Uson v.

Del Rosario
FACTS:
This is an action for recovery of the ownership and possession of five (5) parcels of land in Pangasinan, filed by Maria Uson
against Maria del Rosario and her four illegitimate children. Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda who upon his
death in 1945 left the lands involved in this litigation. Faustino Nebreda left no other heir except his widow Maria Uson. However,
plaintiff claims that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945, his common-law wife Maria del Rosario took possession illegally of said
lands thus depriving her of their possession and enjoyment. Defendants in their answer set up as special defense that Uson and her
husband, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate as husband and wife and, in consideration of which Uson
was given a parcel of land and in return she renounced her right to inherit any other property that may be left by her husband upon
his death. CFI found for Uson. Defendants appealed.
ISSUE:
W/N Uson has a right over the lands from the moment of death of her husband.
W/N the illegitimate children of deceased and his common-law wife have successional rights.
HELD:
Yes. There is no dispute that Maria Uson, is the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, former owner of the five parcels of lands
litigated in the present case. There is likewise no dispute that Maria del Rosario, was merely a common-law wife with whom she
had four illegitimate children with the deceased. It likewise appears that Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 much prior to the
effectivity of the new Civil Code. With this background, it is evident that when Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 the five parcels of
land he was seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson (Art 777 NCC).As
this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor
had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death". From that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of
Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question because she expressly renounced
to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire and leave upon his death in the deed of separation, cannot be
entertained for the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be renounced.
No. The provisions of the NCC shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may have occurred
under the prior legislation only if no vested rights are impaired. Hence, since the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands
in question became vested in 1945 upon the death of her late husband, the new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of
the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the
lands in dispute.
ABANGAN v ABANGAN
40 Phil 476
FACTS
- On September 19, 1917, CFI of Cebu admitted to probate Ana Abangan's will executed July, 1916. From this decision the
opponents appealed.
- The will consists of 2 sheets. The first contains all the disposition of the testatrix, duly signed at the bottom by Martin Montalban
(in the name and under the direction of the testatrix) and by three witnesses. The following sheet contains only the attestation
clause duly signed at the bottom by the three instrumental witnesses. Neither of these sheets is signed on the left margin by the
testatrix and the three witnesses, nor numbered by letters. These omissions, according to appellants' contention, are defects
whereby the probate of the will should have been denied.
ISSUE
WON the will was duly admitted to probate.
HELD
YES. In requiring that each and every sheet of the will be signed on the left margin by the testator and three witnesses in the
presence of each other, Act No. 2645 evidently has for its object the avoidance of substitution of any of said sheets which may
change the disposition of the testatrix. But when these dispositions are wholly written on only one sheet (as in the instant case)
signed at the bottom by the testator and three witnesses, their signatures on the left margin of said sheet are not anymore necessary
as such will be purposeless.
In requiring that each and every page of a will must be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of the sheet, it is
likewise clear that the object of Act No. 2645 is to know whether any sheet of the will has been removed. But, when all the
dispositive parts of a will are written on one sheet only, the object of the statute disappears because the removal of this single
sheet, although unnumbered, cannot be hidden.
In a will consisting of two sheets the first of which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the
testator and three witnesses and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses, it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the witnesses, or be paged.
The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. Therefore the laws on this subject should be
interpreted in such a way as to attain these primordal ends. But, on the other hand, also one must not lose sight of the fact that it is
not the object of the law to restrain and curtail the exercise of the right to make a will. So when an interpretation already given
assures such ends, any other interpretation whatsoever, that adds nothing but demands more requisites entirely unnecessary, useless
and frustative of the testator's last will, must be disregarded.

G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees, vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
FACTS:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a document purporting to be his Last Will
and Testament. Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was
an evacuee. He left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, Andres Enriquez, one of the legatees filed a
petition for the probate of the will in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate
of the deceased if he left no will, filedo pposition. During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being
dead, testified withoutcontradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-witnesses, Father Sancho wroteout in
longhand the will in Spanish which the testator spoke and understood; that he signed on The left hand margin of the front page of
each of the three folios or sheets of which thedocument is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally
signed hisname at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the three attestingwitnesses after telling that it
was his last will and that the said three witnesses signed their nameson the last page after the attestation clause in his presence and
in the presence of each other. Theoppositors did not submit any evidence.The trial court found and declared the will to be a
holographic will; that it was in the handwritingof the testator and that although at the time it was executed and at the time of the
testator's death,holographic wills were not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when thecase was to be
decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted theexecution of holographic wills, under a liberal view,
and to carry out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling factor and may override any defect
in form,said trial court admitted to probate the Last Will and Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. Theoppositors appealed from
that decision.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the holographic will should be allowed despite the fact that when it wasexecuted the civil code proscribes the
execution of such wills.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that despite the effectivity of the new Civil Code allowing the executionof holographic wills, the
contested holographic will still cannot be allowed and admitted to probate. This is because under Art. 795 of the Civil Code,
the extrinsic validity of a will should be judged not by the law existing at the time of the testators death nor the law at the time of
its probate, but by the law existing at the time of the execution of the instrument. For the very simple reason that although the will
becomes operative only after the testators death, still his wishes are given expression at the time of execution.
Roxas v. De Jesus
134 SCRA 245 | Lantion
FACTS:
Bibiane Roxas died. Her brother, Simeon Roxas, filed a spec. pro. for partition of the estate of the deceased and also delivered the
holographic will of the deceased. Simeon stated that he found a notebook belonging to deceased, which contained a letter-will
entirely written and signed in deceaseds handwriting. The will is dated "FEB./61 " and states: "This is my will which I want to be
respected although it is not written by a lawyer. Roxas relatives corroborated the fact that the same is a holographic will of
deceased, identifying her handwriting and signature. Respondent opposed probate on the ground that it such does not comply with
Article 810 of the CC because the date contained in a holographic will must signify the year, month, and day.
ISSUE:
W/N the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the
Article 810 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Valid date.
This will not be the first time that this Court departs from a strict and literal application of the statutory requirements regarding the
due execution of Wills. The underlying and fundamental objectives permeating the provisions of the law wills consists in the
liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last
wishes, but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper
pressure and influence upon the testator. If a Will has been executed in substantial compliance with the formalities of the law, and
the possibility of bad faith and fraud in the exercise thereof is obviated, said Will should be admitted to probate (Rey v. Cartagena
56 Phil. 282).
If the testator, in executing his Will, attempts to comply with all the requisites, although compliance is not literal, it is sufficient if
the objective or purpose sought to be accomplished by such requisite is actually attained by the form followed by the testator.
In Abangan v. Abanga 40 Phil. 476, we ruled that: The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the
door against bad faith and fraud, to avoid substitution of wills and testaments and to guaranty their truth and authenticity. ...
In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two competing Wills executed on the
same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no
such contingency in this case.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud in its execution nor was there any
substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was
entirely written, dated, and signed by the testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its
genuineness and due execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their mother
and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection interposed by the oppositorrespondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic
Will is not sufficient compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.
As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its execution. However, when as in
the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is
established and the only issue is whether or not the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with
Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Maloles II v. Phillips
324 SCRA 172 (2000)
Facts:
On July 20, 1995 Dr. Arturo De Santos filed for the probate of his will. He claimed he had no compulsory heirs and had named in
his will as sole legatee and devisee the Arturo de Santos Foundation, Inc.; that he disposed by his will his properties with an
approximate value of not less than P2,000,000.00; and that copies of said will were in the custody of the named executrix, private
respondent Pacita de los Reyes Phillips.
On Feb. 16 1996, Makati RTC Branch-61 under judge Gorospe issued an order granting the petition and allowing the will, the
court found that the testator was of sound mind and freely executed said will.
Shortly after on Feb. 26, 1996 Dr. De Santos died
Petitioner (testators nephew) claiming to be the only son of the deceaseds sister Alicia de santos, filed a motion for intervention
as the nearest of kin, and also as a creditor of the deceased.
Defendant filed a motion for the issuance of letters testamentary in Makati Branch 61, but then withdrew the same. Later defendant
then filed the motion in Makati RTC Branch 65.
Petitoner then filed a motion for intervention also with Branch 65, stating again he was a full blooded nephew and that a case
already related to the subject matter was pending in Branch 61.
Judge Abad Santos, referred the case to Branch 61.
Meanwhile Judge Gorospe in Branch 61 denied the petitioners motion to intervene, and denied taking cognizance of the case
forwarded by Branch 65, because the case in Branch 65 involved the Estate of Decent Arturo De Santos, while the one in Branch
61 was filed by Arturo de Santos Himself when he was alive and had already been decided back in Feb. 16 1996, when it allowed
the will.
Branch 65 did not want to take the case, but reversed its decision and again took cognizance of the case to expedite proceedings.
Issues:
1. Whether or not Makati, Branch 61 has lost jurisdiction to proceed with the probate proceedings upon its issuance of an order
allowing the will of Dr. Arturo de Santos.
2. Whether or not Makati, Branch 65 acquired jurisdiction over the petition for issuance of letters testamentary filed by (private)
respondent.
3. Whether or not the petitioner, being a creditor of the late Dr. Arturo de Santos, has a right to intervene and oppose the petition
for issuance of letters testamentary filed by the respondent.
Held:
Branch 65 now has jurisdiction. Petitioners contention that that the proceedings must continue until the estate is fully distributed
to the lawful heirs, devisees, and legatees of the testator, pursuant to Rule 73, 1 of the Rules of Court is without merit.
In cases for the probate of wills, it is well-settled that the authority of the court is limited to ascertaining the extrinsic validity of
the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law. This was already done in the ante-mortem probate of Dr. De Santos will during his lifetime.
Thus, after the allowance of the will of Dr. De Santos on February 16, 1996, there was nothing else for Branch 61 to do except to
issue a certificate of allowance of the will pursuant to Rule 73, 12 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner, who defends the order of Branch 65 allowing him to intervene, cites Rule 73, 1 which states:
Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a
citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance
in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent,
shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts
The above rule, however, actually provides for the venue of actions for the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. It could
not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is contained in a law of
procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is another.
Indeed, the jurisdiction over probate proceedings and settlement of estates with approximate value of over P100,000.00 (outside
Metro Manila) or P200,000.00 (in Metro Manila) belongs to the regional trial courts. The different branches comprising each court
in one judicial region do not possess jurisdictions independent of and incompatible with each other.
It is noteworthy that, although Rule 73, 1 applies insofar as the venue of the petition for probate of the will of Dr. De Santos is
concerned, it does not bar other branches of the same court from taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the testator
after his death.
Lastly, regarding petitioners claim as heir and creditor the Court said that
The private respondent herein is not an heir or legatee under the will of the decedent Arturo de Santos. Neither is he a compulsory
heir of the latter. As the only and nearest collateral relative of the decedent, he can inherit from the latter only in case of intestacy.
Since the decedent has left a will which has already been probated and disposes of all his properties the private respondent can
inherit only if the said will is annulled. His interest in the decedent's estate is, therefore, not direct or immediate. His claim to being
a creditor of the estate is a belated one, having been raised for the first time only in his reply to the opposition to his motion to
intervene, and, as far as the records show, not supported by evidence.
Thus, the Petition was denied.

Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio

43 SCRA 177
FACTS:
Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They were married civilly on
September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as husband and wife continuously without any
children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered
that her husband cohabited with a Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of
legal separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share of the conjugal
partnership profits.
Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his prior and subsisting
marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective evidence. However, before the trial could be
completed, respondent already scheduled to present surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her
counsel duly notified the court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil Code and that the death of
Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to substitute the deceased Carmen by her father,
Macario Lapuz.
ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the action and will it also
apply if the action involved property rights.
HELD:
An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved. These rights are mere
effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the decree such rights do not come into existence, so
that before the finality of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the
action, no decree can be forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further interest in continuing the
same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any property rights acquired by either party as a result
of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6 could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the
appellee or by the heirs of the appellant.
Sumaya vs IAC (BALANTAKBO)
201 SCRA 178
September 2, 1991
NATURE
Petition for review on certiorari decision of IAC affirming decision of CFI
FACTS
- Raul Balantakbo inherited 1/3 interest pro-indiviso of a lot in Liliw from his father, and 1/7 interest pro-indiviso in 10 parcels of
land from his maternal grandmother. Raul then died intestate, leaving his mother Consuelo Joaquin Vda. De Balantakbo as his sole
surviving heir.
- Consuelo then adjudicated unto herself the properties in an affidavit then subsequently sold the same to Mariquita Sumaya who
in turn sold them to Villa Honorio Devt Corp. who in turn sold them to Agro-Industrial Coconut Cooperative (the present
possessors of the properties).
- Consuelo then died. The brothers in full blood of Raul, and his niece and nephews from a dead brother then filed suits to
recover the properties which were sold by Consuelo, arguing that the same properties were subject to a reserva troncal in their
favor
- They claim that since there was no annotation in the title, they should be treated as innocent purchasers in good faith and for
value, thus they may not be stripped of the properties.
- RTC ruled in favor of Balantakbo clan, and ordered the possessor of the properties to convey the same to the Balantakbos. It said
that the registration of an affidavit of the self-adjudication of the estate of Raul, wherein it was clearly stated that the properties
were inherited from Rauls father and maternal grandmother, was in its form, declaration, and substance, a recording in the
Registry of Deeds of the reservable character of the properties.
Note:
Propositus Raul
Reservista/ Reservor Consuelo
ISSUE
1. WON the registration of the affidavit of self-adjudication operated as an annotation to the title to the properties
2. WON the purchasers can be held as innocent purchasers in good faith
HELD
1. YES
Ratio
Reasoning It was admitted that the certificates of titles covering the properties in question show that they were free from any liens
and encumbrances at the time of the sale. The fact remains however, that the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Consuelo
stating the source of the properties thereby showing the reservable nature thereof was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Laguna, and this is sufficient notice to the whole world in accordance with Section 52 of the Property Registration Decree
(formerly Sec. 51 of R.A. 496) which provides:
Sec. 52. CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE UPON REGISTRATION. Every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered, filed or entered in the Office of the Register of Deeds

for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be constructive notice to all persons from the time of such
registering, filing or entering.
- Gatioan v Gaffud: Under the rule of notice, it is presumed that the purchaser has examined every instrument of record affecting
the title. Such presumption is irrebuttable. He is charged with notice of every fact shown by the record and is presumed to know
every fact which an examination of the record would have disclosed. This presumption cannot be overcome by proof of innocence
or good faith. Such presumption cannot be defeated by proof of want of knowledge of what the record contains any more than
one may be permitted to show that he was ignorant of the provisions of the law. The rule that all persons must take notice of the
facts which the public record contains is a rule of law.
- affidavit of self adjudication executed by Consuelo which contained a statement that the property was inherited from a
descendant, Raul, which has likewise inherited by the latter from another ascendant, was registered with the Registry of Property.
The failure of the Register of Deeds to annotate the reservable character of the property in the certificate of title cannot be
attributed to Consuelo.
2. NO
Ratio That the properties were subject to reserva troncal was made apparent by the affidavit of self-adjudication and deed of sale
whereby Consuelo explicitly stated that she inherited these properties from her son who in turn inherited from his father. Such fact
operates as constructive notice to the buyers, thus preventing them from being innocent purchasers in good faith.
Reasoning Art. 891. The ascendant who inherits from his descendant any property which the latter may have acquired by
gratuitous title from another ascendant or a brother or sister, is obliged to reserve such property as he may have acquired by
operation of law for the benefit of relatives who are within the third degree and who belong to the line from which said property
came.
- The obligation to reserve rests upon the reservor, Consuelo.
- Dir. Of Lands v Aguas (obiter in that case): The reservable character of a property is but a resolutory condition of the ascendant
reservor's right of ownership. If the condition is fulfilled, that is, if upon the ascendant reservor's death there are relatives having
the status provided in Article (891), the property passes, in accordance with this special order of succession, to said relatives, or to
the nearest of kin among them.... But if this condition is not fulfilled, the property is released and will be adjudicated in accordance
with the regular order of succession. The fulfillment or non-fulfillment of the resolutory condition, the efficacy or cessation of the
reservation, the acquisition of rights or loss of the vested ones, are phenomena which have nothing to do with whether the
reservation has been noted or not in the certificate of title to the property. The purpose of the notation is nothing more than to
afford to the persons entitled to the reservation, if any, due protection against any act of the reservor, which may make it ineffective
...
- Dizon and Dizon v. Galang: reservable character may be lost to innocent purchasers for value. The obligation imposed on a
widowed spouse to annotate the reservable character of a property subject of reserva viudal is applicable to reserva troncal. Since
these parcels of land have been legally transferred to 3rd persons, Vicente Galang has lost ownership thereof and cannot now
register nor record in the Registry of Deeds their reservable character
- Consistent with the rule in reserva viudal where the person obliged to reserve (the widowed spouse) had the obligation to
annotate in the Registry of Property the reservable character of the property, in reserva troncal, the reservor (the ascendant who
inherited from a descendant property which the latter inherited from another descendant) has the duty to reserve and therefore, the
duty to annotate also.
- jurisprudential rule requiring annotation in the Registry of Property of the right reserved in real property subject of reserva viudal
insofar as it is applied to reserva troncal stays despite abolition of reserva viudal in NCC
- The properties involved in this case are already covered by a Torrens title and unless the registration of the limitation is effected
(either actual or constructive), no third persons shall be prejudiced thereby.
Casiano v. Maloto
G.R. No. L-32328
September 30, 1977
Facts:
Aldina Maloto Casiano, Constancio Maloto, Panfilo Maloto, and Felino Maloto, niece and nephews, respectively, of the late
Adriana Maloto, in the belief that the decedent died intestate, commenced on November 4, 1963 in CFI-Iloilo an intestate
proceeding. They partitioned the properties of Adriana among themselves, and said partition was approved by the court. Four years
later, Aldina and Constancio, herein petitioners, went to the same court asking to re-open the case alleging that Adriana actually
left a will. They moved for the annulment of the intestate proceeding and the allowance of the said will. Panfilo and Felino
opposed the motion. The court dismissed the motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. Petitioners filed before the
Supreme Court a petition for certiorari and mandamus which was later dismissed by the Court saying that the proper remedy was
to file a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will. Petitioners then filed with CFI Iloilo a petition for probate of the
said will but the court dismissed the same on the ground of res adjudicata and that the earlier intestate proceeding had made a
finding that the will of the decedent was destroyed and revoked. Hence, this petition for review.
Issue:
Whether or not the petition for probate was barred by the judgment of an earlier intestate proceeding.
Held:
Negative. The Court ruled that the petition for probate of the alleged will was the proper remedy, and should not have been
dismissed. The earlier intestate proceeding is not a bar for the petition for probate of the will as to constitute res adjudicata. The
court also ruled that it was not proper for the court in the intestate proceeding to make a finding that the discovered will had been
destroyed and revoked. (The lower court was directed to proceed with the hearing of the probate of the will).

MANUEL v. FERRER
GR No. 117246, August 21,1995
Vitug, J.
DOCTRINE: Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle
of absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
FACTS:
Petitioners, the legitimate children of spouses Antonio Manuel and Beatriz Guiling, initiated this suit. During his marriage with
Beatriz, Antonio had an extra-marital affair with one Ursula Bautista. From this relationship, Juan Manuel was born. He owned
three parcels of land, all registered in his name. He and his wife, Esperanza Gamba, were not blessed with a child of their own and
so they decided to take private respondent Modesta Manuel-Baltazar into their fold and so raised her as their own "daughter".
During his lifetime, Juan entered into a pacto de retro sale with one Estanislaoa Manuel, one of herein respondents. Later, Juan
died intestate. Two years after, his wife died.
Herein respondent Modesta then executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication claiming for herself the three parcels of land. Modesta
executed in favor of her co-respondent Estanislaoa Manuel a Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim over the unredeemed one-half
(1/2) portion of the that was sold to the latter by Juan Manuel under the 1980 Deed of Sale Con Pacto de Retro. These acts of
Modesta apparently did not sit well with petitioners. In a complaint filed before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan,
the petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid instruments.
Petitioners argue that they are the legal heirs over one-half of Juan's intestate estate (while the other half would pertain to Juan's
surviving spouse) under the provision of the last paragraph of Article 994 of the Civil Code, providing thusly:
Art. 994. In default of the father or mother, an illegitimate child shall be succeeded by his or her surviving spouse, who shall be
entitled to the entire estate.
If the widow or widower should survive with brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she or he shall inherit one-half of the estate,
and the latter the other half. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents, in turn, submit that Article 994 should be read in conjunction with Article 992 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or
mother; nor shall such children or relative inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioners are legal heirs of the decedent Juan Manuel and hence, entitled to inherit
HELD:
NO. Article 992, a basic postulate, enunciates what is so commonly referred to in the rules on succession as the "principle of
absolute separation between the legitimate family and the illegitimate family." The doctrine rejects succession ab intestato in
the collateral line between legitimate relatives, on the one hand, and illegitimate relatives, on other hand, although it does not
totally disavow such succession in the direct line. Since the rule is predicated on the presumed will of the decedent, it has no
application, however, on testamentary dispositions.
This "barrier" between the members of the legitimate and illegitimate family in intestacy is explained by a noted civilist. His
thesis:
What is meant by the law when it speaks of brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, as legal or intestate heirs of an illegitimate
child? It must be noted that under Art. 992 of the Code, there is a barrier dividing members of the illegitimate family from
members of the legitimate family. It is clear that by virtue of this barrier, the legitimate brothers and sisters as well as the children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters, cannot inherit from the illegitimate child. Consequently, when the
law speaks of"brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces" as legal heirs of an illegitimate child, it refers to illegitimate brothers and
sisters as well as to the children, whether legitimate or illegitimate, of such brothers and sisters. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it has ruled that where the illegitimate child had half-brothers who were legitimate, the latter had no right to the former's
inheritance. In her answer to the complaint, Modesta candidly admitted that she herself is not an intestate heir of Juan Manuel. She
is right. A ward (ampon), without the benefit of formal (judicial) adoption, is neither a compulsory nor a legal heir. The court
however held that the complaint of petitioners seeking the nullity of the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication executed by Modesta, the
three (3) TCT's issued to her favor, as well as the Deed of Renunciation and Quitclaim in favor of Estanislaoa Manuel, was
properly dismissed by the trial court. Petitioners, not being the real "parties-in-interest" 14 in the case, had neither the standing nor
the cause of action to initiate the complaint.

Nepomuceno v. Court of Appeals

Facts:
1. Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. It was also
provided therein that he was married to Rufina Gomez with whom he had 3 children.
2. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured
through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage with the petitioner.
3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground of the testator's admission of cohabitation, hence making the will invalid on its
face. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the will is valid except the devise in favor of the petitioner which is null and
void in violation of Art. 739 and 1028.
Issue:
Whether or not the court can pass on the intrinsic validity of a will
RULING:
Yes, as an exception. But the general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the
extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate
court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself
admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner.
The will was validly executed in accordance with law but the court didn't find it to serve a practical purpose to remand the nullified
provision in a separate action for that purpose only since in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the
intrinsic validity of its provisions.
The devisee is invalid by virtue of Art. 739 which voids a donation made between persons guilty of adultery/concubinage at the
time of the donations. Under Art, 1028 it is also prohibited.

G.R. No. L-18788

January 31, 1964

ROMULO LOPEZ, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,

vs.
LUIS GONZAGA, ET AL., defendants,
LUIS GONZAGA and ASUNCION GONZAGA, defendants-appellants.
FACTS:
The case is a joint and direct appeal by both parties-plaintiffs and parties-defendants from the decision of the CFI of Negros
Occidental in its Civil Case No. 5033 to the Supreme Court, because the properties involved valued at more than P200,000.00. The
appealed decision dismissed the petition of plaintiffs (appellants) for partition and cancellation of titles of registered lands and
ordered them to pay defendants (appellees) P1,000.00 by way of attorney's fees, but refused to award moral damages in favor of
the defendants.
The original petition was filed with the court a quo on 6 October 1958, alleging, among other things, that:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer died intestate on 11 April 1935 without any issue and leaving real and personal
properties worth P400,000.00;
that she was survived by the plaintiffs, who are her nearest of kin, being her brother sisters, nephews, and nieces;
that during the lifetime the deceased, she expressed the wish that as long as her brother, Luis Gonzaga, the principal
defendant, was engaged in his coconut oil experimentation he could use products and rentals of her properties in
furtherance his experiments;
that the said scientific venture by said defendant was discontinued when he became totally blind in October, 1955;
in view of which the plaintiffs now ask a partition of the estate and the cancellation of titles of lands allegedly
fraudulently transferred by, and in the name of, the defendant.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and non-inclusion of indispensable parties. The plainttiffs
amended their petition to include the omitted parties. After hearing on the motion to dismiss, the court denied the said motion.
Thereupon, the defendant filed their answer, pleading a denial as to intestacy of deceased, and alleging, among others, that a will of
Soledad Gonzaga Vda. de Ferrer instituted Luis Gonzaga as the sole heir estate, and that the will was duly allowed and probated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Luis Gonzaga is the rightful heir of Soledad Gonzaga
HELD:
The transfer of the certificates title to Luis Gonzaga's own name in 1936 would constitute an open and clear repudiation of any
trust, and the lapse of more than twenty years' open and adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by
prescription in the appellee, since appellants, who knew of the death of Doa Soledad in 1935, never made any move to require
Luis to reconvey the property, or any part thereof. The explanation that Doa Soledad Gonzaga had the express wish that all the
income should go to Luis while conducted experimental studies on coconut products wholly unconvincing as an excuse for the
laches; his right to the income could not have blocked a partition of capital assets among appellants, if they had been at entitled to
them.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision is hereby affirmed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.