Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
By
David J. St. Clair
Professor
Department of Economics
California State University, East Bay
2013
Table of Contents
Chapter 1
Introduction: Economics and Decision Making
Economics is a social science concerned with how people go about
providing for their material well-being. As such, economics often focuses on
business activity. Indeed, economists were studying business activity decades
before the study of business (and business schools) emerged as a separate
academic inquiry.
The systematic study of economics began in the 18th century under the
term political economy. This name was changed to economics in the late
nineteenth century in order to distinguish the field from Marxist political economy.
Today, the term political economy continues to be associated with Marxism;
unless you are a comrade-in-training, it is probably best to stick with the new
name.
After the 1930s, economics split into two distinct (but still related) fields of
study: microeconomics and macroeconomics. Macroeconomics grew out of the
crippling impact of the Great Depression of the 1930s. In macroeconomics, the
focus is on how the overall (or aggregate) economy functions. Do we have full
employment or do we have unemployment? Are prices stable, or do we have
inflation? Are we growing or stagnating? Do non-market economic systems
perform better or worse than market economic systems? These are all primarily
macroeconomic questions.
Microeconomics is the branch of economics that focuses on how
individuals and business firms make decisions in markets. Microeconomics
attempts to explain how markets work, and why they might not work so well.
Microeconomics, like economics in general, has usually been policy-oriented,
that is, the emphasis has usually been on analyzing market outcomes with an
eye toward formulating the firms business strategy and/or public policies. For
example, should markets be allowed to function free of government control, or
should markets be closely regulated by government? Managerial Economics and
Business Strategy is a course in microeconomics taught with the business
manager in mind. As such, it should seek to present microeconomic concepts
and analysis in a manner most useful for business professionals.
Finally, the class and text seek to illustrate economic concepts with short
examples and cases. It is usually easier to understand a concept when it is
grounded in a real-world example. However, we will avoid long case studies
because these often obscure the point rather than highlight it. If the point of an
example or mini case is not readily apparent, you have either missed something,
or I have not done my job well.
and when, as well as who got what and why. People were seldom asked to make
choices, but they were constantly required to conform to tradition.
If you had traveled around in the pre-capitalist world, you would have
encountered societies with very different traditions, languages, costumes, diets,
religions, and customs. But while these societies may have all looked very
different on the surface, at their cores, they were all quite similar - tradition ruled
in each. In addition, all traditional economies have had remarkably similar
structures and features. The following have been typical of just about all
traditional economies:
1. Agriculture predominated
Through history, village economies have conformed to what economic
historian Carlo Cipolla termed The 90 10 Rule. According to Cipolla, village
societies always had about ninety percent of the population directly employed in
agriculture. The vast majority of workers had to work in agriculture due to their
very low (by modern standards) productivity. It took ninety percent of workers
tilling the soil in order to grow food for themselves as well as for the 10 percent
crust that worked outside of agriculture. The 10% crust included the educated,
well-fed, upper classes as well as craftsmen, merchants, soldiers, government
officials and members of the clergy. And the crust was quite thin; these citydwellers were little more than small scattered islands in a sea of peasants
2. Short, but not Sweet
The village economy was usually a place of too little too little food, too
little shelter, too little clothes (and no underwear), and too little years. In the notso-good-old days, men usually had a life expectancy in their mid-thirties; women
lived much shorter lives (child bearing took a terrible toll). The masses were
skinny and the rich were fat; fat was beautiful and the upper classes took great
care to differentiate themselves from the great unwashed through fashions such
as ridiculously long finger nails (i.e., proof that one never touched manual labor).
3. Markets were Few and Far Between
Tradition ruled the lives of peasants and markets were limited to the cities
and towns scattered across the sea of peasants. Most peasants might engage in
only a few market transactions during their lives; many none at all. And where
markets functioned, they were usually tightly regulated by suspicious officials. In
addition, merchants were not tradition-bound and were sometimes very upwardly
mobile. This drew the ire of the upper classes and put them in an awkward
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position; the upper classes enjoyed the products and variety that markets
brought them, but it was difficult for them to watch uppity merchants getting richer
than their social superiors. Distrust of markets and merchants has usually been a
feature of pre-capitalist economies (and many capitalist economies as well).
4. Stability, not Growth
Traditional economies and societies were structured for stability and
survival, not change and development. Equally important, people were not
accustomed to economic progress, nor did they expect economic progress. In
fact, the notion of a "good life to a peasant usually meant an absence of any
change (i.e., a good life was a life where nothing bad happened). In this world,
one generation took over from another, doing essentially the same things that
their parents did. They in turn sought to pass on their traditional lifestyle to the
next generation. Outside of the upper ranks of the nobility, people in traditional
economies seem to never have embraced the idea that things could get better for
themselves or for future generations; maintaining the status quo was thought to
be as good as it gets.
5. A World without Economists
In traditional economies, there was no systematic economic inquiry, nor
much interest in economic topics. The reasons for this largely reflect the features
discussed above; there was little need for or interest in economics because:
First, with little or no market activity, there was little need to understand markets.
Second, with tradition governing these economies, their workings were fairly
obvious. A casual observer spending a few days in a village could easily
understand the workings of the village economy. However, this has never been
the case with markets. Markets have always confused people, both educated as
well as uneducated. Markets have been so confusing because on first inspection,
it always appears that no one (or nothing) is in control. Market activity appears to
be chaotic, free, unstructured, unregulated, unplanned, and selfish. Markets have
been especially confusing to religious and secular authorities, and what people
do not understand, they mistrust. Third, since nothing much changed for the
better in traditional economies, there appeared to be little need for an economic
development strategy. Fourth, educated people in the crust went to great lengths
to separate themselves from the great unwashed masses and took virtually no
interest in the affairs of working people. For all of these reasons, a systematic
study of economics was inconceivable.
In the 18th century, Great Britain became the first country to break the
90-10 rule. This resulted from a revolution in agriculture that began in the 17th
century which dramatically increased productivity. The Agricultural Revolution
was followed by a further quickening of economic activity in the British Industrial
Revolution after 1750. As agricultural output increased dramatically, the share of
agricultural output and employment in agriculture began a relentless decline.
Today, agriculture employs less than 2 percent of workers in most developed
economies.
At the same time, markets expanded, industrial output surged, urban
areas grew, and the population exploded. From Britain, industrialization spread to
Western Europe and to areas of European settlement. On the other hand,
traditional village economies (or hybrid village economies) continued to persist in
most of the underdeveloped parts of the world today, with a large development
gap opening between the developed and underdeveloped parts of the world.
Today, some underdeveloped economies are in the midst of similar rapid
transformations; others however, are virtually dead in the water (i.e., they are
undeveloped and not going any where).
The successes of European economies lead to the development of
economics as a systematic science. The creation of economics was primarily
driven by the need to explain how markets worked, and by growing
dissatisfaction with mercantilist economic development policies. In 1776, Adam
Smith published An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
(Abbreviated title: The Wealth of Nations.) This was one of the first books
devoted to systematic economic inquiry and it established the field of economics.
It offered the reader a scathing criticism of mercantilism and made the case for
laissez-faire. Laissez-faire was a French term adopted by Smith to describe an
economic policy of limited government interference in markets.
When Smith began the study of economics, there was no division of
economics into microeconomics vs. macroeconomics. Smith and those who
followed him were primarily interested in policies that related to how markets
worked (microeconomics) and to in long term economic growth (microeconomics
and macroeconomics). Inquiry into business cycles (a part of macroeconomics)
largely developed as a sub-field of economics in the 19th century.
While this may seem very simple and basic, it was actually quite new at
the time. As noted above, pre-capitalist economies used markets sparingly and
references to economic issues were only scattered in among the writings of
scholars who were primarily concerned with ethics, politics, philosophy, or
theology.
In addition, these scattered discussions of economic issues found in the
writings of pre-capitalist scholars tended to deal entirely with economics from a
moral or ethical perspective. Most involved discussions of what people ought to
do, rather than what they actually did. Economists call this kind of ethics-oriented
discussion normative analysis. On the other hand, discussions about what
people actually do, and how the economy actually works, fall within the bounds of
positive analysis. It is fair to say that most (if not all) economic analysis before
the advent of market economies was normative.
For example, when it came to matters involving prices, pre-capitalist
scholars provided very little analysis of what actually determined market prices.
However, they got into heated discussion about what prices ought to be. In
Europe, these scholars usually argued that prices should be "just." In traditional
economies, prices were considered just when they served to maintain the correct
social order. Everyone, it was argued, had their correct place in society and
market transactions should not disrupt this order. When market prices were
unjust, they were too low or too high and people therefore fell or rose in rank as a
consequence. The doctrine of "Just Price" (and the numerous laws that it gave
rise to) were intended to protect society from unjust markets.
Profit and profit seeking were treated in similar fashion. St. Augustine, an
early leader of the Christian Church in Europe, condemned profit as sin because
making a profit was tantamount to theft. Augustine argued that profit was the
result of buying at one price and selling at another price. But, he reasoned, a
product could never have two different just prices. Consequently, the man who
earned a profit was a thief who had either paid too little for the product initially, or
had subsequently sold it too high. In the first case, he had stolen from the person
that he had bought it from; in the second case, he had stolen from his buyer. For
Augustine, the only interesting question about profit was the identity of the injured
party.
Notice that these discussions of prices and profits do not display any real
interest in explaining the process of price formation or the role of prices or profits
in economic activity. The analysis is normative, not positive, and served primarily
to restrict and condemn market transactions. This disapproval, or at least
distrust, of markets and merchants has been very common around the world in
pre-market societies. Merchants were usually relegated to the fringes of societies
or confined to lower social classes. For example, Aristotle argued that pirating
was a more honorable occupation than being a merchant. Similarly, in Japan,
merchants were at the bottom of the social order, one level above untouchables.
It was not until the thirteenth century that church scholars came to grips
with St. Augustine's condemnation of profits and market activity. The person
most responsible for exonerating profits and profit making was St. Thomas
Aquinas. Aquinas argued that profits were not necessarily sinful provided they
were not excessive and if the proceeds were put to a just purpose such as
supporting ones family, community, and church. (It is amazing how many
cathedrals can be financed from the offerings of merchants anxious about their
souls.) We will not go further into the details of this revolution in economic
thought. Suffice it to note here that Aquinas legitimized markets and profit
making, but he still offered little insight into how markets actually worked.
But European economies were developing through market activity and the
growing use of markets created a need to understand how markets actually
worked, not just how they ought to work. While not the first to wrestle with this
task, Adam Smiths Wealth of Nations was the most successful and firmly
grounded economics in positive analysis. To be sure, there was still plenty of
room for policy discussions and normative analysis, but following Smith, the
positive inquiry came first.
Smith dispensed with the normative-analysis-only perspective and boldly
proclaimed that people acted out of self-interest. People do things because they
figure that it is in their self-interest to undertake that action. Smith went on to
argue that markets channeled self-interest into actions that produced benefits for
society as a whole. Smith then returned to the normative issue and argued that
the pursuit of self interest was in fact good for society. Markets allowed people to
pursue their self-interest and channeled this selfish behavior into activities that
made society better off.
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readily identifiable by the use of such terms as "good," "bad," "should," "ought
to," "better," etc.
The critical point to note about the distinction between positive and
normative analysis is that good and bad are ethical terms, not economic terms.
There is nothing in economics that supports, defends, or rejects any ethical
position. Economists argue that people make rational decisions within their
ethical systems. It does not, and cannot, address the rationality or morality of
those beliefs.
There are some ethical propositions that have a rather large following and
are often assumed to be generally valid. For example, economists will often
proceed on the basis of a value judgment that more material goods is better than
less material goods. While most people have little trouble accepting this, there is
a counter perspective. If one believes that material possessions corrupt the soul,
then more material goods may lead one further from God. Therefore, less
material goods would be better than more material goods. Who is right? You will
have to decide this one for yourself - but the main point is that the battle must be
waged in the realm of religion, ethics, and value judgments, not economics.
Economic analysis cannot resolve this dispute and attempts to resolve any
normative question apart from its ethical underpinnings is doomed to failure.
11
13
Subjective
2.
3.
Relevant
14
15
16
entrenched in the southern English colonies? At different times, slavery has been
practiced all around the world. However, while England had a long feudal history,
slavery was almost unknown in recent times. It is commonly argued that southern
plantation owners (or soon-to-be plantation owners) resorted to slavery in order
to overcome a severe labor shortage. There is some truth in this claim; the
benefits and costs of slave labor were weighed and slavery was adopted. But
one must be careful to keep the issues separate. In weighing the costs versus
the benefits of slavery, Southerners were rational, but this is not an excuse or
even an adequate explanation. The real question is why was slavery considered
in the first place? That is not an economic question - it is an ethical matter.
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In all of the discussion of costs that follow in this course, we will assume
that a normal profit is an opportunity cost that is always a part of rational decision
making.
19
There are quite a few things that one could say about Franklin National.
On the positive side, the bank was a pioneer in developing the drive-up teller
window in 1950; it was an early issuer of bank credit cards in 1951; it was one of
the first banks to initiate a no-smoking policy in 1958; and it was a pioneer in
introducing outdoor teller machines at its branch banks in 1968. On the negative
side, there were persistent rumors linking the bank with the Mafia. However,
none of these allegations had much to do with the collapse; the demise of the
bank can be traced to a fundamental mistake in its lending policies.
Franklins lending strategy was simple: offer interest rates to borrowers
that were at least 1 percent above the average cost of the banks funds. It is hard
to see why a bank that charges more to lenders than it pays to its depositors and
creditors can go wrong, but a closer examination reveals the crucial error.
Like most banks at the time, Franklin got its money from four sources: 1)
invested capital; 2) demand deposits (that is, checking accounts) in the bank; 3)
savings deposits in the bank; and 4) funds borrowed in the federal funds market.
The first, capital invested, was rather small and often had to be retained to satisfy
reserve and capital requirements. The bulk of the funds for lending therefore
came from the other three sources.
In 1974, Franklin had demand deposits of about $2 billion and these
accounts cost the bank about 2.25%. Franklins savings accounts in 1974 totaled
about $1 billion dollars and cost the bank about 4% annually. Both of these
deposit sources were relatively low-cost sources of funds, but they were rather
inflexible. The banks deposits were already invested and additional funds from
these sources were limited to the growth of deposits.
The fourth source of funding was the federal funds market. This was a
market where banks lent and borrowed money on a very short term basis. The
federal funds market got its name from the practice of banks lending out their
excess funds (i.e., funds above their federal reserve requirements) to banks that
needed borrowed funds to meet their federal reserve requirements. Unlike
savings and checking deposits, federal funds market money was usually readily
available, but at much higher interest rates. In 1973 and 1974, Franklin Bank was
paying between 6% and 11% for these funds. In 1974, Franklin had acquired
about $1.7 billion from the federal funds market at these higher interest rates. On
average, these funds cost the bank about 10% during this period.
Using these figures, we can compute Franklins weighted average cost of
funds in 1974:
The weighted average cost of funds was:
$2 billion @ 2.25% + $1 billion @ 4% + $1.7 billion @ 10%
= 5.42%
$4.7 billion
20
On average, funds cost the bank 5.42%. Franklin then lent these funds out
at an average interest rate of about 6.5%. Other banks were generally charging
more than 10% to loan customers - no wonder customers were lined up for loans
at Franklin.
The problem with this strategy can be seen in the equation above. While
the average cost of funds was 5.42%, this rate only covered the funds obtained
from deposits. But all new loans had to be funded with money acquired in the
federal funds market. The interest rate for these funds was 10%, well above the
rate that the bank was charging its borrowers. Franklin was losing money on all
of these loans. Worse, while it was losing money, bank executives were happy
because they thought they were making money. (There is nothing worse than
being stupid with a dumb grin on your face.)
The banks error can be described in the terms introduced earlier in this
chapter: Franklin Bank was losing money because it did not recognize that the
relevant cost of funds was the marginal cost, not the average cost. In economics
and business, marginal always means the next one, or the last one, or the
incremental one, etc. In decision making (e.g., the decision to make a loan) the
relevant cost is usually the marginal or incremental cost.
In the case of Franklin, the next loan was going to be funded with money
from the federal funds market that cost about 10%. This was the marginal cost of
funds and the marginal cost of funds should have been the relevant cost for the
banks lending decisions. The average cost of bank funds (5.42%) was irrelevant
because the next loan was not going to be funded with deposit funds. Franklin
would have been on sound footing if it had lent money at interest rates 1% above
its marginal cost of funds rather than its average costs. When Franklin borrowed
money at 10% in order to fund a loan made to a customer at a 6.5% interest rate,
the bank lost money. More than a third of the banks loans were made where the
marginal cost of funds exceeded the interest rates charged to the banks
customers. You cannot make money this way. In addition, every loan made
under these terms further weakened the bank.
In the real world, there is no big neon sign that lights-up to announce that
you have made a mistake and are about to pay for it. Instead, when a problem
arises, you are usually drained trying to figure out what is wrong. Unfortunately,
Franklin never did figure it out. They were making loans, but not money, and
could not figure out why.
In addition, as the bank grew weaker and weaker, management became
ever more desperate. As a consequence, the bank began to pursue greater
returns, but only at the cost of assuming greater risks. Franklin began to
speculate in risky foreign exchange markets. When these positions turned sour,
the bank went into bankruptcy. However, while the risky investments in the
foreign exchange market were the immediate cause of the banks demise, the
real cause was the banks fatal error in not understanding that it was marginal
costs - not average costs - that were relevant. (In an interesting parallel, the
investment banks that failed in 2008 Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill
21
Lynch all seem to have resorted to similar speculative Hail Mary strategies
just prior to their demise. But in these cases as well, the final desperate
speculation was more consequence than cause.)
In the discussion of Columbus, we noted that some mistakes do in fact
pay off Columbus and Isabel never got nailed for screwing up. In the case of
Franklin, we return to the norm the mistake ended up bankrupting the bank.
One can only hope that the six-figure executives who made the mistake received
their fair share of pain and suffering.
While we have emphasized that average cost were not relevant to
Franklins business model, it should be pointed out that its average cost were
perfectly relevant to another question, that is, the accounting question. To
determine profits, one could look at the average cost of funds and then at the
interest rates charged in order to determine a profit margin. This could then be
multiplied by the amount of funds lent in order to calculate total profits.
This calculation would be relevant for accounting purposes, but it is
definitely not relevant for determining how much to charge for your next loan. In
decision-making, marginal costs are usually the only costs that matter.
[Source note: Some data cited above was obtained from: Robert Thomas, Microeconomic
Applications: Understanding the American Economy (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1981): 87-91.]
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something quite appealing to seeing what just came out of those dirty pores. In
fact, if your friends are around, what will you do? That is right, you will show them
this is too good not to be shared. This is an implicit, subjective benefit that is at
the heart of the companys business model (I assure you, there is someone at
Biore right now who is working on how to promote strip-viewing parties or some
such devises).
Now that we have taken care of hygiene, lets consider a case where a
failure to distinguish relevant from irrelevant costs led to some unwarranted
criticism.
23
24
4. Were the critics correct in calling for a Golden Fleece Award for
NASA? Why or why not?
5. When would the $4.6 billion annual Space Shuttle budget be a
relevant economic cost?
6. Suppose that a space shuttle launch had already been scheduled
and was going to take place regardless of whether the Hubble fix
was aboard. What would be the relevant shuttle cost in the decision
to accept (and price) the Hubble launch?
7. Suppose the scenario in # 6 above applies except that undertaking
the Hubble project on this flight would require not undertaking
another science project that NASA was charging $35 million for?
What would the relevant economic costs be of undertaking the
Hubble project on this launch?
8. Note that the critics never raised the issue as to whether the
Hubble project might have been willing (or forced) to pay more than
$378 million because NASA was the only space launch available
(that is, there was no other game in town). Might this have been a
relevant opportunity cost and a legitimate criticism?
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For example, while an airline flight will consume a lot of fuel and incur a
rather hefty fuel bill, the only relevant part of this cost to the discounting issue is
the incremental fuel cost. The incremental fuel cost is the extra fuel needed to
carry an additional passenger in that empty seat. How much do you think that is?
You are correct - it is next to nothing. In other words, the accounting fuel costs
are very high, but the relevant incremental costs are very low.
What about the flight crew costs? The airlines have to pay for a pilot and a
co-pilot (and perhaps a third navigator on some flights). This is a substantial
labor cost. However, while it is relevant to accounting, it is completely irrelevant
to the discounting decision because the crew is going (and going to be paid)
regardless of whether there is a passenger sitting in a seat.
Cabin personnel costs (that is flight attendants, etc.) are similar. Most
flight attendant costs are sunken and therefore irrelevant (the flight attendants
are going anyway, regardless of the number of passengers). The only relevant
incremental flight attendant costs would be the costs associated with bringing
another flight attendant in to handle a very booked flight (in other words, if the
discounting is very successful in filling the plane).
What about relevant food costs? The additional cost of an in-flight meal
and beverage would be a relevant incremental cost. How much is that? If you
have eaten airplane food, you know it isnt much. (On Southwest Airlines,
incremental food costs are a soft drink and a bag of peanuts two bags if you
are lucky.)
And what about landing fees? Most landing fees are based on the type of
plane. In this case, there are no relevant incremental landing fees. If landing fees
are based on passenger count, then the incremental landing fee cost is the extra
fees due because the seat is occupied.
The same analysis applies to the other costs associated with discounting
tickets: incremental risk costs, incremental baggage handling costs, incremental
overhead and administration costs, etc. are all ridiculously small. Is it any wonder
that airlines can offer such step discounts when the relevant costs are so low? Of
course not.
About fifteen years ago, I had a student in this class who worked for
American Airlines. At the time, the CEO of American Airlines had announced that
American was going to stop the practice of discounting. I offered that it was not
going to happen because the benefit/cost scenario overwhelmingly favored
discounting; she insisted that the company was serious about ending the
practice. After great fanfare, Americans no-discounting policy was quietly
abandoned.
This description of the relevant costs of ticket discounting is incomplete. In
fact, we have not brought up the only significant cost of discounting lost full-fare
ticket sales. This is an opportunity cost that is measured by the lost revenue that
occurs when a customer who would have otherwise paid full-fare manages to
purchase a discounted ticket instead.
26
lower acquisition costs. These firms have had advertising campaigns that point
out that their cars retain their value very well, thus reducing their acquisition
costs.
If you shop at stores with liberal return policies, you are probably already
aware of the point that economists are trying to make here. Exchange and refund
policies certainly impact acquisition costs, but customers need to pay particular
attention to how a refund or return or buy-back guarantee is worded. For
example, a number of years ago, the Avis Car Rental Company was selling its
surplus car rentals as used cars with a full-price buy back guarantee. A buyer
could buy an Avis car and then return it within three days for a full-price buy
back. However, note that a guaranteed full-price buy-back is very different from a
full-refund return. With a refund, sales tax is returned to the buyer. However, a
buy-back constitutes a separate transaction in which the purchase price is
returned, but the sales taxes paid are not refunded.
Avis chose to do a buy-back rather than a refund. Why? The answer is:
making the guarantee a buy-back rather than a refund significantly raised the
acquisition cost and reduced the number of returns. Avis could advertise a
money-back guarantee while simultaneously minimizing the number of
customers who might actually return their vehicles. Of course, this strategy was
clearly predicated on the assumption that buyers would not understand the
distinction up front.
The economic definition of acquisition costs can also be used to explain
how goods with identical prices can have very different acquisition costs. For
example, products that are special ordered are likely to have higher acquisition
costs compared to in-stock products with the same price. The difference stems
from the likely re-sale scenario. Estimating an immediate re-sale value for special
order products requires that you consider the likelihood of connecting with two
very different types of buyers: a) connecting with a buyer who, like you, is
interested in the special features, or b) connecting with one of the more
numerous buyers that is more interested in the non-customized product. Since
you are anticipating the future, your determination is both subjective and risky. In
this case, the acquisition cost of a special-order product would be:
Acquisition cost Spec = Purchase price - [(P gen buyer ) (general re-sale value)
+ (P special buyer ) (special buyer re-sale value)]
In the formula above, P represents the probability of connecting with
each type of buyer (i.e., a special buyer or a general buyer).
As an example, consider the acquisition cost of ordering a black wedding
dress. We wont ask why you want one - our task is to only note the difference in
acquisition costs. First, lets agree that you are not going to be able to return this
dress to a traditional bridal store. (It might be a different story if you bought it at
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Goths-R-Us Bridal Boutique, but lets not go there.) To estimate the immediate
re-sale value, you would need to determine the different types of buyers who
might be interested in buying a black wedding dress. In addition, you would need
to estimate prices that each group might be willing to pay as well as the
probability of finding different types of buyers.
I can think of three types of buyers: a) people who want a black wedding
dress; b) people who would not be caught dead in a black wedding dress, and; c)
people who might buy the dress to go to a funeral.
The first group would probably be very excited about the dress and would
be willing to pay quite a bit for it. However, I suspect that the probability of finding
such a person is very low. The second group is very numerous and the
probability of finding one of these buyers is very high, however, they will probably
pay next to nothing for it. As for the third group, I suspect that they are not very
numerous and that they would not pay very much for the dress. (Funerals are not
really fashion events and a black wedding dress might be over-dressing.)
I do not have actual probabilities or re-sale values, but I would confidently
estimate that the combined resale value would be quite low and the acquisition
cost correspondingly high.
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these assets as non-specific assets. Obviously, asset specificity runs the full
spectrum from highly specific assets to completely general or non-specific.
Why would assets be specific? We can identify the following factors
affecting the degree to which assets might be specific to a particular deployment:
30
To illustrate how this affects the size of the capital requirement and
therefore the size of the barrier to entry, consider the following extreme example:
Suppose one industry requires a capital commitment of $5 million while a second
industry requires a capital commitment of only $3 million. It looks like the first
industry might have the higher barriers to entry because the capital requirement
to enter is 67% higher. However, the relevant cost ought t be the acquisition cost
rather that prices of the capital because acquisition costs are better measures of
what the new entrants actually are risking in their attempt to enter. Suppose the
first industry with the $5 million capital costs entails investments that are very
non-specific. Suppose that immediate re-sale could recover 80% of the initial
cost. This means that entrants into the first entry would be committing to a
potential loss of $1 million (i.e., $5 million - $4 million).
Suppose the second industry with the $3 million capital requirement must
be spent on highly specific investments. In this case, resale is restricted and the
firm can only expect to recover 30% of its initial investment on resale. In this
case, the firms acquisition cost will be $2.1 million (i.e., $3 million - $900,000).
While capital requirements for an entering firm are much lower in the
second industry, highly-specific capital actually creates a much higher acquisition
costs and therefore a greater barrier to entry. Indeed, capital specificity is quite
often more important than the size of the capital requirement in creating a barrier
to entry.
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bell curve would TV content providers aim for? Of course, they aim for the middle
where the bulk of the viewers are. Do you think they would have an interest in a
show that might be very different and innovative and appealing to the fringes?
The answer is no because the numbers are not on the fringes. As a
consequence, broadcast TV content tends to gravitate to the bland middle the
shows all seem pretty similar.
HBO makes money when cable and satellite providers carry HBO
programming. Cable and satellite providers will subscribe to HBO if HBO brings
them cable and satellite TV subscribers. Note that HBO is not looking for a large
viewing audience as much as it is looking for people who want to subscribe to
HBO (via a cable or satellite subscription). For simplicity, we are ignoring the
possibility that the cable station might sell advertisement around HBO content.
Again, this is an oversimplified description of the HBO model, but it is
sufficient to make the connection between content and programming. Rather
than shoot for a larger viewing audience for a show, HBO wants to appeal to the
largest group of potential subscribers. The best way to appeal to a potential
subscriber is to offer something on HBO that they will not find elsewhere. This
has lead HBO to seek out different types of programming to appeal to a broad
spectrum of tastes. The key point here is that they do not have to appeal to
viewers on a per show basis, but rather on a combined programming basis. Not
everyone likes the Sopranos or Six Feet Under or boxing matches. But HBO
does not have to get everyone to like all of its shows; it just has to get you
passionately involved in any one of them to make you a subscriber.
As a consequence, HBO programming has been bold, innovative, and
deliberately diverse. This has been reflected in Emmy Awards. HBO and similar
providers have routinely won more awards for their shows than their broadcast
television counterparts. The difference is not a matter of talent as much as it is a
matter of different relevant benefits in different business models.
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