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November 8, 2007

Lauranne Buchanan
Carolyn J. Simmons

Motorola and the RAZR

What a difference a year makes.
CEO Edward Zander was riding high at Motorola Inc.s 2006 annual shareholders meeting.
Based on sales growth of 18% in 2005 and 23% in the first quarter of 2006, he declared, Our sales
growth is among the strongest, if not the strongest, of large-cap tech companies. The driving force
behind this growth was the firms cell phone business. Zander boasted, Our iconic products like RAZR,
SLVR, and PEBL have established Motorolas design leadership...We are more and more identified as
the cool, innovative company with quality to match. To sum up the years performance, he paraphrased Frank Sinatra lyrics, proclaiming, 2005 was a very good year.1
By comparison, Zanders performance at the 2007 annual meeting was positively meek. Motorolas
handset business had suffered declining margins and share.2 The firm lost $180 million in the first
quarter and its stock had declined by about a third since October. In response, Zander had announced
cost-cutting efforts, including the layoff of thousands of employees and a not-clearly defined plan to
reinvigorate the appeal of the firms handset offerings.3 He was a different man, ending his remarks to
the shareholders with an awkward, Thats it for me, I guess.4
In the space of a few months, Motorola had gone from the darling of the cell phone market to a
high-share but unprofitable handset manufacturer. Both identities derived from the management and
profitability of the RAZR handset. Analysts everywhere were debating the question, Can Motorola
reverse the fortunes of the RAZR?
How had Motorola arrived at this crisis point?

Motorola Develops the Market, Then Falters (1984-2001)

Motorola introduced the cell phone in 1984. It was the size of a brick, weighed 28 ounces, and cost
$4,000.5 For the next 15 years, Motorolawith its strong engineering culture advanced cell phone
technology and, in so doing, dominated the market. Motorola led competitors in reducing the size of
the phone while improving its capabilities and lowering costs. And consumers took notice. By the mid1990s, the cell phone had become a necessity for everyone from business people demanding greater
connectivity to soccer moms appreciating additional security. Motorolas dominance of the category
seemed all but assured with its 1996 launch of the clam-shaped StarTAC. At five cubic inches and 3.1
ounces,6 it was the smallest, lightest cell phone in existence. And it was so stylish that supermodels
carried it as a runway accessory, and rap artists immortalized it in song. Even with a price tag of $1,100,
it was the must-have gadget of the fashion elite.

Copyright 2007 Thunderbird School of Global Management. All rights reserved. This case was prepared by Lauranne
Buchanan, Thunderbird School of Global Management, and Carolyn J. Simmons, Washington and Lee University, for
the purpose of classroom discussion only, and not to indicate either effective or ineffective management.

But the sands were beginning to shift in this nascent industry. Service providersa fragmented
group of competitors including the long-distance companies, Baby-Bells and many regional carriers
were converting from analog to digital technology. Digital technology allowed carriers to handle more
calls simultaneously. It also supported expansion into data services, which would increase their revenue
streams. For consumers, the switch to digital meant better quality sound as well as lower service fees
from roaming charges.
The consequences of the technology shift for handset manufacturers like Motorola were twofold.
The first was that the service providers became more demanding customers. The investment in digital
equipment put enormous financial pressure on the carriers, which led them to expand into each others
regions and gobble up smaller competitors. As competition within the industry increased, so did the
pressure for carriers to differentiate their services to attract more customers. The result was that the
service providerswho had become more important to the handset manufacturers as their customer
base grewbegan to demand unique phones and greater service from the cell phone manufacturers.
The second outcome of the technology shift was that it opened the door for Motorolas competitors to gain a foothold in the U.S. As the leader in analog technology, Motorola was slow to switch to
digital. Nokia, the Finnish manufacturer, moved quickly to take advantage of this opportunity. It already dominated the European market, where digital technology was the standard. Its experience there
allowed Nokia to meet the technical needs of the U.S. carriers faster than Motorola. And Nokias smaller
candy-bar-shaped phonesmade possible by digital technologyquickly captured consumers attention.
By the late nineties, Nokia was challenging Motorola in global market share. And yet, Motorola
seemed blinded by its past dominance in the industry. Its undoing, according to John Stratton, chief
marketing officer of Verizon Wireless, was its arrogance. Listening, for Motorola, was waiting for
you to stop speaking so they could tell you what to buy. It was endemic to their culture Motorola
made the dangerous mistake of forgetting that its customers werent just the people carrying their phone,
but the wireless carrier as well. It is the carrier who determines which phones they will offer in their
retail stores and which ones they will promote with special offers.7
Given this culture, Motorolas response to the demands of the service providers was slow. When
using cell phones while driving became a public policy issue, SBC Wireless asked handset manufacturers to display a safety reminder on the screen. Nokia responded in 24 hours; Motorola took two weeks.
When SBC asked for a unique color for its 8200 series, Nokia delivered a phone in technoblue. As for
Motorola? I cant recall if Motorola ever offered a proprietary color, stated VP Frank Boyer.8
Even worse, Motorola started missing crucial deadlines on product delivery, and, in some cases, it
never sent a product at all. Alltel ordered an inexpensive Motorola model for the Christmas season.
When it didnt arrive, Alltel turned to Nokia for a similar product; Nokia delivered. SBC ordered
several Motorola models in 2000, but Motorola axed several phones and delayed delivery on others.
We had made our plans on the premise that some of those products would be available. We had to
revise our plans and turn to Nokia and Ericsson to meet our needs, recalled Boyer.9
Perhaps the service providers would have tolerated Motorolas poor service if the company had
stayed on top of its game. But it didnt. Ironically, Motorola failed to recognize that its success with
StarTAC had fundamentally changed consumer demand. The StarTAC made innovation as much about
the outside of the phone as about its inside. Consumers attention had turned to size and design. At
meetings in Silicon Valley, men (its usually men) kick things off by placing their phones on the conference table in a sort of silent showdown. If your phone is even a quarter-inch smaller than theirs, youve
won, says Shelley Harrison, a consultant to start-up companies. There is definitely a little phone envy
going on.10 But at Motorola, product design had become a secondary consideration, and the firm no
longer produced phones that anyone envied. As one designer lamented, Just a few years after the

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StarTAC success, products were being built in engineering labs, then sent to what employees called the
beauty parlor for a last-minute face-lift.11
As it began to feel the heat from Nokia, Motorolas response was to churn out lots of different
phonesfinished inventory, after all, could be forced onto carriers. Motorolas product line expanded
dramatically, resulting in massive inefficiencies. By 2000, Motorola offered 100 different phones, based
on 40 different wireless handset platforms.12 Margins shrank to a low of minus 17% in the first quarter
of 2001. In comparison, Nokia had limited product offerings and kept production simple. Working off
three generic platforms enabled Nokia to use common components across productsand contributed
to operating margins of 22%.13
In short, Motorola had sailed directly into a perfect storm. The companys internal operations
were bloated and inefficient. It lacked customer focusconsumers were unimpressed with its handsets,
and service providers no longer felt any loyalty to the company. And Motorola couldnt keep up with
competitors. Only five years after introducing the StarTAC, Motorolas share of the global market had
dropped from 33% to 14%, while Nokias had climbed from 22% to 35%.14
Motorolas lackluster performance in the cell phone business was a major contributor to the devaluation of its stock pricewhich lost three quarters of its value in a little more than a year. In the first
quarter of 2001, the company reported a $533 million loss, the first quarterly loss in more than 16
years. The Personal Communication Division was responsible for an operating loss of $402 million.15

Righting the Ship (2002-2003)

CEO Christopher Galvinwhose grandfather founded Motorolaknew that drastic steps must be
taken to reverse course. He cut more than 56,000 jobsa third of the firms workforceand replaced
or reshuffled three quarters of his senior officers within a two-year period.16 He also broke with company tradition and brought in a team from outside to revitalize the handset division. Mike Zafirovski,
or Mike Z as he became known within the company, came from GE to lead the personal communication division. He brought in Teresa Metty from IBM to lead operations. Geoffrey Frost was hired from
Nike as Chief Brand Officer, a newly created position. And Tim Parsey was lured away from Apple to
head the design group. Although the team didnt know one another, they understood the challenge they
faced, and they knew they had to work together to succeed. They also knew they didnt have much time.

Getting Production Right

As head of the communications division, one of Mike Zs first objectives was to reconnect with the
service providers: We are more humble than ever before. We know now how to work with the carriers.
Execution is clearly ahead of us. He began by spending a quarter of his time with service providers,
trying to repair relationships. They liked what they saw. Alltels group president for communication
said, I see positive signs in a guy like Mike. Inside his first 30 days on the job, he was at our offices in
Little Rock. Voicestream was also impressed. Mike Z changed his schedule to address a group of 1,200
Voicestream employees when the carrier launched its service in Chicago. Bob Stapleton, president and
COO, said, Were finally getting immediate and direct involvement from Motorola senior management.17
Mike Z knew that carrier support would mean little if Motorola couldnt offer providers the right
price. The firm had to reduce its cost structure. The first step was to trim production facilities. But
Mike Z knew that plant shutdowns alone wouldnt translate into greater efficiency. Operations also had
to improve. At the time, Motorola phones had about 600 parts; Mike Zs goal was to reduce the number
to 150. He also wanted to standardize parts so that they could be used in different phones. In itself, this
change could cut the time needed to assemble a phone from 30 minutes to 10 minutes.18

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To improve Motorolas moribund supply chain, Mike Z placed Teresa Metty in charge of the
firms $42 billion procurement budget. Metty recognized that in order to be globally competitive,
Youve got to have world-class procurement and strategic sourcing.19 Her first step was to abolish the
companys regional procurement structure. Before we had factories and distribution centres for all the
regionsImagine the inefficiencies of dealing with that.20 She then helped create a global supply chain
system, supplemented at the regional level by procurement experts working in commodity councils to
address local component sourcing needs. Decisions regarding product specification, technology requirements, and designs were centralized, giving Motorola a panoramic view of its global needs. As a
result, the company leveraged its purchasing power from a central source and cut its supplier base by
more than 50%.21
According to Metty: We were able to set up world-class global experts to leverage the spend, to do
technology road mapping with key suppliers, to reduce the supply base, and to establish preferred parts
that we would like designed into our phones so that we could reduce the complexity of our products.22
The new strategy duplicated the automotive industry model of reducing costs and making production
lines more efficient through the sharing of similar platforms among various product models. Because
customization could then take place later in the manufacturing process, Motorola was able to respond
more quickly to carrier needs. Motorola was further able to cut inventory by sharing information with
carriers.
Results were impressive: between 2000 and 2002, Motorola squeezed $2.6 billion in costs out of
its supply chain, reduced inventory by $1.4 billion, and improved customer response time by 40%.23

Getting the Brand Right

While Mike Z concentrated on rebuilding relationships with service providers and improving operations to reduce costs, the task of rebuilding the Motorola brand was left to Geoffrey Frost. Frost knew
this would be an uphill battle both within the company and with consumers. When he arrived, Motorolas
advertising campaign was based on You Cant Always Get What you Want by the Rolling Stones.
Not exactly the right message for a company struggling to regain leadership, Frost quipped.24 The
irony was lost on most of Motorolas management.
Frosts first objective was to get product design back into the forefront. His right-hand man was
Tim Parsey, Consumer Experience Officer, another new position within the company. Parseys experience at Apple gave him an understanding of the strategic importance of product design: If you dont
use design as a weapon, then youre not going to surviveDesign had been more of a servicecould
you decorate this box?instead of a provocative force in its own right.25
As Frost and Parsey struggled to change Motorola from within, there was an ominous change in
the market. This time the tidal wave came from Asia and from a company that had barely been on
Motorolas radar screen: Samsung. The South Korean company, which had primarily been associated
with cheap consumer durables, had entered the U.S. cell phone market in 1997 with a clam-shaped
silver phone priced at $149.26 It was a successful debut. But as an unknown brand in a field of wellestablished competitors, Samsung knew it had to take a different approach from its competitors. Its
strategy: develop a strong relationship with the service providers to push its brand to consumers. When
Nokia and Motorola balked at putting the service providers names on their phones, Samsung complied. Within five years, Samsung had climbed from nowhere to a distant fourth behind Nokia, Motorola,
and Siemens.
By 2002, Samsung was poised to become a force in its own right. It planned to take the lead by
introducing in the U.S. the color screens and camera phones that were already a hit in Asia. After
reaching an agreement with T-Mobile in April, Samsung assembled 80 designers and engineers from its
chip, telecom, display, computing, and manufacturing operations to develop a prototype. The company then flew 30 engineers to Seattle to field-test the phones for T-Mobile servers and networks.27 By
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November, the phones were rolling off the production line. Priced at $350a 20% premium over
other phonesT-Mobile reported sales of 300,000 units the first month.28 By year-end, global sales of
Samsung phones had increased 51%, and the average price of a Samsung phone was $230.29
Believing U.S. and European customers would not be willing to pay for these features, Motorola
and Nokia had bet against investing in development of similar phones. Once they realized their mistake, they were too far behind to catch up. Both companies missed the Christmas season. When they
got to market in mid-2003, sales had slowed and prices had plummeted. Nokias sales were almost flat,
with an average selling price of $154; Motorolas sales rose only 4%, with an average selling price of
$147.30 Motorola was no longer just trying to catch up with Nokia; it was trying to stay ahead of
Samsung. Acknowledged Frost, The one that keeps you up at night is Samsung.31
Frost needed managements commitment to meet the Samsung challenge. But first he needed to
get their attention. He took the extreme step of assembling 240 of the top brass to listen to nine young
men, ages 18 to 24, whom he flew into Chicago to sound off about the companys cell phones. Motorolas
problem is, Samsung kicks ass, one young man told the audience of top bananas. That started a cascade
of complaints. Even the revered Nextel walkie-talkie phone came in for a shellacking. Thats a product
plumbers or construction workers with low-slung pants use, said another.32 The insults were exactly
what Frost had in mind. And it worked. He finally got the resources to begin developing a top-notch
design team; within a year, he had added 120 designersdoubling the staffand opened new design
studios, including one in Milan, to soak up the fashion vibes.
By mid-2003, Mike Zs and Teresa Mettys efforts to improve operations culminated in the unveiling of three new clamshell phonesthe V300, V500, and V600. The three phones were dubbed The
Triplets because they were the first products to be based on Motorolas new strategy of delivering
differentiated products from a common platform. All featured color screens with double the resolution
of most displays and were based on Motorolas cheaper and more powerful i250 chipset. But they had
different features and sold at different price points.
Now that he had product to run with, Geoffrey Frost began his branding assault in earnest. Using
guerrilla marketing tactics, he gave away handsets to hip-hop artists and sought movie placements. He
held a partywith celebrities in attendanceon the rooftop of a hip Manhattan hotel to unveil the
new products. And he collaborated with the advertising agency on an edgy new campaign, featuring
young, hip consumers and headlines like HelloMoto and DivaMoto. The Rolling Stones were out;
cutting-edge deejays like Paul Van Dyk and Felix Da Housecat were in.
Despite the teams efforts, 2003 was not a good year. Motorola trimmed costs by 20% per handset, but prices dropped 13%.33 Motorola introduced a dozen new camera phones; Samsung launched
20. Motorola changed its product line every 12 to 18 months; Samsung changed its every nine months.34
And once again, Motorola missed the U.S. Christmas selling season. It failed to deliver Verizons camera
phone on time because of delays in testing. Cingular didnt get its phones until mid-Decembertoo
late for any major marketing effort.35 During 2003, Motorolas market share dropped from 16.3% to
14.5%, while Samsung increased its share from 9.8% to 10.8% and Nokia held onto the lead with
34.8%.36 Citing differences with Motorolas Board on the direction of the company, Christopher Galvin
resigned.

Motorolas Transformation (2004-2005)

The Board selected Ed Zander, the former head of Sun Microsystems, as the new CEO. While many
inside Motorola took the choice of an outsider to be a slap in the face, the business press applauded the
choice: Motorola is an engineer-driven company, not well attuned to customer needs. It spends millions on R&D that never sees the light of day. And having lost confidence in itself, it needs a shot in the
arm [Ed Zander] has the people skills, marketing expertise, operational background, and leadership
ability to engineer a turnaround.37 Zander characterized his task as a turn-up, not a turnaround.
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His challenge, as he saw it, was to become more customer-focused and to do a better job at moving
R&D out of the lab and into the marketplace.
To start, he began to break down barriers within the organization. Padmasree Warrior, Motorolas
chief technology officer, says a day-long meeting between marketing and engineering was the first in her
20 years at the company. To ensure a change in working relationships, Zander asked her to spend no
more than 70% of her time on operational issues.38 He also shifted the balance of power to designers.
According to one designer, It used to be the engineers threw us a chunk of circuit boards and said, Put
some plastic around that. Now we base everything on some experience we want to project and then
have the engineering team help us get there.39
Still, Zanders first year was no picnic. Quarter after quarter, market share slipped; Samsung overtook Motorola as the Number 2 global brand of cell phones. Motorolas stock continued to tumble. By
his own account, Zander underestimated the insular nature of the company. He would later recall
thinking, we ought to get back to putting the customer first. Why werent we talking about Verizon
every day? ...I noticed that after three weeks, nobody was in my office to call a customer. I thought it was
strange. In my previous life, wed bring a customer in or wed be pounding away at our market share.
And I just didnt see that. So I asked who our top customers are and started calling them, and then
visiting them, one by one.40
Motorolas turnaround finally came with the introduction of the RAZR in mid-2004. At 3.9
inches long, 2 inches wide, and -inch thick with a large, vivid color screen, the RAZR was, simply put,
a beauty.41 It worked on all four bands of GSM/GPRS standard, allowing it to work in Europe as well
as in the U.S. With prices ranging from $499 to $799, it was expensive enough that most carriers didnt
think it would sell. Cingular took the chance and reaped the rewards. We actually had two customers
get in a fight over the RAZR, said one Cingular store manager.42 Hip-hop impresario, Russell Simmons,
took one look at the phone and declared it hot.43
Throughout the products development, Geoffrey Frost was the RAZRs primary cheerleader.
Once it was ready for market, he insisted the company move away from the common practice of naming phones with numbers and letters to a naming system reminiscent of instant messaging. He also
orchestrated a big launch, including TV advertising and an appearance in a Gwen Stefani music video.
Later, Russian tennis pro Maria Sharapova was enlisted to promote the phone, and the company sent
RAZRs to key Oscar nominees.44
Expecting to sell two million handsets in the first year, Motorola sold more than ten times that
number.45 By the end of 2005, Motorolas market share had jumped to 18.7%solidifying its lead over
Samsung with a 12.5% share.46 With the RAZRs success, Frost saw the opportunity to spin an appealing narrative about how Motorola was cool againa story he shopped widely throughout the media
and with analysts. It worked. As one analyst put it, Two years ago, Motorola was your dads old radio
company. Today it is a hip, cool brand for younger users.47
Thus, it was the RAZRborn of the efforts of former CEO Christopher Galvins team of outsiders and the support of new CEO Ed Zanderthat led to Zanders triumphant performance at the 2006
annual shareholders meeting.

History Repeats: Motorola Falters in the Handset Market (2006)

In November 2005, the company was stunned and saddened by the sudden death of Geoffrey Frost,
who only days before had been promoted to Executive VP-Chief Marketing Officer.48 The loss was both
personal and professional, as the need for marketing leadership had never been greater. In the fastmoving cell phone market, it was time for an innovative new product that would enable Motorola to
build on RAZRs success. Motorolas management knew this, but disagreed on how it could be accomplished.49
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In the end, management decided to introduce a higher-end phone, the KRZR, to win more
status-conscious customers and boost profit margins, while using RAZR to build market share. RAZR
prices were slashed, and service providers were soon offering the RAZR for $30 or even free with a
service contract.50,51,52 Sales of RAZR soared, but KRZR was a disappointment. The two brands werent
clearly differentiated, and consumers didnt see sufficient added value with KRZR. Market share was
gained, but at the expense of profit margins.53,54
Other attempts to extend the brand while maintaining the cachet of the instant-messaging naming conventionthe SLVR, PEBL, RCKRsimilarly failed to win consumer response.55,56 Hence, the
losses that began in late 2006 continued into 2007. To make matters worse, Motorola lagged behind
competitors in the development of third-generation (3G) technology, which allows phones to handle
high volumes of data and to play music and video. Motorolas competitors had already bet that these
features would dominate the market in the near future.57
It was this series of blunders which led to Zanders humbled position at the 2007 annual shareholders meeting. This, and Steve Jobss announcement that the new iPhone was set to launch in June
2007.58

Notes
1

Wolinsky, Howard (2006). Motorolas Zander Basks in Glory of Very Good Year for Schaumburg Giant, The
Chicago Sun-Times. May 2, 47.
2
Stone, Brad (2007). Motorola Ties Its Rebound to a Sequel and New Gear, The New York Times, May 16, C3.
3
Taylor, Paul (2007). Motorola Seeks to Reverse First Quarter, Financial Times, London, April 19, 28.
4
Strahler, Steven R. (2007). Zander Faces Next Test: Motorola Chief under Pressure to Make Deeper Cuts in
Costs. Crains Chicago Business. May 14, 2.
5
Pringle, David, Jesse Drucker and Evan Ramstad (2004). World Circuit: Cellphone Makers Pay a Heavy Toll
for Missing Fads, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30, A1.
6
Hochman, Paul (1996). Worlds Smallest, Lightest Cellular Phone: Motorola StarTAC, Forbes, Winter, 137.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Mehta, Stephanie N. (1998). When They Build a Better Cell Phone, Less is Usually More, Wall Street Journal,
August 24, A1.
11
Stone, Brad (2005). Motorolas Good Call, Newsweek, March 14, 42.
12
Petersen, Andrea (2001). Softer Sell: Once-Mighty Motorola Stumbled When It Began to Act that Way.
13
Daniel, Caroline (2002). Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call, FT.com, October 23, 1.
14
Petersen. Softer Sell.
15
Ibid.
16
Condon, Bernard (2003). Booby Prize, Forbes, May 12, 104.
17
Petersen, Softer Sell.
18
Ibid.
19
Ojo, Bolaji (2003). Motorolas Master Plumber, EBN, March 31, 21.
20
Daniel, Caroline. Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call.
21
Ojo. Motorolas Master Plumber.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Daniel, Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call.
25
Ibid.
26
Edwards, Cliff, Moon Ihlwan, and Pete Engardio (2003). The Samsung Way, Business Week, June 16.
27
Ibid.
28
Ibid.
29
Pringle, David, Jesse Drucker, and Evan Ramstad (2003). World Circuit: Cellphone Makers Pay a Heavy Toll
for Missing Fads, Wall Street Journal, Oct. 30: A1.
30
Edwards et al. The Samsung Way.
31
Daniel. Motorola Answers a Wake-Up Call.
32
Tatge, Mark (2003). Recharged, Forbes, September 15, 62.
33
Ibid.
34
Edwards et al. The Samsung Way.
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35

Drucker, Jesse (2003). Leading the News: Motorola to Miss Key Season to Sell its Camera Phones, Wall Street
Journal, September 26, A3.
36
Pringle, David (2004). Motorola Trails Rivals Growth in Cellphones, Wall Street Journal, February 4, B5.
37
Roberts, Bill (2004). Dialing It Up a Notch at Motorola, Electronic Business, March 30, 3: 2.
38
Rhoads, Christopher (2004). Motorola Shows Signs of Life, Wall Street Journal, July 23, A10.
39
Crockett, Roger O. (2005). How Motorola Got its Groove Back, Business Week, August 8: 68.
40
Rhoads, Christopher (2005). Boss Talk: Motorolas Modernizer, Wall Street Journal, June 23, B1.
41
Mossberg, Walter S. (2004). Handsome New Phone by Motorola Is Skinny, Sleekand Expensive, Wall Street
Journal, November 4, B1.
42
Pringle, David, Christopher Rhoads, and Evan Ramstad (2004). The Gift of Gab, Wall Street Journal,
December 16, B1.
43
Crockett, Roger O. (2004). Phone Magic, Business Week, November 8, 112.
44
Rhoads, Christopher, and Li Yuan (2007). Dropped Call: How Motorola Fell a Giant Step Behind, Wall Street
Journal (Eastern Edition), April 27, p. A1.
45
Lashinsky, Adam (2006). RAZRs Edge, Fortune, June 12, 124.
46
Silver, Sara (2005). Can Motorola Ride RAZRs Edge? Wall Street Journal, December 13, C1.
47
Cuneo, Alice Z. (2005). Frosts Death Leaves Legacy, Leadership Void, Advertising Age, November 21.
48
Ibid.
49
Rhoads and Yuan, Dropped Call.
50
Hughlett, Mike (2007). Motorolas Circle of Woes Widens, Knight Ridder Tribune Business News,
Washington, May 6, p. 1.
51
Yuan, Li, and Joann S. Lublin (2007), Motorolas Call for Help; A Management Shuffle May Signal Boards
Impatience with Zander, Wall Street Journal (Eastern Edition), March 23, A6.
52
Stone, Brad (2007), Motorola Ties Its Rebound to a Sequel and New Gear, The New York Times, May 16, C3.
53
Anonymous (2007). Motorola: Upwardly Mobile? Marketing Week, London, March 1, 22.
54
Hughlett. Motorolas Circle of Woes Widens.
55
Crockett, Roger O., and Olga Khaif (2007). All This and Icahn, Too; As Ed Zander Battles Falling Earning,
Motorola Attracts a Demanding Investor, Business Week, Feb. 12, 4021, 34.
56
Stone. Motorola Ties Its Rebound to a Sequel and New Gear.
57
Rhoads and Yuan. Dropped Call.
58
Hughlett, Mike (2007). Motorola Short on New: Phone Unveiling Lacked Substance, Analysts Note, Knight
Ridder Tribune Business News, Washington, May 16, 1.

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