[G.R. No. 141060.

September 29, 2000]

PILIPINAS BANK, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ELOY R. BELLO, In his
capacity as Presiding Judge, RTC-Manila, Branch 15, And MERIDIAN ASSURANCE
CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Sixth Division, dated July 30, 1999 in
CA-G.R. S.P. No. 297491[1] which dismissed petitioner Pilipinas Bank's petition for certiorari,2[2]
and the Resolution, dated September 17, 19993[3] denying petitioner's Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration, Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Motion for Reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 8, 1995, petitioner obtained from private respondent Meridian Assurance
Corporation a Money Securities and Payroll Comprehensive Policy which was effective from
January 13, 1985 to January 13, 1986. On November 25, 1985, at about 9:15 a.m., while the
policy was in full force and effect, petitioner's armored vehicle bearing Plate No. NBT 379 which
was on its way to deliver the payroll withdrawal of its client Luzon Development Bank ACLEM
Paper Mills, was robbed by two armed men wearing police uniforms along Magsaysay Road,
San Antonio, San Pedro, Laguna. Petitioner's driver, authorized teller and two private armed
guards were on board the armored vehicle when the same was robbed. The loss suffered by
petitioner as a result of the heist amounted to P545,301.40.
Petitioner filed a formal notice of claim under its insurance policy with private respondent on
December 3, 1985, invoking Section II of the Policy which states:
Section II-MONEY AND SECURITIES OUTSIDE PREMISES

11 Pilipinas Bank, Petitioner-Plaintiff, vs. Hon. Eloy R. Bello, Jr. as Judge RTC Manila,
Branch 15 and Meridian Assurance Corporation, Respondents-Defendants.
22 Rollo, pp. 40-52.
33 Id., at 55.

The Company will subject to the Limits of this Section as hereinafter provided indemnify the
insured against loss by any cause whatsoever occuring (sic) outside the premises of Money and
Securities in the personal charge of a Messenger in transit on a Money Route x x x.4[4]
and the warranty/rider attached to the Policy which provides thatWARRANTED that in respect of PILIPINAS BANK Head Office and all its branches, pick-up
and/or deposits and withdrawals without the use of armored car, company car, or official's car
shall be covered by this policy. x x x5[5]
Private respondent denied petitioner's claim and averred that the insurance does not cover the
deliveries of the withdrawals to petitioner's clients.
Petitioner thereafter filed a complaint against private respondent with the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. Private respondent filed a motion to dismiss which was later granted by the RTC.
Petitioner then moved to reconsider the trial court's order, but the same was denied.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the RTC's
order dismissing the complaint.6[6] The appellate court granted the petition and remanded the case
to the RTC for further proceedings. Private respondent filed with this Court a petition for review
of the appellate court's decision, but the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated July 5, 1989.
After the case was remanded to the RTC and the latter set the case for pre-trial, petitioner filed its
Pre-Trial Brief, stating among others, that it would present as one of its witnesses Mr. Cesar R.
Tubianosa to testify on the existence and due execution of the insurance policy, particularly on
the negotiations that were held prior to the execution thereof, including negotiations that led to
the attachment warranties, to prove that the loss subject of petitionerss claim is covered by the
Policy. Petitioner identified the issues of the case as follows:
1.Whether or not the loss due to the hold-up/robbery is covered by the Insurance Policy;
2.
In the affirmative, whether or not, defendant is liable to plaintiff for said loss, inclusive of
other damages prayed for in the Complaint.
On September 18, 1991, when petitioner was about to present Mr. Tubianosa to testify, private
respondent objected and argued that said witness testimony regarding the negotiations on the
terms and conditions of the policy would be violative of the best evidence rule. However,
private respondents objection was overruled and Tubianosa was allowed to take the stand.
44 Id., at 19.
55 Id., at 20.
66 The case docketed as CA-G.R. No. 14682 CV and entitled "Pilipinas Bank vs.
Meridian Assurance Corporation."

Private respondent again objected to the questions regarding the negotiations on the terms and
conditions on the policy, and the trial court sustained the objection in part and overruled it in part
by allowing petitioner to adduce evidence pertaining to the negotiations other than what appears
in the insurance policy. Tubianosas testimony was completed on said date.
On June 18, 1992, petitioner filed a Motion to Recall Witness, praying that it be allowed to
recall Tubianosa to testify on the negotiations pertaining to the terms and conditions of the policy
before its issuance to determine the intention of the parties regarding the said terms and
conditions. Private respondent objected thereto, on the ground that the same would violate the
parol evidence rule.
The RTC issued an Order dated July 24, 1999, denying petitioners motion to recall Tubianosa to
the witness stand, ruling that the same would violate the parol evidence rule. Petitioners motion
for reconsideration was also denied by the lower court.
On December 21, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
assailing the aforementioned Orders of the RTC. In its Decision dated July 30, 1999, the
appellate court dismissed the petition and held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge. It held that there is no ambiguity in the provisions of the Policy which
would necessitate the presentation of extrinsic evidence to clarify the meaning thereof. The
Court of Appeals also stated that petitioner failed to set forth in its Complaint a specific
allegation that there is an intrinsic ambiguity in the insurance policy which would warrant the
presentation of further evidence to clarify the intent of the contracting parties.
Hence, the present petition.
We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners Complaint merely alleged that under the provisions of the Policy, it was entitled to
recover from private respondent the amount it lost during the heist. It did not allege therein that
the Policys terms were ambiguous or failed to express the true agreement between itself and
private respondent. Such being the case, petitioner has no right to insist that it be allowed to
present Tubianosas testimony to shed light on the alleged true agreement of the parties,
notwithstanding its statement in its Pre-Trial Brief that it was presenting said witness for that
purpose.
Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly requires that for parol evidence to
be admissible to vary the terms of the written agreement, the mistake or imperfection thereof or
its failure to express the true agreement of the parties should be put in issue by the pleadings.7[7]
As correctly noted by the appellate court, petitioner failed to raise the issue of an intrinsic
ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the terms of the Policy, or of the failure of said contract to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto in its Complaint. There was therefore
no error on the part of the appellate court when it affirmed the RTCs Order disallowing the recall
77 Philippine National Railways vs. CIR of Albay, Branch 1, 83 SCRA 569, 575 (1978).

of Tubianosa to the witness stand, for such disallowance is in accord with the rule that when the
terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms
agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of
such other terms other than the contents of the written agreement.8[8]
The rationale behind the foregoing rule was explained in Ortanez vs. Court of Appeals,9[9] where
we stated:
The parol evidence herein introduced is inadmissible. First, private respondents oral testimony
on the alleged conditions, coming from a party who has an interest in the outcome of the case,
depending exclusively on human memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
Spoken words could be notoriously undesirable unlike a written contract which speaks of a
uniform language. Thus, under the general rule in Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court,
when the terms of an agreement were reduced to writing, as in this case, it is deemed to contain
all the terms agreed upon and no evidence of such terms can be admitted other than the contents
thereof. xxx.10[10]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 96405. June 26, 1996]

88 Section 9, Rule 130, REVISED RULES OF COURT.
99 266 SCRA 561 (1997).
1010 Id.. at 565.

BALDOMERO INCIONG, JR., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE BANK
OF COMMUNICATIONS, respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; PAROL EVIDENCE RULE; DOES NOT SPECIFY
THAT THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT BE A PUBLIC INSTRUMENT.- Clearly, the rule
does not specify that the written agreement be a public document. What is required is that the
agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience that written evidence is
so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting memory only, that it would
be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in writing, to admit weaker
evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties intended a different
contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them" [FRANCISCO, THE RULES OF
COURT OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p. 179] Thus, for the parol evidence
rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be signed by both parties.
As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar nature are not subject to be
varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.
2. CIVIL LAW; OBLIGATIONS; SOLIDARY OR JOINT AND SEVERAL
OBLIGATION, DEFINED.- A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each
debtor is liable for the entire obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole
obligation. [TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. IV, 1991 ed., p. 217]
Section 4, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book IV of the Civil Code states the law on joint and several
obligations. Under Art. 1207 thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and the same
obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable only
for the proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidary liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.
[Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89252, May 24, 1993, 222 SCRA 466, 481.]
3. ID.; GUARANTY; GUARANTOR AS DISTINGUISHED FROM SOLIDARY
DEBTOR.- While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the liability
of a guarantor is different from that of a solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains: "A guarantor
who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor under the provisions of the second
paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a difference
between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in solidum (surety). The latter, outside of the liability
he assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has been exhausted, retains
all the other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of the fiansa; while a
solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4, Chapter 3,
Title 1, Book IV of the Civil Code." [Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, 1992 ed.,
p. 502]
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Emilio G. Abrogena for petitioner.
Teogenes X. Velez for private respondent.

DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that
of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18,i[1] which disposed of Civil Case
No. 10507 for collection of a sum of money and damages, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, defendant BALDOMERO L. INCIONG, JR. is adjudged solidarily liable and
ordered to pay to the plaintiff Philippine Bank of Communications, Cagayan de Oro City, the
amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00),with interest thereon from May 5, 1983 at
16% per annum until fully paid; and 6% per annum on the total amount due, as liquidated
damages or penalty from May 5, 1983 until fully paid; plus 10% of the total amount due for
expenses of litigation and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs.
The counterclaim, as well as the cross claim, are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED."
Petitioner's liability resulted from the promissory note in the amount of P50,000.00 which he
signed with Rene C. Naybe and Gregorio D. Pantanosas on February 3, 1983, holding
themselves jointly and severally liable to private respondent Philippine Bank of
Communications, Cagayan de Oro City branch. The promissory note was due on May 5, 1983.
Said due date expired without the promissors having paid their obligation. Consequently, on
November 14, 1983 and on June 8, 1984, private respondent sent petitioner telegrams demanding
payment thereof.ii[2] On December 11, 1984 private respondent also sent by registered mail a
final letter of demand to Rene C. Naybe. Since both obligors did not respond to the demands
made, private respondent filed on January 24, 1986 a complaint for collection of the sum of
P50,000.00 against the three obligors.
On November 25, 1986, the complaint was dismissed for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute the
case. However, on January 9, 1987, the lower court reconsidered the dismissal order and
required the sheriff to serve the summonses. On January 27, 1987, the lower court dismissed the
case against defendant Pantanosas as prayed for by the private respondent herein. Meanwhile,
only the summons addressed to petitioner was served as the sheriff learned that defendant Naybe
had gone to Saudi Arabia.
In his answer, petitioner alleged that sometime in January 1983, he was approached by his friend,
Rudy Campos, who told him that he was a partner of Pio Tio, the branch manager of private
respondent in Cagayan de Oro City, in the falcata logs operation business. Campos also
intimated to him that Rene C. Naybe was interested in the business and would contribute a
chainsaw to the venture. He added that, although Naybe had no money to buy the equipment Pio
Tio had assured Naybe of the approval of a loan he would make with private respondent.
Campos then persuaded petitioner to act as a "co-maker" in the said loan. Petitioner allegedly
acceded but with the understanding that he would only be a co-maker for the loan of P5,000.00.

Petitioner alleged further that five (5) copies of a blank promissory note were brought to him by
Campos at his office. He affixed his signature thereto but in one copy, he indicated that he bound
himself only for the amount of P5,000.00. Thus, it was by trickery, fraud and misrepresentation
that he was made liable for the amount of P50,000.00.
In the aforementioned decision of the lower court, it noted that the typewritten figure "P50,000-"
clearly appears directly below the admitted signature of the petitioner in the promissory note.iii[3]
Hence, the latter's uncorroborated testimony on his limited liability cannot prevail over the
presumed regularity and fairness of the transaction, under Sec. 5 (q) of Rule 131. The lower
court added that it was "rather odd" for petitioner to have indicated in a copy and not in the
original, of the promissory note, his supposed obligation in the amount of P5,000.00 only.
Finally, the lower court held that even granting that said limited amount had actually been agreed
upon, the same would have been merely collateral between him and Naybe and, therefore, not
binding upon the private respondent as creditor-bank.
The lower court also noted that petitioner was a holder of a Bachelor of Laws degree and a labor
consultant who was supposed to take due care of his concerns, and that, on the witness stand, Pio
Tio denied having participated in the alleged business venture although he knew for a fact that
the falcata logs operation was encouraged by the bank for its export potential.
Petitioner appealed the said decision to the Court of Appeals which, in its decision of August 31,
1990, affirmed that of the lower court. His motion for reconsideration of the said decision
having been denied, he filed the instant petition for review on certiorari.
On February 6,1991, the Court denied the petition for failure of petitioner to comply with the
Rules of Court and paragraph 2 of Circular No. 1-88, and to sufficiently show that respondent
court had committed any reversible error in its questioned decision.iv[4] His motion for the
reconsideration of the denial of his petition was likewise denied with finality in the Resolution of
April 24, 1991.v[5] Thereafter, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for
reconsideration which, in the Resolution of May 27, 1991, the Court denied. In the same
Resolution, the Court ordered the entry of judgment in this case.vi[6]
Unfazed, petitioner filed a motion for leave to file a motion for clarification. In the latter motion,
he asserted that he had attached Registry Receipt No. 3268 to page 14 of the petition in
compliance with Circular No. 1-88. Thus, on August 7,1991, the Court granted his prayer that
his petition be given due course and reinstated the same.vii[7]
Nonetheless, we find the petition unmeritorious.
Annexed to the petition is a copy of an affidavit executed on May 3, 1988, or after the rendition
of the decision of the lower court, by Gregorio Pantanosas, Jr., an MTCC judge and petitioner's
co-maker in the promissory note. It supports petitioner's allegation that they were induced to
sign the promissory note on the belief that it was only for P5,000.00, adding that it was Campos
who caused the amount of the loan to be increased to P50,000.00.

The affidavit is clearly intended to buttress petitioner's contention in the instant petition that the
Court of Appeals should have declared the promissory note null and void on the following
grounds: (a) the promissory note was signed in the office of Judge Pantanosas, outside the
premises of the bank; (b) the loan was incurred for the purpose of buying a second-hand
chainsaw which cost only P5,000.00; (c) even a new chainsaw would cost only P27,500.00; (d)
the loan was not approved by the board or credit committee which was the practice, at it
exceeded P5,000.00; (e) the loan had no collateral; (f) petitioner and Judge Pantanosas were not
present at the time the loan was released in contravention of the bank practice, and (g) notices of
default are sent simultaneously and separately but no notice was validly sent to him.viii[8] Finally,
petitioner contends that in signing the promissory note, his consent was vitiated by fraud as,
contrary to their agreement that the loan was only for the amount of P5,000. 00, the promissory
note stated the amount of P50,000.00.
The above-stated points are clearly factual. Petitioner is to be reminded of the basic rule that this
Court is not a trier of facts. Having lost the chance to fully ventilate his factual claims below,
petitioner may no longer be accorded the same opportunity in the absence of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the court below. Had he presented Judge Pantanosas' affidavit before the
lower court, it would have strengthened his claim that the promissory note did not reflect the
correct amount of the loan.
Nor is there merit in petitioner's assertion that since the promissory note "is not a public deed
with the formalities prescribed by law but x x x a mere commercial paper which does not bear
the signature of x x x attesting witnesses," parol evidence may "overcome" the contents of the
promissory note.ix[9] The first paragraph of the parol evidence rulex[10] states:
"When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all
the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and their successors-in-interest, no
evidence of such terms other than the contents of the written agreement."
Clearly, the rule does not specify that the written agreement be a public document.
What is required is that agreement be in writing as the rule is in fact founded on "long experience
that written evidence is so much more certain and accurate than that which rests in fleeting
memory only, that it would be unsafe, when parties have expressed the terms of their contract in
writing, to admit weaker evidence to control and vary the stronger and to show that the parties
intended a different contract from that expressed in the writing signed by them."xi[11] Thus, for
the parol evidence rule to apply, a written contract need not be in any particular form, or be
signed by both parties.xii[12] As a general rule, bills, notes and other instruments of a similar
nature are not subject to be varied or contradicted by parol or extrinsic evidence.xiii[13]
By alleging fraud in his answer,xiv[14] petitioner was actually in the right direction towards
proving that he and his co-makers agreed to a loan of P5,000.00 only considering that, where a
parol contemporaneous agreement was the inducing and moving cause of the written contract, it
may be shown by parol evidence.xv[15] However, fraud must be established by clear and
convincing evidence, mere preponderance of evidence, not even being adequate.xvi[16]

Petitioner's attempt to prove fraud must, therefore, fail as it was evidenced only by his own
uncorroborated and, expectedly, self-serving testimony.
Petitioner also argues that the dismissal of the complaint against Naybe, the principal debtor, and
against Pantanosas, his co-maker, constituted a release of his obligation, especially because the
dismissal of the case against Pantanosas was upon the motion of private respondent itself. He
cites as basis for his argument, Article 2080 of the Civil Code which provides that:
"The guarantors, even though they be solidary, are released from their obligation whenever by
some act of the creditor, they cannot be subrogated to the rights, mortgages, and preferences of
the latter."
It is to be noted, however, that petitioner signed the promissory note as a solidary co-maker and
not as a guarantor. This is patent even from the first sentence of the promissory note which states
as follows:
"Ninety one (91) days after date, for value received, I/we, JOINTLY and SEVERALLY promise
to pay to the PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS at its office in the City of Cagayan
de Oro, Philippines the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND ONLY (P50,000. 00) Pesos, Philippine
Currency, together with interest x x x at the rate of SIXTEEN (16) per cent per annum until fully
paid."
A solidary or joint and several obligation is one in which each debtor is liable for the entire
obligation, and each creditor is entitled to demand the whole obligation.xvii[17] On the other
hand, Article 2047 of the Civil Code states:
"By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation
of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.
If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter
3, Title I of this Book shall be observed, In such a case the contract is called a suretyship."
(Italics supplied.)
While a guarantor may bind himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the liability of a
guarantor is different from that of a solidary debtor. Thus, Tolentino explains:
"A guarantor who binds himself in solidum with the principal debtor under the provisions of the
second paragraph does not become a solidary co-debtor to all intents and purposes. There is a
difference between a solidary co-debtor, and a fiador in solidum (surety). The later, outside of
the liability he assumes to pay the debt before the property of the principal debtor has been
exhausted, retains all the other rights, actions and benefits which pertain to him by reason of the
fiansa; while a solidary co-debtor has no other rights than those bestowed upon him in Section 4,
Chapter 3, title I, Book IV of the Civil Code."xviii[18]
Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I, Book IV of the Civil Code states the law on joint and several
obligations. Under Art. 1207 thereof, when there are two or more debtors in one and the same

obligation, the presumption is that the obligation is joint so that each of the debtors is liable only
for a proportionate part of the debt. There is a solidarity liability only when the obligation
expressly so states, when the law so provides or when the nature of the obligation so requires.xix
[19]
Because the promissory note involved in this case expressly states that the three signatories
therein are jointly and severally liable, any one, some or all of them may be proceeded against
for the entire obligation.xx[20] The choice is left to the solidary creditor to determine against
whom he will enforce collection.xxi[21] Consequently, the dismissal of the case against Judge
Pontanosas may not be deemed as having discharged petitioner from liability as well. As regards
Naybe, suffice it to say that the court never acquired jurisdiction over him. Petitioner, therefore,
may only have recourse against his co-makers, as provided by law.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

i[1] Presided by Judge Senen C. Pearanda.

ii[2] Exhs. D-1 & D.
iii[3] Exh. A.
iv[4] Rollo, p. 30.
v[5] Ibid., p. 37.
vi[6] Ibid., p. 46.
vii[7] Ibid., p. 50.
viii[8] Petition, pp. 6-7.
ix[9] Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p. 14.
x[10] Sec. 9, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
xi[11] FRANCISCO, THE RULES OF COURT OF TIIE PHILIPPINES, Vol. VII, Part I, 1990 ed., p.
179.
xii[12] 32A C.J.S. 269.
xiii[13] Ibid., at p. 251.
xiv[14] Record, p. 38.
xv[15] FRANCISCO, supra, p. 193.
xvi[16] Cu v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 75504, April 2, 1991, 195 SCRA 647, 657 citing
Carenan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 84358, May 31, 1989 and Centenera v. Garcia
Palicio, 29 Phil. 470 (1915).
xvii[17] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. IV, 1991, ed., p. 217.
xviii[18] Supra, Vol. V, 1992 ed., p. 502.

xix[19] Sesbreo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89252, May 24, 1993, 222 SCRA 466, 481.
xx[20] Art. 1216, Civil Code; Ouano Arrastre Service, Inc. v. Aleonar, G.R. No. 97664,
October 10, 1991, 202 SCRA 619, 625.

xxi[21] Dimayuga v. Phil. Commercial & Industrial Bank, G.R. No. 42542, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA
143, 148 citing PNB v. Independent Planters Association Inc., L-28046, May 16, 1983, 122 SCRA 113.