78.

People v Musa
Facts: A civilian informer gave the information that Mari Musa was
engaged in selling marijuana in Suterville, Zamboanga City. Sgt. Ani
was ordered by NARCOM leader T/Sgt. Belarga, to conduct a
surveillance and test buy on Musa. The civilian informer guided Ani to
Musas house and gave the description of Musa. Ani was able to buy
one newspaper-wrapped dried marijuana for P10.00.
The next day, a buy-bust was planned. Ani was to raise his right hand if
he successfully buys marijuana from Musa. As Ani proceeded to the
house, the NARCOM team positioned themselves about 90 to 100
meters away. From his position, Belarga could see what was going on.
Musa came out of the house and asked Ani what he wanted. Ani said
he wanted more marijuana and gave Musa the P20.00 marked money.
Musa went into the house and came back, giving Ani two newspaper
wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened and inspected it. He
raised his right hand as a signal to the other NARCOM agents, and the
latter moved in and arrested Musa inside the house. Belarga frisked
Musa in the living room but did not find the marked money (gave it to
his wife who slipped away). T/Sgt. Belarga and Sgt. Lego went to the
kitchen and found a cellophane colored white and stripe hanging at
the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about its contents but
failed to get a response. So they opened it and found dried marijuana
leaves inside. Musa was then placed under arrest.
Issue: Whether or Not the seizure of the plastic bag and the marijuana
inside it is unreasonable, hence, inadmissible as evidence.
Held: Yes. It constituted unreasonable search and seizure thus it may
not be admitted as evidence. The warrantless search and seizure, as
an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person
of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his
immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence. The plain view doctrine is usually
applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the
accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating
object. It will not justify the seizure of the object where the
incriminating nature of the object is not apparent from the plain view
of the object.
In the case at bar, the plastic bag was not in the plain view of the
police. They arrested the accused in the living room and moved into
the kitchen in search for other evidences where they found the plastic

bag. Furthermore, the marijuana inside the plastic bag was not
immediately apparent from the plain view of said object.
Therefore, the plain view does not apply. The plastic bag was seized
illegally and cannot be presented in evidence pursuant to Article III
Section 3 (2) of the Constitution.
80. PACIS V PAMARAN
FACTS:
Respondent Ricardo Santos is the owner of a Mercury automobile,
model 1957, brought into the country without payment of customs
duty and taxes because its original owner, Donald James Hatch, was
tax-exempt. Santos later on paid P311.00 for customs duty and taxes.
On July 22, 1964, Acting Collector of Customs Pedro Pacis was informed
by the General Affairs Administration of the Department of National
Defense that the automobile was a hot car. By virtue thereof, Pacis,
through his subordinates, looked into the records of his office and
found that although the amount of P311.00 was already paid for
customs duty, the amount collectible on the said car should be
P2,500.00, more or less.
Based on such discrepancy, he instituted seizure proceedings and
issued a warrant of seizure and detention. The automobile was also
taken by the Department of National Defense agents and brought to
the General Affairs Administration for compound.
In answer, Santos filed a criminal complaint against Pacis for
usurpation of judicial functions with the City Fiscal of Manila, Manuel
Pamaran, alleging that Pacis did not have authority to issue such
warrant of seizure and detention.
ISSUE:

W/N petitioner, in the discharge of his official function, lay himself open
to a criminal prosecution for usurpation of judicial functions
HELD:
It is undeniable that petitioner, as Acting Collector of Customs for the
Port of Manila, had the requisite authority for the issuance of the
contested warrant of seizure and detention for the automobile owned
by respondent Ricardo Santos. What was done by him certainly could
not be the basis of a prosecution for the usurpation of judicial
functions. The remedy of prohibition lies.

83. IN RE: MIGUEL MORALES

FACTS:
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an unsigned, undated letter
of complaint regarding Atty. Miguel Morales of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC).
The letter alleged that Atty. Morales was consuming his work hours filing and
attending to personal cases, and was using office supplies, equipment and utilities.
Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) Reuben Dela Cruz conducted a spot
investigation and gained access to Morales personal computer. Pleadings to two of
Atty. Morales personal cases were found among the computer files. The computer
was seized and taken to the custody of the OCA.
Morales filed a motion for the release of his computer. The Court granted his motion
but ordered that the files be retrieved first.
Morales filed a letter-complaint addressed to then CJ Davide against DCA Dela Cruz
for alleged conspiracy and culpable violation of the Consti. Morales asserted that
the raid conducted by DCA Dela Cruz without search and seizure orders violated
his right to privacy and the articles seized should therefore be considered
inadmissible.
ISSUE:
1.Are the pleadings found in Atty. Morales personal computer
admissible in the
administrative case against him?
RULING: DISMISSED for insufficiency of evidence
1
.
N
o
Article III Section 2 of the Constitution enshrines the inviolable right of
the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Additionally, Article III Section 3(2) bars the admission of
evidence obtained in violation of such right. Any violation of this right renders the
evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
One of the exceptions to the rule is consented warrantless search. DCA Dela Cruz
claims that they were able to obtain the pleadings with Atty. Morales consent.
However, the Court finds his assertion insufficient to make the present case fall
under the exception. Consent to a search must be unequivocal, specific, intelligently
given and uncontaminated by any duress or coercion. It must be shown by clear and
convincing evidence.
To constitute a valid consent, it must be shown that: (1) the right exists, (2) that the
persons involved had the knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence
of the right, and (3) that the person had actual intention to relinquish the right.
In this case, it was not shown that Atty. Morales had an actual intention to relinquish
his right. He may have agreed to opening his computer and printing the files during
the spot investigation, but he immediately filed an administrative case against the
DCA and his team, specifically invoking his right against unreasonable searches and
seizures.

85. PEOPLE V. MENGOTE - 210 SCRA 174

FACTS:
Information was given about three suspicious looking persons. A
surveillance team was then deployed. Upon seeing that the
men were looking side-by-side and one holding his abdomen,
the policemen approached the group and the latter tried to run away.
The suspects were then searched wherein a handgun and fan knife was
seized. It was found later on that the handgun was part of those stolen
from a house wherein a robbery was staged.
HELD:
A person may not be stopped and frisked in broad daylight on a busy
street on mere unexplained suspicion.
90. Bagalihog v Fernandez
Facts:
On March 17 1989, Rep. Mosises Espinosa was shot to death shortly after
disembarking at the Masbate Airport. That according to witnesses account one of the
gunmen fled on a motorcycle. On the same day, the petitioners house, which was
near in the airport was searched with his consent to see if the killers had sought
refuge there but the said search was fruitless.
Two days later, Capt.Julito Roxas and his men from the Philippine Constabulary seized the
petitioners motorcycle and
took it to the PC headquarters in Masbate. They had no search warrant. The
motorcycle was impounded on the suspicion that it was one of the vehicles
used by the killers.
After the investigation, the petitioner and several others were charged
with multiple murder and frustrated murder for the killing of Rep. Espinosa and three
of his bodyguard and the wounding of
another person. On June 21 1989 the petitioner filed a complaint against Capt. Roxas
for the recovery of the motorcycle with the application of writ of replevin plus
damages with the amount of P55,000.00 docketed
as a Civil Case at the Branch 48 of Masbate RTC. The petitioner also filed on
November 10 1989 an urgent
manifestation for the deposit of the motorcycle with Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Masbate, on the ground that the PC soldiers were using the vehicle without authority.
The motion was granted by Judge Ricardo Butalid on November 10 1989.
But Judge Butalid later inhibited and the case was transferred to Branch 45 of Judge

Gil Fernandez. On October 12 1990 Judge Fernandez dismissed the Civil Case in part
as follows:
That the question to be resolved is whether Replevin is proper to recover the
possession of the subject motorcycle which is in the possession of the Clerk of Court
of Masbate to be used as evidence.
The court opined the same court has no jurisdiction to release evidence impounded
or surrendered to the PC task force handling the case of Rep. Espinosa. Further, the
court said that :
Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and can not be
replevied until such custody is ended.
Granting as claimed by the plaintiff that said motorcycle was illegally seized he can
raised the issue when presented during the trial. And the proper court to
release , the motorcycle in question
is the presiding Judge of Makati RTC Branch 56, wherefore dismissing the petition for
lack of jurisdiction.
Held:
The reconsideration having been denied , the petitioner now asks to reverse the said
order:
The plaintiff contention that the motorcycle was invalidly seized and therefore he
has a right to its return

the proper remedy for this purpose is his complaint for recovery and the issuance of
writ of replevin as authorized by the Rules of Court. In refusing to grant him relief and
dismissing the case instead on the ground of lack of jurisdiction the respondent court
committed reversible error that the plaintiff prays that the Supreme Court will correct.
The private respondent in, his comment admitted the absence of a search warrant
when the motorcycle was
seized but stresses that the crime perpetrated is a heinous offense and Espinosa was
a man of consequences. The motorcycle in question is an extremely mobile vehicle
and can be easily dismantled or hidden, and the unique situation existing at that
time required him to place it in the custody of the PC-CIS Task Force Espinosa without
first securing a search warrant. In doing so, he merely complied with the orders of
his superior to preserve the vehicle for use as evidence in the criminal cases.
The court agreed with Capt. Roxas concern for the apprehension of the killers but
can not agree with his methods. While recognizing the need for the punishment of
the crime the court reminded that in our system of criminal justice the end does not
justify the means. For his strong conviction about the guilt of the
petitioner, the private respondent must still abide by the Constitution and
observe the requirements of the Bill of Rights

Art. III Sec 2.

The mere fact that the private respondents view the crime involved is heinous and
the victim was a man of consequences did not authorize disregard of the
constitutional guaranty the provision protects not only the innocent but also those

who appear to be guilty but nevertheless presumed innocent until contrary is

proved.
Neither did superior orders condone the omission for they could not in any case be
superior to the constitution. That the necessity for the immediate seizure of the
motorcycle without prior obtention of a warrant has not been established
the mere mobility of the motorcycle did not make the search warrant redundant
for it is not denied that the vehicle remained with the petitioner until it
was forcibly taken from him. The fear that it would be dismantled or hidden
was mere speculation that was not borne out by the facts.
The warrantless seizure of the motorcycle was unquestionably violative of the
right to be left alone by the authorities as guaranteed by the Constitution.
The vehicle cannot even be detained on the ground that it is a prohibited article the
mere possession of which is unlawful.
In dismissing the case, the respondent judge said he had no jurisdiction over the
motorcycle because it was a custodia legis (in the custody of the law)and
only the judge trying the criminal case against the petitioner and his co- accused
could order its release . He cited the general doctrine that:
Property seized in enforcing criminal laws is in the custody of the law and cannot be
replevied, until such custody is ended.
The court opined, the rule that property held as evidence in criminal case cannot be
replevied applies only where the property is lawfully held that is seized in accordance
with the rule against warrantless searches and seizures or its accepted exceptions;
When is a thing in custodia legis A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and subjected to the
official custody of the judicial
executive officer in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ.
Only when property is lawful taken by virtue of legal process is it considered in the
custody of the law and not otherwise.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the rule againstunreasonable
searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The
vehicle in the case at bar Is not admissible as an exhibit even if offered as such
because it is the fruit of the poisonous tree.
The court also said that the action to recover the motorcycle in the RTC of Masbate
will not constitute interference with the process of the RTC of Makati and that the
complaint should not have been dismissed by the respondent judge.
The order of the respondent judge was set aside and the case was reinstated for
further proceedings.
91. Alih v Castro
Facts:
Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense
forces raided the compound occupied by petitioner in search of loose
firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out ensued after
petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number
of men. The following morning, the petitioners were arrested and

subjected to finger printing, paraffin testing and photographing

despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and
ammunitions were also confiscated.
The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items
illegally seized returned to them and invoked the provisions on the Bill
of Rights.
The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a
warrant but reasoned that they were acting under superior orders and
that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of the peace
and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.
Issue:
Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the
fingerprints and photographs of the petitioners and subjecting them to
paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are inadmissible
as evidence against them.
Held:
The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the
respondents had against petitioners did not excuse the former from
observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to
due process and should be protected from the arbitrary actions of
those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no showing
that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the
petitioners as criminals or fugitives of justice to merit approval by
virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.
The items seized, having been the fruits of the poisonous tree were
held inadmissible as evidence in any proceedings against the
petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done without a
warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be
acknowledged in court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in
the custody of the law (custodia egis).
However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and
paraffin-testing as violative of the provision against self-incrimination,
the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination applies to
testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United
States, 18 The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to
be a witness against himself is a prohibition of the use of physical or
moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material.

92. Gamboa vs Chan

Facts:
Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Admin No. 275 creating Zearosa
Commission which was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups
in the country in view of eliminating and dismantling them permanently in the
future. Upon conclusion of its investigation, the Commission submitted a confidential
report to the office of the President. Marynette Gamboa was the Mayor of Dingras,
Ilocos Norte. Gamboa alleged that the Philippine
National Police Ilocos Norte conducted surveillance operation against
her and her aides and classified
her as PAG coddler. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP forwarded in the Reports
enumeration of individual maintaining PAGs.
Gamboas association with PAG was published and released in the different forms of
media,
publicly tagging her as a PAG coddler. Alleging that her right to privacy was violated,
Gamboa filed a
petition before the RTC for the issuance of writ of habeas data to destroy the
unverified reports from
the PNP data base and restrain PNP from forwarding baseless reports
against her. The RTC ruled that
the inclusion of Gamboa in the report violates her right to privacy.
However, the RTC dismissed
Gamboas petition for writ of habeas data saying that Gamboa failed to
establish the source of the
information.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not the forwarding or information or intelligence report by the PNP to the
Commission was an unlawful act that violated petitioners right to privacy
2.
Whether or not resort to petition for writ of habeas data was proper
HELD:
Forwarding of information or intelligence report gathered by
the PNP to the Commission is
NOT an intrusion of petitioners right to privacy
It is clear that the issuance of AO 275 articulates a legitimate aim which is to
investigate the
existence of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
Pursuant to the state
interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the powers and functions accorded to the

Commission and the

PNP, the latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
monitored them and
counteracted their activities. One of those individuals is herein
petitioner Gamboa.
This court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the
data contained in the
report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP contrary to the ruling of the
trial court, however,
the forwarding of information by the PNP to the Commission was not unlawful act
that violated or
threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. The PNP was
rationally expected to forward
and share intelligence regarding PAGs with the body specifically
created for the purpose of investigating
the existence of these notorious group. Moreover, the Commission was explicitly
authorized to deputize
the police force in the fulfillment of the formers mandate, and thus had the power to
request as
sistance
from the latter.
Petition for writ of habeas data is NOT PROPER
93. PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN
G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005
Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples
Journal claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who
allegedly shoots wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain.
It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty.
Efren Angara, requested for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the
recurrence of such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed that the
article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the
community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of
a social and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general
interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public (sic) of
the people, and that the story was published in good faith and without
malice.
Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged
communication and therefore protected by the constitutional provision
on freedom of speech.
Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected
speech. In the instant case, even if we assume that the letter written

by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character when

the matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the
general population, especially since the individual alleged to be
defamed is neither a public official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the
BF Homes residents did not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more
so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for
verification of Thoenens status as a foreign resident. The article is also
untrue because the events she reported never happened. Worse, the
main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either does
not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the
intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances societys
interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated
falsehood falls into that class of utterances which are no essential part
of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step
to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality The
knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless
disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection
94. Buatis vs. People
Facts:
The wife of private-complainant Atty. Jose J. Pieraz (Atty. Pieraz),
retrieved a
letter from their mailbox addressed to her husband.
The letter was open, not
contained in an envelope. Not personally knowing who the sender was,
Atty. Pieraz,
nevertheless, responded and sent a communication by registered mail
to said Buatis,
J r. , a c c u s e d - a p p e l l a n t . R e a c t i n g t o t h e i n s u l t i n g
w o r d s u s e d b y B u a t i s , J r. ,
particularly: "Satan, senile, stupid, english carabao," Atty.
Pieraz fi led a complaint
for libel against accused-appellant. Subject letter and
its contents came to the
knowledge not only of his wife but of his children as well.
The defense forwarded by accused-appellant Buatis, Jr. was denial.
According
to him, it was at the behest of the president of the
organization "
Nagkakaisang
Samahan Ng Mga Taga Manggahan
" or

NASATAMA
, a n d o f a m e m b e r , Te r e s i t a
Quingco, that he had dictated to one of his secretaries, a
comment to the letter of
private-complainant. Initially during his testimony,
B u a t i s , J r. c o u l d n o t r e c a l l
w h e t h e r h e h a d s i g n e d t h a t l e t t e r- c o m m e n t o r i f i t
w a s e v e n a d d r e s s e d t o A t t y.
Pieraz. Neither could he remember if he had made and sent another
letter,
to Atty. Pieraz.
C o n f r o n t e d i n c o u r t w i t h t h e c o u n t e r - a ffi d a v i t w h i c h
h e fi l e d b e f o r e t h e
Prosecutors Offi ce, however, Buatis, Jr. could not deny its
contents, among which
was his admission that indeed, he had sent subject letter to Atty.
Pieraz.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner is guilty of the crime of libel.
Held:
Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code defines libel as a public and
malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary, or any
act, omission,
condition, status, or circumstance tending to cause
t h e d i s h o n o r, d i s c r e d i t , o r
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is
dead.
For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur:
(a) it must be
defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be given
publicity; and (d) the
victim must be identifiable.
The last two elements have been duly established by
the prosecution. There is
publication in this case. Petitioners subject letter-reply itself
states that the same
was copy furnished to all concerned. A written letter
containing libelous matter
c a n n o t b e c l a s s i fi e d a s p r i v i l e g e d w h e n i t i s
published and circulated among the
public. In this case, petitioner admitted that he
dictated the letter to one of her
secretaries who typed the same and made a print out
o f t h e c o m p u t e r. W h i l e

petitioner addressed the reply-letter to respondent, the same

letter showed that it
was copy furnished to all concerned. His lack of selectivity is indicative
of malice and
is anathema to his claim of privileged communication. Such publication
had already
created upon the minds of the readers a circumstance which
brought discredit and
shame to respondents reputation.
S C a ffi r m e d t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e C A , r e n d e r i n g t h e
accused Jose Alemania
Buatis, Jr. GUILTY of the crime of LIBEL.
95. GMA NETWORK, INC. (formerly known as RBP
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.) and REY VIDAL v. JESUS G.
BUSTOS, et al.
G.R. No. 146848, 17 October 2006, Garcia, J. (Second Division)
The enumeration under Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code is not an
exclusive list of conditionally privileged communications as the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press has
expanded the privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of
public interest. Although every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, the presumption does not exist in matters considered
privileged. The privilege destroys the presumption.
In February 1988, a certain Abello and over 200 other unsuccessful
examinees in the August 1987 physicians licensure examinations, filed
a Petition for Mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Manila to
compel the Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC) and the board of
medical examiners to re-check and reevaluate the test papers. They
alleged that mistakes in the counting of the total scores and erroneous
checking of answers to test questions vitiated the results of the
examinations. Rey Vidal, a news writer and reporter of GMA Network,
Inc., covered the filing of the said petition. After securing a copy of the
petition, he drafted and narrated the news report for the ten oclock
evening news edition of GMAs Channel 7 Headline News.
Jesus G. Bustos, et al., former chairman and members of the Board of
Medicine of the PRC which conducted the examinations, filed a damage
suit against Vidal and GMA Network, claiming, inter alia, that the latter,
in reckless disregard for the truth, defamed them by word of mouth
and simultaneous visual presentation on GMAs Channel 7 of an
unrelated and old footage showing physicians wearing black armbands.
According to them, Vidal and GMA Network made use of the said

footage to make it appear that other doctors were supporting and

sympathizing with the complaining unsuccessful examinees, when the
same actually related to a 1982 demonstration staged by doctors and
personnel of the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) regarding wage and
economic dispute with hospital management.
The trial court dismissed the complaint for damages, holding that the
news report was privileged, being but a narration of the allegations
contained in and the circumstances attending the filing of the Petition
for Mandamus. This was reversed by the Court of Appeals which, while
regarding the text of the news report as a qualifiedly privileged
communication, nevertheless held that the insertion of the unrelated
1982 PGH picket film footage, without the words file video, was
evidence of malice.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the televised news report on the filing of the Petition
for Mandamus is libelous;
2.) Whether or not the insertion of the old film footage depicting the
doctors and personnel of the PGH in their 1982 demonstrations
constitutes malice to warrant the award of damages
HELD:
The news report is qualifiedly privileged communication, being a fair
and true report without any comment or remarks.
The petition is GRANTED.
RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW
Privileged matters may be absolute or qualified. Absolutely privileged
matters are not actionable regardless of the existence of malice in fact.
The mala or bona fides of the author is of no moment as the occasion
provides an absolute bar to the action. In qualifiedly or conditionally
privileged communications, the freedom from liability for an otherwise
defamatory utterance is conditioned on the absence of express malice
or malice in fact. To this kind belongs private communications and
fair and true report without any comment or remarks falling under
and described as exceptions in Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). The enumeration under this provision is not an exclusive list of
conditionally privileged communications as the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press has expanded the
privilege to include fair commentaries on matters of public interest.

The news telecast in question is a qualifiedly privileged matter, the

same being only a narration of the contents of the Petition for
Mandamus, devoid of any comment or remark. What Vidal and GMA
Network did was simply to inform the public of the said petition filed
against the then Board of Medicine. It was clearly within Vidals job to
keep the public abreast of recent developments in government
institutions, which he was assigned to cover.
The insertion of the 1982 video footage is not malicious.
Contrary to the findings of the Court of Appeals, the identifying
character-generated words file video appeared to have been
superimposed on screen, purposely to prevent misrepresentation so as
not to confuse the viewing public. At any rate, the absence of the said
accompanying words would not change the legal situation insofar as
the privileged nature of the news report is concerned. The video
footage, standing without accompanying sounds or voices, was
meaningless, or, at least, conveyed nothing derogatory in nature. Even
assuming arguendo that the film footage contained demeaning
features, the showing thereof was actually accompanied or
simultaneously voiced over by the narration of the news report lifted
from the filing of the mandamus petition. There was nothing in the
news report to indicate an intent to utilize such old footages to create
another news story beyond what was reported.
The subject news report was clearly a fair and true report. Thus, Vidal
and GMA Network are entitled to the protection and immunity of the
rule on privileged matters under Art. 354, par. 2 of the RPC, and can
not be held liable for damages. Their failure, perhaps even their
indisposition, to obtain and telecast the side of the former Board of
Medicine, is not an indicia of malice. For, although every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, the presumption does not
exist in matters considered privileged. The privilege destroys the
presumption.
96. Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. v Dy
Facts:
Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an
AM radio broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio
broadcast station, in Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds
commenced relocation of its broadcasting station, management office,
and transmitters on propery located in Minante 2, Cauayan City,
Isabela.On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board

(HLURB) and Office of the Municipal Planning and Development

Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified that the commercial
structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning regulations,
noting as well that the location is classified as a commercial area.
The radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.In 2002
however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit,
City Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue
zoning clearance on the grounds that petitioners were not able to
submit conversion papers showing that the agricultural land was
converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the court to compel
the issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In the
meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office
issued to petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property
from agricultural to commercial.In 2003, petitioners again filed their
application for renewal of mayors permit, attaching the DAR Order.
Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of Cauayan City
denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they did
not have record of the DAR Order.The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15,
2004, and respondents Meer and Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal
Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due to the prvosion of
Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio station
during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order
allowing the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was
barred again by respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the
radio station had no permit. Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to
run again until June 10, 2004 after elections.Petitioners filed the case
to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but both courts
denied the petition.A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized
under the LGC to issue licenses and permits, and suspend or revoke
the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or
permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In case of
Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted
through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in
the ordinance requires an application for a mayors permit to submit
either an approved land conversion papers from DAR, showing that its
property was converted from prime agricultural land or an approved
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod
authorizing the reclassification of property from agricultural to
commercial land.In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that
classified the property as commercial. Petitioners are also armed with
several certifications stating that the property is indeed a commercial
area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes based on the
classification of property as commercial without objections raised by
the respondents.Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by
the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the
property constitutes estoppels against respondents from denying the

fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the
government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners
classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and
mistakes of its official especially to those which are irregular.Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government
of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the
state is immune against suits.Held:No. While it is true that the state
cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of its officials or agents,
there is an exception.Estoppels against the public are little favored.
They should not be invoked except in rare and unusual circumstances,
and may not be invoked where they would operate to defeat the
effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must
be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those
special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it.
Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to deal
dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an
ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public
authorities as well as against private individualsThus, when there is no
convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of
the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the
bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have
declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is
absolutely no evidence other than the bare assertions of the
respondents that the Cauayan City government had previously erred
when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use.
The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996
to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion
that respondents are estopped from asserting that the previous
recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.Respondents
were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent
recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property was
commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none,
that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in
doing so. It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to
even require petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers
from the DAR showing that the property was converted from prime
agricultural land to commercial land.Respondents closure of
petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies. Petitioners
have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election
irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and
his political dynasty. Such statement manifests and confirms that
respondents denial of the renewal applications on the ground that
property is commercial and merely a pretext, and their real agenda is
to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the latters
voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press

freedom.WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed

decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of
Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents
are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances and
mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners.
100. IN RE: ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC. July 29, 2002
Facts:
Quoted hereunder is a newspaper article with contemptuous statements attributed
to Atty.
Leonard De Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still pending
before the Court.
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estradas
lawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its supposed vagueness.
PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER
Monday, November 19, 2001
Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was merely exercising his
constitutionally guaranteed right to
freedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court declaring the Plunder
Law unconstitutional
would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People
Power II. While Atty.
Leonard De Vera admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent
denied having made the
same to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in it and to bring it into
disrepute.
Issue:
WON Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable for indirect contempt of court for uttering
statements aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
Held:
Yes, after a careful consideration of
respondents arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering
statements aimed at
influencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the constitutionality of
the Plunder Law.
Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of Court authorizes the courts to hold
liable for criminal

contempt a person guilty of conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority
of the court, or of an act
obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute
or disrespect.
Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial
proceedings, but such right
does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authorit
y, and interfering with the
administration of justice. Freedom of speech is not absolute, and must occasionally
be balanced with the
requirements of equally important public interests, such as the maintenance of the
integrity of the courts and
orderly functioning of the administration of justice.
Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of free
speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the
courts cannot be
disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and
efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein.
In
People vs. Godoy
, this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the proceedings and
decisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express
his opinions on the fitness or unfitness
of the judges for their stations, and the fidelity with which they perform the important
public trusts reposed in
them, he has no right to attempt to degrade the court, destroy public confidence in
it, and encourage the
people to disregard and set naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such
publications are said to be an
abuse of the liberty of speech and of the press, for they tend to destroy the very
foundation of good order and
well-being in society by obstructing the course of justice.
Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of
the constitutionality of the Plunder Law or
risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed
as falling within the ambit of constitutionallyprotected speech, because such statements are not fair criticisms of
any decision of the Court, but obviously are threats
made against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular
manner, or risk earning the ire of the public.

Such
statements show disrespect not only for the Court but also for the
judicial system as a whole, tend to promote distrust and
undermine public confidence in the judiciary, by creating the
impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve cases
impartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried
fairly by an independent tribunal, uninfluenced by
public clamor and other extraneous influences.
101. Jalandoni v Drilon
FACTS: Private respondents published a full-page advertisement in
five major daily newspapers. These ads contained allegations naming
petitioner who was then a PCGG Commissioner of having committed
illegal and unauthorized acts. Petitioner filed a complaint for the crime
of libel.
HELD: In libel cases against public officials, for liability to arise, the
alleged defamatory statement must relate to official conduct, even if
the defamatory statement is false, unless the public official concerned
proves that the statement was made with actual malice, that is, with
knowledge that it was false or not. Here, petitioner failed to prove
actual malice on the part of the private respondents. The statements
embodied in the advertisement are covered by the constitutional
guarantee of freedom of speech. This carries the right to criticize the
action and conduct of a public official.
102. Rodolfo Vasquez v Court of Appeals
The 1964 ruling in New York Times v. Sullivan handed down by the
United States Supreme Court has been the barometer used in
defamation cases involving public officials in both jurisdictions.
The Philippine case that comes comparably close in circumnstances
with that of the New York Times ruling is that of Rodolfo Vasquez versus
Court of Appeals.
It is similar to the New York Times v. Sullivan ruling in the sense that
the plaintiff is also a public official (a barangay official).
When the barangay official sued for criminal libel (note: New York
Times case was a civil case), the Supreme Court ruled that it was
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove actual malice, and failing
such, no liability attached against the accused.
In any event, the Supreme Court took ocassion to apply the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan standard in this case.
Here is the digest of that case:

Rodolfo R. Vasquez v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 118971
September 15, 1999
Facts:
Petitioner Rodolfo R. Vasquez is a resident of the Tondo Foreshore Area.
Sometime in April 1986, he and some 37 families from the area went to
see then National Housing Authority (NHA) General Manager Lito
Atienza regarding their complaint against their Barangay Chairman,
Jaime Olmedo, a public official. After their meeting with Atienza and
other NHA officials, petitioner and his companions were met and
interviewed by newspaper reporters at the NHA compound concerning
their complaint. The next day, April 22, 1986, the following exerpts of
the news article appeared in the newspaper Ang Tinig ng Masa. In the
article, pulished were supposed allegations by Vasquez that (1)
nakipagsabwatan umano si Chairman Jaime Olmedo upang
makamkam ang may 14 na lote ng lupa; (2) ang mga lupa ay ilegal na
patituluhan, nagawa ito ni Olmedo sa pakikipagsabwatan sa mga
project manager at legal officers ng NHA; (3) kasangkot din umano si
Olmedo sa mga ilegal na pasugalan sa naturang lugar at maging sa
mga nakawan ng manok. x x x
Based on the newspaper article, Olmedo filed a complaint for libel
against petitioner alleging that the latters statements cast aspersions
on him and damaged his reputation.
On May 28, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding petitioner
guilty of libel and sentencing him to pay a fine of P1,000.00. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto. Hence, this petition for
review.
Issue:
Whether or not the atual malice standard in New York Times versus
Sullivan is to be applied in prosecutions for criminal libel.
Held:
The standard of actual malice in New York Times versus Sullivan is to
be applied in criminal prosecutions for libel.
For that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability
can attach if it relates to official conduct, unless the public official
concerned proves that the statement was made with actual malice
that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.
In this case, the prosecution failed to prove not only that the charges
made by petitioner were false but also that petitioner made them with
knowledge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of whether they
were false or not.

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of

allegations of official misconduct and/or good motives and justifiable
ends for making such allegations would not only be contrary to Art.
361 of the Revised Penal Code. It would, above all, infringe on the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Libel was used as a form of harassment:
Instead of the claim that petitioner was politically motivated in making
the charges against complainant, it would appear that complainant
filed this case to harass petitioner.
It is curious that the ones most obviously responsible for the
publication of the allegedly offensive news report, namely, the editorial
staff and the periodical itself, were not at all impleaded. The charge
was leveled against the petitioner and, "curiouser" still, his clients who
have nothing to do with the editorial policies of the newspaper.
104. People v Go Pin
Go Pin held an exhibition of what was alleged to be indecent and/or
immoral pictures in a
recreational center.
Facts:
1.
Go Pin, a Chinese citizen, exhibited at the Globe Arcade in Manila, a
recreational
center, a large number of one-real 16 mm films about 100 feet in
length each,
which are allegedly indecent and/or immoral. He pleaded not guilty at
first but
when allowed to change his plea, he did so.
Ruling:
1.
Paintings and pictures of women in the nude, including sculptures of
the at kind are
offensive to morals where they are made and shown not for the sake of
art but
profit would commercial purposes, that is, when gain and profit would
appear to
be the main, if not the exclusive consideration in their exhibition, and
the case of
art only of secondary or minor importance.
2.

If such pictures, sculptures and paintings are shown in art exhibits and
art galleries
for the cause of art, to be viewed and appreciated by people interested
in art,
there would be no offense committed. However, the pictures here in
question
were used not exa
ctly for arts sake but rather for commercial purposes. In other
words, the supposed artistic qualities of said pictures were being
commercialized
so that the cause of art was of secondary or minor importance. Gain
and profit
would appear to have been the main, if not the exclusive consideration
in their
exhibition; and it would not be surprising if the persons who went to
see those
pictures and paid entrance fees for the privilege of doing so, were not
exactly
artists and persons interested in art and who generally go to art
exhibitions and
galleries to satisfy and improve their artistic tastes, but rather people
desirous of
satisfying their morbid curiosity and taste, and lust, and for love for
excitement,
including the youth who because of their immaturity are not in a
position to resist
and shield themselves from the ill and perverting effects of these
pictures.
3.
The decision is affirmed.
105. People v Padan G.R. No. L-7295 June 28, 1957
J. Montemayor
Facts:
The accused exhibited immoral scenes and acts in one of the Manila
nightclubs. Moreover, the manager and ticket collector were also part
of the accused for hiring the women to perform sexual intercourse in
the presence of many spectators.
They were charged with a violation of the RPC Article 201 in the trial
court. All pleaded not guilty. One of the accused however, changed her
mind and pleaded guilty. All were convicted. The evidence of the lewd
show was confiscated.
The accused filed an appeal in the Supreme Court. 2 of the appellants,

manager Fajardo and ticket collector Yabut, failed to file their briefs
within the period prescribed by law and their appeal was dismissed by
resolution of this Court of November 25, 1955, and the decision as to
them became final and executory on January 7, 1956.
The defendant who pleaded guilty, Marina Padan, in her appeal did not
question her conviction; she merely urged the reduction of the penalty
by eliminating the prison sentence. The Supereme Court did not
consider this because the trial court judge reduced the fine from 600 to
200.
Issue: Were the acts obscene and thereby punishable by Art 201 of the
RPC?
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
This is the first time that the courts in this jurisdiction, have been
called upon to take cognizance of an offense against morals and
decency of this kind. We have had occasion to consider offenses like
the exhibition of still moving pictures of women in the nude, which we
have condemned for obscenity and as offensive to morals. In those
cases, one might yet claim that there was involved the element of art;
that connoisseurs of the same, and painters and sculptors might find
inspiration in the showing of pictures in the nude, or the human body
exhibited in sheer nakedness.
But an actual exhibition of the sexual act, preceded by acts of
lasciviousness, can have no redeeming feature. In it, there is no room
for art. One can see nothing in it but clear and unmitigated obscenity,
indecency, and an offense to public morals, inspiring and causing as it
does, nothing but lust and lewdness, and exerting a corrupting
influence specially on the youth of the land. We repeat that because of
all this, the penalty imposed by the trial court on Marina, despite her
plea of guilty, is neither excessive nor unreasonable.
On the appeal of Fajardo, he claimed that he was an innocent
bystander but that because of his popularity in the neighborhood, he
was requested by the spectators to select the man and the woman to
engage or indulge in the actual act of coitus before the spectators.
After making the selection, he did not even care to witness the act but
left the scene and returned to it only when he heard a commotion
produced by the raid conducted by the police.
The evidence on his active participation and that he was the manager
and one in charge of the show is however ample, even conclusive. In
1953, the place used for ping-pong was used for an exhibition of
human "fighting fish", the actual act of coitus or copulation. Tickets
were sold at P3 each, and the show was supposed to begin at 8:00
o'clock in the evening.

The Manila Police Department must have gotten wind of the affair; it
bought tickets and provided several of its members who later attended
the show, but in plain clothes, and after the show conducted a raid and
made arrests. At the trial, said policemen testified as to what actually
took place inside the building. About two civilians who attended the
affair gave testimony as to what they saw.
The customers not provided with tickets actually paid P3 at the
entrance to defendant Ernesto Reyes. He also collected tickets. In all,
there were about ninety paying customers, while about sixteen were
allowed to enter free, presumably friends of the management. Jose
Fajardo y Garcia was clearly the manager of the show. He was at the
door to see to it that the customers either were provided with tickets or
paid P3.00 entrance fee. He even asked them from whom they had
bought the tickets. He ordered that an army steel bed be placed at the
center of the floor, covered with an army blanket and provided with a
pillow. Once the spectators, about 106 in number, were crowded inside
that small building, the show started.
Besides, as found by the trial court and as shown by some of the
tickets collected from the spectators, submitted as exhibits, said
tickets while bearing on one side superimposed with rubber stamped
name "Pepe Fajardo," which defendant Fajardo admits to be his name.
Considering all the above circumstances, we agree with the trial court
that Jose Fajardo is the most guilty of the four, for he was the one who
conducted the show and presumably derived the most profit or gain
from the same.
106. Bayan v Ermita
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their right as organizations and
individuals were violated when the rally they participated in on October
6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing Batas
Pambansa No. 880.
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a
violation of the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and other human rights treaties of which the
Philippines is a signatory. They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a
permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless of the
presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the
choice of venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression
clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not contentneutral as it does not apply to mass actions in support of the
government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the

government. Also, the phrase maximum tolerance shows that the

law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict
scrutiny test. This petition and two other petitions were ordered to be
consolidated on February 14, 2006. During the course of oral
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a speedy resolution of the
petitions, withdrew the portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR
is void as applied to the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6,
2005.
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive response and the Batas
Pambansa No. 880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a)
violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine Constitution as it causes a
disturbing effect on the exercise by the people of the right to
peaceably assemble.
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine Constitution provides that
no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances. The right to
peaceably assemble and petition for redress of grievances, together
with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, is a right that
enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional protection. For this
rights represent the very basis of a functional democratic polity,
without which all the other rights would be meaningless and
unprotected.
However, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is
not absolute. It may be regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society. The power to regulate the exercise
of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign police
power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a restriction
that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies that would use public places. The reference to lawful
cause does not make it content-based because assemblies really have
to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable and
entitled to protection. Neither the words opinion, protesting, and
influencing in of grievances come from the wording of the
Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance

is for the protection and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of the
content of the expression in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and
present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to the
exercise of the rights even under the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part, and respondents, more
particularly the Secretary of the Interior and Local Governments, are
DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance
with Section 15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment
or designation of at least one suitable freedom park or plaza in every
city and municipality of the country. After thirty (30) days from the
finality of this Decision, subject to the giving of advance notices, no
prior permit shall be required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or plaza in every city or
municipality that has not yet complied with section 15 of the law.
Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response (CPR), insofar as it
would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is
NULL and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to REFRAIN from using
it and to STRICTLY OBSERVE the requirements of maximum tolerance,
The petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
108. American Bible Society vs. City of Manila
GR No. L-9637 | April 30, 1957
Facts:

American Bible Society is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit,

religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in
the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in
November, 1898

City of Manila is a municipal corporation with powers that are to

be exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409,
known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila

American Bible Society has been distributing and selling bibles

and/or gospel portions throughout the Philippines and translating the
same into several Philippine dialect

City Treasurer of Manila informed American Bible Society that it

was violating several Ordinances for operating without the necessary
permit and license, thereby requiring the corporation to secure the
permit and license fees covering the period from 4Q 1945-2Q 1953

To avoid closing of its business, American Bible Society paid the

City of Manila its permit and license fees under protest


American Bible filed a complaint, questioning the
constitutionality and legality of the Ordinances 2529 and 3000, and
prayed for a refund of the payment made to the City of Manila. They
contended:
a.
They had been in the Philippines since 1899 and were not
required to pay any license fee or sales tax
b.
it never made any profit from the sale of its bibles

City of Manila prayed that the complaint be dismissed,

reiterating the constitutionality of the Ordinances in question

Trial Court dismissed the complaint

American Bible Society appealed to the Court of Appeals

Issue: WON American Bible Society liable to pay sales tax for the
distribution and sale of bibles
Ruling: NO

Under Sec. 1 of Ordinance 3000, one of the ordinance in

question, person or entity engaged in any of the business, trades or
occupation enumerated under Sec. 3 must obtain a Mayors permit and
license from the City Treasurer. American Bible Societys business is
not among those enumerated

However, item 79 of Sec. 3 of the Ordinance provides that all

other businesses, trade or occupation not mentioned, except those
upon which the City is not empowered to license or to tax P5.00

Therefore, the necessity of the permit is made to depend upon

the power of the City to license or tax said business, trade or
occupation.

2 provisions of law that may have bearing on this case:

a.
Chapter 60 of the Revised Administrative Code, the
Municipal Board of the City of Manila is empowered to tax and fix the
license fees on retail dealers engaged in the sale of books
b.
Sec. 18(o) of RA 409: to tax and fix the license fee on dealers
in general merchandise, including importers and indentors, except
those dealers who may be expressly subject to the payment of some
other municipal tax. Further, Dealers in general merchandise shall be
classified as (a) wholesale dealers and (b) retail dealers. For purposes
of the tax on retail dealers, general merchandise shall be classified into
four main classes: namely (1) luxury articles, (2) semi-luxury articles,
(3) essential commodities, and (4) miscellaneous articles. A separate
license shall be prescribed for each class but where commodities of
different classes are sold in the same establishment, it shall not be
compulsory for the owner to secure more than one license if he pays
the higher or highest rate of tax prescribed by ordinance. Wholesale
dealers shall pay the license tax as such, as may be provided by
ordinance

The only difference between the 2 provisions is the limitation as

to the amount of tax or license fee that a retail dealer has to pay per
annum

As held in Murdock vs. Pennsylvania, The power to impose a

license tax on the exercise of these freedoms provided for in the Bill of
Rights, is indeed as potent as the power of censorship which this Court
has repeatedly struck down. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a
regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in
question. It is in no way apportioned. It is flat license tax levied and
collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is
guaranteed by the constitutional liberties of press and religion and
inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly
recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.

Further, the case also mentioned that the power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its
enjoyment. Those who can tax the exercise of this religious practice
can make its exercise so costly as to deprive it of the resources
necessary for its maintenance. Those who can tax the privilege of
engaging in this form of missionary evangelism can close all its doors
to all those who do not have a full purse

Under Sec. 27(e) of Commonwealth Act No. 466 or the

National Internal Revenue Code, Corporations or associations
organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, . . . or
educational purposes, . . .: Provided, however, That the income of
whatever kind and character from any of its properties, real or
personal, or from any activity conducted for profit, regardless of the
disposition made of such income, shall be liable to the tax imposed
under this Code shall not be taxed

The price asked for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was
in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same
but this cannot mean that American Bible Society was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit

Therefore, the Ordinance cannot be applied for in doing so it

would impair American Bible Societys free exercise and enjoyment of
its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of
dissemination of religious beliefs.
Wherefore, and on the strength of the foregoing
considerations, We hereby reverse the decision appealed from,
sentencing defendant return to plaintiff the sum of P5,891.45
unduly collected from it
109. Victoriano v Elizalde Rope Workers Union
FACTS:
Benjamin Victoriano (Appellee), a member of the religious sect known

as the Iglesia ni Cristo, had been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope
Factory, Inc. (Company) since 1958. He was a member of the Elizalde
Rope Workers Union (Union) which had with the Company a CBA
containing a closed shop provision which reads as follows:
Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of
employment for all permanent employees workers covered by this
Agreement.
Under Sec 4(a), par 4, of RA 975, prior to its amendment by RA 3350,
the employer was not precluded from making an agreement with a
labor organization to require as a condition of employment
membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of
the employees. On June 18, 1961, however, RA 3350 was enacted,
introducing an amendment to par 4 subsection (a) of sec 4 of RA 875,
as follows: xxx but such agreement shall not cover members of any
religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such
labor organization.
Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its
members with any labor organization, Appellee presented his
resignation to appellant Union. The Union wrote a formal letter to the
Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service
because he was resigning from the Union as a member. The Company
in turn notified Appellee and his counsel that unless the Appellee could
achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union, the Company
would be constrained to dismiss him from the service.
Appellee filed an action for injunction to enjoin the Company and the
Union from dismissing Appellee. The Union invoked the union security
clause of the CBA and assailed the constitutionality of RA 3350 and
contends it discriminatorily favors those religious sects which ban their
members from joining labor unions.
ISSUE:Whether Appellee has the freedom of choice in joining the union
or not.
RULING:
YES. The Constitution and RA 875 recognize freedom of association.
Sec 1 (6) of Art III of the Constitution of 1935, as well as Sec 7 of Art IV
of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to form associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
Section 3 of RA 875 provides that employees shall have the right to
self-organization and to form, join of assist labor organizations of their
own choosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in

concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other

mutual aid or protection. What the Constitution and the Industrial
Peace Act recognize and guarantee is the right to form or join
associations. A right comprehends at least two broad notions, namely:
first, liberty or freedom, i.e., the absence of legal restraint, whereby an
employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; and
second, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or
refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who
should decide for himself whether he should join or not an association;
and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to
which association he would join; and even after he has joined, he still
retains the liberty and the power to leave and cancel his membership
with said organization at any time. The right to join a union includes
the right to abstain from joining any union. The law does not enjoin an
employee to sign up with any association.
The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal
protection granted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by
operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on
a closed shop, by virtue of which the employer may employ only
members of the collective bargaining union, and the employees must
continue to be members of the union for the duration of the contract in
order to keep their jobs. By virtue of a closed shop agreement, before
the enactment of RA 3350, if any person, regardless of his religious
beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment he must
become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, the right
of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed and withdrawn.
To that all-embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RA
No.3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4) of
the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: but such agreement
shall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation
of their members in any such labor organization. Republic Act No.
3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of
the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious
sects which prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor
organization. What the exception provides is that members of said
religious sects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions
even when said unions have closed shop agreements with the
employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of
said religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from
their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union. It does not prohibit the members of said
religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with

labor unions. If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of

said religious wets prefer to sign up with the labor union, they can do
so. If in deference and fealty to their religious faith, they refuse to sign
up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does
the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the employer or
labor union compel them to join.
The Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual
obligation it had with the Union of employing only Union members in
permanent positions. It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was
indeed an impairment of said union security clause.
The prohibition to impair the obligation of contracts is not absolute and
unqualified. The prohibition is general. The prohibition is not to be read
with literal exactness, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. In
spite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess
authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation
appropriate to safeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate
contracts already in effect. For not only are existing laws read into
contracts in order to fix the obligations as between the parties, but the
reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The contract clause of the
Constitution. must be not only in harmony with, but also in
subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power of the
state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. This has special
application to contracts regulating relations between capital and labor
which are not merely contractual, and said labor contracts, for being
impressed with public interest, must yield to the common good.
The purpose to be achieved by RA 3350 is to insure freedom of belief
and religion, and to promote the general welfare by preventing
discrimination against those members of religious sects which prohibit
their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their
natural, statutory and constitutional right to work, the fruits of which
work are usually the only means whereby they can maintain their own
life and the life of their dependents.
The individual employee, at various times in his working life, is
confronted by two aggregates of power collective labor, directed by a
union, and collective capital, directed by management. The union, an
institution developed to organize labor into a collective force and thus
protect the individual employee from the power of collective capital, is,
paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and a new source
of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts with
management, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength from
which the individual also needs protection the collective bargaining

relationship.
The free exercise of religious profession or belief is superior to contract
rights. In case of conflict, the latter must yield to the former.
The purpose of RA 3350 is to serve the secular purpose of advancing
the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work, or be
dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a
modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements.
To help its citizens to find gainful employment whereby they can make
a living to support themselves and their families is a valid objective of
the state. The Constitution even mandated that the State shall afford
protection to labor, promote full employment and equality in
employment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race
or creed and regulate the relation between workers and employers.
The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements in
favor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members from
affiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employees
against the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement,
and relieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and
by eliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due to
unemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, and
welfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-being
of society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed
shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of
any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those who
are members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joining
labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental
and indirect.
The purpose of RA 3350 was not to grant rights to labor unions. The
rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act No. 875
and the new Labor Code.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any
lawful association membership in any particular religion or in any
religious sect; neither does the Act require affiliation with a religious
sect that prohibits its members from joining a labor union as a
condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining or
withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act No.
3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the
coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious
objector is not required to do a positive act-to exercise the right to join

or to resign from the union. He is exempted ipso jure without need of

any positive act on his part.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed.
145. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ARTURO LARA y ORBISTA
FACTS:
* Information charging Lara with robbery with homicide was filed with
the RTC.
* Following Lara's plea of not guilty, trial ensued.
PROSECUTION: 3 witnesses: Enrique Sumulong, SPO1 Bernard Cruz and
PO3 Efren Calix
SUMULONG:
May 31, 2001, 9:00 AM, he withdrew the amount of
P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to
defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian and while at
around 10:30 AM, while the pickup he was riding was at the
intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues, Pasig City, Lara
suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the pick-up and
pointed a gun at him stating, "Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?";
Bautista, one of those who accompanied him told him not to give the
bag. He threw the bag in Bautista's direction and Bautista alighted
from the pick-up and ran. Seeing Bautista, Lara ran after him while
firing his gun
He then ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San
Sebastian to relay the incident and when he went back to where the
pick-up was parked, he went to the rear portion of the vehicle and saw
blood on the ground;
He was informed by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the
bag was taken away from him;
June 7, 2001: While on his way to Pasig City, he saw Lara walking
along Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig City and he alerted the police
and Lara was thereafter arrested. At the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob (other companions at pickup) identified Lara as the one who shot and
robbed them of San Sebastian's money.
SPO1 CRUZ
Around 7:55 PM on June 7, 2001, Sumulong went to the police station
and informed him that he saw Lara walking along Dr. Pilapil Street
4 police officers and Sumulong went to Dr. Pilapil Street where they
saw Lara, who Sumulong identified and they then approached Lara and
invited him for questioning.
At the police station, Lara was placed in a line-up where he was
positively identified by Sumulong, Manacob and Atie; and after being
identified, Lara was informed of his rights and subsequently detained.
PO3 CALIX
May 31, 2001: he was informed of a robbery that took place and he,

together with 3 other police officers, proceeded to the crime scene

wherein upon arriving one of the police officers who were able to
respond ahead of them, handed to him 11 pieces of empty shells and 6
deformed slugs of a 9mm pistol;
As part of his investigation, he interviewed Sumulong, Atie, Manacob
at the police station; and before Bautista died, he was able to interview
Bautista at the hospital where the latter was brought after the incident.
DEFENSE:
LARA
*May 31, 2001: he was at his house, digging a sewer trench while his
brother, Wilfredo, was constructing a comfort room which was
corroborated by his sister, Edjosa Manalo and neighbor, Simplicia Delos
Reyes.
*June 7, 2001 and at around 7:00 in the evening, while he was at the
house of one of his cousins, police officers arrived and asked him if he
was Arturo Lara and after confirming that he was Arturo Lara, the
police officers asked him to go with them to the Barangay Hall. He
voluntarily went with them and while inside the patrol car, one of the
policemen said, "You are lucky, we were able to caught you in your house, if in
another place we will kill you".
*He was brought to the police station and not the barangay hall as he
was earlier told where he was investigated for robbery with homicide
and when he told the police that he was at home when the subject
incident took place, the police challenged him to produce witnesses
but when his witnesses arrived at the station, one of the police officers
told them to come back the following day.
*While he was at the police line-up holding a name plate, a police
officer told Sumulong and Atie, "Ituru nyo na yan at uuwi na tayo"; and
when his witnesses arrived the following day, they were told that he
will be subjected to an inquest.
RTC:
GUILTY of robbery with homicide sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties
prescribed by law.
Rejected Lara's defense of alibi as follows because Enrique Sumulong
positively identified accused Arturo Lara as the person who carted
away the payroll money of San Sebastian Allied Services, and the one
who shot Joselito Bautista which caused his instantaneous death on the
same day. Also, it is not impossible for him to be at the place
ARGUMENTS:
On appeal, Lara pointed out several errors that supposedly attended
his conviction. First, that he was arrested without a warrant under
circumstances that do not justify a warrantless arrest rendered void all
proceedings including those that led to his conviction.
Second, he was not assisted by counsel when the police placed him in
a line-up to be identified by the witnesses for the prosecution in

violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. The police line-up
is part of custodial investigation and his right to counsel had already
attached.
Third, the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, the prosecution failed to present a witness who
actually saw him commit the alleged acts. Sumulong merely presumed
that he was the one who shot Bautista and who took the bag of money
from him. The physical description of Lara that Sumulong gave to the
police was different from the one he gave during the trial, indicating
that he did not have a fair glimpse of the perpetrator.
Moreover, this gives rise to the possibility that it was his unidentified
companion who shot Bautista and took possession of the money.
Hence, it cannot be reasonably claimed that his conviction was
attended with moral certainty.
Fourth, the trial court erred in discounting the testimony of his
witnesses. Without any showing that they were impelled by improper
motives in testifying in his favor, their testimonies should
have been given the credence they deserve.
While his two (2) witnesses were his sister and neighbor, this does not
by itself suggest the existence of bias or impair their credibility.
CA:
AFFIRMED conviction.
AUTOMATIC APPEAL TO SC as the penalty imposed was reclusion perpetua
ISSUES:
1. Whether Lara's supposedly illegal arrest may be raised for
the fi rst time on appeal for the purpose of nullifying his
conviction? (YES)
2. Whether the identification made by Sumulong, Atie and Manacob in
the police line-up is inadmissible because Lara stood therein without
the assistance of counsel? (NO, identification not custodial
investigation)
3. Whether there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara? (YES)
4. Whether Lara's alibi can be given credence so as to exonerate him
from the crime charged? (NO)
HELD:
DENY appeal.
1. YES. That Lara was supposedly arrested without a warrant
may not serve as a ground to invalidate the proceedings
leading to his conviction considering its belated invocation. Any
objections to the legality of the warrantless arrest should have been
raised in a motion to quash duly fi led before the accused
enters his plea; otherwise, it is deemed waived.
Further, that the accused was illegally arrested is not a ground to set
aside conviction duly arrived at and based on evidence that sufficiently
establishes culpability:
Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired through

compulsory process such as a warrant of arrest or through his

voluntary appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to
the court.
Any objection to the arrest or acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea,
otherwise the objection is deemed waived. An accused
submits to the jurisdiction of the trial court upon
entering a plea and participating actively in the trial and this precludes
him invoking any irregularities that may have attended his arrest. In
voluntarily submitting himself to the court by entering a plea, instead
of filing a motion to quash the information for lack of jurisdiction over
his person, accused-appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
assail the legality of his arrest.
Furthermore, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient ground
to reverse and set aside a conviction that was arrived upon a
complaint duly filed and a trial conducted without error. The
warrantless arrest, even if illegal, cannot render void all other
proceedings including those leading to the conviction of the appellants
and his co-accused, nor can the state be deprived of its right to convict
the guilty when all the facts on record point to their culpability.
As Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides: Sec. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground
therefor. The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion
to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either
because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same
in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g)and
(i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
2. NO. There was no legal compulsion to afford him a counsel during a
police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation and
this does not constitute a violation of his right to counsel
That he stood at the police line-up without the assistance of counsel
did not render Sumulong's identification of Lara inadmissible.
The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the
precise moment custodial investigation b e g i n s a n d
being made to stand in a police line-up is
not the starting point or a part of
c u s t o d i a l investigation.
People v. Amestuzo: The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a
person while he is under custodial investigation. Custodial
investigation starts when the
police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and
propounds questions to the person to elicit

incriminating statements.
P o l i c e l i n e - u p i s n o t p a r t o f t h e c u s t o d i a l
investigation; hence, the right to counsel
guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot yet be invoked at this stage.
The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only during
custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the
accused during identification in a police line-up because it is not part of
the custodial investigation process.
This is because during a police line-up, the process has
not yet shifted from the investigatory to the
accusatorya n d i t i s u s u a l l y t h e w i t n e s s o r t h e
complainant who is interrogated and who gives a
s t a t e m e n t i n t h e course of the line-up.
An exception to this rule is when the accused had
been the focus of police attention at the start of the
investigation.
In the case at bench, appellant was identified in a police line-up by
prosecution witnesses from a group of persons gathered for the
purpose. However, there was no proof that appellant was interrogated
at all or that a statement or confession was extracted from him. During
the police line-up, the accusatory process had not yet commenced.
Assuming there was interrogation, any allegation of violation of rights
during custodial investigation is relevant and m a t e r i a l o n l y t o
cases in which an extrajudicial admission or
c o n f e s s i o n e x t r a c t e d f r o m t h e a c c u s e d becomes
the basis of their conviction.
Here, appellant was convicted based on the testimony of a
prosecution witness and not on his alleged uncounseled confession or
admission.
3. YES. Contrary to appellant's assertion, prosecution witness
Sumulong actually saw him shoot Bautista, the victim. Also, it
is apparent from the assailed decision of the CA that the finding of guilt
against Lara is
based on circumstantial evidence.
Not only direct evidence but also circumstantial evidence
can overcome the presumption of innocence. Direct evidence
of the commission of the crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial
court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. Even in the absence
of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent
with each other and to the hypothesis that the accused
is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that he is
not.
REQUISITES OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE: Under Section 4, Rule
133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, circumstantial

evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following

requisites:
(a) there is m o r e t h a n o n e c i r c u m s t a n c e ;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived
are proven; and
(c) the
combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
It is not only by direct evidence that an accused may be convicted of
the crime for which he is charged. Resort to circumstantial evidence is
essential since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting felons free and denying proper protection to the community.
Here, the following circumstantial evidence are tellingly sufficient to
prove the guilt of appellant:
*While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at
prosecution witness Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the
bag containing the money.
*Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim
who was then seated at the backseat of the vehicle.
*The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag
*Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
*The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
*The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six
deformed empty shells.
Indeed, in cases of robbery with homicide, the taking of
personal property with intent to gain must itself be
established beyond reasonable doubt. The mere presence of
the accused at the crime scene is not enough to implicate him.
It is essential to prove the intent to rob and the use of violence was
necessary to realize such intent.
*In this case, Lara's intent to gain is proven by Sumulong's positive
narration that it was Lara who pointed the gun at him and demanded
that the bag containing the money be turned over to him. That Lara
resorted to violence in order to actualize his intent to gain is proven by
Sumulong's testimony that he saw Lara fire the gun at the direction of
Bautista, who was running away from the pick-up in order to prevent
Lara from taking possession of the money.
*N o t a b l y , t h e i n c i d e n t t o o k p l a c e i n b r o a d
d a y l i g h t a n d i n t h e m i d d l e o f a s t r e e t . Thus,
w h e r e considerations of visibility are favorable and
the witness does not appear to be biased against the
accused, his or her assertions as to the identity of the
malefactor should be normally accepted.
*Lara did not allege, much less, convincingly demonstrate

that Sumulong was impelled by improper or malicious

motives to impute upon him, however perjurious, such a
serious charge. Thus, his testimony,
which the trial court found to be forthright and credible, is worthy of
full faith and credit and should not be disturbed. If an accused had
nothing to do with the crime, it is against the natural order of events
and of human nature and against the presumption of good faith that a
prosecution witness would falsely testify against the former.
4. NO. In view of Sumulong's positive identification of Lara, the CA was
correct in denying Lara's alibi outright. It is well-settled that
positive identifi cation prevails over alibi, which is
inherently a weak defense. Such is the rule, for as a
defense, alibi is easy to concoct, and difficult to disapprove.
In order for the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated
that:
*that he was present at another place at the time of the perpetration of
the crime
*he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have been
physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at
the time of its commission.
Physical impossibility "refers to the distance between the place where
the accused was when the crime transpired and the place where it was
committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places.
Proximity of Lara's house at the scene of the crime wholly negates his
alibi. He himself admitted that his house was just a stone's throw
(about three minutes away) from the crime scene. Lara and his
witnesses failed to prove that it is well-nigh impossible for him to be at
the scene of the crime.
DISPOSITIVE:
CA AFFIRMED
147. Aballe vs. People, 183 SCRA 196, G.R. No. 64086, March 15, 1990
Argument that Aballes extrajudicial admission should have
been disregarded by the l o w e r c o u r t f o r h a v i n g b e e n
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights well
taken.The argument that Aballes extrajudicial admission should
have been disregarded by the lower court for having been
obtained in violation of Aballes constitutional rights is well taken.
Throughout the custodial interrogation, the accuseds parents and
relatives were almost always around but at no stage of the
entire proceedings was it shown that t h e y o u t h f u l o ff e n d e r
was ever represented by counsel. Since the execution
of the extrajudicial statement was admittedly made in
t h e a b s e n c e o f c o u n s e l , w h e t h e r d e o fi c i o o r d e p a r t e ,

and the waiver of counsel was not made with the

assistance of c o u n s e l a s m a n d a t e d b y t h e
provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the
1 9 7 3 Constitution, said confession should have been discarded by
the lower court. An officer making an arrest may take from the person
arrested any money or property found upon his person which was used
in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which
might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or
escaping or which may be used in evidence in the trial of the case.Indeed, equally inadmissible is the kitchen knife
r e c o v e r e d f r o m A b a l l e a f t e r h i s capture and after the police
had started to question him. Together with the extrajudicial
confession, the fatal weapon is but a fruit of a
constitutionally infi rmed interrogation and must consequently
be disallowed. The bloodstained T-shirt, however, is admissible, being
in the nature of an evidence in plain view which an arresting officer
may take and introduce in evidence. The prevailing rule in this
jurisdiction is that an officer making a n a r r e s t m a y t a k e f r o m
the person arrested any money or property found
u p o n h i s person which was used in the commission of the
crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the
prisoner with the means of committing violence or escaping, or which
may be used in evidence in the trial of the cause. . .
Testimony of Sgt. Marante on Aballes oral confession is competent to
positively link
the accused to the killing.But even with the exclusion of the extrajudicial confession
and the fatal weapon we a g r e e w i t h t h e t r i a l c o u r t t h a t
the guilt of the accused has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. It is well to note that even before
the taking of the extrajudicial
confession, the accused, upon being picked up in the morning of
November 8, 1980 as
he was coming out of the communal bathroom and
w e a r i n g a T- s h i r t c o v e r e d w i t h b l o o d s t a i n s w h i c h h e
tr ie d to c ove r with his ha nds , s udde nly broke down
a n d k n e l t before Sgt. Marante and confessed that he killed Jennie
Banguis. The testimony of Sgt.
Marante on Aballes oral confession is competent
e v i d e n c e t o p o s i t i v e l y l i n k t h e accused to the aforesaid
killing.
Declaration of an accused expressly acknowledging his guilt
of the off ense charged may be given in evidence against him.
151. CRISOSTOMO VS SB
FACTS:

Crisostomo, a member of the Philippine National Police, and others were charged
with the murder
of Renato, a detention prisoner at the Solano Municipal Jail. Crisostomo
pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued. The presentation of evidence for
Crisostomos defense was deemed waived for his failure to appear at the
scheduled hearings despite notice. Crisostomo and 1 co-accused were
found guilty by the Sandiganbayan, while the others were still at large.
ISSUE:
WON Crisostomos bail bond forfeiture was justified.
HELD:
NO.
Crisostomos absence on the 22 June 1995 hearing should not have been deemed
as a waiver of his
right to present evidence. While constitutional rights may be waived,
such waiver must be clear and must be coupled with an actual
intention to relinquish the right. Crisostomo did not voluntarily waive in
person or even through his counsel the right to present evidence. The
Sandiganbayan imposed the waiver due to the agreement of the prosecution,
Calingayan, and Calingayans counsel.
If no waiver of the right to present evidence could be presumed from Crisostomos
failure to attend the 22 June 1995 hearing, with more reason that flight could not
be logically inferred from Crisostomos absence at that hearing. Crisostomos
absence did not even justify the forfeiture of his bail
bond. A bail bond may be forfeited only in instances where the
presence of the accused is specifically required by the court or the
Rules of Court and, despite due notice to the bondsmen to produce him
before the court on a given date, the accused fails to appear in person
as so required. Crisostomo was not specifically required by the
Sandiganbayan or the Rules of Court to appear on the 22 June 1995
hearing. Thus, there was no basis for the SB to order the confiscation of Crisostomos
surety bond and assume Crisostomo had jumped bail.
154. Webb v De Leon
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation filed with the
DOJ a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons with the crime of
Rape and Homicide of Carmela N. Vizconde, her mother Estrellita
Nicolas-Vizconde, and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque, Metro Manila on
June 30, 1991.

Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors headed by Asst Chief

State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuno to conduct the preliminary
investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause.
They assail the credibility of Jessica Alfaro as inherently weak and
uncorroborated due to her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995
and May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the procedure
followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify
the alleged inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without
conducting the required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due
process and violation of their right to an impartial investigation. They
also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.
ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in holding that there
is probable cause to charge accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abuse their
discretion when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination
before issuing warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional right to due
process during their preliminary investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial prerogative when
it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause needs only to rest on
evidence showing that more likely than not, a crime has been
committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need
not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not
on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be a probable cause

that a crime has been committed and that the person arrested
committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of an information, the
RTC may issue a warrant for the accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that respondent judges
should have conducted searching examination of witnesses before
issuing warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because petitioners were
given all the opportunities to be heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to adduce more
evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence
submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the faulty assumption
that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole
prerogative of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the executive
department whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our
laws are faithfully executed. A necessary component of this right is to
prosecute their violators.
155. People v Teehankee
The facts:
In 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino was taking Maureen Hultman to her home at
Campanilla Street, Dasmarinas Village, Makati. Roland John Chapman
went with them. When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino
to stop about a block away from her house, as she wanted to walk the
rest of the way for she did not want her parents to know that she was
going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while Chapman
stayed in the car and listened to the radio.
While Leino and Maureen were walking, a light-colored Mitsubishi boxtype Lancer car, driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up
from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road. Accused
alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: Who are you?

(Show me your) I.D. When Leino handed his I.D., the accused grabbed
and pocketed the I.D., without bothering to look at it.
Chapman saw the incident. He stepped down on the sidewalk and
asked accused: Why are you bothering us? Accused pushed
Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him.
Chapman felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked:
Why did you shoot me? Chapman crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino
knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up
and leave Chapman alone. Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He
pointed gun at him and asked: Do you want a trouble? Leino said
no and took a step backward.
The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came to her senses,
she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly
shouted: Oh, my God, hes got a gun. Hes gonna kill us. Will
somebody help us? All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and
from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut up. Accused ordered
Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt
to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. Maureen
continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the
side of accuseds car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen
circled around accuseds car, trying to put some distance between
them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused
caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down
beside Leino. Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk.
For a moment, the accused turned his back from the two. He faced
them again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell
backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose consciousness. Leino
heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head
to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and
drive away. Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He
noticed at least 3 people who saw the incident.
As a result of the incident, 3 separate criminal cases were filed against
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. Initially, he was charged with: MURDER
for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER
for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
When Hultman subsequently died after 97 days of confinement at the
hospital and during the course of the trial, the Information for
Frustrated Murder was amended to MURDER.
The defense:

Accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that
during the shooting incident, he was not anywhere near the scene of
the crime, but in his house in Pasig. Accused averred that he only came
to know the 3 victims in the Dasmarinas shooting when he read the
newspaper reports about it. Accused admitted ownership of a box-type,
silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number PDW 566. He,
however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition
after its involvement in an accident. Until the day of the shooting, his
Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mothers house in
Dasmarinas Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused
conceded that although the car was not in good running condition, it
could still be used.
The ruling:
Eyewitness identification and out-of-court identification.
The accused was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of 3
eyewitnesses who positively identified him as the gunman. However,
he vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Leino, the lone
surviving victim of the crimes at bar. Appellant urges: First, that Leinos
identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was
highly irregular; Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and
the newspapers before he identified him; Third, that Leinos interview
at the hospital was never put in writing; Fourth, that the sketch of
appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents
was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have
been among the evidence turned over to the NBI when the latter
assumed jurisdiction over the investigation; and, lastly, that Leino
could not have remembered the face of the accused. The shooting
lasted for only five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not
have been fixed only on the gunmans face. His senses were also
dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for the accused to assail his out-of-court
identification by the prosecution witnesses in his first assignment of
error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most
cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while
eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and
authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as
the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness

evidence as inherently suspect. The causes of misidentification are

known, thus:
Identification testimony has at least three components. First,
witnessing a crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves
perception of an event actually occurring. Second, the witness must
memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be able to recall
and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness
testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people
attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve information accurately, they
are limited by normal human fallibilities and suggestive influences.
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It
is done thru show-ups where the suspect alone is brought face to face
with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots where
photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also
done thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group
of persons lined up for the purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court
identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification
during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure
its fairness and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional
due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-ofcourt identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of
circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1)
the witness opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime;
(2) the witness degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of
any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the
suggestiveness of the identification procedure.
Using the totality of circumstances test, the alleged irregularities cited
by the accused did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied
due process. There is nothing wrong in Leinos identification of the
accused in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that
this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. The
need for security even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted
from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and
brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The
Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was
cramped with people and with high security risk. Leinos fear for his
safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold
blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the
metropolis.
There is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are
identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is

often done in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh
in the mind of the victim.
Accused cant also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio
and TV accounts of the shooting before he personally identified him.
The records show that while Leino was still in the hospital, he was
shown 3 pictures of different men by the investigators. He identified
the accused as the gunman from these pictures. He, however,
categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not
seen any picture of accused or read any report relative to the shooting
incident. The burden is on accused to prove that his mug shot
identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-ofcourt identification by Leino.
There is no reason to doubt the correctness of the accuseds
identification by Leino. The scene of the crime was well-lighted by a
lamp post. The accused was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot
Leino. The incident happened for a full 5 minutes. Leino had no illmotive to falsely testify against the accused. His testimony at the trial
was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal cross-examination
of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of the
accused. When asked how sure he was that the accused was
responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: Im very sure. It
could not have been somebody else.
The accused cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the
investigators to reduce to a sworn statement the information revealed
by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established
that Leinos extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue,
limited his mobility. The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he
was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube
inserted in his throat. There is also no rule of evidence which requires
the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not
been priorly reduced to writing.
The SC also rejected the accuseds contention that the NBI suppressed
the sketch prepared by the CIS on the basis of the description given by
Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was
turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption
that the sketch was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not
resemble the accused is not evidence. It is unmitigated guesswork.
The SC was also not impressed with the contention that it was

incredible for Leino to have remembered the accuseds face when the
incident happened within a span of 5 minutes. Five minutes is not a
short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of the accused.
Experience shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of
bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses, especially the
victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the
identity of criminals. The natural reaction of victims of criminal
violence is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and
observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the face
end body movements of the assailant create an impression which
cannot be easily erased from their memory. In this case, there is
absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to
the accused. The victims and the accused were unknown to each other
before their chance encounter. If Leino identified the accused, it must
be because the accused was the real culprit.
The SC also gave credence to the testimony of the other two
witnesses. As to the testimony of Cadenas, his initial reluctance to
reveal to the authorities what he witnessed was sufficiently explained
during the trial he feared for his and his familys safety. The Court has
taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get
involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and
limbs. In light of these all too real risks, the court has not considered
the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with
authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. As to the
testimony of Mangubat, the SC found nothing in the records to suspect
that Mangubat would perjure himself.
2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
According to the accused, the trial court erred in not holding that the
prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. First,
he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement
in previous shooting incidents. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an
examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at the scene of
the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third,
the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunmans car as white,
but the trial court found it to be silver metalic gray. Fourth, the accused
could not have been the gunman, for Mangubat said that he overheard
the victim Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: Please, dont shoot me
and dont kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy. The accused also
contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told
Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: Daddy
dont shoot. Dont. Fifth, the NBI towed accuseds car from
Dasmarinas Village to the NBI office which proved that the same was

not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test
conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
The accused points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN,
since one of the eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having
overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy.; and, (b)
JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a
white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
The accused, however, cannot hope to exculpate himself simply
because the trial judge violated the rule on res inter alios acta when he
considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This rule
has long been laid to rest. The harmless error rule is also followed in
our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial,
the court examines its damaging quality and its impact to the
substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and
insignificant, the court disregards the error as it will not overcome the
weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party.
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the
troublesome character of appellant is a harmless error. The reference is
not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence appreciated by the trial
judge in convicting the accused. As aforestated, the accused was
convicted mainly because of his identification by 3 eyewitnesses with
high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the
fatal gun with the bullets found at the scene of the crime. The
omission, however, cannot exculpate the accused. The omitted
comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive
identification of the accused.
There is also little to the contention of the accused that his Lancer car
was not in running condition. Allegedly, this was vicariously proved
when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it was
parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records
which show that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its
ignition key which was then in the possession of the accused. Clearly,
the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even
the accuseds evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs,
the accuseds son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop
in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarinas Village, in Makati, where it was
parked.

Nor was the SC impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the

eyewitnesses description of the color of the gunmans car. Leino
described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat
white (medyo puti); Mangubat declared the car was white; and
Cadenas testified it was silver metallic gray. These alleged
discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are
not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white
and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of
the incident which happened before the break of dawn, these slight
discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution
eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
The accuseds attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the
adoptive father of Maureen Hultman, deserves scant consideration.
The accused cites a newspaper item where Maureen was allegedly
overheard as saying to the gunman: Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy.
The evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman
could not have been the gunman. It was clearly established that
Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons:
Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as
Papa, not Daddy. Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this
suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati
police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders
Hultman was NOT the gunman. Leino is a reliable witness.
The accused cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was
negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the
paraffin test has . . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of
nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test
alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge of a
firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since
these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors
which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the
hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the
direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. In
the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and
confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use
of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the

skin. She likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after
more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the shooting may
not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have
already been removed by washing or perspiration. In the Report on the
paraffin test conducted on appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth
Ayonon noted that when the accused was tested for the presence of
nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the
alleged shooting.
3. The right to an impartial trial.
The accused blames the press for his conviction as he contends that
the publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial.
He postulates there was pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking
government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as
no less than then Vice-President Estrada and then DOJ Secretary Drilon
attended some of the hearings and, President Aquino even visited
Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that
the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and
disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases.
The SC did not sustain the accuseds claim that he was denied the
right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. Its true that the print
and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule
that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accuseds right to
a fair trial for, as well pointed out, a responsible press has always
been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration,
especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish
information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice
by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism.
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to
fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-today, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity
so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality.
For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench
from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational criminal
cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news
as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our
bedrooms. These news form part of our everyday menu of the facts
and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is
not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not

installed the jury system whose members are overly protected from
publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Our judges are learned in the
law and trained to disregard off-court evidence and on-camera
performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to
publications and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their
impartiality.
At best, the accused can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the
part of the trial judge due to the barrage of publicity that characterized
the investigation and trial of the case. The SC had previously rejected
this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual
prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity,
there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity.
In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the
extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his case. The
totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is
incapable of change even by evidence presented during the trial. The
accused has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not
discharged the burden. There is no evidence showing that the trial
judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he
consent to or condone any manifestation of unruly or improper
behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the case at
bar.
Parenthetically, the accused should be the last person to complain
against the press for prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records
reveal he presented in court no less than 7 newspaper reporters and
relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The
defenses documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper
clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which
appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair
to appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that the trial judge voluntarily
inhibited himself from further hearing the case, but the SC, nothing in
the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality
against the trial judge, directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial
to speed up the administration of justice.
4. The presence of treachery

The accused claims that treachery was not present in the killing of
Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown
that the gunman consciously and deliberately adopted particular
means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. The accused
asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The 3 Informations charged the accused with having committed the
crimes with treachery and evident premeditation. Evident
premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for, admittedly,
the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance
meeting on the street since the victims were unknown to the accused
and vice-versa. It, however, appreciated the presence of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery.
On the other hand, the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the
killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness Leino established the
sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no
apparent reason, the accused suddenly alighted from his car and
accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were then walking along the
sidewalk.
Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After
Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and
asked what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the
sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There and then,
the accused pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and
shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. Why did you shoot me?
was all Chapman could utter. Concededly, the shooting of Chapman
was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend himself.
Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that the accused
consciously and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the
accomplishment of his criminal design without risk to himself. The
accused acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by
chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the
initial encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The
shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse on the part of the accused rather than a deliberate act of will.
Mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself,
constitute treachery. Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, the
accused should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and
killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Leino and the killing of Hultman, treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows
that after shooting Chapman in cold blood, the accused ordered Leino

to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to

the side of appellants car. When the accused went after her, Maureen
moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them.
After a minute or two, the accused got to Maureen and ordered her to
sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging
for mercy, the two were gunned down by the accused . Clearly, the
accused purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless
position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time
between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman
a period which the accused used to prepare for a mode of attack
which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Penalties:(Note: Mr. Teehankee was pardoned in 2008)
(1) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman. He was sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 8 years and 1 day of prision
mayor as minimum to 14 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the
following amounts: P50,000 as indemnity for the victims death; and,
P1,000,000 as moral damages.
(2) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman. He was
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: P50,000 as
indemnity for her death; P2,350,461.83 as actual damages;
P564,042.57 for loss of earning capacity of said deceased; P1,000,000
as moral damages; and P2,000,000 as exemplary damages.
(3) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 8 years of prision
mayor as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following amounts:
P30,000 as indemnity for his injuries; P118,369.84 and equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages;
P1,000,000 as moral damages; and, P2,000,000 as exemplary
damages.
(4) In all three cases, to pay each of the 3 offended parties the sum of
P1,000,000, or a total of P3,000,000, for attorneys fees and expenses
of litigation; and

(5) To pay the costs in all 3 cases.

156. Andrada vs People
Nature: This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of
the CA which charged the petitioner with frustrated murder.
Facts:- On September 24, 1986 at about 1:15 am, Sgt
Sumabong, Sgt Gaces and Cpl Aresinio Ugerio were eating at the
Marlows Restaurant in Baguio City. When Cpl Ugerio talked to a
woman who passed by their table, petitioner Peter Andrada,
approached him and scolded him.
Sgt. Sumabong advised Andrada to pay his bills and go home as he
was apparently drunk.
- As Sumabong was paying the bills, he heard Ugerio moan in pain. He
then saw Andrada
hacking Ugerio with a bolo. Sumabong approached them but Andrada
ran away. Andrada was then arrested in a waiting shed at the corner of
Camdas Road and Magsaysay Ave.
- Andrada invoked self defense claiming that Ugerio and Sumabong
slapped his face and
pointed their guns to his head. He also said that he ran away to his
house in Camdas Subd. He checked to see if his mother was around to
accompany him to surrender, but nobody was home. On his way to
surrender, he say his mother with a policeman. They proceeded to the
police station in Magsaysay Ave where Andrada surrenderd. The RTC
however ruled against Andrada.
Issue:WON the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender can be invoked by Andrada
H e l d : N o
Ratio:- Evidences showed that Andrada, after attacking the
victim, ran away. However, he was apprehended by the
policemen who were in the waiting shed.
- For voluntary surrender to be accepted as a mitigating circumstance,
it should be
spontaneous and it must show that Andrada has the real interest to
surrender unconditionally to the police authorities.
- In this case however, surrender was not spontaneous.
157. Vertudes vs Buenaflor and Bureau of Immigration
Facts:
Before us is a petition for review by certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules
of
Court, seeking to review and set aside the decision
and resolution
o f t h e Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of the Civil

Service Commission ( C S C ) fi n d i n g p e t i t i o n e r g u i l t y o f
g r a v e m i s c o n d u c t a n d d i s m i s s i n g h e r f r o m government
service.
Private respondent Buenafl or complained of having been
convinced by petitioner into paying the total amount of
P79,000.00 in exchange for the processing of her visa,
passport and other travel documents for Japan. Private respondent
delivered to petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos. 0014797 and
0014798 in the amounts of P30,000.00 and P20,000.00, respectively,
and cash worth P29,000.00. However, no visa was delivered. Private
respondent insisted that petitioner return her money, to no avail.
Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct and recommended her dismissal from the service. Petitioner filed
a Motion to Re-open with the BI, wherein Commissioner Rodriguez
issued an order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela
Cruz.
Subsequently, the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then
Department of Justice Secretary Serafin Cuevas. Petitioner appealed to
the CSC, raising the issues of lack of due process and lack of
substantial evidence, which dismissed the petitioners appeal.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review before the CA, raising
the issue:
whether or not the BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due
process. the CA
dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was accorded due process
Held: The petition is denied. She contends that she was denied of her
right to a full
hearing when she was not accorded the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses
against her. The argument is unmeritorious.
The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses
in a judicial
litigation is a fundamental right which is part of due process. However,
the right is
a personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by conduct
amounting to a renunciation of the right of
c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n . T h u s , where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but f a i l e d t o
avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the
r i g h t t o c r o s s - examine.
The right to cross-examination being a personal right,
petitioner must be

deemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit the case for
resolution and not questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before
the BI.
161. Patula v. people
Facts:
In a Estafa case, witness auditor based her testimony on the entries
found in the receipts supposedly issued by petitioner and in the
ledgers corresponding to each customer, as well as on the unsworn
statements of some of the customers.
Issue: Is the testimony hearsay?
Ruling: Yes
Analysis:
Sec. 36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court , states that a witness can testify
only to those
facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which are
derived from her
own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules of Court .
Witness-ladyauditor witness bereft of personal knowledge of the disputed fact
cannot be called
upon for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from
the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity
and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
163. SERAPIO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN 396 SCRA 443 (2003)
Facts:
Before the Court are two petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Edward Serapio,
assailing the resolutions of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan denying his
petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash, and a petition for
habeas corpus, all in relation to Criminal Case No. 26558 for plunder wherein
petitioner is one of the accused together with former President Joseph E.
Estrada, Jose Jinggoy P. Estrada and several others.
Petitioner was a member of the Board of Trustees and the Legal Counsel of the Erap
Muslim Youth Foundation, a non-stock, non-profit foundation established in February
2000 ostensibly for the purpose of providing educational opportunities for
the poor and underprivileged but deserving Muslim youth and students, and
support to research and advance studies of young Muslim educators and scientists.
Petitioner, as trustee of the Foundation, received on its behalf a donation in the
amount of Two Hundred Million Pesos (P200 Million) from Ilocos Sur Governor
Luis Chavit Singson. Accused by Singson. Informations filed. The

Sandiganbayan set the arraignment of the accused, including petitioner. In the

meantime, on April 27, 2001, petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan an
Urgent Petition for Bail which was set for hearing on May 4, 2001. For his part,
petitioners co-accused Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed on April 20, 2001 a
Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that he was entitled to bail as a
matter of right. During the hearing on May 4, 2001 on petitioners
Urgent Petition for Bail, the
prosecution moved for the resetting of the arraignment of the accused earlier than
the June 27,
2001 schedule. However, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion of the
prosecution and issued an order declaring that the petition for bail can and should
be heard before petitioners arraignment on June 27,
2001 and even before the other accused filed their respective petitions for bail.
Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan set the hearing for the reception of evidence on
petitioners petition for bail on May 21 to 25,2001.
The Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance
of petitioner as well as all the other accused during the hearings on the petitions for
bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination. The Sandiganbayan, citing its
inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the
case, directed the other accused to participate in the said bail hearing considering
that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, whatever evidence is
adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the
trial.
The bail hearing did not proceed because petitioner filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion to quash the amended Information on the grounds that as against him, the
amended Information does not allege a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts constitutive of plunder; as against him, the amended Information
does not allege a pattern of criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy. By way of riposte, the prosecution objected to the holding of bail hearing
until petitioner agreed to withdraw his motion to quash.
The prosecution contended that petitioners motion to quash the
amended Information was antithetical to his petition for bail. He also filed a petition
for Habeas Corpus.
Meanwhile, Jose Jinggoy Estrada filed with the Sandiganbayan a
motion praying that said court resolve his motion to fix his bail. The Sandiganbayan
issued a Resolution denying petitioners
motion to quash the amended Information. The motion to fix bail filed by Jose
Jinggoy Estrada was also denied by the Sandiganbayan. Jose Jinggoy
Estrada filed a petition for certiorari for the nullification of a resolution of the
Sandiganbayan denying his motion to fix bail.
ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of

his petition for bail may be conducted;
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during
the pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other
accused is mandatory;
(4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in
opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to adduce strong evidence of
guilt of petitioner for the crime charged
HELD/RATIO:
1.NO. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on his petition for bail. A
person is allowed to petition for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty by virtue
of his arrest or voluntary surrender. An accused need not wait for his arraignment
before filing a petition for bail. In cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted
before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to
quash.
However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the
hearing on a petition for bail
should at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived
of his liberty by virtue of
his arrest or voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is
deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or information is filed against him.
The Courts pronouncement in Lavides should be understood in light of the
fact that the accused in said case filed a petition for bail as well as a motion
to quash the informations filed against him. Hence, we explained therein that to
condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in
a position where he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus
delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash can be resolved, his
arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so
that he can be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. This would
undermine his constitutional right not to be put on trial except upon a valid
complaint or Information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his right to bail. It
is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of
hearings on his application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused
may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment. The ruling in
Lavides also implies that an application for bail in a case involving an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death may also be heard even before an
accused is arraigned. Further, if the court finds in such case that the accused is
entitled to bail because the evidence against him is not strong, he may be granted
provisional liberty even prior to arraignment; for in such a situation, bail would be
authorized under the circumstances. In fine, the Sandiganbayan
committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the arraignment of petitioner before proceeding with the hearing of his

petition for bail.

2. YES. The Court finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of
an accused for bail and his filing of a motion to quash. Bail is the security
given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a
bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the
conditions set forth under the Rules of Court. Its purpose is to obtain
the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction
while at the same time securing his appearance at the trial. As stated earlier, a
person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty
by virtue of his arrest or voluntary surrender.
On the other hand, a motion to quash an Information is the mode by which an
accused assails the validity of a criminal complaint or Information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects which are apparent in
the face of the Information. An accused may file a motion to quash the Information,
as a general rule, before arraignment. These two reliefs have objectives which are
not necessarily antithetical to each other. Certainly, the right of an accused right to
seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an
offense punishable by such penalties but after due hearing, evidence of his
guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense. It must be conceded, however, that if a
motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that the same
does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the
accused is ordered released, the petition for bail of an accused may become moot
and academic.
3. No. There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules
of Procedure of the Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions
for bail filed by different accused or that a
petition for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case
against the other accused. The
matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail
filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another
accused is addressed to
the sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to
excess or lack of
jurisdiction is shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the
Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
It may be underscored that in the exercise of its discretion, the Sandiganbayan must
take into account
not only the convenience of the State, including the prosecution, but also that of the
accused and the
witnesses of both the prosecution and the accused and the right of accused to a

speedy trial. The Sandiganbayan must also consider the complexities of the cases
and of the factual and legal issues involving
petitioner and the other accused. After all, if this Court may echo the observation of
the United States Supreme
Court, the State has a stake, with every citizen, in his being afforded our historic
individual protections,
including those surrounding criminal prosecutions. About them, this Court dares not
become careless or
complacent when that fashion has become rampant over the earth.
4. No. Petitioners claim that the prosecution had refused to present
evidence to prove his guilt for purposes of his bail application and that the
Sandiganbayan has refused to grant a hearing thereon is not borne by the records.
The prosecution did not waive, expressly or even impliedly, its right to adduce
evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner. It must be noted that the
Sandiganbayan had already scheduled the hearing dates for petitioners
application for bail but the same were reset due to pending incidents raised in
several motions filed by the parties, which incidents had to be resolved by the court
prior to the bail hearings. The bail hearing was eventually scheduled by the
Sandiganbayan on July 10, 2001 but the hearing did not push through due to the
filing of this petition on June29, 2001.
The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioners application for bail is
therefore not imputable solely to the Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner
is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following list of motions filed
by him and by the prosecution.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden
of showing that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. However, the
determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong, being a
matter of judicial discretion,remains with the judge. This discretion by the very
nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to
the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the
evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court,
it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of
guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce his own
evidence in rebuttal.
Accordingly, petitioner cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan
conducts a hearing of his application for bail and resolve the same in his favor. Even
then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is not strong
before he may be granted bail.
165. Go v. Dimagiba

Facts: Fernando Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen checks which,

when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the
due dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed.
Subqequently, Dimagiba was prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of
BP 22 (An Act Penalizing the Making or Drawing and Issuance of a
Check Without Sufficient Funds or Credit and for Other Purposes,
approved on April 3, 1979). He was found guilty by the MTCC, was
sentenced three months imprisonment, and was ordered to pay the
offended party the amount he owed plus interest. On February 27,
2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution, praying for the recall of the
Order of Arrest and the modification of the final decision. Citing SC-AC
No. 12-2000, he pointed out that the penalty of fine only, instead of
imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him. The MTCC
denied the motion for reconsideration; Dimagiba was arrested and
imprisoned for the service of his sentence. On October 9, 2001,
Dimagiba filed with the RTC of Baguio city a petition for writ of habeas
corpus which was granted by the said court after hearing the case.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus is the proper
remedy.
(2) Whether or not SC-AC No. 12-2000 can be given retroactive
application.
Held:
(1) No. The respondent had previously sought the modification of his
sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration and in a Motion for the Partial
Quashal of the Writ of Execution. The remedy should have been an
appeal of the MTCC Order denying these motions. His petition for writ
of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had
already become final and executory, an action deplorably amounting to
forum shopping.
(2) No. The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be
applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. SC-AC No. 12-2000
cannot be given retroactive application for it is not a law that deletes
the penalty of imprisonment. It is merely a rule of preference as to
which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of
the case.
166. Camara vs Pagayatan
Facts: Petitioner Assistant Vice-President and Head of the Land

Compensation Division of the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) was

detained under a warrant of arrest respondent judge issued from a
contempt citation against the former for LBPs failure to deposit the
preliminary compensation in Civil Case No. R-1390 as provided under
the trial courts order. LBP was directed to deposit the preliminary
compensation, in cash and bonds, in the total amount of
P71,634,027.30 with the LBP, Manila, within 7 days from receipt of this
order, and to notify the Court of compliance within such period.
LBP then complied with this order by depositing the said amount in its
head office in cash under its account in trust for, and in bond payable
to, the trial courts clerk of court. However the respondent judge found
LBPs compliance insufficient and ordered LBP to place the deposit in
the name of Josefina Lubrica as payee, in the form that is readily
withdrawable. Respondent judge ordered Camara to remain in
detention until LBP complies with such order. Hence, petitioner filed
this petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
Issue: WON a respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of his jurisdiction when he refused to
release Camara from detention despite LBPs compliance.
Held: Yes. Under section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, a writ of
habeas corpus does not lie if it appears that the person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue
the process. Petitioner does not question the trial courts jurisdiction to
issue the Order citing petitioner in contempt. What petitioner assails is
respondent judges refusal to release Camara from detention despite
LBPs compliance of the full amount of the preliminary compensation.
This is grave abuse of respondent judges contempt powers,
amounting to lack or excess of his jurisdiction.
167. CASE TITLE :G.R. No. 169482
January 29, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS CORPUS OF
EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner,
vs.
LUISA R. VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R. PABELLO, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005
and September 2, 2005 of the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus
was denied.
The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow,
allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating
cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after demanding the return of
Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner
failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally

adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother

of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of
Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated
February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 Hence,
this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas
corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether
or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is
no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of
habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody
of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a
person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus
may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court
that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful
deprivation of liberty.
However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted
daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez.
Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were
staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed.
Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other
household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was
appointed as administrator of the properties of Eufemia and her
deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting
payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for
and in behalf of Eufemia and the respondents who were the only
compulsory heirs of the late Maximo.Eufemia and the respondents
demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to
petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa.
Consequently, and by reason of their mothers deteriorating health,
respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005.
She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right
to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents action.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted.
RULING: Petition Denied. ApplicationL: The writ of habeas corpus
extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any
person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a
person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued
when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented
from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it
contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a persons liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of
the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody.
According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or
restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is

filed, the petition should be dismissed

In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being
restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not.
Petition was DENIED.
170. G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012
NAVIA vs. PARDICO
Facts
Bong and Ben were suspects in stealing the street lamp . Bong then
signed a statement to the effect that the guards released him without
inflicting any harm or injury to him.
His mother Lolita also signed the logbook below an entry, which states
that she will never again harbor or entertain Ben in her house.
Thereafter, Lolita and Bong left the security office leaving Ben behind.
The following morning, Virginia, Bens wife, went to the Asian Land
security office to visit her husband Ben, but only to be told that
petitioners had already released him together with Bong the night
before. She then looked for Ben, asked around, and went to the
barangay. Since she could not still find her husband, Virginia reported
the matter to the police. The last time Ben was seen was Lolita and
Bong left him in petitioners custody at the security office.
Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband,
Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC of Malolos
City. Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, the amparo
court issued an Order dated June 26, 2008 directing, among others, the
issuance of a writ of amparo and the production of the body of Ben
before it on June 30, 2008.
Issue
Whether or not the writ of amparo may be issued against the Asian
Land security officers.
Held
But lest it be overlooked, in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance
alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such
disappearance was carried out with the direct or indirect authorization,
support or acquiescence of the government. This indispensable
element of State participation is not present in this case.
The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and
none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or
any of its agents orchestrated Bens disappearance. In fact, none of its
agents, officials, or employees were
impleaded or implicated in Virginias amparo petition whether as
responsible or accountable persons.
Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or

its agents had a hand in Bens disappearance or that they failed to

exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will
definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible
or accountable persons.
We are aware that under Section 1 of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC a writ of
amparo may lie against a private individual or entity.
But even if the person sought to be held accountable or responsible in
an amparo petition is a private individual or entity, still, government
involvement in the disappearance remains an indispensable element.
Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision
in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a
private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has
been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police,
military or governmental operation. As discussed above, to fall within
the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the
disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement.
This hallmark of State participation differentiates an enforced
disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person.

179. COCOFED vs. Republic

GR Nos. 177857-58, January 24, 2012
FACTS:
In 1971, Republic Act No. 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut
Investment
Fund (CIF). The source of the CIF was a P0.55 levy on the sale of every
100 kg. of
copra. The Philippine Coconut Administration was tasked to collect and
administer the
Fund. Out of the 0.55 levy, P0.02 was placed at the disposition of the
COCOFED, the
recognized national association of coconut producers declared by the
PCA. Cocofund
receipts were ought to be issued to every copra seller.
During the Martial Law regime, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued
several
Presidential Decrees purportedly for the improvement of the coconut
industry. The most
relevant among these is P.D. No. 755 which permitted the use of the
Fund for the
acquisition of a commercial bank for the benefit of coconut farmers and the

distribution of the shares of the stock of the bank it [PCA] acquired free
to the
coconut farmers (Sec.2).
Thus, the PCA acquired the First United Bank, later renamed the United
Coconut
Planters Bank (UCPB). The PCA bought the 72.2% of PUBs outstanding capital stock
or 137,866 shares at P200 per share (P27, 573,200.00) from Pedro
Cojuangco in behalf of the coconut farmers.
The rest of the Fund was deposited to the UCPB interest free.
Farmers who had paid the CIF and registered their receipts with PCA
were given
their corresponding UCPB stock certificates. Only 16 million worth of
COCOFUND
receipts were registered and a large number of the coconut farmers
opted to sell all/part
of their UCPB shares to private individuals. Simply put, parts of the
coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to various projects and/or
was converted into different assets or investments through the years.
After the EDSA Revolution, President Corazon Aquino issued Executive
Order 1
which created the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG).
The PCGG aimed to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth
accumulated by the Marcoses and their cronies. PCGG was empowered
to file cases
for sequestration in the Sandiganbayan.
Among the sequestered properties were the shares of stock in the
UCPB
registered in the name of over a million coconut farmers held in trust by the
PCA. The
Sandiganbayan allowed the sequestration by ruling in a Partial
Summary Judgment that
the Coconut Levy Funds are prima facie public funds and that Section 1
and 2 of PD
No. 755 (and some other PDs) were unconstitutional.
The COCOFED representing the over a million coconut farmers via Petition for
review under Rule 45 sought the reversal of the ruling contending
among others that the sequestration amounted to taking of private property
without just compensation and impairment of vested right of ownership.

ISSUE:
What is the NATURE of the Coconut Levy Fund?
RULING:
The SC ruled in favor of the REPUBLIC.
To begin with, the Coconut Levy was imposed in the exercise of the States inherent
power of taxation. Indeed, the Coconut Levy Funds partake the nature
of TAXES. The Funds were generated by virtue of statutory enactments
by the proper legislative authorities and for public purpose.
The Funds were collected to advance the government avowed policy of
protecting the coconut industry. The SC took judicial notice of the fact
that the coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars of our
nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the
countries export products.
Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the
government, but also to
provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened
industry, which is so affected with public interest.
182. People vs. Linsangan [GR 43290, 21 December 1935]
En Banc, Abad Santos (J): 9 concur
Facts: Ambrosio Linsagan was prosecuted for nonpayment of the
cedula or poll tax under section 1439, in connection with section 2718,
of the Revised Administrative Code. After due trial, he was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for 5 days, and to pay the costs. The case was
tried and decided in the trial court before the Constitution of the
Philippines took effect. But while the appeal was pending, the said
Constitution became effective, and section 1, clause 12, of Article III
thereof provides that "no person shall be imprisoned for debt or
nonpayment of a poll tax." Linsagan appealed, alleging that the trial
court erred in not declaring said sections 1439 and 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code unconstitutional and void, as the judgment of
conviction violates the provision of the Philippine Autonomy Act
interdicting imprisonment for debt.
Issue: Whether, in view of section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the
Constitution, the judgment of conviction against Linsagan can stand.
Held: Section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, provides that "All laws
of the Philippine Islands shall continue in force until the inauguration of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; thereafter, such laws shall

remain operative, unless inconsistent with this Constitution, until

amended, altered, modified, or repealed by the National Assembly, and
all references in such laws to the Government or officials of the
Philippine Islands shall be construed, in so far as applicable, to refer to
the Government and corresponding officials under this Constitution."
Section 2718 of the Revised Administrative Code is inconsistent with
section 1, clause 12, of Article III of the Constitution, in that, while the
former authorizes imprisonment for nonpayment of the poll or cedula
tax, the latter forbids it. It follows that upon the inauguration of the
Government of the Commonwealth, said section 2718 of the Revised
Administrative Code became inoperative, and no judgment of
conviction can be based thereon. It results that the judgment appealed
from must be reversed, and the case dismissed with costs de oficio.
183. People v Larranaga
FACTS:On the night of July 16, 1997, victims Marijoy and Jacqueline
Chiong failed to come home on the expected time. Two days after, a
young woman was found dead at the foot of a cliff. Her pants were
torn, her t-shirt was raised up to her breast and her bra was pulled
down.
Her face and neck were covered with masking tape and attached to
her left wrist was a handcuff. The woman was identified as Marijoy.
After almost ten months, accused Davidson Rusia surfaced and
admitted before the police having participated in the abduction of the
sisters. He identified appellants Francisco Juan Larraaga, Josman
Aznar, Rowen Adlawan, Alberto Cao, Ariel Balansag, James Anthony
Uy, and James Andrew Uy as co-perpetrators in the crime. Rusia
provided the following before the trial court:1) That at 10:30 in the
evening of July 16, 1997, he met Rowen and Josman and told him to
ride with them in a white car. Following them were Larraaga, James
Anthony and James Andrew who were in a red car. Josman stopped the
white car in front of the waiting shed where the sisters Marijoy and
Jacqueline were standing and forced them to ride the car. Rusia taped
their mouths while Rowen handcuffed them jointly.2) That after
stopping by a safehouse, the group thereafter headed to the South Bus
Terminal where they met Alberto and Ariel, and hired the white van
driven by the former. They traveled towards south of Cebu City, leaving
the red car at the South Bus Terminal.3) That after parking their
vehicles near a precipice, they drank and had a pot session. Later, they
started to rape Marijoy inside the vehicle, and thereafter raped
Jaqueline.4) That Josman intructed Rowen and Ariel to bring Marijoy to
the cliff and push her into the ravine.The claims of Rusia were

supported by other witnesses. He was discharged as an accused and

became a state witness. Still, the body of Jacqueline was never found.
The trial court found the other appellants guilty of two crimes of
kidnapping and serious illegal detention and sentenced each of them
to suffer the penalties of two (2) reclusiones perpetua. The appellants
assailed the said decision, arguing inter alia, that court erred in finding
that there was consipiracy. James Anthony was also claimed to be only
16 years old when the crimes were committed.
ISSUES:1) Whether or not there was conspiracy.2) Whether or not the
trial court erred in characterizing the crime.3) Whether or not the trial
court erred imposing the correct penalty.
HELD:1) Yes. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner
by which the offense was perpetrated, or may be inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint design and
community of interest. The appellants actions showed that they had
the same objective to kidnap and detain the Chiong sisters. The Court
affirmed the trial courts finding that the appellants indeed conspired in
the commission of the crimes charged.
2) Yes. The rule is that when the law provides a single penalty for two
or more component offenses, the resulting crime is called a special
complex crime. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 8 of R.A. 7659, provides that in the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention, when the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. Thus, the
resulting crime will change from complex crime to special complex
crime. In the present case, the victims were raped and subjected to
dehumanizing acts. Thus, the Court held that all the appellants were
guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention with homicide and rape in the case where Marijoy is the
victim; and simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention in the case
of Jacqueline.
3) Yes. Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code provides that by reason of
minority, the imposable penalty to the offender is one degree lower
than the statutory penalty. James Anthony was only 16 years old when
the crimes were committed. As penalty for the special complex crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape is
death, the correct penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua.
On the other hand, the penalty for simple kidnapping and serious
illegal detention is reclusion perpetua to death. One degree lower from

the said penalty is reclusion temporal. There being no aggravating and

mitigating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed on him should be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of twelve
(12) years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. With regard to the rest of the appellants, the statutory
penalty as provided above should be imposed. Therefore, trial court
erred in merely imposing two (2) reclusiones perpetua
184. MARCELO LASOY AND FELIX BANISA, PETITIONERS, VS.
HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 76,
QUEZON CITY, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS
G.R. No. 129472, April 12, 2005, SECOND DIVISION, CHICONAZARIO, J.
Facts
Asst. City Prosecutor Evelyn Dimaculangan Querijero filed a criminal
information against Marcelo Lasoy and Felix Banisa for selling 42.41
grams of Marijuana fruiting tops in the RTC (presided by Judge Jaime N.
Salazar,Jr.). Both pleaded guilty on arraignment and were later on
convicted for violating section 4 of RA 6425. They were sentenced to
suffer a jail term of 6 months and 1 day. Later on, Asst. City Prosecutor
Ma. Aurora Escasa-Ramos filed two separate motions, first, to admit
amended Information, and second, to set aside the arraignment of the
accused. Prosecutor Ramos intends to amend the filed information
because for some reason, Lasoy and Banisa were charged of selling
42.41 grams instead of 42.41 kilograms of marijuana. The RTC denied
the first motion and granted the second. The RTC granted the second
motion on the ground that the jurisdiction over drug of small quantity
should be tried by the Metropolitan Trial Court, although under the
statute of R.A. 7659 which took effect on December 31, 1993 the
penalty for possession or use of prohibited or regulated drugs is from
prision [correccional] to reclusion temporal which indeterminate
penalty and under the rule on jurisdiction the court, which has
jurisdiction over a criminal case is dependent on the maximum penalty
attached by the statute to the crime. Thus the information now
contains kilograms instead of grams.
In its assailed resolution, presided by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa dated
14 February 1997, the trial court denied accused's motion to quash,
and scheduled the arraignment of the accused under the amended
information. Lasoy and Banisa raises a petition for
certiorari on the ground of double jeopardy. In response, respondent
claims that the trial based on the first information was a sham, that the

petitioners participated in tampering the information, and was decided

without jurisdiction thus the petitioner cannot claim double jeopardy.
Issue
WON the information after having been filed and the accused had been
arraigned, pleaded guilty and were convicted and after they had
applied for probation, may be amended and the accused arraigned
anew on the ground that the information was allegedly
altered/tampered with?
Held
No, for double jeopardy sets in the case. In double jeopardy, the
following requisites must be present:
(1)a valid complaint or information;
(2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case;
(3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and
(4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The question is whether this is sufficient to consider the first
Information under which
the accused were arraigned invalid. Under the Rules of Court, Rule 110,
Section 4, an information is an accusation in writing charging a person
with an offense subscribed by the fiscal and filed with the court.
Applying the foregoing, the inescapable conclusion is that the first
information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by
which the crime was committed. Furthermore section 6 of rule 110
states a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of
the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or
omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the
offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense,
and the place wherein the offense was committed.
With respect to the trial court's point of view that the accused cannot
claim their right against double jeopardy because they
"participated/acquiesced to the tampering," cannot be upheld because
there is actually no hard evidence thereof. The fact that accused were
arraigned, entered a plea of guilty and convicted under the first
information cannot be overlooked. Granting that alteration/tampering
took place and the accused had a hand in it, this does not justify the
setting aside of the decision dated 16 July 1996. The alleged
tampering/alteration allegedly participated in by the accused may well
be the subject of another inquiry. The court did not agree with the trial
court in citing Galman v. Sandiganbayan because such case was
considered a mock trial owing to the act of a then authoritarian
president who ordered the therein respondents Sandiganbayan and
Tanodbayan to rig the trial and who closely monitored the entire

proceedings to assure a predetermined final outcome of acquittal and

total absolution of the respondents-accused therein of all the charges.
On the issue of jurisdiction, the lower court reasons that double
jeopardy has not set in because the criminal jurisdiction of
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts under Section 32 (2) of B. P. 129, as amended by Rep. Act
7691 has been increased to cover offenses punishable with
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of
the fine (Administrative Cir. No. 09-94, June 14, 1994). It appears that
the imposable penalties applicable to the subject cases are within the
range of prision correccional, a penalty not exceeding six years, thus
falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC. It follows
that the RTC has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the charges
against petitioners thus the
decision based on the first information was rendered without
jurisdition.
This cannot be upheld because a later resolution superseding the
resolution cited by the trial courts, specifically Administrative Order No.
51-96 dated 03 May 1996, vests the RTC with jurisdiction to try
Criminal Case based on the first information.
Petition was granted, Lasoy and Banisa were released.
192. Artemio Villareal vs People of the Philippines
FACTS:
Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of
Law have been initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February
1991. The initiation rites started when the neophytes were met by
some members of the mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the Ateneo
Law School. They were consequently brought to a house and briefed on
what will be happening during the days when they will be initiated.
They were informed that there will be physical beatings and that the
neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to another
house to commence their initiation.
The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before
they got off the van. Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the
neophytes as they alighted from the van. Several initiation rites were
experienced by the neophytes like the Indian run, Bicol express and
rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles of the
fraternity and were hit everytime they made a mistake.
Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the
initiation rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members
subjected neophytes to paddling and additional hours of physical pain.
After the last session of beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that

night, he was feeling cold and his condition worsened. He was brought
to the hospital but was declared dead on arrival.
Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and
was subsequently found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of homicide and penalized with reclusion perpetua.
On January 10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the
accused according to individual participation. 19 of the the accused
were acquitted, 4 of the appellants were found guilty of slight physical
injuries, and 2 of the accused-appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide.
Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rule
45 on the grounds that the CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of
due process and second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable
doubt. Consequently, petitioner Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and
filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011.
ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is
extinguished by death
RULING:
Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death.
The Court took note of counsel for petitioners Notice of Death when it
has been received while the petition was pending resolution. Personal
penalties refer to the service of personal or imprisonment penalties,
while pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, civil liability. Article 89 of
the Revised Penal Code states that the criminal liability of a convict for
personal penalties is totally extinguished by death of the convict. His
pecuniary penalty has been extinguished since the death of the
accused happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the death of
the petitioner for both personal and pecuniary penalties including his
civil liability has ended. His petition has also been dismissed and the
criminal case against him has been closed and terminated.
195. ANTONIO Y. CO, petitioner, vs. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND JOSE ONG, JR.,
respondents.

Facts:
The petitioners come to this Court asking for the setting aside and
reversal of a decision of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET).
The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born
Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting
purposes.
On May 11, 1987, the congressional election for the second district of

Northern Samar was held.

Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in
the second legislative district of Northern Samar are the petitioners,
Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr.
Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the
second district of Northern Samar.
The petitioners filed election protests against the private respondent
premised on the following grounds:
1)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines; and
2)Jose Ong, Jr. is not a resident of the second district of Northern
Samar.
The HRET in its decision dated November 6, 1989, found for the private
respondent.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners on November
12, 1989. This was, however, denied by the HRET in its resolution
dated February 22, 1989.
Hence, these petitions for certiorari.

Issue:
WON Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born citizen of the Philippines.

Held: Yes. Petitions are dismissed.

Ratio:
The records show that in the year 1895, Ong Te (Jose Ong's
grandfather), arrived in the Philippines from China. Ong Te established
his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar on land which he
bought from the fruits of hard work.
As a resident of Laoang, Ong Te was able to obtain a certificate of
residence from the then Spanish colonial administration.
The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in
China in 1905. He was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915.
Jose Ong Chuan spent his childhood in the province of Samar.
As Jose Ong Chuan grew older in the rural and seaside community of
Laoang, he absorbed Filipino cultural values and practices. He was
baptized into Christianity. As the years passed, Jose Ong Chuan met a
natural born-Filipino, Agripina Lao. The two fell in love and, thereafter,
got married in 1932 according to Catholic faith and practice.
The couple bore eight children, one of whom is the Jose Ong who was
born in 1948.
Jose Ong Chuan never emigrated from this country. He decided to put
up a hardware store and shared and survived the vicissitudes of life in

Samar.
The business prospered. Expansion became inevitable. As a result, a
branch was set-up in Binondo, Manila. In the meantime, Jose Ong
Chuan, unsure of his legal status and in an unequivocal affirmation of
where he cast his life and family, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Samar an application for naturalization on February 15, 1954.
On April 28, 1955, the CFI of Samar, after trial, declared Jose Ong
Chuan a Filipino citizen. On May 15, 1957, the Court of First Instance of
Samar issued an order declaring the decision of April 28, 1955 as final
and executory and that Jose Ong Chuan may already take his Oath of
Allegiance.
Pursuant to said order, Jose Ong Chuan took his Oath of Allegiance;
correspondingly, a certificate of naturalization was issued to him.
During this time, Jose Ong (private respondent) was 9 years old,
finishing his elementary education in the province of Samar.
There is nothing in the records to differentiate him from other Filipinos
insofar as the customs and practices of the local populace were
concerned.
After completing his elementary education, the private respondent, in
search for better education, went to Manila in order to acquire his
secondary and college education.
Jose Ong graduated from college, and thereafter took and passed the
CPA Board Examinations. Since employment opportunities were better
in Manila, the respondent looked for work here. He found a job in the
Central Bank of the Philippines as an examiner. Later, however, he
worked in the hardware business of his family in Manila.
In 1971, his elder brother, Emil, was elected as a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention. His status as a natural born citizen was
challenged. Parenthetically, the Convention which in drafting the
Constitution removed the unequal treatment given to derived
citizenship on the basis of the mother's citizenship formally and
solemnly declared Emil Ong, respondent's full brother, as a natural
born Filipino. The Constitutional Convention had to be aware of the
meaning of natural born citizenship since it was precisely amending
the article on this subject.
The pertinent portions of the Constitution found in Article IV read:
SECTION 1, the following are citizens of the Philippines:
1.
Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of the Constitution;
2.
Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the
Philippines;
3.
Those born before January 17, 1973, of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and

4.
Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.
SECTION 2, Natural-born Citizens are those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or
perfect their citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph 3 hereof shall be deemed natural-born
citizens.

The Court interprets Section 1, Paragraph 3 above as applying not only

to those who elect Philippine citizenship after February 2, 1987 but also
to those who, having been born of Filipino mothers, elected citizenship
before that date. The provision in question was enacted to correct the
anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father and an alien
mother was automatically granted the status of a natural-born citizen
while one born of a Filipino mother and an alien father would still have
to elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was not, under
earlier laws, conferred the status of a natural-born
Election becomes material because Section 2 of Article IV of the
Constitution accords natural born status to children born of Filipino
mothers before January 17, 1973, if they elect citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority.
To expect the respondent to have formally or in writing elected
citizenship when he came of age is to ask for the unnatural and
unnecessary. He was already a citizen. Not only was his mother a
natural born citizen but his father had been naturalized when the
respondent was only nine (9) years old.
He could not have divined when he came of age that in 1973 and 1987
the Constitution would be amended to require him to have filed a
sworn statement in 1969 electing citizenship inspite of his already
having been a citizen since 1957.
In 1969, election through a sworn statement would have been an
unusual and unnecessary procedure for one who had been a citizen
since he was nine years old
In Re: Florencio Mallare: the Court held that the exercise of the right
of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a
positive act of election of Philippine citizenship
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of
suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.
Petitioners alleged that Jose Ong Chuan was not validly a naturalized
citizen because of his premature taking of the oath of citizenship.
SC: The Court cannot go into the collateral procedure of stripping
respondents father of his citizenship after his death. An attack on a
persons citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its
nullity, therefore, to ask the Court to declare the grant of Philippine
citizenship to respondents father as null and void would run against

the principle of due process because he has already been laid to rest
197. Tabasa v CA
FACTS:
When he was 7 years old, Joevanie A. Tabasa acquired American
citizenship when his father became a naturalized citizen of the US. In
1995, he arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as "balikbayan";
thereafter, he was arrested and detained by the agent of BID. Th
Consul General of the US embassy of Manila filed a request with the
BID that his passport has been revoked and that Tabasa had a standing
warrant for several federal charges against him.
Petitioner alleged that he acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in
accordance with the RA No. 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino
citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the BID.
ISSUE:
Whether or not he has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under
RA 8171 and therefore, is not an undocumented alien subject to
deportation.
RULING:
No. Petitioner is not qualified to avail himself of repatriation under RA
8171. The only person entitled to repatriation under RA 8171 is either a
Filipino woman who lost her Philippine citizenship by marriage to an
alien, or a natural-born Filipino, including his minor children who lost
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity.
Petitioner was already 35 years old when he filed for repatriation. The
act cannot be applied in his case because he is no longer a minor at
the time of his repatriation in 1996. The privilege under RA 8171 only
belongs to children who are of minor age at the time of filing of the
petition for repatriation.
198. G.R. NO. 180048 JUNE 19, 2009 DE GUZMAN VS COMELEC
FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction
and temporary restraining order assails the June 15, 2007 Resolution of
the First Division of COMELEC, disqualifying ROSELLER DE GUZMAN
from running as vice-mayor in the May 14, 2007 elections.
Petitioner was a naturalized American. However, on January 25, 2006,
he applied for dual citizenship under RA 9225. Upon approval of his
application, he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on September 6, 2006. Having reacquired Philippine
citizenship, he is entitled to exercise full civil and political rights. As

such, qualified to run as vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner is disqualified from running
for vice-mayor of Guimba, Nueva Ecija in the May 14, 2007
elections for having failed to renounce his American
Citizenship in accordance with RA 9225.
HELD:
We find that petitioner is disqualified from running for public office in
view of his failure to renounce his American citizenship. RA 9225 was
enacted to allow reacquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship
for:
1. Natural born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country;
2. Natural born citizens of the Philippines who after the effectivity of
the law, becomes citizens of a foreign country.
The law provides that they are not deemed to have reacquired or
retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance.
Petitioners oath of allegiance and certificate of candidacy did not
comply with section(5)2 of RA 9225 which further requires those
seeking elective public office in the Philippines to make a personal and
sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship. Petitioner failed to renounce
his American citizenship; as such, he is disqualified from running for
vice mayor.
199. Bengson III v.Cruz and HRET
Facts:
Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born
in SanClemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The
fundamental law then applicablewas the 1935 Constitution. On
November 5, 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the United
StatesMarine Corps and, without the consent of the Republic of the
Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a
consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for underCommonwealth
Act No. 63, Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by,
amongothers, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.Cruz was thereafter naturalized as a
US citizen on June 5, 1990 in connection with his service inthe U.S.
Marine Corps.On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
Philippine citizenship throughrepatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.
He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District
of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing
marginof 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was
then running for reelection.Bengson then filed a case for Quo Warranto

Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET claiming thatrespondent Cruz was

not qualified to become a member of the House of Representatives
sincehe is not a natural-born citizen as required under Article VI,
Section 6 of the Constitution.On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its
decision dismissing the petition for quo warrantoand declaring
respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the 2nd District of
Pangasinanin the May 1998 elections. Bengsons MR was likewise
denied.
Issue:
Whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Held:
Yes. There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2)
by naturalization. These ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to
the two kinds of citizens: the natural-borncitizen, and the naturalized
citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. As defined in the same
Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his
Philippinecitizenship."On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those
who have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, generally
under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act
No. 2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant
has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided by law to become a Filipino citizen. The
decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after
two (2) years from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)not left the
Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession;
(3) has not been convicted of any offense or violation of Government
promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest
of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire
the same in the manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63
(C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization,
(2)by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress. Naturalization is a
mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As
a mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended. On the other
hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippinecitizenship is
governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63. Under this law, a former
Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must
possess certain qualifications and none of the disqualifications

mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473. Repatriation, on the other hand,

may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship
due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces; (2) service in the armed
forces of the allied forces in World War II; (3) service in the Armed
Forces of the United States at any other time; (4) marriage of a Filipino
woman to an alien; and (5) political and economic necessity. As
distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation
simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of
the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. As a
rule, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This
means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be
restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the
other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino. The rule applies to Cruzs case. Being a naturalborn citizen, Cruz reacquired this status upon his repatriation.
200. Frivaldo vs Comelec Digest with additional info
G.R. No. 120295. June 28, 1996]
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
and RAUL R. LEE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 123755. June 28, 1996]
RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JUAN G. FRIVALDO, respondents.
On March 20, 1995, private respondent Juan G. Frivaldo filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the office of Governor of Sorsogon in the
May 8, 1995 elections. On March 23, 1995, petitioner Raul R. Lee,
another candidate, filed a petition with the Comelec praying that
Frivaldo "be disqualified from seeking or holding any public office or
position by reason of not yet being a citizen of the Philippines," and
that his Certificate of Candidacy be cancelled. On May 1, 1995, the
Second Division of the Comelec promulgated a Resolution granting the
petition.
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by Frivaldo remained unacted
upon until after the May 8, 1995 elections. So, his candidacy continued
and he was voted for during the elections held on said date. On May
11, 1995, the Comelec en banc affirmed the aforementioned
Resolution of the Second Division.
The Provincial Board of Canvassers completed the canvass of the
election returns and a Certificate of Votes was issued showing the
following votes obtained by the candidates for the position of Governor

of Sorsogon:
Antonio H. Escudero, Jr.
Juan G. Frivaldo
RaulR.Lee
Isagani P. Ocampo

51,060
73,440
53,304
1,925

On June 9, 1995, Lee filed a (supplemental) petition praying for his

proclamation as the duly-elected Governor of Sorsogon.
In an orderdated June 21, 1995, but promulgated according to the
petition "only on June 29, 1995," the Comelec en bane directed "the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Sorsogon to reconvene for the
purpose of proclaiming candidate Raul Lee as the winning
gubernatorial candidate in the province of Sorsogon on June 29,1995 x
x x." Accordingly, at 8:30 in the evening of June 30,1995, Lee was
proclaimed governor of Sorsogon.
Frivaldo filed with the Comelec a new petition praying for the
annulment of the June 30, 1995 proclamation of Lee and for his own
proclamation. He alleged that on June 30, 1995, at 2:00 in the
afternoon, he took his oath of allegiance as a citizen of the Philippines
after "his petition for repatriation under P.D. 725 which he filed with the
Special Committee on Naturalization in September 1994 had been
granted." As such, when "the said order (dated June 21, 1995) (of the
Comelec) x x x was released and received by Frivaldo on June 30, 1995
at 5:30 o'clock in the evening, there was no more legal impediment to
the proclamation (of Frivaldo) as governor x x x." In the alternative, he
averred that pursuant to the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec, the ViceGovernor not Lee should occupy said position of governor.
On December 19, 1995, the Comelec First Division promulgated the
herein assailed Resolution holding that Lee, "not having garnered the
highest number of votes," was not legally entitled to be proclaimed as
duly-elected governor; and that Frivaldo, "having garnered the highest
number of votes, and having reacquired his Filipino citizenship by
repatriation on June 30, 1995 under the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 725 is qualified to hold the office of governor of Sorsogon".
Issues: 1. Is Frivaldo's "judicially declared" disqualification for lack of
Filipino citizenship a continuing bar to his eligibility to run for, be
elected to or hold the governorship of Sorsogon NO!
2. Was the proclamation of Lee, a runner-up in the election,
valid and legal in light of existing jurisprudence? -NO!

Held:
1.)
It should be noted that our first ruling in G.R. No. 87193 disqualifying
Frivaldo was rendered in connection with the 1988 elections while that
in G.R. No. 104654 was in connection with the 1992 elections. That he
was disqualified for such elections is final and can no longer be
changed.
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of
citizenship cannot govern a person's future status with finality.
This is because a person may subsequently reacquire, or for
that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes
recognized by law for the purpose.
"Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or
administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is
generally not considered res judicata, hence it has to be threshed out
again and again, as the occasion demands."
2.) Frivaldo assails the validity of the Lee proclamation. We uphold him
for the following reasons:
First. To paraphrase this Court in Labo vs. COMELEC, "the fact remains
that he (Lee) was not the choice of the sovereign will," and in
Aquino vs. COMELEC, Lee is "a second placer, just that, a second
placer."
"The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. A
minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to
the office."
Second. As we have earlier declared Frivaldo to have seasonably
re-acquired his citizenship and inasmuch as he obtained the
highest number of votes in the 1995 elections, henot Lee
should be proclaimed. Hence, Lee's proclamation was patently
erroneous and should now be corrected.
==========================================
================
CONCLUSION OF THE COURT

In sum, we rule that the citizenship requirement in the Local

Government Code is to be possessed by an elective official at
the latest as of the time he is proclaimed and at the start of
the term of office to which he has been elected. We further hold
P.D. No. 725 to be in full force and effect up to the present, not having
been suspended or repealed expressly nor impliedly at any time, and
Frivaldo's repatriation by virtue thereof to have been properly granted
and thus valid and effective. Moreover, by reason of the remedial or
curative nature of the law granting him a new right to resume his
political status and the legislative intent behind it, as well as his unique
situation of having been forced to give up his citizenship and political
aspiration as his means of escaping a regime he abhorred, his
repatriation is to be given retroactive effect as of the date of his
application therefor, during the pendency of which he was stateless, he
having given ' up his U. S. nationality.
Thus, in contemplation of law, he possessed the vital requirement
of Filipino citizenship as of the start of the term of office of
governor, and should have been proclaimed instead of Lee.
Furthermore, since his reacquisition of citizenship retroacted
to August 17, 1994, his registration as a voter of Sorsogon is
deemed to have been validated as of said date as well. The
foregoing, of course, are precisely consistent with our holding that lack
of the citizenship requirement is not a continuing disability or
disqualification to run for and hold public office. And once again,
we emphasize herein our previous rulings recognizing the Comelec's
authority and jurisdiction to hear and decide petitions for annulment of
proclamations.
This Court has time and again liberally and equitably construed
the electoral laws of our country to give fullest effect to the
manifest will of our people, for in case of doubt, political laws
must be interpreted to give life and spirit to the popular
mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Otherwise
stated, legal niceties and technicalities cannot stand in the
way of the sovereign will. Consistently, we have held:
"x x x (L)aws governing election contests must be liberally construed
to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials
may not be defeated by mere technical objections (citations omitted)."
The law and the courts must accord Frivaldo every possible protection,
defense and refuge, in deference to the popular will. Indeed, this Court
has repeatedly stressed the importance of giving effect to the
sovereign will in order to ensure the survival of our democracy.
In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the
popular electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to
resolve the issues in a manner that would give effect to the

will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause

elective offices to be filled by those who are the choice of the
majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate's
qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal
principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to
the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. In this
undertaking, Lee has miserably failed.
In Frivaldo's case, it would have been technically easy to find fault with
his cause. The Court could have refused to grant retroactivity to
the effects of his repatriation and hold him still ineligible due
to his failure to show his citizenship at the time he registered
as a voter before the 1995 elections. Or, it could have disputed
the factual findings of the Comelec that he was stateless at the
time of repatriation and thus hold his consequent dual
citizenship as a disqualification "from running for any elective
local position." But the real essence of justice does not
emanate from quibblings over patchwork legal technicality. It
proceeds from the spirit's gut consciousness of the dynamic
role of law as a brick in the ultimate development of the social
edifice. Thus, the Court struggled against and eschewed the easy,
legalistic, technical and sometimes harsh anachronisms of the law in
order to evoke substantial justice in the larger social context consistent
with Frivaldo's unique situation approximating venerability in Philippine
political life. Concededly, he sought American citizenship only to
escape the clutches of the dictatorship. At this stage, we
cannot seriously entertain any doubt about his loyalty and
dedication to this country. At the first opportunity, he returned
to this land, and sought to serve his people once more. The
people of Sorsogon overwhelmingly voted for him three times.
He took an oath of allegiance to this Republic every time he
filed his certificate of candidacy and during his failed
naturalization bid. And let it not be overlooked, his demonstrated
tenacity and sheer determination to re-assume his nationality of
birth despite several legal set-backs speak more loudly, in
spirit, in fact and in truth than any legal technicality, of his
consuming intention and burning desire to re-embrace his
native Philippines even now at the ripe old age of 81 years.
Such loyalty to and love of country as well as nobility of purpose
cannot be lost on this Court of justice and equity. Mortals of lesser
mettle would have given up. After all, Frivaldo was assured of a life of
ease and plenty as a citizen of the most powerful country in the world.
But he opted, nay, single-mindedly insisted on returning to and serving

once more his struggling but beloved land of birth. He therefore

deserves every liberal interpretation of the law which can be
applied in his favor. And in the final analysis, over and above
Frivaldo himself, the indomitable people of Sorsogon most
certainly deserve to be governed by a leader of their
overwhelming choice.

201. Loida Nicolas-Lewis, et al. vs. COMELEC | G.R. No. 162759 |

August 4, 2006
Facts: Petitioners, who reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
9225, sought registration and certification as overseas absentee
voters however they were advised by the Philippine Embassy in the
US that as per a COMELEC letter to DFA dated September 23, 2003,
they have no right yet to vote in such elections owing to their lack of
the one-year residence requirement prescribed by Sec. 1, Art. IV of the
Constitution.
When petitioner Nicolas-Lewis clarified on said requirement, the
COMELEC replied its position that the OAVL was not enacted for the
petitioners and that they are considered regular voters who have to
meet the requirements of residency under the Constitution.
Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004
elections because of COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National
Registry of Absentee Voters, petitioners filed on April 1, 2004 a petition
for certiorari and mandamus.
On April 30, 2004 (a little over a week before Election Day), COMELEC
filed a Comment praying for the denial of the petition. Consequently,
petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.
On May 20, 2004, the OSG filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment)
stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who
care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so, observing, however,
that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition
moot and academic.
Issue: Must the Supreme Court still resolve said petition considering
that under the circumstances the same has already been rendered
moot and academic?
Held: The holding of the 2004 elections had indeed rendered the
petition moot and academic, but only insofar as petitioners

participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and

transcendental issue tendered in the petition is the propriety of
allowing dual citizens to participate and vote as absentee voter in
future elections, which however, remains unresolved.
The issues are thus reduced to the question of whether or not
petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as
absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
[Ruling on the main issue: Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law
with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that dual
citizens may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee
voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.
The Court granted the instant petition and held that those who retain
or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 may exercise
the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in R.A. No. 9189,
the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.]

202. AASJS vs Datumanong

Petitioner prays that a writ of prohibition be issued to stop respondent
from implementing Republic Act No. 9225, entitled "An Act Making the
Citizenship of Philippine Citizens Who Acquire Foreign Citizenship
Permanent, Amending for the Purpose Commonwealth Act No. 63, As
Amended, and for Other Purposes." Petitioner avers that Rep. Act No.
9225 is unconstitutional as it violates Section 5, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution that states, "Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
ISSUE: By recognizing & allowing dual allegiance, is RA 9225
unconstitutional?
HELD: No. Section 5, Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a
policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to
enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No.
9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to
their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress was
given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance.Until this is done, it would be
premature for the judicial department, including this Court, to rule on

issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

203. Jacot vs. Dal
Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying
him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman,
Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the
ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US
citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who
became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He
sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No.
9225.
ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to
qualify him to run as a vice-mayor?
HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general
requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine
elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional
requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek elective public
posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one
citizenship.