1.

Solid Homes V Payawal SOURCE OF POWER

As a result of the growing complexity of the modern society, it has become necessary to create more and more administrative
bodies to help in the regulation of its ramified activities. Specialized in the particular fields assigned to them, they can deal
with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice.
This is the reason for the increasing vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in what is now not unreasonably
called the fourth department of the government.
Statutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their
assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose

2.

Christian General assembly v Ignacio SOURCE OF POWER

Generally, the extent to which an administrative agency may exercise its powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the
provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency.
In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board to
award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily only by the courts of justice. This
departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is justified by expediency, or the need of the government to
respond swiftly and competently to the pressing problems of the modern world.
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or commissions with the special
knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual
matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in 1984,
the Court noted that between the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmistakable trend has been to
refer it to the former.
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the
enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends
largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the
agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such
contracts, One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.

3.

Dadubo V CSC PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS ON ADMIN PROCEEDINGS

The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing
authority. 10 is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. 11 Administrative decisions on matters within their
jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of
law. 12 None of these vices has been shown in this case.
While the rules governing Judicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their strict observance is not indispensable
in administrative cases. 13 As this Court has held, "the standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals
allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored."
The petitioner had several opportunities to be heard and to present evidence that she was not guilty of embezzlement but only
of failure to comply with the tellering procedure.
The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a
criminal prosecution. It is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him; what is controlling is the
allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense.
We must also dismiss the petitioner's complaint that CSC Resolution No. 92-878 failed to comply with the constitutional
requirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which a decision is based. We have held that this provision
applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies like the Civil Service Commission.

4.

Lianga Bay Logging v Enage

ISSUE:
WON the respondent court has jurisdiction over the case?
SC RULING:
The Court ruled in the negative. It held that Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago,
asking for the determination anew of the correct boundary fine of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been
determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the President,
administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs.
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall
not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of such findings are supported by substantial
evidence

5.

Larin V Exec Secretary PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, INVALID REORGANIZATION, SOURCES OF THE
POWER OF THE PRESIDENT TO REORGANIZE
Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential appointee,
he comes under the direct diciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled principle that the power
to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
We are not unaware of the rule that since administrative cases are independent from criminal actions for the same act or
omission, the dismissal or acquittal of the criminal charge does not foreclose the institution of administrative action nor carry
with it the relief from administrative liability.[6] However, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from
the foregoing rule and placed it well within the exception. Corollarily, where the very basis of the administrative case against
petitioner is his conviction in the criminal action which was later on set aside by this court upon a categorical and clear
findings that the acts for which he was administratively held liable are not unlawful and irregular, the acquittal of the
petitioner in the criminal case necessarily entails the dismissal of the administrative action against him, because in such a
case, there is no basis nor justifiable reason to maintain the administrative suit.
On the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to present his side. The rule
is well settled that the essence of due process in administrative proceedings is that a party be afforded a reasonable
opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence he may have in support of his defense
"As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy
more efficient. In that event no dismissal or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that
case the security of tenure would not be a Chinese Wall. Be that as it may, if the abolition which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat security of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
valid abolition takes place and whatever abolition is done is void ab initio. There is an invalid abolition as where there is
merely a change of nomenclature of positions or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds."

In this regard, it is worth mentioning that Section 2 of R.A. No. 6656 lists down the circumstances evidencing bad faith in the
removal of employees as a result of the reorganization, thus:
Sec. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due notice and
hearing. A valid cause for removal exist when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has been abolished or
rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to meet the exigencies of the service,

or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may
be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise to a claim for
reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; VIOLATED
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;M - VIOLATED
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit;
d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially
the same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof."
* LARIN WAS REINSTATED*

6.

DARIO V MISON - INVALID REORGANIZATION

Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. 81 As a general rule,
a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In
that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. And in
that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a
separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no
valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there
is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds.
RA 6656 sec 2 provides the evidence of bad faith in the removals.
Evidence of bad faith in the case at bar:
1. There is no showing that a legitimate reorganization was actually undertaken at the Bureau of Customs
2. Mison separated 394 but replaced 522 personnel

7.

BUKLOD NG KAWANI EIIB V ZAMORA POWER OF PRESIDENT TO REORGANIZE, DEACTIVATION

Surely, there exists a distinction between the words deactivate and abolish. To deactivate means to render inactive or
ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel,[13] while to abolish means to do away with, to annul,
abrogate or destroy completely.[14] In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the
office wholly andpermanently.[15] Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not true
in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it may, deactivation
and abolition are both reorganization measures.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the
legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by
statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the
same legislature that brought it into existence.[18]
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the Presidents
power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, [19] or certain laws may grant him the broad

authority to carry out reorganization measures. [20] The case in point is Larin v. Executive Secretary.[21] In this case, it was argued
that there is no law which empowers the President to reorganize the BIR.
Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987), the President,
subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have the
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre,[25] we ruled that
reorganization involves the reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or
redundancy of functions. It takes place when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units
therein, including the lines of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the
Department of Finance.[26] It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize.

8.

BAGAOISAN V NTA VALID REORGANIZATION, PRESIDENTS POWER TO REORGANIZE

There was no evidence of bad faith
It is important to emphasize that the questioned Executive Orders No. 29 and No. 36 have not abolished the National
Tobacco Administration but merely mandated its reorganization through the streamlining or reduction of its
personnel. Article VII, Section 17,[10] of the Constitution, expressly grants the President control of all executive departments,
bureaus, agencies and offices which may justify an executive action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to
carry out reorganization measures under a broad authority of law.[11] Section 78 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No.
8522 (General Appropriations Act of FY 1998) has decreed that the President may direct changes in the organization and key
positions in any department, bureau or agency pursuant to Article VI, Section 25,[12] of the Constitution, which grants to the
Executive Department the authority to recommend the budget necessary for its operation. Evidently, this grant of power
includes the authority to evaluate each and every government agency, including the determination of the most economical
and efficient staffing pattern, under the Executive Department.

The provisions of Section 31, Book III, Chapter 10, of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987), abovereferred to, reads thusly:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the
Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the
Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions
to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to
the Office of the President from other departments and agencies.
The first sentence of the law is an express grant to the President of a continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly
limit the aim and scope of the grant to the President of the power to reorganize but are to be viewed in consonance
therewith. Section 31(1) of Executive Order No. 292 specifically refers to the Presidents power to restructure the internal
organization of the Office of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring
functions from one unit to another, while Section 31(2) and (3) concern executive offices outside the Office of the
President Proper allowing the President to transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or

Agency and vice-versa, and the transfer of any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency
and vice-versa

In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganization
under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest of simplicity, economy and
efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of President motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the
appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept

9.

DOMINGO V ZAMORA PRESIDENTS POWER TO REORGANIZE

Executive Order No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the
President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:
SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy in the Executive
Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganize the administrative
structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may take any of the following actions:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices, the Presidential
Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support System, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or
transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer functions to the
Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the Office
of the President from other Departments or Agencies. (Emphasis supplied.)
Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, [8] EO 81 is a valid exercise
of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the President this power in recognition of
the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the
President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of
being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of
the President is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.

However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 should be
distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can
reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one
unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside the Office of
the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office
of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

BATCH 2
1.

MAKATI STOCK EXCHANGE V SEC

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the statute, and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission has (Sec. 33) does not imply
authority to prohibit."
2. TAULE V SANTOS NO JUDICIAL POWER ON THE MATTER
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga barangay
composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective
members. The COMELEC exercises only appellate jurisdiction over election contests involving elective barangay officials
decided by the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts which likewise have limited jurisdiction.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies are bereft of
quasi- judicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon the provisions of the statutes
reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction is essential to give validity to their
determinations.
3. SOLID HOMES
4. CARINO V CHR INVESTIGATORY POWER ONLY, NOT JUDICIAL
The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness, the
same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to appeal to
the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected may take
appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.
The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do so;
whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or
the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations
involving civil or political rights.
The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the fundamental
law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency
or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,
properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy
must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be
decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided
by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have
The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power toinvestigate all forms of human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any person. It
may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for

contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it
may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is
necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency
in the performance of its functions, in the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its
findings. 26
But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To
investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood
and quite distinct meanings.

5.

VILLALUZ V ZALDIVAR CSC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND DECIDE THE ADMIN CASE
BECAUSE HE IS NOT IN THE CLASSIFIED SERVICE
There is merit in the claim that petitioner, being a presidential appointee, belongs to the non-competitive or unclassified
service of the government and is such he can only be investigated and removed from office after due hearing the President of
the Philippines under the principle that "the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint" as can be clearly implied
from Section 5 of Republic Act No. 2260.
Commissioner of Civil Service is without jurisdiction to hear and decide the administrative charges filed against petitioner
because the authority of said Commissioner to pass upon questions of suspension, separation, or removal can only be
exercised with reference to permanent officials and employees in the classified service to which classification petitioner does
not belong. This is also what we said in the Ang-Angco case when, in interpreting Section 16 (i) of Republic Act No. 2260,
we emphasized that only permanent officers and employees who belong to the classified service come under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commissioner of Civil Service.

6.

RUIZ V DRILON- NOT ENTITLED TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to
inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based on substantial evidence
made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him
during the hearings of the investigating committees. 17 There is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.
7.

SEC OF JUSTICE V LANTION

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process in administrative
proceeding is an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the actions or
ruling complained of
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioner's favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private
respondent's liberty is easily comprehensible.

8. PEFIANCO V MORAL NOT ENTITLED TO THE COMMITTEE REPORT

In her petition for mandamus, respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the DECS
Investigation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner DECS Secretary to furnish her with a copy
thereof. Consequently, she is not entitled to the writ prayed for.
Moreover, there is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon[8] that a respondent in an administrative case is
not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to inquire into

charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision based on substantial evidence made of record, and
a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation
committee. Respondent no doubt had been accorded these rights.
Respondents assertion that the investigation report would be used "to guide [her] on what action would be appropriate to
take under the circumstances,"[9] hardly merits consideration. It must be stressed that the disputed investigation report is an
internal communication between the DECS Secretary and the Investigation Committee, and it is not generally intended for
the perusal of respondent or any other person for that matter, except the DECS Secretary
9.

CAMARA V MUNICIPAL COURT - WARRANTS BY JUDICIAL OFFICER

"The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave concern not only to the individual, but to a society,
which chooses to dwell in reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must reasonably
yield to the right of search is, as a rule, to be decided by a judicial officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement
agent."
10. SALAZAR V ACHACOSO

11. CATURA V CIR POWER TO INVESTIGATE INCLUDES POWER THE POWER TO REQUIRE
PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS/FACTS
The authority to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law. To
paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the very least, requires an inquiry into
existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to
whether or not there was a failure to comply with the mandates of the law. It is not for this Court to whittle down the
authority conferred on administrative agencies to assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to
protect the rights of union members against its officers. The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means
necessary to give it force and effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary
as to trench upon private rights of petitioners entitled to priority.
12. EVANGELISTA V JARENCIO

13. OFFICE OF COURT ADMINISTRATOR V CANQUE

14. CARMELO V RAMOS

The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which petitioner is the chairman, to subpoena
witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal.
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does not comprehend
contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless said contempt is clearly considered and
expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.
Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:

Powers incidental to taking of testimony. When authority to take testimony or evidence is conferred upon an
administrative officer or upon any nonjudicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall be understood to
comprehend the right to administer oaths and summons witnesses and shall include authority to require the production of
documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as
apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character.
One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony or evidence" before he can apply to
the courts for the punishment of hostile witnesses.
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant of power. All that the
order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city employees.
In the second place, even granting that the Mayor has the implied power to require the appearance of witnesses before him, the rule, as
noted earlier, is that the Mayor can not delegate this power to a body like the committee of the petitioner.

15. MASANGKAY V COMELEC

that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on Elections has only the duty to enforce and administer all laws to the
conduct of elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be submitted to it in connection with the
elections. In this sense, said, the Commission, although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may however exercise quasi-judicial functions
insofar as controversies that by express provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation
line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function which calls for the exercise of the quasijudicial function of the Commission. In the same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a
ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature,
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for whose violation the charge for contempt was
filed against petitioner Masangcay merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election paraphernalia among the different
municipalities.
16. BEDOL V COMELEC
The Creation of Task Force Maguindanao was impelled by the allegations of fraud and irregularities attending the conduct of elections
in the province of Maguindanao and the non-transmittal of the canvassing documents for all municipalities of said province.
Task Force Maguindanaos fact-finding investigation to probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the elections in said
province; and consequently, to determine whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious, and whether an election
offense had possibly been committed could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or administrative function.
The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth behind the
allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force conducted hearings and
required the attendance of the parties concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to argue and support their respective
positions.
The effectiveness of the quasijudicial power vested by law on a government institution hinges on its authority to
compel attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings or proceedings.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-finding
investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the COMELECs investigative power, which is an
essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible elections.

Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to appear before it,
the Court had the occasion to rule that the powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial. The board exercises quasijudicial functions,

17. GAOIRAN V ALCALA INITIATION OF ADMIN COMPLAINTS

The pertinent provisions governing the initiation of administrative complaints against civil service officials or employees are
provided in Book V of E.O. No. 292. Sections 46(c) and 48(1) and (2), Chapter 6, Subtitle A thereof read:
Sec. 46. Discipline: General provisions.
(c) Except when initiated by the disciplining authority, no complaint against a civil service official or employee shall be given due
course unless the same is in writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant.
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not concededly verified, appended thereto
were the verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn statements of his witnesses. These
documents could very well be considered as constituting the complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court
Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violations of the Code of Ethical Conduct. [12] Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is
given a wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. [13] After all, in administrative proceedings, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.[14]
In this case, it was the formal charge and order of preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig against the petitioner charging him
with grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and directing him to submit his answer in writing and
under oath that constituted the complaint. [18] Notably, Atty. Dasig signed the formal charge and order of preventive suspension for the
Commission in her capacity as then OIC of the CHEDs Legal Affairs Service. As the complaint against the petitioner was initiated
by the appropriate disciplining authority, under Sections 46(c) [19] and 48(1),[20] Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292, the
same need not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it required that the same contain a verification of non-forum shopping.
Since it was the CHED,[21] as the disciplining authority, through Atty. Dasig, which filed the formal charge or complaint against the
petitioner, jurisdiction was properly acquired over the case.

18. ANG TIBAY V CIR

ISSUE:
WON the case merits a new trial with the CIR?
SC RULING:
The Court ruled in the affirmative. It explained the the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasized
certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth
Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere
receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked
and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear
from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. . There is in reality here a mingling of executive and
judicial functions, which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In one case, it was ruled that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the
Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable."
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural
requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must
be respected even in proceedings of this character:
1.

The right to a hearing

2.

The tribunal must consider the evidence presented

3.

The decision must have evidence to support it

4.

The evidence supporting the decision must be substantial

5.

The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected.

6.

The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.

7.

The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to
the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered