Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
INDEX
S.No
TOPIC
Page
No.
Abstract
1.
2.
Introduction
3.
4.
5.
Approaches of Interpretation
11
6.
Conclusion
12
8.
Bibliography
13
1.
Abstract
interest
of
nations
and
prevalence
of
different
and
2.
Introduction
Till October, 2013 there was more then 4, 61,0001 war related deaths
in Iraq. This is the cost of the war and prima facie it represents the
failure of the basic aim of establishment of UN i.e. to save succeeding
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has
brought untold sorrow to mankind2.
Article 1(1) of the UN Charter has obliged it to maintain international
peace and security and in order to achieve this aim; Article 2(4) of the
charter contains a prohibition on the use of force. This prohibition is
enforced through a mechanism in which sanctions are collectively
levied against the offending State that resorts to the use of force.
These sanctions could be found in Articles 39-51 of the UN Charter.
As mentioned, the use of force can never be prohibited in totality and
hence there are exceptions given under Art.42 and 51 of the UN
Charter. These articles are further complimented by the following
doctrines:
(i)
(ii)
(ii)
3.
Joe Barnes, Bonner Means Baker Fellow at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, and Richard
J. Stoll, PhD, Professor of Political Science at Rice University, Mar. 2007 , "Preemptive and Preventive War:
A Preliminary Taxonomy".
Pre-emptive Self- Defense and these two terms are often used
interchangeably but these are fundamentally different. Difference
between the two is clearly pointed out by The Council on Foreign
Relations' Boston Term Member group, in a Feb. 1, 2004 summary
paper as:
"The difference between preemptive war and preventive war is not a
matter of semantics. Rather, it is a matter of timing that has
implications for whether an act is justified or not. Traditionally,
preemption constitutes a 'war of necessity' based on credible
evidence of imminent attack against which action is justified under
international law as enshrined in the self-defense clause (Article 51)
of the UN Charter. But the Bush administration has expanded the
definition to include actions that more closely resemble preventive
war. Preventive wars are essentially 'wars of choice' that derive
mostly from a calculus of power, rather than the precedent of
international law, conventions and practices. In choosing preventive
wars, policymakers project that waging a war, even if unprovoked,
against a rising adversary sooner is preferable to an inevitable war
later when the balance of power no longer rests in their favor. The
proposition gains traction when that enemy state is arming itself
with WMD, or credibly threatens the supply of a critical resource
such as oil, and national intelligence indicates that the enemy
intends to harm one's own state."4
4 The Bush Administration's Doctrine of Preemption (and Prevention): When, How, Where?
4.
status
challenging
to
of
Humanitarian
future
world
Intervention
order.
Some
is
ambiguous
authors
believe
and
that
Letter from Daniel Webster, U.S. Secy of State, to Lord Ashburton, British Special Minister (July 27,
1842), in 4 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 183646,
at 449 (Hunter Miller ed., 1934), available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br1842d.asp.
Law
on
Association
Human
Rights
submitted
stated
to
the
International
that
the
doctrine
of
In
1970
General
Assemblys
Declaration
of
Principles
of
9 G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 338, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
10 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27)
General
Assembly
Debate
on
this
question,
the
Mexican
11
11 U.N. GAOR 6th Comm., 18th Sess., at 113, U.N. Doc. A/C6/SR806 (1963) [hereinafter U.N. Doc.
A/C6/SR806]. On this view, one might find it difficult to justify peacekeeping operations that do not
necessarily fall under Chapter 7 enforcement action but sanctioned by the Security Council
12 Richard B. Lillich, Intervention to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGill L.J. 205, 20809 (1969)
13
5.
Approaches of Interpretations
of
the
Security
Council,
or
the
right
of
15
The following table will further demonstrate and explain the differences
between these two approaches. These two approaches signify two
different poles of thought process or in common parlance two different
schools of thought. The researcher tried to maintain a balance between
these two approaches to reach at a conclusion of the working
hypothesis mentioned in the abstract because inclining towards one
13 U.N. Doc. A/C6/SR806, supra note 56, at 230
14 Felix Ermacora, Human Rights and Domestic Jurisdiction, 124 Recueil des Cours 375, 436 (1968)
15 T. Franck, Recourse to Force. State Actions Against Threats and Armed Attacks
International Law and the Use of Force (2nd edn. 2004).
law
is
very
vibrant
and
complex
and
these
two
Status of custom
Understanding of
the constitutive
elements of
custom
Extensive
approach
Privileged source
Formal and
material source
Policy-oriented or
objectivist
tendencies Practice
as the dominant
element; the role of
political organs
Instant or rapidly
evolving custom
Dominant role of
major states
Restrictive16
approach
Equality between
sources
Formal source
Voluntarist or
formalist
tendencies
Opinio juris as the
dominant element;
the role of legal
discourse
Custom evolves
gradually
Equality between
states
6.
Conclusion
From above discussion it is cleared that there exist two distinct schools
of thoughts regarding the scope of this doctrine. Scholars following
restrictive
approach
advocate
complete
ban
on
Humanitarian
possibility does not mean that world should turn a blind eye towards
the gross human rights violation and mass genocide. So there is need
of middle path wherein Humanitarian Intervention should take place
under the control of Security Council with keeping UN principles in
mind.
7.
Bibliography
Books
1. Buergenthal, T. & Maier H. G. PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
(WestsNutshell series)
2004)
Journals
1. Corten, O.
at
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/br
1842d.asp.
GAOR
6th
Comm.,
18th
Sess.,
at
113,
U.N.
Doc.
4. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 18, at 338,
U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970).
Case
1.