Family Migration and the Relative Earnings

of Husbands and Wives

Thomas J. Cooke
Department of Geography, University of Connecticut

This article focuses primarily on determining the economic consequences of family migration for husbands
and wives in matched married-couple families, using data from waves 1 and 2 of the National Survey of Families and
Households. The analysis is designed to determine whether or not the return to migration for husbands and wives is
similarly affected by their relative earning potential, as predicted by the human-capital model of migration. The
studys secondary contributions include its estimation of the effect of moving on earnings for both husbands
and wives within matched married-couple families and its avoidance of the problems of self-selection bias and
unobserved variable bias associated with cross-sectional models by using panel-data methods. The results
indicateas predicted by the gender-role model of family migrationthat the effect of family migration on
individual earnings is largely a function of gender: family migration causes an increase in the husbands income and
no change in the wifes income even if a wife has a greater earning potential than her husband. Thus, the study does
not support the human-capital argumentthat family migration decisions are egalitarian and symmetrical, such
that each spouses absolute and relative earning power is given equal weight in the migration decision. This research
makes a strong statement that the gender-role model of family migration is of greater utility for understanding family
migration behavior than the human-capital model of family migration. Key Words: family, gender, migration.

s far back as 1885, Ravenstein (1885, 178) stated

that [T]he major causes of migration are economic. Today, economic mobility is virtually
synonymous with spatial mobility. The ability to move for
economic gain is difficult for the fifty-six million
married couples living in the United States, however, and
even more so for the 53 percent of married couples of whom
both spouses work. For married couples, an economically
motivated move by one spouse likely entails some sort of
sacrifice by the other spouse, even if the other spouse does
not work. While no prior research directly shows how the
gains and losses resulting from moving may be distributed
between husbands and wives (a question this research
addresses), the bulk of empirical evidence suggests that the
gains and losses from family migration largely depend on
gender: family migration nearly always harms the labormarket status of the wife. A few studies also suggest that this
trailing wife effect may occur even when the wife has a
higher socioeconomic status than the husband.
The principal aim of this article is to provide a theoretically grounded and empirically thorough analysis
of the effect of family migration on the economic status
of husbands and wives, with the ultimate objective of
informing the further development of family-migration
theory. On the theoretical side, this research attempts to
strike an even balance between the two competing
explanations for the trailing-wife effect. On the one hand

is the empirically challenged but conceptually dominant

human-capital model of family migration. On the other
hand is the empirically consistent but poorly developed
gender-role model of family migration. Balance between
these two competing explanations is achieved by treating
them as alternative hypotheses within the empirical
section of the research.
On the empirical side, the article makes several
unique and significant contributions. For one thing,
it is the first article to use matched pairs of husbands
and wives to compare the costs and benefits of moving
between husbands and wives. While the human-capital
model of family migration clearly states that the relative
gains and losses from moving must be evaluated for
both husbands and wives, most previous studies have
focused solely on the gains and losses for the wife alone.
By focusing on the gains and losses from moving for
matched pairs of husbands and wives this study clarifies
the source of the wifes sacrifice. Second, this study
moves beyond the mere measurement of the wifes
sacrifice and toward the identification of its source. The
models of the effect of moving on income include variables
reflecting the earning potential of husbands and wives
and their relative economic status. The inclusion of these
variables in the models is unique to this article and
provides a direct test of the two alternative models of
family migration.

Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 93(2), 2003, pp. 338349

r 2003 by Association of American Geographers
Published by Blackwell Publishing, 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, and 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK.

Family Migration and the Relative Earnings of Husbands and Wives

Previous Research
The overwhelming empirical evidence indicates that
family migration has a negative effect on married womens
labor-force participation (Morrison and Lichter 1988;
LeClere and McLaughlin 1997; Cooke and Bailey 1999;
Boyle et al. 2000; Cooke 2001; Clark and Withers 2002a,
2002b), employment (Long 1974; Lichter 1980; Spitze
1984; Morrison and Lichter 1988; Shihadeh 1991; Rives
and West 1992; Shumway and Cooke 1998; Lee and
Roseman 1999; Cooke 2001), weeks worked (Sandell 1977;
Spitze 1984), hours worked (LeClere and McLaughlin
1997; Cooke and Bailey 1999), income (Sandell 1977;
Lichter 1983; Spitze 1984; Maxwell 1986; Jacobsen
and Levin 1997; LeClere and McLaughlin 1997; Clark
and Withers 2002a, 2002b), and attitudes toward work
(Spitze 1984). The human-capital model of family
migration remains the only well-formed theoretical
explanation for these observations. Developed independently by both Sandell (1977) and Mincer (1978),
this model is an extension of human capital theory
(Sjaastad 1962):
[C]ouples pool information on their joint utilities and weigh
both in the final decision. However, since total family utility is
assumed to be measured best by total monetary income, the
spouse who can contribute the most to this total may have
his/her prospects weighed most heavily in the decision.
Given the sex gap in earnings, Mincers analysis suggests that
dual-earner couples will move less than single-earner ones,
and that men in such couples will more often be tied stayers
while women will more often be tied movers. (Spitze
1984, 22)

A key element of the human-capital model of family

migration is the concept of the tied mover and the tied
stayer. A tied mover is a family migrant who, if single,
would not have chosen to migrate, while a tied stayer is a
family nonmigrant who, if single, would have chosen to
migrate. The human-capital model of family migration
concludes that women are more likely to be tied movers
and that men are more likely to be tied stayers, based on
the assumption that actual and potential earning power is
greater for men than for women. The implicit argument
is that wives will more often be tied movers because their
loss of earnings, and that the cost of migration will not be
enough to offset the gain in earnings associated with their
husbands career-oriented moves. Likewise, husbands will
more often be tied movers, because the potential gains in
earnings associated with their career-oriented moves will
not offset their wives losses in earnings and the costs of
moving. It is extremely important to emphasize, however,
that the human-capital model argues that when wives

339

have a higher actual and potential earning power than

husbands, wives are more likely to be tied stayers and
husbands are more likely to be tied movers. Thus, the
human-capital model argues, family migration decisions
are entirely egalitarian, completely symmetrical, and
based on the relative earning potentials of spouses.
The alternative explanation for family migration
remains only superficially developed. The gender-role
model of family migration takes issue with the way in
which the human-capital model of family migration places
the factors that determine the relative earning potentials
of husbands and wives outside the migration decisionmaking process (Halfacree 1995). The gender-role model
focuses on how gender roles and gender identities are the
basis upon which family migration decisions are made, and
that family migration decision making is asymmetrical,
not egalitarian (Bielby and Bielby 1992). While there is
ample evidence that much of the trailing-wife phenomenon is due to womens acquiescence to male decisionmaking power, there is more to this perspective than just
an assumption that [W]omen are often socialized to
place family first and personal goals second when it comes
to critical household matters (Shihadeh 1991, 443). For
example, Hanson and Pratt (1995) discuss how genderbased labor market segmentation sets the stage for the
female role as the trailing wife. Many women enter into
such careers as nursing and primary education in
anticipation of their future gender roles as mothers who
need flexible work hours and as trailing wives who need to
have a job that is in demand in any locality. The genderrole perspective does not deny that the trailing-wife
phenomenon has an economic dimension, but it emphasizes that wives are tied movers because family migration is
embedded within the system of male domination of family
decision making, womens acquiescence to male decision
making, and gender-based labor-market segmentation
(Halfacree 1995).
The empirical evidence points toward the salience of
the gender-role model. Bielby and Bielby (1992) use data
from a 1977 employment survey to estimate models of
reluctance to move because of family considerations. They
find that even if a wife has a high-paying job, a husband
with traditional gender-role beliefs (75 percent of men in
the sample) will not be dissuaded from moving for family
considerations if the move promises a much better job.
In contrast, wives with both traditional and nontraditional
gender-role beliefs will forgo the same opportunity to
move for a much better job, especially if their husbands
have high-paying jobs. Therefore, wives are unwilling to
consider a move to improve their own career prospects if it
means uprooting their families and requiring that their
husbands find new jobs, but husbands are willing to uproot

340

Cooke

their families and require that their wives find new jobs if it
means that their own career prospects will improve.
Not only are husbands apparently less concerned with
the impact of a career-induced move on the economic
and even noneconomic well-being of their families, but
gender-based identities are likely to impel wives to
acquiesce to their husbands migration desires. McCollums
(1990) two-year longitudinal analysis of a group of fortytwo recent migrants to the anonymous city of Northland in New England uncovers the powerful and subtle
role of gender identity in shaping family migration
behavior. She (1990, 251) concludes:
Among all the coupled women in my population, 60 percent
believed that they had exercised some choice or full choice in
the decision to move. Yet in many cases that choice was
illusory, based on conscious or unconscious disregard of
the movers own needs and disregard of characteristics
of Northland that would prove highly significant in terms of
the movers well-being.

Wallston, Foster, and Berger (1978) demonstrate the

difference between stated expectations of egalitarianism
in migration decision making and revealed behavior.
Wallston and colleagues (1978) surveyed dual-career
couples who were nearing the completion of their Ph.D.s
in the early 1970s. Their analysis of responses to hypothetical migration scenarios found that husbands and
wives preferred to find migration destinations that could
accommodate both careers, and that husbands and wives
were equally willing to be the trailing spouse. Yet, when
the migration histories of these same couples were
reviewed several years later, the wives were much more
likely to have become trailing spouses.
Most effective at demonstrating the salience of the
gender-role model are the few studies that show that wives
sacrifice their own careers in order to support their
husbands careers by following them as tied migrants,
largely independent of their own relative economic power,
socioeconomic status, or education level (in addition to
those discussed below, see Duncan and Perrucci 1976;
Spitze 1986; Shihadeh 1991). These results indicate that
tied migration is not nearly as economically rational as the
human-capital model would suggest. Lichter (1982) first
estimated models of the likelihood of migrating using a
sample of National Longitudinal Surveys data from 1967
to 1972. In models that include the demographic and
human capital characteristics of husbands and wives, the
wives characteristics are less important than the husbands characteristics in predicting family migration.
Lichter (1983) then estimated models of changes in
wives earnings using similar data and found that, in the
short run, family migration reduces all wives earnings,

regardless of their absolute and relative education and

occupation status. More recent research by Boyle
and colleagues (2000) supports Lichters (1982, 1983)
conclusion that family migration decision making is biased
toward husbands human-capital characteristics. Using
matched variables for the Sample of Anonymised Records
of the 1991 British census and the Public Use Microdata Sample of the 1990 U.S. census, cross-sectional
models of the effect of family migration on the employment of married women demonstrate that employment
consequences of family migration are not associated
with spouses relative socioeconomic status. Even those
couples where women are more occupationally powerful
than their male partner do not appear to migrate to follow
the females career (Boyle et al. 2000, 149).
One of the most obvious ways in which to uncover the
relative merits of the human-capital and gender-role
models is to examine the effect of variables reflecting
gender-based familial roles on the consequence of migration. While a few studies have indirectly addressed this
issue (Maxwell 1986; Yu et al. 1993; Bailey and Cooke
1998; Smits 1999), recent research by Cooke (2001) is
the first to directly take this approach. Specifically, Cooke
(2001) examined how the interaction between migration
and the birth of a first child affects the labor-market
participation and employment of married women. Using
random effects probit models and data from recent
samples of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Cooke
(2001) found that the consequences of family migration
for married womens labor-market participation are contingent upon parental status. For nonmothers, migration
has only a small, short-lived impact on employment, with
no impact on labor-force participation. In contrast,
mothers of young children experience a sizable long-term
decline in both labor-force participation and employment
following family migration. This is interpreted as strong
evidence that gender roles (e.g., motherhood) are of
primary importance in shaping family migration behavior.

Directions for New Research

While the empirical evidence points toward the
validity of the gender-role model at the expense of
the human-capital model, a definitive statement has yet to
emerge from the literature, because of the limitations of
previous research. The most important limitation in the
literature is that most research on the consequences of
family migration is conducted on the individual level
rather than the family level (important exceptions include
Sandell 1977; Jacobson and Levin 1997, 2000; Clark
and Withers 2002a, 2002b), despite the fact that the

Family Migration and the Relative Earnings of Husbands and Wives

human-capital model of family migration explicitly places
the wifes sacrifice within the context of net family gain.
This is a significant issue. If, for example, families gain
economically but wives lose economically, then wives
sacrifices may be perceived as rational economic decisions.
In contrast, if the net gains to families are negative and yet
husbands gain economically, this lends greater credence
to arguments that family migration decision making is
determined more by gender roles than by economic
rationality. The difficulty of determining how spousal gains
and losses may offset each other is made more problematic
by the fact that most studies focus on just married women,
and those that estimate models for both men and women
rarely use matched samples of husbands and wives (see
Boyle et al. 1999 for a discussion).
Two studies by Jacobson and Levin (1997, 2000) are
important exceptions. Using data from the Survey of
Income and Program Participation, these authors examined matched pairs of husbands and wives to examine how
family earnings change as a function of migration status.
They found that family earnings actually decline with
migration, that the decline in earnings is largely due to the
decline in wives earnings, and that while there is a
negative correlation between change in husbands earnings and wives earnings, husbands gains do not offset
wives losses. Jacobson and Levin also found that even
though family migration may not initially increase family
earnings, this may be due to a large variation in
postmigration earnings, signaling that family migration
may be more speculative than usually assumed.
Jacobson and Levins (1997, 2000) research makes a
good starting point from which to evaluate the state of
family migration research. First, unlike most previous
studies, Jacobson and Levin (1997, 2000) are to be
credited with focusing only on matched married couples
(see also Boyle et al. 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002), rather than
on a sample just of married women or of randomly selected
married men and women. Since the human-capital model
of family migration emphasizes the relative earnings of
husbands and wives within families, empirical studies
must focus on the relative gains and losses within
individual families. Second, Jacobson and Levin (1997,
2000) are to be credited with using panel-data methods.
Cooke (2001) discusses at length the ability of panel-data
methods to avoid the problems of sample selection bias
that are likely to plague cross-sectional analyses of family
migration. However, one limitation of previous studies
that Jacobson and Levin (1997, 2000) fail to address is that
they exclude couples if either spouse does not report
earnings. While consistent with accepted methods in
labor-market economics, this eliminates couples that
would experience the largest potential gains and losses

341

from moving and may be a source of bias. In addition, few

studies attempt to reconcile their analyses to both the
human-capital and the gender-role models of family
migration. Indeed, Bielby and Bielby (1992) lament that
this may be the most significant limitation of the family
migration literature.
This article aims to address these empirical limitations in order to move toward a reconciliation of the
human capital and the gender-role models of family
migration. While it focuses primarily on a definitive
empirical statement of the relative effects of moving on
the income of husbands and wives, it aims to point the way
toward the development of a theory of family migration
that is empirically grounded. That said, the immediate
task is to determine the economic consequences of
family migration for husbands and wives in matched
married-couple families. The analysis is designed to
determine whether or not the return to migration for
husbands and wives is similarly affected by their relative
earning potential, as predicted by the human-capital
model of migration. Hence, the study is designed as a test
of the two alternative hypotheses. The human-capital
model of migration predicts that the effect of migration on
individual earnings increases as an individuals relative
earning potential increases, without regard to gender.
That is, it argues that family migration decisions are
entirely egalitarian and completely symmetrical. In contrast, the gender-role model of family migration predicts
that the effect of migration on individual earnings
responds only to the relative earning potential of the
husband. The studys secondary contributions include its
estimation of the effect of moving on earnings for both
husbands and wives within matched married-couple
families and its avoidance of the problems of self-selection
bias and unobserved variable bias associated with crosssectional models by using panel-data methods.

Research Design and Methods

The data for the analysis are drawn from the National
Survey of Families and Households (NSFH) (Sweet and
Bumpass 1988, 1996). The NSFH comprises a nationally
representative two-wave panel study of 13,007 respondents in 19871988 (wave 1) and a follow-up interview of
10,007 surviving respondents in 19921994 (wave 2).
The NSFH is uniquely valuable for the study of family
migration in general and for this analysis in particular.
First, its panel-data structure allows for the use of paneldata methods. Second, it provides data for both spouses,
which allows the relative effects of family migration to be
determined. Third, special tabulations of the NSFH report

342

Cooke

whether respondents counties of residence in waves 1 and

2 are the same. While certainly not an ideal measure of
migration behavior, this is an acceptable proxy. Fourth,
in addition to a wealth of economic and demographic
data for each spouse, the NSFH also provides a wealth of
information on such issues as health, marital satisfaction,
daily roles, and personal beliefs, which will be used in
subsequent research.
The sample for the study consists of married-couple
families in which both spouses meet the following criteria:
 Continually married since wave 1
 No missing data for the selected variables
 No change in educational achievement between

wave 1 and wave 21

 Not in the Armed Forces in either wave 1 or wave 2
 No government transfers or retirement income
receipts in either wave 1 or wave 2
Table 1 documents how these selection criteria reduce the
sample to 1,498 couples, who make up a sample of stable,
economically active, married couples in the civilian
economy.
The key variables in the analysis are wave 1 and wave
2 yearly incomes, which have been deflated by their
respective annual regional Consumer Price Index for All
Urban Consumers (CPI-U) to 1982 dollars.2 Note that the
sample includes individuals who have reported incomes of
zero in wave 1 and/or wave 2.3 The primary empirical approach of this study is to estimate lagged-variable models
of wave 2 income4 as a function of initial conditions
in wave 1 (wave 1 income5 and share of wave 1 family
income), factors that changed between wave 1 and wave
2 (parental status variables and migration), and the interaction of migrant status with both the initial conditions and
the changed conditions. As a type of first-difference
model, lagged-variable models provide a more effective
method for controlling for self-selection bias and unobserved variable bias than do traditional cross-sectional
models (Hsiao 1986; Menard 1991).
Figure 1 presents the modeling approach, graphically
but without the effect of estimating covariates. Each bar
represents the mean of the change in earnings between
wave 1 and wave 2 for three groups. The first three bars
represent the change in income for women, the second
three bars represent the change in income for men, and
the last three bars represent the change in income for the
entire family. Within each group of three, the first bar
represents the change in income for nonmigrants, and the
second bar is the change in income for migrants. The third
bar represents the difference in the first two bars. Hence,
the third bar reflects the effect of moving on the income of
each group. Figure 1, therefore, indicates that the effect

Table 1. Descriptive Statistics

Variable
Wave 1 income (total wage and
salary income in 1982 dollars)
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants

Husband

Wife

$29,230
$24,115
$30,055

$11,605
$9,158
$11,999

73%
72%
73%

27%
28%
27%

$29,693
$29,034
$29,799

$11,717
$8,506
$12,234

Wave 2 age
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants

42
39
43

40
37
40

New parent? (first child born

between wave 1 and wave 2)
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants

10.81%
19.23%
9.00%

Share of wave 1 family income

(percent of total family income
earned by the individual)
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants
Wave 2 income (total wage and
salary income in 1982 dollars)
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants

New empty nest? (children at home

in wave 1, no children at home
in wave 2)
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants

7.41%
5.28%
8.00%

Months between interviews (number

of months between wave 1 and
wave 2 interviews)
 Migrants
 Nonmigrants

69
71
69

Migrant? ( 5 1 if wave 1 county

of residence is not the same as
wave 2 county of residence;
otherwise 5 0)

13.89%

Sample size

Figure 1. Change in income.

1,498

Family Migration and the Relative Earnings of Husbands and Wives

of moving for women is nearly zero, but the effect of
moving for men is quite large. Figure 1 seems to suggest
that the trailing-wife effect occurs not so much because
women experience a loss from moving but because they
experience no gain from movingin direct contrast with
their husbands, who experience a sizeable gain from
moving. The wifes loss, however, is more than compensated for by the large gain in total family income.
The relative merits of the human-capital model of
family migration and the gender-role model of family
migration are evaluated with respect to the parameter
estimates associated with migrant status and the interaction of migrant status with both wave 1 income and
share of wave 1 family income. These three parameters
(Migrant?, Migrant? * Wave 1 Income, and Migrant? *
Share of Wave 1 Family Income) allow for the estimation of:
(1) the effect of both staying and moving on wave 2
income; (2) how the effect of staying and moving on
wave 2 income co-varies with both earning potential (as
measured by wave 1 income) and share of family income;
(3) the total effect of moving on wave 2 income; (4) how
these effects differ between men and women; and (5) the
effect of moving on total family income.

Results
Table 2 reports the results for the model of the wifes
wave 2 income. The adjusted r-square of 0.14 and the
highly significant f-value indicate that the model provides
a meaningful description of the wifes wave 2 income. At
first glance, only five of the parameter estimates are
statistically significant. The wifes wave 2 income increases with her wave 1 income and with her share of wave
1 family income. Becoming a parent for the first time is
associated with a drop in wave 2 income. With respect to
the migration variables, only two are statistically signifi-

343

cant. Migrating between wave 1 and wave 2 is associated

with a drop in income. The interaction of migrant status
and share of wave 1 family income is negative, indicating
that migrants have a less positive relationship between
share of wave 1 family income and wave 2 income. Directly
interpreting these particular parameters with respect to
the research questions is not advisable, however, as
interpreting models with a large number of interaction
effects is quite complicated. Discussion of the interaction
effects will be taken up below following a similarly brief
discussion of the model of the husbands wave 2 income.
Table 3 reports the results for the model of the
husbands wave 2 income. The adjusted r-square of 0.23
and the highly significant f-value indicate that, similar to
the previous model, this model provides a meaningful
description of the husbands wave 2 income. In addition to
the significance of the parameters associated with the
husbands wave 1 income and his share of wave 1 family
income, two of the variables associated with migration are
statistically significant. The parameter estimate associated
with the interaction of migration and a husbands wave 1
income is positive and significant, indicating that the
effect of a husbands wave 1 income on his wave 2 income
is greater for migrants than nonmigrants. In contrast, the
parameter estimate associated with the interaction of
migration and a husbands share of wave 1 family income is
negative and significant, indicating that the effect of
a husbands share of wave 1 family income on wave 2
income is less for migrants than nonmigrants.

Effect of Share of Wave 1 Income

The structure of the models allows for the identification
of how the effects of migrationand of not migrating
vary by wave 1 income and share of wave 1 family income
for both husbands and wives. Table 4 presents the

Table 2. Model of Wifes Wave 2 Income

Variable
Intercept
Wave 1 income
Share of wave 1 family income
New parent?
New empty nest?
Migrant?
Migrant? * Wave 1 income
Migrant? * Share of wave 1 family income
Migrant? * New parent?
Migrant? * New empty nest?
Adjusted r-square
f value
Pr4F

Parameter Estimate
7,155.09
0.01
18,293.00
2,306.43
828.56
2,631.65
0.17
9,545.17
1,161.02
301.92
0.14
27.11
0.00

Standard Error
496.00
0.01
1,447.34
1,105.62
1,188.57
1,335.63
0.10
4,442.06
2,405.29
3,783.56

t-value
14.42
1.87
12.64
2.09
0.70
1.97
1.62
2.15
0.48
0.08

a
0.00
0.06
0.00
0.04
0.49
0.05
0.11
0.03
0.63
0.94

344

Cooke
Table 3. Model of Husbands Wave 2 Income

Variable
Intercept
Wave 1 income
Share of wave 1 family income
New parent?
New empty nest?
Migrant?
Migrant? * Wave 1 income
Migrant? * Share of wave 1 family income
Migrant? * New parent?
Migrant? * New empty nest?
Adjusted r-square
f value
Pr4F

Parameter Estimate

Standard Error

13,018.00
0.32
9,107.84
2,997.78
3,009.00
1,143.73
0.48
16,029.00
1,149.83
1,054.46
0.23
49.86
0.00

parameters and associated statistical tests for specific

subgroups, as calculated from the two previous models.6
The estimates of the first row indicate the relationship
(i.e., the parameter, or slope) between share of wave 1
family income and wave 2 income for migrants. Thus, the
parameter for the effect of share of wave 1 family income
on wave 2 income for female migrants is 8,748. This
parameter is statistically significant, indicating that among
female migrants, wave 2 income increases with share of
wave 1 family income. This result is consistent with the
human-capital model of family migration, in that it is
expected that the primary wage-earner will initiate
migration and will only migrate if there is an expected
positive return to the investment. Similarly, the parameter

2,060.80
0.02
2,735.31
2,145.66
2,317.54
5,797.68
0.11
7,942.69
4,615.55
7,572.59

t-value

6.32
17.31
3.33
1.40
1.30
0.20
4.60
2.02
0.25
0.14

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.16
0.19
0.84
0.00
0.04
0.80
0.89

indicates that the effect of moving is much less among

female secondary wage-earners than for female primary
wage-earners. This, too, is consistent with the humancapital model of migration, in that it is expected that the
secondary wage-earner will be the trailing spouse and may
be required to search for employment in the destination as
a speculative migrant.
The corresponding parameter for the effect of share of
wave 1 family income on wave 2 income for male migrants
is statistically insignificant. This is an important contradiction to both the human-capital andperhaps
more importantlythe gender-role models of migration. The
human-capital model posits that this parameter should
be positive and that the male and female parameters

Table 4. Tests of Human-Capital Hypotheses

Human-Capital Hypothesis
The effect of moving on wave 2 income
increases with share of wave 1 family
income
The effect of staying on wave 2 income
increases with share of wave 1 family
income
The effect among migrants is greater
than the effect among nonmigrants
The effect of moving on wave 2 income
increases with wave 1 income

The effect of staying on wave 2 income

increases with wave 1 income
The effect among migrants is greater
than the effect among nonmigrants
* 0.05 o a o 0.10
** 0.01 o a o 0.05
*** ao 0.01

Parameterization
Wifes/husbands share plus
migration * wifes/husbands
share
Wifes/husbands share

Migration * wifes/husbands
share
Wifes/husbands wave 1
income plus
migration * wifes/husbands
wave 1 income
Wifes/husbands wave 1
income
Migration * wifes/husbands
wave 1 income

Wives
8,748**

18,293***

9,545**

Husbands
6,921

9,108***

16,029**

Difference in Effects between

Husbands and Wives
15,669*

9,186***

6,483

0.19

0.8083***

0.62***

0.02*

0.3209***

0.30***

0.17

0.4874***

0.32*

Family Migration and the Relative Earnings of Husbands and Wives

should be equal, indicating some degree of gender-neutral
symmetry in migration decision making. Indeed, the last
column indicates that the positive and significant female
parameter is statistically and positively greater than
the insignificant male parameter. This result apparently
indicates that while family migration is economically
rational with respect to whether or not the wife is a primary
or secondary wage-earner, families do not take into
account whether or not the husband is a primary or
secondary wage-earner when making migration decisions.
On the face of it, this can be interpreted as evidence that
the wifes relative earning capacity is considered in family
migration decision making, but another interpretation is
that migration benefits the husband without regard to
whether or not the husband or the wife is the primary
wage-earner. This possibility is addressed below.
The second row of Table 4 presents the effect of the
share of wave 1 family income on wave 2 income among
nonmigrants. Again, the human-capital expectations
are that these parameters are positive, which would indicate that the primary wage-earner dominates the migration
decision and will choose not to migrate if the expected
return to not migrating is positive. The human-capital
model also proposes that these parameters will be the same
for husbands and wives, reflecting the assumed genderneutrality of family migration decision making. These
results are similar to the results for migrants discussed
above. For nonmigrant women, the effect of share of
wave 1 income on wave 2 income is positive and statistically significant. While the same effect for nonmigrant
men is also positive and statistically significant, the wifes
parameter is statistically larger than the husbands
parameter. Again, at first glance, this can be interpreted
as evidence that the wifes relative earning capacity is
taken into consideration when the family makes migration
decisions.
The third row of Table 4 presents the differences in the
parameters relating share of wave 1 family income to wave
2 family income between migrants and nonmigrants. This
is interpreted as the effect of migrating, since, for example,
at any given level of share of wave 1 family income, the
difference in the parameter estimates between migrants
and nonmigrants provides an estimate of the difference in
wave 2 income between migrants and nonmigrants for
otherwise similar individuals. Thus, the estimated effect
of migration on the relationship between share of wave
1 income and wave 2 income is negative for women. In
other words, as a function of share of wave 1 income, a
nonmigrant female is going to have a higher wave 2
income than a migrant female. This is true for husbands as
well. These results contradict the human-capital model
of family migration, which posits that migration is an

345

investment that an individual makes in order to improve

his or her well-being over the course of his or her lifetime.
The decision to stay, as well as the decision to move, is
considered to be a logical consequence of the migration
decision-making process. But since staying incurs fewer
costs than moving, the economic return of staying does
not have to be as high as the economic return of moving
in order to induce people to migrate. Therefore, it is
hypothesized that the effect of moving on income will be
greater than the effect of staying, and that this effect will
be the same between men and women. However, the
effect of moving as a function of share of wave 1 income is
found to be negative for both men and women, suggesting
that, as a function of share of family income, both male and
female primary wage-earners do worse by moving.

Wave 1 Income
The second half of Table 4 presents the results for the
interaction of wave 1 income and migration on wave 2
income. Row 4 of Table 4 presents the predicted effects of
wave 1 income on wave 2 income for migrants. For
women, the parameter estimate is statistically equal to
zero, while for men the parameter is near unity and
statistically significant. As expected, the difference between men and women for the effect of wave 1 income on
wave 2 income for migrants is statistically significant,
indicating that the husbands parameter is statistically
different from the wifes parameter. These results contradict the human-capital model of family migration, which
proposes that family migration is economically rational
and gender-neutral, such that a family will not move if it
means harming the earning potential of a high-income
family member. Yet these results demonstrate that among
migrants, wave 2 income is not correlated with the
previous income of the wife, but that it is highly correlated
with the previous income of the husband. Therefore,
families are apparently considering the effect of moving on
the income of high-income husbands, but do not pay the
same consideration to the effect of moving on the income
of high-income wives.
Row 5 of Table 4 presents the predicted effects of wave 1
income on wave 2 income for nonmigrants. For women,
the parameter estimate is nearly zero, but it is marginally
significant, while the parameter estimate for men is
statistically larger than the parameter estimate for women.
The parameter estimate for the predicted effect of wave 1
income on wave 2 income for male nonmigrants is likewise
positively greater than zero. The interpretation of these
results is exactly the same as the interpretation of the
results for migrants: families apparently consider the effect
of not moving on the income of high-income husbands,

346

Cooke
Table 5. Effect of Moving on Wifes Wave 2 Incomea
Wave 1 Family Income

Wifes Share of Wave 1 Family Income

$15,000

0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
a

$2,632
$4,395
$6,159
$7,923
$9,686

$45,000
$2,632
$3,150
$3,668
$4,187
$4,705

$75,000
$2,632
$1,905
$1,178
$451
$276

$105,000
$2,632
$659
$1,313
$3,285
$5,257

None of the estimates are statistically different from zero.

but do not pay the same consideration to the effect of not

moving on the income of high-income wives.
The final row of Table 4 shows the results that most
clearly contradict the human-capital model of family
migration. This row shows the difference between
migrants and nonmigrants in the effect of wave 1 income
on wave 2 income. The human-capital model of family
migration predicts that the effect of moving will be greater
than the effect of staying, and that these results will be the
same for men and women. As expected, the effect of
moving for women is statistically zero, but for men it is
statistically positive. The difference in these effects
between men and women is marginally significant. Thus,
the effect of wave 1 income on wave 2 income is
statistically greater for male migrants than for male
nonmigrants, but the same difference is statistically
insignificant for female migrants and nonmigrants. In
other words, families appear to make migration decisions
in such a way that they maximize only the husbands
income.

Predicted Effects of Moving

The results presented in Table 4 offer little in support of
the human-capital model of family migration: The effect
of moving on wave 2 income as a function of either share of
wave 1 income or wave 1 income is not equal between men
and women. Yet these results also seem to contradict the

gender-role model of family migration, because even

though migration as a function of wave 1 income results
in an increase in the husbands income, migration as a
function of share of wave 1 income results in an increase in
the wifes income. The following analysis demonstrates
that the gender-role model is not actually contradicted by
these results, as the effects of share of wave 1 income on
the wifes income are overwhelmed by the effects of wave 1
income.
This final analysis presents the combined effects of
migration as a function of share of wave 1 income and
wave 1 income. Based upon the parameters presented in
Table 4, Tables 5, 6, and 7 present the effect of migrating on
wave 2 income as a function of relative and absolute
earning potential for wives, husbands, and the family,
respectively. Table 5 shows that, statistically speaking,
women experience no gain to moving, even if they are the
primary wage-earner and/or they have a high earning
potential. The calculated effects of moving are based upon
the parameter estimates presented in Table 4, which
clearly shows why the effects of moving are so small and
statistically insignificant. While the parameter estimates
for the effects of share of wave 1 family income are large
and statistically significant for women, the potential
influence of these parameters is limited, because the
variable itself can only range from 0 percent of family
income to 100 percent of family income. On top of the fact
that the share of family income variable has a limited

Table 6. Effect of Moving on Husbands Wave 2 Income

Wave 1 Family Income
Husbands Share of Wave 1 Family Income
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%
* 0.05 o a o 0.10
** 0.01 o a o 0.05
*** a o 0.01

$15,000
$1,144
$1,049
$3,242
$5,436
$7,629

$45,000

$75,000

$105,000

$1,144
$2,579
$4,014**
$5,449***
$6,884***

$1,144
$6,207**
$11,270***
$16,333***
$21,396***

$1,144
$9,835***
$18,526***
$27,217***
$35,908***

Family Migration and the Relative Earnings of Husbands and Wives

347

Table 7. Effect of Moving on Wave 2 Family Income

Share of Family Income
Husbands Share
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%

Wave 1 Family Income

Wifes Share
0%
25%
50%
75%
100%

$15,000
$10,260
$9,831
$9,401
$8,972
$8,543

$45,000
$4,252*
$2,299
$354
$1,608
$3,561

$75,000

$105,000

$18,764***
$14,428***
$10,092**
$5,756
$1,420

$33,277***
$26,558***
$19,838***
$13,119
$6,400

* 0.05 o a o 0.10
** 0.01 o a o 0.05
*** a o 0.01

mathematical influence on the total estimated effect of

migrating, the fact that the parameter estimate is negative
(indicating that migration has a negative effect for any
given level of share of wave 1 family income) is countered
by the positive parameter for the effect of wave 1 income.
Thus, while the wave 1 income parameters for women
indicate that wave 1 income has a positive effect on wave 2
income for migrants, the two variables cancel each other
out. These results are consistent with Figure 1, which
shows that, on average, family migration has no effect on
female income.
Table 6 presents the estimated effect of moving on
the wave 2 income of husbands as a function of share of
wave 1 family income and wave 1 income. The results
are dramatically different from those for wives wave
2 income. For middle- and high-income families,
migration has a positive and statistically significant
effect on the incomes of husbands. This is true even
for husbands who earn only 25 percent of family income.
For men in low-income families and/or for men who
have no income in wave 1, migration has no effect on wave
2 income. In contrast, even for men who are not the
primary wage-earners in middle- or high-income families,
migration is associated with a large increase in wave 2
income.
Table 7 summarizes these results, combining the effects
of Tables 5 and 6. Statistically speaking, family migration
is never associated with a decline in family migration;
hence, family migration is economically rational. Yet the
gains to moving are concentrated only among families
where the wife is not the primary wage-earner or the family
has at least a middle-class income. This last table quite
clearly demonstrates that while migration is generally
associated with economic improvement at the family level
(or, at least, is not associated with economic decline),
family migration decisions are not egalitarian, completely
symmetrical, and based on the relative earning potentials
of spouses. Indeed, the effect of migration
on family income appears to be affected primarily by

whether it is the husband or the wife that is the primary

wage-earner.

Conclusions
The family migration literature remains preoccupied
with the human-capital model of family migration, despite
the fact that a growing body of empirical evidence
contradicts its basic hypotheses. The empirical results of
this analysis add to the body of evidence critical of the
human-capital model of family migration:
 Family migration increases family income only

among high-income families where the wife is not

the primary wage-earner.
 All of the positive benefits to moving among these
families are associated with an increase in the
husbands income.
 The effect of moving among all women is numerically
small and statistically equivalent to zero.
As predicted by the gender-role model of family migration,
the results indicate that the effect of family migration on
individual earnings is largely a function of gender. Thus,
the human-capital argument that family migration decisions are egalitarian and symmetrical, such that each
spouses absolute and relative earning power are given
equal weight in the migration decision, is not supported.
This research provides a strong statement that the
gender-role model of family migration is of greater utility
for understanding family migration behavior than is the
human-capital model of family migration. Yet, simplistic
statements such as [W]omen are often socialized to place
family first and personal goals second when it comes to
critical household matters (Shihadeh 1991, 443) are of
little explanatory power. Family migration research must
move beyond its preoccupation with testing the validity
of the human-capital model of family migration. The
development of a succinct theory of family migration,
based upon the recognition that gender relations and

348

Cooke

labor-market segmentation are central to family migration

but acknowledging that the economic imperative to family
migration is not to be discounted, will be of value to
more than just the family migration literature. There is
a growing awareness among population geographers
that family migration is a large component of all migration behavior. Thus, the development of an empirically
grounded model of family migration will have the
additional benefit of improving the state of migration
theory in general, and will perhaps help to bring population geography, which has been roundly criticized
for having ignored the theoretical development of geography for the last twenty-five years, into contemporary
geographic thought.

Notes
1. While this effectively eliminates individuals whose general
human capital changed between wave 1 and wave 2 the
possibility still exists that individuals may have differential
changes in the acquisition of specific human capital that are
not captured by the time change between wave 1 and wave 2.
2. See Clark and Withers (2002b) for a discussion of issues
concerning the use of the CPI-U and some alternative
approaches.
3. Even if a married-couple individual is unemployed or out of the
labor force, the individual will be included in the analysis, with
yearly income set to zero. While this may not be the traditional
way of viewing labor-market activity, the focus here is on
changes in earnings between wave 1 and wave 2 as a function
of family migration behavior. Excluding individuals with no
earnings in either the origin or the destination would exclude
those individuals who may have the greatest losses and gains to
family migration and would bias the results.
4. See Cooke (2001) for a discussion of the relative merits of
panel data versus cross-sectional data models in migration
studies.
5. Importantly, wave 1 family income is considered to be a proxy
for both general and specific human capital and, as such, is
assumed to reflect earning potential.
6. In the case of the estimates of differences between the
parameters for husbands and wives, a model that pooled both
groups together was estimated. Statistically, this joint model is
identical to the separate models (Gujarati 1995), but it is not
presented for ease of discussion. The author will provide the
results upon request.

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Correspondence: Department of Geography, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT 06269-4148, e-mail: tcooke@uconn.edu.