1.

[G.R. No. 139561. June 10, 2003]

SPOUSES FEDERICO ATUEL and SARAH ATUEL and SPOUSES GEORGE
GALDIANO and ELIADA GALDIANO,petitioners, vs. SPOUSES
BERNABE VALDEZ and CONCHITA VALDEZ, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari[1] seeking to reverse the
Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals dated 20 May 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No.
48682 as well as the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration. The Court of Appeals in its assailed decision affirmed the
Decision
of
the
Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
Adjudication
[3]
[4]
Board (DARAB) which reversed the Decision of the Municipal Agrarian
Reform Office (MARO) in Malaybalay, Bukidnon. The MARO of Bukidnon
ordered the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), Agusan del Sur, to
segregate 2,000 square meters from the land of the Spouses Bernabe and
Conchita Valdez. The MARO of Bukidnon also awarded the same segregated
land to the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel and the Spouses George and
Eliada Galdiano.
The Facts
The present controversy springs from a battle of possession over a
portion of a property in Poblacion (formerly Sibagat Nuevo), Sibagat, Agusan
del Sur.
Atty. Manuel D. Cab (Cab) is the registered owner of two parcels of land
in Poblacion, Sibagat, Agusan del Sur with an area of 125,804 square meters
(Cab Property). The Cab Property is covered by OCT No. P-5638 issued
pursuant to Free Patent No. 1318. The Cab Property is traversed by the
Butuan to Davao Road and adjacent to the municipal building of
Sibagat. From the Cab Property, Cab donated the lot occupied by the
municipal building.[5]

In 1964, Cab appointed Federico Atuel (Atuel) as administrator of the

Cab Property.
Sometime in 1977, Bernabe Valdez (Valdez) arrived in Sibagat from
Baogo Bontoc, Southern Leyte. Valdez is the nephew of Atuel, who
recommended to Cab to lease a portion of the Cab Property to Valdez. [6] On
9 October 1978, Cab and Valdez entered into a Lease of Improved
Agricultural Land under which Valdez leased a 1.25-hectare portion of the
Cab Property for P300.00 per year for two years.
In 1982, Cab allowed the Spouses Federico and Sarah Atuel (Spouses
Atuel) and the Spouses George and Eliada Galdiano (Spouses Galdiano) to
occupy a 2,000-square meter portion of the Cab Property. The Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano constructed their respective houses on this 2,000square meter lot (Subject Lot).
On 27 September 1985, the Sangguniang Bayan of Sibagat, Agusan del
Sur, approved the town plan of the Municipality of Sibagat which classified
the Cab Property as residential, subject to the approval of the Ministry of
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission.
On 25 June 1988, Cab informed Valdez that their lease contract had
already expired, and demanded that Valdez stop cultivating the 1.25-hectare
portion of the Cab Property and vacate the same.
On 2 October 1988, responding to Cabs letter, the MARO of Sibagat,
Agusan del Sur informed Cab that Valdez was properly identified as a tenant,
and thus deemed to be the owner of the land he cultivated. The MARO
added that on 14 September 1988, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27,
Emancipation Patent No. A-159969 was issued to Valdez for a 2.3231-hectare
portion (PD 27 Land) of the Cab Property. The PD 27 Land included the
2,000-square meter Subject Lot occupied by the houses of the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
On 11 May 1989, Cab filed with the DAR in Manila a petition for
cancellation of Valdezs emancipation patent. Cab claimed that his property
is not planted to rice and corn and that Valdez is a civil law lessee, not a
tenant.[7] Consequently, the DAR ordered the Regional Director of Cagayan
de Oro City to conduct an investigation regarding the petition.[8]

On 17 September 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB) approved the Town Plan and Zoning Ordinance of fifty-eight
municipalities, including that of Sibagat. The HLURB classified the Cab
Property as 90 percent residential, and the remaining portion as institutional
and park or open space.
On 27 September 1991, the Spouses Bernabe and Conchita Valdez
(Spouses Valdez) filed a complaint[9] for Recovery of Possession with
Damages with the DARAB in Malaybalay, Bukidnon against the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano. In their complaint, the Spouses Valdez
alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano stealthily and
through fraud entered and occupied a portion of the abovedescribed property with an area of 2,000 sq. m. more or less. The
Spouses Valdez claimed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano,
despite repeated demands, refused to restore possession of the said portion
of land to the Spouses Valdez. The Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses
Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be ordered to vacate and restore to the
Spouses Valdez possession of the Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez also
prayed for payment of litigation expenses, as well as unearned income from
the Subject Lot and moral damages.
In their answer, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano asserted
that the Spouses Valdez had no cause of action against them because Cab is
the owner of the Subject Lot while Atuel is the administrator of the Cab
Property. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano claimed that upon
Cabs instruction and consent, they had been occupying the Cab Property
since 1964, long before the Spouses Valdez leased a portion of the Cab
Property in 1978. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano also pointed
out that the Spouses Valdez never set foot on the Subject Lot nor cultivated
the same, thus, there is no dispossession to speak of.
Moreover, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano alleged that the
emancipation patent issued to Valdez is null and void. The Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano maintained that the entire Cab Property, which is
covered by the Free Patent issued to Cab, has already been classified as
residential, hence, no longer covered by PD No. 27.[10]
On 4 March 1993, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, after hearing the
case, issued a decision which disposed of as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises above considered, the DAR Agusan del Sur is hereby
ordered to segregate the TWO THOUSAND (2,000) SQ. METERS, more or less,
from the land of the complainants, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1261
covered by Emancipation Patent No. A-159969, and award the same to the
respondents; and hereby ordered this case dismissed.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Dissatisfied with the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano appealed to the DARAB Central Office. The DARAB Central Office
reversed the decision of the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED. Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(1)

Enjoining the respondents-appellants from committing acts of

intrusion and maintain the possessory rights of the complainants
over the EP (Emancipation Patent) covered land; and

(2)

Ordering the MARO (Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer) or PARO

(Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer) concerned to assist the
parties in determining the amount to be reimbursed in favor of
the respondents for whatever improvements made on the 2,000
square meter portion to be paid by the complainants.

SO ORDERED.[12]
Aggrieved by the decision, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano
filed a petition for review[13] with the Court of Appeals. On 20 May 1999, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the DARAB Central Office and
dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals
denied. On 14 January 1998, while the case was pending in the Court of
Appeals, the Spouses Valdez sold 5,000 square meters out of the PD 27 Land
to the Municipality of Sibagat.[14]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In affirming the decision of the DARAB, the Court of Appeals ruled that
the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of emancipation patents. The Court of
Appeals held that the DARABs decision should be respected because it
enjoys the presumption of regularity.
The Court of Appeals also ruled that the DARAB correctly relied
on Pagtalunan v. Tamayo[15] where this Court held that upon issuance of
an emancipation patent, a holder acquires a vested right of absolute
ownership in the land.
The Court of Appeals further held that the doctrine laid down in Teodoro
v. Macaraeg[16] is applicable. In Teodoro, this Court ruled that a landowner
has full liberty to enter into a civil lease contract covering his
property. However, once a landowner enters into a contract of lease
whereby his land is to be devoted to agricultural production and said
landholding is susceptible of personal cultivation by the lessee, solely or with
the help of labor coming from his immediate farm household, then such
contract is of the very essence of a leasehold agreement. Otherwise, the
Court added, it would be easy to subvert, under the guise of the liberty to
contract, the intendment of the law of protecting the underprivileged and
ordinarily credulous farmer from the unscrupulous schemes and pernicious
practices of the landed gentry.[17]
The Issue
After a review of the issues raised,[18] the question boils down to whether
the Spouses Valdez are entitled to seek redress from the DARAB in
recovering possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot from the
Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano.
The Courts Ruling
We grant the petition based not on the arguments of the Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano but on an entirely different ground. We reverse the
decision of the Court of Appeals because of the DARABs lack of jurisdiction
to take cognizance of the present controversy.
The DARAB has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the Spouses
Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession of the Subject
Lot. Though the parties do not challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB, the

Court may motu proprio consider the issue of jurisdiction. [19] The Court has
discretion to determine whether the DARAB validly acquired jurisdiction over
the case. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by
law. It may not be conferred on the court by consent or waiver of the parties
where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the action.[20]
In their complaint for recovery of possession, the Spouses Valdez alleged,
among others, that they are farmers and beneficiaries of an emancipation
patent. The Spouses Valdez also alleged that the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano stealthily and fraudulently occupied the 2,000-square
meter Subject Lot. The Spouses Valdez claimed that despite repeated
demands,[21] the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano refused to vacate
and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses Valdez. [22] The
Spouses Valdez prayed that the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano be
ordered to vacate and restore possession of the Subject Lot to the Spouses
Valdez.
The Spouses Valdez did not allege the existence of tenancy
relations, if any, between them and the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano. In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, [23] this Court ruled:
It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as
which court has jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and
the character of the relief sought. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is
determined upon the allegations made in the complaint.
In the instant case, the allegations in the complaint, which are contained
in the decision of the MARO,[24] indicate that the nature and subject
matter of the instant case is for recovery of possession or accion
publiciana. The issue to be resolved is who between the Spouses Valdez on
one hand, and the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano on the other,
have a better right to possession of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot
forming part of the PD 27 Land. The Spouses Atuel and the Spouses
Galdiano likewise raise the issue of ownership by insisting that Cab is the real
and lawful owner of the Subject Lot. In Cruz v. Torres,[25] this Court had
occasion to discuss the nature of an action to recover possession or accion
publiciana, thus:
xxx This is an action for recovery of the right to posses and is a plenary
action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a regional trial court to determine

the better right of possession of realty independently of the title. Accion

publiciana or plenaria de posesion is also used to refer to an ejectment suit
filed after the expiration of one year from the accrual of the cause of action
or from the unlawful withholding of possession of the realty. In such case, the
regional trial court has jurisdiction. xxx[26]
For the DARAB to acquire jurisdiction over the case, there must exist a
tenancy relations between the parties.[27] This Court held inMorta,[28] that in
order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it is essential to
establish all its indispensable elements, to wit:
xxx 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the relationship is an
agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee.
xxx[29] (Emphasis supplied)
Emphasizing the DARABs jurisdiction, this Court held in Hon. Antonio
M. Nuesa, et al. v. Hon. Court of Appeals, et al.,[30] that:
xxx the DAR is vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have the exclusive jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of the agrarian reform
program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos.
229, 228 and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and
other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. (Emphasis
supplied)
Under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as the
CARP Law, an agrarian dispute is defined as follows:
(d)
xxx any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether
leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers' associations or

representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or

seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.
It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under
this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from
landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries,
whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.
In the instant case, the Spouses Atuel and the Spouses Galdiano are not
and do not claim to be the owners of the 2,000-square meter Subject Lot
where their houses are constructed. They also do not claim ownership to any
other portion of the PD 27 Land. They and the Spouses Valdez have no
tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian relations whatsoever that will bring
this controversy within Section 3(d) of RA No. 6657. [31] The instant case is
similar to Chico v. CA,[32] where this Court ruled that the DARAB had no
jurisdiction over a case which did not involve any tenurial or agrarian
relations between the parties. Since the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
present controversy, it should not have taken cognizance of the Spouses
Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession. Jurisdiction over an accion
publiciana is vested in a court of general jurisdiction. [33] Specifically, the
regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions
which involve x x x possession of real property. [34] However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceedP50,000.00 in Metro
Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court
exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real property.
[35]
Moreover, the municipal trial court exercises jurisdiction over all cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer.
The Court of Appeals correctly stated that the DARAB has exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases involving the issuance, correction and
cancellation of registered emancipation patents. However, the Spouses
Valdezs complaint for recovery of possession does not involve or seek the
cancellation of any emancipation patent. It was the Spouses Atuel and the
Spouses Galdiano who attacked the validity of the emancipation patent as
part of their affirmative defenses in their answer to the complaint. The rule
is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court (or agency in this case)
cannot be made to depend on the defenses made by the defendant
in his answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of
jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on the defendant.[36]

Jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be acquired through, or

waived by, any act or omission of the parties. [37] The active participation of
the parties in the proceedings before the DARAB does not vest jurisdiction on
the DARAB, as jurisdiction is conferred only by law. The courts or the parties
cannot disregard the rule of non-waiver of jurisdiction. Likewise, estoppel
does not apply to confer jurisdiction to a tribunal that has none over a cause
of action.[38] The failure of the parties to challenge the jurisdiction of the
DARAB does not prevent this Court from addressing the issue, as the
DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the complaint. Issues
of jurisdiction are not subject to the whims of the parties.[39]
In a long line of decisions, this Court has consistently held that an order
or decision rendered by a tribunal or agency without jurisdiction is a total
nullity.[40] Accordingly, we rule that the decision of the DARAB in the instant
case is null and void. Consequently, the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the decision of the DARAB is likewise invalid. This Court finds no
compelling reason to rule on the other issues raised by the Spouses Atuel
and the Spouses Galdiano.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 20 May 1999 and the Resolution dated 14 July 1999 in CA-G.R.
SP No. 48682 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The MAROs Decision dated 4
March 1993, and the DARABs Decision dated 17 June 1998, are declared
NULL and VOID for lack of jurisdiction. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
JJ., concur.

Jr.,

C.J.,

(Chairman),

Vitug,

Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna,

2. [G.R. No. 133365. September 16, 2003]

PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE
M. PANLILIO, respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules

of Court assailing the January 15, 1998 decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
which ruled that:
xxx
Consequently, the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 941634.
x x x We also leave it to the respondent Judge to decide whether he will
return Civil Case No. 96-635 to Branch 146 or keep it in his docket but should
he opt for the latter, he should act on it as a separate case from Civil Case
No. 94-1634.
WHEREFORE, the petition is partially granted and the assailed Orders dated
July 23, 1996 and September 17, 1996, allowing the consolidation of Civil
Case No. 96-635 with Civil Case No. 94-1634 and denying petitioners motion
for reconsideration, respectively, are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, with the
consequent complete severance of the two (2) cases.[2]
The facts follow:
On April 27, 1994, petitioner Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum)
filed a complaint for a sum of money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel
Corporation (PATC) and its president Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to
collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC bought from it. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-1634.
On October 24, 1994, the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 62,
rendered a judgment[3] by default in favor of Platinum and ordered PATC and
Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03
with legal interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit.
On February 10, 1995, a writ of execution was issued on motion of
Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary Membership
Certificate No. 2133 in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and
sold for P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.
On June 2, 1995, private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to
intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634. Panlilio claimed that, in October 1992,

Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her shares of stock
in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and that Galvez had
already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5 million.
On June 9, 1995, the trial court denied Panlilios motion for intervention:
Submitted for resolution is Jose M. Panlilios Motion for Intervention dated
May 31, 1995.
This Court has to deny the motion because (1) a decision had already been
rendered in this case and that the only matters at issue is the propriety of
the execution; (2) it will only delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights
of the original parties; and, (3) the Intervenors rights may be fully protected
in a separate action.[4]
On January 29, 1996, the trial court declared the execution sale null and
void due to irregularities in the conduct thereof.
On May 3, 1996, Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with
application for a writ of preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo
Club shares, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365. The case was raffled to
Branch 146 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City [5]. In the meantime,
Panlilio again attempted to intervene in Civil Case No. 94-1634, this time by
incorporating in his complaint a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 96-365
and Civil Case No. 94-1634.
On June 13, 1996, Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the
motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch
62, who was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge
Diokno later issued an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation
of the two cases and setting for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of
preliminary attachment.
Platinum, as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the
July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno but its motion was denied.
On January 31, 1997, Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of
Appeals assailing, among others, the July 23, 1996 order of Judge Diokno
allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 941634.

In a decision dated January 15, 1998, the Court of Appeals annulled the
assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to return Civil
Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket
and decide it as a separate case.
Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, praying that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch
146 or re-raffled to another RTC Branch of Makati. However, the motion was
denied by the Court of Appeals on April 2, 1998.
In the instant petition, Platinum insists that the Makati RTC, Branch 62,
has no jurisdiction to try Civil Case No. 96-365. It argues that, when Judge
Dioknos July 23, 1996 order allowing the consolidation of the two cases was
annulled and set aside, RTC Branch 62s basis for acquiring jurisdiction over
Civil Case No. 96-365 was likewise extinguished.
We disagree.
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to hear, try and decide
a case.[6] In general, jurisdiction may either be over the nature of the action,
over the subject matter, over the person of the defendants or over the issues
framed in the pleadings.
Jurisdiction over the nature of the action and subject matter is conferred
by law. It is determined by the allegations of the complaint, irrespective of
whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the
claims asserted therein.[7] Jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff is
acquired from the time he files his complaint; while jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is acquired by his voluntary appearance in court and
his submission to its authority, or by the coercive power of legal processes
exerted over his person.
Since jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it
does not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that
power or on the correctness of its decisions.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case
docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of
Makati, Branch 62. The fact that the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled
Judge Dioknos order granting the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and

Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the jurisdiction of the court which
issued the said order.
Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over
the person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all
questions arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any
error that the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an
error of judgment which does not affect its authority to decide the case,
much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.
We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left
to Judge Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case
No. 96-365 to Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his
own sala.
Moreover, we find the instant petition premature and speculative. Had
Platinum waited until Judge Diokno decided on what to do with Civil Case No.
96-365, the parties would have been spared the trouble and the expense of
seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn would have had one petition
less in its docket.
The unfounded fear that Civil Case No. 96-365 would unduly delay the
final resolution of Civil Case No. 94-1634, if the former were retained by
Branch 62, made Platinum act with haste. In so doing, it wasted the precious
time not only of the parties but also of this Court.
All told, nothing legally prevents the RTC of Makati, Branch 62, from
proceeding with Civil Case No. 96-365. Should it decide to retain the case, it
is hereby directed to resolve the same with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales,
JJ., concur.

3. RACHEL C. CELESTIAL VS JESSE CACHOPERO Gr. No. 142595. October

15, 2003
Jun28
Facts:
Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Miscellaneous Sales
Application)with the Bureau of Lands. Petitioner filed a protest, claiming
preferential right over the land. However, on an ocular inspection, the
Bureau found that the subject land was outside the commerce of man and
thus, denied the petitioners protest. Petitioner thereafter filed an ejectment
case against the respondent. Subsequently, respondent filed another MSA
which the petitioner once again protested against. The DENR Regional
Executive Director declared that the land is suitable for residential purposes
and in the light of the conflicting interest of the parties, ordered that the land
be sold at public auction. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the said order but was denied by the OIC Regional Executive Director of
Region XII. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary mandatory injunction and temporary restraining
order. Petitioner then moved for the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction and
non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. The RTC denied respondents
petition. The CA on the other hand, reversed and set aside the decision of
the CA and ordered the DENR to process the MSA of the respondent.
Petitioner contends that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the respondents
petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC had jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari.
Ruling:
Yes. Petition for review of a decision of a quasi-judicial agency under rule 43
andpetition for review under rule 65 is separate and distinct. The petition
filed beforethe RTC clearly shows that it alleged the DENR acted with grave
abuse of discretionand without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Ordersthrough a special civil action for certiorari was within
the jurisdiction of the RTC.

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 142595. October 15, 2003.]
RACHEL C. CELESTIAL, Petitioner, v. JESSE CACHOPERO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In the instant appeal by petition for review on certiorari, 1 petitioner Rachel
Cachopero Celestial assails the February 15, 1999 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 45927, "Jesse C. Cachopero v. Regional Executive
Director of DENR, Region XII and Rachel C. Celestial," which reversed and set
aside the Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Midsayap, Cotabato,
Branch 18 dismissing respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, and mandated the Regional Executive Director of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region XII to
process the Miscellaneous Sales Application (MSA) of respondent Jesse
Cachopero in DENR Claim No. XII-050-90 to which petitioner filed a
protest.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Respondent, brother of petitioner, filed an MSA (Plan No. (XII-6)-1669) with
the Bureau of Lands covering a 415 square meter parcel of land located at
Barrio 8, Midsayap, Cotabato and formerly part of the Salunayan Creek in
Katingawan, Midsayap.
In his MSA, respondent alleged that he had, since 1968, been occupying the
land whereon he built a residential house and introduced other
improvements.
Petitioner filed a protest against respondents MSA, claiming preferential
right over the land subject thereof since it is adjacent to, and is the only
outlet from, her residential house situated at Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd105462, Poblacion 8, Midsayap.
Following an ocular inspection, the Bureau of Lands, finding the land subject
of respondents MSA to be outside the commerce of man, dismissed
petitioners protest and denied respondents MSA, to wit:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
In the ocular inspection, it was verified that the land in dispute with an area
of 415 square meters was formerly a part of the Salunayan Creek that
became dry as a result of the construction of an irrigation canal by the

National Irrigation Administration. However, it was certified by Project

Engineer Reynaldo Abeto of the said office in his certification dated May 19,
1982, that only a portion of the same containing an area of 59.40 square
meters more or less was taken as part of the National Irrigation
Administration service road. It was also ascertained that the P20,000.00
residential house wherein Jesse Cachopero and his family are living is not
within the 69-meters width of the national highway. However, per the
certification of the local office of the District Engineer for Public Works and
Highways, the government may need the area where the house stands for
expansion in the future. Moreover, it was also certified by the Office of
Municipal Mayor that the whole area covered by the miscellaneous sales
application of Jesse Cachopero is needed by the municipal government for
future public improvements.
From the foregoing facts, it is clear that the subject land is outside the
commerce of man and therefore, not susceptible of private acquisition under
the provision of the Public Land Act. However, in keeping with the policy of
our compassionate society in tilting the balance of social forces by favoring
the disadvantaged in life, we may allow Jesse Cachopero to temporarily
occupy the land in dispute, after excluding therefrom the portion needed for
the existing right of way being claimed by Rachel Celestial to be [the] only
adequate outlet to the public highway until such time that the land is needed
by the government for expansion of the road.
WHEREFORE, it is ordered that this case, be, as hereby it is, dismissed and
this case (sic), dropped from the records. The Miscellaneous Sales
Application (New) of Jesse Cachopero is hereby rejected and in lieu thereof,
he shall file a revocable permit application for the land in question after
excluding from the southern part of the land the area of five (5) meters for
right of way purposes as shown in the sketch drawn at the back of this order.
The segregation survey of the area shall be at the pro-rata expense of the
parties.
SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
Petitioner thereafter instituted an action for ejectment against respondent
and his wife before the Municipal Trial Court of Midsayap, Cotabato, docketed
as Civil Case No. 711. A judgment based on a compromise was rendered in
said case under the following terms and conditions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
That Spouses Jesse Cachopero and Bema Cachopero, defendants in this case,
are going to vacate the premises in question and transfer the old house
subject of this ejectment case at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC) Psd105462, located at 8, Midsayap, Cotabato, within eight (8) months from
today, but not later than April 30, 1990;

That plaintiff is willing to give a two (2)-meter wide exit alley on the eastern
portion of said lot as road-right-of-way up to the point of the NIA road on the
west of Lot No. 2586-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462;
That defendants hereby promise to remove all their improvements
introduced fronting the residence of the plaintiff before August 31, 1989; and
the plaintiff shall likewise remove all her existing improvements on the same
area;
x

x 3 (Emphasis supplied)

Subsequently or on May 21, 1991, respondent filed another MSA with the
DENR Regional Office of Cotabato involving a portion of the same lot subject
of his first MSA, covering an area of 334 square meters, more or less (the
subject land), and docketed as DENR-XII-Claim No. 050-90. This time, the
MSA was supported by a certification 4 dated January 9, 1989 issued by the
Office of the Mayor of Midsayap and an Indorsement 5 dated January 16,
1989 by the District Engineer of the Department of Public Works and
Highways stating that the subject land is suitable for residential purposes
and no longer needed by the municipal government.
Petitioner likewise filed a protest against her brother-respondents second
MSA, alleging a preferential right over the subject land, she being the
adjacent and riparian owner, and maintaining that it is her only access to the
national highway. She thus reiterated her demand for a five (5)-meter road
right of way through the land.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
After another investigation of the subject land, DENR Regional Executive
Director Macorro Macumbal issued an Order dated February 17, 1994 stating
that it was suitable for residential purposes but that, in light of the conflicting
interest of the parties, it be sold at public auction. Respondents second MSA
was accordingly dismissed, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
In the ocular investigation of the premises, it was established that the said
property is a dried bed of Salunayan Creek resulting from the construction of
the irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration; that it is
suitable for residential purpose . . .
x

It is evident that under the law, property of the public domain situated within
the first (1st) to fourth class municipalities are disposable by sales only. Since

municipality of Midsayap, Cotabato is classified as third (3rd) class

municipality and the property in dispute, Lot no. (MSA-XII-6)-1669, is situated
in the poblacion of Midsayap, Cotabato, and considering the conflicting
interest of the herein parties, it is therefore equitable to dispose the same by
sale at a public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as amended,
pertinent clause of which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . sale shall be made through oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made
to the highest bidder, . . .
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, it is ordered as hereby is ordered
that the instant protest is dismissed and dropped from the records, and the
Miscellaneous Sales Application (New) of Jesse C. Cachopero is rejected and
returned unrecorded. Accordingly, the CENR Officer of CENRO XII-4B shall
cause the segregation survey of a portion of five (5) meters in width running
parallel to line point C-1 of the approved survey plan (MSA-XII-6)-1669,
sketch is shown at the dorsal side hereof, as a permanent easement and
access road for the occupants of Lot No. 2386-G-28, (LRC) Psd-105462 to the
national highway. Thereafter, and pursuant to paragraph G.2.3 of
Department Administrative Order No. 38, Series of 1990, the CENRO XII 4B
shall dispose the remaining area of the lot in question through oral bidding.
SO ORDERED." 6 (Emphasis and Italics supplied)
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-said order of the
DENR Regional Executive Director, but it was denied by Order of February 27,
1995 by the OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII, Cotabato City in
this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A meticulous scrutiny of the records disclosed that Civil Case No. 711 for
ejectment, decided on the basis of compromise agreement of the parties
dated August 10, 1989, involved "transfer of the house from Lot No. MSA XII6-1669 to the litigants parents property situated at the back of protestant
property, Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC), Psd-105462." Whereas the issue in DENR
XII Claim No. 050-90 involved the disposition of lot no. (MSA II-6)-1669 a
residential public land being exclusively vested with the Director of Lands
(Sec. 4, C.A. 141).
The two (2) meters wide exit alley provided in the compromise agreement
was established by the protestant from her private property (Lot No. 2586-G28 (LRC), Psd-105462) for the benefit of her brother, herein respondent, upon
his transfer to their parents property at the back of Lot No. 2586-G-28 (LRC),
Psd-105462. Whereas the five (5) meters wide easement imposed on Lot No.
(MSA-XII-6)-1669, a public land, provided in the decision in DENR Claim No.
050-90 is in accordance with Article 670 of the New Civil Code . . .

With all the above foregoing, we find no reversible error to reconsider our
Order of February 17, 1994.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration is DENIED. 7
Respondent thereupon filed on April 3, 1995 with the RTC of Midsayap,
Cotabato a petition forcertiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary
mandatory injunction and temporary restraining order assailing the Orders
dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995 of the DENR Regional
Executive Director and OIC Regional Executive Director of Region XII,
Cotabato, attributing grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the petition, alleging lack of jurisdiction
and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.
By Order of March 26, 1997, the RTC denied respondents petition
for certiorari for lack of merit and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies,
as it did deny his motion for reconsideration.
The Court of Appeals, before which respondent assailed the RTC orders by
petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, granted said petition, and
accordingly reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the RTC and
ordered the DENR to process the MSA of Respondent. 8
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration 9 of the appellate courts decision
having been denied by Resolution of March 2, 2000, 10 she lodged the
present petition, alleging that the Court of Appeals acted contrary to law and
jurisprudence 1) in holding that the RTC of Midsayap had jurisdiction over
respondents petition, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
was not applicable to the instant case, and the contested land is public land;
and 2) in ordering the processing of respondents MSA pursuant to R.A. 730.
11
Petitioner contends that the RTC of Midsayap had no jurisdiction over
respondents petition forcertiorari as (a) it "is in the nature of an appeal" 12
falling within the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals under Section 9(3) 13 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended; and (b) respondent failed
to exhaust administrative remedies when he failed to appeal the questioned
Orders to the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. 14
Petitioners petition fails.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner has apparently confused the separate and distinct remedies of an

appeal (i.e. through a petition for review of a decision of a quasi judicial

agency under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court) and a special civil action
for certiorari (i.e. through a petition for review under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court). In Silverio v. Court of Appeals, 15 this Court, speaking through then
Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee, distinguished between these two modes of
judicial review as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The provisions of the Rules of Court permit an aggrieved party, in the general
types of cases, to take a cause and apply for relief to the appellate courts by
way of either of two distinctly different and dissimilar modes through the
broad process of appeal or the limited special civil action ofcertiorari. An
appeal brings up for review errors of judgment committed by a court with
jurisdiction over the subject of the suit and the persons of the parties or any
such error committed by the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction
amounting to nothing more than an error of judgment. On the other hand,
the writ of certiorari issues for the correction of errors of jurisdiction only or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The writ
of certiorari "cannot legally be used for any other purpose." In terms of its
function, the writ of certiorari serves "to keep an inferior court within the
bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction" or to relieve parties from
arbitrary acts of courts acts which courts have no power or authority in
law to perform. 16 (Italics, emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Concomitantly, appellate jurisdiction is separate and distinct from the
jurisdiction to issue the prerogative writ of certiorari. An appellate jurisdiction
refers to a process which is a continuation of the original suit and not a
commencement of a new action. In contrast, to invoke a courts jurisdiction
to issue the writ of certiorari requires the commencement of a new and
original action therefor, independent of the proceedings which gave rise to
the questioned decision or order. 17 As correctly held by the Court of
Appeals, 18 the RTCs have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court over original petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus 19 under Section 21 20 of B.P. 129.
A perusal of respondents Petition dated April 3, 1995 filed before the RTC
clearly shows that it alleged that the DENR Regional Executive Director and
OIC Regional Executive Director acted with "grave abuse of discretion and
without or in excess of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction" when
they issued the questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27,
1995. Evidently, respondent sought a judicial review of the questioned
Orders through a special civil action forcertiorari which, as aforementioned,
was within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Midsayap, Cotabato. 21
Additionally, this Court finds no reason to disturb the Court of Appeals
conclusion that the instant case falls under the recognized exceptions to the

rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

library
The rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable if it should
appear that an irreparable injury or damage will be suffered by a party if he
should await, before taking court action, the final action of the administrative
official concerned on the matter as a result of a patently illegal order (Vivo v.
Cloribel, 18 SCRA 713; De Lara v. Cloribel, 14 SCRA 269); or where appeal
would not prove to be speedy and adequate remedy. 22
True, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies calls for resort
first to the appropriate administrative authorities in the resolution of a
controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated
to the courts of justice for review, and non-observance thereof is a ground
for the dismissal of the complaint, 23 the rationale being:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
The thrust of the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is that the
courts must allow the administrative agencies to carry out their functions
and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their
respective competence. It is presumed that an administrative agency, if
afforded an opportunity to pass upon a matter, will decide the same
correctly, or correct any previous error committed in its forum. Furthermore,
reasons of law, comity and convenience prevent the courts from entertaining
cases proper for determination by administrative agencies. Hence,
premature resort to the courts necessarily becomes fatal to the cause of
action of the petitioner. 24
However, this requirement of prior exhaustion of administrative remedies is
not absolute, there being instances when it may be dispensed with and
judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately, among which are: 1)
when the question raised is purely legal; 2) when the administrative body is
in estoppel; 3) when the act complained of is patently illegal; 4) when there
is urgent need for judicial intervention; 5) when the claim involved is small;
6) when irreparable damage will be suffered; 7) when there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy; 8) when strong public interest is involved; and
9) in quo warranto proceedings.25cralaw:red
Hence, where the act complained of is patently illegal since the
administrative body acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with such
grave abuse of discretion as to be tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, as was
alleged in respondents petition before the RTC, prior exhaustion of
administrative remedies is not required and resort to the courts through a
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is permitted:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

We hold that it was an error for the court a quo to rule that the petitioners
should have exhausted its remedy of appeal from the orders denying their
application for waiver/suspension to the Board of Trustees and thereafter to
the Court of Appeals pursuant to the Rules. Certiorari is an appropriate
remedy to question the validity of the challenged issuances of the HDMF
which are alleged to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Moreover, among the accepted exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of
administrative remedies are: (1) where the question in dispute is purely a
legal one; and (2) where the controverted act is patently illegal or was
performed without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction. Moreover,
while certiorari as a remedy may not be used as a substitute for an appeal,
especially for a lost appeal, this rule should not be strictly enforced if the
petition is genuinely meritorious. It has been said that where the rigid
application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the
vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a
particular case from the operation of the rules. 26 (Emphasis supplied)
To justify the issuance of the writ of certiorari, however, it must be clearly
shown that there is a patent and grave abuse of discretion amounting to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined
by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility. 27
The crux of the case at bar is, therefore, whether the DENR Regional
Executive Director and OIC Regional Director acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned Orders dated February 17, 1994 and February 27, 1995,
respectively.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In resolving respondents second MSA and petitioners protest thereto, the
DENR Regional Executive Director, after considering the conflicting interest
of the parties, found it equitable to resolve the same by directing the sale of
the subject land at public auction pursuant to Section 67, C.A. No. 141, as
amended.
Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as "The Public
Land Act," provides the procedure for the disposition of lands of the public
domain which are open to disposition or concession and intended to be used
for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other
than agricultural, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 67. The lease or sale shall be made through oral bidding; and
adjudication shall be made to the highest bidder. However, where an

applicant has made improvements on the land by virtue of a permit issued to

him by competent authority, the sale or lease shall be made by sealed
bidding as prescribed in Section twenty-six of this Act, the provisions of
which shall be applied wherever applicable. If all or part of the lots remain
unleased or unsold, the Director of Lands shall from time to time announce in
the Official Gazette or in any other newspapers of general circulation, the
lease or sale of those lots, if necessary. (Emphasis supplied)
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 730 28 on June 18, 1952, however,
an exception to the foregoing procedure was created by authorizing
disposition of lands of the public domain by private sale, instead of bidding,
provided that: (1) the applicant has in his favor the conditions specified
therein and (2) the area applied for is not more than 1,000 square meters. 29
The pertinent provision of R.A. 730 thus provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
SEC. 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 61 and 67 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 293, any
Filipino citizen of legal age who is not the owner of a home lot in the
municipality or city in which he resides and who has in good faith established
his residence on a parcel of the public land of the Republic of the Philippines
which is not needed for the public service, shall be given preference to
purchase at a private sale of which reasonable notice shall be given to him
not more than one thousand square meters at a price to be fixed by the
Director of Lands with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources. It shall be an essential condition of this sale that the
occupant has constructed his house on the land and actually resided therein.
Ten percent of the purchase price shall be paid upon the approval of the sale
and the balance may be paid in full, or in ten equal annual installments.
SEC. 2. Land acquired under the provisions of this Act shall not be subject to
any restrictions against encumbrance or alienation before and after the
issuance of the patents thereon. 30
SEC. 3. The provisions of the Public Land Act with respect to the sale of lands
for residential purposes which are not inconsistent herewith shall be
applicable.
SEC. 4. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 18, 1952. (Emphasis supplied)
Given the foregoing provisions of R.A. 730 which took effect on June 18,
1952, and the DENR Regional Executive Directors February 17, 1994 finding
that the subject land was "suitable for residential purposes," it was
incumbent upon him to determine whether the provisions of R.A. 730 were

applicable to respondents MSA. As held by the Court of Appeals:chanrob1es

virtual 1aw library
Finally, petitioner contends that the DENR Regional Executive Director and
OIC Regional Executive Director gravely erred in ordering the sale of the
subject lot through oral bidding applying Section 67, Commonwealth Act No.
141 and not Republic Act 730 authorizing the sale of public land without
bidding.
We agree with the petitioner.
x

Apropos is the case of Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 125 SCRA 785, ruling
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"When public land lots of not more than 1,000 sq. ms. are used, or to be
used as a residence . . . they can be sold on private sales under the
provisions of Republic Act No. 730."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Agura v. Serfino, Sr., (204 SCRA 569), the Supreme Court held
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"R.A. 730 authorizes a sale by private sale, as an exception to the general
rule that it should be by bidding, if the area applied for does not exceed
1,000 square meters, . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
We see no reason why these ruling should not be applied in this case which
involves 415 [should have been 334] square meters only. 31
The Regional Director, however, summarily chose to apply Section 67 of the
Public Land Act upon a finding that it was more "equitable" in light of the
"conflicting interest" of the parties. In his "Answer" to respondents petition
before the RTC, the Director justified his non-application of R.A. 730 in this
wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . Republic Act No. 730 is not applicable to the case at bar, the land being
disputed, Republic Act No. 730 requisite (sic) vas not meet (sic) that for this
law to apply to a particular case, the land must be in the first place not a
land in conflict. There being a pending protest for final adjudication, the said
conflict continues to exist thus an impediment to the application of Republic
Act 730 32 (Emphasis supplied)
which justification he reiterated in his Opposition 33 to respondents Motion
for Reconsideration of the RTC decision.

The Directors reliance on equity as basis for his action was misplaced,
however. It is well-settled that "equity follows the law." 34 Described as
"justice outside legality," it is applied only in the absence of, and never
against, statutory law or legal pronouncements. 35 Where pertinent positive
rules are present, they should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract
arguments based only on equity. 36
A reading of R.A. 730 (or of the Public Land Act for that matter) shows
nothing therein to support the Directors contention that the pendency of a
protest is a bar to the application of R.A. 730 to an MSA. Indeed, that Section
1 of R.A. 730 gives a qualified applicant preference to purchase alienable
public land suitable for residential purposes implies that there may be more
than one party interested in purchasing it.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw library
What is more, under Section 91 of the Public Land Act, it is the duty of the
Director of the Lands Management Bureau (formerly the Director of Lands) to
determine whether the material facts set forth in an MSA are
true:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 91. The statements made in the application shall be considered as
essential conditions and parts of any concession, title, or permit issued on
the basis of such application, and any false statement therein or omission of
facts altering, changing, or modifying the consideration of the facts set forth
in such statements, and any subsequent modification, alteration, or change
of the material facts set forth in the application shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession, title, or permit granted. It shall be the duty of
the Director of Lands, from time to time and whenever he may deem it
advisable, to make the necessary investigations for the purpose of
ascertaining whether the material facts set out in the application are true, or
whether they continue to exist and are maintained and preserved in good
faith, and for the purposes of such investigation, the Director of Lands is
hereby empowered to issue subpoenas and subpoenas duces tecum and, if
necessary, to obtain compulsory process from the courts. In every
investigation made in accordance with this section, the existence of bad
faith, fraud, concealment, or fraudulent and illegal modification of essential
facts shall be presumed if the grantee or possessor of the land shall refuse or
fail to obey a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum lawfully issued by the
Director of Lands or his authorized delegates or agents, or shall refuse or fail
to give direct and specific answers to pertinent questions, and on the basis of
such presumption, an order of cancellation may issue without further
proceedings. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, under Section 102 of the same Public Land Act, it is the duty of the
Director of the Lands Management Bureau to, after due hearing, verify
whether the grounds of a protest or objection to an MSA are well founded,

and, if so, to cancel the MSA:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 102. Any person, corporation, or association may file an objection under
oath to any application or concession under this Act, grounded on any reason
sufficient under this Act for the denial or cancellation of the application or
the denial of the patent or grant. If, after the applicant or grantee has been
given suitable opportunity to be duly heard, the objection is found to be well
founded, the Director of Lands shall deny or cancel the application or deny
patent or grant, and the person objecting shall, if qualified, be granted a
prior right of entry for a term of sixty days from the date of the notice.
(Emphasis supplied)
There was thus clearly a positive duty on the part of the DENR Director to
process respondents MSA, and to ascertain, particularly in light of
petitioners protest, whether respondent was qualified to purchase the
subject land at a private sale pursuant to R.A. 730. This, he did not do.
In fine, by abdicating his duty to process respondents MSA and summarily
ordering, without factual or legal basis, that the subject land be disposed of
via oral bidding pursuant to Section 67 of the Public Land Act, the Director
acted with patent grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. As the Court of Appeals held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Considering that the assailed Orders of public respondent DENR Regional
Executive Director applying Section 67 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 and
ordering the sale of the subject lot by oral bidding are patently erroneous,
the authority of the court to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus is warranted. 37
The Directors commission of grave abuse of discretion does not, however,
mean that respondent automatically has the better right to the subject land.
As mandated by law, the Director must process respondents MSA, conduct
an investigation, and determine whether the material facts set forth therein
are true to bring it within the coverage of R.A. 730.
A thorough investigation is all the more imperative considering that
petitioners protest raises serious factual issues regarding respondents
qualification to purchase the subject land in particular, whether he already
owns a home lot in Midsayap and whether he has, in good faith, constructed
his house on the subject land and actually resided therein. These factual
issues are properly within the authority of the DENR and the Land
Management Bureau, which are tasked with carrying out the provisions of
the Public Land Act and R.A. 730, 38 do determine, after both parties have
been given an opportunity to fully present their evidence.
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a

dried-up bed of the Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term
adverse possession and that of her predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina
Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased the adjoining
property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same
must fail.
Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man 39 and
not susceptible to private appropriation and acquisitive prescription, 40 the
adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of title in the
confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable
portions of the public domain. 41 It is only after the Government has
declared the land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land that the
year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 42
A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river
and participating in the ebb and flow of the sea. 43 As such, under Articles
420(1) 44 and 502(1) 45 of the Civil Code, the Salunayan Creek, including its
natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to
private appropriation and acquisitive prescription. 46 And, absent any
declaration by the government, that a portion of the creek has dried-up does
not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
This, in fact, was the very reason behind the denial of respondents first MSA,
the District Engineer having certified that the government may need the
subject land for future expansion, and the office of the Municipal Mayor
having certified that it was needed by t he municipal government for future
public improvements. 47 Consequently, it was only after the same offices
subsequently certified 48 that the subject land was suitable for residential
purposes and no longer needed by the municipal government that it became
alienable and disposable. Confronted with similar factual circumstances, this
Court in Bracewell v. Court of Appeals 49 held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Clear from the above is the requirement that the applicant must prove that
the land is alienable public land. On this score, we agree with respondents
that petitioner failed to show that the parcels of land subject of his
application are alienable or disposable. On the contrary, it was conclusively
shown by the government that the same were only classified as alienable or
disposable on March 27, 1972. Thus, even granting that petitioner and his
predecessors-in-interest had occupied the same since 1908, he still cannot
claim title thereto by virtue of such possession since the subject parcels of
land were not yet alienable land at that time nor capable of private
appropriation. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant of
title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or
disposable portions of the public domain. 50 (Emphasis supplied)

With respect to petitioners invocation of the principle of accession under

either Article 370 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil
Code, the same does not apply to vest her with ownership over subject land.
Under Article 370 51 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which took effect in
the Philippines on December 7, 1889, 52 the beds of rivers which remain
abandoned because the course of the water has naturally changed belong to
the owners of the riparian lands throughout their respective lengths. If the
abandoned bed divided estates belonging to different owners, the new
dividing line shall run at equal distance therefrom. 53
When the present Civil Code took effect on August 30, 1950, 54 the
foregoing rule was abandoned in favor of the present Article 461, which
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ART. 461. River beds which are abandoned through the natural change in the
course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners whose lands are
occupied by the new course in proportion to the area lost. However, the
owners of the lands adjoining the old bed shall have the right to acquire the
same by paying the value thereof, which value shall not exceed the value of
the area occupied by the new bed. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 461 provides for compensation for the loss of the land occupied by
the new bed since it is believed more equitable to compensate the actual
losers than to add land to those who have lost nothing. 55 Thus, the
abandoned river bed is given to the owner(s) of the land(s) onto which the
river changed its course instead of the riparian owner(s). 56
Petitioner claims that on October 22, 1966, when she purchased the property
adjoining the subject land from Marcelina Basadre, the said subject land was
already a dried-up river bed such that "almost one-half portion of the
residential house . . . was so already built and is still now situated at the said
dried-up portion of the Salunayan Creek bed . . ." 57 She failed to allege,
however, when the subject portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up, a fact
essential to determining whether the applicable law is Article 370 of the
Spanish Civil Code of 1889 or Article 461 of the Civil Code.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present
Civil Code took effect, the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner
or her predecessor-in-interest since under the aforementioned provision of
Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural change in
the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied
by the new course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to
acquire them only after paying their value. 58

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil
Code are applicable only when" [r]iver beds are abandoned through the
natural change in the course of the waters." It is uncontroverted, however,
that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional Executive
Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction of an
irrigation canal by the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v.
Court of Appeals, 59 this Court held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation.
Article 370 applies only if there is a natural change in the course of the
waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-made or artificial
accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of
Estero Calubcub was actually caused by the active intervention of man, it
follows that Article 370 does not apply to the case at bar and, hence, the Del
Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.
The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as
forming part of the land of the public domain which cannot be subject to
acquisition by private ownership. . . 60 (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a
change in the course of a river, not where the river simply dries up. In the
instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the Salunayan Creek changed its
course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the dry
river bed remains property of public dominion. 61
Finally, while this Court notes that petitioner offered to purchase the subject
land from the government, 62 she did so through an informal letter dated
August 9, 1989 63 instead of the prescribed form. By such move, she is
deemed to have acknowledged that the subject land is public land, for it
would be absurd for her to have applied for its purchase if she believed it
was hers. She is thus stopped from claiming otherwise. 64
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
4.
SECOND DIVISION
JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F.
ABOITIZ,
XAVIER
ABOITIZ,

G.R. No. 132477

ROBERTO E. ABOITIZ, ENRIQUE

ABOITIZ,
MATTHIAS
G.
MENDEZONA, CEBU INDUSTRIAL
PARK DEVELOPERS, INC. and
FBM ABOITIZ MARINE, INC.,
P e t i t i o n e r s,

Present:
PUNO,
Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

- versus DEPARTMENT
OF
AGRARIAN
REFORM,
HON.
ERNESTO
GARILAO, in his capacity as DAR
Secretary,
and
DIR.
JOSE
LLAMES, in his capacity as
Director of DAR-Regional 7,
R e s p o n d e n t s.

Promulgated:

August 31, 2005

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land
located in Arpili, Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101
passed by the Municipal Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were
reclassified as industrial lands.[1] On 03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of
Cebu approved Balambans land use plan and adopted en toto Balambans
Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of Resolution No. 836-95 and
Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. [2] As part of their preparation for
the development of the subject lands as an industrial park, petitioners
secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government certifications.
[3]

Despite

these

permits

and

certifications,

petitioner

Matthias

Mendezona received a letter from Mr. Jose Llames, Director of the

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Regional Office for Region 7, informing

him that the DAR was disallowing the conversion of the subject lands for
industrial

use

and

directed

him

to

cease

and

desist

from

further

developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and criminal

liabilities.[4]
Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Toledo City a Complaint dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with
Application for Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction, docketed as Civil Case No. T-590. [5] In an order[6] dated 12 August
1996, the RTC, ruling that it is the DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the
Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.[7] It justified the dismissal in this wise:
A perusal of Section 20 of the Local Government Code
expressly provides that the Municipalities through an Ordinance
by the Sanggunian may authorize the reclassification of the
agricultural land within their area into non-agricultural.
Paragraph (e) of the aforesaid Section, provides further: that
nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing or
modifying in any manner the provision of Republic Act 6657. In
an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, quoted: With respect of
(sic) conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses the
authority of the DAR to approve the same may be exercise (sic)
only from the date of the effectivity of the Agrarian Reform Law
on June 15, 1988. It appears that the petitioners had applied for
conversion on June 13, 1995 and therefore the petitioner (sic) are
estopped from questioning the authority and jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform. The application having been
filed after June 15, 1988, the reclassification by the Municipal
Council of Balamban was just a step in the conversion of the
aforestated lands according to its purpose. Executive Order No.
129-A, Section 5, The Department shall be responsible for
implementing Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and for such
purpose it is authorized to (J) approve or disapprove the
conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural land into
non-agricultural uses. Said Executive Order amended Section
36 of Republic Act No. 3644 which clearly mandates that the DAR
Secretary (sic) approve or disapprove conversion are not
impliedly repealed. In fact, under Section 75 of Republic Act
6657 the above laws and other laws not inconsistent of (sic) this

act shall have suppletory effect. Further, Section 68 of Republic

Act 6657 provides: No injunction, restraining order, prohibition
or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the
Department of Agrarian Reform, DENR and Department of Justice
in their implementation of the program. With this provision, it is
therefore clear (sic) when there is conflict of laws determining
whether the Department of Agrarian Reform has been exclusively
empowered by law to approve land conversion after June 15,
1988 and (sic) the final ruling falls only with the Supreme Court
or Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Application for
Restraining Order is hereby ordered DENIED and the main case is
DISMISSED, this Court having no jurisdiction over the same.[8]

In an order dated 18 September 1996, the trial court denied the

motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners. [9] Petitioners filed before
this Court a Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary
Restraining

Order

and

Writ

of

Preliminary

Injunction.[10]

In

resolution[11] dated 11 November 1996, this Court referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals.[12] Petitioners moved for a reconsideration of the said
resolution but the same was denied in a resolution dated 27 January 1997.[13]
At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered [14] to file
their Comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public
respondents, one from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial
Office[15] and another from the Office of the Solicitor General,[16] were
submitted, to which petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply.[17]
On

02

December

1997,

the

Court

of

Appeals

rendered

decision[18] affirming the Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC. [19] A motion
for reconsideration filed by the petitioners was denied in a resolution dated
30 January 1998.[20]
Hence, this petition.

The following issues[21] are raised by the petitioners for resolution:

(a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject
lands to industrial use by the Municipality of Balamban, Cebu
pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of Republic Act No.
7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the LGC) has the
effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the CARL and
beyond the jurisdiction of the DAR;
(b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be
dismissed under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
(c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an
appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining
development works on the subject lands;
(d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City
had authority to issue a writ of injunction against the DAR.

In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the
power to reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the
conditions set forth in Section 20[22][23]of the Local Government Code.
According to them, if the agricultural land sought to be reclassified by the
local government is one which has already been brought under the coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) and/or which has been
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then such reclassification must
be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under Section 65 22 of the
CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective. If, however, the
land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not distributed
to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is
necessary in order for the reclassification to become effective as such case
would not fall within the DARs conversion authority.

Stated otherwise,

Section 65 of the CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute,
sweeping

and

all-encompassing

power

to

approve

or

disapprove

reclassifications or conversions of all agricultural lands. Said section only

grants the DAR exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of

agricultural lands which have already been brought under the coverage of
the CARL and which have already been distributed to farmer beneficiaries.
The petition lacks merit.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as
Comprehensive

Agrarian

Reform

Program,

agricultural

lands,

though

reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over

which is vested in the DAR. However, agricultural lands already reclassified
before the effectivity of Rep. Act No. 6657 are exempted from conversion.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides:
. . . True, the DARs express power over land use
conversion is limited to cases in which agricultural lands already
awarded have, after five years, ceased to be economically
feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes. But to
suggest that these are the only instances when the DAR can
require conversion clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No.
6657, which every landowner may use to evade compliance with
the agrarian reform program. Hence, it should logically follow
from the said departments express duty and function to execute
and enforce the said statute that any reclassification of a private
land as a residential, commercial or industrial property should
first be cleared by the DAR.

The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of

conversion despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in the
case of Alarcon v. Court of Appeals,[24] where it was held that reclassification
of land does not suffice:
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The
subject landholding was merely reclassified. Conversion is

different from reclassification. Conversion is the act of changing

the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform.
Reclassification, on the other hand, is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such
as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land
use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use
conversion. Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural
land does not automatically allow a landowner to change its use
and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants. He has to undergo
the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
agricultural land for other purposes.

Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance
No. 101 of Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed
on 25 March 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board
of Cebu, which adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April
1995, long after Rep. Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act
No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as
provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229,
including other lands of the public domain suitable for
agriculture.
...
(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture
regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be
raised thereon.

To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued

Administrative Order No. 12 dated October 1994 which reads:
Administrative Order No. 12
Series of 1994

SUBJECT:

I.

CONSOLIDATED
AND
REVISED
RULES
AND
PROCEDURES
GOVERNING
CONVERSION
OF
ARICULTURAL LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES

PREFATORY STATEMENT
The guiding principles on land use conversion is to
preserve prime agricultural lands. On the other hand,
conversion of agricultural lands, when coinciding with the
objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to
promote social justice, industrialization, and the optimum
use of land as a national resource for public welfare, shall
be pursued in a speedy and judicious manner.
To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3844, as amended, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
27, P.D. No. 946, Executive Order (E.O.) No. 129-A and R.A.
No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has
issued several policy guidelines to regulate land use
conversion. This Administrative Order consolidates and
revises all existing implementing guidelines issued by the
DAR, taking into consideration, other Presidential issuances
and national policies related to land use conversion.

II.

LEGAL MANDATE
A.

The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is

mandated to approve or disapprove applications for
conversion,
restructuring
or
readjustment
of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses,
pursuant to Section 4(i) of Executive Order No. 129-A,
Series of 1987.

B.

Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987,

vests in the DAR, exclusive authority to approve or
disapprove applications for conversion of agricultural
lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and
other land uses.

C.

Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known

as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988,
likewise empowers the DAR to authorize under

certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion

of agricultural lands.
D.

III.

Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54,

Series of 1993 of the Office of the President, provides
that action on applications for land use conversion
on individual landholdings shall remain as the
responsibility of the DAR, which shall utilize as its
primary reference, documents on the comprehensive
land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed
upon and approved by the local government units
concerned, together with the National Land Use
Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. 129-A.

DEFINITION OF TERMS
A.

Agricultural land refers to land devoted to

agricultural activity and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land
(Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).

B.

Conversion is the act of changing the current use of

a piece of agricultural land into some other use.

C.

Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of

specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial,
commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. It
also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands
to agricultural use.

...
V.

COVERAGE
These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands
as defined herein regardless of tenurial arrangement and
commodity produced. It shall also include agricultural lands
reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses, after June
15, 1988, pursuant to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54,
Series of 1993 of the Office of the President and those
proposed to be used for livestock, poultry and swine raising
as provided in DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of
1993.

In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:

Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National
Housing Authority v. Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]).
The Court of Appeals reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44,
Series of 1990, is in order. In the said opinion, the Secretary of
Justice declared, viz:
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view
that with respect to conversions of agricultural lands covered by
R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of DAR to
approve such conversions may be exercised from the date of the
laws effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a
liberal interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DARs
mandate and extensive coverage of the agrarian reform
program.
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative
Order No. 6, Series of 1994, stating that lands already classified
as non-agricultural before the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6657 no
longer needed any conversion clearance:

I.

Prefatory Statement

In order to streamline the issuance of exemption

clearances, based on DOJ Opinion No. 44, the following
guidelines are being issued for the guidance of the DAR and the
public in general.
II.

Legal Basis

Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers

to the land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this act
and not classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or
industrial land.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has
ruled that, with respect to the conversion of agricultural lands
covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses, the authority of
DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the date
of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are

already classified as commercial, industrial, or residential before

15 June 1988 no longer need any conversion clearance.

The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands

covered by Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced
by the passage of the Local Government Code.

The Code explicitly

provides[26] that nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or

modifying in any manner the provisions of Rep. Act No. 6657.
It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in
the DAR, the complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and
appellate courts under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.

This Court,

in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. De Villena,[27] found occasion to reiterate the

doctrine of primary jurisdiction
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts
from resolving a controversy over which jurisdiction has initially
been lodged with an administrative body of special competence.
For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasijudicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under
the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of their
general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction
over all agrarian reform matters. The pertinent provision reads:
Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. The DAR
is hereby vested with the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation
of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive

jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department

of Environment and Natural Resources.
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and
evidence but shall proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes
or controversies in a most expeditious manner, employing all
reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every case in
accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case.
Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to
achieve a just, expeditious and inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding before it. . . .

Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into
whether or not an injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of
the DAR enjoining petitioners in developing the subject land, we rule in the
negative. Section 68 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue
Interference. No injunction, restraining order, prohibition or
mandamus shall be issued by the lower courts against the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for

lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666
dated 02 December 1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996 of the
Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

5. [G.R. No. 144025. December 27, 2002]

SPS. RENE GONZAGA and LERIO GONZAGA, petitioners, vs. HON.

COURT OF APPEALS, Second Division, Manila, HON. QUIRICO G.
DEFENSOR, Judge, RTC, Branch 36, Sixth Judicial Region, Iloilo
City, and LUCKY HOMES, INC., represented by WILSON JESENA,
JR., as Manager, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal
of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated December 29, 1999 and its
resolution dated June 1, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 54587.
The records disclose that, sometime in 1970, petitioner-spouses
purchased a parcel of land from private respondent Lucky Homes, Inc.,
situated in Iloilo and containing an area of 240 square meters. Said lot was
specifically denominated as Lot No. 19 under Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. 28254 and was mortgaged to the Social Security System (SSS) as
security for their housing loan. Petitioners then started the construction of
their house, not on Lot No. 19 but on Lot No. 18, as private respondent
mistakenly identified Lot No. 18 as Lot No. 19. Upon realizing its error,
private respondent, through its general manager, informed petitioners of
such mistake but the latter offered to buy Lot No. 18 in order to widen their
premises. Thus, petitioners continued with the construction of their
house. However, petitioners defaulted in the payment of their housing loan
from SSS. Consequently, Lot No. 19 was foreclosed by SSS and petitioners
certificate of title was cancelled and a new one was issued in the name of
SSS. After Lot No. 19 was foreclosed, petitioners offered to swap Lot Nos. 18
and 19 and demanded from private respondent that their contract of sale be
reformed and another deed of sale be executed with respect to Lot No. 18,
considering that their house was built therein. However, private respondent
refused. This prompted petitioners to file, on June 13, 1996, an action for
reformation of contract and damages with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 36, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 17115.
On January 15, 1998, the trial court[2] rendered its decision dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit and ordering herein petitioners to pay private
respondent the amount of P10,000 as moral damages and another P10,000
as attorneys fees. The pertinent conclusion of the trial court reads as
follows:

Aware of such fact, the plaintiff nonetheless continued to stay in the

premises of Lot 18 on the proposal that he would also buy the same. Plaintiff
however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in the payment of his
loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosed and
sold at public auction. Thereafter TCT No. T-29950 was cancelled and in lieu
thereof TCT No. T-86612 (Exh. 9) was issued in favor of SSS. This being the
situation obtaining, the reformation of instruments, even if allowed, or the
swapping of Lot 18 and Lot 19 as earlier proposed by the plaintiff, is no
longer feasible considering that plaintiff is no longer the owner of Lot 19,
otherwise, defendant will be losing Lot 18 without any substitute therefore
(sic). Upon the other hand, plaintiff will be unjustly enriching himself having
in its favor both Lot 19 which was earlier mortgaged by him and
subsequently foreclosed by SSS, as well as Lot 18 where his house is
presently standing.
The logic and common sense of the situation lean heavily in favor of the
defendant. It is evident that what plaintiff had bought from the defendant is
Lot 19 covered by TCT No. 28254 which parcel of land has been properly
indicated in the instruments and not Lot 18 as claimed by the plaintiff. The
contracts being clear and unmistakable, they reflect the true intention of the
parties, besides the plaintiff failed to assail the contracts on mutual mistake,
hence the same need no longer be reformed.[3]
On June 22, 1998, a writ of execution was issued by the trial court. Thus,
on September 17, 1998, petitioners filed an urgent motion to recall writ of
execution, alleging that the court a quo had no jurisdiction to try the case as
it was vested in the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB)
pursuant to PD 957 (The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective
Decree). Conformably, petitioners filed a new complaint against private
respondent with the HLURB. Likewise, on June 30, 1999, petitioner-spouses
filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for annulment of judgment,
premised on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to try and
decide Civil Case No. 17115.
In a decision rendered on December 29, 1999, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition for annulment of judgment, relying mainly on the
jurisprudential doctrine of estoppel as laid down in the case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy.[4]

Their subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied,

petitioners filed this instant petition, contending that the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the petition by applying the principle of estoppel, even if
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to decide
Civil Case No. 17115.
At the outset, it should be stressed that petitioners are seeking from us
the annulment of a trial court judgment based on lack of
jurisdiction. Because it is not an appeal, the correctness of the judgment is
not in issue here. Accordingly, there is no need to delve into the propriety of
the decision rendered by the trial court.
Petitioners claim that the recent decisions of this Court have already
abandoned the doctrine laid down in Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy.[5] We do not
agree. In countless decisions, this Court has consistently held that, while an
order or decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be
assailed at any stage, active participation in the proceedings in the court
which rendered the order or decision will bar such party from attacking its
jurisdiction. As we held in the leading case of Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy:[6]
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways
and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.
x

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x
[T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
Tijam has been reiterated in many succeeding cases. Thus, in Orosa vs.
Court of Appeals;[7] Ang Ping vs. Court of Appeals;[8] Salva vs. Court of
Appeals;[9] National Steel Corporation vs. Court of Appeals;[10] Province of
Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals;[11] PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals,[12] this Court affirmed the rule that a partys active
participation in all stages of the case before the trial court, which includes

invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative relief, effectively estops

such party from later challenging that same courts jurisdiction.
In the case at bar, it was petitioners themselves who invoked the
jurisdiction of the court a quo by instituting an action for reformation of
contract against private respondents. It appears that, in the proceedings
before the trial court, petitioners vigorously asserted their cause from start
to finish. Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts
jurisdiction during the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was
only after the trial court rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution
against them in 1998 did petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and
it was only because said decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus
effectively waived their right to question the courts jurisdiction over the
case they themselves filed.
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be
allowed to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the
private respondent. This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a
party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment but
only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction if not.[13]
Public policy dictates that this Court must strongly condemn any doubledealing by parties who are disposed to trifle with the courts by deliberately
taking inconsistent positions, in utter disregard of the elementary principles
of justice and good faith.[14] There is no denying that, in this case, petitioners
never raised the issue of jurisdiction throughout the entire proceedings in the
trial court. Instead, they voluntarily and willingly submitted themselves to
the jurisdiction of said court. It is now too late in the day for them to
repudiate the jurisdiction they were invoking all along.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

6. [G. R. No 149754. September 17, 2002]

MORTIMER F. CORDERO, petitioner, vs. ALAN G.
LANDICHO, and VINCENT TECSON,respondents.

GO,

FELIPE

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals
setting aside an order of execution pending appeal issued by the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City.
The facts are as follows:
On May 31, 2000, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City,
rendered judgment by default in Civil Case No. Q-98-35332, entitled
Mortimer F. Cordero v. Alan C. Go, [2] doing business under the name and
style of ACG Express Liner, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent
Tecson (for breach of contract with damages), ordering the defendants,
herein respondents Alan Go, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson, together
with Tony Robinson, jointly and solidarily to pay to petitioner Mortimer F.
Cordero damages in the total amount of P19,291,352.043.
Petitioner received a copy of the decision on June 19, 2000, while
respondents received their copy on June 29, 2000. Prior to his receipt of the
decision, petitioner had filed on June 14, 2000 a motion for execution
pending appeal of the judgment. This was opposed by respondents, who
moved for a new trial on the ground that their failure to attend the pre-trial
conference of the case, on the basis of which they were declared in default,
was due to the negligence of their counsel.
In its order of July 28, 2000, the trial court granted petitioners motion for
execution pending appeal and denied respondents motion for new trial. In
its order, the trial court stated:
Plaintiffs motion for execution pending appeal is well taken there being
written proof/admission before this Court by the counsel for defendants that
there is an impending bankruptcy proceeding [against defendant Tony
Robinson] hence possibly rendering nugatory whatever judgment that has
been rendered in this case (Astraquillo vs. Javier, No. L-20034, 30 January
1965, 13 SCRA 125).
. . . .

Moreover, the dire need for financial resources arising out of a plainly valid,
just, and binding obligation, justifies execution pending appeal (Ma-ao Sugar
central Co., Inc. vs. Canete, 19 SCRA 646). Lastly, it appears from the
evidence presented during the hearing that defendants are seeking to evade
judgment in this case by disposing of or encumbering their properties to
defeat execution.[3]
Respondents received a copy of this order on July 31, 2000. On August 1,
2000, they moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the
trial court on August 18, 2000. On August 21, 2000, the trial court ordered
the issuance of the writ of execution, to implement which the sheriffs
garnished the bank accounts of respondents and levied six parcels of land
belonging to respondent Go. On November 8, 2000, the sheriffs issued a
notice of sale of the levied real properties on December 14, 2000. But
execution was stayed on September 29, 2000 in view of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) issued by the Court of Appeals at the instance of
respondents (CA G.R. SP No. 60354). On August 8, 2000, respondents also
filed a notice of appeal of the trial courts decision of May 31, 2000. Initially,
in its order of August 21, 2000, the trial court denied due course to the
appeal for failure of respondents to pay the appellate docket fees on
time. But, on November 29, 2000, it reconsidered its order and gave due
course to respondents appeal (CA G.R. CV No. 69113).
Petitioner filed two motions, one entitled Ex-Parte Motion for Break
Open Order and another one entitled Ex-Parte Motion for Encashment of
Check, to implement the writ of execution earlier issued by the trial
court. However, in view of the TRO issued by the Court of Appeals, which it
received on October 4, 2000, the trial court, on November 27, 2000, denied
the aforesaid motions of petitioner, set aside its earlier order for the release
of garnished funds, and canceled the sheriffs notice of sale of November 8,
2000.
Petitioner sought a reconsideration of the order of November 29, 2000
giving due course to respondents appeal and, after the expiration of the 60day TRO, again moved for the issuance of a break open order and the
encashment of checks. In addition, he filed two other motions entitled ExParte Motion to Proceed and Ex-Parte Motion to Appoint Cebu City Sheriff
Jessie A. Belarmino as Special Sheriff. Respondents opposed the motion for
the appointment of a special sheriff.

In an order dated December 18, 2000, the trial court denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration of the order giving due course to respondents
appeal. As to petitioners motions for the implementation of the order of
execution and respondents opposition to the motion for the appointment of
a special sheriff, it directed the parties to reiterate the same before the Court
of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 69113 on the ground that the trial court had lost
jurisdiction over the case by reason of the perfection of respondents appeal.
On January 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment in CA G.R.
SP. 60354, granting respondents petition for certiorari and setting aside the
trial courts orders of execution pending appeal. The appeals court
subsequently denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution
of August 31, 2001. The Court of Appeals held in its decision:
True, at the time that the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed, the
court a quo had the jurisdiction to exercise its good discretion to direct
discretionary execution. However, at the time it recalled its earlier Order
dated August, 21, 2000 (denying due recourse to the appeal), and gave due
course to the appeal, the TRO issued by the former Fifth Division of this Court
was still in force and effect, the same to expire on 04 December 2000 [per]
the Resolution dated 29 September 2000 declaring the TRO in full force and
effect. Such recall gives due course to the appeal retroactive to the time of
the actual filing of the Notice of Appeal on 08 August 2000.
However, what militates against the discretionary execution long prayed for
by private respondent is the fact that the court a quo has no more discretion
to order the same as it was already relinquished of jurisdiction over Civil
Case Q-98-35332. Under paragraph 3, Section 9, Rule 41 of the [1997] Rules
[of Civil Procedure] (i)n appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses
jurisdiction over the case upon the perfection of the appeals filed in due time
and the expiration of the time of appeal of the other parties. As to private
respondent, [the] time to appeal expired on 05 July 2000, or on the sixteenth
day after he was served a copy of the Decision of 31 May 2000 on 19 June
2000, he not having filed a motion for new trial or reconsideration which tolls
the reglementary period to appeal. Discretionary execution was temporarily
but effectively enjoined by the TRO issued by the former Fifth Division of this
Court which expired on 04 December 2000. However, before the expiration
of the TRO, the Court a quo issued the Omnibus Order dated 27 November
2000, canceling the Sheriffs Notice of Sale, the same being null and void,
which consequently cancelled the public auction sale to be held on 14

December 2000. From such order, we could infer that on the motion for
discretionary execution, action is deferred, if it is not altogether denied. This
observation may be confirmed from the fact that on 29 November 2000, it
issued an Order giving due course to petitioners Notice of Appeal, and
directing the Branch Clerk of Court to forward the entire records of Civil case
No. Q-98-35332 to this Court for proper action and disposition, without
reserving its right to act upon the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal
because technically, prior to transmittal of the original record, it may order
execution pending appeal in accordance with Section 2, Rule 39 (Ultimate
paragraph, Section 9, Rule 41).
. . . .
It may be observed that the Order dated 28 July 2000 granting execution
pending appeal as well as the Writ of Execution Pending Appeal issued on 21
August 2000 remained outstanding, for which an inquiry as to whether the
same w[as] issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction would have been ripe. However, the original records of
Civil Case No. Q-98-35332 ha[ve] already been received by this Court on 19
December 2000, and the appeal docketed as CA-G.R. CV. No. 69113. Thus,
granting that Sheriff Belarmino had the authority to issue the Sheriffs Notice
of Sale of Real Properties, its implementation has been rendered moot by the
loss of jurisdiction of the court which appointed him, coupled by the
transmittal of the original records of Civil Case No. Q-98-35332. Whether
execution pending appeal is warranted by the circumstances of the case is a
matter for the better consideration of this Court, not in this petition but in the
appeal of the case.[4]
Petitioner, therefore, brought this appeal. He alleges
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL

COURT HAD LOST ITS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE ORDER FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL, AND ORDERS IN FURTHERANCE
THEREOF, SINCE THE TRIAL COURT RETAINED ITS RESIDUAL
JURISDICTION
INASMUCH
AS
PETITIONERS
MOTION
FOR
EXECUTION PENDING APPEAL WAS FILED WITHIN THE FIFTEEN (15)
DAY PERIOD FOR APPEAL AND THE RECORDS WERE STILL IN THE
POSSESSION OF THE TRIAL COURT AT THE TIME IT WAS ISSUED.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS HAD NO JURISDICTION TO EXTEND THE

EFFECTIVITY OF THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED IN
THIS CASE.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE
RESPONDENTS PETITION SINCE THE PETITION HAD THE
FOLLOWING FORMAL DEFECTS;
A.

THE PETITION
RESPONDENT;

WAS

NOT

PROPERLY

SERVED

TO

THE

B. THE PETITION FAILED TO COMPLY WITH RULE 13 OF THE RULES

OF COURT IN THAT IT DID NOT STATE A WRITTEN EXPLANATION
AS TO WHY PERSONAL SERVICE WAS NOT RESORTED TO IN THIS
CASE;
C. THE PETITION WAS, IN TRUTH, NOT VERIFIED;
V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

REFUSING TO RESOLVE PETITIONERS NUMEROUS PENDING
MOTION[S].[5]

The petition has no merit. Rule 39, 2(a) of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:
On motion of the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party filed in the
trial court while it has jurisdiction over the case and is in possession of either
the original record or the record on appeal, as the case may be, at the time
of the filing of such motion said court may, in its discretion, order execution
of a judgment or final order even before the expiration of the period to
appeal.
After the trial court had lost jurisdiction, the motion for execution pending
appeal may be filed in the appellate court.
Discretionary execution may only issue upon good reasons to be stated in a
special order after due hearing.
On the other hand, Rule 41, 9 pertinently states:

In appeals by notice of appeal, the court loses jurisdiction over the case upon
the perfection of the appeals filed in due time and the expiration of the time
to appeal of the other parties.
....
[P]rior to the transmittal of the original record . . ., the court may issue orders
for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties which do not
involve any matter litigated by the appeal, approve compromises, permit
appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal in accordance
with Section 2 of Rule 39, and allow withdrawal of the appeal.
Petitioner contends that, since at the time he filed his motion for execution
pending appeal on June 14, 2000, the trial court still had jurisdiction over the
case (as respondents appeal was perfected only on August 8, 2000) and still
had the records of the case (as the same were ordered elevated to the Court
of Appeals only on December 18, 2000), it can validly implement its order of
execution notwithstanding the perfection of respondents appeal.
To be sure, the trial court still had jurisdiction of the case when it ordered
the execution of its judgment pending appeal. However, the fact is that the
enforcement of its order was restrained by the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP
No. 60354. On the other hand, the subsequent perfection of respondents
appeal forced the elevation of the records of the case to the Court of
Appeals. The twin moves of respondents rendered execution pending appeal
impossible not only while the TRO was effective but even after its expiration,
in view of the elevation of the records to the Court of Appeals. Eventually,
on January 29, 2001, the Court of Appeals set aside the trial courts order of
execution pending appeal. Petitioner cannot take advantage of the
expiration of the TRO to seek an implementation of the trial courts order of
execution, as this was the very issue in CA G.R. SP No. 60354 (for certiorari).
The trial court properly held itself to have no jurisdiction to act further on
the case. Instead, in its order of December 18, 2001, it referred petitioner to
the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 69113 with regard to his efforts to
seek implementation of the order of execution. Petitioner did not appeal from
this ruling.
Anent petitioners claim that respondents petition in the Court of Appeals
was deficient because it lacked verification and an explanation for lack of
personal service of the petition on him; that the same was improperly served

on petitioner instead of his counsel; and that the Court of Appeals failed to
resolve the motions filed by him for the dismissal of the petition, lifting of the
TRO, and setting of the case for oral arguments, suffice it to say that these
matters have been raised before, and were found to be without merit by, the
Court of Appeals in its decision of January 29, 2001 and resolution of August
31, 2001, and this Court finds no reason to modify its rulings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated January 29, 2001 and its resolution, dated August 31 2001,
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.