GE Energy: Generator Protection

GEK 75512l
Revised August 2009
GE Energy
Generator Protection
These instructions do not purport to cover all details or variations in equipment nor to provide for every possible
contingency to be met in connection with installation, operation or maintenance. Should further information be
desired or should particular problems arise which are not covered sufciently for the purchaser's purposes the
matter should be referred to the GE Company.
General Electric Company, 2009. GE Proprietary Information. All Rights Reserved.
GEK 75512l
The below will be found throughout this publication. It is important that the signicance of each is thoroughly
understood by those using this document. The denitions are as follows:
NOTE
Highlights an essential element of a procedure to assure correctness.
CAUTION
Indicates a potentially hazardous situation, which, if not avoided, could result in
minor or moderate injury or equipment damage.
WARNING
INDICATES A POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION,
WHICH, IF NOT AVOIDED, COULD RESULT IN DEATH OR
SERIOUS INJURY
***DANGER***
INDICATES AN IMMINENTLY HAZARDOUS SITUATION, WHICH, IF NOT AVOIDED WILL RESULT IN
DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY.
GEK 75512l
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................................
A. Standards ..................................................................................................................................
B. Protection Responsibility .........................................................................................................
C. Protection Equipment...............................................................................................................
4
4
4
5
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS ....................

A. Operation and Protection..........................................................................................................
B. Protection and Alarms..............................................................................................................
6
6
6
III. ALARMS ........................................................................................................................................
IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE ..............................................................
V. TRIPPING METHODS.................................................................................................................
A. Protective Actions for Generator Faults...................................................................................
10
10
VI. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................

A. Discussion and Recommendations for Generator Faults .........................................................
12
12
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. .................................................................................................................................................
17
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. ALARMS .................................................................................................................................
Table 2. SUMMARY OF GENERATOR PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS ...........................
7
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GEK 75512l
I. INTRODUCTION
This instruction book insert was prepared to provide a summary of General Electric's recommendations for
protection of its cylindrical rotor synchronous generators. Since a wide variety of technology is applied to
machines of various size and rating, not all of the alarm and protection recommendations are applicable for
a given generator design. For example, references to hydrogen and stator water cooling systems are not
applicable to air cooled machines. The alarm and protection sections are sequenced so that recommendations which are generally applicable appear rst, ones related to hydrogen systems next, and nally stator
water cooling system alarms and protection. Recommendations for excitation system protection are not
included, but are covered in separate instructions.
This instruction book discusses the kinds of protection that are desirable, and the action that is believed to
be best for the needed protection. Specic relays and relay circuits are not discussed.
A. Standards
General Electric turbine-generators are designed and built to meet or surpass applicable industry accepted standards. For the cylindrical rotor synchronous generators covered by these instructions, these
standards are:
1.
ANSI C50.10
General Requirements for Synchronous Machines
2.
ANSI C50.13
Requirements for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generator
3.
ANSI C50.14
Requirements for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generators
4.
ANSI C50.15
Requirements for Gas Turbine Driven Synchronous Machines
5.
CEI/IEC 34-1
Rotating Electrical Machines - Rating and Performance
6.
CEI/IEC 34-3
Rotating Electrical Machines - Specic requirements for turbine-type synchronous machines
B. Protection Responsibility
There are IEEE Standards covering generator protection which provide guidance material on generator
protective relaying. These include:
1.
ANSI/IEEE C37.101
IEEE Guide for Generator Ground Protection
2.
ANSI/IEEE C37.102
IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection
3.
ANSI/IEEE C37.106
IEEE Guide for Abnormal Frequency Protection for Power Generating Plants
GEK 75512l
There are two IEEE Press Books which provide a useful anthology of the background material related
to generator protection. These are:
1.
IEEE Press Book - Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 1, 1980
2.
IEEE Press Book - Protective Relaying for Power Systems: Volume 2, 1992.
Another useful reference is the IEEE Buff Book from the color series - ANSI/IEEE Std 242 - Protection
and Coordination of Industrial and Commercial Power Systems.
The operating limits specied by the manufacturer may be inadvertently exceeded for a number of
reasons. These include, among others:
internal generator failure
auxiliary equipment failure
operator error
abnormal system conditions
The protection methods and equipment in place should be able to safely protect the generator no matter
which of these circumstances, or combination of them, causes the abnormal operation.
Since protective relays and other devices are not immune to failure, it is recommended that consideration be given to providing back-up protection for those faults where a device failure could subject the
generator to serious damage.
Generator protection is a large and complex subject. These instructions were written to provide information on protection, based on our experience as designers and manufacturers, that may not always be
readily available in other forms.
The recommendations contained in these instructions are based on the best available information at the
time of publication. Changes in the state of the art may result in modication of these recommendations. Such modications will usually be communicated to all owners of affected turbine-generators
through General Electric, Technical Information Letter (TIL) series. These modications will be incorporated in periodic revisions to these instructions.
C. Protection Equipment
It should not be assumed that any required hardware is part of the turbine-generator supplied, although
in certain cases some protection is due to special requirements or it is integrated into the excitation or
control system.
In either case, it is the owner's or his designate's responsibility to check, adjust, calibrate and connect all
protective equipment to suitable tripping relays or circuits in order to provide the intended protection.
The manufacture should be consulted for specic protection application issues or concerns.
GEK 75512l
II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS

A. Operation and Protection
The line between generator operation and protection is not always clear and there is inevitably an area
of overlap. These instructions cover those functions that are mainly performed by protective relaying
or similar devices or functions. A companion instruction (Ref. 1) covers those aspects of generator
operation that are mainly under control of an operator and/or electronic turbine-generator controller.
Both of these publications should be consulted during plant design and should be used in conjunction
with other parts of the instruction book for proper operation of the turbine-generator.
B. Protection and Alarms
Those protective relays or devices that trip the generator should alert an operator as to the cause of any
trip, and be able to take direct action if this should prove necessary. In addition to the tripping relays
there are other relays or devices that initiate only an alarm or data logging. In these cases it becomes
an operator's responsibility to decide what corrective action is required and to take it.
III. ALARMS
Many of the alarm only devices are for temperature measurement. These are Resistance Temperature
Detectors (RTDs) and Thermocouples (TCs). Some measure other variables such as hydrogen pressure
and purity, and stator cooling water pressure, ow and conductivity (if applicable). A typical list of alarm
devices furnished with the generator is given in Table 1, including recommended alarm points and signal
ranges. If additional special instrumentation is supplied, alarm settings will be specied in the appropriate
section of the instruction book.
Table 1 contains information which may be useful when specifying signal monitoring or recording equipment.
The table also includes typical ranges of the variable for each of the devices shown. These ranges do not
represent the actual capabilities of the generator or its auxiliary equipment and should not be used in any
way as a guide for operation.
When a protective device or function signals a trip, or when the operator trips the unit because of an alarm
or other indication of malfunction, it is most important that the cause of the problem be determined and
corrected before attempting to restart or resynchronize. Failure to do so may lead to more serious troubles.
IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE
The need for protecting a generator while on line is well known, but the need when off line may not be as
well understood. Nevertheless, there are circumstances under which a generator could be damaged while
off line.
For this reason, it is recommended that, as a general rule, all alarms and protections be kept operative at
all times. Exceptions to this rule are those protections which would mis-operate or give false signals when
the unit is below rated speed, not excited, or not synchronized. Relaying and interlocking circuitry that
operates when the unit is off line should be reviewed to make certain it does not inadvertently incapacitate
any essential protection.
GEK 75512l
Table1. ALARMS
SIGNAL
MACHINE
TEMPERATURES
DEVICE
RANGE
SETTING
NOTES
GENERATOR WITH
BRUSHLESS EXCITER
BRUSHLESS EXCITER
OUTLET AIR
RTD
-20 to 80C
Generator
Cold Gas
+40C
Check Ventilation
COLLECTOR AIR IN
RTD or TC
-30 to 70C
65C
In: Check Ventilation
COLLECTOR AIR OUT
RTD or TC
-20 to 90C
AIR IN +
20C
Out: Check Filters
GENERATOR FIELD
TRANSDUCER
0 to 150C
Reduce field current by

adj. MVAR load.
STATOR COIL (SLOT)
RTD
0 to 100C for H2O
See Ref. 2
GENERATOR WITH STATIC

EXCITATION
0 to 150C for H2
and Air
OTHER ALARMS
BEARING VIBRATION
VIBRATION
DETECTOR
---
---
See Recommendation in
this publication.
BEARING OIL TEMP HIGH
---
---
See Turbine Section of

Instruction Book
NEGATIVE SEQUENCE
CURRENT
RELAY
---
---
Balance or reduce load.

See Recommendation for
Unbalanced Armature
Currents.
GENERATOR
OVERVOLTAGE
RELAY
---
Over 1.05 pu
voltage
Reduce machine voltage.
Collector / Cab Fire Detection

System - High Temperature
Heat Detector
---
325F (Not
Adjustable Set By
Device)
---
Collector / Cab H2 Detection

System Presence of Hydrogen
H2 Detector
0% to 100% LEL
10% LEL
High Alarm
& 25% LEL
High-High
Alarm
---
AIR COOLING (if

applicable)
COLD AIR
RTD
-30 to 70C
HOT AIR
RTD
-10 to 90C
CORE MONITOR LEVEL (if

applicable)
CORE MONITOR
---
---
See Recommend. for

Local Overheating.
MACHINE HEATING (if

applicable)
SIGNAL
VALIDATION
DEVICE
---
---
See Recommend. for

Local Overheating.
LOCAL OVERHEATING (if

applicable)
@From operating pressure

Two switches
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Table 1. ALARMS (Cont'd)
SIGNAL
DEVICE
RANGE
SETTING
NOTES
SEAL OIL SYSTEM (if applic.)

DIFF SEAL OIL PRESSURE
DIFF. PRESSURE
LOW
SWITCH
---
3 psid
See Ref. 3
[20.7 kPa]
[211 g/cm2]
DRAIN ENLARGEMENT
LIQUID LEVEL
LIQUID DETECTOR FULL
DETECTOR
---
See Ref. 3
EMERGENCY PUMP RUNNING
RELAY
---
See Ref. 3
FILTER DIFF. PRESSURE HIGH
DIFF. PRESSURE
10 psid
(if applicable)
SWITCH
[69 kPa
See Ref. 3
(differential)]
[703 g/cm2
(diff.)]
VACUUM TANK OIL LEVEL
FLOAT SWITCH
---
HIGH/LOW (if applicable)

MAIN PUMP MOTOR
+4/-6 in
See Ref. 3
[+102/-152 mm]
THERMOSTAT
---
See Ref. 2
THERMOSTAT
---
See Ref 2
COOLER HOT GAS TEMP HIGH
RTD or TC
0100C
COOLER COLD GAS TEMP
RTD or TC
070C
RTD
070C
MACHINE GAS TEMP HIGH
METER RELAY
0100C
MACHINE GAS PRESSURE
PRESSURE SWITCH
---
OVERLOAD (if applicable)

EMERGENCY PUMP MOTOR
OVERLOAD (if applicable)
HYDROGEN GAS SYSTEM
HIGH/LOW
COMMON COLD GAS TEMP
HIGH (if applicable)
HIGH/LOW
See Ref. 4
+4/-2 psi @
See Ref. 4
[+27.6/-13.8
kPa]
[+281/-14.1
g/cm2]
MACHINE GAS PURITY LOW
GENERATOR CASING LIQUID
METER RELAY or
50100C
TRANSMITTER
0100C
LIQUID DETECTOR
---
90%
See Ref. 4
See Ref. 4
DETECTOR FULL
Two switches
GEK 75512l
Table 1. ALARMS (Cont'd)
SIGNAL
DEVICE
RANGE
SETTING
NOTES
STATOR COOLING WATER

SYSTEM (if applicable)
INLET TEMP HIGH
RTD or TC
070C
2C OVER
See Ref. 2
MAX.
INLET FLOW LOW
FLOW SWITCH
See Ref. 3
INLET PRESSURE LOW
PRESSURE SWITCH
See Ref. 3
LIQUID HEADER OUTLET
TC
0100C
See Ref. 3
RTD
0100C
See Ref. 2
TC
0100C
See Ref. 2
TEMP HIGH
BULK WATER OUTLET TEMP
HIGH
CONN RING TEMP HIGH (if
separately cooled)
CONN RING FLOW LOW (if
FLOWMETER
See Ref. 3
separately cooled)
HV BUSHING OUTLET TEMP
TC
0100C
See Ref. 2
HIGH
HV BUSHING FLOW LOW
FLOWMETER
3 gpm LOW
See Ref. 3
[189 ml/s]
MAIN FILTER DIFF PRESSURE
DIFF PRESSURE
015 psid
8 psid
Change lter before 7 psid
HIGH
SWITCH
[0103 kPa
[55 kPa
[48 kPa (diff.)]
(differential)]
(differential)]
[492 g/cm2 (diff.)]
[01.05 kg/cm2 (diff.)]
[562
g/cm2(diff.)]
CONDUCTIVITY HIGH
TRANSDUCER
010 mho/cm
0.5 & 9.9
Change resin on rst alarm.
[010 S/cm]
mho/cm
Trip manually on second
[0.5 & 9.9
alarm
S/cm]
TANK LEVEL HIGH/LOW
FLOAT SWITCH
---
+4/-4 inches
Check main pump
[+102/-102 mm]
RESERVE PUMP RUNNING
PRESSURE SWITCH
0150 psi
10 & 20 psi
[01.03 MPa]
below normal
[010.5 kg/cm2]
[69 & 138
Check cause and correct
kPa][0.7 & 1.41

kg/cm2]
RUNBACK INITIATED
RELAY
NONE
PRESET
Two switches
GEK 75512l
V. TRIPPING METHODS
There are a number of ways a turbine-generator, or a generator alone, may be tripped, i.e., disconnected
from the system or shut down. Some of the factors that should be considered in determining what type of
trip to use for each fault requiring one are:
severity of fault to generator
probability of fault spreading
amount of overspeed resulting
probability of high overspeed
importance of removing excitation
need for maintaining auxiliary power
need for shutting down the unit
time required to resynchronize
effect on the power system
In recognition of the factors above, the manufacturer recommends an action that insures protection of the
generator. Unless otherwise noted, a protective action with a lower number than the recommended action is
allowable (see Table II). Although the lower number protective action may provide faster protection, additional danger to the turbine is incurred. These dangers include higher overspeed and worse turbine thermal
shock duty. The recommended protective actions are selected based on the manufactures judgement with
regard to providing acceptable generator protection, while minimizing unnecessarily harsh turbine duty.
The owner should select the action to be used based on the importance of the applicable factors in his case.
A. Protective Actions for Generator Faults
10
1.
Simultaneous trip - trips the turbine valves closed, opens generator line breakers and removes
excitation simultaneously, as with a lock-out relay. A simultaneous trip is acceptable for all generator faults, and generally provides the highest degree of protection for the turbine-generator
although it does permit a small overspeed and there is a slight probability of high overspeed.
2.
Generator trip - opens the generator line breakers and removes excitation simultaneously, but
leaves the turbine running near rated speed. Where maintaining speed is not harmful, this provides
as high a degree of protection for the generator as a simultaneous trip (Type 1). If the plant can
operate following a full load rejection, and if the cause of the trip can be identied and rectied
quickly, it may make resynchronization possible in a shorter time than Type 1. Since it does
result in a higher overspeed than Type 1, it should only be used when there is an advantage in not
tripping the turbine.
3.
Breaker trip - trips all generator line breakers but not the excitation or the turbine. This trip has
advantages similar to the generator trip when the fault permits excitation to remain applied. Its
advantage over Type 2 is that it provides auxiliary power in cases where this cannot be switched
to another bus. If this is not an advantage, Types 2 or 1 should be used.
GEK 75512l
4.
Sequential trip - trips the turbine rst. When the turbine inlet valve limit switches indicate the
valves are closed, and the recommended reverse power relay (or function) operates, normally
after a three-second delay, the generator line breakers are tripped. Opening of the breakers then
trips excitation. This trip should prevent any overspeed and thus is preferred whenever the risk
from a three-second delay in tripping the generator is slight. It is also preferred for most faults
in the turbine or steam generator. Its disadvantage is that certain multiple limit-switch failures,
or a reverse power relay failure, would prevent completing the trip. Although this probability is
small, a second reverse power relay, with a 10 to 30 second time delay, connected to produce a
Type 1 simultaneous trip, is recommended as a back-up. This back-up relay also serves as the
primary protection for motoring which does not occur as part of a sequential trip.
5.
Manual trip - turbine is tripped manually. When generator power reverses, reverse power relay
trips generator line breakers. Breaker opening trips excitation. This trip is recommended whenever an operator sees the need for a fault trip and is not certain that a runback and trip (Type 6)
will be fast enough. Note that Type 5 is actually a manually initiated sequential trip.
NOTE
There are no cases for which manually tripping the generator breakers is recommended. This is because the generator breakers should not normally be tripped
until after the turbine has been tripped and power has reversed. Then the generator breakers should be automatically tripped by the reverse power relay. A protected bypass switch may be used to permit manually tripping the generator alone
in case of limit-switch or reverse power relay failure. A manual generator breaker
trip should only be used with full recognition of the risk involved.
6.
Manual runback and trip - manually decreases turbine output to low level or to zero, followed
by the turbine (sequential) trip. This is the normal trip, which is preferred for all normal shutdowns. It is also recommended for trips required by alarms when the operator judges a Type 5
manual trip is not essential.
7.
Automatic runback - reduces load (via turbine control) at a preset rate to a preset load. It is
recommended here only for loss of stator coolant (if required). It is an alternative to tripping the
unit, and permits continuing on line at a very low load. When it can be used, it has the advantage
of enabling earlier return to full load if the trouble can be quickly corrected.
8.
Manual runback - manually reduces load at a rate and to a level determined by operator. This is
useful for some faults which may be load sensitive, such as local overheating, and where there is
no need to trip immediately. It also allows the generator to continue to supply reactive power to
the system.
The recommendations in these instructions are intended to provide the best balanced protection for
the turbine-generator for generator faults. Unusual circumstances or other plant limitations must be
considered by the owner, and may require different actions. Turbine problems should be handled in
accordance with applicable turbine instructions.
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GEK 75512l
VI. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS

The remainder of this instruction book comprises discussions of, and detailed recommendations for, each
of the faults listed in the table of contents, and summarized in Table II.
References are listed at the end of the book.
A. Discussion and Recommendations for Generator Faults
1. Stator Overcurrent
1.
Description
Generators are designed to operate continuously at rated kVA, frequency and power factor
over a range of 95 to 105% of rated voltage. Operation beyond rated kVA may result in
harmful stator overcurrent. Note that at rated kVA, 95% voltage, stator current will be 105%.
This is permissible.
Normally, generator load is under the control of an operator. Situations can arise during system disturbances, such as accompanying generator or line tripouts, which can result in an
overcurrent condition.
For short times, it is permissible to exceed the current corresponding to rated kVA. This capability is specied in ANSI Standard C50.13 as follows:
Time (seconds)
Armature current (percent)
2.
10
30
60
120
226
154
130
116
Detection
Stator current should be monitored by an operator, and kept within rated value by adjustment
of the turbine-generator controls.
A consequence of overcurrent is stator winding overheating, which should be detected by
winding temperature detectors, usually TCs measuring stator cooling water temperature,
and/or RTD's in slots with the stator winding (if applicable). All functioning TCs and
RTDs should be continuously monitored and alarmed (see Ref. 1, and 2&3 for H20 cooled
machines). However, even though it may not result in excessive stator winding temperatures,
operating above specied currents is not an acceptable practice since unmonitored phenomena, such as temperatures in other parts of the stator circuit, winding forces, abnormal
magnetic elds, etc., may become excessive.
3.
Recommendation
Automatic tripping is not provided for protection against stator overcurrent. However, all
operators should be made aware of the importance of operating the generator within its rated
capability. In cases when a generator will operate in an unattended station, some form of
overcurrent (overload) protection should be provided. An alternative is stator overtemperature which provides similar protection. For additional information, see Ref. 1.
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2. Stator Ground Fault

1.
Description
The generator stator neutral normally operates at a potential close to ground, generally
through a high impedance grounding transformer/resistor. In some cases a reactor is used
in a resonant grounding arrangement. Should a phase winding or any equipment connected
to it fault to ground, the normally low neutral voltage could rise as high as line-to-neutral
voltage, depending on fault location.
Although a single ground fault will not necessarily cause immediate damage, the presence of
one increases the probability of a second. This is because the occurrence of such a fault is
probably the result of damage which is not conned to one spot. In fact, the existence of a
ground fault through tough, high-voltage insulation is usually a result of another, potentially
catastrophic, trouble. A second fault, even if detected by differential relays, may cause serious
damage. A second fault in the same phase will not be detected by differential relays, and could
cause serious damage as a result.
2.
Detection
The usual method of detection is by a voltage relay across the grounding resistor. A current
relay is sometimes used in place of a voltage relay or as a back-up. The relay should be
insensitive to third harmonic voltage, but should have as low a pick-up level at line frequency
as is practical to reduce the unprotected zone at the neutral end of the windings. Methods
are available which are designed to protect the entire winding. These schemes make use of
the relationship of third harmonic voltages at the line and neutral terminals of the generator.
These schemes supplement the fundamental frequency protection.
3.
Recommendations
The grounding impedance should limit the ground fault current to less than 25 amperes. The
usual criterion based on circuit capacitance will normally result in less than 10 amperes. The
stator ground fault relay should be connected to trip the unit within several seconds, using a
simultaneous trip, Type 1.
For further information, see Ref. 5.
3. Stator Phase-to-Phase Fault

1.
Description
A stator phase-to-phase fault is any electrical fault between two phases of the armature winding. This type of fault is very serious because very large currents can ow and produce large
amounts of damage to the winding if allowed to persist. Because of the nature of the construction of the armature it is very likely that this type of fault will grow to include ground,
thereby causing signicant damage to the stator core.
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GEK 75512l
2.
Detection
It is possible to detect a phase-to-phase fault in the winding by means of a differential relay.
This method provides protection for the entire winding, and its sensitivity is limited mainly
by the degree to which the various current transformers are matched.
The differential relay method cannot protect against a fault within one phase of the winding.
Such a turn-to-turn fault can only be detected by the resulting armature current unbalance.
However, such faults are rare and will usually include ground, in which case they will be
detected by the stator ground fault relay.
3.
Recommendations
Upon detection of a phase-to-phase fault in the winding, it is imperative that the unit be tripped
without delay, using a simultaneous (Type 1) trip.
4. Over-Voltage
1.
Description
Permissible voltage limits under various operating conditions are given in the Generator Operation instructions (Ref. 1). It is normally an operator's responsibility to maintain voltage
(and the corresponding kVA) within specied limits.
With turbine-generators it is unlikely that voltage will depart signicantly from the preset
value. If it does, due to a regulator failure or a system disturbance, a trip signal will usually
be produced by one of the protective relays, such as volts/Hertz or maximum excitation limit.
2.
Recommended Action
Therefore, specic over-voltage protection is generally not required for the generator. Depending on the circumstances, it may be desirable to protect other equipment connected to the
generator. For unmanned generating stations, consideration should by given to implementing
automatic overvoltage protection. For additional information, see Ref. 1.
5. Volts Per Hertz

1.
Description
Per unit voltage divided by per unit frequency, commonly called volts/Hertz, is a readily
measurable quantity that is proportional to ux in the generator and step-up transformer cores.
Moderate overuxing (105%110%) increases core loss, elevating core temperatures for all
generator designs and armature temperatures for generators with conventionally cooled stator
windings. Long term operation at elevated temperatures can shorten the life of the stator
insulation systems. More severe overuxing (above 110%) further increases core loss, and
saturates portions of the core to the point that ux ows out into adjacent structures. The
resulting induced voltages can be coupled to stator punchings due to the manner in which
cores are assembled and clamped. Severe overuxing can breakdown interlaminar insulation,
followed by rapid local core melting.
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GEK 75512l
Over-volts/Hertz can be caused by regulator failure, load rejection while under control of the
dc regulator, or excessive excitation with the generator off line.
It can also result from decreasing speed while the ac regulator or the operator attempts to
maintain rated stator voltage.
2.
Detection
Volts per Hertz is calculated in a static circuit incorporated in a volts/Hertz relay or sensor.
Timing circuits are also incorporated. The volts/Hertz sensor is normally included as part of
the excitation system.
3.
Recommendation
Even though over-volts/Hertz is more likely to occur when off line, it can also occur when on
line. For this reason the volts/Hertz protection should be in operation whenever excitation is
applied.
Refer to for a graphical representation of the recommended V/Hz protection.
In view of the potential consequences it is prudent to provide as conservative protection as
possible consistent with security from false tripping. Selection of a modest maximum trip
level of above 118%, coupled with a 2 second time delay satises these objectives. A load
rejection from full rated KVA, rated power factor and 105% of rated voltage will not result
in tripping if an automatic voltage regulator is in service. Operation at 118% should be limited not to exceed 45 seconds. The curve shape from 118 to 110% V/Hz approximates the
overexcitation capability of many transformers (for stepup and station service power applications). However if the transformers require lower values, the protective relays should be set
accordingly. Continuous operation above 105% V/Hz is not sanctioned and an alarm function should be provided to alert the operator that corrective action is needed. The excitation
control limiter (if applicable) should be set to prevent continuous operation above 109%.
The trip signal should produce a simultaneous trip, Type 1, or a generator trip, Type 2.
6. Field Overexcitation
1.
Description
The generator eld winding is designed to operate continuously at a current equal to that
required to produce rated kVA at rated conditions. In addition, higher currents are permitted
for short times, to permit eld forcing during transient conditions. These limits are specied
in terms of a curve of eld voltage vs. time dened by the following points in ANSI Standard
C50.13-1977:
Time (seconds)
Field voltage (percent)
10
30
60
120
208
146
125
112
15
GEK 75512l
2.
Detection
Most excitation systems now being furnished include a Maximum Excitation Limit function.
Its purpose is to prevent prolonged eld overcurrent by recalibrating the current regulator,
transferring to another regulator, and, nally, producing a trip signal, as required.
3.
Recommendation
The owner's responsibility with respect to this function is to see that the Maximum Excitation
Limit is properly adjusted and maintained, and properly connected to trip the unit when required. Protection Type 4, sequential trip, or Type 1, simultaneous trip, is recommended. For
high response exciters, a Type 1 trip may be required to avoid rapid overheating of the eld
should the exciter stay at ceiling for an extended period of time. In such cases a sequential
trip would take too long.
Since loss of potential transformer signal to the voltage regulator is one cause of eld overcurrent, relaying to detect this situation and automatic transfer to another regulator is suggested.
Sensing and transfer functions are part of most modern excitation systems.
7. Field Ground
1.
Description
The generator eld winding is electrically isolated from ground. Therefore the existence of
one ground fault in the winding will usually not damage the rotor. However, the presence
of two or more grounds in the winding will cause magnetic and thermal imbalances plus localized heating and damage to the rotor forging or other metallic parts. Unfortunately, the
presence of the rst ground fault makes detection of a second fault difcult, if not impossible. In addition, modern rotor winding insulation systems have achieved a level of quality
that reduces the likelihood of a eld ground except under unusual circumstances where the
probability of occurrence of a second ground or other serious problem is high.
16
GEK 75512l
Figure 1.
2.
Detection
The relay necessary to detect a eld ground is normally supplied with the excitation system.
3.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the eld ground detector be connected to produce a sequential trip,
Type 4. Alternatively, a runback, Type 6, or simultaneous trip, Type 1, may be used.
8. Loss of Excitation
1.
Description
Loss of excitation (or loss of eld) results in loss of synchronism and operation of the generator as an induction machine. This will result in the ow of slip frequency currents in the
rotor body, wedges, and amortisseur windings (if so equipped), as well as severe torque oscillations in the rotor shaft. The rotor is not designed to sustain such currents, nor is the
turbine-generator shaft designed to long withstand the alternating torques. The result can be
rotor overheating, coupling slippage and even rotor failure. The length of time before serious
damage occurs depends on the generator load at the time of the incident, slip frequency, and
whether the eld winding is open circuited or shorted, and may be a matter of seconds.
A loss of excitation normally indicates a problem with the excitation system which, depending
on its nature, could be serious (e.g., collector ring ashover, if so equipped). Because of the
VARs absorbed to make up for the low or lost excitation, some systems cannot tolerate the
continued operation of a generator without excitation. Consequently, if the generator is not
disconnected immediately when it loses excitation, widespread instability may very quickly
develop, and major system shut-down may occur.
17
GEK 75512l
2.
Detection
Since loss of excitation results in a marked change in reactive kVA, a loss of excitation relay
of the impedance or mho type is usually used (Ref. 6).
3.
Recommendation
The generator should be tripped from the power system, using a simultaneous trip (Type 1),
or a generator trip (Type 2). It is important that all excitation power be removed. It should
not be assumed that, since there is loss of excitation, the exciter is not supplying power to an
internal fault.
9. Unbalanced Armature Currents

1.
Description
When the generator is supplying an unbalanced load, the phase currents and terminal voltages deviate from the ideal balanced relationship, and a negative phase sequence armature
current (I2) is imposed on the generator. The negative sequence current in the armature winding creates a magnetic ux wave in the air gap which rotates in opposition to the rotor at
synchronous speed. This ux induces currents in the rotor body iron, wedges, retaining rings
and amortisseur windings, if so equipped, at twice the line frequency. Heating occurs in these
areas and the resulting temperatures depend upon the level and duration of the unbalanced
currents. Under some conditions, it is possible to reach temperatures at which the rotor materials no longer contain the centrifugal forces imposed on them, resulting in serious damage
to the turbine-generator set (Ref. 11).
There is always some low level unbalance in any power system and therefore limits on the
continuous unbalance have been established. For currents above the permissible continuous
levels, a limit on the time-integral of I22 has been established for times up to 120 seconds.
Such levels will often result from faults, open lines or breaker failures.
Unless otherwise specied by the manufacturer as part of the generator design data information, the negative sequence current limits are given in the applicable standards (Ref 31 or Ref
32), where I2 is the per unit negative sequence current on the generator base and t is the time
in seconds. See Ref 1 for further comments on unbalanced loading capability.
2.
Detection
The protection scheme should be designed such that it will permit negative sequence currents
up to the continuous limit, but produce a trip signal if the level exceeds this value long enough
to reach the permissible I22t limit (Ref 13).
It is also desirable to alert an operator when I2 exceeds a normal level, which may be lower
than the permissible continuous negative sequence current. This enables him to adjust load
in order to prevent a trip. Ref. 1 describes in more detail the actions an operator may take.
3.
18
Recommendations
GEK 75512l
A negative sequence relay, similar to that described above, should be used on all units. It
should be arranged to cause a breaker trip, Type 3, generator trip, Type 2, or a simultaneous
trip, Type 1.
10. Loss of Synchronism
1.
Description
Loss of synchronism, also referred to as out-of-step operation or pole slipping, can occur as
a result of steady-state transient or dynamic instability. It also may occur as a result of loss
of excitation or synchronizing errors.
2.
Detection
The majority of users do not apply specic loss-of-synchronization relaying. However, a
skilled relay engineer can adjust impedance relaying to reliably detect loss of synchronism.
Loss of excitation relays may provide detection, but cannot be relied upon under all conditions. If the electrical center during loss of synchronism is in the transmission system, line
relays may detect it. If they do not, specic relaying should be provided.
3.
Recommendation
Out-of-step operation can result in pulsating torques and winding stresses and high rotor iron
currents that are potentially damaging to the generator. Excessive stator winding and core
end heating can also result if the out-of-step operation is caused by reduced or lost excitation.
Therefore, it is recommended that the generator be separated from the system without delay,
preferably during the rst slip cycle (Ref. 14, 26, 27.). A breaker trip, Type 3, is recommended, and permits the fastest resynchronization after conditions have stabilized.
11. Abnormal Frequency Operation

1.
Description
For a generator connected to a power system, abnormal frequency operation is a result of
a severe system disturbance. An isolated or unconnected unit could operate at low or high
frequency due to improper speed control adjustment or misoperation of the speed control.
There are two effects to be considered. The generator can tolerate underfrequency operation
for long periods, provided load and voltage are sufciently reduced, as explained in Generator
Operation instructions (Ref. 1).
The generator can also tolerate overfrequency operation provided voltage is within an acceptable range.
19
GEK 75512l
2.
Recommendation
For the generator, specic protection for abnormal frequency operation is not required. However, the turbine is very sensitive to abnormal frequencies and recommendations given for
it should be carefully studied and followed (Ref. 24, 25). Detection of abnormal frequency
operation may also be used to identify system problems.
Refer unusual frequency operation questions to the GE company for recommendations.
12. Breaker Failure

1.
Description
Since most faults involving the generator require tripping of the generator/line breakers, failure of any of them to open properly results in loss of protection and/or other problems, such
as motoring. If one or two poles of a generator line breaker fail to open, the result can be a
single-phase load on the generator and negative sequence currents on the rotor.
2.
Detection
Both types of failure described above will cause conditions that may be detected by other protective devices, e.g., reverse power, loss of synchronism or negative sequence relays. However, a more direct method is the use of Breaker Failure Protection (BFP) which is energized
when the breaker trip is initiated. After a suitable time interval, if conrmation of breaker
tripping in all three lines is not received, a signal is generated.
3.
Recommendation
Industry past practice has not always recognized the need for breaker failure protection because of the reliability of line breakers. However, it is recommended that BFP be used with
all tripping relays that can trip a generator line breaker. The BFP signal should trip all line
breakers that can feed current to the generator through the failed breaker (Ref. 15).
13. System Back-Up

1.
Description
System back-up protection is also known as external fault back-up protection. As this name
implies, it is used to protect the generator from supplying short circuit current to a fault in an
adjacent system element because of a primary relaying failure (Ref. 15, 16).
2.
Detection
Either voltage restrained or current restrained inverse-time overcurrent or distance relays may
be used, depending on the kind of relaying with which the back-up relays must be selective.
Negative sequence relays, in addition to their primary protective role, are sometimes considered for system back-up protection. However, these will not provide protection against
balanced faults.
20
3.
GEK 75512l
Recommendation
System back-up protection is recommended. A breaker trip Type 3 is recommended, which
permits the fastest resynchronization after the system fault has been cleared. In Steam turbines, if immediate resynchronization is not a priority, a type 1 trip may be considered to trip
the turbine, exciter and generator breaker simultaneously.
14. Voltage Surges

1.
Description
Certain abnormal conditions could occur which might subject the generator to high voltages
surges. Among these are:
Switching surges from circuit breakers at generator voltage
Positive and negative surges arriving simultaneously on two phases
Ineffective direct stroke shielding
Failure of high side surge protective equipment
Accidental connection between high and low side transformer windings, due to internal
failure, external ashover or other cause
The latter category is not a normal protective function of low voltage arrestors and would subject them to excessive duty which could cause their failure. In view of the potential personnel
hazard in the event of surge arrestor failure, the user should consider physically isolating the
surge arrestor cubicles and limiting access to them.
2.
Recommendation
To provide protection for these and similar situations, surge arrestors are recommended for all
units. Surge capacitors are generally not required for machines with single-turn coils. They
are provided on some packaged generators where optional installation of surge capacitors
close to the surge arrestors would not be convenient. Application of LCI (load commutated
inverters) for turbine-generator starting may also obviate the use of surge capacitors on multiturn coil machines.
Optimal protection requires surge protection be located in close proximity to the generator
terminals.
15. Transmission Line Switching

1.
Description
The switching of transmission lines at or near generating stations for maintenance purposes,
or simply restoring a line to service after a relayed tripout, are recognized as normal functions
in the course of operating a power system. In some cases these line switching operations can
subject nearby generating units to excessive duty. The effect on the generator in severe cases
21
GEK 75512l
is the same as for poor synchronizing in causing possible stator winding and shaft fatigue
damage (Ref. 7).
2.
Detection
A measure of the severity of a switching event is the sudden step change in power (P) seen
by the generator at the instant of switching. As a general guide, studies have shown that where
P does not exceed 0.5 per unit on the generator kVA base the duty will be negligible (Ref.
17, 18). Values of P greater than 0.5 per unit may be determined to be non-harmful to the
generator, for specic units and system switching events, but these cases should be carefully
studied and identied.
Predetermination of duties associated with line-switching operations and operating procedures which limit these duties to acceptable values can be found from simulating these operations, using a computer program such as that normally used for stability studies (Ref. 17,
18).
3.
Recommendation
The recommended procedure for avoiding excessive duty for the normal planned line-switching operation is to establish, where necessary, operating procedures which limit the machine
P to either the general 0.5 per unit level or an individually determined level for that unit.
As an adjunct to established operating procedures, phase angle check relays at key breaker
locations can prevent line closings under circumstances predetermined to be excessive. Note,
however, that such check relays should not be applied without reliable means of overriding
which would permit necessary line closing operations under emergency circumstances.
16. High Speed Reclosing

1.
Description
High speed reclosing of transmission circuits directly out of generating stations or electrically
close to the station may cause signicant shaft fatigue damage to the turbine-generator unit,
particularly where high speed reclosing following severe multi-phase faults is permitted (Ref.
7, 19). The actual fatigue duty which a unit may experience during its lifetime from this
cause depends on many factors, including both the unit's and the system's characteristics, the
frequency of fault occurrence, etc. Studies substantiate that signicant shaft damage could
occur with unsuccessful reclosing for close-in three-phase faults.
2.
Recommendation
In order to eliminate or reduce the potential effects of unrestricted high speed reclosing of
lines near generating stations, an alternative reclosing practice such as one of the following
is recommended:
22
Delayed reclosing, with a delay of 10 seconds or longer.
Sequential reclosing, i.e., reclose initially only from the remote end of the line and block
closing at the station if the fault persists. This is recommended only if the remote end of
the line is not electrically near other turbine-generator units.
GEK 75512l
Selective reclosing, i.e., high speed reclosing only for the less severe faults such as single
line-to-ground; delayed reclosing on others. Other relaying practices providing selectivity on the basis of fault severity would also be effective in reducing shaft fatigue duty.
Where such alternative reclosing practices are not considered acceptable to the user, it is
recommended that either:
a. Detailed studies be performed to determine the probable lifetime fatigue damage which
might be experienced for the reclosing practice contemplated, or
b. Torsional monitoring equipment be installed to determine the accumulated fatigue damage being incurred.
17. Subsynchronous Resonance (SSR)
1.
Description
When a turbine-generator is connected to a transmission network that has series capacitor
compensation or a high voltage dc (HVDC) transmission system, it is possible to develop
subsynchronous (under line frequency) current oscillations in the lines and in the generator armature. In the case of series compensated ac systems, these currents interact with the
synchronously rotating ux to produce torque pulsation on the generator rotor. If these pulsations are at a frequency close to one of the torsional natural frequencies of the turbine-generator, high levels of torsional vibration can be induced in the shafts. Torsional instability
of the turbine-generator shaft system has the potential for being extremely damaging to the
turbine-generator shafts, and resulted in two shaft failures in the early 1970s. A more recently observed phenomenon involves interaction between torsional modes and HVDC controls (Ref. 28). This could lead to an unstable situation, resulting in spontaneous growth of
torsional vibrations and potential damage to the shaft.
2.
Detection
Unstable or high levels of torsional vibration may be detected by observing the variations in
angular velocity of the turbine-generator. A common measuring system involves a toothed
wheel, a magnetic pickup and a frequency demodulator. Strain gauge telemetry systems have
also been utilized in short-term tests to detect shaft torsional oscillations. Indirect methods
of identifying subsynchronous resonance steady-state instability problems involve monitoring generator electrical terminal quantities. The armature current relay described in Ref. 20
utilizes this approach.
3.
Responsibility for Detection

It should be understood by those utilities that utilize series capacitor compensation, or have
HVDC transmission in their system, that the potential for damaging torsional vibrations is a
consequence of the special electrical characteristics of the transmission network. It is, therefore, the owner's responsibility to implement devices to detect, and protect the machine from,
the inuences of subsynchronous torsional interaction. In the case of HVDC transmission
lines, the potential for interaction between the HVDC controls and the turbine-generator rotor system needs to be accounted for in HVDC control design. General Electric has worked
closely with many utilities on system studies to dene the requirements for protective devices
23
GEK 75512l
on particular systems. The company has also manufactured and has in service protective devices. This equipment includes (Ref. 20):
a. A static subsynchronous resonance lter (static blocking lter)
b. A supplementary excitation damping control (excitation system damper)
c. A machine frequency relay (armature current frequency relay) (Ref. 21)
d. A torsional vibration monitor (Ref. 22)
In addition, generators that are applied for use in series capacitor compensated systems or
systems containing HVDC transmission are sometimes furnished with pole-face amortisseur
windings. The addition of pole-face amortisseur windings does not necessarily enhance negative sequence capability. The function of amortisseur windings is to reduce the machine
electrical resistance in the subsynchronous frequency range, which reduces the potential for
torsional interaction at subsynchronous frequencies.
4.
Recommendation
It is vital that the electric utility work closely with the manufacturer at the planning stage to
dene the need for auxiliary equipment to protect the machine. This equipment, if required,
needs to be operational when the machine is rst connected to the network containing series
capacitor compensated and/or HVDC transmission lines. It needs to be highly reliable, as
misoperation could result in major machine failure.
18. Inadvertent Energization

1.
Description
When a generator is energized three-phase while at standstill or reduced speed, it will behave
and accelerate as an induction motor. The equivalent machine impedance during the high
slip interval can be represented by negative sequence reactance (X2) in series with negative
sequence resistance (R2). The machine terminal voltage and current during this interval will
be a function of generator, transformer and system impedances. If the generator-transformer
is connected to an innite system, the machine currents will be high (several per unit), and
conversely, if the unit is connected to a weak system, the machine current could be low (12
per unit). During the period the machine is accelerating, high currents will be induced in the
rotor and the time to damage may be on the order of a few seconds.
NOTE
Negative sequence reactance of a steam turbine-generator is approximately equal

to the subtransient reactance X"dv.
A number of generators have been accidentally energized while at standstill or very low speed.
While many have survived the experience with minor damage, others have not.
24
2.
GEK 75512l
Detection
While there are several generator zone relays that may detect this contingency, their performance may be marginal. Therefore, the preferred approach is to provide detection means
specically designed for this purpose.
One such method is to use overcurrent relays that are armed by a speed relay when the generator is off line.
3.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the detection scheme described above be used to protect every generator. To prevent damage to the rotor, stator bearings, etc., it is desirable that high speed
protection be provided for this contingency. The relaying should be connected to trip the
main generator breaker, trip any breakers which could feed current to the generator if breaker
failure is detected, and be so implemented that it is never taken out of service when the unit
is shut down for any purpose, even with the rotor removed.
19. Bearing Vibration

1.
Description
High vibration (as dened below) on a generator is a symptom of a problem. There are many
possible causes of vibration, including:
2.
Unbalance
Misalignment
Thermal sensitivity
Damaged bearings
Oil whip
Rubbing
Bent overhangs
Out-of-round journals or collectors
Stiffness dissymmetry.
Detection
All bearings are normally provided with vibration detectors and recorders. Either velocity
probes, proximity probes, or both are used. These permit recording and monitoring of vibration, and alarming and/or tripping at predetermined levels of vibration. The vibration
recorders do not provide the frequency spectrum information which could be useful in determining the cause of the vibration. This information must be obtained with a portable vibration
analyzer.
25
GEK 75512l
3.
Recommendation
For both generator and alternator bearings provided with proximity probes, the table below
summarizes recommendations for various levels of shaft vibration. The vibration levels are
given in mils [m], peak-to-peak, unltered.
For Vibration Level Exceeding
2 Poles
Recommendations
4 Poles
(mils)
(m)
(mils)
(m)
10
254
12
305
Sequential trip (Type 4)
178
10
254
Runback and trip within 15 minutes

(Type 6)
152
203
Correct at rst opportunity
76
127
Correct when convenient
For generators provided with velocity probes which monitor endshield or pedestal deection
in the vicinity of the bearing, the alarm level is 0.5 in/sec, and the trip level is 1 in/sec.
4.
Reference
For more detailed information on vibration, refer to the turbine section of the instruction book
(Ref. 24).
20. Synchronizing Errors

1.
Description
Improper synchronizing of units to the line may occur for a number of reasons. The most
severe of these results from incorrect connection of potential transformer or synchronizing
aids such that gross out-of-phase synchronizing, such as a 120 error, may occur. A failure of
automatic synchronizing equipment may also result in large synchronizing errors. While turbine-generators are designed to withstand these rare occurrences without catastrophic results,
provided stator current does not exceed the three-phase short circuit value, they can result in
damage, such as slipped couplings, with resulting high vibration, loosened stator windings,
and fatigue damage to the shaft and other mechanical parts (Ref. 7).
Careless synchronizing, while generally a less severe incident, may, on an accumulated basis,
have the same result.
The following synchronizing limits are recommended to avoid damaging effects:
26
Breaker closing within 10 (electrical angle)
Voltage matching within 0 to +5%
Slip slower than 10 seconds per slip cycle for manual synchronization.
Slip slower than 6 seconds per slip cycle for automatic synchronization.
2.
GEK 75512l
Detection
A severe out-of-phase synchronizing incident will be evident from the physical effects of
noise and turbine-generator foundation vibration. In addition, a tripout may result from the
vibration trips or from electrical protective relays. Poor synchronizing routine is less evident but would be observable by the synchroscope and an oscillation of electrical quantities
(power, VARs) subsequent to the synchronizing.
3.
Recommendations
Careful checking of circuits during initial installation or equipment changeout and the establishment of well-adhered-to procedures for manual synchronizing are key elements in minimizing out-of-phase synchronizing incidents.
A Synch Check function should monitor manual synchronizing to prevent large errors (Ref.
8).
Automatic synchronizing relays can provide very high accuracy. Where such relays are used,
however, it is important that a check function be applied to provide an independent back-up.
Failure of the primary relays to perform should be alarmed, since this might otherwise not be
noticed.
21. Motoring
1.
Description
Motoring of a generator will occur when turbine output is reduced such that it develops less
than no-load losses while the generator is still on line. Assuming excitation is sufcient,
the generator will operate as a synchronous motor driving the turbine. The generator will
not be harmed by synchronous motoring, but, if it occurs as a result of failure to complete a
sequential trip, protection for the fault originating that trip is lost. In addition, a steam turbine
can be harmed through overheating during synchronous motoring.
If eld excitation is lost, along with turbine output, the generator will run as an induction
motor, driving the turbine. In addition to possible harm to the turbine, this will produce slipfrequency currents in the rotor and could cause it to overheat if continued long enough.
A third type of motoring occurs when the generator is accidentally energized when at low
speed. This is discussed separately under Accidental Energization.
2.
Detection
Motoring following loss of turbine output can be detected with a reverse power relay. To
avoid false trips due to power swings, a time-delay pick-up of 10 to 30 seconds is suggested.
This is the backup relay suggested in the description of Trip 4 - sequential trip. Measurement
of very low power levels at very low power factors will require relatively high precision. Reduction in reactive power ow in the generator will reduce the requirement for high precision.
This may be accomplished through control action of the excitation system or by operator action.
27
GEK 75512l
3.
Recommendation
It is recommended that the reverse power relay referred to above be used and connected to
produce a Type 1, simultaneous trip. Alternatively, a Type 2 generator trip or Type 3 breaker
trip could be used. Breaker Failure Protection (see page 23) should be initiated, since line
breaker failure may be the cause of the motoring. In addition, the turbine section of the instruction book (Ref. 9) should be consulted and followed.
22. Stator Overtemperature

1.
Description
Stator overheating may result from overcurrent operation, improper gas pressure or purity (if
applicable), gas or water cooling system malfunction, internal cooling passage blockage, etc.
2.
Detection
Armature bar temperatures are monitored by either TCs measuring stator cooling water temperature and/or RTD's in the stator slots (if applicable). All functioning RTDs and TCs should
be constantly monitored and alarmed (see Ref 1, and 2&3 for H20 cooled machines). As
pointed out in the stator overcurrent section, these temperature detectors do not provide complete protection against damage due to overcurrent operation, because temperatures in other
parts of the winding, winding forces, abnormal magnetic elds, etc. may become excessive.
3.
Recommendation
Automatic shutdown is not always provided for protection against stator overheating on generators with conventionally cooled stator windings. Section 26 describes automatic protection
recommended for liquid cooled armature windings. All operators should be made aware of
the importance of operating the generator within its rated capability. In cases where a generator will operate in an unattended station, some form of overtemperature protection should
be provided. Implementation of an automatic stator overtemperature protection scheme also
provides some overcurrent protection, and is generally easier to implement than overcurrent
relaying.
23. Loss of Coolant to Gas Coolers (if applicable)

1.
Description
Serious overheating of all generator components will occur if coolant ow to the gas coolers
is lost. Various machine temperature alarms will detect the overheating condition prior to
any damaging overtemperatures. However, without human monitoring and intervention, the
condition will persist.
2.
Detection
The RTD's monitoring the hot and cold gas temperatures may be used as the basis for establishing protection against the loss of gas coolant. Refer to Table 1 for Alarm information.
28
3.
GEK 75512l
Recommendation
For machines which run unattended, consideration should be given to implementing an automatic runback (trip 6) or trip 4 (sequential trip), based on the cold and hot gas RTD's.
24. Reduced Seal Oil Pressure (if applicable)

1.
Description
A oating, radial ring-type seal is used to prevent hydrogen leakage from the generator along
the shaft. Oil is supplied to the seals at a pressure slightly higher than that of the hydrogen in
the generator.
For large, liquid cooled generators, the oil is supplied by a seal oil pumping unit. The main
pump is driven by an ac motor. An emergency back-up pump is driven by a dc motor. This
pump will start automatically if the oil discharge pressure of the main pump decreases or if
ac power is lost. In addition to the main and emergency pumps, bearing header pressure is
available to maintain hydrogen pressure in the generator at a maximum of approximately 8
psig or 5 psid less than the available bearing header pressure, whichever is lower.
For most conventionally cooled hydrogen generators, seal oil is supplied from the lube oil
tank by the same pump supplying bearing oil. The main pump is driven by an ac motor. An
emergency lube oil back-up pump is driven by a dc motor. This pump will start automatically
if the seal oil differential pressure decreases or if ac power is lost. Some machines are provided with a specic DC seal oil emergency backup pump in addition to the lube oil backup
pump. Higher pressure (greater than 30 psig) conventionally cooled machines are provided
with separate seal oil pumps. See Ref. 10 for details on the seal oil system provided.
2.
Detection
Alarms indicate low differential seal oil pressure, main pump motor overload, and emergency
pump running (see Table 1).
3.
Recommendation
If the main pump is lost an operator should take immediate action to determine the cause.
If the problem requires more than a few hours to correct, gas pressure should be reduced to
the lowest value required for the generator load, as determined from the reactive capability
curves. This procedure is recommended because the emergency pump has only the bearing
header pressure as back-up on liquid cooled machines, and no additional backup is provided
on conventionally cooled generators. Careful consideration of the DC supply capacity and
the purge cycle time is required to decide how long it is safe operate on the backup DC pump.
If this gas pressure cannot be maintained, additional reductions in both gas pressure and load
will be required. Operation for long periods with the emergency pump or the bearing header
supply only will result in a reduction of hydrogen purity. For most generators under these conditions, gas must be scavenged from the generator to maintain hydrogen purity as described
in Ref. 4. Some conventionally cooled machines will automatically increase the scavenge
gas rate in an attempt to maintain purity. Again, see Ref. 4 for details.
29
GEK 75512l
25. Local Overheating (if applicable)

1.
Description
Before synchronization, there are at least two areas of possible overheating in the generator
which are a function of eld excitation:
Stator core heating, which is related to the stator ux (volts/Hertz).
Generator eld heating, which is related to eld current.
After synchronization, in addition to these two, there is also the possibility of stator winding
heating (including end windings, connection rings, leads, and high voltage bushings), which
is related to armature current.
Local overheating can be caused in a number of ways. One is damage to the laminations at
the inner diameter of the stator core. This might cause electrical contact between laminations
leading to a ow of current and therefore heating. This type of damage may be caused by a
foreign object striking the core under the inuence of electromagnetic forces in the machine.
Overheating may also be caused by improper cooling or by faulty or damaged insulation,
allowing excessive leakage current to ow. It can also be caused by operating outside the
capability limits, especially in underexcited regions.
2.
Detection
On hydrogen-cooled steam turbine-generators, overheating can be detected by the use of the
Generator Gas Monitoring System (GGMS). The GGMS consists of a generator Core Monitor, a Signal Validation Control and a Pyrolysate Collector. The generator Core Monitor is an
ionization-type particulate detector that is connected to the generator so that a constant ow
of cooling gas passes through it. The cooling gas is monitored for the presence of submicron
particles (particulates). Under normal conditions, the gas coolant contains no particulates
that can be detected by the monitor. When overheating occurs, the thermal decomposition of
organic material, epoxy paint, core lamination enamel or other insulating materials produces
a large number of particulates which can be detected by the monitor to produce an alarm. The
particulates can be collected by the Pyrolysate Collector which is designed to operate when
a generator Core Monitor alarm occurs. Conrmation of overheating may be accomplished
by laboratory analysis of the particulates.
The Validation Control is used to automatically discriminate between a Core Monitor alarm
caused by an instrument malfunction and one caused by local overheating. When the alarm
is veried, the Validation Control actuates a machine heating alarm.
3.
Recommendation
When a machine heating alarm occurs, load should be reduced by manual runback (Type
8) until the alarm signal clears. If the alarm signal does not clear within ve minutes the
generator should be tripped manually (Type 5).
Contacts are provided in the Validation Control which can be used to actuate runback or trip
circuits if this feature is desired.
30
GEK 75512l
Additional information may be found in specic Generator Gas Monitoring System publications in the Operation and Maintenance Manual (O&M Manual).
26. Loss of Stator Coolant (if applicable)
1.
Description
Stator winding cooling water is supplied by one of two identical pumps. The pump not running is in a standby mode and is connected to start automatically if the discharge pressure of
the operating pump falls.
Cooling ow may be reduced or lost because of:
a. System restrictions such as plugged lters or strainer, or a buildup of material such as
copper oxide in the stator winding strands
b. Localized restriction in a single bar or group of bars in the winding
c. Pipe break
d. Loss of pumps
e. Misadjustment of the control valve
f.
Control valve failure
g. Freeze-up of the system or instrument lines containing moisture

2.
Detection
a. System restrictions downstream of the control valve sensing point will be signaled by the
low ow alarm. System restrictions upstream of the sensing point will be compensated for
by the control valve. If the limits of control valve operation are reached, a restriction will
be signalled by the low pressure and low ow alarms. A high differential pressure will
occur across the component containing the restriction, and the most likely place for this
is the main lter. On newer units, lter pressure is monitored by a differential pressure
alarm. System restrictions can also be signalled by the bulk water outlet temperature
sensor which provides an alarm function, and by the individual liquid header outlet TCs
and slot RTDs.
b. Localized restrictions in a single bar or group of bars might be detected by the individual
liquid header outlet TCs and the slot RTDs.
c. A pipe break will be detected by a rise in the bulk outlet temperature and the individual
liquid heater TCs, or by the low pressure alarm and a temperature rise indicated by the
slot RTDs.
d. Loss of both pumps will be detected by low pressure and low ow alarms and by a temperature rise signalled by all of the slot RTDs.
31
GEK 75512l
e. Misadjustment of the control valve, which causes a ow restriction, will be detected by
low pressure, low ow, and high bulk outlet temperature alarms. The individual outlet
TCs and slot RTDs will also be affected.
f.
Control valve failure is likely to cause higher ow than required. There are no alarms to
detect this, but the situation will, in time, be apparent to an operator when higher than
normal ows and pressures are observed.
g. Freezing temperatures in the station are particularly dangerous because some of the protective devices may freeze and either fail to operate or operate incorrectly. The generator
should not be operated above its no-liquid capability when station temperatures are below freezing unless provisions are made to protect vital parts of the system from the low
temperature.
3.
Recommendation
Most serious faults will initiate an alarm. These are listed in Table 1. Appropriate operator
action should be taken at the time of the alarm (Ref. 2, 3). The nature of the problem dictates
the action required, as discussed below.
Abnormal temperatures in the stator require that a check be made of the cooling ow. If a
pumping unit abnormality is not apparent, a local restriction in the stator winding may be
the cause. Temperature limits are outlined in the generator instruction book (Tab 30). Load
reduction may be necessary to prevent exceeding limits.
Problems with the cooling system should be corrected at the time of the alarm. If they are
not, and the condition (ow, pressure, etc.) becomes more abnormal, a second contact will
operate. This should be used to initiate either a runback or a trip, as selected by the owner
during the design stage. If tripping was selected, a sequential trip, Type 4, may be used.
Operators should be advised, however, not to wait for automatic protection to operate but to
take corrective action immediately. This is the reason for the alarm.
If runback, rather than trip, was selected, but the runback fails to occur, a trip signal will be
produced.
In many cases a load reduction to the no-liquid capability of the generator is required before
maintenance can be performed, such as adjustment of the control valve, changing lters or
calibrating sensors. These tasks should be performed periodically as recommended in the
applicable instruction (Tab 33 of Generator Instruction Book).
27. High Water Conductivity (if applicable)

1.
Description
High purity water is required to cool the stator winding conductors safely. The water purity
is maintained by ne ltration and a deionizer. A reduction in deionizer resin capacity will
result in an increase in water conductivity.
32
2.
GEK 75512l
Detection
Water conductivity is continuously monitored at both inlet and outlet of the stator. A conductivity above 0.5 mhos/cm [0.5 S/cm] will initiate an alarm. A second alarm will register
when conductivity rises to 9.9 mhos/cm [9.9 S/cm].
3.
Recommendation
The operator should replace the deionizer resin after the rst alarm at 0.5 mhos/cm [0.5
S/cm], and before the second alarm. The unit should not be operated with water conductivity
above the second alarm point, which is 9.9 mhos/cm [9.9 S/cm]. If this alarm sounds, the
unit should be removed from service, using manual runback and trip (Type 6).
Table 2. SUMMARY OF GENERATOR PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS
Fault Type
Recommendation
Page
Electrical Faults
Stator overcurrent
Stator ground fault
Stator phase-to-phase fault
Over-voltage
Over-volts/Hertz
Field overexcitation
Field ground
Loss Of excitation
Runback 8 or 7
Trip 1
Trip 1
Restore normal voltage 13
Trip 1 (or 2)
Trip 4
Trip 4 (or 6)
Trip 1 (or 2)
11
11
12
13
13
14
14
16
System Faults
Unbalanced armature currents
Loss of synchronism
Abnormal frequency
operation
Breaker failure
System Back-up
Voltage surges
Trip 3
Trip 3
See Turbine Instructions
Use Breaker Failure
Protection
Trip 3
Use surge arrestors
17
17
18
18
19
19
System Operations
Transmission line switching
High speed reclosing
Subsynchronous resonance
Inadvertent energization
Limit magnitude of power

step
See detailed recommendations
20
21
21
22
Mechanical or Thermal
Faults
33
GEK 75512l
Fault Type
Recommendation
Bearing vibration
Synchronizing errors
Motoring
Stator Overtemperature
Loss coolant to gas coolers
Reduced seal oil pressure
Local Overheating
Loss of stator coolant
High water conductivity
Trip 4
Use check relays
Trip 1 (or 2 or 3)
Aarm (Trip 6 or 4)
Trip 6 (or 4)
Reduce H2 pressure & load
Runback 8(or 7) or Trip 5
Runback 7 or Trip 4
Trip 6
Page
23
24
25
26
26
27
28
29
30
Protective Actions Key

1 Simultaneous trip
2 Generator trip
3 Breaker trip
4 Sequential trip
5 Manual trip
6 Manual Runback and trip
7 Automatic runback
8 Manual runback
This table does not purport to summarize all the descriptive material contained in the
referenced pages. These must be read and understood when using this summary.
REFERENCES
1.
Generator Tab in O&M Manual.
2.
Operator Action on High Temperature Alarms, Generator Section of O&M Manual.
3.
Operator Action on Low Flow and Low Pressure Alarms, Generator Section of O&M Manual.
4.
Gas Control System, Generator Section of O&M Manual.
5.
Brown, P.G., Johnson, I.B. and Stevenson, J.R., Generator Neutral Grounding, IEEE Trans.,
Vol. PAS-97, No. 3, 1978, pp. 683694.
6.
Berdy, J., Loss of Excitation Protection for Modern Synchronous Generators, IEEE Trans., Vol.
PAS-94, 1975, pp. 14571463; available as GE Publication GER 3183.
7.
Brown, P.G. and Quay, R., Transmission Line Reclosing - Turbine-Generator Duties and Stability Considerations, Texas A&M Relay Conference, April 1976.
8.
Winick, Kenneth, Relay Supervision of Manual Synchronizing, available as GE Publication

GER 2624.
9.
Sequential Tripping and Prevention of Motoring, Turbine section of O&M Manual.
10.
34
Shaft Sealing System, Generator Section of O&M Manual.
11.
12.
GEK 75512l
Linkinhoker, C.L., Schmitt, N. and Winchester, R.L., Inuence of Unbalanced Currents on

the Design and Operation of Large Turbine-Generators, IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-92, 1973, pp.
15971604; available as GE Publication GER 2874.
ANSI Std. C50.13-1977, Sections 6.3 and 6.5.
13.
Graham, P.J., Brown, P.G. and Winchester, R.L., Generator Protection with New Static Negative Sequence Relays, IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-94, 1974, pp. 12081223.
14.
Working Group Report, Out of Step Relaying for Generators, IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-96, No.
5, 1977, pp. 15561564.
15.
IEEE Committee Report, Local Back-up Relaying Protection, IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-89, No.
6, 1970, pp. 10611608.
16.
Hoffman, D.C., Back-up Protection for System Faults at the Generator, General Electric Review, February 1950.
17.
Walker, D.N., Adams, S.L. and Placaek, R.J., Torsional Vibration and Fatigue of Turbine-Generator Shafts, IEEE Power Engineering Society 1978 IEEE/ASME/ASCE Joint Power Generation Conference; Digest State of the Art Symposium, Turbine-Generator Shaft Torsionals.
18.
IEEE Working Group of the Subsynchronous Machine Committee, Steady State Switching
Guide.
19.
Joyce, J.S. and Lambrecht, D., Status of Evaluating the Fatigue of Large Steam Turbine-Generators Caused by Electrical Disturbances, IEEE Power Engineering Society 1978
IEEE/ASME/ASCE Joint Power Generator Conference; Digest State of the Art Symposium,
Turbine-Generator Shaft Torsionals.
20.
Counter-measures to Subsynchronous Resonance Problems, IEEE Subsynchronous Resonance Working Group of the System Dynamic Performance Subcommittee; IEEE Trans., Vol.
PAS-99, No. 5, 1980, pp. 18101818.
21.
Bowler, C.E.J., et al., The Navajo SMF Type SSR Relay, IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-97, No. 5,
1978, pp. 14891495.
22.
Farmer, R.G., et. al., Navajo Project Report on SSR Analysis and Solution, IEEE Trans., Vol.
PAS-96, No. 1, 1977, pp. 12261232.
23.
Resistance Temperature Detectors publication, Generator Section of O&M Manual.
24.
Starting and Loading, publication, Turbine section of O&M Manual.
25.
26.
27.
Smaha, D.W., Rowland, C.R. and Pope, J.W., Coordination of Load Conservation with TurbineGenerator Underfrequency Protection, IEEE Trans., Vol. PAS-99, No. 3, 1980, pp. 11371150.
Berdy, J., Out-of-Step Protection for Generators, available as GE Publication GER 3179.
Berdy, J., Application of Out-of-Step Blocking and Tripping Relays, available as GE Publication GER 3180.
35
GEK 75512l
28.
Piwko, R.J. and Larsen, E.V., HVDC System Control for Damping of Subsynchronous Oscillations, IEEE Paper No. 81-TD660-0 (presented September 1981 at IEEE Transmission and
Distribution Conference).
29.
ANSI/IEEE C37-101 IEEE Guide for Generator Ground Protection.
30.
ANSI/IEEE C37-102 IEEE Guide for AC Generator Protection.
31.
32.
CEI/IEC standard 34-3 Rotating Electrical Machines - Specic requirements for turbine-type
synchronous machines.
ANSI C50.13 Requirements for Cylindrical Rotor Synchronous Generator.
GERs are General Electric Company publications which may be obtained through the nearest
GE Sales Ofce.
GE Energy
General Electric Company
www.gepower.com
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GEK 75512l

Revised August 2009

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II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS ....................

III. ALARMS ........................................................................................................................................

IV. PROTECTION WHEN GENERATOR IS OFF LINE ..............................................................

VI. PROTECTION RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................

General Electric Company, 2009. GE Proprietary Information. All Rights Reserved.

internal generator failure

auxiliary equipment failure

abnormal system conditions

General Electric Company, 2009. GE Proprietary Information. All Rights Reserved.

II. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPERATION, PROTECTION AND ALARMS

General Electric Company, 2009. GE Proprietary Information. All Rights Reserved.

In: Check Ventilation

COLLECTOR AIR OUT

Out: Check Filters

Reduce field current by

STATOR COIL (SLOT)

0 to 100C for H2O

GENERATOR WITH STATIC

BEARING OIL TEMP HIGH

See Turbine Section of

Balance or reduce load.

Reduce machine voltage.

Collector / Cab Fire Detection

Collector / Cab H2 Detection

AIR COOLING (if

CORE MONITOR LEVEL (if

See Recommend. for

MACHINE HEATING (if

See Recommend. for

LOCAL OVERHEATING (if

@From operating pressure

General Electric Company, 2009. GE Proprietary Information. All Rights Reserved.

SEAL OIL SYSTEM (if applic.)

LIQUID DETECTOR FULL

EMERGENCY PUMP RUNNING

FILTER DIFF. PRESSURE HIGH

HIGH/LOW (if applicable)

COOLER HOT GAS TEMP HIGH

COOLER COLD GAS TEMP

MACHINE GAS TEMP HIGH

MACHINE GAS PRESSURE

OVERLOAD (if applicable)

MACHINE GAS PURITY LOW

GENERATOR CASING LIQUID

General Electric Company, 2009. GE Proprietary Information. All Rights Reserved.

STATOR COOLING WATER

INLET PRESSURE LOW

LIQUID HEADER OUTLET

Change lter before 7 psid

[48 kPa (diff.)]

[492 g/cm2 (diff.)]

[01.05 kg/cm2 (diff.)]

0.5 & 9.9

Change resin on rst alarm.

Trip manually on second

[0.5 & 9.9

Check main pump

[69 & 138

Check cause and correct

kPa][0.7 & 1.41