ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR A~rD HUi~cIAI~I

" PERFOR~[ANCE 49 1 7 6 - 2 1 1

(1969)

Equity Theory: A Review and Critique 1

ROBERT D. PRITCHARD
Department o] Psychology, University o] Minnesota
The theoretical precision and research related to equity theory, as it is
conceived by Adams, are reviewed. While equity theory is a significant step
forward, the theory itself needs further specification. The research supports
equity predictions in the area of underpayment, but the overpayment effects
have not been satisfactorily demonstrated. Elaborations of the theory are
presented in the areas of (1) determinants of inequity, (2) dissatisfaction
resulting from inequity, and (3) responses to dissatisfaction.
E q u i t y theory is one of the major formulations relevant to financial
compensation. E q u i t y theories have been proposed by Adams (1963a,
1965), Homans (1961), Jacques (1961), and Patchen (1961).
This paper concentrates on equity theory as it is conceived by Adams
(1963a, 1965). This is done for three reasons. First, as Vroom (1964, p.
170) points out, the formal statements of various equity theories differ
so little t h a t testable differences cannot be deduced from them in areas
where they would make predictions. Second, Adams' presentation is the
most explicit and extended of the theories. Third, his theory and the research related to it has received widespread attention among persons concerned with compensation theories and practices.
Our primary purpose then, is to take a closer look at both the theory
and research generated by equity theory. In the pages following, we
present the theory briefly, comment on it as a theory, discuss and critically evaluate research done to test deductions from it, and suggest certain modifications of equity theory t h a t seem to be indicated.
In its most recent formulation (Adams, 1965), the theory considers
(1) the nature of inputs and outcomes, (2) the nature of the social comparison process, (3) the conditions leading to equity or inequity and the
possible effects of inequity, and (4) the possible responses one m a y
make to reduce a condition of inequity.
Inputs include any and all factors perceived by a person to be relev a n t for getting some return on his personal investment, for example,
1The author gratefully acknowledges the detailed comments and invaluable,
criticisms of earlier drafts of this paper made by John P. Campbell, Marvin D.
Dunnette, and Norman Miller.
176

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THEORY

177

such factors as effort, education, age, beauty, etc. The important point
is that the person actually perceives them as something of value that he
brings or puts into a relationship. In contrast, outcomes include any and
all factors perceived by the person as returns to himself that is, factors
that have utility or value to him. Outcomes and inputs form a ratio,
and the individual outcomes and inputs are weighted according to their
perceived importance in determining the final "value" of this outcome/
input ratio.
A person is said to consciously or unconsciously compare his outcome/
input ratio to t h a t of another person or persons. This comparison "person" does not necessarily have to be any one individual, it could be a
broad class of individuals who are perceived by the person as relevant for
comparison.
Adams refers to this generalized comparison person as "Other," and to
the comparer as "Person." This notation will be followed in the remainder of this paper.
Equity is said to occur when Person perceives that the ratio of his
outcomes to his inputs is equal to Other's outcome/input ratio. Conversely, Person experiences inequity when he perceives t h a t his ratio is
not equal to Other's. Inequity can result either when Person and Other
are in a direct exchange relationship, for example two lovers or two partners; or, when both Person and Other are related to a third p a r t y and
Person compares himself with Other, for example, two employees being
paid by one employer.
Inequity can occur in m a n y ways. Several possibilities are shown
in Table 1.
Thus, perceived equity results when Person's inputs match his outeomes
and when Other's inputs match his (Other's) outcomes. (LL, LL; 2 HH,
HH; LL, HH; HH, LL.) This is true regardless of the absolute level
of inputs and outcomes for either party. E q u i t y is also said to exist
in those situations where Person's inputs do not match his outcomes but
Other is perceived to be an identical situation (LH, LH, or HL, HL).
Perceived inequity arises whenever Person's ratio differs from Other's
In exemplifying various input-outcome relationships, the notation used by Weiek
and Nesset (unpublished manuscript) will be employed in place of the more complicated notation of Adams (1965). This simplified notation is based on a temporal
sequence, and'is not to be read as a ratio. The first letter of a pair refers to level of
inputs, the second letter to level of outcomes. Thus, HL = Person invests high input
and receives low outcomes. In situations involving two persons, the input-outcome
relationship for Person will appear first and the input-outcome relationship for
Other, the generalized comparison person, appears second. Thus HL, LH = Person
invests high inputs and receives low outcomes while his generalized comparison
person invests low inputs and receives high outcomes.

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ROBERT D. PRITCHARD
TABLE 1
SITUATIONS OF ]~QUITY AND INEQUITY
Equitable

Inequitable
Under-reward

LL,
HH,
LL,
HH,
LH,
HL,

LL 2
HH
HH
LL
LH
HL

LL,
HL,
HL,
HL,
HH,

LH
LL
LH
HH
LH

Over-reward

LL,
LH,
LH,
LH,
HH,

HL
LL
HL
HH
HL

ratio. This is the case not only when Person is under-rewarded relative
to Other (LL, LH ; HL, LL ; HL, LH ; HL, HH ; HH, LH) but also when
Person is over-rewarded relative to Other (LL, HL; LH, LL; LH, HL;
LH, HH; HH, HL). The degree or magnitude of felt inequity is said
to vary as a function of the degree of discrepancy between the two ratios.
For example, HL, LH should produce more inequity than LL, LH.
Although Adams is somewhat imprecise in the discussion of the consequences of inequity, he does postulate that it will "create tension" and
that this tension has motivating properties impelling Person to reduce
or eliminate it. Moreover, the force of the motivation is proportional
to the magnitude of the inequity. Thus, the strength of the behavioral
tendencies to reduce inequity is determined by the amount of difference
between the two ratios.
Adams lists several things Person can do to reduce or avoid inequity.
He can attempt to equalize his and Other's ratios by (1) cognitively distorting his or Other's inputs or outcomes, (2) by acting on Other to get
him to change his inputs or outcomes, (3) Person can change his own
inputs or outcomes, (4) Person can change his comparison person or
leave the field. Adams notes that not all of these modes of inequity reduction are equally available to Person psychologically, and he sets down
some tentative hypotheses about how Person will choose to reduce inequity. Person will maximize positive outcomes; he will minimize increasing effortful or costly inputs. He will resist real and cognitive
changes in inputs and outcomes that are more central to his self-concept
and to his self-esteem. Person will be more resistant to altering cognitions about his own inputs and outcomes than to altering cognitions about
the inputs and outcomes of Other. Leaving the field will be a last resort,
occuring only when inequity is high and other means of reducing it are
unavailable. Once comparison with a particular Other has stablized over
time, Person will be highly resistant to changing comparison persons.

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THEORY

179

EQUITY THEORY AS A THEORY

While equity theory is a large step forward in the development of
a systematic theory of exchange, the formulation needs further specification in several areas. Three general areas will be discussed: Questions
relating to (1) the nature of inputs and outcomes, (2) the comparison
person and comparison process, and (3) the modes of inequity resolution.
It is not always possible to determine a priori whether a particular
aspect of the exchange relationship will be perceived as an input or as
an outcome. For example, a great deal of responsibility on the job may
be seen by one person as an outcome. He is important to the operations
of the organization and his superiors trust his judgment. To another
person, however, responsibility is an input in that he must "take the
job home with him at night," and must bear the burden for anything that
goes wrong.
Another difficulty with inputs and outcomes, which Adams points out
in his 1963 formulation of the theory, is the correlation Person perceives
between inputs and between outcomes. Objectively, age and job experience may be very highly correlated, but does Person see them as
separate inputs? Similarly, position and fringe benefits such as a special
parking place may again be highly correlated, but perceived as separate.
Also, would it not be possible for Person to cognitively manipulate these
correlations to reduce inequity? For example, if Person perceives his
inputs as higher than his outcomes relative to Other, he might achieve
equity by perceiving his desirable parking place, his carpet, his walnut
desk, and his liberal expense account all as separate outcomes that add
to his total amount of outcome. The real issue seems to be whether individual inputs and outcomes and their importance and interdependence
are constants for Person or whether they change in the service of inequity resolution.
The second area of consideration in equity theory is Person's choice
of a comparison person. Adams does not elaborate on how or with whom
Person will choose to compare his input-outcome ratio. This is crucial
to any prediction of the presence or magnitude of perceived inequity.
Yet several questions are left unanswered by the theory. How many
Others will Person use? Are they mutually exclusive? Is there some ranking of the importance of different Others? How, or what dimensions are
salient in the choice of an Other? How stable is the choice of a particular
Other? Does choice of an Other change with changes in Person's status,
pay, etc?
Weick (1965) discusses another consideration: what are the effects

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ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

of the amount of comparability between Person and Other? Weick makes

the plausible hypotheses that the greater the similarity between Person
and Other on relevant input and outcome dimensions, the greater discomfort Person will experience with a given amount of inequity. Since
the amount of discomfort is presumably related to the occurrence of
attempts to reduce inequity, the amount of felt inequity is important
to any actual prediction of behavior.
Adams' discussion of the modes of inequity resolution present a
third area of discussion. As Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) point out, the
hazy formulations of what form of inequity resolution will occur make the
theory difficult to test empirically. Their example is worth quoting.
if an overcompensated group failed to show increased input
(in the form of higher quantity or quality), might this be regarded
as disconfirmation of the theory or merely an instance of the subjects choosing under mode (e.g., altering their perceptions o f their
own or others' inputs or of the nature of the job being performed) for
reducing feelings of inequity (p. 113).
Weick (1965) feels the list of modes of inequity reduction is not complete, and includes such factors as denial and task enhancement. Weick
also points out that the difficulty in predicting modes of inequity resolution is increased by the incredible richness and complexity of inputs and
outcomes. It is thus difficult to predict just which inputs and outcomes
will be changed.
A final point about modes of inequity reduction is that Adams makes
no mention of individual differences variables. As Opsahl and Dunnette
(1966) point out, the different modes of inequity reduction are "undoubtedly a function of individual motive configurations and ability, interest, and personality variables (p. 113)."
The difficulties in actually making a specific prediction about feelings
of inequity are probably best summarized by Vroom (]964). The variables that must be considered for predicting Person's felt inequity include:
(1) his beliefs concerning the degree to which he possesses
various characteristics; (2) his convictions concerning the degree
to which these characteristics should result in the attainment of rewarding outcomes from his job, i.e., their value as inputs; (3) his
beliefs concerning the degree to which he receives these rewarding
outcomes from his job; (4) his beliefs concerning the degree to which
others possess these characteristics; (5) his beliefs concerning the
degree to which others receive rewarding outcomes from their jobs;
and (6) the extent to which he compares himself to these others
(pp. 171-172).

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181

This may be a good place to inject a point that deserves mention. These
criticisms of Adams' theory may seem quite unfair if they are seen as
points Adams failed to consider. This is not meant to be the case. This
discussion is meant to indicate that the theory needs further work, and
to point out some of the directions this further work should take.
REVIEW OF EMPIRICAL LITERATURE
Studies bearing on equity theory divide conveniently into two groups:
those studying the effects of underpayment and those dealing with the
effects of overpayment. The first three discussed below are cited by
Adams as support for his theory, but were not originally planned in the
context of the theory.

Homans (1963)
The relevant portion of this study consisted of interview data from two
types of clerical workers in a large company. In one part of the billing
department there were two groups of female clerical workers, cash posters
and ledger clerks. One group, known as cash posters, did the fairly
monotonous job of entering paid bills on the customer's account while the
other group, the ledger clerks, were required to record address changes,
make breakdowns of over- and underpayments and deal with other
employees and customers on the phone. A girl had to be a cash poster for
several years before she became a ledger clerk. Although the ledger clerks
had higher status, they were nearly all paid the same as the cash posters.
Adams (1965) sees this as a situation where the ledger clerks have higher
inputs than the cash posters, but their outcomes are not correspondingly
high. Thus, inequity should be experienced to the extent the ledger clerks
used the cash posters as Others; and given that the ledger clerks perceived the input-outcome ratios as unequal. The results of the openended interviews indicate that approximately 75% of the ledger clerks
stated that the situation was unjust and that they should "get a few
dollars more" because of their higher seniority and greater skill. It was
not so much that they were actually dissatisfied with the pay; in answer
to the same open-ended question of "How do you like your job," 11 of
the 19 voluntarily reported that they liked the pay; rather, they felt they
should get a little more than the cash posters because their inputs were
higher. Adams (1965) interprets this as support for the theory in that
unequal input-outcome ratios led to felt inequity.

Clark (1958)
The results of this study are available only through Adams (1965). As
such, we are limited to the details he reports.
The subjects in Clark's study consisted of two groups of employees in

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ROBERT D. PRITCt-IARD

a supermarket: cashiers and bundlers (employees who put the groceries

into boxes). The cashier was a higher status, better paid lob, usually
staffed by full-time employees, while the bundlers were generally parttime. Psychologically, the bundlers were working ]or the cashiers. Frequently, cashier-bundler teams were formed that on the basis of age, sex,
and education led to potentially inequitable situations, since many of the
bundlers were male college students who were generally older than the
female, less educated cashiers.
The theory would predict that the bundlers, if they perceived that they
were underpaid in comparison to the cashiers, would experience inequity
and take steps to reduce it. The findings are in agreement w i t h this
prediction in that Clark found that when interviewed, these bundlers
were quite explicit about expressing inequity. The interview data also
indicated the principal mode of inequity resolution was decreasing inputs
in the form of lowered productivity. Clark also studied cashier-bundler
pairs in several different stores, and for each store he determined the
average discrepany between inpuS-outcome ratios for the pairs in each
store. He found that the productivity of the store was related to this
average. The less average difference between ratios for the pairs (the less
the objective inequity), the greater the productivity of the store.
This is strong support for the underpayment aspect of equity theory,
since perceived input-outcome ratios seemed to be discrepant; this led
to feelings of inequity, and lowered inputs in the form of productivity
occurred.

Patchen (1961)
Patchen's thesis was explicitly designed to test derivations from cognitire dissonance theory. He deals with overpayment only in passing,
devoting the vast majority of his effort to equitable and underpayment.
In this respect it is similar to the first two studies discussed.
The data that are relevant here were collected by asking skilled and
unskilled workers (N = 489) in an oil refinery to describe two persons
either inside or outside the company whose earnings were different from
their own. The subject was also asked several other questions including
whether the "comparison person" earned more or less than himself, the
comparison person's occupational level, and the worker's satisfaction
with his own earnings. Actual pay rates were also available.
Patchen's results generally support equity theory. Subjects who chose
higher-earning Others showed a consistent trend to be less satisfied with
these comparisons the closer Other's occupational level was to their own.
Patchen interprets these data as indicating that "the more a comparison person who earns more than the comparer is similar to the com-

EQUITY THEORY

183

parer in occupational level (and thus, the more objectively dissonant the
comparison), the less satisfied the comparer is (p. 39)." This is consistent
with the equity theory prediction earlier elaborated from Weick (1965)
that a given amount of inequity will create more dissatisfaction the more
similar Person is to Other. These data are also consistent with the
postulate that the greater the difference between the input-outcome ratios
the greater inequity and the greater the dissatisfaction. A comparison
with an individual who earns more than Person should not be bothersome
if that individual also has higher inputs. For example, if the comparison
were with a professional man (Person is a blue-collar worker) the situation would be LL, H H - - a n equitable condition. On the other hand, if the
comparison is with an individual who is of more similar occupational
level the situation would be closer to LL, LH. This should generate
feelings of inequity and lead to dissatisfaction.
Reasons for reported satisfaction or dissatisfaction with a comparison
with a higher-earning Other were also recorded. Included in reasons for
satisfaction were: Person has compensating financial and nonfinancial
advantages; Other is superior in what his job requires in seniority, experience, age, and in personal qualities; Person is not interested in comparing earnings; and Person earns enough for his needs. Predominantly
reported reasons for dissatisfaction with a comparison with a higher
earning Other were: Person is superior in job requirements, seniority,
age, and experienee; and Person wants more money and a higher living
standard. This list is very similar to types of inputs and outcomes Adams
discusses as relevant in determining the input-outcome ratio.
One of the methodological drawbacks with Patehen's study concerns
the procedures he used in obtaining comparison persons. By asking
Person to name someone he knew inside or outside the company who
earned more than he, Patchen may easily have obtained "nominees" who
were in no way real Others for Person. Person's doctor makes more than
he, but is very unlikely to be an Other. Furthermore, a large source of
"nominees" could have come from the direct family of Person since these
could easily be the first people to come to Person's mind if he was not
trying to name someone he actually used as an Other. We have no direct
evidence of the number of "nominees" named who were irrelevent for
Person's comparisons, but 30% of these comparisons made were a close
relative of Person. Admittedly, some portion of these "nominees" were
Others, but the point is, we don't know how many.
Another related problem is tha~ Person was prohibited, by the directions, from naming someone who earned the same as he did. The degree
to which this procedure precluded the choice of relevant Others is again
not estimable.

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ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

Lawler and O'Gara (1967)

This study experimentally investigated underpayment. After completing a job application, college student Ss were "hired" and told they would
be paid 10 per interview (underpaid) or 25 per interview (equitably
paid). Two measures of productivity were taken, quantity--the number
of interviews completed, and quality--the number of words recorded per
interview. The results supported equity theory in that relative to equitably paid Ss, underpaid Ss conducted more interviews, and their quality
was lower. Presumably the underpaid Ss felt that relative to some Other,
their inputs were greater than their outcomes (pay), and attempted to
reduce inequity by increasing outcomes without increasing inputs, i.e.,
conducting more interviews, but spending less time on each one.
Lawler and O'Gara also included measures that attempted to tap other
modes of inequity reduction. Specifically, the authors obtained measures
of perceived interestingness, importance, complexity, and challengingness of the interviewing task. They hypothesized that underpaid Ss would
find the task more interesting, more important, less complex, and less
challenging than the equitably paid Ss, since perceiving the task in this
way would presumably tend to bring inputs more in line with outcomes
compared to Other. Data from the questionnaire showed that differences
between underpaid and equitable paid Ss generally supported the
predictions.
This attempted determination of modes of inequity resolution is very
laudable, but it seems equity theory would have a difficult time actually
predicting which direction these differences should show, and no matter
which direction actually occurred, be able to interpret the results as at
least not contrary to equity theory. The basic problem, as discusssed
previously, is the a priori determination of whether a particular job
characteristic is an input or an outcome for a particular Person. For
example, a lob that is simple could be interpreted as increasing inputs
since it is boring; on the other hand, a simple job could be an outcome in
that it does not demand too much effort.
Lawler and O'Gara also collected data on individual differences.
Because of their limited sample size, it seems unwarranted at this point
to deal with the substantive aspects of their results. However, their results
do indicate that individual differences occur in inequity reduction, and
deserve careful study.

Adams and Rosenbaum (1962)

This study was designed to test some overpayment aspects of equity
theory. In the first experiment, Ss were made either to feel overpaid by

EQIJITY T H E O R Y

~85

the hour or equitably paid by the hour in relation to a hypothetical group

of "qualified" interviewers. The argument was that the inequity gengrated
by overpayment should lead to increased productivity since this ~vould
increase inputs, while financial outcomes would remain constant :due to
the hourly pay schedule. Thus increasing productivity (inputs)changes
Person from LH to HH, a condition which is equitable in relation to
Other who is HH. The overpayment manipulation was designed to induce
cognitions that Person was not really qualified for the interviewing task,
but that E would have to hire him anyway, and would have to p a y him
at, the rate a "qualified" interviewer would be paid. The equitabl?/paid
Ss were told they were qualified and would be paid accordingly. The data
supported the hypothesis in that the overpaid Ss conducted more interviews than their equitably paid counterparts.
In the second experiment, university students were again hired through
the University Placement Center for an interviewing job. Subjects were
placed into one of four conditions; the first two comprised a replication
of the first study in that Ss were paid by the hour and made to feel either
overpaid or equitably paid. In the other two conditions, Ss were paid on
a piece-rate basis, and again made to feel overpaid or equitably paid.
The method of inducing cognitions regarding Ss qualifications (i.e.,
inputs) were identical to those used in the first experiment.
Here equity theory makes different predictions: inequity resolution
will take different forms depending on whether overpaid Ss were paid by
the hour or by the interview. Specifically, Ss overpaid by the hour should
increase their inputs by conducting more interviews. This mode of inequity resolution is not available to Ss paid by the piece since conducting
more interviews (increasing inputs) would also raise financial outcomes.
It was predicted that Ss overpaid in the piece-rate condition would decrease their productivity, and therefore their outcomes, in a n effort to
achieve equity.
Adams and Rosenbaum feel that the results support the equity theory
predictions in that (1) the results of the first experiment were replicated:
Ss made to feel overpaid by the hour produced more interviews than Ss
who were equitably paid by the hour; and (2) Ss overpaid on a piecework basis conducted ]ewer interviews than piece-work Ss who were
equitably paid.
The most significant problem with this research deals with the method
of manipulating perceived inputs. Ss in the overpaid condition were told,
You don't have any (nearly enough) experience in interviewing or
survey work of the kind we're engaged in here. I specifically a s k e d
the Placement Serviee to refer only people with that kind of experi-

~86

ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

ence. This was the maior qualification set. I can't understand how
such a slip-up could have occurred . . . (agonizing pause) . . .
Research in this area has shown that the nature of the response
elicited by a skilled and experienced interviewer is more accurate
and representative of the respondent's sentiments and differs substantially from the responses elicited by inexperienced people.
Who interviewed you at Placement? (tries to call Blacement).
Gets a busy signal and slams the receiver down . . .
I guess I'll have to hire you anyway, but please pay close attention
to the hlstructions I will give you. If anything I say seems complicated, don't hesitate to ask for clarification. If it seems simple, pay
close attention. Some of this stuff, on the surface, may appear to be
deceptively easy.
Since I'm going to hire you, I'll just have to pay you at the rate
we advertized; that is, $3.50 per hour (or 30 per interview for piecerate conditions) (p. 165, emphasis on original).
The purpose of this extended quote describing the manipulation is
to emphasize the nature of the message the Ss received. The essence
of E's statement seems to be (1) what is an unqualified person like you
doing here; (2) you will be a poor interviewer; (3) you will cause errors
in my data; (4) I'm going to raise hell with the idiot who sent you over
here; (5) I have to hire you, but I don't want to; (6) you will have
to be extremely careful of these interviews; (7) you may think this
stuff is simple, but it's not; and (8) I'm forced to pay you at the going
rate, but you don't deserve it. E then proceeds to describe the extremely
simple interviewing procedure.
I t seems quite likely that the result of this initial contact with the
"employer" was not only to induce cognitions of LH, HH inequity in the
S, but also to threaten the S's self-esteem. This threat could be relative
to the subject himself "I'll be a poor interviewer," and/or relative
to E--"He thinks I'll be a poor interviewer." If these were indeed the
feelings aroused by the manipulation, it seems quite plausible that the
S would attempt to do an especially good job to convince himself
and/or E that he was not as poor an interviewer as he was made out
r o b e . The essential point is, how would increasing self-esteem by doing
a "better job" take the form o f increasing the number of interviews
in the hourly paid condition, and decreasing the number of interviews
in the piece-rate condition. Since the task was a Simple one,s it seems
zThe interviewers were only to record which of five kinds of automobile the
interviewees associated with six brief personal descriptions such as, "A rising junior
executive."

EQUITY THEORY

187

unlikely that inputs could have been very different in terms of actual
quality for the two conditions. Thus it seems that the sheer number of
interviews conducted is the important measure. For the hourly paid
Ss, supposedly experiencing inequity due to overpayment, conducting
a large number of interviews could be seen as doing a good job. This
would tend to raise the previously reduced feelings of self-es~eem, ttowever, the self-esteem explanation is not so straightforward for Ss in
the piece-rate condition. It could be that the number of interviews was
a more salient aspec~ of the job in the piece-rate condition since Ss
would be paid on this basis. Approaching E with a relatively small
number of completed interviews could consciously or unconsciously
express to E that S conducted the interdews with a great deal of care
and hence would not bias his employer's data.
The argument for the piece-rate Ss admittedly rests on the two lessthan-obvious assumptions that number of interviews was more salient
for piece-rate Ss and that perceptions of "subjective quality" existed
in the piece-rate condition that did not exist in the hourly condition.
Nevertheless, perceptions of self-esteem and methods of increasing selfesteem potentially confound the data and make the results difficult to
interpret.
There is another qualification which is applicable to this study and
to all the following studies that experimentally test equity theory.
Namely, the work periods are short; they range from one to two-andone half hours. If the subjects are not really aware of how difficult the
lob will be and especially how much they will really be earning in the
piece-rate conditions (e.g., how many interviews they are doing in an
hour), it is difficult to see how they can make "accurate estimates" of
their input-outcome ratios. Also, it seems reasonable that when Ss are
first hired, they would tend to be under high motivation to make a
good initial impression.
Arrowood (1961)
Another potential difficulty in interpreting the Adams and Rosenbaum study was foreseen and discussed by them, using data from a
thesis by Arrowood. 4 The criticism they bring up is that the differences
in productivity in the L H conditions (Ss told they were unqualified~
but hired anyway) might be interpreted as resulting from feelings of
job insecurity. If Ss who were told they were really unqualified for
the job perceived that they might be fired if they did not do an espeThe Arrowood thesis was n o t available to this author, and as such, we are once
again limited to what has been reported a b o u t it in other sources, especially Adams
(1963).

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ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

iciat'ly good job, they could have increased their job inputs to minimize
.this'l~ossibitity rather than to attempt to establish equity.
~ i l t ~ho~'ld :be~ noted, parenthetically, that this argument presented
by,~~dams ~nd ~Rosenbaum is similar to that presented above concerni~r/~ th6~p0ss~ble contaminating effects of lowered self-esteem. They are
taci~Jly aSmitting t h e possibility t h a t perceptions o f lowered lob seeu~ity:, would:" have differential effects on piece-work and hourly paid
workers~.numely, to:lower the piece-rate Ss' productivity and raise .the
p'roductivity!ib'f:.hour'ly p a i d Ss. This is the same possibility mentioned
~a'bove',~oneerning lowered self-esteem. The fact that Adams and Rosenbaum:~themselves feel this could occur gives some added credence:to
the= i~rgument for the contaminating effects of lowered self-esteem. :
Arrowood employed a .factorial design wherein Ss were either :oVer,
paid or,~eq~itably paid on an hourly basis, and performed under either
public ~r,: private c0nditions. The public-private manipulation .was
achieve~i by .'.having 8S submit the results o f their interviews t o the
eml~'l:oyer (the experimenter) or mail their work in preaddressed: er/Velopesl to:::an address several thousand miles a w a y . In the latter
,(privat6) conditions, Ss w e r e given the impression that the experi.
reenter would never see their work. The overpaid-equitably paid manipulation w a s similar to that used in the Adams and Rosenbaum (1962)
stud~)~ Ss hired at $3.50 per hour and made to feel qualified or unqualified for the job.
:If Ss increase inputs merely to decrease the possibility of being fired,
overpayment should not lead to higher productivity when job security
is maximized, i.e., the private condition. The data show that the equity
prediction does indeed occur in the private condition: overpaid Ss
conducted more interviews than the equitably paid Ss. Adams and
Rosenbaum interpret these results as showing that perceived job insecurity was not a contributor to the increased productivity of "unqualified" 8s.
Although there is very little information upon which to base an
evaluation of the Arrowood study, one consideration does deserve mention. Since the Arrowood manipulation attempted to make the overpaid Ss feet .unqualified, the possible contaminating effects of lowered
selfiesteem could have occurred here also. The results show a very
strong effect for the public-private manipulation: Ss whose productivity was not under E's surveillance conducted far fewer interviews
than the 'Ss who reported directly to E. This would seem to indicate
tha} since E had no access to the production figures of the Ss in the
pd~ate condition, these Ss did not work as hard as the Ss who reported
directly to E. There also was a main effect due to payment conditions,

EQUITY

THEORY

189

with the overpaid Ss conducting more interviews than the equitably

paid Ss. (There was no interaction between the two treatment dimensions.) While this difference is interpreted by Adams as confirming the
overpayment prediction of equity theory~ it could also be explained
by the self-esteem argument. Subjects who were told they were:unqualified could have increased their productivity to counteract feelings of
lowered self-esteem.
We mentioned previously that this lowered self-esteem could exist
vis-a-vis E or vis-a-vis the subject himself. In this case, attempts to
raise self-esteem by increased inputs could occur vis-a-vis both the
subject and E in the public condition, but in the private condition E
would presumably never know how many interviews S conducted and
thus S could not raise his self-esteem by behaving in ways that could
cause E to evaluate him more favorably. Recall that both overpaid
and equitably paid Ss in the private condition conducted fewer interviews than their counterparts in the public condition, and that this
difference was constant for both payment conditions. We said earlier
that this difference could have resulted from lack of surveillance b y E
in the private condition. However, another alternative is possible. The
SS in the overpaid-private group may not have been reacting to the
lowered surveillance, but instead were trying to raise their self-esteem
(vis-a-vis themselves) by raising their level of inputs, but since E
would never know their number of interviews, they did not raise
them as high as they would have if the possibility existed that he would
change his evaluation of them. The Ss who were equitably paid, however, were indeed reacting to the lowered surveillance by simply lowering their efforts.
To summarize this rather tortuous argument, the observed difference
in number of interviews conducted in the p u b l i c condition could..lmve
occurred because overpaid Ss were attempting to increase self-este.em
vis-a-vis themselves and the experimenter. However, in the pr~vatv
condition the observed difference resulted from two factors: (1).~,overr
paid Ss were attempting to raise self-esteem but could do s o onJy
vis-a-vis themselves and not E, and (2) equitably paid Ss did not work
as hard due to lack of surveillance.
::.'.

Adams

(1963D)

:.: ~:~

:..... :

In this study Adams considers the effects of overpayment on work

quantity and quality. Up to this point, research on overpayment has
considered only the quantity of work produced. Equity theory also
predicts that when Person is overpaid relative ~o Other (e:.g., L H , H H ) ,
one way of increasing inputs is for Person to increase the quality' of:

i90

ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

his work. In the two previous studies, the task was so simple that it
was difficult for Person to manipulate work quality. In this study, the
task was such that Ss could differ in work qualiW, and this difference
could be measured.
Subjects were made to feel either qualified or unqualified for conducting open-ended interviews about opinions, and were paid on a
piece-rate basis. The quantity measure was simply the number of
interviews conducted, and quality was measured by the amount of
recorded information Ss elicited from the respondents.
The prediction made by equity theory is that (1) Ss overpaid on a
piece-rate basis will conduct fewer interviews, and (2) will record
more information per interview than Ss who were equitably paid. The
data support both hypotheses.
Two points should be discussed in regard to this study. The first is
the self-esteem problem discussed at length above. If we again assume
that feelings of lowered self-esteem were generated by the manipulation of job qualifications (the procedure was similar to the one used in
the two previous studies), possible modes of increasing self-esteem
appear to contaminate the results of this study even more than in the
previous two studies. In this study, Ss had much greater control over
the quality of their work, and thus one way to "do a good job" vis-a-vis
the experimenter or themselves would be to record very carefully everything the interviewee said, i.e., increase quality. Thus, the increased
quality of the underqualified (overpaid) Ss could have resulted from
measures to enhance their self-esteem.
T h e second point is one presented by Opsahl and Dunnette (1966)
in reference to the Adams and Jacobsen (1964) study, but which is
also relevant here. The manipulation used by Adams tells the overpaid 8s that the job is not as simple as it may seem and that they will
have to be extremely careful with the interviews. Thus in this experimerit, where Bs can affect the quality of their work, the initial contact
with the "employer" tells them to pay particular attention to qualiW!
Moreover, this is not the case for the equitably paid Ss; they are simply
hired and then the task is explained to them. Thus, the different quality
sets induced by E could have increased quality in the overpaid group,
and since doing a high qaulity job (recording many ideas) necessitares conducting fevcer interviews, have the additional effect of reducing quantity.
Adams and Jacobsen (1964)

This experiment employed a 3 X 2 factorial design with three conditions of equity and two conditions related to permanence of the job,

EQUITY THEORY

191

After completing a job application, the Ss took a contrived proofreading test. The E then interviewed the Ss to "decide" whether to hire
them for a proofreading task. In the overpaid condition, which Adams
and Jacobsen call high dissonance, Ss were told they did not have
enough experience; experience is important; accuracy was very important; their proofreading test was not really satisfactory; they would
be hired anyway; they should pay close attention to the instructions;
and that E would pay them at the going rate (30 per page). In the
second equity condition, termed the reduced dissonance condition, Ss
were also told they were unqualified and, because of their low qualifications would only be paid 20 per page instead of the rate of 30 for
"qualified" proofreaders. In the third condition (low dissonance) Ss were
told they were well qualified and would be paid 30, wages for qualified
people.
The other factor in the experiment was job prospectus. Subjects in the
high job prospectus condition were told that the book they were proofreading was one of a series he (the experimenter) would be working on,
and it was possible that the S would also be able to help him in the
future. In the low job prospectus, Ss were told that this particular
(small) book had to be returned to the publishers soon, and that it was
all the work that they would do.
Equity theory predicts that Ss who are overpaid (e.g., LH, HH)
should not produce as much as those who are equitably paid (since this
is piece-rate) and that these overpaid 5s should do higher quality work.
Subjects in the reduced dissonance and the low dissonance conditions
should not experience inequity, since the former would be more in a
position of e.g., LL, HH; and the latter a position of e.g., HH, HH.
The dimension of job prospectus was included to determine whether a
job security variable could account for the results. The argument is that
if unqualified Ss feel they may be fired at some later time, they may try
to do a good job to decrease the chances of being fired. However, the
prediction is that if underqualified Ss feel the job will be of short duration, there would be no reason to try to "look good" for future employment. Thus, the prediction is that if job security is a factor contributing
to increased inputs by the overpaid Ss, increased inputs should not result
in the low job prospectus condition; i.e., if job security is a contaminant,
equity prediction should not hold for the overpaid, low job prospectus
group.
The results support the predictions made by Adams and Jacobsen. The
high dissonance (overpaid) Ss proofed fewer pages than the reduced
dissonance and the low dissonance groups, and the high dissonance groups
showed higher quality scores than the other two groups. There were no

t92

ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

differences in quality or quantity between the reduced dissonance and

the low dissonance groups. The results also indicated that job prospectus
was not a contaminant in that there was no interaction between iob
prospectus and payment condition.
Discussion of this study will largely center around points mentioned
in connection with previous studies. The first is the self-esteem question.
It could be argued that if methods of enhancing self-esteem were operating, they should operate not only under the high dissonance condition,
but also under the reduced dissonance condition since both groups were
told that they were unqualified for the iob. The data indicate that only
the high dissonance groups raised inputs in comparison to the equitably
paid groups; there was no difference in inputs between the reduced dissonance and the low dissonance (equitably paid) groups. Also, if the
set to increase quality is operating, the reduced dissonance Ss should also
have produced higher quality work since they were given the same
instructions to "pay close attention," etc. One explanation for these
results is suggested by Opsahl and Dunnette (1966) who point out,
It is likely, for example, that the pay reduction (in the reduced
dissonance group) would be sufficient to suggest to an "unqualified"
subject that his expected poor performance was already being taken
into account, and he might then be expected to work in accordance
with his employer's implied expectations (p. 112).
Some confirmation of this proposition is found in a study by Goodman
and Friedman (1968), which will be discussed more completely later in
the paper. Using a reduced dissonance group similar to that employed
by Adams and Jacobsen, they found that if the reduced dissonance Ss
knew the production rates of "qualified" workers, their performance was
comparable to the overpaid Ss, but if they did not know these production
"norms," they produced less than the overpaid Ss. Thus if one "controls"
for the Opsahl and Dunnette criticism by stating production norms, the
"insulted" reduced dissonance Ss perform much like the "insulted" overpaid Ss.

Andrews (1967)
This experiment considered three variables: amount of payment,
interestingness of the task, and previous wage experience. Subjects were
assigned to do one of two piece-rate tasks at either 15 per piece (underpayment), 20 per piece (equitable payment), or 30 per piece (overpayment). The asymmetry of the payments was employed to reflect the
proposed different thresholds for under- and overpayment.

EQUITY THEORY

193

Subjects were assigned to one of two tasks, interviewing students

(interesting task) or checking pages of data (dull task). Independent
cheeks on the amount of payment and the interestingness of the tasks
indicated that the different levels of these two variables were perceived
as intended. The third variable considered was previous wage experience,
and college student Ss were divided into high, medium, and low on the
basis of the highest wages they had received prior to the experiment.
Andrews gave no initial instructions or comments that could have
induced a quality set or that could serve to affect self-esteem. His payment manipulation was addressed solely to outcomes rather than the
input manipulations employed in the overpayment experiments above.
The predictions made by equity are that since Ss are employed on a
piece-rate basis, Ss who are underpaid should produce more with lower
quality relative to the equitably paid groups, and overpaid Ss should
produce less with higher quality. If one can assume that previous wage
experience is related to perceived inputs, equity theory would predict
that Ss with a higher wage history should be most strongly affected by
underpayment in that of all the groups, they should produce the most
work with lowest quality. Conversely, the Ss with a low wage history
should be most affected by overpayment in that of all the groups, they
should produce the least with the highest quality. Finally, to the extent
that high task interestingness was perceived as a positive outcome,
underpayment effects (higher quantity, lower quality) should not be as
strong in the dull task as in the interesting task; and similarly, overpaymerit effects (lower quantity, higher quality) should also be less strong
in the dull task than in the interesting task. The rationale for the overpayment side of this prediction is that if a Person is in e.g., LH, HH
situation, lowering his outcomes via a dull task would tend to reduce the
discrepancy between his and Other's input-outcome ratios, thus tending
to reduce inequity, and tending to reduce pressures to alleviate inequity
via increasing quality (increasing inputs) and lowering quantiW.
Taking the last prediction first, Andrews reports that none of the
analyses related to quantity and quality showed any significant difference
between the dull task and the interesting task. While this could be taken
as disconfirmation of the equity prediction, results reported by Weick
(1964) indicate that equity predictions dealing with task attractiveness
are very difficult to make. I-Ie found that compared with a more attractive
task, Ss performing a less attractive task worked harder and reported it
more enjoyable. Thus equity theory could explain the lack of difference
between the two tasks as being due to Ss using another mode of inequity
resolution; namely, cognitively manipulating the task attractiveness to
increase or decrease outcomes in the underpaid and overpaid conditions

194

ROBERT n. PRITCHARD

respectively. Since there were no differences between the two tasks, the
results of the two task treatments were combined in reporting the rest
of the data.
Andrews found that q u a n t i t y of work tended to decrease with increased
payment, i.e., underpaid Ss produced more than equitably paid Ss who,
in turn, produced more than overpaid Ss. Apparently, however, the only
statistically significant difference was between the two extreme payment
groups; overpaid vs. underpaid. It would seem that a more appropriate
analysis would be to separately compare both the overpayment and
underpayment group with the equitable payment group. Visual inspection
of these means indicates that the difference between the equitably paid
group's mean and the underpaid group's mean is twice as large as the
difference between the equitable payment mean and the overpaid group's
mean. Thus, most of the observed difference between the two extreme
payment groups is due to underpaid Ss producing more as opposed to
overpaid Ss producing less. These data, therefore, do not clearly support
the overpayment predictions.
There is a problem with interpreting Andrews' data in that, for
quantity of work at least, there appears to be a very marked interaction
between rate of pay and previous wage history. It is the author's opinion,
from inspection of the cell means, that an analysis of variance (which
is really more appropriate than the multiple t-tests used by Andrews)
would show not only a significant interaction, but would yield a nonsignificant difference between payment conditions. Since the interaction
appears to be so marked, it is really inappropriate to iust consider main
effects, rather the difference between levels of one variable should be
considered w i t h i n a particular level of the other.
Withothis in mind, a closer look at the quantity data indicates that in
the high wage history group, equity predictions do not hold up for overpayment since overpaid Ss produced more than equitably paid Ss. In
the medium wage history group, the predicted pattern occurs, while in the
low wage history group, there is practically no difference between the
quantity of the equitably paid group and quantity of the overpaid group.
Within each level of wage history, the predicted effects of underpayment
(increased quantity) do occur. Thus, while equity theory correctly
predicts the effects of underpayment, it fails to make accurate predictions
for overpayment.
Considering the effects of wage history on quantity, again the trend
is accurately predicted by equity theory, i.e., the higher the wage history,
the greater work quantity, but here again, the only significant difference
is between the extreme wage history groups. Looking at wage history
effects within levels of pay indicated that the equity prediction was

EQUITY THEORY

195

upheld in the under reward and over reward conditions, but was not
upheld in the equitably paid condition.
In reporting quality data we are faced with a simpler task in that the
Payment level X Wage history interaction does not appear very strong.
Comparison of quality scores between the overpaid and underpaid Ss
(the two extreme conditions) resulted in an insignificant 2-tailed t-test,
but significance (.05) was reached with a one-tailed test. The effects of
wage history on quality of work conformed to the direction predicted by
equity theory in that quality increased with lower wage history. Here,
however, while only the extremes are statistically significant, all of the
effect was due to the overpaid group producing higher quality work. It
is not known whether the more appropriate comparison between the
equitably paid group and the overpaid group would have been significant.
These results are very interesting in light of the fact that this is the
only study of overpayment that was not potentially contaminated by the
"self-esteem problem" nor the "set to increase quality problem." As such,
it is probably the best test of equity so far considered. The results, however, appear to be damaging to equity theory. The only finding that is
completely consistent with direct equity theory predictions is that underpaid Ss tend to produce a higher quantity of work. There is no firm
evidence that overpaid Ss produce less; that underpaid Ss produce lower
quality work; and at best only marginal evidence that overpaid Ss
produce higher quality work. We say this evidence is marginal since the
comparison was between the underpaid and overpaid groups rather than
the more appropriate comparison of the equitably paid group with the
overpaid group.

Friedman and Goodman (1967)

This study attempts to refine the methodology employed in equity
research. The authors point out that one important area that has largely
been overlooked in previous research is the subject's perceptions of his
own qualifications prior to the "hiring" situation. To establish the overpayment condition, mos~ studies (Andrews (1967) being the notable exception) try to make the Ss feel overpaid by informing them that they
are not qualified to do the task. Friedman and Goodman point out that
a subject's prior perception of his own abilities must be considered, and if
these perceptions are at odds with the employer's statements, dissonance
can result, and this dissonance could effect productivity. Specifically,
they argue that if a subject feels he is qualified to do the fairly easy task,
and the employer says he is not, one method of reducing the resulting
dissonance would be to do an especially good lob, i.e., increase inputs.
Thus, the increased inputs could result from attempts to "re-affirm the

196

ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

subject's own self-conception and might 'change' the experimenter's

perception of his qualifications (p. 408)." For subjects who do not feel
they are especially qualified to do the task, the experimenter's statement
that they are not qualified should not create dissonance and thus their
subsequent productivity should not be effected by this source of dissonance. This leads Friedman and Goodman to hypothesize that overpaid
Ss who see themselves as not qualified will not produce more than
equitably paid Ss, but those Ss who do see themselves as qualified and
who are told they are not (i.e., overpaid) will produce more than equitably paid Ss.
In the equitably paid conditions, the subjects' prior perception of their
qualifications could also contaminate the experimental manipulation.
For a subject who feels he is qualified and is told so by the experimenter,
not producing enough to meet his own or the experimenter's expectation
of a qualified worker would lead to dissonance. And "since the 'appropriate' production level is unknown, we might expect a considerable
energy expenditure by these individuals to complete as many units as
possible (p. 408)." For subjects who feel they have low qualifications,
and who are told by the experimenter that they are qualified, dissonance
is created which could also have contaminating effects, although the
exact mechanism is not entirely clear.
Friedman and Goodman's discussion of the possible self-esteem contaminant in the overpayment manipulation is, at first glance, quite
similar to that discussed by the writer. However, they are not the same
thing. They are saying that for Ss who feel they are qualified for the job,
induced cognitions that they are not will create dissonance which could
lead to increased inputs to reaffirm their perceptions of their own qualifications. We are saying that the somewhat abusive treatment all Ss
experience in the typical overpayment manipulation tends to result in a
general devaluation of the subject in the eyes of E and/or himself,
regardless of the subieet's prior perceptions of his own qualifications. As
such, they are conceptually and experimentally distinct.
To test their hypotheses, the authors employed male college students
to do a simple interviewing task through the school's Placement Office.
The overpayment--equitable payment manipulation was similar to that
used by Adams, i.e., overpaid Ss were told they were not qualified but
would be paid at the advertised rate Of $3.50 per hour while the equitably
paid Ss were told they were qualified for the $3.50. per hour. An index of
the subiects' perceived qualifications was developed from questionnaire
data and remarks made by the subjects in the "hiring" situation.
In considering the basic overpayment-equitable payment comparison,
the results show the expected greater productivity of the overpaid Ss did

EQUITY THEORY

197

not occur. That is, there was no difference between overpaid and equitably paid subjects. When the subjects' perceptions of their qualifications were considered, the predictions were supported. Subjects who
perceived themselves as qualified produced more than those who perceived
themselves as less qualified regardless of whether they were in the overpaid or equitably paid condition. Recall, however, that the rationale for
the greater productivity of subjects who perceived themselves as qualified is different for the two payment conditions. For the overpaid Ss the
increase is postulated as being due to attempts to reduce the dissonance
created by the induced cognitions that the subject was not actually
qualified. The increased productivity of these Ss is seen as attempting
to reaffirm their cognitions of high qualifications by means of demonstrating to themselves and E that they were indeed:qualified. For the Ss who
felt they were qualified and were told they were (i.e., equitably paid)
the increase in productivity is said to be due to attempts to avoid the
dissonance which would be created by producing less than their own or
E's expectations.
In considering the data bearing on their other major hypothesis, the
authors show that the overpaid Ss who felt they were not qualified
produced more, but not significantly more than the equitably paid Ss
who initially felt they were unqualified~ but this overpaid group produced
less than the equitably paid group who felt they were qualified. There is
some question over which equitably paid group is the most appropriate
group to compare with the overpaid groups. If the equitably paid Ss who
felt they were qualified are used, equity predictions are clearly not
supported. However, the authors present some indirect evidence indicating that the equitably paid Ss used in the experiments by Adams and his
co-workers were most similar to those equitably paid Ss in this study
who felt they were not necessarily qualified. If we assume this to be the
case, the appropriate comparisons between overpaid and equitably paid
Ss should be made with this low initial perceptions of qualifications
group.
The overpaid Ss who felt they were qualified produced much more than
the equitably paid Ss and also much more than the overpaid Ss who did
not feel qualified. These data support the hypothesis that a large portion
of the observed increased performance of overpaid Ss in previous equity
research may be due to overpaid Ss, who feel they are qualified, producing
more to reduce the dissonance created by the overpayment manipulation.
As the authors point out, these results should not be taken as evidence
against the theory itself; the S's perceived qualifications are seen as an
uncontrolled variable that could account for at least part of the results
observed in other studies. The theory could account for these results by

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ROBERTD. PRITCHARD

pointing out that a person's perceptions of his qualifications to do the

iob is one of the inputs going into a person's input-outcome ratio, and,
iudging from the results of this study, a fairly important one for the
overpayment situation and presumably for underpayment as well.
A problem with this study is that the overpayment manipulation is
similar to that used in studies discussed previously and the possible contaminant of lowered self-esteem exists here also (as well as the set to
increase quality). If one assumes that a subject who feels he is qualified
t o do a good lob would experience a greater lowering of his self-esteem
than a subject who does not feel he is especially qualified to do the lob,
the results offer some support to the writer's self-esteem argument. That
is, Bs who felt they were qualified and were told they were not (overpaid)
did produce more than Ss who did not feel they were especially qualified
and were told they indeed were not qualified. The essential idea is that
(1) part of the increased productivity of both groups of overpaid Ss may
have been due to the generalized lowered self-esteem that was not specifically related to any dissonance brought on by cognitions about iob
qualifications, and (2) Ss who felt they were qualified and told they were
not may have experienced more of this generalized lowered self-esteem
than those overpaid Ss who did not feel themselves especially qualified.

Lawler, Koplin, Young, and Fadem (1968)

This study serves to extend equity theory by considering the effects of
overpayment with increased time periods. In considering the piece-rate
situation, they feel that while the inequity resulting from overpayment
should result in decreased quantity of output (along with higher quality)
immediately following the cognitions of overpayment, this effect will not
persist. They postulate that the feelings of overpayment can be reduced
in ways that are more economically favorable than the lowered wages
resulting from lowered quantity of output. A more economically favorable
mode of inequity reduction would be for the person to change his perceptions of his inputs as outcomes. Adams, of course, suggests that this
mode of inequity reduction is entirely possible, the significant addition
made by Lawler et al. is that the modes of inequity reduction change over
time. They further hypothesize that a subject's need for money should
influence his rate of production over and above the equity manipulation.
Male and female subjects were recruited from the general community
and given overpaid or equitably paid manipulations similar to those used
by Adams and Rosenbaum (1962). The Ss knew in advance that they
would work for three 2-hour periods conducting open-ended interviews.
These three sessions were separated by at least one day. At various

EQUITY THEORY

199

points in the three sessions, questionnaire data were collected concerning

perceived qualifications and need for money.
The data showed that there was a marked time effect on quantity and
quality of output for the overpaid group. While the overpaid Ss produced
less than equitably paid Ss during the first 2-hour period, this difference
did not occur in the second and third 2-hour periods. Thus, it appeared
that while Ss originally reduced inequity by lowered quantity of production, this mode was not continued over time. Work quality, as determined
by the number of words per interview, was also considered. Here again,
while the overpaid Ss produced higher quality interviews during the
first session, their quality was lower in later sessions.
Further evidence for the change in modes of inequity reduction comes
from data on the Ss' perceived qualifications. These data show that the
Ss' perceived qualifications were significantly higher at the end of the
last session than at the end of the first. Thus, overpaid Ss could be
manipulating their perceived inputs to achieve equity. They also found
that overpaid Ss who showed the largest increase in perceived qualifications produced more than those Ss who did not increase their perceived
qualifications as much.
One feature of their data that Lawler et al. do not consider in detail
is that while the overpaid Ss showed a large drop in quality from the
first session to the second, they also show a rise in quality from the
second session to the third. If these results can be taken as valid, they
seem to indicate that the overpaid Ss were still experiencing inequity. The
data picture the overpaid S as initially producing a low quantity of work
of high quality, then sacrificing quality for the sake of more pay via
increased quantity, and, in the third session, maintaining their high
quantity, but increasing inputs in the form of increased quality. Thus one
could argue that the overpaid Ss were "working harder" than the equitably paid Ss. This, of course, in no way invalidates the authors' explanation of the results, but rather extends it slightly. It could be that overpaid Ss attempted to cognitively manipulate their inputs and/or outcomes
subsequent to the second session, but this having not proved completely
successful, attempted to reduce the inequity by increasing quality while
at the same time keeping quantity high also.
In their internal analysis of the effects of need for money on productivity, Lawler et al. found that their measure of need for money correlated positively and significantly with productivity in all three sessions
for the overpaid group (average r -----.70) and also with the third session
for the equitably paid Ss, although the effect was less strong (r = .38).
These results support the notion that need for money is a significant
determiner of productivity. Also, since the correlation increased from the

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ROBERT D. PRITCHARD

first session (r ---- .51) to the second and third sessions (r = .71 and .70,
respectively) it would seem that the need for money became more highly
related to production over time.
The major criticism of this study is the self-esteem problem which has
been discussed at length above. It could be argued that the overpaid Ss
in the first session were attempting to increase self-esteem vis-a-vis E
and themselves, and this could account for at least part of the decrease
in number of interviews. But why did the overpaid Ss increase their
productivity in the second and third sessions? It could very well be that
concern for money overcame the need to increase self-esteem or that the
feelings of lowered self-esteem tended to dissipate over time. However,
another explanation is also possible. After the Ss returned with their
first batch of interviews, "the experimenter did not comment on the
quality of the subject's work or indicate his approval or disapproval with
the subject's productivity (p. 259)." Thus, after he had been careful to do
a very good job, the experimenter gave no notice to his efforts. The
subject might, therefore, have felt it hopeless to attempt to increase E's
evaluation of him by his care in doing the job. The subject may have even
considered this lack of recognition a negative outcome, and decreased his
inequity (and thus raise his number of interviews) by incorporating it
into his inpuS-outcome ratio.

Goodman and Friedman (1968)

The major concerns of this study were to determine the effects of
known production rates and further specification of the preferred modes
of inequity reduction under hourly overpayment. They feel that the
inpuP-outcome ratio of Other has been left ambiguous in previous research and if typical production rates are given, performance variance
should decrease since Ss have some conception of what constitutes equitable performance for qualified workers. They further hypothesize that the
mode of inequity resolution will depend on what the S perceives as the
most salient aspect of his performance--quantity or quality. Thus, if
quantity is stressed as the major concern of E, S will produce more; while
if quality is stressed, he will have fewer errors.
The overpayment manipulation was similar to that used by Adams
and his co-workers, and in addition to the equitably paid group, Goodman and Friedman had a reduced dissonance group similar to that used
in Adams and Jacobsen (1964). That is, they were told they were unqualified, and they would be paid only $2.50 per hour instead of the $3.50
rate. In an effort to control for the college student Ss' prior perceptions
of their own qualifications (Friedman and Goodman 1967) only Ss with
no previous experience in the questionnaire coding task were used.

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The results showed that for those Ss whose quantity was emphasized,
the overpaid Ss produced more than the reduced dissonance and the
equitably paid groups, but the only statistically significant difference was
between the overpaid and reduced dissonance groups (the Ns, however,
were very small--from 6 to 12). Data relevant to the quantity--quality
set manipulation, which was used only for the overpaid Ss, generally
showed that when quantity was emphasized in the "hiring" situation, Ss
scored more questionnaires with lower quality, and when quality was
emphasized, the reverse held true. The hypothesis regarding known production rates was also supported in that for Ss who were told what other
qualified workers had done, a significant reduction in their productivity
variance was observed.
This study may be contaminated by the self-esteem problem. However,
in this study, as in the Adams and Jacobsen study (1964), the reduced
dissonance group, which was also "insulted," did not produce as much as
the overpaid (also "insulted") group, and, in fact, produced slightly less
than the equitably paid Ss. A possible reason for this finding is that
discussed by Opsabl and Dunnette (1966) and has been previously considered in discussing the Adams and Jacobsen (1964) study. The argument is that in the reduced dissonance condition, the subject may feel
that he is expected to perform poorly and the S might then perform in
accordance with E's implied expectation. This study offers some support
of this explanation in that those reduced dissonance Ss who were given
no knowledge of production "norms" scored fewer questionnaires than
any of the groups, while those who were told the "norms" produced more
than the overpaid Ss who knew the norms and nearly as much as those
overpaid Ss who did not know the norms. Thus, if one "controls" for
Opsahl and Dunnette's criticism by stating production norms, the "insulted" reduced dissonance S performs very much like the "insulted"
overpaid Ss.

Weick~ and Nesset (in press)

This study is considerably different from the others reviewed so far,
both in the more refined types of questions it asks and in its methodology.
Weiek and Nesset consider the possibility that Person can use himself
as an Other. Adams (1965) does mention tha~ this is a possibility, but
in our opinion, and obviously in the opinion of Weick and Nesset, this
aspect of equity theory deserved elaboration. Weick and Nesset feel
inequity can arise from Person himself or from Person's comparison with
Other, or both, depending on the configurations: of the two input-outcome ratios.
This formulation leads them to posit three kinds of inequity: "own

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inequity," which occurs when Person's input-outcome ratio is not unity

(e.g., HL); "comparison inequity," which occurs when Person's ratio is
not equal to Other's ratio, but Person's own ratio is unity (e.g., LL, HL) ;
and "own-comparison inequity," which occurs when Person's own ratio
is not unity and is also unequal to Other's ratio (e.g., HL, HH). Weick
and Nesset seek to determine which type of inequity will be most bothersome.
A second point they raise is given that Person is an additional reference
point, inequity can occur for different reasons. Specifically, they point out
that overpayment can occur with respect to own inputs (Person has
greater outcomes than inputs), Other's inputs (Person has lower inputs
than Other, but they receive similar outcomes), Other's outcomes (Person
and Other contribute similar inputs, but Person's outcomes are larger).
An analogous argument can be made for underpayment. Thus, a second
purpose of the study was to consider preferences for situations where the
locus of a particular type of inequity was Person's inputs, Other's inputs,
or Other's outcomes.
Another aspect of this study that differentiates it from the others we
have considered is the methodology. Weick and :Nesset gave their Ss a
questionnaire that described twenty pairs of hypothetical work situations
and instructed them to indicate the situation in which they would feel
most comfortable. After each pair of items, S marked one of ten possible
adjustments he would make to the situation he least preferred. These ten
"adjustments" represent different modes of inequity reduction, e.g.,
request higher wages, persuade co-worker to work less energetically, etc.
The co-worker was described as a person very similar to Person in age,
sex, education, interests, family responsibilities, background, and seniority. The twenty pairs of items were constructed to compare preferences
between own, comparison and own/comparison inequity. Within each of
these groups of items, some represented overpayment and others underpayment relative to Other's inputs, Other's outcomes or Person's inputs.
The results of this study indicate that when given the choice between
own equity and comparison equity, Ss predominantly preferred comparison equity to own equity (situations where their inputs and outcomes
matched those of Other even though Person's own inputs did not match
his own outcomes). The result would seem to indicate that Person is more
bothered by inequitable comparisons with Other than with inequitable
relations between his own inputs and outcomes.
On items which required a choice between own-comparison vs. own
equity, Ss predominantly preferred own-comparison equity. That is, S
would rather be in a situation where both his own input-outcome ratio
was unity and was equal to Other's ratio than in a situation where his

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own ratio was unity but was not equal to Other's. This finding is consistent with equity theory.
Preferences between own-comparison and own equity were approximately equal.
The results generally show that comparison inequity is more uncomfortable than own inequity, and that own-comparison inequity is more
uncomfortable than own inequity. However, as Weick and Nesset point
out, there are some situations where own inequity is more bothersome
than comparison inequity.
The authors also consider other aspects of their data including preferences between overpayment and underpayment, and preferences between
the three types of overpayment and three types of underpayment described earlier. However, it seems very difficult to interpret these data
due to the fact that the effects are so confounded. There are three types
of preferences possible (own vs. comparison, own/comparison vs. own,
own/comparison vs. comparison) ; within each of these, there is overpayment and underpayment; and for both of these there are three different
configurations leading to inequity. This necessitates 18 separate types of
items in this 20 item questionnaire. Any grouping of items analyzed for
the effects of one variable must necessarily include items which are different on other variables. Due to this difficulty in interpretation, it seems
advisable to forego consideration of these analyses at the present time.
While it appears to us that the methodology employed in this study is
very valuable for generating hypotheses about equity, this methodology
is inferior to actually hiring Ss and e.g., paying them at different rates.
The first problem with this questionnaire approach is the validity of the
self-report technique. Specifically, even though S may honestly feel he
would resolve the inequity in a certain fashion if he were in that situation, or even that he would prefer to be in one situation as compared with
another, may or may not be identical to his feelings or actions if he were
actually in the situation. Secondly, it seems possible that some sort of
social desirability set could be affecting the results. S has to choose
between two situations: e.g., (1) he is earning high wages for little work
while his co-worker earns the same wages for a great deal of work; or (2)
a situation which is similar except that S earns wages more commensurate
with the amount of work he does. Clearly, the socially desirable response
is to prefer the latter. Employing social desirability set is made even
"easier" since it doesn't "cost" S anything to lower his own wages. The
authors report that, when asked the purpose of the experiment, the most
frequent answers were "how much you worry about the other guy" and
"how aftiliative you are with others." If we add the idea of demand
characteristics to the social desirability argument, there could be a

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ROBERT D. PRITCI-IARD

marked tendency for S to choose comparison and own/comparison inequity as most uncomfortable. This is indeed what was found, and thus,
it seems impossible to separate the possible effects of social desirability
and demand characteristics from actual preference.
From the literature we have discussed, the predictions made by equity
theory regarding underpayment are generally supported. In two of the
studies (Homans, 1953, and Patchen, 1961) discrepancies in input-outcome ratios were related to feelings of dissatisfaction. In four studies
(Clark, 1958; Lawler and O'Gara, 1967; Adams and Rosenbaum, 1962;
Arrowood, 1961), perceived under-reward led to observable behavior that
tended to make input-outcome ratios more equitable. The effects reported by these studies were statistically significant, and in the :other
study of underpayment (Andrews, 1967), the results were in the predicted direction.
The effects of overpayment, however, have not been demonstrated to
our satisfaction. The only extensively discussed study which excluded
the possible contaminants of the "self-esteem" problem and the "set for
high quality" problem was that of Andrews (1967). Here overpaid Ss
did not produce significantly less work than the equitably paid Ss, and
there is only marginal evidence that overpaid Ss produced higher quality
work. Furthermore, an unpublished study by Lawler, reported by Goodman and Friedman (1968), also tends to confirm the self-esteem argument. He found that while Ss who were made to feel overpaid by implying they were unqualified produced more than the equitably paid group,
Ss who were overpaid "by circumstance," and thus should not experience
this generalized lowered self-esteem, did not produce more than the
equitably paid Ss.
It would seem appropriate at this time to briefly summarize the
methodological issues brought up by the previous studies with one eye
towards some guidelines for subsequent research in the area. The most
commonly used overpayment manipulation may be contaminated with
problems of self-esteem, both a generalized lowered self-esteem from the
"insult" and dissonance due to the subject's prior perceived qualifications.
A better manipulation may be to simply pay the overpaid Ss more, the
amount based on a pretest, and forego discussion of the S's qualifications.
Aside from the self-esteem problem, particular attention must be given
to any aspects of the manipulation which stress either quantity or quality
of subsequent work. Stressing either quantity or quality in the initial
contact may tend to effect the other, since they are inversely correlated.
Another issue is the use of piece-rate or hourly payment. In the piecerate condition, the subject will not initially be aware of how much he is
.earning unless he actually stops to count his work. Also, the modes of

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inequity reduction seem to change over time in piece-rate payment. The

length of time variable may be important for hourly payment also, and
is another consideration in designing equity experiments.
Some considerations of the task may be important. If the subject must
go out to e.g., conduct interviews, error variance in the form of willingness
to approach strangers, availability of possible interviewees at the site
chosen, and faking of the interviews may be a problem.
Individual differences must also be considered for a really precise
study. Some that may have an effect are ability, previous work history,
need for achievement, and desire or need for money.
Finally, the effects of the physical or psychological presence of the
other co-workers seems important. Actual physiea! presence may result
in contaminating co-action effects, but the effects of psychological presence may be important and, in the case where production norms are
given, seem to have an effect on productivity.
ELABORATIONS AND ALTERNATIVES

The notions of equity theory posit that (1) in certain situations Person
will experience inequity, (2) this experience of inequity will lead to some
form of discomfort, and (3) that Person will respond in ways to reestablish equity and reduce this discomfort. We will consider each of
these three notions in turn.

Determinants of Inequity
While Adams mentions that Person may use himself as an Other, he
primarily considers the case where Other is another individual or individuals. It seems to us that the former possibility, which we shall term
the "internal standard," is a very powerful concept. We shall use this
term to denote the amount of outcome Person perceives as being commensurate with his own inputs, without regard to any comparison
person. It is quite reasonable to assume that this internal standard exists,
and no matter how it was developedi can be t h e basis of satisfaction or
dissatisfaction in an exchange relationship. If a.graduate engineer were
paid $1.50 per hour, he would not need a comparison person to feel the
situation was inequitable. Equity theory as presented by Adams postulates that Person will:not experience inequity if he is in a position of
underpayment and those he compares with are in a similar plight. The
concept of the internal standard would suggest that if Person's inputs are
greater than his outcomes, he will experience some form of discomfort
whether or not comparison persons are in a similar plight.
The internal standard is based both on Person's past experience in
exchange relationships and his knowledge of the "market value" of

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various inputs. If an accountant has been earning $10,000 per year in a

particular iob, going to another company and doing tile same job for
$8,000 per year would be seen as inequitable. A young man about to
finish his education for a particular profession generally has a fairly good
notion of what current salaries are. This knowledge is based on reading
placement office bulletin boards, talking to professors, etc.
Our alternative to equity theory is largely based on this internal
standard. We are proposing that feelings of inequity arise first and foremost from the correspondence between Person's own inputs and outcomes.
Considering Person by himself, he will feel satisfied if his inputs match
his outcomes. If his inputs are greater than outcomes, he will experience
inequity, which will lead to feelings of dissatisfaction regardless of the
input-outcome ratio of anyone else.
A second tenet of this formulation is that Person will tend to maximize
outcomes. Thus, if Person's inputs are less than his outcomes, this will
generally lead to "satisfaction" rather than "dissatisfaction." The qualification "generally" needs clarification. The various types of exchange
relationships can be ordered on a continuum related to the amount of
psychological contact. At one extreme is an intimate emotional relationship between two people. Other points would be two partners working
"for" each other; two co-workers (friends) in an exchange relationship
with a third party, their employer; a worker and an unknown generalized
comparison group (e.g., lathe operators in general) who are both in
exchange relationships with employers. One characteristic of this intimate-impersonal continuum is that changes or differences in inputs or in
outcomes are much easier to perceive and become more salient at the
intimate end than at the impersonal end. Furthermore, at the intimate
end of the continuum, discrepancy between one person's inputs and his
outcomes will lead to discrepancy between inputs and outcomes for the
other person (assuming veridical perceptions); while at the impersonal
end, since the outcomes of both partners in the relationship are determined by a third person, e.g., an employer, there is no necessary relation
between one person's input-outcome ratio and the other person's inputoutcome ratio. Assuming this greater sensitivity to differences in ratios
as the relationship between the two people is closer to the intimate end,
and assuming that there is less direct correspondence between the two
people's ratios as the relationship moves toward the impersonal end, it
would seem less likely that Person will experience inequity relative to the
other person in the relationship the closer the relationship is to the
impersonal end of the continuum. Aside from these direct determinants
of inequity, it would seem easier to cognitively distort inputs and out-

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207

comes at the impersonal end, and thus decrease the chances of felt
inequity.
We postulated previously that Person will not generally experience
dissatisfaction when his outcomes are greater than his inputs. We are now
in a position to clarify this. Person will tend to maximize gain and thus
will feel less inequity when his outcomes are greater than his inputs in
the situation where there is no one in a direct exchange relationship with
him whose input-outcome ratio is less than his. Thus, if Person's inputoutcome ratio is higher than that of an individual with whom he is in a
direct exchange relationship, he will experience inequity much easier than
if the same amount of over-reward existed on a job where rewards were
controlled by a third party. 5 Thus, it is not only the absolute discrepancy
between input-outcome ratios that determines the presence and amount
of inequity, but also, and more importantly, the amount of psychological
contact between Person and those who might be available for comparison.
This seems to be the basis of the postulated existence of a higher
threshold for over-reward than for under-reward. Under-reward will
always lead to dissatisfaction due to the maximum gain hypothesis ; overreward, on the other hand, will lead to satisfaction to the extent that
possible comparison persons are in an impersonal relationship with
Person. A person in an industrial setting will typically have available to
him possible comparison persons who are in a more impersonal relationship with him, and thus be relatively insensitive to over-reward.
Consideration of the intimate-impersonal continuum also yields a
prediction contrary to Adams in the situation where Person's inputs equal
his outcomes, but another individual in Person's psychological environment has inputs which are greater than his (Other's) outcomes (HH,
HL). We would predict that Person would experience inequity if he and
the other person are in a direct exchange relationship. However, Person
will not feel nearly as much inequity if the second person is expending
more inputs for the same amount of reward and t.hey are related to each
other by the fact that they are being rewarded by a third party, e.g., an
employer. Person may feel inequity in the sense that the other person
should work less or be paid more, but this will in no way lead to dissatisfaction with his own ratio, nor will it lead to Person engaging in behavior
to lower his own outcomes or raise his own inputs, but more on this later.
We postulated earlier that if Person's inputs were greater than his
5 I t might be argued t h a t the person who hired Person could be seen as the
partner in a direct exchange relationship, b u t we do n o t feel this would normally be
the case, since the person who does the hiring is usually n o t paying the person
out of his own pocket.

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outcomes, he will experience dissatisfaction regardless of the input-outcome ratio of other people in his psychological environment. We can now
add that if other people in Person's psychological environment have a
more advantageous ratio (i.e., they have HH or LH compared with
Person's HL), this will lead to even greater dissatisfaction. However,
based on the continuum idea, with a given amount of difference between
the two ratios, the dissatisfaction will be greater when two people are in
a direct exchange relationship than when their outcomes are controlled
by a third party.

Dissatisfaction Resulting ]rom Inequity

The second link in the equity model states that feelings of inequity will
result in some form of "dissatisfaction." We feel that this needs refinement. If Person feels his inputs are greater than his outcomes, he will
experience dissatisfaction. This dissatisfaction will be directed at the
way the person or thing (e.g., company) treats him, i.e., controls his outcomes. This will be true regardless of whether or not anyone else is in the
same or a better position than he is. If, on the other hand, he is in a
better position than others in his psychological environment, this sort of
dissatisfaction will not always occur. If he is in a direct exchange relationship, yes, he will tend to feel dissatisfied with controller of rewards
(in this case himself). However, in the more typical industrial situation,
there is no direct face-to-face relationship involved, and the dissatisfaction will not be of the type discussed above. Rather, the feeling will be
that it is unfortunate that the other individual is not rewarded as well
as he (Person) is, but that is the fault of the System, not Person's fault.
Thus, since Person has no real control over this other individual's outcomes, he should not feel, as Adams says, guilty. This may very well be
the reason why most companies allow supervisors to "pass the buck" to
the Salary Administration Department in pay decisions (Dunnette, personal communication).
A point where we would make a slightly different prediction than
Adams is in the situation where Person's inputs match his outcomes, and
the other individual is over-rewarded, e.g., LL, LH. In this situation,
Person will be dissatisfied since relative to the "outcome potential" of
the situation, his outcomes are not maximized. This prediction of dissatisfaction is also made by Adams, but while we would also argue that this
situation would cause dissatisfaction, the dissatisfaction would be directed at the controller of rewards, the Other in the case of a direct
exchange relationship; but in the three-person industrial situation the
dissatisfaction would not be directed at the other person, but rather at
the company.

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209

Responses to Dissatisfaction
We have now said that when Person is under-rewarded he will experience dissatisfaction with his own situation, irrespective of any eomparison person; when over-rewarded in a. direct, face-to-face, exchange
relationship he will be dissatisfied with his own position; but when he is
relatively over-rewarded and both persons' rewards are controlled by
someone else, he will feel that the System is unjust, but will not feel
responsible for it.
In this situation we would make different predictions than Adams. If
Person feels relatively over-rewarded by a third party, he should make
no attempts to change his own inputs or outcomes, nor feel dissatisfied
when comparing his ratio with someone who has the same inputs as he
does, but lower outcomes.
We also said that when Person is in an equitable situation with regard
to his internal standard, and other people in his psychological environment are receiving more reward from the third party for the same inputs
(LL, LH) Person should experience dissatisfaction with the System. In
this case, we would agree with Adams in saying that Person will make
attempts to achieve a more "equitable" situation. However, we would
predict that he will attempt to raise his outcomes rather than lower his
inputs (maximum gain). Furthermore, he will not attempt to alter Other's
ratio by encouraging him to raise his inputs or lower his outcomes since
Person's dissatisfaction is not directed at any aspect of the other individual, but rather at the System.
It would be beneficial to conclude this section with a list of predictions
made by this formulation which are either not made or are at odds with
the predictions made by Adams.

1. HH will be preferred to LL (maximum gain).

2. HL will always lead to inequity and feelings of dissatisfaction,
regardless of the ratio of anyone else in Person's environment.
3. IlL will be more inequitable if the two people are in a direct
exchange relationship with each other than if a third party controls outcomes. Or, put in another way, a given amount of underreward will be more uncomfortable the closer the relationship is
to the intimate end of the continuum.
4. LH will not lead to dissatisfaction, but rather to satisfaction, if
there are no other face-to-face comparisons Person can make.
5. If Person is LH and a face-to-face comparison person who is in a
direct exchange relation with Person is LL or HL, a given amount
of difference between the two ratios will yield greater inequity the

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more the relationship between the two people is on the intimate

end of the intimate-impersonal continuum.
6. If Person is LH and a face-to-face comparison person who is
related to Person via a third person (e.g., an employer) is LL or
HL, Person will experience no dissatisfaction with the comparison
and any feelings of inequity will be toward the employer. Further,
this situation will not motivate Person to alter his own inputs or
outcomes.
7. If Person is LL and someone in his psychological environment is
LH, and both are being rewarded by a third party, Person will
experience feelings of inequity towards the employer, and will
attempt to raise his own outcomes rather than lower his inputs or
attempt to manipulate the inputs or outcomes of the other person.
At the present time, there are little data to support these predictions.
One crucial idea, the internal standard, seems a quite reasonable assumption. Another very important postulate is the intimate-impersonal continuum and the dichotomy between direct exchange relationships and
relationships where outcomes are determined by a third party. These
considerations led to the hypothesis that Person will not experience inequity if he is over-rewarded relative to someone else and their outcomes
are determined by a third party. Thus, in the typical employment situation where rewards are controlled by Salary Administrations, overpaymerit should not result in greater inputs. If we accept the conclusion we
have drawn from this review of the literature that there is no firm experimental evidence for the effects Adams predicts for overpayment, this
conclusion can be explained by the present formulation. In these experiments, the only way feelings of inequity could have arisen is for Person
to have perceived that he and his employer were in a direct exchange
relationship. Only if this were the case and Person perceived that he was
over-rewarded, would Person make any attempt to increase his inputs or
decrease his outcomes. As we pointed out earlier, it's quite possible that
Person did not perceive his employer as paying him from his "own
pocket." If this were indeed the case, then Person's rewards are controlled by a third party (the granting agency, his employer's superior,
etc.), and Person should not take steps to increase his inputs or lower
his outcomes.
While the present formulation is yet in crude form and requires empirical validation, it is felt that it advances and, to some extent, makes more
definite predictions than Adams'.
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1963, 3, 9-16. (b)

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211

ADAMS, J. S. Toward an understanding of inequity. Journal of Abnormal and Social

Psychology, 1963, 67, 422-436. (a)
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RECEIVED: A u g u s t 5, 1968