational EU
Counter-Terrorism Coordinator.

Activities:
Q: Based on the intelligence cycle – where does counter-terrorism cooperation come into
play?
A: It is practiced (with different degrees of intensity) at each individual step of the
intelligence cycle.
(a) Planning and direction:
� Bilateral/multilateral dimension:
-- installing means for secure communication
-- establishment of security standards
-- procedural rules on security clearance
-- organisation of liaison officer exchanges/ training
-- investment in joint technological equipment
� supranational dimension:
-- EU High Rep. formulates framework of important
goals and targets. SITCEN then chooses priority
objectives which are summarised in the so-called
“Watch-list”

(b) Collection
� Refers mostly to the sharing of information
� Distinction between “raw” and ‘processed” information sharing
� Bilateral/multilateral dimension:
• Ad hoc: historic and recent examples
• More institutionalised: shared missions, “varifocal model” (ex. Dutch AIVD)
� Supranational dimension:
• Proposal to grant intelligence services access to VISA Information service
• SITCEN gathers information on the items of its
Watchlist

(c) Processing
� Obviously, little is publicly known about content of shared / jointly collected material.
� However, processed information is being shared and fed into national or jointly
operated databases (some of which require further decryption efforts)

(d) Analysis, production and dissemination

� Intelligence reports from the CdB and CTG, SitCen are regularly submitted to national
and CFSP decision makers in the EU
� EUROPOL produces Analytical Work Files on terrorist threat scenarios available to all
contributing members.

Dimensions:
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Dimension Depth Activities Intelligence Intelligence
on the functions sources
cycle
Bilateral *** all all all
Multilateral ** all limited all
EU-level * limited limited only OSIT,
IMINT
Risks:
� many intelligence cooperation practices serve the interests of democratic states
� Sometimes it is not the activity, e.g. the actual sharing of information, but the international
isation of such practices, i.e. the acting beyond the scope of national intelligence laws that
renders it problematic.
� This can – and has – created windows of opportunities that are then no longer compatible
with standards of democratic governance and basic human rights norms
• As per the former, one can point to the possibility of avoiding accountability (in fact it opens
several different pathways)
• As per the later, the sharing of intelligence can certainly jeopardise the right to privacy
� Unfortunately, intelligence laws in Europe are often “far more rigorous concerning agencies’
activities within its own national borders. […] the collection of intelligence abroad is not
regulated with the same stringency […] this area is all too often poorly legislated.”
question of accountability for intelligence cooperation is inherently
complex:
Who seeks what kind of accountability for what kind of cooperation from what kind
of actors?

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who seeks
- national parliaments / international
parliamentary bodies
-Judicial inquiries / judicial review
- Independent investigators on behalf
of parliament / government
- Executive control
for what kind of cooperation
geographical dimension: sub-regional,
regional, global Membership
dimension: bilateral, multilateral,
(limited) supranational
Depth: ex. Exchange of raw or
processed data, joint training, operation security (UN)
voluntary or coerced cooperation
� National accountability for international intelligence cooperation practices
� International accountability for international intelligence cooperation practices
National parliamentary
accountability for bilateral
intelligence cooperation practices
(case 1)
Germany’s parliamentary inquiries into
rendition and the bilateral exchange of
information with US intelligence on Iraq
in 2003
(case 2)
The United Kingdom’s ISC inquiry on
rendition
what kind of accountability
-Time dimension:
Ex ante? (ex. MPs would hold
government to account for positions
they will take in EU negotiations);
ongoing (ex. Immediate access to
government files / intel. premises for
accountholders);
ex post fact
-Scope dimension: effectiveness of
intelligence governance , policy
administration, legality
-Obligation dimension:
vertical, horizontal, diagonal
accountability relationships differ with
respect to their assertiveness
(monitoring vs. scrutiny)
from what kind of actors
Private / public intelligence agencies
National executives EU CFSP decision-
makers, re: EU intelligence
International users of covertly obtained
intelligence in the pursuit of collective
International accountability for
bilateral intelligence cooperation
(case 3)
The European Parliament’s TDIP
committee rendition investigation
(case 4)
PACE ’s Legal Affairs and Human
Rights committee investigation