JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE v.

COURT OF APPEALS & PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 189122, 17 March 2010, THIRD DIVISION, (Corona, J.)
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, Leviste was convicted by the RTC of Makati City for the lesser crime of
homicide and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12
years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the CA. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for admission to bail pending
appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his
part. The CA denied his application for bail.
ISSUE:

In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of
imprisonment for more than six years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail
should automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court?
RULING:
NO.
If none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the
appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even
if the bail-negating circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate
court's denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute
abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to
carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no
other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending
appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Any application for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant's case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow
or disallow bail.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before the trial
courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its commission and
at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail,
and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in
the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of
his appeal, unless the proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as
amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of
its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is
out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the
complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and
after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall
be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.

As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before his Court where the
accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from notice to the court
of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the
cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru the Philippine
National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending resolution of his appeal; 3) If the
accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his bond shall be forfeited
and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed
under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail.

FELISA TABORITE & LUCY T. GALLARDO v. JUDGE MANUEL S. SOLLESTA

A.M. No. MTJ-02-1388, 12 August 2003, THIRD DIVISION, (Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.)
Reyaldo Divino was charged with murder of Bienvenido Taborite, husband of Felisa Taborite and brother of Lucy
Gallardo. PNP - Criminal Investigation Group (PNP-CIG) of Koronadal, South Cotabato arrested Divino. He then
filed with the MCTC a petition for bail set for hearing on September 23, 1998. Complainants and the PNP-CIG did not
receive any subpoena. The hearing was reset on September 30, 1998. This time, SPO2 Wilfredo D. Bautista of the
PNP-CIG was notified, but not the public prosecutors. During the hearing, only counsel for the accused and SPO2
Bautista appeared. Then, Judge Sollesta granted the bail at P50,000.00.
ISSUE:

Is the grant of bail by Judge Sollesta valid despite absence of prosecutors?

RULING:
NO.
Before a judge may grant an application for bail, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, the prosecutor
must be given reasonable notice of hearing or he must be asked to submit his recommendation, as per Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended.
In Cortes vs. Catral, the Court laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8,id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the bail bond
(Section 19, id); otherwise, the petition should be denied.
The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to present evidence. It is on the basis of such evidence
that judicial discretion is exercised in determining whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. Any order
issued in the absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and outright
arbitrariness.
Granting bail in non-bailable offenses without hearing is gross ignorance of the law.

JASON IVLER y AGUILAR v. HON. MARIA ROWENA MODESTO-SAN PEDRO, Judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 71, Pasig City, and EVANGELINE PONCE, Respondents.
FACTS.
Petitioner Ivler was charged before the MTC Pasig City for two separate offenses: Reckless imprudence resulting
in slight physical injuries (Criminal Case No. 82367) and reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and
damage of property (Criminal Case No. 82366). The first offense for the injuries suffered by herein respondent and
the second offense for the death of her husband and damage to the spouses vehicle. Ivler pleaded guilty on the first
offense and meted public censure as penalty. He invokes this conviction as a ground in his motion to quash the
information for the second offense contending it places him in double jeopardy for the same offense of reckless
imprudence. MTC refused quashal of the information thus petitioners motion for certiorari was elevated before the
RTC while moving for the suspension of the criminal case before the MTC pending resolution of the prejudicial
question as subject of his motion for reconsideration at the RTC. MTC however proceeded with the criminal
proceeding. The non-appearance of Ivler to the proceeding resulted to the cancellation of his bail and order of
his arrest was issued. By virtue of this arrest order, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the motion for certiorari filed
by Ivler on ground that he loss standing to maintain suit. RTC dismissed said petition on this ground thus this petition
to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE.
1. Whether or not the petitioner loses his standing to maintain suit?
2. Whether or not the petitioners right against double jeopardy a bar to another prosecution on the second
offense charged on Criminal Case No. 82366?
HELD.
The court held that petitioner did not lose his standing to maintain his petition. The lower court based its ruling
from Rule 124, Section 8, second par. that provides that an appeal may be dismissed when an appellant escapes from
custody or violates the terms of his bail bond. The appeal contemplated in this section is applicable on a suit to review
judgment of conviction. No judgment has yet been rendered against the petitioner. Section 21, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendants absence in a proceeding merely renders his
bondman liable, subjecting the bond to cancellation if it fails to produce defendant before the court within 30
days. This does not ipso facto convert the standing of an accused as a fugitive to lose his standing before the
court. Moreover, the court observed that contrary to the lower court contention that petitioner failed to attend the
hearing without justified reason it failed to appreciate the fact that there is a pending motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioner which was left unresolved by the lower court.
On the issue on double jeopardy, the two charges were prosecuted by the court under the provision of Article
365 of the Revised Penal Code that penalizes quasi-offenses such as negligence. What this provision contemplates in
quasi-offenses of criminal negligence is punishing the act of negligence that if intentionally done will constitute a
criminal offense. Thus, the law punishes the negligent act and not the result thereof. It takes into account the gravity of
the offenses in determining the penalty but not to qualify the substance of the offense. It treats a negligent act as single
whether the injurious result affects one or several persons. The offense of criminal negligence remains as one and
cannot be split into different crimes and prosecutions. The contention of the lower court to invoke Article 48 where
light offenses such as slight physical injuries cannot be complexed with grave or less grave felony such as homicide that
the court is compelled to separate both charges is untenable in this case. The principle of prosecuting quasi offenses
remain intact in the case thus the petitioner cannot be prosecuted for 2 offenses of similar charges on reckless
imprudence. His prosecution on the first offense thus bars another prosecution for the second offense by virtue of the
principle of double jeopardy. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the lower court.

RUFINA CHUA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS and WILFRED N. CHIOK

G.R. No. 140842 April 12, 2007 FIRST DIVISION
(SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.)
FACTS:
Topic: Cancellation of bail (Rule 114 Sec. 22)
Crime: Estafa
Place of commission: Pasig City
Rufina Chua met Wilfred Chiok, who represented himself as a licensed stockbroker and an expert in the stock
market. Chiok issued two checks as payment to Chua but when petitioner deposited them in the drawee bank, the
checks were dishonored for insufficient funds. Respondent was charged of estafa. The trial court convicted respondent
of estafa and sentencing him to suffer twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. The prosecution then filed a motion for cancellation of bail on the ground that respondent
might flee or commit another crime. The prosecution presented a Record Check Routing Form issued by the Bureau of
Immigration showing that respondent has an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of
Residence (ICR). Trial court issued an Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari with application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a writ preliminary injunction. CA
issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the arrest of respondent, holding that the latter should not be deprived
of his liberty pending resolution of his appeal as the offense for which he was convicted is a non-capital offense; and
that the probability that he will flee during the pendency of his appeal is merely conjectural. Hence, the instant petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE: Is the cancellation of bail valid?
HELD:
Yes. The petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and a writ of preliminary injunction is not the proper
recourse in assailing the trial court Omnibus Order canceling his bail. Section 5, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Private respondents appropriate remedy against the trial courts Omnibus Order canceling his bail
is by filing with the Court of Appeals a motion to review the said order. The filing of a separate petition via a special
civil action or special proceeding questioning such adverse order before the appellate court is proscribed. Hence, the
Court of Appeals erred in not dismissing outright respondents petition for certiorari. The basic rule is that such
petition may only be availed of when "there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law."
The resolution of CA granting respondents application for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
implementation of the trial courts Omnibus Order canceling his bail, is bereft of any factual or legal basis. To be
entitled to an injunctive writ, the applicant must show that (1) he has a clear existing right to be protected; and (2) the
acts against which the injunction is to be directed are in violation of such right. The first requisite is absent. Respondent
has no right to be freed on bail pending his appeal from the trial courts judgment. His conviction carries a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding 6 years (to be exact, 12 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion temporal,
as maximum) which justifies the cancellation of his bail pursuant to the third paragraph of Section 5 (b), (d) and (e) of
Rule 114, quoted above. Moreover, he failed to appear despite notice during the promulgation of judgment. His
inexcusable non-appearance not only violated the condition of his bail that he "shall appear" before the court
"whenever required" by the latter or the Rules, but also showed the probability that he might flee or commit another
crime while released on bail.

TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., BEJASA, MANUEL, JR., LEE, DIZON, DE LEON, GONZALES,
JR., and YU LIM, JR., v. MAGDALENO M. PEA and JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.,
FACTS:
Pea filed a case for recovery of agents compensation against Urban Bank and the petitioners based on contract of
agency to perform acts necessary to prevent unlawful occupation of the Banks property.
Petitioners argued that they never appointed the respondent as agent or counsel. Documents were presented in an
attempt to show that the respondent was appointed as agent by Isabela Sugar Company and not Urban Bank or by the
petitioners.
Pea filed his Complaint with the OCP claiming the said documents were falsified because the alleged signatories did
not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI.
Worse, petitioners introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were falsified. The
corresponding informations were filed with the MTCC. Thereafter, the judge issued warrants of arrest of the
petitioners.
Petitioners filed Omnibus Motion to Quash and on the same day, posted bail. Their bail bonds expressly provided that
they do not intend to waive their right to question the validity of their arrest. On arraignment, petitioners refuse to enter
their plea. MTCC upheld the validity of arrest.
ISSUE: Did the petitioners act of posting a bail constitute waiver of their right to question the validity of their arrest?
HELD:
No, the issues raised by the petitioners have not been mooted by the fact that they had posted bail and were
already arraigned.
The erstwhile ruling of the Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity in the issuance of a
warrant of arrest has already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The
principle that the accused is precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if he
voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously invoking his objections thereto.
Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity
of their arrest. On the date of their arraignment, petitioners refused to enter their plea due to the fact that the issue on
the legality of their arrest is still pending with the Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for
them, there was no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the CA or SC. The posting
of bail bond was a matter of imperative necessity to avert their incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of
their right to assail their arrest.

JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, AND ROMEO B. OCON, PETITIONERS, VS. VIRGILIO M.
TULIAO, RESPONDENT.
Murder - Grave abuse of Discretion (Anghad); Santiago City
FACTS.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested and executed a sworn confession and identified petitioners Jose
C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P. Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe for the death of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao1. After the filing of the charges, Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners. In
the hearing of the urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation and for the quashal of the warrants of arrest, Judge
Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing
the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan consequently ordering the cancellation of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner
Miranda. Later on, Judge Anghad dismissed the informations for murder against petitioners notwithstanding the SC granting the
prayer for a temporary restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Respondent Tuliao
filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully
committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the
informations for murder which was referred to the Court of Appeals.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the
reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and
SPO2 Maderal.
ISSUE. WON the adjudication of a motion to quash requires jurisdiction or custody of law over the body of the accused.
DECISION.
Yes, adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the accused, nor
custody of law over the body of the accused. Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and
jurisdiction over the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but is not
required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor constitutes a waiver of
the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary
surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance. One can be under
the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue
of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of
the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial has
commenced.
Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It
includes, but is not limited to, detention.
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes voluntary appearance,
and the consequent submission of one's person to the jurisdiction of the court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is
precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are:
(1) In civil cases, motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or
not other grounds for dismissal are included;
(2) In criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused;
and
(3) Motions to quash a warrant of arrest.
The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the
submission of the person of the accused that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. 2

A previous case was filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel
Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City for the same deaths. They were subsequently acquitted
based on reasonable doubt by the SC.
2 The court nevertheless found that there was grave abuse of discretion by Judge Anghad first; he quashed the standing warrant of because of a
subsequently filed appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause due to the political climate in
the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutor's resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of
this Court in another case with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining order against further
proceeding
with the case
1

ATTY. EDWARD SERAPIO, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), PEOPLE OF

THE PHILIPPINES, AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE DIRECTOR-GENERAL LEANDRO
MENDOZA, RESPONDENTS.

FACTS.
In 2000, criminal complaints against Joseph Estrada, Jinggoy Estrada and petitioner, together with other
persons were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman after Gov. Singson publicly accused them of engaging in several
illegal activities, including its operation on the illegal numbers game known as jueteng. Consequently, the Ombudsman
filed with the Sandiganbayan several Informations against the accused, including petitioner, charging them with plunder.
The Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner and thereafter, petitioner filed with the
Sandiganbayan an Urgent Petition for Bail. The hearing for the said petition was rescheduled for several times due to
subsequent motions filed by the Ombudsman and the petitioner. The Sandiganbayan then reset the arraignment of
accused and the hearing on the petition for bail of petitioner for July 10, 2001 to enable it to resolve the pending
incidents and the motion to quash of petitioner. However, even before the Sandiganbayan could resolve the pending
motions, petitioner filed with the SC a petition contending that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its
discretion when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and entered a
plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned.
ISSUE. WON petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted
RULING
NO. The contention of petitioner is well-taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to
the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail. A person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is
deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his
arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
In Lavides vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held that in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before
arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. However, the foregoing
pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should at all times precede
arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender may
apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him. The
Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the fact that the accused in said case filed a petition
for bail as well as a motion to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to condition
the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to choose between
(1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be arraigned at once and
thereafter be released on bail. This would undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid
complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail.
It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even
prior to arraignment. In fine, the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction in ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his petition for bail.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: ANDREW HARVEY, JOHN
SHERMAN & ADRIAAN VAN DEL ELSHOUT v. COMMISSIONERMIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO
OF COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION
Harvey, Sherman both Americans and Adriaan Van Elshout, a Dutch citizen, were apprehended by agents of the
Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of Mission Orders issued by Commissioner Defensor
Santiago of the CID. Petitioners are presently detained at the CID Detention Center. They were among the twenty-two
(22) suspected alien pedophiles after three months of close surveillance by CID agents.
When deportation proceedings were instituted against them, they filed a Petition for Bail which, however, Defensor
Santiago denied.
ISSUE: Is Commissioner Defensor Santiago correct in denying the petition for bail by Harvey, et al. in a deportation
proceedings?
RULING:
YES. The denial by respondent Commissioner of petitioners' release on bail, also challenged by them, was in order
because in deportation proceedings, the right to bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on the
part of the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation. Thus, Section 37(e) of the Philippine Immigration Act
of 1940 provides that "any alien under arrest in a deportation proceeding may be released under bond or under such
other conditions as may be imposed by the Commissioner of Immigration." The use of the word "may" in said
provision indicates that the grant of bail is merely permissive and not mandatory on the part of the Commissioner. The
exercise of the power is wholly discretionary. Neither the Constitution nor Section 69 of the Revised
Administrative Code guarantees the right of aliens facing deportation to provisional liberty on bail. As
deportation proceedings do not partake of the nature of a criminal action, the constitutional guarantee to bail may not
be invoked by aliens in said proceedings.