Case Digest: Antonio

Lejano vs. People of the

Philippines
G.R. No. 176389

14 December 2010

FACTS:
On 30 June 1991, Estellita Vizconde and her daughters
Carmela and Jennifer were brutally slain at their home in
Paranaque City. Four years later in 1995, the NBI announced
that it had solved the crime. It presented star-witness Jessica
Alfaro, one of its informers, who claimed that she had
witnessed the crime. She pointed to Hubert Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Artemio Ventura, Michael Gatchalian, Hospicio
Fernandez, Peter Estrada, Miguel Rodriguez and Joy Filart as
the culprits. She also tagged police officer, Gerardo Biong, as
an accessory after the fact. Alfaro had been working as an asset
to the NBI by leading the agency to criminals. Some of the said
criminals had been so high-profile, that Alfaro had become the
darling of the NBI because of her contribution to its success.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that Alfaros
direct and spontaneous narration of events unshaken by
gruesome cross-examination should be given a great weight in
the decision of the case.
In Alfaros story, she stated that after she and the accused got
high of shabu, she was asked to see Carmela at their residence.
After Webb was informed that Carmela had a male companion
with her, Webb became piqued and thereafter consumed more
drugs and plotted the gang rape on Carmela. Webb, on the
other hand, denied all the accusations against him with the
alibi that during the whole time that the crime had taken place,
he was staying in the United States. He had apparently left for
the US on 09 March 1991 and only returned on 27 October
1992. As documentary evidence, he presented photocopies of
his passport with four stamps recording his entry and exit from
both the Philippines and the US, Flights Passenger Manifest
employment documents in the US during his stay there and
US-INS computer generated certification authenticated by the
Philippine DFA. Aside from these documentary alibis, he also
gave a thorough recount of his activities in the US
ISSUE:
Whether or not Webbs documented alibi of his U.S. travel
should be given more credence by the Court than the positive
identification by Alfaro.
RULING:
For a positive identification to be acceptable, it must meet at
least two criteria:
1. The positive identification of the offender must come
from a credible witness; and
2. The witness story of what she personally saw must be
believable, not inherently contrived.
The Supreme Court found that Alfaro and her testimony failed
to meet the above criteria. She did not show up at the NBI as a
spontaneous witness bothered by her conscience. She had
been hanging around the agency for sometime as a stool
pigeon, one paid for mixing up with criminals and squealing on
them. And although her testimony included details, Alfaro had
prior access to the details that the investigators knew of the
case. She took advantage of her familiarity with these details to

include in her testimony the clearly incompatible acts of Webb

hurling a stone at the front door glass frames, for example, just
so she can accommodate the crime scene feature.
To establish alibi, the accused must prove by positive, clear and
satisfactory evidence that:
1. He was present at another place at the time of the
perpetration of the crime, and
2. That it was physically impossible for him to be at the
scene of the crime.
The Supreme Court gave very high credence to the
compounded documentary alibi presented by Webb. This alibi
altogether impeaches Alfaros testimony not only with respect
to him, but also with respect to the other accused. For, if the
Court accepts the proposition that Webb was in the US when
the crime took place, Alfaros testimony will not hold
altogether. Webbs participation is the anchor of Alfaros story.

Case Digest: People vs Webb and Lejano vs People

Lejano vs People
People vs Webb
GR Nos. 176389 and 176864
January 18, 2011
Facts:
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the CA
and acquitted accused, namely: Hubert Webb, Antonio
Lejano, Michael Atchalian, Hospicio Fernandez, Miguel
Rodriguez, Peter Estrada, and Gerardo Biong on the
ground of lack of proof of their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
Thereafter, complaint Lauro Vizconde, asked the Court
to reconsider its decision, claiming that it "denied the
prosecution
due
process
of
law;
seriously
misappreciated the facts; unreasonably regarded Alfaro
as lacking credibility; issued a tainted and erroneous
decision; decided the case in a manner that resulted in
the miscarriage of justice; or committed grave abuse in
its treatment of the evidence and prosecution
witnesses."
Issue:
Whether or not a judgment of acquittal may be
reconsidered.
Ruling:
No, as a rule a judgment of acquittal cannot be
reconsidered for it places the accused under double
jeopardy. On occasions, a motion for reconsideration
after an acquittal is possible, but the grounds are
exceptional and narrow as when the court that absolved
the accused gravely abused its discretion, resulting in
loss of jurisdiction, or when a mistrial has occurred. In

any of such cases, the State may assail the decision by

special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65.
Althou complainant Vizconde invoked the exceptions, he
has been unable to bring pleas for reconsideration under
such exceptions. He did not specify that violations of due
process and acts constituting grave abuse of discretion
that the Court supposedly committed. Vizconde did not
also alleged that the Court held a sham review of the
decision of the CA. What the complainant actually
questions is the Court's appreciation of the evidence and
assessment of the prosecution witnesses' credibility.
That the court committed grave error in finding Alfaro as
not a credible witness. The complaint wants the court to
review the evidence anew and render another judgment
based on such evaluation which is not constitutionally
allowed and therefore, the judgment of acquittal can no
longer be disturbed.

CASE DIGESTSDemurrer

To Evidence Without
Leave Of Court Waiver of Right To Present
Evidence
Olivia was a teller at the Prudential Bank
branch of Angeles City, the only one
assigned to handle dollar deposits and
withdrawals. An internal spot-audit team
conducted by Virgilio inventoried the cash
accountabilities of the branch. Olivia was
short by $10,000.00; she only had
US5,040.52, when she should have
$15,040.52. When asked to explain, she
averred that a withdrawal was made on
December 29, 1006 after the cut-off time,
evidenced by a withdrawal memo which she
showed to Virgilio; this withdrawal should be
treated as a withdrawal on January 2, 1996.
The account belonged to Adoracion Tayag
and her co-signatory, Apolinario Tayag. This
withdrawal memo when shown to the branch
cashier, Noel, did not contain the required
signature of two officers, hence Noel asked
the nature of this withdrawal. Olivia
explained that Apolnario instructed her to
withdraw $10,000.00 from his account thru
his driver. Although the memo was supposed
to be made on January 3, the memo itself
was dated January 2. Noel then instructed
her to post the corresponding memo in the
corresponding ledger and bring the memo

back to him so he and the branch manager,

Edgardo. Virigilio, meanwhile checked the
account ledger of Apolinario and Adoracion,
where he found out that there is a hold
jacket, indicating that no withdrawal should
be made to the account so as not to reduce
its balance below $35,000.00. The
withdrawal reduced its balance to
$26,077.51. The account ledger also
indicated a deposit of $10,000.00 on January
2, 1996. When he compared the signatures
in the withdrawal slip to the signature card,
he noticed a big difference which he reported
to the branch manager.

When Edgardo required her to explain, Olivia

reiterated that the withdrawal was made on
December 29, 1996 after the cut-off time.
Another cash count conducted by Virgilio for
that period revealed that Olivia should have
a cash balance of $21,778.86; her actual
cash count revealed she only had $11,778.86
(Olivia used the money withdrawn from the
account of Apolinario, and replenished it with
her cash accountability). Olivia eventually
broke down and told Edgardo she will explain
everything to the bank president. Apolinario
denied affixing the signature on the
withdrawal slip.In a handwritten letter, Olivia
explained that the $10,000.00 cash
shortage, and another P2.2 Million shortage
was taken by her. She gave it to a man who
approached her at the counter who
threatened her and her family. They allegedly
approached her. She then gave the cash to
the man. Despite this, she did not report the
matter to the bank officers.
The bank then filed a case for
Qualified Theft against Olivia. After the
prosecution rested its case, Olivia filed a
Demurrer To Evidence And Motion To Defer
Defense Evidence, on the ground that the
prosecution evidence failed to prove its case.
The RTC denied the motion filed by Olivia,
and proceeded to rule on the case without
giving her the opportunity to present her

evidence, holding that the Demurrer to

Evidence was filed without leave of court,
hence, she is considered to have waived her
presentation of evidence.
The RTC convicted her, affirmed with
modification by the Court of Appeals which
increased the imposable penalty to reclusion
perpetua.
Among the issues she raised before
the Supreme Court was that the RTC denied
her an opportunity to present evidence when
it declared that her demurrer to evidence
was filed without leave of court.The Supreme
Court:The rule in point is Section 15, Rule
119, of the Revised Rules of Court,
viz:Section 15. Demurrer to evidence. After
the prosecution has rested its case, the court
may dismiss the case on the ground of
insufficiency of evidence: (1) on its own
initiative after giving the prosecution an
opportunity to be heard; or (2) on motion of
the accused filed with prior leave of court.If
the court denies the motion for dismissal, the
accused may adduce evidence in his
defense. When the accused files such motion
to dismiss without express leave of court, he
waives the right to present evidence and
submits the case for judgment on the basis
of the evidence for the prosecution. (n)Under
the rule, the RTC properly declared the
accused to have waived her right to present
evidence because she did not obtain the
express leave of court for her demurrer to
evidence, thereby reflecting her voluntary
and knowing waiver of her right to present
evidence. The RTC did not need to inquire
into the voluntariness and intelligence of the
waiver, for her opting to file her demurrer to
evidence without first obtaining express
leave of court effectively waived her right to
present her evidence.It is true that the Court
has frequently deemed the failure of the trial
courts to conduct an inquiry into the
voluntariness and intelligence of the waiver
to be a sufficient cause to remand cases to
the trial courts for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the accused truly

intended to waive their constitutional right to

be heard, and whether they understood the
consequences of their waivers. In People v.
Bodoso, a prosecution for a capital offense,
we leaned towards the protection of the
accuseds constitutional right to due process
by outlining the proper steps to be taken
before deeming the right to present evidence
as waived, thus:Henceforth, to protect the
constitutional right to due process of every
accused in a capital offense and to avoid any
confusion about the proper steps to be taken
when a trial court comes face to face with an
accused or his counsel who wants to waive
his clients right to present evidence and be
heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the
trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the
validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a
searching inquiry as specified in People v.
Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty,
particularly -1. The trial court shall hear both
the prosecution and the accused with their
respective counsel on the desire or
manifestation of the accused to waive the
right to present evidence and be heard.2.
The trial court shall ensure the attendance of
the prosecution and especially the accused
with their respective counsel in the hearing
which must be recorded. Their presence
must be duly entered in the minutes of the
proceedings.3. During the hearing, it shall be
the task of the trial court to -a. ask the
defense counsel a series of question to
determine whether he had conferred with
and completely explained to the accused
that he had the right to present evidence
and be heard as well as its meaning and
consequences, together with the significance
and outcome of the waiver of such right. If
the lawyer for the accused has not done so,
the trial court shall give the latter enough
time to fulfill this professional obligation.b.
inquire from the defense counsel with
conformity of the accused whether he wants
to present evidence or submit a
memorandum elucidating on the
contradictions and insufficiency of the
prosecution evidence, if any, or in default
theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior

leave of court, if he so believes that the

prosecution evidence is so weak that it need
not even be rebutted. If there is a desire to
do so, the trial court shall give the defense
enough time to this purpose.c. elicit
information about the personality profile of
the accused, such as his age, socio-economic
status, and educational background, which
may serve as a trustworthy index of his
capacity to give a free and informed waiver.
d. all questions posed to the accused should
be in a language known and understood by
the latter, hence, the record must state the
language used for this purpose as well as
reflect the corresponding translation thereof
in English.In passing, trial courts may also
abide by the foregoing criminal procedure
when the waiver of the right to be present
and be heard is made in criminal cases
involving non-capital offenses. After all, in
whatever action or forum the accused is
situated, the waiver that he makes if it is to
be binding and effective must still be
exhibited in the case records to have been
validly undertaken, that is, it was done
voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently with
sufficient awareness of the relevant
circumstances and likely consequences. As a
matter of good court practice, the trial court
would have to rely upon the most
convenient, if not primary, evidence of the
validity of the waiver which would amount to
the same thing as showing its adherence to
the step-by-step process outlined above.Also,
in Rivera v. People, which involved an
accused charged with a non-capital offense
who filed a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court, the Court, citing People v.
Bodoso, supra, remanded the case to the
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings upon
finding that the accused had not been asked

whether he had understood the

consequences of filing the demurrer to
evidence without leave of court.

Yet, the accused cannot be extended

the benefit of People v. Bodoso and
Rivera v. People. The factual milieus
that warranted the safeguards in said
criminal cases had nothing in common
with the factual milieu in which the RTC
deemed the herein accused to have
waived her right to present evidence.
The accused in People v. Bodoso,
without filing a demurrer to evidence,
expressly waived the right to present
evidence. The Court felt that the trial
court ought to have followed the steps
outlined therein. The accused in Rivera
v. People filed a demurrer to evidence
without having to obtain an express
leave of court, considering that the
Sandiganbayan itself had told him to
file the demurrer to evidence. Thus,
after the demurrer to evidence was
denied, the accused was held to be still
entitled to present his evidence.
The accused and her counsel should not
have ignored the potentially prejudicial
consequence of the filing of a demurrer
to evidence without the leave of court
required in Section 15, Rule 119, of the
Revised Rules of Court.[20] They were
well aware of the risk of a denial of the
demurrer being high, for by demurring
the accused impliedly admitted the
facts adduced by the State and the
proper inferences therefrom.[21] We
cannot step in now to alleviate her selfinflicted plight, for which she had no
one to blame but herself; otherwise, we
may unduly diminish the essence of the
rule that gave her the alternative
option to waive presenting her own
evidence.