Canadian Journal of Philosophy

Goodman's Semiotic Theory of Art

Author(s): Markus Lammenranta
Source: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Sep., 1992), pp. 339-351
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CANADIANJOURNALOF PHILOSOPHY
Volume22, Number3, Septemberl992,pp. 339 - 352

339

Goodman'sSemiotic
Theoryof Art
MARKUSLAMMENRANTA
Universityof Helsinki
Unioninkatu40 B
SF-00170Helsinki
Finland

In 1968,Nelson Goodmanpublished his Languages

ofArf which became
one of the most importantworks on aestheticsin the traditionof analytical philosophy. Goodmanoffered there a semiotic theory of art, the
purposeof which was to explicateour conceptof artin termsof different
symbolic or referentialfunctions;the theory was furtherdeveloped in
his subsequent book Waysof Worldmaking.
Though it is a very subtle
and sophisticated theory, I will argue that it is not adequate, that it
doesn't even satisfy Goodman'sown requirementsfor a theory of art.
Traditionally,the aim of a theoryof arthas been to capturethe essence
of art, to describe what is common to all works of art and at the same
time distinguishes them from everything else. As a nominalist,Goodman does not, however, believe that there is any essence of art that we
can discover. Thereis just our practiceof calling certainobjectsworks
of art.So, the task of defining art is not a matterof discoveringa hidden
essence.
But neitheris it to describethe ordinaryuse of the term 'workof art.'
Ordinaryusage is often ambiguous and vague. The task is rather to
reform this usage so that it becomes more precise and informative.
Sometimes we may need to correctthis usage in an even more radical
way. Thiskind of thing happenede.g. when biologists defined the term

1 Nelson Goodman,Languages
ofArt(Brighton:HarvesterPress1981)
2 Nelson Goodman,Waysof Worldmaking
(Indianapolis:Hackett1978)

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340 MarkusLammenranta

'fish'so that it doesn't apply to whales though ordinaryusage may take

whales to be fish. Our ordinary concept may not be appropriatefor
scientific and philosophical purposes, in which case it needs to be
revised.3
We can say that Goodman is proposing a rationalreconstructionor
explication4of our conceptof art.Suchan explicationmust satisfyat least
two requirements:First,it must be immunefromcounterexamples.This
doesn't mean that every case where the explication is in conflict with
ordinaryusage is a counterexample.Explicationis sometimes allowed
to revise ordinary usage. But we can't allow too drastic revisions,
because otherwise we would not have a explication of art at all. For
systematicalreasons,we can let our definition exclude some cases that
we pretheoreticallytook as works of artand include some cases thatwje
didn't take as works of art.But they can'tbe any importantcases, cases
that we careabout. So the definitionmust be immune from any important counterexamples.
Second, the definition must be illuminating.It is made to serve explanatorypurposes.Forexample,it won't do to define 'a work of art'as
somethingmade by an artist.If we takeany person that makesworks of
artas an artist,then theremay not be any counterexamples;but it would
not be very illuminatingto be told thatthe conceptsof a work of artand
an artistare connectedin this way. We have no use for a definitionthat
doesn't help us to understandanything.The definitionof 'a work of art'
must pick out interestingsimilaritiesbetween differentworks of artand
at the same time relatethem to other culturalobjects.A good definition
of art should increase our understandingof art and its relationshipto
other parts of our culture.
Many traditionaland currenttheories of art satisfy only one of these
requirements:eitherthey arenot immunefromcounterexamplesor they
are not illuminating.ButGoodmanpromises to give a theoryof art that
has both of these virtues. ThoughI thinkGoodman'stheory is the most
promisingtheoryin this respect,I must concludethatit doesn't succeed.
At first,it may really look that it is both immune fromcounterexamples
and illuminating,but this is just an illusion which is based on his using
his central primitive term 'reference'ambiguously. When we resolve
this ambiguity,we can see that his theory either gets a large numberof

3 NelsonGoodman,OfMindandOtherMatters(Cambridge:HarvardUniversityPress
1984),198-9
4 Goodmanspeaks about constructionaldefinitions;see his TheStructure
of Appearance(Dordrecht:D. Reidel1977),3-23.

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Goodman'sSemioticTheoryof Art 341

importantcounterexamplesorbecomes vacuous.So, it can'tsatisfyboth

of the requirementsfor a theoryof art.To make my point clear,I should
like first to give a short sketchof Goodman'stheory.
Traditionally,a theory of art is supposed to be an answer to the
question What is art?'Goodman thinks that this is a wrong question.
We can see why if we considercases of found art- Duchamp'sFountain
or just a stone picked out of the driveway and exhibitedin the museum.
It can be very difficult to decide whether one has here a work of art or
not. Ifwe takethese as cases of art,shouldn'twe takeany ordinaryurinal
or stone as a work of art,too?
Difficulties like these show, according to Goodman,5that we have
asked the wrong question. Instead of asking What is art?'we should
ratherask When is art?'Therealquestionis not 'Whatobjectsareworks
of art?'but When is an objecta work of art?'Thisis so because an object
can function as a work of art at some times and not at others. A stone
doesn't usually functionas a work of art while in a driveway, but may
do so when on display in an art museum.
We can make similarremarkson symbols. Justas an objectmay be a
work of art at certain times and not at others, so an object may be a
symbolat certaintimesand not at others.An objectfunctionsas a symbol
only when it is used as a symbol,i.e., it is used for referringto something
or it is used as a memberin a scheme of symbols some of which areused
for referring.Goodman'sgeneraltheory of symbols is a presentationof
different types and functions of symbols and symbol systems - of
differentways objectsare used for referring.6
In his semiotictheoryof art,Goodmancombinesthese two points:an
objectfunctionsas a work of artonly when it functionsas a symbol. To
functionas a symbol is a necessaryconditionfor an objectto functionas
a work of art. It is, naturally,not sufficient.The world is full of objects
that functionas symbols but do not functionas art.So, Goodmanneeds
to distinguish the cases of art from other sorts of symbolic functioning.
Things function as works of art only when their symbolic functioning
has certaincharacteristicswhich Goodman calls the symptoms of the
aesthetic. He distinguishes five symptoms: (1) syntactic density, (2)
semantic density, (3) relative repleteness, (4) exemplification,and (5)
multiple and complex reference.Sucha symptom is neithera necessary

5 Waysof Worldmaking,66-7
6 The theory is given in Languagesof Art;for a summary, see Of Mind and OtherMatters,
55-70.

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342 MarkusLammenranta

nor a sufficient condition but rathera featurethat, in conjunctionwith

others,makes it more probablethat something functionsas art.7
I shall not discuss here whether the symptoms of the aesthetic suggested by Goodmanareadequate.I will raisea moreimportantquestion:
whether symbolic functioningis a necessarycondition for an objectto
functionas a work of artat all. Theanswerdepends on how we interpret
Goodman'sterm 'symbolicfunctioning'or 'referring/becausehe seems
to use these terms in two different senses, in a broad sense and in a
narrowsense. If we acceptthe broad interpretation,symbolic functioning seems to be a necessaryconditionfor an objectto functionas art.But
this broadreadingmakes the whole theorytotallyvacuous. If we accept
the narrowinterpretation,on the otherhand,symbolicfunctioningcan't
be a necessary condition, because there will be many cases where an
object functions as art without functioning as a symbol. The narrow
interpretationof 'referring7thus leaves room for a huge number of
counterexamples.So, Goodman'stheory fails on both interpretations.
Goodman'stheory may look more promising than it is if we mix up
these two interpretations.We use the broad interpretationto rule out
counterexamplesand the narrow interpretationto make theory look
illuminating. I think Goodman switches these interpretationsall the
time without noticing:he is, of course, not allowed to do so. We must
keep the interpretationsdistinct.
Goodmanuses 'reference'as a primitiveand most generaltermof his
system. It covers all sorts of symbolization, all cases of standing for.
Thereare two main forms of reference:denotationand exemplification.
'Denotation'applies to cases, such as naming,predication,and description, where a word or string of words applies to one objector to each of
many objects:e.g., 'Gdansk'denotes a single city, and 'city'denotes each
of the cities of the world. But denotation includes also depiction by
drawings, paintings, sculpture, photographs, films, and so on: e.g., a
portraitdenotes its subject,and a drawing of a tiger in a dictionarymay
denote each of all tigers. So, denotation covers all cases of representationalart.

7 Goodman, Ways of Worldmaking,67-70, and Of Mind and Other Matters, 135-8.

Goodman doesn't thus give a complete definition of art that specifies necessary and
sufficient conditions. He gives just one necessary property and a cluster of typical
properties of art. This may, however, be taken as an early stage in a search for a
definition (Of Mind and OtherMatters, 135). And it can be evaluated in terms of the
same criteria that are appropriate for a complete definition. His one necessary
condition makes it possible to look for counterexamples, and, of course, we can
assess how illuminating it is. See also n. 11.

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Goodman'sSemioticTheoryof Art 343

Exemplificationis referenceof a sample to a feature of the sample.

Take,e.g., a swatch of cloth in a tailor'ssample book. It functions as a
symbol exemplifying certain properties. It exemplifies color, weave,
texture,and pattern,but not size, shape, or weight. It refersto some of
its properties, not to all of them. Exemplificationis possession plus
reference.Samplesarethus used to referto some of theirown properties.
Goodman'snotion of exemplificationexplains how abstractworks can
functionas symbols.They referto theirown properties.They exemplify
colors, sounds, forms, structures,rhythms,even feelings.
Both denotation and exemplification are divided into literal and
metaphoricalformsof referring.The notion of metaphoricaldenotation
is used to explain how fictive works of art can denote something.
Though terms like 'Don Quixote,' 'Don Juan,'and 'Lolita'don't denote
literallyanything, they denote metaphoricallymany of us. Expression,
on the other hand, is analyzed as metaphoricalexemplification. So
expressionof feelings and other propertiesis understood as one sort of
reference,referenceto metaphoricalpropertiesof a work.
Thereare also complex forms of reference,chains of referencemade
up of simple links, each of which is constitutedof either denotation or
exemplification. So, a work can also hint or suggest something by
referringindirectlyto it.
So we have here a very simple theory constructedin terms of just a
few primitivenotions.Evenexemplificationis furtheranalyzedin terms
of referenceand the converse of denotation. But at the same time it
explains a lot. It gives an illuminating account of several important
phenomena in the arts: representation,expression, fiction, allusion,
abstractart,and so on. At the same time, it seems to explain how works
of art differ from other cultural objects,from non-symbols, like hammers, axes, knifes, and pencils, and from other symbols, like scientific
theories, thermometers,trafficsigns, and gestures. We seem to have a
very effective theory.
However, there is an ambiguity that may not be so easily detected.
Goodmanuses his term 'reference'in two distinctways. Thisambiguity
resides in one of the subspeciesof referenceand derives from there.His
use of the term'denotation'is reasonablyclear.Butwe can'tsay the same
about 'exemplification.'My claim is that Goodman's use of 'exemplification'is ambiguous.
Let's take another look at exemplification.The basic motivation for
introducingthis termis to explain how non-representationalworks can
refer.Itis herewherethe mostsemiotictheoriesget intodifficulties.Here,
we have just structuresof paint or sound. How are we supposed to use
themforreferringto something?Goodmanhas an ingeniousanswer:we
use these works as samples of the structuresand other propertiesthey
instantiate.So, these worksexemplifysome of theirown properties.

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344 MarkusLammenranta

Because exemplificationis the only form of referenceavailable for

some worksof art,like abstractpaintings,buildings,and musicalworks,
Goodman'ssemiotictheoryimplies thatthose works functionas artonly
when they exemplify their properties.8But do non-representational
works always exemplify theirown properties?Do they always function
as samples? To answer this questions, we must consider a little more
carefullywhat the conditionsare under which we can correctlysay that
an objectexemplifies some of its own properties.By readingGoodman
carefully, I think we can get two wholly different answers to this
question.Thereare two distinct interpretationsof 'exemplification/
In some passages Goodman seems to say that he uses the term
'exemplification'just to make a distinctionbetween the artisticallyrelevant propertiesof a work of artand the irrelevantproperties:to say that
a work exemplifies certain properties is just to say that these are the
artisticallyrelevantpropertiesof the work. E.g. to MonroeBeardsley's
criticism that the whole idea of exemplification might be dropped
without a loss, that mere possession of properties is all that matters,
Goodman gives the following response:
Surely he [Beardsley] does not suppose that critical comment consists of random
listing of properties a work possesses, or that understanding a work amounts to
noting such properties indiscriminately. A vital part of aesthetic understanding,
especially but not exclusively in the case of abstract works, is determining which
among its properties the work not only possesses but also conveys. The significant
properties of a work, we might say, are those it signifies. This must be taken fully
into account in one way or another, and my way is in terms of exemplification.9

In anotherpassage, he writes:

8 I don't want to deny that there are some buildings and musical works that denote
and represent something. Some musical events may represent e.g. a gunshot or
singing of birds. Goodman notes himself that some buildings contain statues that
represent and that even a whole building may sometimes represent something. E.g.
Jorn Utzon's Opera House in Sydney represents sailboats, though even in this case
we are more interested in the form it exemplifies. See Goodman, 'How Buildings
Mean,' CriticalInquiry12 (1986), reprinted in Nelson Goodman & Catherine Z. Elgin,
Reconceptionsin Philosophy& OtherArts & Sciences(London: Routledge 1988) 31-48.
These are all quite exceptional cases. For my purposes, it is enough that there are
typical cases of paintings, buildings, and musical works that do not denote anything.
9 Goodman, Of Mind and OtherMatters, 84

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Goodman'sSemioticTheoryof Art 345

Why not, then, speak simply of properties possessed rather than properties exemplified or expressed? Because not all the properties the object possesses, but only
those it exemplifies or expresses when functioning as a symbol of a certain kind,
are relevant to it as a work of art.10

So, these two passages suggest that the point of using the term 'exemplification'is justto pick out certainrelevantpropertiesof an object.This
means that the necessaryand sufficientcondition for an objectto refer
to some of its propertiesis just that these propertiesare relevantto it as
such an object.To say that non-representationalworks of art always
referto somethingwould be just to say that the work always have some
propertiesthat are relevant to it as a work of art. This is an extremely
liberalview of exemplificationor self-reference.Itbecomestriviallytrue
that objectsfunctionas art only when they functionas symbols. To use
something as art is always to distinguish some of its properties from
others.Butto use almostanythingforany purpose,we must distinguish
some of its propertiesfrom others:e.g., we can't use any tool without
knowing how to distinguish its relevantproperties.Some propertiesof
a hammerare relevantto it as a hammer,some propertiesof an axe are
relevant to it as an axe, and so on. So this interpretationof symbolic
functioningwould not give us a way to distinguish artfrom these other
human practices.
On this broad interpretationof 'exemplification,'symbolic functioning is a necessarycondition for something to function as art. But this is
so just because it is a necessary condition for anything to function as
anything. So, on this interpretation,there are no counterexamplesfor
Goodman'sview that to functionas art is to functionas a symbol. But it
also makeshis view vacuous. If the semiotic theoryof art says only that
some propertiesof every work of art are artisticallyrelevant,it doesn't
say much. The theory ceases to be illuminating.It can't make an interesting distinctionbetween works of art and other culturalobjects,e.g.
tools like a hammer,a pen, an axe, etc. So on this broad interpretation
of 'symbolicfunctioning/ Goodman'stheory doesn't satisfy one of the
requirementsfor such a theory, the requirementthat a theory or an
analysis of art should be illuminating.11

10 Goodman, Problemsand Projects(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill 1972), 126

11 One of the referees of the CanadianJournalof Philosophymade the point that it is quite
inappropriate to concede that functioning as a symbol is a necessary condition of
art but to complain that it is not an interesting or illuminating necessary condition.
Not all necessary conditions are expected to be interesting. There may be other
necessary conditions which together with this one make the theory illuminating.

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346 Markus Lammenranta

On the other hand, giving an accountof artisticrelevancein terms of

referenceis unilluminatingin anotherway. It doesn't tell us why certain
propertiesof a work of art are artisticallyrelevantwhile others are not.
To get an illuminating account, we should be able to tell what is the
purpose for which we use works of art, in other words, what is the
functionof art.This would explainwhy certainfeaturesof a work of art
are relevantwhile certainothersare not. The relevantfeaturesare those
that help the work of art to serve its functionwell.
Of course, Goodman has also an accountof the functionof art. But if
we take the function into account here, we get a narrowernotion of
exemplification.This narrowernotion is more illuminating.It explains
why certainpropertiesare artisticallyrelevantwhile othersare not, and
it also makesan illuminatingdistinctionbetween worksof artand other
cultural objects, like hammers and other tools. The problem is that it
makesGoodman'stheoryof artvulnerableto a largenumberof serious
counterexamples.
According to Goodman,art has a cognitive function.So if we accept
the narrowinterpretation,the artisticallyrelevantfeaturesare those that
make the work cognitivelyefficient.And on this interpretation,we may
say that the work refersonly to those of its featuresthat are cognitively
relevantin this sense.
Thereis some evidence that Goodman ties up the symbolic function
and the cognitive functionin this way. He says thatthe primarypurpose

This is a good general point, but it doesn't save Goodman's theory. First of all,
Goodman gives only one necessary condition of art. So it is expected that it does
some work in the theory. Second, if one still insist that this doesn't need to be so
and that all the illumination comes from the symptoms of the aesthetic that are
supposed to distinguish artistic functioning from other symbolic functioning, I can
deny this, too. If we understand 'exemplification' in the broad sense and concede
that tools exemplify their properties, the symptoms of the aesthetic doesn't help us
at all. This is because tools would also satisfy most of the symptoms: at least (1)
syntactic density, (2) semantic density, (3) relative repleteness, and (4) exemplification. The only symptom about which I hesitate is (5) the multiple and complex
reference. So, the symptoms would not help us to distinguish art from ordinary
tools, like hammers and axes, and tell us anything that is specifically illuminating
about art. I can't explain here what Goodman means by his symptoms because of
the technicalities involved, but I urge interested readers to study Goodman and
confirm my point themselves. See Goodman, Languages of Art, 127-73, Ways of
Worldmaking,67-8, and Of Mind and OtherMatters, 135-8.
One might suggest that tools would thus be a counterexample to Goodman's
theory. This is not so, however, because Goodman does not want to claim that the
symptoms are even conjunctively sufficient for something to function as art (Goodman, Of Mind and OtherMatters, 135).

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Goodman'sSemioticTheoryof Art 347

of symbolizationis cognition in and for itself and that symbolizationis

to be judged fundamentallyhow well it serves the cognitive purpose.12
Thereare, however, two sides in Goodman'semphasizing cognition
in art.This can be seen, for example, in the following passage:
I have held ... that we have to read the painting as well as the poem, and that
aesthetic experience is dynamic rather than static. It involves making delicate
discriminations and discerning subtle relationships, identifying symbol systems
and characters within these systems and what these characters denote and exemplify, interpreting works and reorganizing the world in terms of works and works
in terms of the world. (Ibid., 241)

On the one hand, our experiencesof works of art involve cognition.To

understandworksof art,we must have certaincognitiveskills.We must
be able to make discriminations,to discernrelationships,and to identify
symbols and symbol systems. On the other hand, art increases our
knowledge and understandingof the world, or worlds, as Goodman
prefers to say elsewhere. We learn to reorganizethe world in terms of
art,or we learnto make worlds in termsof art,as he also says.
Now, when he speaks about the cognitive functionof art,he can only
mean the latter role of cognition in the arts. The function of art is to
advance our knowledge and understanding of the world. It is not to
develop those skills thatare needed to understandart.It does not make
sense to say that the functionof art is to help us to understandart. But
even here thereis a slight dangerof ambiguity.WhenGoodmanemphasizes cognitionin the arts,it is not always quite clearwhetherhe means
thatcognitionis involved in understandingof artor thatcognitionis the
functionof art.The role of cognitionin the firstsense is easy to combine
with the broad notion of exemplification.The latterrole is requiredfor
the narrownotion.
So, if the symbolic function and the cognitive function of art are
intimatelyconnected,we get the narrownotion of exemplification.We
can say that works of art referto their propertiesonly when this reference has a cognitive purpose. It is easy to motivate this view by developing Goodman'sown example.His paradigmfor exemplificationwas
a tailor'ssample book. We may say that a sample exemplifiesand thus
refers to some of its properties, but only because we use it to get
knowledge, and not just about the sample itself. We want to know
something about anotherobjectdistinct from it. The point of using the
sampleis thatit is difficultor impossibleto get the knowledgeby directly

12 Goodman, Languagesof Art, 258

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348 MarkusLammenranta

inspecting the objectitself. We use a tailor's sample book, because we

want to know what propertiesthe ready suit will have. We can'tget this
knowledge by direct inspection, because there is not yet any suit to
inspect.So, we can say thata sample refersto its properties,because by
referringto these properties,it also refersto the same propertiesof other
objects,and thus gives us knowledge about those objects.This is the
whole point of using the sample.
Analogously, the function of art is to give us knowledge about the
world, knowledge that we can't get by inspectingit directly.Goodman
expresses this metaphorically,as follows:
Works of art are not specimens from bolts or barrels but samples from the sea. They
literally or metaphorically exemplify forms, feelings, affinities, contrasts, to be
sought in or built into a world. (Ways of Worldmaking,137)

We can'tfind out directlythe chemicalcompositionof sea water.We

can do this only by inspecting samples from the sea. In the same way,
thereis no ready-madeworld thatwe could directlyinspect.We can get
knowledge of a world (sic)13only indirectly by using symbols. By
symbols we divide our world or worlds into objectsand kindsof objects,
and thus in a sense make worlds. So, if works of art are samples from
our worlds, then their whole purpose is knowing or making those
worlds.14
Consequently,works of artexemplifytheirown propertiesonly when
they are used for the purpose of knowing and makingworlds. We have
here the narrownotion of exemplification.Fora work of artto exemplify
some of its properties,it is not enough thatthese are artisticallyrelevant
in some loose sense. They must be cognitively relevant,relevantto the
purpose of knowing and making our worlds.15

13 In Waysof Worldmaking,Goodman speaks often about a world instead of the world.

Because he now thinks that there are many worlds if any and that they are all made
by us with symbols, it would be misleading to speak about the world out there
waiting to be found. I will, however, go on speaking about the world, too, because
I think that Goodman's theory of art is quite compatible with a realistic view about
the world out there. See Markus Lammenranta, 'Do We Make Worlds With Symbols?' Semiotica,86 (1991), 277-87.
14 According to Goodman's antirealism, knowing and making go on together. See
Goodman, Waysof Worldmaking,21-2.
15 Some aestheticians seem to interpret Goodman as claiming that mere making of
works of art would count as worldmaking. This is a gross misunderstanding. Works
of art are not worlds; they - like other symbols - are the means to making worlds.

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Goodman'sSemioticTheoryof Art 349

But this narrow notion of exemplificationmakes Goodman's theory

open to importantcounterexamples.Thereareimportantcasesof artistic
functioningthatare not cases of symbolicfunctioning.So the lattercan't
be a necessary condition for the former.These cases can be found in
works of art where the only possible form of symbolizationis exemplification.I will argue that there are typical uses of non-representational
worksthatdo not servea cognitivefunction.So, they would also be cases
in which we do not use works of artas samples exemplifyingtheirown
properties.
I will not deny that such works can be used as samples and that we
might sometimes use them so. Some non-representationalworks can
draw our attentionto some of their propertiesthat we can 'built into a
world.' I will just claim that there are importantuses of art where we
don't use such works as samples.
How do I know this?I think that there can be good evidence for how
people use objectsin how they evaluatethem.If people canuse an object
for some purpose, they can, generally, also evaluate how efficient the
object is for this purpose. Now, if people agree that a certainobjectis
good, and we know that it is not a good means to a certainpurpose, we
have pretty good evidence that they are not using the object for that
purpose.
A good example of non-representationalart that people value highly
is classicalmusic:the symphonies of Beethoven,for example.Are these
works good means to knowing our world or worlds? I would say that
they are not. Of course, they instantiatecertain musical forms, structures, themes, and so on. But do we learnto know our worlds betterby
studying these forms and structures?No, these are propertiesthat are
typical of classicalmusic, not of the world or worlds outside it.
How about feelings?Classicalmusic may exemplify feelings that are
found in a world outside it, in humanbeings. This is true,but we might
still doubt whether Beethoven's symphonies are typically used for
knowing oneself and other people better. Because we can recognize
feelings in ourselves,we can also projectfeelings to music. But it is hard
to see how projectingfeelings to music can help us to distinguish new
feelings in ourselves.Moreover,thereis good instrumentalmusic e.g.
the Webernquartets that is not very expressive of human feelings at
all.

This misunderstanding may be encouraged by Goodman's broad notion of exemplification. Neither would the making of imaginary or fictive worlds count as
worldmaking in Goodman's sense. There are no fictive, merely possible, worlds.
Only making actual worlds counts as worldmaking.

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350 MarkusLammenranta

I don't say that there might not be something in classical music that
you canuse for worldmaking.Thepoint is thatif this were the only basis
of its value, the value would not be very high, indeed. It would not
explain why people set such a high value on this kind of music. So, we
have a good reason to believe that people generallyuse classicalmusic
for some other purpose.
This kind of examples can be multiplied by drawing from the other
arts,like abstractpaintingand architecture.Thepoint remainsthe same.
We can use people's value judgments as evidence for how they use
objectsas works of art.This evidence suggests that there must be other
purposes than the advancementof knowledge for which people use art.
Theirvalue judgmentscan'tbe explainedby supposing that they speak
exclusively about the cognitive efficiencyof works of art.
At least in some cases, people's value judgmentare betterexplained
by supposing that they use works of art to get experiences.They listen
to classicalmusic to enjoythe experiencescausedby it, and they evaluate
it on the basis of the quality of the experience. Of course, they must
discernsome propertiesof the piece of music to enjoyit, but they are not
using it as a sample of those properties,because their interestis just to
enjoythe music, not to get knowledge aboutsomethingelse. So, they are
not using the piece as a symbol. Nevertheless, it is clear that they may
use it as a work of art. Consequently, symbolic functioning is not a
necessary condition for an object to function as a work of art; and
Goodman'ssemiotic theory of art must be rejected.
So,we have seen thattherearetwo interpretationsof Goodman'sterm
'exemplification.'How we should evaluateGoodman'ssemiotictheory
of art depends on which interpretationwe choose. If we choose the
broad interpretation,then there are no counterexamplesfor his view
that referenceis a necessarycondition for something to functionas art.
Every work of art can be said to exemplify some of their properties,
because this is just to say that these propertiesare relevantfor them as
works of art.Buton this broadinterpretation,the whole theorybecomes
vacuous. To say that some propertiesof every work of art are relevant
is not to say very much. It is not to make an illuminating distinction
between works of art and other culturalobjects.
But if we choose the narrowinterpretationand makeexemplification
essentially connectedto a cognitive function, then there will be a huge
numberof importantcounterexamplesto Goodman'stheory.Thereare
many, especially non-representational,works that have no cognitive
function.Sothey can't be saidto exemplifytheirown propertiesorreferin
anyothersense.Symbolicfunctioningis thusnota necessaryconditionfor
artisticfunctioning.Goodman'stheoryfailson bothinterpretations.
All this is not to say thatGoodman'stheoryof artis not useful for our
understanding of the arts. Its significanceis just somewhat narrower

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Goodman'sSemioticTheoryof Art 351

than Goodman himself thought. It is not adequate as a theory of the

general nature of art. But if we interpret it as a theory of one of its
functions, then it may be more successful. It may give an illuminating
account of how art can serve the importantfunction of advancing our
knowledge and understanding.16
Received:August, 1991
Revised:February,1992

16 I am indebted to Dr. Joseph Tolliver, Dr. Josef Tarnowski, and the editor and the
anonymous referees of CanadianJournalof Philosophyfor their helpful comments on
the earlier versions of this article.

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