KULAYAN v.

TAN
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465 of
the Local Government Code.
FACTS.
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is
exclusive to the President.

Three members from the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were kidnapped in the vicinity of
the Provincial Capitol in Patikul, Sulu.
Andres Notter, Eugenio Vagni, and Marie Jean Lacaba, were purportedly inspecting a water sanitation project
for the Sulu Provincial Jail when they were seized by three armed men who were later confirmed to be
members of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG).

A Local Crisis Committee, later renamed Sulu Crisis Management Committee (Committee) was then formed to
investigate the kidnapping incident. The Committee convened under the leadership of respondent Abdusakur Mahail
Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu.
Governor Tan issued Proclamation No. 1, Series of 2009, declaring a state of emergency in the province of Sulu. The
Proclamation cited the kidnapping incident as a ground for the said declaration, describing it as a terrorist act pursuant
to the Human Security Act (R.A. 9372). It also invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A.
7160), which bestows on the Provincial Governor the power to carry out emergency measures during man-made and
natural disasters and calamities, and to call upon the appropriate national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder
and lawless violence.
In the Proclamation, Tan called upon the PNP and the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF) to set up checkpoints and
chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions necessary to ensure public safety.Petitioners, Jamar Kulayan, et al. claimed that Proclamation No. 1-09 was issued ultra vires, and thus null and void, for
violating Sections 1 and 18, Article VII of the Constitution, which grants the President sole authority to exercise
emergency powers and calling-out powers as the chief executive of the Republic and commander-in-chief of the armed
forces.
ISSUE: Whether or not a governor can exercise the calling-out powers of a President
HELD:
NO; It has already been established that there is one repository of executive powers, and that is the President
of the Republic. This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the Constitution speaks of executive power, it is
granted to the President and no one else.
Corollarily, it is only the President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under
Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under Section
7, Article VII thereof. While the President is still a civilian, Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution mandates that
civilian authority is, at all times, supreme over the military, making the civilian president the nations supreme military
leader. The net effect of Article II, Section 3, when read with Article VII, Section 18, is that a civilian President is the
ceremonial, legal and administrative head of the armed forces. The Constitution does not require that the President
must be possessed of military training and talents, but as Commander-in-Chief, he has the power to direct military

operations and to determine military strategy. Normally, he would be expected to delegate the actual command of the
armed forces to military experts; but the ultimate power is his.
Given the foregoing, Governor Tan is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding.
In issuing the assailed proclamation, Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency and
called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force.
The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive to the President. An exercise by another
official, even if he is the local chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Section 465
of the Local Government Code.

HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PETITIONERS, VS. HON.
EUFEMIO DOMINGO AND THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
On Sept 27, 1988, the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60, which
provided for burial assistance program by the office of the mayor. Said program aims to extend financial assistance of
P500 to bereaved families whose gross income does not exceed P2, 000. The Metro Manila Council approved the
Resolution but the COA disapproved it, disallowing in audit the disbursement of funds for the implementation thereof.
Mayor Jejomar Binay now petitions the SC that the Resolution be declared a valid exercise of the police power.
ISSUE. WON the Resolution is an invalid exercise of police power for having no perceptible connection to the public
safety, health, morals or general welfare and violates the equal protection clause since it only benefits few individuals
RULING.
NO. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good
order or safety and general welfare of the people. In Sangalang vs. IAC, we ruled that police power is not capable of an
exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensiveness. Its scope,
over-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done, provides
enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but not to
exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and convenience as
consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in a broad sense includes all
legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is
especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security, health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is
not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal with conditions which exist so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare
of the people by promoting public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation
of comfort of the inhabitants of the corporation. Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to frame any definition
which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
Apparently, COA tries to redefine the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public safety,
general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
Furthermore, there is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As
correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared
towards state policies to provide adequate social, the promotion of the general welfare, social justice as well as human
dignity and respect for human rights." The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for
the poor has long been an accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good. Thus, paupers
may be reasonably classified and different groups may receive varying treatment.
Petition granted.

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ, et al., PETITIONERS, VS. THE HONORABLE EDGARDO L. PARAS, et al.,
RESPONDENTS.

FACTS
The Municipal Council of Bocaue, Bulacan passed Ordinance No. 84 which among others, state: Being the
principal cause in the decadence of morality and because of their other adverse effects on the community as explained
above no operator night club, cabarets and dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the
jurisdiction of the municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and
professional dance for employment in any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition x x x shall include the
prohibition in the renewal thereof.
Vicente de la Cruz and other club owners assailed this Ordinance contending that the municipality had no
authority to prohibit a lawful business or calling. The lower court dismissed the petitions, upholding in the name of
police power the validity of the assailed ordinance.
ISSUE. WON the reliance on the police power is sufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance
RULING.
NO. Police power is granted to municipal corporations in general terms as follows: "General power of council
to enact ordinances and make regulations. The municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such
regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and
duties conferred upon it by law and such as shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and
safety, promote the prosperity, improve the morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the
municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of property therein."
In United States v. Salaveria, where the present Administrative Code provision was applied, it was stated by this
Court thru Justice Malcolm that, "x x x It is a general rule that ordinances passed by virtue of the implied power found
in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of the corporation, and
not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State."
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term
reasonable. The objective of fostering public morals, a worthy and desirable end can be attained by a measure that does
not encompass too wide a field. Certainly the ordinance on its face is characterized by overbreadth. The purpose
sought to be achieved could have been attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition.
The admonition in Salaveria should be heeded: "The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is
not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation." It is clear that in the guise of a
police regulation, there was in this instance a clear invasion of personal or property rights, personal in the case of those
individuals desirous of patronizing those night clubs and property in terms of the investments made and salaries to be
earned by those therein employed.
Decision of the lower court is reversed and set aside.

CITY OF MANILA, et al., PETITIONERS VS. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., AS PRESIDING
JUDGE, RTC, MANILA AND MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
RESPONDENTS.
FACTS
Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business
of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed
as a motel although duly accredited with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC assailed the constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 7783, insofar as it prohibits all person, partnership, corporation or entity to contract or engage in, any
business providing certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community in the Ermita-Malate area.
The RTC, thru Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision declaring the Ordinance void.
Petitioners contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power
of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units. Thus, it is a valid exercise of police
power.
ISSUE. WON the questioned Ordinance is ultra vires and is not a valid exercise of police power
RULING.
YES. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the
corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
Anent the first criterion, ordinances shall only be valid when they are not contrary to the Constitution and to
the laws. The Ordinance must satisfy two requirements: it must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the
test of consistency with the prevailing laws. That ordinances should be constitutional uphold the principle of the
supremacy of the Constitution. The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the
precept that local government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation
of legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City
Council acting as agent of Congress. But such police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be reasonable
and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power
as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws. The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that
almost every sentence thereof violates a constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the
cardinal rights of persons enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts
at rendering them worthless.
Petition denied.

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION AND STA. MESA TOURIST &
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. CITY OF MANILA, REPRESENTED BY
MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, RESPONDENT.

FACTS
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Lim signed into a law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An
Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels,
Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila. On December 15,
1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for
a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila represented by
Mayor Lim with the prayer that the Ordinance be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), et al. filed a motion to intervene and to
admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as
operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The RTC issued a TRO directing the City to cease and desist from
enforcing the Ordinance. The City alleges that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power. The RTC
rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. On a petition for review on certiorari, the CA reversed the
decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. It held that the virtually limitless reach of
police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful objective of
the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are
still allowed to operate
ISSUE. WON the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power
RULING.
NO. Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to
underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response
as the conditions warrant. Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right
to protect itself and its people. Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the
State. The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit
sex, prostitution, drug use and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit
of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends does not sanctify any and all means for their
achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to
enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must
not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners
of lucrative business ties in with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power
measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work (active police work would be more effective).
More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for

its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into
private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc, the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or
property is affected. However, this is not in any way meant to take it away from the vastness of State police power
whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity.
Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

CONCEPCION PARAYNO VS. JOSE JOVELLANOS AND THE MUNICIPALITY OF CALASIAO,

PANGASINAN
Facts:

Petitioner, Concepcion Parayno, was the owner of a gasoline filling station in Calasiao, Pangasinan. In 1989,
some residents of Calasiao petitioned the Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality for the closure or transfer of the
station to another location. The matter was referred to the Municipal Engineer, Chief of Police, Municipal Health
Officer and the Bureau of Fire Protection for investigation. Upon their advise, the Sangguniang Bayan recommended to
the Mayor the closure or transfer of location of petitioner's gasoline station.
In Resolution No. 50, it declared:
a) the existing gasoline station is a blatant violation and disregard of the Official Zoning Code
b) b. The gasoline station remains in thickly populated area with commercial/residential buildings, houses close to
each other which still endangers the lives and safety of the people in case of fire
c) The residents of our barangay always complain of the irritating smell of gasoline most of the time especially
during gas filling
d) xxx the gasoline station violated Building and Fire Safety Codes because the station has 2nd floor storey
building used for business rental offices, with iron grilled windows, no firewalls. It also endangers the lives of
people upstairs.
e) It hampers the flow of traffic, the gasoline station is too small and narrow, the entrance and exit are closed to
the street property lines.
Issue: Was the closure/ transfer of the gasoline filling station by respondent municipality an invalid exercise of the
latter's police powers?
Held:

Yes. Respondent municipality invalidly used its police powers in ordering the closure/transfer of petitioner's
gasoline station. While it had, under RA 7160, the power to take actions and enact measures to promote the health and
general welfare of its constituents, it should have given due deference to the law and the rights of petitioner.
A local government is considered to have properly exercised its police powers only when the following requisites are
met:
1. the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of
the State and
2. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and
not unduly oppressive.
The first requirement refers to the equal protection clause and the second, to the due process clause of the
Constitution.
Respondent municipality failed to comply with the due process clause when it passed Resolution No. 50. While it
maintained that the gasoline filling station of petitioner was less than 100 meters from the nearest public school and
church, the records do not show that it even attempted to measure the distance, notwithstanding that such distance was
crucial in determining whether there was an actual violation of Section 44. The different local offices that respondent
municipality tapped to conduct an investigation never conducted such measurement either.
Petition Granted.

HON. MA. LOURDES C. FERNANDO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CITY MAYOR OF MARIKINA CITY VS.
ST. SCHOLASTICA'S COLLEGE AND ST. SCHOLASTICA'S ACADEMY-MARIKINA, INC.,
RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
The petitioners, the officials of the City Government of Marikina, enacted Ordinance No. 192 entitled
Regulating the Construction of Fences and Walls in the Municipality of Marikina. According to the ordinance, high fences or
walls did not actually discourage but, in fact, even protected burglars, robbers, and other lawless elements from the view
of outsiders once they have gained ingress into these walls. Hence, fences not necessarily providing security, but
becomes itself a security problem. Part of the said ordinance were:
Section 3. The standard height of fences or walls allowed under this ordinance are as follows:
(1) Fences on the front yard shall be no more than one (1) meter in height. Fences in excess of one
(1) meter shall be of an open fence type, at least eighty percent (80%) see-thru;
Section 5. In no case shall walls and fences be built within the five (5) meter parking area allowance
located between the front monument line and the building line of commercial and industrial
establishments and educational and religious institutions.
Respondent St. Scholasticas College (SSC) and St. Scholasticas Academy-Marikina, Inc. (SSA-Marikina), is the owner
of four (4) parcels of land measuring a total of 56,306.80 square meters, located in Marikina Heights. The property is
enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built some thirty (30) years ago. Abutting the fence along the West Drive are
buildings, facilities, and other improvements.They argued that the petitioners were acting in excess of jurisdiction in
enforcing Ordinance No. 192, asserting that such contravenes Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. That
demolishing their fence and constructing it six (6) meters back would result in the loss of at least 1,808.34 square
meters, worth about P9,041,700.00, along West Drive, and at least 1,954.02 square meters, worth roughly
P9,770,100.00, along East Drive. It would also result in the destruction of the garbage house, covered walk, electric
house, storage house, comfort rooms, guards room, guards post, waiting area for visitors, waiting area for students,
Blessed Virgin Shrine, P.E. area, and the multi-purpose hall, resulting in the permanent loss of their beneficial use. The
respondents, thus, asserted that the implementation of the ordinance on their property would be tantamount to an
appropriation of property without due process of law; and that the petitioners could only appropriate a portion of their
property through eminent domain. They also pointed out that the goal of the provisions to deter lawless elements and
criminality did not exist as the solid concrete walls of the school had served as sufficient protection for many years.
Issue: Are Sections 3.1 and 5 of Ordinance No. 192 valid exercises of police power by the City Government of
Marikina?
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 192 was passed by the City Council of Marikina in the apparent exercise of its police
power. To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to
free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court the rational relationship
test and the strict scrutiny test:
The Court have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the
rational basis examination, laws or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental
interest. Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of less
restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather
than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
Even without going to a discussion of the strict scrutiny test, Ordinance No. 192, series of 1994 must be struck down
for not being reasonably necessary to accomplish the Citys purpose. More importantly, it is oppressive of private rights.
Under the rational relationship test, an ordinance must pass the following requisites as discussed in Social Justice Society
(SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.:
As with the State, local governments may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if the
following requisites are met:
1. the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise and

2. the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals. In short, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police power measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion
into private rights and a violation of the due process clause.
The Court cannot accommodate the petitioner. For Section 3.1 to pass the rational relationship test, the petitioners
must show the reasonable relation between the purpose of the police power measure and the means employed for its
accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to
private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
The principal purpose of Section 3.1 is to discourage, suppress or prevent the concealment of prohibited or unlawful
acts. The ultimate goal of this objective is clearly the prevention of crime to ensure public safety and security. The
means employed by the petitioners, however, is not reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of this purpose and is
unduly oppressive to private rights.
Compelling the respondents to construct their fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus, a clear
encroachment on their right to property, which necessarily includes their right to decide how best to protect their
property. It also appears that requiring the exposure of their property via a see- thru fence is violative of their right to
privacy, considering that the residence of the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property.
Petition was Granted.

THE ILOILO ICE AND COLD STORAGE COMPANY V. THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO ET
AL.
The Municipal Council of Iloilo granted the Iloilo Ice Cold Storage Company (ICS) authority to construct an ice cold
storage plant in the city of Iloilo. Sometime after the plant had been completed and was in operation, nearby residents
made complaints to the defendant that the smoke from the plant was very injurious to their health and comfort.
Thereupon the defendant appointed a committee to investigate and report upon the matters contained in said
complaints. The committee reported that the complaints were well founded. Petioner was given one month to proceed
with the elevation of said smokestacks, otherwise, the municipal president will execute the order requiring the closing or
suspension of operations of said establishment.
Petitioner alleges that defendants threatened them to require compliance with said resolution administratively and
without the intervention of the court, and by force to compel the closing and suspension of operations of the plaintiff's
machinery and consequently of the entire plant, should the plaintiff not proceed with the elevation of the smokestacks
to one hundred feet, which the plaintiff maintains it is not obliged to do and will not do.
Issue: Does the power delegated to a municipal council under section 39 (j) of the Municipal Code commit to the
unrestrained will of that body the absolute power of declaring anything to be a nuisance?
Held:
No. The municipal council is, under section 39 (j) of the Municipal Code, specifically empowered "to declare
and abate nuisances." A nuisance is, according to Blackstone, "Anything that worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damage."
Nuisances have been divided into two, classes: Nuisances per se, and nuisances per accidens. To the first belong those
which are unquestionably and under all circumstances nuisances, such as gambling houses, houses of ill fame, etc. The
number of such nuisances is necessarily limited, and by far the greater number of nuisances are such because of
particular facts and circumstances surrounding the otherwise harmless cause of the nuisance. For this reason, it will
readily be seen that whether a particular thing is a nuisance is generally a question of fact, to be determined in the first
instance before the term nuisance can be applied to it. This is certainly true of a legitimate calling, trade, or business
such as an ice plant.
The right to abate public nuisances, whether we regard it as existing in the municipalities, or in the community, or in the
land of the individual, is a common law right, and is derived, in every instance of its exercise, from the same source that
of necessity. It is akin to the right of destroying property for the public safety, in case of the prevalence of a devastating
fire or other controlling exigency. But the necessity must be present to justify the exercise of the right, and whether
present or not, must be submitted to a jury under the guidance of a court.
The city is clothed with authority to declare by general ordinance under what circumstances and conditions certain
specified acts or things injurious to the health or dangerous to the public are to constitute and be deemed nuisances,
leaving the question of fact open for judicial determination as to whether the particular act or thing complained of
comes within the prohibited class; but it cannot by ordinance arbitrarily declare any particular thing a nuisance which
has not heretofore been so declared by law, or judicially determined to be such.
In Everett vs. City of Council Bluffs the court held:
"The defendant is incorporated under a special charter, which provides that the city council has power to declare what
shall be a nuisance, and to prevent, remove, or abate the same.' This general grant of power, however, will not authorize
the council to declare anything a nuisance which is not such at common law, or has been declared such by statute."
Under the exercise of the police power, it may be conceded that municipalities can declare and abate nuisances in cases
of necessity, without citation and without adjudication as to whether there is in fact a nuisance. But whenever the action
of the municipality in declaring and abating a nuisance goes so far as to fix a burden upon the owner of the property, he

is entitled to be heard upon the question as to the existence of the nuisance. This right to a hearing upon this question
may come before or after the nuisance is abated, as circumstances may require, but there must be an opportunity
offered him to be heard upon that matter before his property can be loaded with the cost of the removal of the
nuisance.
In the present case, it is certain that the ice factory of the plaintiff is not a nuisance per se. It is a legitimate industry,
beneficial to the people, and conducive to their health and comfort. If it be in fact a nuisance due to the manner of its
operation, that question cannot be determined by a mere resolution of the board. The petitioner is entitled to a fair and
impartial hearing before a judicial tribunal.
The order sustaining the plaintiffs demurrer to the defendants answer was Reversed.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS

Technology Developers Inc. (TDI) is a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and export of
charcoal briquette. It received an order from Acting Mayor Pablo Cruz ordering he full cessation of TDIs plant in
Guyong Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Also TDI Plant manager Armando Meneses was ordered to appear before the said mayor
and produce the following a.) Building permit b.) Mayors Permit c.) Region III Pollution of Environment and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution Permit, and other documents.
TDI was found to lack a Mayors Permit and the Region III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources AntiPollution Permit. Without previous and reasonable notice to TDI, Acting Mayor Cruz ordered the padlock of TDIs
plant.
TDI was granted a writ of preliminary injunction against the Acting Mayors order. Upon motion for reconsideration,
Acting Mayor Cruz presented evidence that TDIs plant produce hazardous fumes which endangered the lives of the
people living nearby. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court dissolved the writ. An appeal by TDI with the CA
proves fruitless. Thus, TDI sought relief with the SC.
Issue: Is there a valid exercise of police power for closing TDI?
Held:
YES. The simple reason is that TDI failed to secure a Mayors Permit and Region III-Pollution of
Environment and natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit. The Temporary Permit it received from the national
Pollution Control Commission has already expired.
It must be stressed however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and contribute to the growth of
the economy is the equally essential imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people, from the
deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
The petition was DENIED

AC ENTERPRISES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. FRABELLE PROPERTIES CORPORATION,

RESPONDENT
G.R. NO. 166744, November 02, 2006, CALLEJO, SR., J., FIRST DIVISION
Facts
AC enterprises (Petitioner) is a corporation owns a 10-storey building (Feliza Building) in Makati City. Frabelle
(Respondent) is a condominium corporation who's condominium development (Frabella I) is located behind petitioner
separated by a small street (Rodriguez). Respondent complained of the unbearable heat and noise emanating from the
blower of the air-conditioning units of petitioner. On June 29, 1995, respondent requested that the 36 blowers of Feliza
Building be tested by the NCR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR. On August 11, 1995, it
received a report from the EMB that the noise generated by the blowers of Feliza Building is beyond the legal allowable
level under Section 78(b) of PD 984.
On March 2002, respondent requested Mayor Jejomar Binay not to renew or to cancel the Mayor's License and
Business Permits of Feliza Building and to compel petitioner to comply with the law. As a response, the city building
official, Engr. Morales, requested the EMB to investigate the complaint. The EMB gave a report stating that the passing
of vehicles along the street and the blowers of nearby building contributed to the ambient noise quality in the area thus
there were other prevailing factors to consider. The report stated that since DENR Administrative Order No. 30
devolved the functions of the DENR on the abatement of noise nuisance to the Local Government Unit, the case
should be endorsed to the City Government of Makati for appropriate action. However, Engr. Morales stated to the
respondents since there were other prevailing factors to consider, advised the latter to seek that further inquiry or
anything involving a sound environment process which is not sanctioned by this office, be addressed directly to the said
agency.
On July 2003, respondent filed a complaint for the abatement of nuisance with damages with prayer for the issuance of
a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction before the RTC of Malabon City against petitioner. Petitioner asked for
the court to dismiss the case on the ground, among others, that it was the Makati City Government that had jurisdiction
over the complaint pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160. It also pointed out that DENR Administrative Order
(A.O.) No. 30 devolved to the local government units the power to determine matters pertaining to environmental
management such as: (a) enforcement of pollution control and environmental protection laws, rules and regulations; (b)
abatement of noise and other forms of nuisance; and (c) implementation of cease and desist orders issued by the
Pollution Adjudication Board.
Issue. WON the court could resolve an issue pertaining to a nuisance or a nuisance per se
Decision
The case is for the abatement of a nuisance. The court agrees with the ruling of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that as
gleaned from the material averments of the complaint as well as the character of the relief prayed for by respondent in
its complaint before the RTC, the petition is one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance, more specifically the
noise generated by the blowers of the air-conditioning system of the Feliza Building owned by petitioner, with a plea for
a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction, plus damages.
The term nuisance is so comprehensive that it has been applied to almost all ways which have interfered with the
rights of the citizens, either in person, property, the enjoyment of property, or his comfort; A private nuisance is one
which violates only private rights and produces damage to but one or a few persons while a nuisance is public when it
interferes with the exercise of public right by directly encroaching on public property or by causing a common injury, an
unreasonable interference with the right common to the general public. In this case, the noise generated by an airconditioning system is considered a private nuisance and a private nuisance is actionable under Art. 705 of the NCC.

On the other hand, the action for the abatement of a public nuisance should be commenced by the city or
municipality1.
The test to determine noise as a nuisance is whether rights of property, of health or of comfort are so injuriously
affected by the noise in question that the sufferer is subjected to a loss [i.e. Actual Physical Discomfort] which goes
beyond the reasonable limit imposed upon him by the condition of living, or of holding property, in a particular locality
in fact devoted to uses which involve the emission of noise although ordinary care is taken to confine it within
reasonable bounds; or in the vicinity of property of another owner who, though creating a noise, is acting with
reasonable regard for the rights of those affected by it.
Petition Denied
Notes:
Devolution refers to the act by which the national government confers powers and authority upon the various local
government units to perform specific functions and responsibilities.

The LGUs may conduct inspections, at all reasonable times, without doing damage, after due notice to the
owners of buildings to ascertain compliance with the noise standards under the law; and to order them to
comply therewith if they fail to do so; or suspend or cancel any building permits or clearance certificates issued
by it for said units/buildings after due hearing as required by P.D. No. 984. However, the LGUs have no
power to declare a particular thing as a nuisance unless such as thing is a nuisance per se; nor can they effect
the extrajudicial abatement of that as a nuisance which in its nature or use is not such.

Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may be of such a character as to constitute a nuisance, even though it arises
from the operation of a lawful business, only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in
the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the air-conditioning
units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to be resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings.
*location of the buildings - Makati business district/Legazpi Village.

Under Section 447(a)(3)(i) of the LGC, the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered to enact ordinances declaring, preventing or
abating noise and other forms of nuisance. It bears stressing, however, that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing
as a nuisance per se and order its condemnation.

ROBERT TAYABAN Et Al., PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENTS.
Facts
Sometime in 1988, then Mayor Tayaban submitted a project proposal to provincial governor Benjamin Cappleman for the
construction of the Tinoc Public Market. The proposal was approved and funded by the Cordillera Executive Board (CEB). In the
bidding for the project, complainant Lopez Pugong won the contract for the construction of the said public market. On March 1,
1989, a formal contract was executed by and between Pugong, as the contractor, and the CEB, as the project owner. On August 15,
1989, the Sangguniang Bayan of Tinoc adopted Resolution No. 20 deciding to demolish the on-going construction of the market.
That same day, Tayaban and his co-petitioners, together with some men, proceeded to the construction site and demolished the
structures and improvements introduced thereon. As a result, Pugong filed an Affidavit-Complaint against herein petitioners
charging them with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 30192, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. Sandiganbayan found the petitioners guilty.
Petitioners argue that one of the elements of the offense which constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 is
that the government or any private party suffers undue injury by reason of the prohibited acts committed by the public officer being
charged. Petitioners argue that this element was not proved because the CEB, which was supposed to be the injured party as alleged
in the Information, did not complain or participate in the trial of the case. They also assert that their act of demolishing the
structures erected on the construction site is an implementation of the provisions of the Letter of Instruction No. 19 which
empowers certain public officials, like the municipal mayor, to remove illegal constructions which were built, either in public places
or private property, without permit and that they validly exercising Police Power.
Issue. WON petitioners were validly exercising Police Power
Decision.
No, the Court is not persuaded by petitioners' contention that the subject demolition is a valid exercise of police power.
The exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes the fundamental law of the land, or an act of the
legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating, or in derogation of a common
right. In the present case, the acts of petitioner have been established as a violation of law, particularly of the provisions of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
Neither can petitioners seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial
proceedings. This principle applies to nuisances per se, or those which affect the immediate safety of persons and property and
may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. Petitioners claim that the public market would pose danger to the
safety and health of schoolchildren if it were built on the place being contested. However, petitioners never made known their
supposed concerns either to the Governor or to the CEB. Instead, they took the law into their own hands and precipitately
demolished the subject structures that were built without the benefit of any hearing or consultation with the proper authority, which
in this case is the CEB.
Tayabans defense that he acted by virtue of LOI 19 is a mere afterthought, nowhere in the resolution was it said that they
are going to demolish because of LOI 19 but rather only on the ground that the market being built is in the wrong place. Further,
Tayaban actually never specified as to where he intended the market to be built.
PETITION DENIED

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions
2

EMILIO GANCAYCO, PETITIONER, VS. CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY AND METRO
MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 177807, October 11, 2011, SERENO, J., EN BANC
Facts
Retired Justice Emilio A. Gancayco (retired) owned a parcel of land located EDSA, Quezon City. In 1956, the Quezon
City Council issued Ordinance No. 2904, requiring the construction of arcades3 for commercial buildings to be
constructed on business zones in accordance with the citys zoning plan. The arcade is to be created by constructing the
wall of the ground floor facing the sidewalk a few meters away from the property line. Thus, the building owner is not
allowed to construct his wall up to the edge of the property line, thereby creating a space or shelter under the first floor.
Also at that time no building code was in effect, regulations pertaining to structures were under the control of local
governments. Justice Gancayco was able to secure an exemption for his two-storey building subject to the condition
that upon notice by the City Engineer, the owner shall, within reasonable time, demolish the enclosure of said arcade at
his own expense when public interest so demands.
Decades after, the MMDA conducted operations to clear obstructions along the sidewalk of EDSA in Quezon City
pursuant to Metro Manila Council's (MMC) Resolution No. 02-28. The resolution authorized the MMDA and local
government units to "clear the sidewalks, streets, avenues, alleys, bridges, parks and other public places in Metro Manila
of all illegal structures and obstructions." Thereafter, MMDA sent a notice of demolition to Justice Gancayco alleging
that a portion of his building violated the Building Code in relation to Ordinance No. 2904. He did not comply with the
notice. The MMDA then proceeded to demolish the party wall of the ground floor structure. J. Gancayco then sought
for the nullity of Ordinance 2904 or to be justly compensated. MMDA on the other hand, contends that the wing
walls on said property was a public nuisance impeding the safe passage of pedestrians. Finally, the MMDA claimed
that it was merely implementing the legal easement established by Ordinance No. 2904. RTC ruled in favor of J.
Gancayco while on appeal, partly ruled in favor of MMDA4.
Issue
WON the assailed Ordinance no. 2904 is a valid exercise of police power.
WON the wing wall was a public nuisance/nuisance per se.
WON the MMDA had the authority to demolish such walls.
Decision
Yes, it is clear that the primary objectives of the city council of Quezon City when it issued the questioned ordinance
ordering the construction of arcades were the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants; the promotion of their
prosperity; and the improvement of their morals, peace, good order, comfort, and the convenience. At the time that the
ordinance was passed, there was no national building code enforced to guide the city council; thus, there was no law of
national application that prohibited the city council from regulating the construction of buildings, arcades and sidewalks
in their jurisdiction. Such power was validly vested to the city government in its charter for it the Charter also expressly
provided that the city government had the power to regulate the kinds of buildings and structures that may be erected
within fire limits and the manner of constructing and repairing them.
No, the fact that in 1966 the City Council gave Justice Gancayco an exemption from constructing an arcade is an
indication that the wing walls of the building are not nuisances per se. The wing walls do not per se immediately and
An arcade is defined as any portion of a building above the first floor projecting over the sidewalk beyond the first storey wall
used as protection for pedestrians against rain or sun
4 The CA stated that the MMDA is not clothed with the authority to declare, prevent or abate nuisances and that it went beyond its
powers when it demolished Justice Gancaycos property
3

adversely affect the safety of persons and property. The fact that an ordinance may declare a structure illegal does not
necessarily make that structure a nuisance5. Clearly, when Justice Gancayco was given a permit to construct the building,
the city council or the city engineer did not consider the building, or its demolished portion, to be a threat to the safety
of persons and property. This fact alone should have warned the MMDA against summarily demolishing the structure.
No, only courts of law have the power to determine whether a thing is a nuisance. Citing the case of AC enterprises v.
Frabelle, the Sangguniang Bayan (*more so the MMDA in this case) cannot declare a particular thing as a nuisance per
se and order its condemnation. It does not have the power to find, as a fact, that a particular thing is a nuisance when
such thing is not a nuisance per se; nor can it authorize the extrajudicial condemnation and destruction of that as a
nuisance which in its nature, situation or use is not such. Those things must be determined and resolved in the ordinary
courts of law.
Neither can MMDA claim that it is acting in pursuance of the building code. The building Code clearly provides the
process by which a building may be demolished. The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the
Building Official..
As pointed out in the Trackworks case, the MMDA does not have the power to enact ordinances. Thus, it cannot
supplement the provisions of Quezon City Ordinance No. 2904 merely through its Resolution No. 02-28.. Lastly, the
MMDA claims that the City Government of Quezon City may be considered to have approved the demolition of the
structure, simply because then Quezon City Mayor Belmonte signed MMDA Resolution No. 02-28. In effect, the city
government delegated these powers to the MMDA. The powers referred to are those that include the power to declare,
prevent and abate a nuisance and to further impose the penalty of removal or demolition of the building or structure by
the owner or by the city at the expense of the owner. There was no valid delegation of powers to the MMDA. Contrary
to the claim of the MMDA, the City Government of Quezon City washed its hands off the acts of the former. In its
Answer, the city government stated that "the demolition was undertaken by the MMDA only, without the participation
and/or consent of Quezon City." Therefore, the MMDA acted on its own and should be held solely liable for the
destruction of the portion of Justice Gancayco's building.
CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

Article 694 of the Civil Code defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition or property, or anything
else that (1) injures or endangers the health or safety of others; (2) annoys or offends the senses; (3) shocks, defies or disregards
decency or morality; (4) obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body of water; or, (5)
hinders or impairs the use of property. A nuisance may be per se or per accidens. A nuisance per se is that which affects the
immediate safety of persons and property and may summarily be abated under the undefined law of necessity.

AMERICAN MAIL LINE, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. CITY OF BASILAN, ET AL.,
DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.
G.R. No. L-12647, May 31, 1961, DIZON, J.
Facts
On September 12, 1955 the City Council of Basilan City enacted Ordinance No. 180, Series of 1955. Under such
ordinance, Any foreign vessel engaged in coastwise trade which may anchor at any open bay, channel, or any loading
point within the territorial waters of the City of Basilan for the purpose of loading or unloading logs or passengers and
other cargoes shall pay an anchorage fee of 1/2 centavo (P.005) per registered gross ton of the vessel for the first
twenty-four (24) hours, or part thereof, and for succeeding hours, or part thereof, PROVIDED, that maximum charge
shall not exceed, seventy-five pesos (P75.00) per day, irrespective of the greater tonnage of the vessels.
Appellees are foreign shipping companies licensed to do business in the Philippines, with offices in Manila. Their
vessels call at Basilan City and anchor in the bay or channel within its territorial waters. As the city treasurer assessed
and attempted to collect from them the anchorage fees prescribed in the aforesaid amendatory ordinance, they filed the
present action for Declaratory Relief to have the courts determine its validity. The lower court ruled in favor of
appellees.
Issue. WON Ordinance no. 180 is an exercise of either its revenue-raising power or of its police power
Decision
The ordinance is invalid for it is an invalid exercise of the citys revenue raising power. In its charter, section 14(a)
provides that the city may levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes in accordance with law and (v) to fix
charges to be paid by all watercraft landing at or using public wharves, docks, levees, or landing places. Under section
14(a), it is clear that the City of Basilan may only levy and collect taxes for general and special purposes in accordance
with or as provided by law; in other words, the City of Basilan was not granted a blanket power of taxation. The use of
the phrase "in accordance with law" means the same as "as provided by law"clearly discloses the legislative intent
to limit the taxing power of the City. On the other hand, Section 14 (v) does not authorize the City of Basilan to
promulgate ordinances providing for the collection of "Anchorage" fees. This is clearly not included in the power
granted by the provision under consideration "to fix the charges to be paid by all watercraft landing at or using public
wharves, docks, levees or landing places". That this is so is shown by the need which the City of Basilan had to enact
the amendatory ordinance.
Appellants also argue that the ordinance in question was validly enacted in the exercise of the city's police power and
that the fees imposed therein are for purely regulatory purposes. In this connection it has been held that the power to
regulate as an exercise of police power does not include the power to impose fees for revenue purposes. As held in the
Cu Unjieng case, fees for purely regulatory purposes "may only be of sufficient amount to include the expenses of
issuing the license and the cost of the necessary inspection or police surveillance, taking into account not only the
expense of direct regulation but also incidental expenses.
The fees required are intended for revenue purposes. In the first place, being based upon the tonnage of the vessels, the
fees have no proper or reasonable relation to the cost of issuing the permits and the cost of inspection or surveillance.
In the second place, the fee imposed on foreign vessels1/2 centavo per registered gross ton for the first 24 hours,
and which shall not exceed P75.00 per dayexceeds even the harbor fee imposed by the National Government, which
is only P50.00 for foreign vessels.
DECISION AFFIRMED.

ZOOMZAT, INC. vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Facts:
Petitioner Zoomzat, Inc. alleged that on December 20, 1991,the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City passed
Resolution No.261 which resolved to express the willingness of the City of Gingoog to allow Zoomzat to install and
operate a cable TV system. Thereupon, petitioner applied for a mayors permit but the same was not acted upon by the
mayors office. On April 6, 1993, respondents enacted Ordinance No. 19 which granted a franchise to Gingoog Spacelink
Cable TV, Inc. to operate a cable television for a period of ten (10) years, subject to automatic renewal. On July 30,
1993, Zoomzat filed a complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman against respondents for violation of Section 3(e),
R.A.No. 3019. The complaint alleged that in enacting Ordinance No. 19,the respondents gave unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference to Spacelink, to the prejudice of Zoomzat who was a prior grantee-applicant by virtue
of Resolution No. 261. A criminal information for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019,was filed against the
respondents before the Sandiganbayan. However, upon directive by the Sandiganbayan to restudy the instant case, Special
Prosecution Officer II Antonio Manzano recommended the dismissal of the case and the Information withdrawn for lack
of probable cause. On further investigation, Special Prosecution Officer III Victor Pascual also recommended that the case
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. On June 17, 1998, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution approving the
dismissal of the case and ordering the withdrawal of the Information against the respondents. On September 9, 1998, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Do the LGUs have the authority to grant the franchise to operate a cable television?
Did the petitioners give Spacelink undue or unwarranted advantage and preference because it stifled business competition?
HELD:
No. Executive Order No. 205 clearly provides that only the NTC could grant certificates of authority to cable
television operators and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Likewise, Executive Order No. vests with
the NTC the regulation and supervision of cable television industry in the Philippines. is clear that in the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no power to grant franchises
Consequently, the protection of the constitutional provision as to impairment of the obligation of a contract does not
extend to privileges, franchises and grants given by a municipality in excess of its powers, or ultra vires. It is undisputed
that respondents were not employees of NTC. Instead, they were charged in their official capacity as members of the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Gingoog City. As such, they cannot be charged with violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019
for enacting Ordinance No. 19 which granted Spacelink a franchise to operate acable television.
No. On the second issue, indeed, under the general welfare clause of the Local Government Code, the local
government unit can regulate the operation of cable television but only when it encroaches on public properties, such as
the use of public streets, rights of ways, thef ounding of structures, and the parceling of large regions. Beyond these
parameters, its acts, such as the grant of the franchise toSpacelink, would beultra vires .Plainly, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Gingoog City overstepped the bounds of its authority when it usurped the powers of the NTC with the
enactment of Ordinance No. 19. Being a void legislative act, Ordinance No. 19 did not confer any right nor vest any
privilege to Spacelink. As such, petitioner could not claim to have been prejudiced or suffered injury thereby. Incidentally,
petitioners claim of undue injury becomes even more baseless with the finding that Spacelink did not commence to
operate despite the grant to it of a franchise under Ordinance No. 19.In addition; petitioner could not impute manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence on the part of the respondents when they enacted Ordinance
No. 19. A perfunctory reading of Resolution No. 261 shows that the Sangguniang Panlungsod did not grant a franchise to
it but merely expressed its willingness to allow the petitioner to install and operate a cable television. Had respondents
intended otherwise, they would have couched the resolution in more concrete, specific and categorical terms. In contrast,
Ordinance No. 19 clearly and unequivocally granted a franchise to Spacelink, specifically stating therein its terms and
conditions. Not being a bona fide franchise holder, petitioner could not claim prior right on the strength of Resolution No.
261.

THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. LUIS TORIBIO, DEFENDANT AND
APPELLANT.
FACTS:
Appellant in the case at bar was charged for the violation of sections 30 & 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating
the registration, branding, and slaughter of large cattle. Evidence sustained in the trial court found that appellant
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a
permit from the municipal treasurer of the municipality where it was slaughtered. Appellant contends that he applied for a
permit to slaughter the animal but was not given one because the carabao was not found to be unfit for agricultural work
which resulted to appellant to slaughter said carabao in a place other than the municipal slaughterhouse. Appellant then
assails the validity of a provision under Act No. 1147 which states that only carabaos unfit for agricultural work can be
slaughtered.
ISSUE: Is Act. No. 1147, regulating the registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, an undue and unauthorized
exercise of police power?
HELD:
Yes. Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate laws which may interfere with personal liberties.
To justify the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it must appear (1) that the interest of the general public
requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the purpose of
the law and the intent of the law makers. The act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to make it easy for the
recovery and return to owners, which encouraged them to regulate the registration and slaughter of large cattle.
As these work animals are vested with public interest for they are of fundamental use for the production of crops,
the government was prompted to pass a law that would protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to stabilize
the number of carabaos in the country as well as to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It was also the
same reason why large cattles fit for farm work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human consumption. Most
importantly, the respondents carabao was found to be fit for farm work.
These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise of police power.
Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the
taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a mere regulation for the consumption of these private properties for
the protection of general welfare and public interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner must fail.

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION

COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO AND THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents.
FACTS.
On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same
was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed
by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the recovery of the carabaos. After considering
the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The
petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.
ISSUE. Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
HELD.
Yes. The Court ruled that the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be
achieved by the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial
transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province will not prevent their
slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them there
The executive act defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which
was carried out forthright. Due process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily
confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for
recovery and given a supersede as bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner
without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, et al. v. METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY & CITY OF

MANDALUYONG
G.R. No. 102782, 11 December 1991, EN BANC, (Cruz, J.)
Rodolfo A. Malapira, Stephen L. Monsanto, Dan R. Calderon, a lawyer and Grandy N. Trieste, another lawyer,
complained to the Court that when they were stopped for an alleged traffic violation while they were driving on various
occasions, their drivers licenses were confiscated by traffic enforcer in various cities in Metro Manila.
They allege that the acts of the traffic enforcers violate the decision in the in Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District
v. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong which held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was
not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and was permitted only
under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets and that even the
confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the decree nor was it allowed by the
decree to be imposed by the Commission., whether they could seek damages for confiscation of their drivers licenses, and
where they should file their complaints.
ISSUE: Are the acts of the traffic enforcers of confiscating the drivers license and removing the license plates a valid
exercise of the delegated power, even if it was allowed under Ordinance No. 11, s. of 1991?
RULING:
NO. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any
statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate
trade; 5) must not be unreasonable; and 7) must be general and consistent with public policy.
A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do not pass the first criterion
because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of
license plates or the confiscation of drivers licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is
nothing in the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission (and now the
Metropolitan Manila Authority) to impose such sanctions.
In fact, the above provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was
allowed to impose fines and otherwise discipline traffic violators only in such amounts and under such penalties as are
herein prescribed, that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the decree or
at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof expressly provides that in case of
traffic violations, the drivers license shall not be confiscated. These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila
Authority and all other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality of
Mandaluyong.
The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are
able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national legislature (except only that the
power to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). They are mere
agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the local government
unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their principal. In the case before us, the enactments in
question, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute.
The self-serving language of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance is worth noting. Curiously, it is the measure itself, which
was enacted by the Metropolitan Manila Authority that authorizes the Metropolitan Manila Authority to impose the
questioned sanction.

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY, et al. v. MAYOR LITO ATIENZA

G.R. No. 156052, 7 March 2007, FIRST DIVISION, (Corona, J.)
FACTS. On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027, which became
effective on November 28, 2001, after its publication. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from
industrial to commercial and directed the owners and operators of businesses disallowed under it to cease and desist from
operating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. One of which is the so-called
"Pandacan Terminals" of the oil companies Caltex, Petron and Pilipinas Shell.
However, on June 26, 2002, the Manila and the DOE entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with the oil
companies agreeing that "the scaling down of the Pandacan Terminals [was] the most viable and practicable option." Thus,
the Pandacan Terminals stayed and its operations continued.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified the MOU in Resolution No. 97 which declared that the MOU was effective only for a
period of six months. Thereafter, on January 30, 2003, the Sanggunian adopted Resolution No. 13 extending the validity of
Resolution No. 97 to April 30, 2003 and authorizing Mayor Atienza to issue special business permits to the oil companies.
Resolution No. 13, s. 2003 also called for a reassessment of the ordinance.
ISSUE: Does the MOU and the subsequent Sanggunian resolutions make the respondent's duty to enforce Ordinance No.
8027 doubtful, unclear or uncertain?
RULING:
NO. Assuming that the terms of the MOU were inconsistent with Ordinance No. 8027, the resolutions which
ratified it and made it binding on the City of Manila expressly gave it full force and effect only until April 30, 2003. Thus, at
present, there is nothing that legally hinders respondent from enforcing Ordinance No. 8027.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted right after the Philippines, along with the rest of the world, witnessed the horror of the
September 11, 2001 attack on the Twin Towers of the World Trade Center in New York City. The objective of the
ordinance is to protect the residents of Manila from the catastrophic devastation that will surely occur in case of a terrorist
attack on the Pandacan Terminals. No reason exists why such a protective measure should be delayed.
The Local Government Code imposes upon respondent the duty, as city mayor, to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative
to the governance of the city." One of these is Ordinance No. 8027. As the chief executive of the city, he has the duty to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long as it has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He has no
other choice. It is his ministerial duty to do so.

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION DENIED

Additional Facts:
In 2003, a Writ of Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction was issued ordering Atienza and the City of Manila to refrain
from taking steps to enforce Ordinance No. 8027.
In 2006, the city council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8119, also known as the Manila Comprehensive Land
Use Plan and Zoning Ordinance of 2006.
Ruling:
Courts will not invalidate an ordinance unless it clearly appears that it is unconstitutional. There is no such
showing here. Therefore, the injunctive writs issued in the Manila RTCs May 19, 2003 order had no leg to stand on.

The two ordinances can be reconciled. Ordinance No. 8027 is applicable to the area particularly described therein,
only in the Pandacan area, whereas Ordinance No. 8119 is applicable to the entire City of Manila.
Ordinance No. 8027 was enacted for the purpose of promoting sound urban planning, ensuring health, public
safety and general welfare of the residents of Manila. The Sanggunian was impelled to take measures to protect the
residents of Manila from catastrophic devastation in case of a terrorist attack on the Pandacan Terminals. Towards this
objective, the Sanggunian reclassified the area defined in the ordinance from industrial to commercial.
Under Section 5 I of RA 7638, DOE was given the power to establish and administer programs for the exploration,
transportation, marketing, distribution, utilization, conservation, stockpiling, and storage of energy resources. On the
other hand, under Section 7 of RA 8749, the DOE shall continue to encourage certain practices in the Industry which
serve the public interest and are intended to achieve efficiency and cost reduction, ensure continuous supply of petroleum
products. Nothing in these statutes prohibits the City of Manila from enacting ordinances in the exercise of its police
power.

FELICIDAD VILLANUEVA, et al. v. JUDGE MARIANO CASTANEDA, JR.

G.R. No. 61311, 21 September 1987, FIRST DIVISION, (Cruz, J.)
In the vicinity of the public market of San Fernando, Pampanga, along Mercado Street, stands a conglomeration of vendors
stalls together forming what is commonly known as a talipapa. On 1961, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted
Resolution No. 218 authorizing some 24 members of the Fernandino United Merchants and Traders Association to
construct permanent stalls and sell in the above-mentioned place.
On 1964, the municipal council of San Fernando adopted Resolution No. 29, which declared the subject area as "the
parking place and as the public plaza of the municipality," impliedly revoking Resolution No. 218, series of 1961. On 1968,
Judge Andres C. Aguilar decided that the land occupied by the Villanueva, et al., being public in nature, was beyond the
commerce of man and therefore could not be the subject of private occupancy.
On 1982, the Association of Concerned Citizens and Consumers of San Fernando filed a petition to restore the subject
property "to its original and customary use as a public plaza. The petition for prohibition filed by Villanueva, et al. was
denied by the RTC.
ISSUE:

Can Villanueva, et al. occupy and conduct commerce in a public plaza authorized in the guise of a lease contract
with the local government?
RULING:
NO.
There is no question that the place occupied by the petitioners and from which they are sought to be evicted is a
public plaza, as found by the trial court
Villanueva, et al. had no right in the first place to occupy the disputed premises and cannot insist in remaining there
now on the strength of their alleged lease contracts. They should have realized and accepted this earlier, considering that
the municipal council of San Fernando had already adopted Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, declaring the area as the
parking place and public plaza of the municipality.
The problems caused by the usurpation of the place by the petitioners are covered by the police power as
delegated to the municipality under the general welfare clause. This authority was validly exercised in this case
through the adoption of Resolution No. 29, series of 1964, by the the municipal council of San Fernando.
Even assuming a valid lease of the property in dispute, the resolution could have effectively terminated the
agreement for it is settled that the police power cannot be surrendered or bargained away through the medium of a
contract.