CASES DIGEST PRELIMS. LLB 2C. CIVIL PROCEDURE.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STUDENT

DIGEST

1) Pinausukan Seafood House Vs. Far East Bank & Trust Company, 1

CASTRO

2) Alonzo Gipa V Southern Luzon Institute, 3

SIBONGA

3) A.L. Ang Network, Inc. Vs. Emma Mondejar, 4

CUEVA

4) Rodolfo Laborte V Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers Cooperative, 5

MARAON

5) Office Of The Court Administrator Vs. Sarah P. Ampong, 7

PENIANO

6) National Housing Authority v CA,

MOMBAY

7) Bonifacio Piedad V Sps Gurieza,

TAEDO

8) Saint Louis University, Inc., V Olairez, 8

BERMUDO

9) Bignay Ex-Im Phils V Unionbank, 10

TABERNILLA

10) Emilio Gonzales Iii Vs Office Of The President Of The Philippines, 11

DORONILLA

11) Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. Vs. Bpi/Ms Insurance Corp, 12

TOLEDO

12) LZK Holdings And Development Corp Vs. Planters Development Bank, 13

DEFENSOR

13) Spouses Edmundo Dela Cruz Vs. Spouses Rufino R. Capco,

____________

14) Inocencia Tagalog Vs. Maria Lim Vda. De Gonzalez, 14

GO

15) Esperanza Tumpag Vs Samuel Tumpag,

LAURON

N/A

16) Tung Ho Steel Enterprises Corp Vs. Ting Guan Trading Corp,

PASQUIN

N/A

17) Roberto R. David Vs. Eduardo C. David, 16

SALE

18) Ralph Tua vs Hon. Cesar Mangrobang , 17

BERMEJO

19) DBP vs Guaria Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation, 18

COLMENARES

20) Rivelisa Realty Inc vs Ramon Pangilinan, 19

GARCIA

N/A

N/A

constituted professional misconduct amounting to EXTRINSIC FRAUD, properly warranting

the annulment of their cases dismissal.
PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, INC. VS. FAR EAST BANK, NOW B.P.I.
G.R. No. 159926, January 20, 2014.
Extrinsic Fraud, as a ground for annulment of judgment, must emanate from
an act of the adverse party, and not by the petitioners own counsel.
FACTS:
Petitioner Pausukan Seafood House issued four real estate mortgages in favor of
Respondent Far East Bank & Trust Company (now Bank of the Philippine Islands). When
the unpaid obligation secured by Pinausukan totaled more than Php15M, respondent
commenced proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. Two weeks
after, the sheriff issued a notice of sheriffs sale, setting the lands for public auction.

The CA dismissed the petition, citing the failure to attach affidavits of witnesses attesting to
the extrinsic fraud as required by Sec.4, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court. The CA denied
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for annulment of judgment grounded on extrinsic fraud should be
granted by the CA.

RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.

Upon learning of the impending sale, Pinausukan brought an action for the annulment of the
mortgages contending that Bonier (President of Pinausukan) obtained the loans only in his
personal capacity and entered into the mortgages without Pinausukans consent through a
board resolution. Pinausukan applied for the issuance of a TRO to stop the extrajudicial
foreclosure and public auction.
RTC:
The case was assigned to Branch 108, RTC in Pasay City. The counsels of the parties did
not appear in court on their scheduled hearing, despite having agreed thereto. The RTC
dismissed the case for failure to prosecute, and the order attained finality.
The sheriff issued a notice of extrajudicial sale over the property. The notice was received a
week later by Pinausukan, claiming surprise over the turn of events. Pinausukan learned
that Atty. Michael Dale Villaflor, its counsel, had not informed it about the order of dismissal
of the case.
CA:
Pinausukan brought a petition for annulment in the CA seeking nullification of the dismissal,
stating that its counsel had been guilty of gross and palpable negligence in failing to inform
his client of the developments of the case. In addition, Pinausukan was never notified that its
attorney had changed his office and address. Pinausukan asserts that Atty. Villaflor

1. Nature and statutory requirements for an action to annul a judgment or final

order.
There are only two remedies available to a party aggrieved by a decision rendered by a CFI
that had attained finality namely:
a) Sec. 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, akin to the petition for relief from
judgement under Rule 38; and
b) Sec. 513 of the Code of CivPro, stipulating that an aggrieved party under
a judgment rendered by a CFI who had been deprived of a hearing by fraud,
accident, mistake, or excusable negligence could present his petition to the SC
within 60 days after he learns of the judgment.
Act No. 136 (An Act providing for the Organization of Courts in the Philippine Islands) vested
original jurisdiction in the CFI over all civil actions in which the subject of litigations is not
capable of pecuniary estimation. The CFI retained this jurisdiction under R.A. 296 (The
Judiciary Act of 1948).
The policy of judicial stability enunciates that the judgment of a court of competent
jurisdiction could not be interfered with by any court of concurrent jurisdiction.

The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely:

a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice; and
b) to put an end to judicial controversies.
Given the extraordinary nature of the remedy of annulment of judgment, Pinausukan must
be mindful of the following statutory requirements as set forth in Rule 47:
1) The remedy is only available only when the petitioner can no longer resort to the
ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies through no fault of the petitioner.
2) The ground for action of annulment of judgment is limited to extrinsic fraud or lack
of jurisdiction.
a. Extrinsic Fraud- where the unsuccessful party has been prevented from
exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his
opponent; or where the defendant never had knowledge of the suit; or
where the attorney fraudulently of without authority connives at his defeat.
b. Intrinsic Fraud- acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair and just
determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or things, could
have been litigated and determined at the trial or adjudication of the case.
3) The action, if based on extrinsic fraud, must be filed within 4 years from
discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, must be brought before it is barred
by laches or estoppels.
a. Laches- failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could have been done
earlier.
b. Estoppel- precludes a person who has admitted or made a reperesentation
about something as true from denying or disproving it against anyone else
relying on his admission or representation.
4) The petition should be verified, and should allege with particularity the facts and the
law relief upon for annulment, as well as those supporting the petitioners good and
substantial cause of action or defense, as the case may be.

2. Pinausukans petition for annulment was substantively and procedurally

defective.

The procedural defect in Pinausukans petition was its disregard of the fourth requirement
consisting in its failure to submit together with the petition the affidavits of witnesses or
documents supporting the cause of action.
The substantive defect related to the neglect of Atty. Villaflor did not constitute extrinsic
fraud because based solely on the allegations, they do not constitute extrinsic fraud as
contemplated under Rule 47. The petitions own language states that what is involved is
mistake and gross negligence of the petitioners own counsel. In applying Rule 47, mistake
and gross negligence cannot be equated to intrinsic fraud. By its nature, extrinsic fraud
related to a cause that is collateral in character, it relates to an act of the prevailing party
which is committed outside of the case. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not
lie unless the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by ones own lawyer.
Wherefore, the court AFFIRMS the resolutions of the CA; ORDERS the petitioner to pay
cost of suit.

ALONZO GIPA, et al
vs.
SOUTHERN LUZON INSTITUTE as represented by its Vice-President For Operations
and Corporate Secretary, RUBEN G. ASUNCION, Respondent.
CASE DIGEST:
On February 26, 1996, respondent Southern Luzon Institute (SLI) filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Ownership and Possession with Damages against petitioners. The RTC
rendered its decision on January 5, 2005 finding SLI to have proven its ownership of the
property by preponderance of evidence. Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Notice of
Appeal which was granted by the RTC in its Order of January 27, 2005.
The CA dismissed the appeal in its Resolution of August 26, 2005 since it was not shown
that the appellate court docket fees and other lawful fees were paid. Petitioners and their codefendants promptly filed a Motion for Reconsideration to which they attached a
Certification from the RTC that they paid the appeal fee in the amount of P3,000.00. The CA
granted the said motion and consequently reinstated the appeal through a Resolution dated
November 2, 2005.

However, the CA further required petitioners and their codefendants, through a Minute
Resolution to remit within ten days from notice the amount of P30.00 for legal research fund.
Despite the lapse of nine months, petitioners and their co-defendants failed to comply with
the CAs directive. Hence, CA dismissed the appeal through its Resolution of December 20,
2006 in this wise:
Jurisprudence is replete that the nonpayment of the docket and other lawful fees within the
reglementary period as provided under Section 4 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of [C]ourt
is a ground for the dismissal of an appeal, as provided for under Section 1(c)[,] Rule 50 of
the same Rule:
SECTION 1. Grounds for dismissal of appeal. An appeal may be dismissed by the Court of
Appeals, on its own motion or on that of the appellee, on the following grounds:
c. Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other lawful fees as provided in Section 4 of
Rule 41;
Petitioners and their co-defendants filed a Motion for Reconsideration invoking the principle
of liberality in the application of technical rules considering that they have paid the
substantial amount of P3,000.00 for docket and other legal fees and fell short only by the
meager amount of P30.00.

Sec. 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Within the period for taking an
appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from, the full amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees.
Proof of payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together with the
original record or the record on appeal.
The liberality which petitioners pray for has already been granted to them by the CA at the
outset. The CA acted conformably with the pronouncement made in Camposagrado, a case
cited by petitioners, that "[a] partys failure to pay the appellate docket fee within the
reglementary period confers only a discretionary and not a mandatory power to dismiss the
proposed appeal. Such discretionary power should be used in the exercise of the courts
sound judgment in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play with great deal of
circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances and must be exercised wisely and
prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial justice."
Suffice it to say that "[c]oncomitant to the liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure
should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure
to abide by the rules." Those who seek exemption from the application of the rule have the
burden of proving the existence of exceptionally meritorious reason warranting such
departure.

The CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution of March 30, 2007.
Issue
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
APPEAL FILED BY THE PETITIONERS FOR FAILURE TO REMIT THE MEAGER
AMOUNT OF THIRTY PESOS (P30.00) AFTER HAVING ADVANCED A SUBSTANTIAL
PORTION OF THE DOCKET FEES.
Ruling
The Petition fails.
Payment of the full amount of appellate court docket and lawful fees is mandatory and
jurisdictional; Relaxation of the rule on payment of appeal fee is unwarranted in this case.
Section 4, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides:

G.R. No. 200804, January 22, 2014-11-24

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner,
vs
EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent.

FACTS
On 23 March 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for collection of sum of money under
Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from
respondent the amount of P23, 111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the
period of 1 June 2002 to 30 September 2005.
Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment
therefor from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is the respondent.

Respondent assailed that she religiously paid the monthly charges of P75.00. She
claimed that the increased rate of P113.00 for every 10 cubic meter of water plus an
additional P11.60 for every cubic meter thereafter was not valid because the petitioner
unilaterally made the increase without informing the residents therein which was stipulated
in their agreement.
MTCC

RULING
Yes. The RTC erred in its decision.
The petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the RRC before the RTC was proper.

The MTCC ruled in favour of the respondent. The petitioner can only charge the
respondent the agreed flat rate for the period 1 June 2002 to 7 August 2003 since the
Certificate of Public Convenience was only issued on the latter date. Respondent should be
considered to have fully paid.
The MTCC disregarded the petitioners reliance on HLURBs decision because it
failed to prove that it complied with the directive to inform the HLURB of the result of its
consultation with the concerned homeowners as regards the rates to be charged and the
HLURBs approval to such charges.
Petitioner also failed to submit evidence showing the exact date when it actually
began imposing the NWRB approved rates and the formal agreement of the parties
containing the terms and conditions thereof, without which it cannot establish with certainty
respondents obligation.

It is an essential requisite for the availability of the extraordinary remedies under the
Rules in the absence of an appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
In the case at bar, the first level courts are vested exclusive jurisdiction over small
claims cases, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed to their
corresponding RTCs.
The SC held that the RTC was wrong in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy and, as such, the RTC case must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
Petition is granted. The RTCs decision and resolution are reversed and set aside.
RTC case is reinstated and the court a quo is ordered to resolve the same with dispatch.

RTC
On a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for grave abuse of
discretion filed with the RTC, the petitioner assailed that the MTCC disregarded petitioners
reliance on the source of its authority to impose new water consumption rates.
The RTC issued a decision dismissing the petition, finding that the petition was only
filed to circumvent the non-appealable nature of small claims cases as provided in
Section23 of the Rules of Procedure on Small Claims Cases. To this end, the RTC ruled that
it cannot supplant the decision of the MTCC with another decision directing respondent to
pay petitioners a bigger sum than that which has been awarded.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.
Hence, this instant petition.
ISSUE
Whether or not the RTC erred in dismissing petitioners recourse under Rule 65 of
the RRC assailing the propriety of the MTCCs decision in the subject small claims case.

Rodolfo Laborte V Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers Cooperative

Facts: In 1989, in order to help respondent Pagsanjan Tourism Consumers Cooperative
(PTCC), petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA) allowed it to operate a restaurant
business located at the main building of the PTA Complex and the boat ride services to ferry
guests and tourists to and from the Pagsanjan Falls, paying a certain percentage of its
earnings to the PTA. In 1993, the PTA implemented a reorganization and reshuffling in its
top level management. Herein petitioner Rodolfo Laborte (Laborte) was designated as Area
Manager, CALABARZON area with direct supervision over the PTA Complex. In view of the
rehabilitation project of the PTA Complex, Laborte served a written notice upon the
respondents to cease the operations of the latters restaurant business and boat ride
services on October 22, 1993.
On November 9, 1993, the PTCC filed with the RTC, Branch 28, Santa Cruz, Laguna a
Complaint for Prohibition, Injunction and Damages with Temporary Restraining Order (TRO)
and preliminary Injunction against Laborte, docketed as Civil Case No. 3150, plus damages.
It also prayed for the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Laborte
from causing the PTCC to cease the operations of the restaurant and boat ride services and

from evicting the PTCCs restaurant from the main building of the PTA Complex. The TRO
was granted on November 11, 1993. Opposing the issuance of the TRO, Laborte averred
that the PTCC does not own the restaurant facility. The respondents, therefore, had no right
for the injunctive relief prayed for.

(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting;

On December 7, 1993, the PTCC filed with the trial court a Petition for Contempt with Motion
for Early Resolution. It alleged that Laborte defied the TRO and proceeded to close the
restaurant on December 2, 1993 and prohibited PTCCs boatmen from ferrying tourists and
allowed another association of boatmen to operate.

(7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;

On December 13, 1993, Laborte filed his Answer with Counter-Claim, denying PTCCs
allegations of harassment. On March 14, 1994, the individual respondents, Fabricio et al.,
who are employees and boatmen of the PTCC, filed a Complaint-in-Intervention against
Laborte. They stated that they were deprived of their livelihood because Laborte failed to
heed the trial courts TRO. On May 29, 2002, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the
plaintiff and intervenors and against the defendants. Dissatisfied, Laborte and the PTA
appealed to the CA. On May 29, 2008, the CA promulgated its Decision, affirming the RTC
Decision24 dated
May 29, 2002. The petitioners seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the said
motion was also denied for lack of merit.

(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondent; and

Issue: Whether or not the Supreme Court can review the factual findings of the COURT OF
APPEALS IN FINDING LABORTE LIABLE NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF
PECULIAR AND UNUSUAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD RENDER THE
DECISION UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
The Court notes the CAs ruling that the closure of the business is a factual matter which
need not be reviewed by the Court under Rule 45. The Court has consistently held that as a
general rule, a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court covers questions of
law only.
The rule, however, admits of exceptions, subject to the following exceptions, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible;
(3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on misappreciation of facts;

(6) when in making its findings, the same are contrary to the admissions of both appellant
and appellee;

(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based;

(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record.
After a careful review and based on the evidence on record, the Court finds cogent reason
to deviate from the general rule. The petitioners assert that
1. PTA is mandated to administer tourism zones and it has adopted a comprehensive
program and project to rehabilitate and upgrade the facilities of the PTA Complex;
2. bidding out to private parties of the business operations in the PTA Complex is a legal
requirement and a mandate given to every revenue-generating government entity like the
PTA. Thus, since it is only exercising its mandate and has acted in good faith, petitioner PTA
believes that it has not incurred any liability against respondents;
3. PTCC is without contract, concession or exclusive franchise to operate the restaurant and
boat ride service at the PTA Complex. It has no vested right to continue operating the
restaurant and boat ride services; therefore, it not entitled to damages; and
4. The petitioners also claimed to have informed the PTCC as early as October 22, 1993 of
the intention to rehabilitate and upgrade the facilities of the PTA Complex and for the PTCC
to vacate the area by November 15, 1993 and further extended to December 6, 1993.
The Court finds that there was indeed a renovation of the Pagsanjan Administration
Complex which was sanctioned by the PTA main office; and such renovation was done in
good faith in performance of its mandated duties as tourism administrator. In the exercise of
its management prerogative to determine what is best for the said agency, the PTA had the
right to terminate at any moment the PTCCs operations of the restaurant and the boat ride
services since the PTCC has no contract, concession or franchise from the PTA to operate
the abovementioned businesses.

The Court finds that Laborte was simply implementing the lawful order of the PTA
Management within the scope of his authority and in good faith. Further, absent a contract
between the PTCC and the PTA, and considering further that the respondents were
adequately notified
to properly vacate the PTA Complex, the Court finds no justifiable reason to award any
damages. Petition is granted.
Both the trial court and the CA faulted the petitioners for their failure to formally offer their
evidence in spite of the ample opportunity granted to do so. Based on Section 34, Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence, it is clear that the court considers the evidence only when
it is formally offered. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty of the trial
court to base its findings of fact and its judgment only and strictly on the evidence offered by
the parties. However, there are instances when the Court relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted. For the evidence to be considered
despite failure to formally offer it, it must be shown that:
1. the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded; and
2. the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.
In the instant case, the Court finds that the above requisites are attendant to warrant the
relaxation of the rule and admit the evidence of the petitioners not formally offered. As can
be seen in the records of the case, the petitioners were able to present evidence that have
been duly identified by testimony duly recorded.

1996, after Ampong herself admitted to having committed the charges against her, the CSC
rendered a resolution dismissing her from service, imposing all accessory penalties
attendant to such dismissal, and revoking her Professional Board Examination for Teachers
(PBET) rating. Ampong moved for reconsideration on the ground that when the said
administrative case was filed, she was already appointed to the judiciary; as such, she
posited that the CSC no longer had any jurisdiction over her. Ampongs motion was later
denied, thus, prompting her to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.
On November 30, 2004, the CA denied Ampongs petition and affirmed her
dismissal from service on the ground that she never raised the issue of jurisdiction until after
the CSC ruled against her and, thus, she is estopped from assailing the same. Similarly, on
August 26, 2008, the Court En Banc denied her petition for review on certiorari and, thus,
affirmed her dismissal from service. In her Comment dated September 25, 2012, Ampong
prayed that the Court revisit its ruling in G.R. No. 167916 despite its finality because it might
lead to unwarranted complications in its enforcement.
ISSUE:
WoN the Civil Service has jurisdiction over the respondent as court interpreter
RULING:
NO. But the SC rule against the petition on the ground of estoppel.

Office of the Court Administrator

vs.
Sarah Ampong
A.M NO. P-13-3132
June 4, 2014
FACTS:
Sometime in August 1994, the CSC instituted an administrative case against
Ampong for Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service for having impersonated or taken the November 1991 Civil Service Eligibility
Examination for Teachers on behalf of one Evelyn B. Junio-Decir (Decir). On March 21,

It is true that the CSC has administrative jurisdiction over the civil service. It is
granted the power to control, supervise, and coordinate the Civil Service
examinations. This authority grants to the CSC the right to take cognizance of any
irregularity or anomaly connected with the examinations.
However, the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court is given exclusive
administrative supervision over all courts and judicial personnel. By virtue of this
power, it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges and court
personnels compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. It may take the proper
administrative action against them if they commit any violation. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The bottom line is administrative jurisdiction over a court employee belongs to the
Supreme Court, regardless of whether the offense was committed before or after
employment in the judiciary.

The previous actions of petitioner have estopped her from attacking the jurisdiction
of the CSC. A party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court or
tribunal exercising quasi-judicial functions to secure an affirmative relief may not
afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.
Petitioner was given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in
her defense before the CSC. She filed with it her answer to the charges leveled
against her. When the CSC found her guilty, she moved for a reconsideration of the
ruling. These circumstances all too clearly show that due process was accorded to
petitioner.

G.R. No. 162299

March 26, 2014
LOUIS UNIVERSITY, INC Petitioners,
vs.
BABY NELLIE M. OLAIREZ et al
The Case:
For assessment and disposition before the Court are the following consolidated petitions for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In G.R. No. 162299, Saint Louis University (SLU), along with co-petitioners, are challenging
the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA), dismissing SLUs petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 which sought the reversal of the orders of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1,
Baguio City,
1) directing the petitioners to show cause why they should not be held in contempt of court;
2)directing compliance with the July 16, 2003 RTC decision;
3] Writ of Execution,6 dated July 18, 2003, signed by the Branch Clerk of Court, without any
motion for its issuance; and
4] Order,7 dated July 18, 2003, directing the issuance of a writ of execution pursuant to
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, for the reason that no motion for reconsideration
was filed before the RTC
In G.R. No. 174758, the Olairez group are assailing the April 7, 2006 Decision8 and the
September 11, 2006 Resolution9 of the CA, in CA-G.R. CR No. 27861, setting aside the
July 23, 2003 RTC Order and dismissing the contempt charges against SLU.
Facts:
SLU is an educational institution based in Baguio City offering various diploma courses in
different fields of study.

Baby Nellie M. Olairez (Olairez), Shieryl A. Rebucal (Rebucal), Jenny Riza Banta (Banta),
and Brando Badecao (Badecao), were fourth-year graduating students of SLUs College of
Medicine Batch 2002. On March 18, 2002, Olairez and Rebucal filed their Complaint for
Mandatory Injunction with Damages and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order before the RTC, against Dean Dacanay, a certain April Lily Bangaoet and other
unidentified individuals, referred to as "John Does," challenging the implementation of the
revised version of the Comprehensive Oral and Written Examination (COWE), a prerequisite
for graduation from SLUs medicine course.10 In their complaint, Olairez and Rebucal
alleged that as a condition for graduation, SLU required their students to complete and pass
the COWE and, and if a student would fail, the student concerned may take another
remedial exam.11 Olairez alleged that the then newly designated Dean Dacanay, suddenly
devised and revised the COWE by further subjecting the graduating students to additional
requirements such as completing Orals 1 and Orals 2, along with added months of medical
clerkship (Revised COWE).12 Contending that the implementation of the Revised COWE
was contrary to SLUs Student Handbook and would arbitrarily delay their graduation, they
sought injunctive relief from the trial court. Thereafter, Jenny Riza Banta and Brando B.
Badecao intervened in the same proceedings.13
On April 2, 2002, after submitting their applications for graduation with waiver, the Olairez
group was allowed to attend the graduation rites.
On April 9, 2002, the RTC granted the Writ of Preliminary Injunction preventing SLU and
Dean Dacanay from enforcing the Revised COWE.14
In their Fourth Amended Complaint,15 the Olairez group disclosed that they had completed,
passed and received their final grades in all the subjects required for the conferment of the
degree of doctor of medicine. They were allowed to march and attend the commencement
exercises. They received the symbolic diploma and were eventually conferred with the
degree, Doctor of Medicine. Similarly, the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges
permitted them to attend the twelve-month post graduate internship at the Baguio General
Hospital. Subsequently, they obtained clearances from various departments except for two
departments, the Administrative Secretary and the Training Officer of SLU. Still, Dean
Dacanay refused to issue certifications in their favor. To them, it was unacceptable.
Thus, the Olairez group prayed that Dean Dacanay and SLU be ordered to forward their
final grades (SLU Form No. 4) to the Registrars Office for recording; to issue their
clearances, certificate of graduation, diploma and include them in the SLU Registry of
Graduates; to cease and desist from exerting pressure on the Association of Philippine
Medical Colleges (APMC) to recall their certifications granting their internship and on Baguio
General Hospital to pull them out from their internship; to declare the Revised COWE as
moot and academic insofar as they were concerned; and to pay them moral damages,
nominal damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.16

Thereafter, SLU filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the
CA,
Decision of the RTC
the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Olairez group as graduates of the College of
Medicine, SLU.17 It explained that the Revised COWE became moot and academic for the
following reasons: 1] the Regional Director of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED)
issued a certification that the Olairez group had completed all the requirements for the
Degree of Medicine, notwithstanding the grant of autonomy to SLU by the CHED; and 2]
SLU allowed the Olairez group to participate in the graduation rites.
on July 17, 2003, the Olairez group trooped to SLU and insisted on its immediate
compliance with the RTC ruling. Unable to get a favorable reply from SLU, the Olairez group
filed, on the same day, a "Very Urgent Motion to Cite Defendants in Contempt" setting the
hearing of the motion for July 18, 2003.19 Meanwhile, SLU filed its Notice of Appeal20
before the RTC.
In its Order, dated July 18, 2003, the RTC cited Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
specifying that a judgment in an action for injunction was immediately executory, but reset
the hearing on the motion to cite SLU in contempt of court to July 22, 2003 to allow
compliance with a technical defect in the motion.21 In the order22 read in open court, it was
mentioned that SLU had already filed a notice of appeal. The RTC, however, stressed that
its judgment of injunction was immediately enforceable even though SLU interposed an
appeal.
On that same day, the Olairez group submitted their "Compliance," by providing the required
verification.23 Thus, in another Order, dated July 18, 2003, the RTC ordered the issuance of
a writ of execution.24 Afterwards, the Branch Clerk of Court issued a writ of execution.25
On July 19, 2003, the RTC sheriff served SLU with the said writ of execution.
On July 21, 2003, SLU moved for the inhibition of Presiding Judge Ayson,26 but its motion
was denied in the Order, dated July 22, 2003.27 Thereafter, the hearing of the motion to cite
SLU in contempt proceeded on the same day without any participation of SLU and its
officials.
On the next day, or on July 23, 2003, the RTC found SLU guilty of indirect contempt.
The Petition for certiorari

the CA dismissed SLUs petition outright for its failure to file a prior motion for
reconsideration.30 The CA explained that "a special civil action for certiorari will not lie
unless the aggrieved party has no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, such as a timely filed motion for reconsideration so as to allow the lower court
to correct the alleged error."31 SLU moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the same.
Unsatisfied, SLU elevated the disputed CA resolutions before the Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45, docketed as G.R. No. 162299.33
The Issues
G.R. No. 162299
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ON THE GROUND THAT THE PENDENCY OF AN APPEAL EXCLUDES THE REMEDY
OF CERTIORARI.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
ON THE GROUND THAT THE PETITIONERS FAILED TO FILE A MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT.42
The Courts Ruling
G.R. No. 162299
SLU contends that the CA erred in dismissing its petition for certiorari for filing it without a
prior motion for reconsideration which, according to it, constituted a fatal infirmity.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing
of a petition for certiorari.44 Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any
actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual
circumstances of the case.45 It is not, however, an ironclad rule. There are recognized
exceptions such as (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo had no
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceeding have been duly raised
and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those raised and passed upon in
the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and

any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for
reconsideration would be useless; (e) where petitioner was deprived of due process and
there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest
is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the
proceedings were ex parte, or in which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and (i)
where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved.46
Under the circumstances, the Court is not convinced that SLUs explanation constitutes
sufficient ground for the application of the exception to the rule. In the same vein, petitioners
may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is
necessary or not.47 It should be emphasized that procedural rules are tools designed to
facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are, thus, enjoined to abide
strictly by the rules. Although the Court, in some cases, permits a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. It is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, but it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed
procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.48
In this case, a liberality in the application of the rules of procedure may not be invoked if it
will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration
of justice. For it is equally settled that, except for the most persuasive of reasons, strict
compliance is enjoined to facilitate the orderly administration of justice.49
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 162299, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the Resolutions,
dated November 18, 2003 and February 10, 2004, of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. No.
SP 78127, are AFFIRMED.

UNION BANK OF THE PIDLIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC.,

Respondent.
Facts:
In 1984, Alfonso de Leon (Alfonso) mortgaged in favor of Union Bank of the
Philippines (Union Bank) real property situated at Quezon City, which was registered in his
and his wife Rosarios name.
The property was subsequently foreclosed and sold at a public auction to Union
Bank. After the redemption period expired, the bank consolidated its ownership, whereupon
a Transfer Certificate of Title was issued in its name in 1987.
In 1988, Rosario filed (Civil Case No. Q-52702) for annulment of the 1984
mortgage, claiming that Alfonso mortgaged the property without her consent, and for
reconveyance.
In a September 6, 1989 LetterProposal, Bignay ExIm Philippines, Inc. (Bignay),
through its President, Milagros Ong Siy (Siy), offered to purchase the property. The written
offer, acknowledging the propertys being subject of a pending litigation, proposed for the
execution a deed of absolute sale to document the transaction subject to a mortgage in
favor of the bank to secure the balance.
On December 20, 1989, a Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by the parties
through Bignays Siy and Union Banks Senior Vice President Anthony Robles (Robles). The
deed of sale, which conveyed the property for P 4 million, included provisions freeing the
bank from any representation or warranty.
However, the decision on the case filed by Alfonsos wife was rendered on
December 12, 1991, finding that Alfonso alone executed the aforementioned mortgage on
their conjugal property with a forged signature of his wife. The same decision nullified and
voided the mortgage and the ensuing transactions and pertinent documents.

G.R. No. 171590

February 12, 2014

BIGNAY EX-IM PHILIPPINES, INC., Petitioner, vs.UNION BANK OF THE PIDLIPPINES,

Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No.171598

Union Bank appealed with the Court of Appeals. Such appeal, the new trial, petition
for review, annulment, and motion for consideration that the bank successively sought were
all either denied or dismissed. Bignay also filed a Petition for annulment of the said decision
and a consequent Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court (SC) but both got
dismissed.
xxx
On March 21, 1994, Bignay filed a case for breach of warranty (Civil Case No. 94-

1129) against eviction under Articles 1547 and 1548 of the Civil Code, with damages,
against Union Bank and Robles, who was eventually dropped from being a party defendant
upon the banks admission to authorizing all of Robless acts relative to the sale.

Both parties filed Motions for Reconsideration. Bignay questioned only the CAs
ruling on Union Banks counterclaim while the other party questioned the rest of the
decision.

In the said case, the Branch 41 of the Makati Regional Trial Court (RTC) found that
Robles and Siy maintained a secret alliance and relationship of trust. Robles would look out
for desirable properties from the banks asset inventory, recommend them to Siy, then
facilitate the negotiation, sale and documentation for her. Basing on Siys claim that she
signed papers in blank and left them with Robles to facilitate their connived purchase of
bank properties, the trial court concluded that it was Robles and not Siy who prepared
the September 6, 1989 letter-proposal, and that even though the then pending civil case
(between Rosario and Alfonso-Union Bank) was mentioned in the letter-proposal, Siy
actually had no knowledge thereof.

On February 10, 2006, the CA issued the resolution denying the parties respective
motions for reconsideration, which was assailed together with the August 5, 2005 decision.

After a deferred Motion to Dismiss and in conjuction to an Answer Ad Cautelam,

Union Bank interposed a counterclaim grounded on two promissory notes signed by Siy in
favor of the bank which allegedly resulted in outstanding liabilities for the bank in the total
amount of more than P10.4 million as of December 20, 1996.
The trial court declared on March 21, 2000 that Union Bank, through Robles, acted
in bad faith in selling the subject property to Bignay. In effect, the stipulation in the
December 20, 1989 deed of sale limiting the banks liability in case of eviction cannot apply.
On the banks counterclaim, the trial court held that it was not at all connected with
Bignays Complaint, which makes it a permissive counterclaim for which the docket fees
should accordingly be paid. Since the bank did not pay the docket fees, the trial court held
that it did not acquire jurisdiction over its counterclaim; thus, it dismissed the same.
Union Bank appealed the lower courts decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). On
August 5, 2005, the appeal was partially granted. While the appellate court shared the trial
courts views that the bank was negligent in the handling and prosecution of Civil Case No.
Q-52702 and that it was their vice president who prepared the said letter-proposal, the CA
held that Union Bank timely paid the docket fees for the counterclaim amounting to
P32,940 at the time it filed its Answer Ad Cautelam on November 4, 1994. The CA based
such conclusion on Official Receipt Nos. 4272579 and 4271965 and the rubberstamped
mark on the face of the answer itself. It added that since the trial court received the banks
evidence on the counterclaim during trial, it should have made a ruling thereon. Thus, it
ordered Bignay to pay its liabilities in relation to the promissory notes alleged in the
counterclaim.

Two Petitions for Review on Certiorari were filed with the Supreme Court (SC)- G.R.
No. 171590 was initiated by Bignay, while G.R. No. 171598 was filed by Union Bank. Both
petitions were ordered consolidated on June 21, 2006.
Issue/s:
Bignay raised the procedural issues that can be summed up as to whether or not:
1) the docket fees to Union Banks counterclaim, in the breach of warranty
case, have been paid; and
2) the court can dismiss such counterclaim, in the event of non-payment of
docket fees, for not acquiring jurisdiction thereon.
Held:
After concurring with most of the CAs decision- on Bignays good faith in the
purchase of Alfonsos property and on the gross negligence exhibited by Union Bank in
relation to the resultant litigation- the SC disagreed mainly on the appellate courts take on
the issue of Union Banks counterclaim.
In concluding that Union Bank did not pay the docket fees for such counterclaim, the
SC noted how the trial court specifically declared that they remained unpaid in its March 21,
2000 decision. Although the counterclaims were denominated as compulsory (to Union
Banks) answer, the matters therein alleged were not connected with (their) complaint. The
counterclaims could stand independently from the plaintiffs complaint hence they are
permissive counterclaims. And like the trial court, the SC could not exercise jurisdiction over
the same, as defendant did not pay the docket fees therefore.
The SC emphasized on the observation that had the bank really paid the said fees,
it would have vigorously insisted on such fact after being apprised of the trial courts March
21, 2000 Decision. After such counterclaim was dismissed, no motion for reconsideration
was filed to raise the supposed fact of payment, backed up by the official receipts that
suspiciously and questionably surfaced later.
Bignays petition is granted while Union Banks is denied. The counterclaim is
dismissed.

10

G.R. No. 196231

January 28, 2014

EMILIO A. GONZALES III, Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH AND
REPRESENTED BY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., SENIOR
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY JOSE AMOR M. AMORANDO, OFFICER-INCHARGE - OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS,
ATTY. RONALDO A. GERON, DIR. ROWENA TURINGAN-SANCHEZ, AND ATTY.
CARLITO D. CATAYONG, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 196232

WENDELL BARRERAS-SULIT Petitioner,

repeated pleas" xxx "precipitated the desperate resort to hostage-taking." The IIRC
recommended the referral of its findings to the OP for further determination of possible
administrative offenses and for the initiation of the proper administrative proceedings.
Accordingly, on October 15, 2010, Gonzales was formally charged before the Office of the
President for Gross Neglect of Duty and/or Inefficiency in the Performance of Official Duty
and for Misconduct in Office.
On February 25, 2010, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Sulit and her
prosecutorial staff, entered into a plea bargaining agreement (Agreement) with Garcia.
Garcia thereby agreed to: (i) withdraw his plea of not guilty to the charge of plunder and
enter a plea of guilty to the lesser offense of indirect bribery; and (ii) withdraw his plea of not
guilty to the charge of money laundering and enter a guilty plea to the lesser offense of
facilitating money laundering. In exchange, he would convey to the government his
ownership, rights and other interests over the real and personal properties enumerated in
the Agreement and the bank deposits alleged in the information.
The Sandiganbayan approved the Agreement on May 4, 2010. Based on the
parties submitted Joint Motion for Approval. The apparent one-sidedness of the Agreement
drew public outrage and prompted the Committee on Justice of the House of
Representatives to conduct an investigation. After public hearings, the Committee found that
Sulit, her deputies and assistants committed culpable violations of the Constitution and
betrayal of public trust grounds for removal under Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770. The
Committee recommended to the President the dismissal from the service of Sulit and the
filing of appropriate charges against her deputies and assistants before the appropriate
government office.

vs.
ATTY. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., IN HIS CAP A CITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ATTY. DENNIS F. ORTIZ, ATTY. CARLO D. SULAY AND
ATTY. FROILAN D. MONTALBAN, JR., IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND
MEMBERS OF OFFICE OF MALACANANG LEGAL AFFAIRS, Respondents.

Facts: In its September 16, 2010 First Report, the IIRC found the Ombudsman and
Gonzales accountable for their "gross negligence and grave misconduct in handling the
case against Mendoza." The IIRC stated that the Ombudsman and Gonzales failure to
promptly resolve Mendozas motion for reconsideration, "without justification and despite

Accordingly, the Office of the President initiated an administrative disciplinary

proceeding against Sulit. On March 24, 2011, Sulit filed her Written Explanation, questioning
the OPs jurisdiction.

Issue: W/N the Office of the President has jurisdiction to initiate administrative disciplinary
proceedings against the deputy ombudsman and and the special prosecutor.
No. Subjecting the Deputy Ombudsman to discipline and removal by the President,
whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the

11

Ombudsmans disciplinary authority, cannot but seriously place at risk the independence of
the Office of the Ombudsman itself. The Office of the Ombudsman, by express constitutional
mandate, includes its key officials, all of them tasked to support the Ombudsman in carrying
out her mandate. Unfortunately, intrusion upon the constitutionally-granted independence is
what Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 exactly did. By so doing, the law directly collided not only
with the independence that the Constitution guarantees to the Office of the Ombudsman, but
inevitably with the principle of checks and balances that the creation of an Ombudsman
office seeks to revitalize.
What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally and necessarily true for her
Deputies who act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their duties. The
Ombudsman can hardly be expected to place her complete trust in her subordinate officials
who are not as independent as she is, if only because they are subject to pressures and
controls external to her Office. This need for complete trust is true in an ideal setting and
truer still in a young democracy like the Philippines where graft and corruption is still a major
problem for the government. For these reasons, Section 8(2) of RA No. 6770 (providing that
the President may remove a Deputy Ombudsman) should be declared void.
The 1987 Constitution and RA No. 6770, militates against an interpretation that
would insulate the Deputy Ombudsman from the disciplinary authority of the OP and yet
expose the Special Prosecutor to the same ills that a grant of independence to the Office of
the Ombudsman was designed for.
Congress recognized the importance of the Special Prosecutor as a necessary
adjunct of the Ombudsman, aside from his or her deputies, by making the Office of the
Special Prosecutor an organic component of the Office of the Ombudsman and by granting
the Ombudsman control and supervision over that office. This power of control and
supervision includes vesting the Office of the Ombudsman with the power to assign duties to
the Special Prosecutor as he/she may deem fit. By constitutional design, the Special
Prosecutor is by no means an ordinary subordinate but one who effectively and directly aids
the Ombudsman in the exercise of his/her duties, which include investigation and
prosecution of officials in the Executive Department.

Subjecting the Special Prosecutor to disciplinary and removal powers of the

President, whose own alter egos and officials in the Executive Department are subject to the
prosecutorial authority of the Special Prosecutor, would seriously place the independence of

the Office of the Ombudsman itself at risk.Thus, even if the Office of the Special Prosecutor
is not expressly made part of the composition of the Office of the Ombudsman, the role it
performs as an organic component of that Office militates against a differential treatment
between the Ombudsmans Deputies, on one hand, and the Special Prosecutor himself, on
the other. What is true for the Ombudsman must be equally true, not only for her Deputies
but, also for other lesser officials of that Office who act directly as agents of the Ombudsman
herself in the performance of her duties.
Under the present Constitution, there is every reason to treat the Special
Prosecutor to be at par with the Ombudsman's deputies, at least insofar as an extraneous
disciplinary authority is concerned, and must also enjoy the same grant of independence
under the Constitution.

Eastern Shipping Lines Inc., vs. BPI/MS Insurance Corp. and Mitsui Sum Tomo Insurance
Co.
Facts:
On August 2003, Sumitomo entered into a contract with Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. to ship
31 steel sheets from Japan for delivery in favor of CalamBa Steel Center Inc. the cargo was
insured against all risk by Sumitomo with Mistui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. Once the
shipment arrived, some of the coils were observed to be in bad condition as evidenced by
the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo.
Two more subsequent shipments followed and upon unloading of the cargo, more coils were
found damaged. The possession was then transferred to Asian Terminals Inc. (ATI) for
stevedoring, storage and safekeeping and CalambaSteel rejected the damaged portion of
the goods on delivery.
Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui and the RTC rendered judgment in favor
of Calamba Steel, ordering Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc. to pay the
plaintiff damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.
Upon appeal, the CA affirmed the RTCs findings with modification, holding that Eastern
Shipping lines and ATI were very negligent with the handling of the subject cargoes.
Additionally, the CA said that their findings coincide with the factual findings of the RTC.

12

LZK HOLDINGS and DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

versus
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK
G.R. No. 187973
January 20, 2014

In their petitions for review on certiorari filed before the Supreme Court, Eastern Shipping
avers that the CA erred in affirming the RTCs decision because the survey reports which
were submitted show that the cause of the damage was due to rough handling of the goods.
Consequently, it should be absolved from any liability because it had no participation in the
discharging operations.
Respondent insurance corporations counter that the goods suffered damage while still in the
possession of the petitioner. As a common carrier, they are required by law to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods they carry.
Issue:
Whether or not the CA committed any reversible error in finding that petitioner is solidarily
liable with ATI on account of the damage incurred by the goods.
Ruling:
The Court emphasizes that factual questions may not be raised before it in a petition for
review on certiorari as the Court is not a trier of facts, as stated in Section 1 Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.
A question of law exists when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of
law or jurisprudence to a certain set of facts, or when the issue does not call for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, the truth or falsehood of facts
being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the whole evidence.
In this petition, the resolution of the question as to who between petitioner and ATI should
be liable for the damage to the goods is indubitably factual, and would clearly impose upon
this Court the task of reviewing, examining and evaluating or weighing all over again the
probative value of the evidence presented something which is not, as a rule, within the
functions of this Court and within the office of a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court finds that the petitioner failed to show any reversible error on the part of the CA in
affirming the ruling of the RTC as to warrant the modification, much less the reversal of the
assailed decision.

FACTS
LZK Holdings loaned P40,000,000.00 from Planters Bank in 1996 and secured the same
with a Real Estate Mortgage over its 589sqm lot located in La Union. Two years later, LZK
Holdings' failed to pay its loan, thereby Planters Bank extra-judicially foreclosed the real
estate mortgage thereon and the lot was sold at a public auction. Planters Bank emerged as
the highest bidder then registered the Certificate of sale on March 1999.
LZK Holdings filed before the RTC of Makati City, a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial
foreclosure, mortgage contract, promissory note and damages. LZK Holdings also prayed
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) or writ of preliminary injunction to
enjoin the consolidation of title over the lot by Planters Bank.
Regional Trial Court:
Planters Bank filed before the RTC-San Fernando a motion to set ex-parte hearing for the
issuance of a writ of possession and set the hearing on April 14, 2008, but on April 8, 2008,
the RTC-San Fernando issued another Order declaring the scheduled hearing moot and
academic and granting Planters Bank's ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession which was filed as early as December 1999. The order placed the Deputy
Sherriff to place Planters Development Bank or any of its authorized representatives in
possession of the subject parcel of land, together with all the improvements existing thereon.
CA affirmed.
Court of Appeals:
The Court of Appeals held that Planters Bank, as the purchaser in the foreclosure sale, may
apply for a writ of possession during the redemption period. In fact, it did apply for a writ
three (3) days before the expiration of LZK Holdings' redemption period. The San Fernando
RTC, given its ministerial duty to issue the writ should have acted on the ex parte petition.
An injunction is not allowed to prohibit the issuance of a writ of possession. Neither does the
pending case for annulment of foreclosure sale, mortgage contract, promissory notes and
damages stay the issuance of said writ.

13

ISSUE
1. Whether or not Planters Bank is entitled to writ of possession over the subject parcel
of land
2. Whether or not the RTC erred in the cancellation of the hearing for the issuance of
writ of possession

RULING
Supreme Court:
1. Under the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, the right of Planter's Bank to a
writ of possession is binding and conclusive on the parties. The doctrine of res
judicata by conclusiveness of judgment postulates that "when a right or fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or when an
opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court, as long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with
them.
Hence, LZK Holdings can no longer question Planter Bank's right to a writ of
possession over the subject property because the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment bars the re-litigation of such particular issue. The purchaser in foreclosure
sale may take possession of the property even before the expiration of the
redemption period by filing an ex parte motion for such purpose and upon posting of
the necessary bond. Right of possession is based on the ownership of the subject
property by the applicant pertains to applications for writ of possession after the
expiration of the redemption period, a situation not contemplated within the facts of
the present case.
2. R TC did not err in cancelling the previously scheduled hearing and in granting
Planters Bank's motion without affording notice to LZK Holdings or allowing it to
participate. No hearing is required prior to the issuance of a writ of possession. The
proceeding in a petition for a writ of possession is ex parte and summary in nature.
It is a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of one's right of possession as
purchaser in a foreclosure sale.
The decision of the CA is in accordance with the law and jurisprudence on the
matter. It correctly sustained the Order of the RTC in issuing a writ of possession in
favor of Planters Bank.

G.R. No. 201286

July 18, 2014

INOCENCIA TAGALOG, Petitioner,

vs.
MARIA LIM VDA. DE GONZALEZ, GAUDENCIA L. BUAGAS, RANULFO Y. LIM, DON L.
CALVO, SUSAN C. SANTIAGO, DINA C. ARANAS, and RUFINA C.
RAMIREZ, Respondents.
The subject of the litigation involves a parcel of land known as Lot A situated in Cebu.
Respondents filed with the RTC of Cebu a Complaint for Recovery of Possession against
petitioner Inocencia Tagalog (Tagalog). At the time of the complaint, the land was declared
for taxation purposes with an assessed value of P57,960 and a market value of P264,930.
Respondents stated that they were the co-owners of the land. They alleged that Tagalog
occupied a portion of the land as lessee and paid rent on a month to month basis by virtue
of a verbal contract. Tagalog built a house with light materials on the land and when a strong
typhoon hit Cebu, Tagalogs house was damaged. Thereafter, respondents alleged that
Tagalog discontinued paying the rent and stopped inhabiting the house.
Respondents informed Tagalog to vacate the premises asserting that the verbal contract of
lease was deemed terminated upon the expiration of the monthly contract. However,
Tagalog refused to vacate claiming that she was still a lessee. Respondents alleged that
Tagalog constructed a two-storey residential house made of cement, large steel bars, hollow
blocks, sand and gravel on the land.
Tagalog alleged that the lease contract was still valid and subsisting and had never been
terminated by the parties. She added that she had not abandoned her possession over the
land and has continuously paid the rent on a month to month basis and further alleged that
she was granted permission to repair her dwelling structure and undertook the repair without
enlarging the area of her occupation. Tagalog prayed for the dismissal of the case on the
ground that the action was for ejectment and unlawful detainer which was beyond the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
RTC decided the case in favor of respondents.RTC ruled that the respondents prayed for
the recovery of possession of the leased property as owners. Thus, the issue of ownership,

14

which was within the original jurisdiction of the court was primordial and the prayer for
eviction was merely incidental there being no written contract of lease between the parties.
Tagalog filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied hence, the petition to the
Supreme Court.
Issue
The main issue for our resolution is whether the Regional Trial Court had jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
Ruling
No. Subject of the action is for unlawful detainer, thus cognizable by a first level court or the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC). Since the case was filed with the RTC, a second level court,
the RTCs decision should be rendered void for lack of jurisdiction over the case.
The jurisdiction of a particular court is determined by the nature of the action pleaded as
appearing from the allegations in the complaint. In order to determine whether the lower
court had jurisdiction, it is necessary to first ascertain the nature of the complaint filed before
it.

The MOA stipulated that in order to save payment of high and multiple taxes, considering
that the subject matter of the sale is mortgaged with DBP and sold to Roberto, Edwin will
execute the necessary Deed of Absolute sale in favour of the spouses Go, in lieu of
Roberto. The spouses Go then deposited the amount of P10,000,000.00 to Robertos
account.
After the execution of the MOA, Roberto gave Eduardo P2,000,000.00 and returned to him
one of the truck tractors and trailer but Roberto refused.
Eduardo initiated a replevin suit against Roberto alleging that he was exercising his right to
repurchase and that he was entitled to the possession of the other properties. Roberto
denied and insisted that the MOA had distinguished their deed of sale by novation.
On December 5, 2001, RTC rendered a decision in favour of Eduardo and that Robertos
defense of Novation has no merit. On appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the decision of the
RTC on October 10, 2003 and on February 16, 2004, CA denied Robertos motion for
reconsideration, hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUES resolved regarding Civil Procedure:
1. Appeal by certiorari under rule 45; factual findings of trial court, when are affirmed
by CA, are binding on the Supreme Court.
2. Question of law distinguished from question of fact.

ROBERTO R. DAVID, petitioner vs EDUARDO C. DAVID, respondent

RULING:

GR NO. 162365

Considering that the factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the CA, are binding
on the SC, the court affirms the judgment of the CA upholding Eduardos exercise of the
right to repurchase. Roberto could no longer assail the factual findings because his petition
for review on certiorari was limited to the review and determination of question of law only.

FACTS:
On July 7, 1995, Eduardo and his brother Edwin C. David sold their inherited properties to
Roberto, specifically a parcel of land and two units truck tractor with two trailers. A deed of
sale with assumption of mortgage embodied the terms of their agreement. Parties further
agreed to give Eduardo and Edwin the right to repurchase the properties within a period of
three years from execution of the deed of sale based on the purchase price agreed upon
plus 12% interest per annum.
In April 1997, Roberto and Edwin executed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the
spouses Go, by which they agreed to sell the lot to the latter.

A question of law when doubt centers on what law is on a certain set of undisputed facts.
While a question of fact exist when doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the alleged facts.
Whether the conditions for the right to repurchase where complied with, or whether there
was a tender of payment is a question of fact.
Court affirms the decision promulgated on October 10,20013 and orders the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.

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Ralph P. Tua vs. Hon. Cesar A. Mangrobang and Rosana Honrado-Tua

Whether or not CA refused to rule on constitutionality of RA 9262 has decided the

case not in accordance with established laws and jurisprudence considering that contrary to
its finding the constitutionality of RA 9262 is the lis mota of the case.

GR No. 170701
FACTS:

RULING:

Respondent Rosana Honrado-Tua filed protection order with the RTC against her
husband Ralph Tua. She contends that her husband threatened to cause her and her
children physical harm, deprived of custody and access to her children and deprived of
financial support. RTC issued TPO, effective for 30 days.

We find that since petitioner is assiling the validity of RA 9262, the constitutionality
of said law must first be decided upon. The petitioner particularly directs his attack on Sec. 5
of RA 9262, the ex parte issuance of TPO.

Then, hearing for permanent protection is set. Petitioner commented to

respondents petition with Urgent Petition to lift the TPO. Petioner denied the respondents
allegation and alleged that he had been maintaining separate abode since November 2004
and that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually and morally unfit to keep the
children in her custody. Petitioner contended that the issuance of TPO is unconstitutional for
being violative of due process of 1987 Constitution.
Without any wait for resolution of his comment on the petition and motion to lift TPO,
petition filed with CA a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold departure
order assailing the TPO.
The CA issued TRO to temporarily enjoin the parties from enforcing the assailed
TPO. Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction
with Manifestation. A hearing was conducted on the motion. Petition is denied for lack of
merit and upheld the TPO.
Thus, petitioner files this petition.
ISSUES:
Whether or not CA erred in finding a manner contrary to establish rules and
jurisprudence that respondent committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued the
TPO without observing due process.

The SC ruled a protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children. Since time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further
violence is to be prevented, the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but
brfore notice and hearing when the life is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim.
The grant of TPO ex parte cannot be challenged as a violative of right to due
process. Here, the procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital
public interests, like protection of women and their children from violence.
After TPO is issued ex parte notice is immediately given to respondednt for him to
file opposition within 5 days from receipt thereof.
Hence, the respondent judge is only acting in accordance with RA 9262 without any
grave abuse of discretion.
It is settled doctrine thatb there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a
capricuouc and whimsical exercise of judgment is equivalent of lack of jurisdiction, such as
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross s9 as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
law.
We find that the CA did not err when it found no grave abuse of discretion
committed by the RTC in issuance of TPO.

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Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP)

vs.
Guaria Agricultural and Realty Development Corporation (GARDC)
G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014.
By Richard Troy A. Colmenares
USA College of Law
Start: 11/24/14 1:31:54 PM
Finish: 11/26/14 12:55:02 AM
Nature of the Case
A petition for review on certiorari by DBP assailing the CAs judgment upholding the RTCs
decision, except the award for attorneys fees.
Facts
There are three cases involved in this petition, to wit:Case 1. Civil Case No. 12707 the case delved around the issue on specific performance
and ruled that GARDC was not in default so that the
extrajudicial foreclosure by DBP was null and void and that the subsequent Sheriffs
certificate of sale was cancelled. DBP was ordered to pay
attorneys fees. DBP appealed the decision in Case 2.
Case 2. C.A.-G.R. CV No. 59491 this was an ordinary appeal challenging the decision of
RTC in Case 1. The CA sustained judgment in Case 1,
deleting award of attorneys fees. MR by DBP was denied. Hence, DBP this petition for
certiorari.
Meanwhile, pending Case 2, DBP sought for a writ of possession and was granted the same
on MR. Thus, GARDC assailed on ordinary appeal the
granting of the writ of possession in Case 3.
Case 3. C.A.-G.R. No. 12670-SP GARDC did not receive favorable judgment here.
Hence, DBP sought the promulgation of an order implementing
the writ of possession, and was granted the same.
The cases revolve around the contract of loan which GARDC and DBP executed for the
purpose of developing the formers beach resort. The parties agreed
that:
1. the loan, including its proceeds, would only be used for the purpose constituted;
2. a cash equity be placed by GARDC for construction of buildings and other facilities at the
beach resort; and
3. DBP had the power to verify compliance to these conditions.
GARDC obtained the loan (released on several installments) and thereafter executed the
following:
1. a promissory note;
2. as security for the loan, two mortgage contracts, to wit:2.1. real estate mortgage (on several properties) and
2.2. a chattel mortgage (on personal properties of the resort complex as well as proceeds
from the loan to answer for the cost of improvements on
the resort complex).

However, despite GARDCs demand, DBP failed to release the remaining loan balance.
Instead, and with objections from GARDC, DBP directly paid some of
the debts of the formers suppliers. DBPs findings revealed that GARDC did not complete
the construction works, thus, it demanded for GARDC to expedite
its completion, else its non-compliance would result to foreclosure proceedings. GARDC
neither complied nor objected, thus extrajudicial foreclosure
proceedings manifested.
Subsequently, GARDC judicially demanded DBP for specific performance and to cease from
the extrajudicial foreclosure (Case 1). DBP moved for dismissal
of Case 1 contending that the foreclosed properties had already been sold at a public action
to satisfy the debt of GARDC. Thus, GARDC, amended its
complaint which prayed for the cancellation of the certificate of sale and nullification of the
foreclosure proceedings (amended Case 1), and was granted the
same. DBP assailed the decision on appeal (as in Case 2) with prayer for a writ of
possession (Case 3).
In Case 1, the RTC ruled to (1) restore actual possession and enjoyment of all properties
foreclosed to GARDC; (2) a reasonable rental to reckon from the
time DBP occupied and used said beach resort up to the time of its actual restoration to
GARDC; and (3) attorneys fees. Case 2 upheld the rulings in Case 1,
but deleted the award of attorneys fees.
Issue(s)
1. Is the CAs denial of the appeal lawful?
2. Does the doctrine of law of the case apply to the appealed case (Case 3)?
3. Is Guaria Corporation legally entitled to the restoration of the possession of the resort
complex and payment of reasonable rentals by DBP?
Held
(1). Yes, since the CA, being not a trier of facts, is bound to uphold the factual findings of the
lower court and GARDC was not in default, as explained
herein:
The Relationship between the Parties is Reciprocal
According to the CA, which the SC upholds, the nature of the obligation between GARDC
and DBP is that of a reciprocal obligation, and
as such is dependent on, and simultaneous to each others obligation so that DBP is
obliged to deliver the full (not partial or incomplete)
loan amount, while GARDC is obliged to repay the loaned amount when it has fallen due
and demandable. The SC added that if the other
party fails to perform its obligation, the other party could not be obliged to perform what is
expected of it.
GARDC is not yet in default
In accordance with the Rules on Evidence, the CA correctly ruled that DBP failed (1) to
establish that GARDC was in default; (2) prove
the demand for payment of the loan which, according to the SC, is necessary for the
effects of default to gives rise to the creditors

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(DBP) right to collect or [extra]judicially foreclose said mortgage. It appears that the sole
basis for the extrajudicial foreclosure was noncompletion
of the beach resort. This proceeding, added the SC, had no legal basis. The SC further
added that while it is true that a loan is
secured by a mortgage constituted on either real or personal properties for the creditors
protection in case the debtor is in default, the
enforcement of the mortgage contract is contingent to violations of the principal obligation
(DBPs delivery of the full loan amount), since
the nature of the mortgage remains only as an accessory contract. DBP failed to release the
full amount, thus it was legally impossible for
GARDC to be in default.
The Obligation of GARDC is not yet due and demandable
Since GARDC is not yet in default, and DBP admits it did not release the full loan amount, it
follows that the real estate mortgage is
unenforceable. Thus, demand for payment could not be had. An obligation only becomes
due upon demand. Thus, the CA held that the
extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings were premature and improper, and upheld by the SC
to be void and ineffectual. Henceforth, GARDC
is still entitled to possession of the foreclosed properties.
[The SC only noted (since GARDC did not appeal the deletion by the CA of attorneys fees
and nor elevated the apparent negligence of
DBP) that DBP, being a banking institution, was required to exercise the highest degree of
diligence, as well as to observe the high
standards of integrity and performance in all its transactions because its business was
imbued with public interest. This it failed to do, by
its premature foreclosure of the mortgaged properties].
(2). No, the doctrine of law of the case does not apply to Case 3.
The law of the case is an opinion to the former appeal, so that whatever is irrevocably
established as the controlling legal rule of decision between
the same parties to the same case continues to be the law of the case, so long as the facts
remain as is; they remain the law of the case in all other
steps below or above on subsequent appeal, else the case remains a bottleneck. Thus, it
would be foolish to reopen what has been settled earlier.
Otherwise stated, when an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its
declaration continues to be the law of that case even on a
subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid down may have been reversed in
other cases. This is predicated on practicality such that
the parties were already given the full opportunity to be heard and should not be reopened
to determine other issues of the case, like damages. Its
concern, however, is limited to legal questions or issues adjudicated on former appeal.
In the case at bar, the ex parte proceeding to the writ of possession in Case 3 had no
bearing to Case 2, since Case 2 dealt with specific

performance while Case 3 dealt with possession.

(3). Yes.
Since the foreclosure was premature and the sale was void, then it follows that GARDC was
unjustly dispossessed. The SC affirms that the
possession be restored to GARDC including the reasonable rentals of the beach resort. One
who recovers, according to law, possession unjustly
lost shall be deemed for all purposes which may redound to his benefit to have enjoyed it
without interruption

Rivelisa Realty vs. First Sta. Clara

(Disclaimer: This is not the digest I passed inside the notebook. I made this one in a hurry so
this is going to be very short but I guess all the elements will be here. Also, please excuse
the English if necessary. Im in a damn rush. D.A. Garcia)
Facts
Rivelisa Realty (Rivelisa) and First Sta. Clara entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA).
Of course, there are conditions in the agreement otherwise these will not be called as such.
(Their business here is developing subdivision or real property)
Because of some problems, First Sta.Clara wanted to back out of the JVA. Rivelisa agreed
that they are backing out. First Sta. Clara asked to be reimbursed P3M for the work it has
done. Rivelisa agreed but they didnt give the payment. First Sta. Clara demanded to be
paid but was unpaid hence they filed a complaint of recession of the JVA, payment of
damages for breach of contract, and performance of an obligation.
In the RTC, First Sta. Clara lost the case. It was the party that filed the case at the RTC but
they lost it all the same. Instead of them asking that they be paid damages for breach of
contract and demand to be reimbursed of the amount they are asking, they were the party
that was commanded to pay Rivelisa damages because according to the RTC, they were
the first party that violated the JVA.
Appealed to the CA, this court found that Rivelisa is indeed obligated to reimburse First Sta.
Clara because Rivelisa agreed that First Sta. Clara will back out and also agreed that it will
reimburse the latter. Because of this decision from the CA, Rivelisa moved for a 15-day

18

extension to file MR. However, CA denied saying that filing the MR cannot be extended.
This is then the main issue of the case.
Issue
WON filing MR can be extended.
SC Ruling
It cannot be extended. This is what the SC has to say Beginning one month after the
promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for
extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court
as the court of last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the
extension requested.
Therefore, First Sta.Clara won the case and needs to be reimbursed by Rivelisa. The JVA is
dissolved because both agreed even though it was First Sta. Clara who first violated the
agreement.

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