III.

Creation and Abolition - Decided Cases

EMMANUEL PELAEZ v. THE AUDITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. L-23825 December 24, 1965, EN BANC, (CONCEPCION, J.)
Pursuant to Revised Administrative Act Section 68, President Macapagal issued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three (33)
municipalities. Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines, instituted a special
civil action, for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction, against the Auditor General,
to restrain him, as well as his representatives and agents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in the implementation. Pelaez alleges that said executive orders
are null and void, upon the ground that said 1) Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by
Republic Act No. 2370 2) constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power and 3) Sec 68
can allow the President to interfere in local government affairs.
ISSUES:
1) Can the President create a new municipality without creating new barrios that
would violate RA 2370?
2) Did such exercise constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
3) Can the president interfere in local government affairs?
HELD:
1) NO. Since January 1, 1960, when Republic Act No. 2370 became effective,
barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed"
except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition
of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the
council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is
situated." Statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio
implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which
consists of several barrios. The cogency and force of this argument is too obvious
to be denied or even questioned. Founded upon logic and experience, it cannot
be offset except by a clear manifestation of the intent of Congress to the
contrary, and no such manifestation, subsequent to the passage of Republic Act
No. 2379, has been brought to our attention.
2) YES. Although1a Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government
the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of
a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of
powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the
policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate2 and (b) fix
a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable
to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions.2a
Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does not meet these well settled
requirements for a valid delegation of the power to fix the details in the
enforcement of a law. It does not enunciate any policy to be carried out or
implemented by the President. Neither does it give a standard sufficiently precise
to avoid the evil effects above referred to.
3) NO. Upon the other hand if the President could create a municipality, he could, in
effect, remove any of its officials, by creating a new municipality and including
therein the barrio in which the official concerned resides, for his office would
thereby become vacant.6 Thus, by merely brandishing the power to create a new
municipality (if he had it), without actually creating it, he could compel local

officials to submit to his dictation, thereby, in effect, exercising over them the
power of control denied to him by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and void ab
initio and the respondent permanently restrained from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement by the
municipalities above referred to.
SULTAN OSOP B. CAMID v. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT ET. AL
G.R. NO. 161414, January 17, 2005, EN BANC, (TINGA, J.)
In Palaez v. The Auditor General, wherein President Diosdado Macapagal issued
several EOs creating 33 municipalities, among the Executive Orders annulled was Executive
Order No. 107 which created the Municipality of Andong. Sultan Osop B. Camid (Camid)
represents himself as a current resident of Andong, suing as a private citizen and taxpayer
alleges that Andong has metamorphosed into a full-blown municipality with a complete set
of officials appointed to handle essential services for the municipality and its constituents.
He presented certificates from various agencies that purported to recognize the existence of
the Municipality of Andong.
Camid prays that the Court annul the DILG Certification dated 21 November 2003;
direct the DILG to classify Andong as a regular existing municipality; all public
respondents, to extend full recognition and support to Andong; the Department of Finance
and the Department of Budget and Management, to immediately release the internal
revenue allotments of Andong; and the public respondents, particularly the DILG, to
recognize the Interim Local Officials of Andong.
ISSUE:
Can a municipality whose creation by executive fiat was previously voided by Court
may attain recognition in the absence of any curative or reimplementing statute?
HELD:
NO.
Andong was expressly annulled by order of this Court in 1965. If we were to affirm
Andongs de facto status by reason of its alleged continued existence despite its
nullification, we would in effect be condoning defiance of a valid order of this Court. Court
decisions cannot obviously lose their efficacy due to the sheer defiance by the parties
aggrieved. It bears noting that based on Camids own admissions, Andong does not meet
the requisites set forth by Section 442(d) of the Local Government Code. Section 442(d)
requires that in order that the municipality created by executive order may receive
recognition, they must have their respective set of elective municipal officials holding
office at the time of the effectivity of [the Local Government] Code. Camid admits that
Andong has never elected its municipal officers at all. This incapacity ties in with the fact
that Andong was judicially annulled in 1965. Out of obeisance to our ruling in Pelaez, the
national government ceased to recognize the existence of Andong, depriving it of its share
of the public funds, and refusing to conduct municipal elections for the void municipality.
Petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
PATRICIO TAN, FELIX FERRER, JUAN M. HAGAD, SERGIO HILADO, VIRGILIO GASTON, CON
CHITA MINAYA, TERESITA ESTACIO, DESIDERIO DEFERIA, ROMEO GAMBOA, ALBERTO LAC
SON, FE HOFILENA, EMILY JISON, NIEVES LOPEZ, AND CECILIA MAGSAYSAY, petitioners v.
COMELEC and THE PROVINCIAL TREASURER OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, respondents.
III. Creation and abolition of municipal corporations

FACTS.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the Island of Negros to
be known as the Province of Negros del Norte was enacted. The Cities of Silay, Cadiz and
San Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias
, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador Benedicto were proposed to belong to this new province. To
implement this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners op
posed and filed a case for Prohibition, contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and n
ot in complete accord with the Local Government Code because of the following reasons:

1) The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within

the territory of the new province of Negros del Norte, were not included in the
plebiscite.
2) The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be
about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser than the minimum area prescribed by the
governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
ISSUE.
WON BP. Blg. 885 violated Article XI, Sec. 3 of the Consititution, which states that:
"No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or
its boundary substantially altered except in accordance with the criteria established in th
e Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in a pl
ebiscite in the unit or units affected."
HELD.
YES, petitioners contention is correct.
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration
of the boundaries, the approval of a majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units a
ffected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new province of Negros del No
rte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The
first would be the parent province of Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be sub
stantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of those in the area subtract
ed from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte. The p
eople of Negros Occidental should have been allowed to vote in the plebiscite as they are dir
ectly affected by the diminution in land size of their area.
As to the issue on the new provinces land area, a reading of the last sentence of the
first paragraph of Section 197 of the LGC says that the territory need not be contiguous if i
t comprises two or more islands. The use of the word territory clearly reflects that the la
w refers only to the land mass and excludes the waters over which the political unit has cont
rol. Therefore, Negros del Norte failed to meet the required land area of 3,500 sq. km for it
to become a province.
"WHEREFORE, Batas Pambansa Blg. 885 is hereby declared unconstitutional. The proclamati
on of the new province of Negros del Norte, as well as the appointment of the officials there
of are also declared null and void.
GOVERNOR ZOSIMO J. PAREDES AND MAYOR MARIO W. CHILAGAN, petitioners v.
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.
III. Creation and abolition of municipal corporations

FACTS.
Pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 56 certain barangays in the municipality of Mayoyao,
Ifugao were directed to hold a plebiscite to determine whether they want to constitute
themselves into the new municipality of Aguinaldo. Petitioners, however, alleged that BP
blg. 86 is unconstitutional for being violative of Article XI, Section 3 of the Constitution. The
basis for such contention is that the state excluded from the plebiscite the voters from the
poblacion and other barangays of the Municipality of Mayoyao and included only those which
were specifically mentioned in the Act.
ISSUE.
WON all the inhabitants of the municipality of Mayoyao should participate in the
plebiscite as they are included in the "unit or units affected" as contended by Paredes.
HELD.
Petitioners contention is wrong. The Court sustained respondents contention that:
In the interpretation of the above phrase, the Court "should not lose sight of the fact
that this provision is intended to promote autonomy of our local government units. Thus, in
a case where barrios are being separated from an existing municipality to form a new
municipality, as in the case at bar, the units affected are the barrios whose transfer is being
sought. It is the people in these barrios who will really be affected by the new grant of
autonomy. They will be under a new set of officials, a new government, a new set of
powers and responsibilities. They should thus be consulted on whether they are willing to
shoulder the responsibilities attendant to autonomy. Barrios which will remain with the
original municipality are not affected since their autonomy vis-a-vis the national
government is not in any way diminished. They will be under the same local government,
without any diminution whatsoever of their rights. There is therefore no infringement of the
Constitution if people in these barrios do not vote in the plebiscite.
Presumption of constitutionality must be applied in the case at bar. Admittedly, this
is one of those cases where the discretion of the Court is allowed considerable leeway.
There is indeed an element of ambiguity in the use of the expression "unit or units
affected." It is plausible to assert as petitioners do that when certain barangays are
separated from a parent municipality to form a new one, all the voters therein are affected.
It is much more persuasive, however, to contend as respondents do that the acceptable
construction is for those voters, who are not from the barangays to be separated, should be
excluded in the plebiscite.
The State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units,
especially the [barangays], to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities."
It is clear that in granting autonomy, priority is to be accorded the smallest unit, the
barangay. That enables its residents the fullest development as a self-reliant community,
with a distinct personality of its own. Adherence to such a philosophy compels the
conclusion that when there are indications that the inhabitants of several barangays are
inclined to separate from a parent municipality they should be allowed to do so. What is
more logical than to ascertain their will in a plebiscite called for that purpose. If is they, and
they alone, who shall constitute the new unit. New responsibilities will be assumed. New
burdens will be imposed. A new municipal corporation will come into existence. Its birth will
be a matter of choice - their choice. They should be left alone then to decide for
themselves. To allow other voters to participate will not yield a true expression of their will.
They may even frustrate it. That certainly will be so if they vote against it for selfish
reasons, and they constitute the majority. That is not to abide by the fundamental principle
of the Constitution to promote local autonomy, the preference being for smaller units.

MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY, BOHOL v. CA & MUNICIPALITY OF ALICIA, BOHOL

G.R. No. 116702, December 28, 1995, THIRD DIVISION (Panganiban, J.)
FACTS
The municipality of Candijay filed a petition claiming that its boundary line covers
barrio Pagahat since the municipality of Alicia also claims to have current territorial
jurisdiction over it. The RTC declared barrio Pagahat as within the territorial jurisdiction of
the municipality of Candijay. However, on appeal the CA stated that the RTC committed an
error in declaring that Barrio Pagahat is within the territorial jurisdiction of the municipality
of Candijay. The CA ruled in favor of the municipality of Alicia based on equiponderance of
evidence which states that When the scale shall stand upon equipoise and there is nothing
in the evidence which shall incline it to one side or the other, the court will find for the
defendant.
ISSUE:
Does the municipality of Alicia lack juridical personality, having been created under a
void E.O which was issued by President Quirino and was declared unconstitutional, per this
Court's ruling in Pelaez vs. Auditor General?
HELD:
NO. The municipality of Alicias situation is similar to that with the municipality of
San Andres. The municipality of Alicia was created by virtue of Executive Order No. 265 in
1949 and therefore had been in existence for all of 16 years when Pelaez vs. Auditor
General was promulgated. And various governmental acts throughout the years all indicate
the State's recognition and acknowledgment of the existence thereof. For instance, under
Administrative Order No. 33 above-mentioned, the Municipality of Alicia was covered by the
7th Municipal Circuit Court of Alicia-Mabini for the province of Bohol. Likewise, under the
Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution, the Municipality of Alicia is one of twenty
municipalities comprising the Third District of Bohol. The municipality of Alicia, it should
benefit from the effects of Section 442 (d) of the Local Government Code, and should
henceforth be considered as a regular, de jure municipality. The objection against it being a
municipal corporation should have been done before the LGC was enacted.
MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ v. BAZ, JR., & MUNICIPALITY OF SINACABAN
G.R. No. 105746, December 2, 1996, EN BANC (Mendoza, J.)
FACTS
The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by E.O. 258 of then President Quirino,
pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. By virtue of Municipal
Council Resolution No. 171, Sinacaban laid claims to 5 barrios which was filed with the
Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental against the Municipality of Jimenez. The Municipality
of Jimenez, while conceding that under E.O. No. 258 the disputed area is part of Sinacaban,
nonetheless asserted jurisdiction on the basis of an agreement it had with the Municipality
of Sinacaban.The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban.
Jimenez filed an a petition in the RTC alleging that, in accordance with the decision in
Pelaez v. Auditor General, the power to create municipalities is essentially legislative and
consequently Sinacaban, which was created by an executive order, had no legal personality
and no right to assert a territorial claim vis--vis Jimenez, of which it remains part. The RTC
held that Sinacaban is a de facto corporation since it had completely organized itself even
prior to the Pelaez case and exercised corporate powers for 40 years before the existence
was questioned and Jimenez did not have the legal standing to question the existence of
Sinacaban.
ISSUE:

Does the municipality of Sinacaban legally exist?

HELD:
YES. The same factors are present so as to confer on Sinacaban the status of at least
a de facto municipal corporation in the sense that its legal existence has been recognized
and acquiesced publicly and officially. Sinacaban had been in existence for sixteen years
when Pelaez v. Auditor General was decided on December 24, 1965. Yet the validity of E.O.
No. 258 creating it had never been questioned. Created in 1949, it was only 40 years later
that its existence was questioned and only because it had laid claim to an area that
apparently is desired for its revenue. This fact must be underscored because under Rule 66,
Sec. 16 of the Rules of Court, a quo warranto suit against a corporation for forfeiture of its
charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complained of was done
or committed. On the contrary, the State and even the municipality of Jimenez itself have
recognized Sinacabans corporate existence. Under A.O. 33 of this Court, Sinacaban is
constituted part of municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in the country. For its part, Jimenez had earlier recognized Sinacaban in 1950
by entering into an agreement with it regarding their common boundary. The agreement
was embodied in Resolution no. 77 of the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidental.
Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinance appended to the
1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country, which
considered Sinacaban part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental. Following the ruling in
Municipality of an Narciso, Quezon v. Mendez, Sr., Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC must be deemed
to have cured any defect in the creation of Sinacaban. This provision states:
Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to
exist and operate as such. Existing municipal district organized pursuant to presidential
issuances or executive orders and which have their respective set of elective municipal
officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the Code shall henceforth be
considered as regular municipalities.
Mendenilla v. Onandia
Facts
Petitioner Emilio Mendenilla was appointed Chief of Police of the then Municipality of
Legaspi, Albay, on June 21, 1954 by the Municipal Mayor. Then, in 1959, Congress passed
R.A. 2234 converting the municipality of Legaspi into the City of Legaspi R.A. 2234 provides
that the position of Chief of Police of the city of Legaspi is to be appointed by the President.
Therefore, when Jose Manuel Onandia was appointed by the President City Chief of Police,
Mendenilla assailed the legality of such a move, claiming that his position as chief of police
was not abolished when Legaspi was converted from a municipality to a city.
Issue:
When Legaspi was converted from municipality into a city, was the termination of
Mendenilla as chief of police valid?
Held:
Yes. Well-settled is the rule that "the power to create or establish municipal
corporations, to enlarge or diminish their area, to reorganize their governments, or to
dissolve or abolish them altogether, is a political function, which rests solely in the
legislative branch of the government and, in the absence of constitutional restrictions, the
power is practically unlimited." In this country, the power to create or abolish municipal
corporations resides in Congress which, under the Constitution, is given general legislative
powers. Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress. Municipal corporations are
here created under a general law, i.e., pursuant to the Municipal Law embodied in the

Revised Administrative Code, in the case of municipalities proper, and, under special
charters, in the case of chartered cities.
Pursuant to the aforementioned legislative power, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
2234, otherwise known as the charter of the City of Legaspi, which became effective on
June 12, 1959.
With the creation of the City of Legaspi on said date, the legal personality of the
Municipality of Legaspi was extinguished, and the city, which superseded the municipality
came into being as a new legal entity or municipal corporation. The consequent effect of
said dissolution, was the abolition of all municipal offices then existing under the superseded
municipality, including that held by petitioner, save those excepted in the charter itself.
Petitioner's appointment of June 21, 1954 by the then municipal mayor of the municipality
of Legaspi, therefore, ceased to have legal force and effect. The weight of authorities
support this view:
The absolute and unconditioned repeal of a municipal corporation without any saving
clause, as to the right of officers under the former charter, abolishes all offices
thereunder. The adoption of a general law or charter abolishes all offices not
excepted . . . . (62 C.J.S. Sec. 465.).
Statutory offices may be altered or abolished by the legislature. . . . The same
general principle applies to municipal offices. The may be abolished, extended or
vacated by the municipal authority by which the corporation itself was created . . . .
(Mechem, Public Officers, Sec. 465.)
In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the superseding of the old charter by
the new, has the effect of abolishing the offices under the old charter. The general
rule is, that the repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts an end to
the functions of the incumbents.
The only offices expressly excepted from said abolitions were those mentioned in Section
96, Article XVII of the charter, which reads:
SEC. 96. Change of Government. The incumbent Mayor, Vice-Mayor and members
of the Municipal Board shall continue in office as the Mayor, Vice-Mayor and
members of the Municipal Board of the City, respectively, until the expiration of their
present terms of office.
Applying the principle of "expressio unius, est exclusio alterius" in statutory construction, all
municipal offices including that held by petitioner, in the then municipality of Legaspi not
included in the above-excepted offices were deemed abolished.
Hence, no reversible error in the decision appealed. Decision was AFFIRMED.
MOISES S. SAMSON, petitioner, vs. HON. ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, in his capacity as
the Executive Secretary, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and the DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET, respondents.
President Fidel V. Ramos signed into law Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of
Novaliches out of 15 barangays of Quezon City. Petitioner Moises S. Samson, incumbent
councilor of the first district of Quezon City, is now before the Court challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8535.
Petitioner bases his petition on the following grounds:
a) R.A. No. 8535 failed to conform to the criteria established by the Local Government
Code particularly, Sections 7, 11(a) and 450(a), as to the requirements of income,
population and land area; seat of government; and no adverse effect to being a city of

Quezon City, respectively, and its Implementing Rules as provided in Article 11(b)(1) and
(2), as to furnishing a copy of the Quezon City Council of barangay resolution; and
b) The said law will in effect amend the Constitution.
Issue:
1. Did Republic Act No. 8535, creating the City of Novaliches, fail to conform to the criteria
by the Local Government Code?
2. Will the said law affect the constitution?
Held: 1. No, City of Novaliches conforms to the criteria by the Local Government Code.
The Local Government Code of 1991 provides under Section 7:
SECTION 7. Creation and Conversion. As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be based on
verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two or more islands or is
separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly identified by
metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Land Management Bureau
(LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).
Corollarily, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Code provide in Article 11:
ART. 11. Cities. (a) Requisites for creation A city shall not be created unless the
following requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
(1) Income an average annual income of not less than Twenty Million Pesos
(P20,000,000.00), for the immediately preceding two (2) consecutive years
based on 1991 constant prices, as certified by DOF. The average annual
income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of
special funds, special accounts, transfers, and nonrecurring income; and
(2) Population or land area Population which shall not be less than one
hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the NSO; or
land area which must be contiguous with an area of at least one hundred
(100) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a
chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed
city is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a
city sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
The creation of a new city shall not reduce the land area, population, and income of the
original LGU or LGUs at the time of said creation to less than the prescribed minimum
requirements. All expenses incidental to the creation shall be borne by the petitioners.
During the public hearings held by the Senate Committee on Local Government were
resource persons from the different government offices like National Statistics Office,

Bureau of Local Government Finance, Land Management Bureau, and Department of Budget
and Management, aside from officials of Quezon City itself.
The representative from the Bureau of Local Government Finance estimated the combined
average annual income of the 13 barangays for the years 1995 and 1996 to be around
P26,952,128.26. Under the Local Government Code, a proposed city must have an average
annual income of only at least P20,000,000.00 for the immediately preceding two
years. The representative from the NSO estimated the population in the barangays that
would comprise the proposed City of Novaliches to be around 347,310. This figure is more
than the 150,000 required by the Implementing Rules. There is no need to consider the
land area, given these figures, since under the Local Government Code, the proposed city
must comply with requirements as regards income and population or land area. Other than
the income requirement, the proposed city must have the requisite number of inhabitants or
land area. Compliance with either requirement, in addition to income, is sufficient. Judicial
notice may also be taken that Novaliches is now highly urbanized.
2. No, City of Novaliches will in no way result in a prohibited amendment of the
Constitution. The ordinance appended to the Constitution merely apportions the seats of
the House of Representatives to the different legislative districts in the country. Nowhere
does it provide that Metro Manila shall forever be composed of only 17 cities and
municipalities as claimed by petitioner. Too literal a reading of the ordinance in or appendix
of the Constitution will only result in its erroneous interpretation.
Petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption
of constitutionality being enjoyed by R.A. No. 8535. Nor did he succeed to convince the
Court with substantial and persuasive legal reasons for us to grant the reliefs he seeks.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition was DISMISSED.
CAWALING v COMELEC
Facts:
President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an Act Creating The City
Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of
Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor.
Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer of the former Municipality of Sorsorgon,
Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. filed on January 2, 2001 the present petition for certiorari (G.R.
No. 146319) seeking the annulment of the plebiscite. Petitioner contends that RA 8806 is
unconstitutional because creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates
Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of
the Constitution) which requires that only a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city.
Issue:
Is the RA 8806 unconstitutional for merging 2 municipalities to be to a component
city?
Held: No.
Petitioners constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase
A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city is not a
criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution which provides, inter alia:
Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the

criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority
of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to
create a province, city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established
by the Code. Thus, Section 8 of the Code distinctly provides:
Section 8. Division and Merger. Division and merger of existing local government
units shall comply with the same requirements herein prescribed for their
creation: Provided, however, That such division shall not reduce the income,
population, or land area of the local government unit or units concerned to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed in this Code: Provided, further, That the income
classification of the original local government unit or units shall not fall below its current
income classification prior to such division. x x x. (Emphasis ours)
Verily, the creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or
a merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution,
provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed
by the Code.
Petition was DISMISSED for lack of merit.
THE CENTRAL (POBLACION) BARRIO, CITY OF DAVAO, represented by its BARRIO
CAPTAIN,
HONORIO
B.
GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
CITY TREASURER, MAXIMO ASISTIDO, THE HON. CITY COUNCIL, THE HON. CITY
AUDITOR, ATTY. FELIX PEPITO and the HON. CITY MAYOR, CARMELO
PORRAS, respondents-appellees.
Facts:
On August 29, 1962, the City of Davao passed Resolution No. 732 declaring as
officially and legally existing, pursuant to Republic Act 2370, the several barrios of the city.
Among these were barrios Agdao, Bucana and Poblacion.
Subsequently, barrio Poblacion, also called barrio Central, claiming that it was
created under Section 27 of the Code of Mindanao and Sulu, asked from Davao City for its
alleged 10% share in taxes collected on real property located within the barrio, as provided
in Section 23 of Republic Act 3590. Davao City's Treasurer, however, refused to release the
share for said barrio, on the ground that the amount pertaining to said barrio, in relation to
those of barrios Agdao and Bucana, cannot be determined, because the respective
boundaries of said barrios were not yet fixed as required by law.
The Court, upon motion of the Fiscal, dismissed the case without prejudice, on the
ground that the issues were rendered academic by the passage of Republic Act 4354, on
June 19, 1965, amending the Charter of Davao City.
Issue:
Is the dismissal order duly warranted?
Held:
Yes. Republic Act 4354, in Section 2, enumerated the barrios comprising the City of
Davao. Petitioner barrio Central or Poblacion was not mentioned therein. Accordingly,
there prima facie arises the conclusion that said law abolished barrio Central as part of
Davao City. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. The court a quo had sufficient and tenable
reason to dismiss the suit in the face of said law, for being academic. A non-existent barrio,
or a barrio not situated in Davao City, cannot present a claim against it or its officials for a
share in taxes under Republic Act 3590. Said law must be presumed, until squarely

challenged and declared by the courts to be otherwise, as constitutional, especially because

the power to create or abolish municipal corporations resides in Congress (Mendenilla v.
Onandia, L-17803, June 30, 1962).
-DAR V. SARANGGANI -LEAGUE OF CITIES CASES Navarro v. Ermita
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9355 created a province of Dinagat Islands, formerly part of
Surigao Del Norte. It was questioned for constitutionality for not being in compliance with
the population or the land area requirements of the Local Government Code under Sec. 461.
Previous decisions relating to this case declared the creation of the province as
unconstitutional.
Issue: Is the creation of Dinagat Islands as a separate province constitutional?
Held:
Yes. The Court looked at the central policy considerations in the creation of
provinces. They compared the LGC provisions on the creation of municipalities and cities
and how they allow an exception to the land area requirement in cases of non-contiguity as
provided for under Sections 442 and 450 of the LGC.
SEC. 442. Requisites for Creation. (Municipality)
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be
contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
SEC. 450. Requisites for Creation. (City)
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be
created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it
comprises two (2) or more islands.
The Court held that it must have been the intent of the legislators to extend such
exception to provinces especially considering the physical configuration of the Philippine
archipelago. In fact, while such exemption was absent under Section 461 of the LGC, Such
was incorporated under the LGC-IRR thus correcting the congressional oversight in said
provision and reflecting the true legislative intent.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces.
(2) Population or land area - Population which shall not be less than two hundred
fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants, as certified by NSO; or land area which must be
contiguous with an area of at least two thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by
LMB. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is
separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to the income of the
province. The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a province sought to be
created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
Moreover, the earlier decisions show a very restrictive construction which could
trench on the equal protection clause, as it actually defeats the purpose of local autonomy
and decentralization as enshrined in the Constitution. Hence, the land area requirement
should be read together with territorial contiguity.

DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, PETITIONER, VS. THE COMMISSION ONELECTIONS, AND

CLAUDE P. BAUTISTA, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Petitioner Douglas R. Cagas was proclaimed the winner for the gubernatorial race for
the province of Davao del Sur. Respondent Claude P. Bautista, his rival, filed an electoral
protest alleging fraud, anomalies, irregularities, vote-buying and violations of election laws,
rules and resolutions. The protest was raffled to the COMELEC First Division.
In his affirmative defense, Cagas argued that Bautista did not make the requisite
cash deposit on time and that Bautista did not render a detailed specification of the acts or
omissions complained of. The COMELEC First Division denied the special affirmative
defences. Thus, Cagas prayed that the matter be certified to the COMELEC En Banc.
Bautista countered that the assailed orders, being merely interlocutory, could not be
elevated to the COMELEC En Banc. The COMELEC First Division issued an order denying
Cagas motion for reconsideration, prompting him to file a petition for certiorari before the
Supreme Court.
Issue:
Does the Supreme Court have the power to review on certiorari an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC?
Held:
No. Although Section 7, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution confers on the Court the
power to review any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC, it limits such power to a final
decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc, and does not extend to an interlocutory
order issued by a Division of the COMELEC. Otherwise stated, the Court has no power to
review on certiorari an interlocutory order or even a final resolution issued by a Division of
the COMELEC.
There is no question, therefore, that the Court has no jurisdiction to take cognizance
of the petition for certiorari assailing the denial by the COMELEC First Division of the special
affirmative defenses of the petitioner. The proper remedy is for the petitioner to wait for the
COMELEC First Division to first decide the protest on its merits, and if the result should
aggrieve him, to appeal the denial of his special affirmative defenses to the COMELEC En
Banc along with the other errors committed by the Division upon the merits.
It is true that there may be an exception to the general rule, which is when an
interlocutory order of a Division of the COMELEC was issued without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, as the Court conceded in Kho v. Commission
on Elections. However, the said case has no application herein because the COMELEC First
Division had the competence to determine the lack of detailed specifications of the acts or
omissions complained of as required by Rule 6, Section 7 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8804,
and whether such lack called for the outright dismissal of the protest.
III. Creation and Abolition - how are existing sub-provinces converted into
municipalities
SIMPLICIO C. GRINO, ARTURO GADIAN, THE LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG
PILIPINO, EVELYN C. JIZ AND PERLA ZULUETA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS, ILOILO PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
Section 462 of the LGC called for the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular
provinces upon approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be held in the
areas directly affected by such conversion. Said section likewise directed the holding of the

said plebiscite simultaneously with the national elections following the effectivity of R.A.
7160. Pursuant thereto, a plebiscite to determine whether the sub-province of Guimaras (its
mother province was Iloilo) wants to become a regular province was held simultaneously
with the May 11, 1992 elections. The participants in the said plebiscite were the residents of
Iloilo (except Iloilo city) and the 3 municipalities of Guimaras. Surprisingly, the ballots
issued in the said 3 municipalities did not provide any space for the election of governor,
vice-governor and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the province of Iloilo.
LDP Iloilo governor-candidate Simplicio Grino claims that the COMELEC erred in not allowing
the said 3 municipalities to vote for the provincial officials of Iloilo, since at the time of the
plebiscite Guimaras was still a sub-province of Iloilo. Grino says if Guimaras voted for
regular provincehood then there would have been no need for them at all to vote for the
provincial officials of Iloilo. But what if Guimaras votes to remain as a sub-province? Should
special election be held for the 3 municipalities so that they can vote for the provincial
official of Iloilo?
ISSUE:
WON COMELEC erred in not allowing the voters of the sub-province of Guimaras from
voting for the provincial officials of Iloilo
RULING:
YES.
The Commission was under mistaken presumption that under Section 462 of the LGC,
whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people
in a plebiscite, the President will fill up the positions of provincial officials (sub-province
officials in case of a negative vote) through appointment until their successors shall have
been elected and qualified. The law did not provide that the President shall also appoint
provincial officials of the sub-province because, by a negative vote, the people of the subprovince of Guimaras shall continue to be represented by the provincial officials of the
province of Iloilo elected at large by registered voters of Iloilo province including the subprovince of Guimaras.
However, it would serve no useful purpose if we undo all that the Commission on
Elections had done in that plebiscite. In the recently conducted plebiscite, the voters of the
sub-province of Iloilo overwhelmingly voted for the approval of the conversion of Guimaras
into a regular province. In this event, the President shall appoint, the governor for the
newly created province of Guimaras, and he shall also appoint a vice-governor and the
member of the sangguniang panlalawigan in accordance with the third paragraph of Section
462 of R.A. 6170. The then sub-province of Guimaras is now a regular province, politically
independent from the province of Iloilo. There is no more legal basis for the calling of a
special election for the 3 municipalities of Guimaras for the purpose of electing the governor
and vice-governor of Iloilo and the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the second
district thereof.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
III. Creation and Abolition - conversion of a component city into a highly
urbanized city
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL AND ALEJANDRO
R. ALINSUG, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, AND NATIONAL TREASURER, RESPONDENTS.
FACTS:
On Dec. 22 1979, the interim Batasang Pambansa enacted B.P. Blg. 51 providing for
local elections on Jan 30, 1980. Its section 3, the subject of controversy, reads as follows:

xxx Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component comes in accordance
with standard established in the LGC as province for in Art XI, Sec 4 (1) of the Constitution.
Any city now existing with an annual regular income derived from infrastructure and general
funds of not less than P40M at the time of the approval of the act shall be classified as a
highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where
they are geographically located. xxx The registered voters may be entitled to vote in the
election of the official of the province of which that city is a component. If its charter so
provides. However, voters in a highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall not
participate nor vote in the election of the official of the province in which the highly
urbanized city is geographical located.
Robert Ceniza et.al. filed a case as tax payers and registered voters in the cities of
Cebu and Mandaue assailing the aforementioned section. They questioned the use of annual
income of a given city as basis for classification of whether or not a particular city is a highly
urbanized city whose voters may no longer participate in the election of provincial officials of
the province in which the city is geographically located.
ISSUE:
WON the basis of annual income of a city for its classification as highly urbanized is
unconstitutional
RULING:
NO.
The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local
government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the
barrio, to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities." Art. XI, Section 4(1)
of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the
province where they are geographically located. This is as it should be because of the
complex and varied problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and
greater economic activity which require greater autonomy.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the
basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a
city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively
independent social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has
sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province
where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of
the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the
election of provincial officials in some instances.
Moreover, corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials
since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and
authority over said city.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, et al. v. MAYOR BENJAMIN ABALOS
G.R. No. 114783, 8 December 1994, EN BANC, (Bidin, J.)
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and
San Juan belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent
congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually
became R.A. No. 7675 which converts the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City as the City of Mandaluyong. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law

on February 9, 1994. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting
population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these
results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
ISSUES:
1. Did R.A. 7675 violated the one title-one subject rule of the Constitution?
2. Did R.A. 7675 violated the one city-one representative rule of the Constitution?
3. Did R.A. 7675 violated the limit of number of representatives set forth in the
Constitution?
4. Should the people of San Juan participate in the plebescite on whether to convert
Mandaluyong into a HUC?
RULING:
1. NO.
The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject
separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city.
A liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by
this court so as not to cripple or impede legislation.
"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents
and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the
constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of
the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation"
2. NO
The statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population
of not less than two hundred fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one
city-one representative" proviso in the Constitution.
3. NO
The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of
the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress
itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
4. NO
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in
the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district.
The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was
the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district
representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly
excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the change of status of
neighboring Mandaluyong.
JOSE MIRANDA, et al. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALEXANDER AGUIRRE, et al.
G.R. No. 133064, 16 September 1999, EN BANC, (Puno, J.)
On 1994, R.A. 7720 converted the municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an
independent component city. The people of Santiago ratified R.A. No. 7720 in a plebiscite.
On 1998, R.A. 8528 was enacted. It amended R.A. No. 7720. Among others, it downgraded
the status of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city. However,

R.A. No. 8528 lacked provision for the ratification by the people of Santiago City in a proper
plebiscite.
The OSG argued that R.A. No. 8528 merely reclassified Santiago City from an
independent component city to a component city, hence, it does not involve any "creation,
division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local government
units," thus, a plebiscite of the people of Santiago is unnecessary.
ISSUE:
Is R.A. No. 8528 unconstitutional for its failure to provide that the conversion of the
city of Santiago from an independent component city to a component city should be
submitted to its people in a proper plebiscite?
RULING:
YES.
The Court holds that the Constitution requires a plebiscite, as per section 10, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution. This constitutional requirement is reiterated in Section 10,
Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160).
A close analysis of the said constitutional provision will reveal that the
creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units involve a common denominator material change in the
political and economic rights of the local government units directly affected as
well as the people therein. It is precisely for this reason that the Constitution
requires the approval of the people "in the political units directly affected."
The changes that will result from the downgrading of the city of Santiago from an
independent component city to a component city are many and cannot be characterized as
insubstantial. For one, the independence of the city as a political unit will be diminished. The
city mayor will be placed under the administrative supervision of the provincial governor.
The resolutions and ordinances of the city council of Santiago will have to be reviewed by
the Provincial Board of Isabela. Taxes that will be collected by the city will now have to be
shared with the province.
It is clear that the Constitution imposes two conditions first, the creation,
division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundary of a local government unit
must meet the criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on income, population and land
area and second, the law must be approved by the people "by a majority of the votes cast
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."
In accord with the Constitution, sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Local Government Code
fixed the said criteria and they involve requirements on income, population and land area.
These requirements, however, are imposed to help assure the economic viability of the local
government unit concerned. The criteria fixed by the Local Government Code on
income, population and land area are designed to achieve an economic purpose.
The people's plebiscite is required to achieve a political purpose.
With due respect, the cities of Oroquieta and San Carlos are not similarly situated as
the city of Santiago. The said two cities then were not independent component cities unlike
the city of Santiago. The two cities were chartered but were not independent component
cities for both were not highly urbanized cities which alone were considered independent
cities at that time.
JADEWELL PARKING SYSTEMS CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY NORMA
TAN, PETITIONER, VS. HON. JUDGE NELSON F. LIDUA SR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 169588, October 07, 2013, LEONEN, J., THIRD DIVISION

Facts
Jadewell is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the
parking spaces in Baguio City, they are also able to render a vehicle immobile by placing
clamps on its wheels when its illegally parked pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. On
May 17, 2003, Jadewell filed a complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of San
Fernando City, La Union against Edwin Ang ET AL. for dismantling and carrying away the
clamp (valued at 26k) attached to the left front wheel of a Mitsubishi Adventure because the
vehicle was illegally parked, a violation of the Baguio City Ordinance no. 003 - 2000. The
information was filed with the Municipal Trial court on October 2, 2003. The Municipal TC
dismissed the complaint on the ground that offenses are covered by the Rules on Summary
Procedure and Act 3326 being alleged violations of City Ordinances. Under Section 9, the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is filed in Court and
that such action prescribes in 2 months. RTC likewise dismissed the petitioners appeal on
the ground of prescription.
Issue
WON the prescription period for violation of city ordinances halts when filed with
the prosecutors office
Decision
No, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances (Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months). Likewise, according to the 1991
Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, the rule shall govern summary procedure with
municipal trial courts concerning criminal cases for violations of municipal or city
ordinances. Section 11 from the same rules provide that - The filing of criminal cases falling
within the scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information: Provided,
however, that in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be
commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be prosecuted de
officio.
Cities in the Philippines that were created by law can either be highly urbanized cities
or component cities. An independent component city has a charter that proscribes its voters
from voting for provincial elective officials. It stands that all cities as defined by Congress
are chartered cities. In cases as early as United States v. Pascual Pacis, the Court
recognized the validity of the Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise
known as the charter of Baguio City. As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary
Procedure, only the filing of an Information shall halt the prescriptive period where the
crime charged is involved in an ordinance.
Petition denied.
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 176970, December 08, 2008, BRION, J., EN BANC
Facts
On October 10, 2006, Cagayan de Oro's then Congressman Constantino G. Jaraula
filed and sponsored House Bill No. 5859: "An Act Providing for the Apportionment of the
Lone Legislative District of the City of Cagayan De Oro." This law eventually became
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9371. It increased Cagayan de Oro's legislative district from one to
two. On March 13, 2007, the COMELEC en Banc promulgated Resolution No. 7837
implementing R.A. No. 9371. Petitioner Bagabuyo contends that COMELEC cannot
implement R.A. No. 9371 without providing for the rules, regulations and guidelines for the

conduct of a plebiscite which is indispensable for the division or conversion of a local

government unit and that it violates the equality of representation doctrine.
Issue
WON a plebiscite is indispensable in dividing congressional districts
Decision
No, the concern of Article VI, Section 5 is political representation and the means to
make a legislative district sufficiently represented so that the people can be effectively
heard. The aim of legislative apportionment is "to equalize population and voting power
among districts." Hence, emphasis is given to the number of people represented; the
uniform and progressive ratio to be observed among the representative districts; and
accessibility and commonality of interests in terms of each district being, as far as
practicable, continuous, compact and adjacent territory. In terms of the people represented,
every city with at least 250,000 people and every province (irrespective of population) is
entitled to one representative. In this sense, legislative districts, on the one hand, and
provinces and cities, on the other, relate and interface with each other. To ensure
continued adherence to the required standards of apportionment, Section 5(4) specifically
mandates reapportionment as soon as the given standards are met.
In contrast with the equal representation objective of Article VI, Section 5, Article X,
Section 10 expressly speaks of how local government units may be "created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered. A pronounced distinction
between Article VI, Section 5 and, Article X, Section 10 is on the requirement of a
plebiscite. The Constitution and the Local Government Code expressly require a plebiscite
to carry out any creation, division, merger, abolition or alteration of boundary of a local
government unit. In contrast, no plebiscite requirement exists under the apportionment or
reapportionment provision.
The legislative district that Article VI, Section 5 speaks of may, in a sense, be called
a political unit because it is the basis for the election of a member of the House of
Representatives and members of the local legislative body. It is not, however, a political
subdivision through which functions of government are carried out. A district does not act
for and in behalf of the people comprising the district; it merely delineates the areas
occupied by the people who will choose a representative in their national affairs.
In the case at bar, no division of Cagayan de Oro City as a political and corporate
entity takes place or is mandated by RA 9371. Cagayan de Oro City politically remains a
single unit and its administration is not divided along territorial lines thus it does not need a
plebiscite for legislative apportionment.
The ground that such law violates the equality of representation doctrine likewise,
cannot be sustained. The Constitution does not require mathematical exactitude or rigid
equality as a standard in gauging equality of representation. In fact, for cities, all it asks is
that "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand shall have one
representative," while ensuring representation for every province regardless of the size of
its population.
Petition Denied
Note:
Legislative apportionment (Black's Law Dictionary) - the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or other subdivision may send to a legislative body. It
is the allocation of seats in a legislative body in proportion to the population; the drawing of
voting district lines so as to equalize population and voting power among the districts.

Reapportionment - the realignment or change in legislative districts brought about by

changes in population and mandated by the constitutional requirement of equality of
representation.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA et al. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R No. 188078, January 25, 2010, EN BANC, (CARPIO, J.)
1 May 2009, the province of Bulacan was represented in Congress through four
legislative districts. The First Legislative District comprised of the city of Malolos[1] and the
municipalities of Hagonoy, Calumpit, Pulilan, Bulacan, and Paombong. On 1 May 2009, RA
9591 lapsed into law, amending Malolos' City Charter, by creating a separate legislative
district for the city. At the time the legislative bills for RA 9591 were filed in Congress in
2007, namely, House Bill No. 3162 (later converted to House Bill No. 3693) and Senate Bill
No. 1986, the population of Malolos City was 223,069. They projected that it will be
254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of 3.78 between 1995 to 2000.
Petitioners, taxpayers, registered voters and residents of Malolos City, filed a petition
contending that RA 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum population
threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representation in Congress as provided under
Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to
the 1987 Constitution.
ISSUE:
Is RA 9591 unconstitutional for being violative of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution for failing to
meet the required population?
HELD:
YES.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda, which is based on demographic
projections, is without legal effect because Regional Director Miranda has no basis and no
authority to issue the Certification. The Certification is also void on its face because based
on its own growth rate assumption, the population of Malolos will be less than 250,000 in
the year 2010. In addition, intercensal demographic projections cannot be made for the
entire year. In any event, a city whose population has increased to 250,000 is entitled to
have a legislative district only in the "immediately following election" after the attainment of
the 250,000 population.
The Certification of Regional Director Miranda does not state that the demographic
projections he certified have been declared official by the NSCB. The records of this case do
not also show that the Certification of Regional Director Miranda is based on demographic
projections declared official by the NSCB. The Certification, which states that the population
of Malolos "will be 254,030 by the year 2010," violates the requirement that intercensal
demographic projections shall be "as of the middle of every year." In addition, there is no
showing that Regional Director Miranda has been designated by the NSO Administrator as a
certifying officer for demographic projections in Region III. In the absence of such official
designation, only the certification of the NSO Administrator can be given credence by this
Court.
Motion for Reconsideration: DENIED
First. It will not do for the COMELEC to insist that the reliability and
authoritativeness of the population indicators Congress used in enacting RA 9591 are nonjusticiable. If laws creating legislative districts are unquestionably within the ambit of this
Court's judicial review power,[5] then there is more reason to hold justiciable subsidiary

questions impacting on their constitutionality, such as their compliance with a specific

constitutional limitation under Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that only
cities with at least 250,000 constituents are entitled to representation in Congress.
Second. Under Executive Order No. 135 (EO 135), the population indicators
Congress used to measure Malolos City's compliance with the constitutional limitation are
unreliable and non-authoritative. On Miranda's Certification, (that the "projected population
of the [City] of Malolos will be 254,030 by the year 2010 using the population growth rate of
3.78[%] between 1995 and 2000"), this fell short of EO 135's requirements that (a) for
intercensal years, the certification should bebased on a set of demographic projections and
estimates declared official by the National Statistical and Coordination Board (NSCB); (b)
certifications on intercensal population estimates will be as of the middle of every year; and
(c) certifications based on projections or estimates must be issued by the NSO
Administrator or his designated certifying officer.
Third. Malolos City is entitled to representation in Congress only if, before the 10
May 2010 elections, it breaches the 250,000 population mark following the mandate in
Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution that "any city whose
population may hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled
in the immediately following election to at least one Member."
Fourth. Aside from failing to comply with Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution
on the population requirement, the creation by RA 9591 of a legislative district for Malolos
City, carving the city from the former First Legislative District, leaves the town of Bulacan
isolated from the rest of the geographic mass of that district.This contravenes the
requirement in Section 5(3), Article VI that each legislative district shall "comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory."
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III AND MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO v.
COMELEC
G.R. No. 189793, April 07, 2010, EN BANC, (PEREZ, J.)
Petitioners filed by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as unconstitutional, R.A. 9716
entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First (1st) and Second Legislative
Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby Creating a New Legislative
District from such Reapportionment.Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it
was enacted by President Macapagal-Arroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the
existing four districts, and apportioned districts shall form additional district where the new
first district shall be composed of 176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district
under Section 5 (3), Article VI of the1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the
petitioners that if population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be
stricken-down for non-compliance with the minimum population requirement, unless
otherwise fixed by law. Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal
technical effects: first, error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi
to question the constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
ISSUE:
Is Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and void, or whether
or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional requirement for the
creation of a new legislative district in a province?
HELD:

NO.
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a 250,000 minimum
population that must compose a legislative district. As already mentioned, the petitioners
rely on the second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled
with what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the Constitution to adopt a
minimum population of 250,000 for each legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution, succinctly
provides: "Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each
province, shall have at least one representative." The provision draws a plain and clear
distinction between the entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement
of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is entitled to at least a
representative, with nothing mentioned about population, a city must first meet a
population minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the phrase "each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point
to no other conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only required for a city,
but not for a province. Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a representative, but not so for a
province.
III. Creation and Abolition - effect of conversion of a municipality to a city on the
term of the mayor
ROBERTO LACEDA, SR. v. RANDY L. LIMENA AND COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 182867, November 25, 2008, EN BANC, (QUISUMBING, J.)
Limena filed a petition for disqualification and/or declaration as an ineligible
candidate against Laceda before the COMELEC, contending that Laceda had already served
as Punong Barangay for Brgy. Panlayaan for three consecutive terms since 1994, and was
thus prohibited from running for the fourth time under Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9164 1.
However, Laceda asserted that when he was elected for his first two terms, Sorsogon was
still a municipality, and that when he served his third term, the Municipality of Sorsogon had
already been merged with the Municipality of Bacon to form a new political unit, the City of
Sorsogon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 8806.
COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified and cancelled his certificate of candidacy.
Laceda moved for reconsideration, but it was denied. Hence, this petition on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Is Laceda entitled to run again for the same position since the Municipality of
Sorsogon was converted into a City?
HELD:
NO.
Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, like Section 43 of the Local Government Code from
which it was taken, is primarily intended to broaden the choices of the electorate of the
candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new blood in the political arena by
SEC. 2. Term of Office.The term of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan officials after the effectivity of this Act shall
be three (3) years.No barangay elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position: Provided,
however, That the term of office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay elections.Voluntary renunciation of office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was
elected.
1

disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a term of nine years. This Court
has held that for the prohibition to apply, two requisites must concur: (1) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post
and (2) that he or she has fully served three consecutive terms.
In this case, while it is true that under Rep. Act No. 8806 the municipalities of
Sorsogon and Bacon were merged and converted into a city thereby abolishing the former
and creating Sorsogon City as a new political unit, it cannot be said that for the purpose of
applying the prohibition in Section 2 of Rep. Act No. 9164, the office of Punong Barangay of
Barangay Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon, would now be construed as a different local
government post as that of the office ofPunong Barangay of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon
City. The territorial jurisdiction of Barangay Panlayaan, Sorsogon City, is the same as before
the conversion. Consequently, the inhabitants of the barangay are the same. They are the
same group of voters who elected Laceda to be their Punong Barangay for three consecutive
terms and over whom Laceda held power and authority as their Punong Barangay.
Moreover, Rep. Act No. 8806 did not interrupt Laceda's term.
III. Creation and Abolition - Abolition
SULTAN USMAN SARANGANI ET. AL. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 135927, June 26, 2000, EN BANC, (BUENA, J.)
Sultan Usman Sarangani, Soraida M. Sarangani and Hadji Nor Hassan, in their
respective capacity as former Municipal Mayor, incumbent Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Madalum filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus urging us to nullify the Order
issued by the COMELEC, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion declaring
that Padian-Torogan as ghost precinct. Hence, should be abolished.
ISSUE:
Did respondent COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in declaring PadianTorogan as ghost precinct?
HELD: NO.
It is a time-honored precept that factual findings of the COMELEC based on its own
assessments and duly supported by evidence, are conclusive upon this Court, more so, in
the absence of a substantiated attack on the validity of the same. Upon review of the
records, the Court finds that the COMELEC had exerted efforts to investigate the facts and
verified that there were no public or private buildings in the said place, hence its conclusion
that there were no inhabitants. If there were no inhabitants, a fortiori, there can be no
registered voters, or the registered voters may have left the place. It is not impossible for a
certain barangay not to actually have inhabitants considering that people migrate. A
barangay may officially exist on record and the fact that nobody resides in the place does
not result in its automatic cessation as a unit of local government.
Under the Local Government Code of 1991, the abolition of a local government unit
(LGU) may be done by Congress in the case of a province, city, municipality, or any other
political subdivision. In the case of a barangay, except in Metropolitan Manila area and in
cultural communities, it may be done by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan or Sangguniang
Panglungsod concerned subject to the mandatory requirement of a plebiscite conducted for
the purpose in the political units affected. The findings of the administrative agency cannot
be reversed on appeal or certiorari particularly when no significant facts and circumstances
are shown to have been overlooked or disregarded which when considered would have
substantially affected the outcome of the case. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain
the true results of an election by means available to it. The assailed order having been
issued pursuant to COMELEC's administrative powers and in the absence of any finding of
grave abuse of discretion in declaring a precinct as non-existent, said order shall stand.

Judicial interference is unnecessary and uncalled for. No voter is disenfranchised because no

such voter exist. The sacred right of suffrage guaranteed by the Constitution is not
tampered when a list of fictitious voters is excluded from an electoral exercise. Suffrage is
conferred by the Constitution only on citizens who are qualified to vote and are not
otherwise disqualified by law. On the contrary, such exclusion of non-existent voters all the
more protects the validity and credibility of the electoral process as well as the right of
suffrage because the "electoral will" would not be rendered nugatory by the inclusion of
some ghost votes. Election laws should give effect to, rather than frustrate the will of the
people.
ELPIDIO SALVA, et al., v. CA & HON. ROBERTO MAKALINTAL, et al.
G.R. No. 132603, September 18, 2000, EN BANC (Buena, J.)
Petitioners, as officials and residents of barangay San Rafael, Batangas, filed a class
suit against the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, Sangguniang Pambayan of Calaca,
Batangas, and COMELEC for annulment of Ordinance No. 05 and Resolution No. 345, both
enacted by the Sangguniang Panglalawigan of Batangas, and COMELEC Resolution No.
2987. Ordinance No. 05 declared the abolition of barangay San Rafael and its merger with
barangay Dacanlao, municipality of Calaca, Batangas and accordingly instructed the
COMELEC to conduct the required plebiscite as provided under Sections 9 and 10 of the
LGC. Resolution No. 345 affirmed the effectivity of Ordinance No. 05, thereby overriding the
veto by the governor of Batangas. Ordinance No. 05 was vetoed by the Batangas governor
for being ultra vires as it was not shown that the essential requirements referring to the
attestations or certifications of the DOF, NSO and the LMB were obtained. The RTC denied
the ex parte motion for the issuance of a TRO and/or preliminary injunction for lack of
jurisdiction. According to the RTC, the TRO/injunction sought by petitioners is directed only
to COMELEC Resolution No. 2987. The RTC ruled that any petition or action questioning an
act, resolution or decision of the COMELEC must be brought before the SC.
ISSUE:
Does the respondent court have jurisdiction to enjoin COMELEC from implementing
its resolution which provided the rules and regulations for the conduct of the plebiscite to
decide on the abolition of Brgy. San Rafael and its merger with Brgy. Dacanlao?
HELD:
Yes. In Filipinas, the Court has likewise affirmed that the powers vested by the
Constitution and the law on the COMELEC may either be classified as those pertaining to its
adjudicatory or quasi-judicial functions, or those which are inherently administrative and
sometimes ministerial in character. As aptly explained by the Solicitor General, after the
COMELEC ascertained the issuance of the ordinance and resolution declaring the abolition of
barangay San Rafael, it issued COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 calling for a plebiscite to be
held in the affected barangays, pursuant to the provisions of Section 10 of Republic Act No.
7160. The Court agrees with the SolGen that the issuance of Resolution No. 2987 is thus a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC that is enjoined by law and is part and parcel of its
administrative functions. It involves no exercise of discretionary authority on the part of
respondent COMELEC; let alone an exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power to
hear and resolve controversies defining the rights and duties of party-litigants, relative to
the conduct of elections of public officers and the enforcement of the election laws. Briefly,
COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 which provides for the rules and regulations governing the
conduct of the required plebiscite, was not issued pursuant to the COMELECs quasi-judicial
functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct
of plebiscites, thus, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by
certiorari by this Court. Any question pertaining to the validity of said resolution may be well
taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

Even the cases cited by the public respondent in support of its contention that the
power to review or reverse COMELEC Resolution No. 2987 solely belongs to this Court are
simply not in point. Zaldivar vs. Estenzo speaks of the power of the COMELEC to enforce
and administer all laws relative to the conduct of elections to the exclusion of the judiciary.
In the present case, petitioners are not contesting the exclusive authority of the COMELEC
to enforce and administer election laws. Luison vs. Garcia refers to this Courts power to
review administrative decisions, particularly referring to a COMELEC resolution declaring a
certain certificate of candidacy null and void, based on Article X, Section 2 of the 1935
Constitution. In Macud vs. COMELEC, we reiterated that when a board of canvassers
rejects an election return on the ground that it is spurious or has been tampered with, the
aggrieved party may elevate the matter to the COMELEC for appropriate relief, and if the
COMELEC sustains the action of the board, the aggrieved party may appeal to this Court. In
both Luison and Macud, the assailed COMELEC resolutions fall within the purview of final
orders, rulings and decisions of the COMELEC reviewable by certiorari by this Court.
III. Creation and Abolition - Classification of provinces, cities, and municipalities
HERMIE HERRERA, et al., v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 131499, November 17, 1999, EN BANC (Purisima, J.)
In view of the addition of the 2 new municipalities, San Lorenzo and Sibunag to
Guimaras, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Guimaras decided to have the province
subdivided into 2 provincial districts. It passed Resolution No. 68 requesting the COMELEC
to bring about the desired division. Acting upon the said Resolution, the Provincial Election
Supervisor in Guimaras conducted 2 consultative which later issued a Memorandum
recommending the division of the Province of Guimaras into 2 provincial districts. The
Bureau of Local Government Finance of the DOF issued Memorandum Circular No. 97-1
reclassifying several provinces including Guimaras, which was reclassified from 5 th class to
4th class province. In line with such reclassification, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2950
which allotted 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan seats to Guimaras, dividing it into 2 provincial
districts. The division of provinces into districts and the corresponding apportionment, by
district, of the number of elective members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan are provided
for by law. Under Republic Act No. 6636, allotment of elective members to provinces and
municipalities must be made on the basis of its classification as a province and/or
municipality. Thus, a 4th class province shall have 8 Sangguniang Panlalawigan members.
ISSUE:
Is the apportionment of
disproportionate representation?

Guimaras

into

districts

not

equitable

due

to

HELD:
NO. Under R.A. 7166 and COMELEC Resolution No. 2313, the basis for division into
districts shall be the number of inhabitants of the province concerned and not the number of
listed or registered voters as theorized upon by petitioners. Thus, COMELEC did not act with
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution because clearly, the basis for the
districting is the number of inhabitants of the Province of Guimaras by municipality based
on the official 1995 Census of Population as certified to by Tomas P. Africa, Administrator of
the NSO.
III. Creation and Abolition - settlement of boundary disputes
CITY OF PASIG v. COMELEC & MUN. OF CAINTA
G.R. Nos. 125646 & 128663, September 10, 1999, EN BANC (Ynares-Santiago, J.)
Upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its
mother Brgys. Manggahan and Dela Paz, Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a
distinct barangay to be known as Brgy. Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and

approved Ordinance No. 21 creating Brgy. Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the
creation of said barangay was set. Pasig City similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating
Brgy. Napico and a plebiscite was also scheduled. Immediately upon learning of such
ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the respective plebiscites
scheduled. The Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case
before the RTC for settlement of boundary dispute. According to the Municipality of Cainta,
the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said
pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after
the said case shall have been finally decided by the court.
ISSUE:
Should the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Brgys. Karangalan and Napico be
suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the 2 local
governments?
HELD:
YES. The plebiscite on the creation of Brgy. Karangalan should be held in abeyance
pending final resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta by the RTC. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997
to ratify the creation of Barangay Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.
To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that the civil case
involving the boundary dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig
presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before plebiscites for the
creation of the proposed barangays may be held. In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig
vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico
are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether
the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the
proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the creation of a
barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an
issue raised in the pending civil case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to
define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays would only be an exercise in
futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra vires acts of such
barangays.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far
more prudent to hold in abeyance the conduct of the same, pending final determination of
whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are truly within the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Pasig. Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had
already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay Napico, the petition of the
Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised by
the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the
plebiscite for the creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the
Antipolo Regional Trial Court.
JUANITO MARIANO, JR., et al., v. COMELEC, et al.
G.R. Nos. 118577 & 118627, March 7, 1995, EN BANC (Puno, J.)
2 petitions assail certain provisions of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No.
7854 is entitled, An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City
to be known as the City of Makati. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the
land area or territorial jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions, in violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7

and 450 of the LGC. Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land area of the
proposed city of Makati which provided that The Municipality of Makati shall be converted
into a highly urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati over which it
has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by Pasig River and beyond by the City of
Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on the southeast by the municipalities of
Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig;
and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila. The foregoing provision shall be without
prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate agency or forum of existing boundary
disputes or cases involving questions of territorial jurisdiction between the City of Makati
and the adjoining LGUs.
ISSUE:
Did the delineation violate sections 7 and 450 of the LGC which requires that the
area of a LGU should be made by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions?
HELD:
NO. Any uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of
governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice the people's welfare which is the evil
sought to be avoided by the LGC. The Court cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about
by the description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854. Petitioners have not demonstrated that
the delineation of the land area of the proposed Makati will cause confusion as to its
boundaries. The said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously
covered by Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the
established land area of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that
the city's land area shall comprise the present territory of the municipality.
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the
land area of the proposed Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical
descriptions. At the time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute
between the municipalities of Makati and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court
litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to a co-equal department of government, the
legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide. They did not want to
foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide the issue.
This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact metes
and bounds, with technical descriptions. The Court takes judicial notice of the fact that
Congress has also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of
other LGUs with unsettled boundary disputes.
The Court holds that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an
insurmountable difficulty which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable
certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a LGU. Congress maintained the existing boundaries of
the proposed Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution
by the courts. The Court is not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 is
unconstitutional. Congress did not intend that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the LGC seeks to serve. The manifest
intent of the Code is to empower LGUs and to give them their rightful due. It seeks to make
LGUs more responsive to the needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a
vital cog in national development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no
cadastral type of description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit

of the Code. It then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other
way around. This could not be the intendment of the law.
MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA, vs. Hon. FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, Presiding Judge,
RTC of Ormoc City (Branch 35); and the CITY OF ORMOC
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
FACTS.
A boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of
Ormoc. However, no amicable settlement was reached when they submitted the issue in a
joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Ormoc City and the Sangguniang Bayan of
Kananga. Consequently, they elevated the issue to the RTC of Ormoc. Petitioner filed a
Motion to Dismiss on the following grounds:
1. The Honorable Court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim;
2. There is no cause of action;
3. That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been complied
with.
RTC denied the Motion and held that it had jurisdiction over the action under BP
Blg.129.
It further ruled that Section 118 of the Local Government Code had been
substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and
thresh out their differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via
a Resolution.
ISSUE.
WON the RTC of Ormoc City may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of
a boundary dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.
HELD.
YES; although Section 118 of the Local Government Code finds no application to the
instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should be applied. The applicable
provision is found in BP Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act of
1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Section 19(6) of this law provides:
Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction:
(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or
body exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.
Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of
discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all
controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They have the
power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first
time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power
is not only original, but also exclusive.
Why is Section 118 inapplicable in the case at bar?
Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a component city or a municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized
city on the other -- or between two or more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly
referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units
involved.

Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a

municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an
independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to
them.
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE v. MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
FACTS.
For the Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and
Canabuan, the Municipality of Sta. Fe submitted the issue before the RTC of Bayombong,
Nueva Vizcaya. The trial was almost over when the court realizing its oversight under
existing law, ordered the suspension of the proceedings and the referral of the case to the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 64
which resolves to adjudicate barangays Bantinan and Canabuan as parts of Aritaos
territorial jurisdiction. They then endorsed the dispute to the RTC for further proceedings.
In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The
RTC denied the motion ruling that since there was no amicable settlement in the
Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a decision favoring a party. Under the law in force, the
purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably settle with
the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement
is reached, the court proceedings shall be resumed. Respondent filed a motion praying for
the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide municipal
boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian.
The RTC granted the motion. The CA affirmed. According to the CA, a new
legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC
vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect. Since the LGC of 1991
is the latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary disputes
should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that
the laws on the creation of LGUs as well as settling boundary disputes are political in
character, hence, can be changed from time to time and the latest will of the people should
always prevail.
ISSUE.
WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction on the ground
that at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss the original jurisdiction to hear and
decide, the case had been vested on the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and no longer on the
RTC..
HELD.
NO; This Court held that the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
complaint when it was filed on October 16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section
2167 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Sec. 1 of RA 6128. Said law
granted the CFI the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving municipal boundary
disputes. The antecedents of the Municipality of Sogod case reveal that it dealt with the
trial courts dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction because at the time of the
institution of the civil actions, the law in force was the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the
RAC, which empowered the provincial boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such
cases.

Since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan has been the
primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or
among two or more municipalities located in the same province.
With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced that in the
event the Sanggunian fails to effect a settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to
that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the reglementary period.
Under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of
municipal boundary disputes.
The LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the Sanggunian concerned in resolving
cases of municipal boundary disputes. Aside from having the function of bringing the
contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable settlement of the
case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to
actually hear and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law
and its implementing rules and regulations. This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule
under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128. Moreover, only in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case.
Considering the foregoing, the RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to dismiss an action
whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Indeed, the RTC
acted accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of
jurisdiction was evident.
MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA v. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
FACTS.
By virtue of EO No.66, the Rancherias of Bugayong, Cabittaoran, Garnaden,
Padpadon, Padsan, Paorpatoc, Tibangran, and Uguis were united to form the township of
Nueva Era. On the other hand, the Municipality of Marcos was created by virtue of RA
3753. Section 1 of said Republic Act provides:
SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao,
Alabaan,
Ragas
and
Agunit
in
the Municipality of Dingras, Province ofIlocos Norte, are hereby
separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new and
separate municipality to be known as the Municipalityof Marcos,
with the following boundaries:
On the Northwest, by the barrios Biding-Rangay boundary going
down to the barrios Capariaan-Gabon boundary consisting of foot
path and feeder road; on the Northeast, by the Burnay River which
is the common boundary of barrios Agunit and Naglayaan; on the
East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary; on the
South, by the Padsan River which is at the same time the boundary
between the municipalities of Banna and Dingras; on the West and
Southwest, by the boundary between the municipalities of Batac
and Dingras.
The Municipality of Marcos shall have its seat of government in the
barrio of Biding.
There is no issue insofar as the first paragraph is concerned which named only
Dingras as the mother municipality of Marcos. The problem, however, lies in the description
of Marcos boundaries as stated in the second paragraph, particularly in the phrase: on the

East, by the Ilocos Norte-Mt. Province boundary.

It must be noted that the term
Mt. Province stated in the above phrase refers to the present adjoining provinces of
Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Kalinga and Apayao, which were then a single
province.
Nueva Era was between Marcos and Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary such that if
Marcos was to be bounded on the east by Ilocos Norte-Apayao boundary, it would
necessarily traverse a part of Nueva Era.
The Sangguniang Panlalawian of Ilocos Norte dismissed Marcos claim for lack of
merit. RTC affirmed SPs ruling. On appeal, CA expressed the view that Marcos adopted
the wrong mode of appeal because the said case was appealable only to the RTC.
Nonetheless, they took cognizance of the issue and reversed the ruling of SP and RTC.
ISSUE.
WON the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva
Era.
HELD.
NO. No part of Nueva Eras territory was taken for the creation of the Municipality of
Marcos. As provided in RA 3753, only those specifically enumerated barrios in
Dingras will form part of Marcos territory. Nueva Eras territory is, therefore,
excluded. Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing
implies the exclusion of another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things
upon which it is to operate, everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded
from its operation and effect. This rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based
upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind. Had the legislature
intended other barangays from Nueva Era to become part of Marcos, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language.
In relation to the procedural aspect, SC held that the CA erred in declaring that only
the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over SPs judgment on settlement of boundary disputes.
BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended by R.A. No.
7902, vests in the CA the appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards of RTCs and quasi-judicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards
or commissions, among others. CA need not treat the appeal via petition for review filed
by Marcos as a petition for certiorari to be able to pass upon the same. B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, which is supplemented by Rule 42 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, gives
the CA the authority to entertain appeals of such judgments and final orders
rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
NOTE. At the time Marcos was created, a plebiscite was not required by law to create a local
government unit. Hence, Marcos was validly created without conducting a plebiscite.
STA. LUCIA REALTY & DEVELOPMENT, INC. v. CITY OF PASIG
Settlement of Boundary Disputes
FACTS.
Sta. Lucia Realty & Development, Inc. is the registered owners of several parcels of
land located in Barrio Tatlong Kawaayan. The City of Pasig filed a complaint against Sta.
Lucia for the collection of real estate taxes. According to Sta. Lucia, the subject property is
within the boundaries of Cainta. Sta. Lucia have been paying their real estate taxes in
Cainta like their predecessors-in-interest did although the TCTs of the subject property
indicate that the properties were in the locality of Pasig.

Cainta has already filed a petition for the settlement of boundary dispute with Pasig
before the RTC of Antipolo when this complaint for collection of taxes was filed by Pasig.
RTC ruled that the TCTs were conclusive evidence as to ownership and location, therefore,
the subject properties were ruled to be in Pasig. CA, however, set aside the ruling of the
RTC, and said that the boundary dispute case presented a prejudicial question which must
be decided before Pasig can collect the realty taxes due over the subject properties. Pasig
sought to have the decision reversed in a petition for certiorari, eventually, CA affirmed
RTCs ruling and held that there can be on prejudicial question when the cases involved are
both civil.
ISSUE.
WON Sta. Lucia should continue paying its real property taxes to Cainta, as it alleged
to have always done, or to Pasig, as the location stated in Sta. Lucias TCTs.
HELD.
PREJUDICIAL QUESTION IS PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR.
While we fully agree that a certificate of title is conclusive as to its ownership and
location, this does not preclude the filing of an action for the very purpose of attacking the
statements therein. In Pioneer Insurance and Surety Corporation v. Heirs of Vicente
Coronado, we set aside the lower courts ruling that the property subject of the case was not
situated in the location stated and described in the TCT, for lack of adequate basis. Our
decision was in line with the doctrine that the TCT is conclusive evidence of ownership and
location. However, we refused to simply uphold the veracity of the disputed TCT, and
instead, we remanded the case back to the trial court for the determination of the exact
location of the property seeing that it was the issue in the complaint filed before it.
Although it is true that Pasig is the locality stated in the TCTs of the subject
properties, both Sta. Lucia and Cainta aver that the metes and bounds of the subject
properties, as they are described in the TCTs, reveal that they are within Caintas
boundaries. This only means that there may be a conflict between the location as stated
and the location as technically described in the TCTs. Mere reliance therefore on the face of
the TCTs will not suffice as they can only be conclusive evidence of the subject properties
locations if both the stated and described locations point to the same area.
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Pasig RTC should have held in abeyance
the proceedings in this civil case, in view of the fact that the outcome of the boundary
dispute case before the Antipolo RTC will undeniably affect both Pasigs and Caintas
rights. In fact, the only reason Pasig had to file a tax collection case against Sta. Lucia was
not that Sta. Lucia refused to pay, but that Sta. Lucia had already paid, albeit to another
local government unit. Evidently, had the territorial boundaries of the contending local
government units herein been delineated with accuracy, then there would be no controversy
at all.
In the meantime, to avoid further animosity, Sta. Lucia is directed to deposit
the succeeding real property taxes due on the subject properties, in an escrow account
with the Land Bank of the Philippines.
III. Creation and Abolition - principle and definition of devolution
DEMOCRITO D. PLAZA II V. CAROLINA M. CASSION
Before the passage of Republic Act No. 7160, the task of delivering basic social
services was dispensed by the national government through the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). Upon the promulgation and implementation of the Local
Government Code, some of the functions of the DSWD were transferred to the local
government units.

Through a resolution by Sangguniang Panglungsod, Mayor Democrito D. Plaza II

signed a Memorandum of Agreement for the Devolution of the DSWD to the City of Butuan.
Latters services, personnel, assets and liabilities, and technical support systems were
transferred to its city counterpart.
By virtue of the MOA, Mayor Plaza issued Executive Order (EO) No. 06-92 dated
reconstituting the City Social Services Development Office (CSSDO), devolving or adding
thereto 19 national DSWD employees headed by petitioner Virginia Tuazon, Social Welfare
Officer V. Mayor Plaza designated her Officer-in-Charge of the reconstituted CSSDO. Its
office was transferred from the original CSSDO building to the DSWD building.
The CSSDO was originally composed of herein respondents, headed by Carolina M.
Cassion, Social Welfare Officer IV. Aggrieved by such development, they refused to
recognize petitioner Tuazon as their new head and to report at the DSWD building. They
contended that the issuance of EO No. 06-92 by Mayor Plaza and the designation of
petitioner Tuazon as Officer-in-charge of the CSSDO are illegal.
Despite Mayor Plazas series of orders to respondents to report for work at the DSWD
building, they failed to do so. Hence, they were charged administratively for grave
misconduct and insubordination and were suspended. But they remain obstinate, so Mayor
Plaza decided issued an order dropping respondents from the rolls.
Issue:
Is Mayor Plaza empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give effect to the
devolution and have authority over the respondents?
Held:
Yes. Section 17 of the Local Government Code authorizes the devolution of
personnel, assets and liabilities, records of basic services, and facilities of a national
government agency to local government units. Under this Code, the term devolution
refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the
various local government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.
As a consequence of the devolution of national agencies, Executive Order No. 503
was enacted by then President Corazon C. Aquino to govern and ensure the efficient
transfer of responsibilities to the local government unit concerned. Section 2 (g) provides:
The local chief executive shall be responsible for all devolved functions. He may
delegate such powers and functions to his duly authorized representative whose position
shall preferably not be lower than the rank of a local government department head. In all
cases of delegated authority, the local chief executive shall at all times observe the principle
of command responsibility.
Section 2 (a) states that:
Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically
reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer which
shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.
Likewise, Section 22 of CSC Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of 1992, specifies
that:
The positions absorbed by the local government units from the national government
agencies shall be automatically created upon transfer of their corresponding budgetary
allocation. Devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local
chief executive concerned immediately upon their transfer. However, pending the
completion of the new organizational structure and staffing pattern, the local government

executives may assign devolved personnel

qualifications are best suited or appropriate.

to

divisions/sections/units

where

their

It is thus clear that Mayor Plaza is empowered to issue EO No. 06-92 in order to give
effect to the devolution decreed by the Local Government Code. As the local chief executive
of Butuan City, Mayor Plaza has the authority to reappoint devolved personnel and may
designate an employee to take charge of a department until the appointment of a regular
head, as was done by the Mayor here.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION V. DR. AGNES OUIDA P. YU.
In 1992, the national government implemented a devolution program pursuant to
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as the "The Local Government Code of
1991," which affected the Department of Health (DOH) along with other government
agencies. Prior to the devolution, Dr. Fortunata Castillo held the position of Provincial Health
Officer II (PHO II) of the Department of Health (DOH) Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga
City and was the head of both the Basilan Provincial Health Hospital and Public Health
Services. Respondent Dr. Agnes Ouida P. Yu, on the other hand, held the position of
Provincial Health Officer I (PHO I). She was assigned, however, at the Integrated Provincial
Health Office in Isabela, Basilan.
Upon the implementation of the devolution program, then Basilan Governor Gerry
Salapuddin refused to accept Dr. Castillo as the incumbent of the PHO II position that was
to be devolved to the local government unit of Basilan, prompting the DOH to retain Dr.
Castillo at the Regional Office No. IX in Zamboanga City where she would serve the
remaining four years of her public service.
Meanwhile, or two years after the implementation of the devolution program,
Governor Salapuddin appointed Dr. Yu to the PHO II position.
Through Republic Act No. 8543, The Basilan Provincial Hospital in the Municipality of
Isabela, Province of Basilan, was converted into a Tertiary Hospital Under the Full
Administrative and Technical Supervision of the Department of Health. The hospital
positions previously devolved to the local government unit of Basilan were re-nationalized
and reverted to the DOH. The Basilan Provincial Health Hospital was later renamed the
Basilan General Hospital, and the position of PHO II was then re-classified to Chief of
Hospital II.
While Dr. Yu was among the personnel reverted to the DOH with the renationalization of the Basilan General Hospital, she was made to retain her original item of
PHO II instead of being given the re-classified position of Chief of Hospital II. Subsequently,
then DOH Secretary Manuel M. Dayrit appointed Dr. Domingo Remus A. Dayrit to the
position of Chief of Hospital II.
Aggrieved, Dr. Yu filed a letter of protest before the CSC claiming that she has a
vested right to the position of Chief of Hospital II.
CSC initially ruled in favor of Dr. Yu, however upon MR it declared that the position
of PHO II was never devolved to the Provincial Government of Basilan but was retained by
the DOH. The PHO II position held by Dr. Yu was a newly-created position; and that,
therefore, she did not have a vested right to the Chief of Hospital II position.
Petitioner appealed to CA and ruled in her favor.
Issue: Is the PHO II position previously occupied by respondent Yu a devolved
position?
Held: Yes.

In pursuance of the declared policy under The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
No. 7160) to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
through a system of decentralization, national agencies or offices, including the DOH, were
mandated to devolve to the local government units the responsibility for the provision of
basic services and facilities.
Devolution" is the act by which the national government confers power and
authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and
responsibilities.[12] Specifically, Section 17(i) of the same Code prescribes the manner of
devolution, as follows:
(i) The devolution contemplated in this Code shall include the transfer to local
government units of the records, equipment, and other assets and personnel of national
agencies and offices corresponding to the devolved powers, functions and responsibilities.
Personnel of said national agencies or offices shall be absorbed by the local
government units to which they belong or in whose areas they are assigned to the extent
that it is administratively viable as determined by the said oversight committee: Provided,
further, That regional directors who are career executive service officers and other officers
of similar rank in the said regional offices who cannot be absorbed by the local government
unit shall be retained by the national government, without any diminution of rank, salary or
tenure.
To ensure the proper implementation of the devolution process, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 503, otherwise known as the "Rules
and Regulations Implementing the Transfer of Personnel and Assets, Liabilities and Records
of National Government Agencies Whose Functions Are To Be Devolved To The Local
Government Units And For Other Related Purposes," which laid down the following pertinent
guidelines with respect to the transfer of personnel:
Section 2. Principles and Policies Governing Transfer of Personnel.- a. Coverage,
Tenure, Compensation and Career Development.
xxx
2. The absorption of the NGA personnel by the LGU shall be mandatory, in which
case, the LGUs shall create the equivalent positions of the affected personnel except when it
is not administratively viable.
3. Absorption is not administratively viable when there is a duplication of functions
unless the LGU opts to absorb the personnel concerned.
4. The national personnel who are not absorbed by the LGUs under no. 3 above,
shall be retained by the NGA concerned, subject to civil service law, rules and regulations.
xxx
12. Except as herein otherwise provided, devolved permanent personnel shall be
automatically reappointed by the local chief executive concerned immediately upon their
transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992. xxx
On the basis of the foregoing, it was mandatory for Governor Salapuddin to absorb
the position of PHO II, as well as its incumbent, Dr. Fortunata Castillo. Highlighting the
absence of discretion is the use of the word "shall" both in Section 17 (i) of R.A. No. 7160
and in Section 2(a)(2) of E.O. No. 503, which connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a
statute denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion. The
only instance that the LGU concerned may choose not to absorb the NGA personnel is when
absorption is not administratively viable, meaning, it would result to duplication of
functions, in which case, the NGA personnel shall be retained by the national government.
However, in the absence of the recognized exception, devolved permanent personnel shall

be automatically reappointed [Section 2(a)(12)] by the local chief executive concerned

immediately upon their transfer which shall not go beyond June 30, 1992.
Assailed decision was AFFIRMED.
SPOUSES LEONOR AND ROSA BADUA V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION
In 1996.David Quema as the owner of 2 parcels of land in Lacaga, Lumaba,
Villaviciosa, Abra mortgaged said parcels of land of 6,000 to Dra. Erotida Valera. He was
able to redeem the land of 22 years later, long after Dra. Valera had already died. He
allegedly was able to pay the redemption price of Dra. Valeras heir. Spouses Leonor and
Rosa Badua alleged however that Dra. Valera sold the land to her while she was still alive.
However, Rosa could not produce the deed of sale because it was allegedly in the
possession of Vice-governor Benesa.
As Quema was prevented by Rosa from cultivating the land, he filed a case with the
Maeng Tribal Court of the Cordillera Bondong Administration (CBA) instead of provincial
level court. In 1989, The tribal court rule in favor of Quema. When spouses Badua refused
to vacate the subject land, they received a warning order from the Cordillera Peoples
Liberation Army. Spouses Badua later the filed for Special and Extraordinary relief with the
SC, questioning the jurisdiction and legal personality of the Maeng Tribal Court, the CBA and
the CPLA.
Issue:
Can a tribal court of the Cordillera Bodong Administration render a valid and executory
decision in a land dispute?
Held: No.
"Resolution No. 2259 of the Commission on Elections, insofar as it upholds the
creation of an autonomous region, the February 14, 1990 memorandum of the Secretary of
Justice, the February 5, 1990 memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No. 6861 are declared null and void while Executive Order
No. 220 is declared to be still in force and effect until properly repealed or amended."
As a logical consequence of that judicial declaration, the Cordillera Bodong
Administration created Under Section 13 of Executive Order No. 220, the indigenous and
special courts for the indigenous cultural communities of the Cordillera region (Sec. 1, Art.
VII, Rep. Act 6766), and the Cordillera People's Liberation Army, as a regional police force
or a regional command of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Secs. 2 and 4, Article XVIII
of R.A. 6766), do not legally exist. Since the Cordillera Autonomous Region did not come
into legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or
special court under R.A. No. 6766. Hence, the Maeng Tribal Court is an ordinary tribal court
existing under the customs and traditions of an indigenous cultural community.
Such tribal courts are not a part of the Philippine judicial system which consists of
the Supreme Court and the lower courts which have been established by law (Sec. 1, Art.
VIII, 1987 Constitution). They do not possess judicial power. Like the pangkats or
conciliation panels created by P.D. No. 1508 in the barangays, they are advisory and
conciliatory bodies whose principal objective to bring together the parties to a dispute and
persuade them to make peace settle, and compromise. An amicable settlement,
compromise, and arbitration award rendered by a pangkat, if not seasonably repudiated,
has the force and effect of a final judgment of a court (Sec. 11, P.D. 1508), but it can be
enforced only through the local city or municipal court to which the secretary of the Lupon
transmits the compromise settlement or arbitration award upon expiration of the period to
annul or repudiate it (Sec. 14, P.D. 1508). Similarly, the decisions of a tribal court based on
compromise or arbitration, as provided in P.D. 1508, may been enforced or set aside, in and
through the regular courts only.

Petition was GRANTED.