Clint Peterson Lawsuit

Case 3:15-cv-00247-M Document 1 Filed 01/23/15
Page 1 of 18 PageID 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION
KRISTINE PETERSON ON BEHALF OF THE
CIVIL ACTION NO.:
MINOR CHILD KENDRA PETERSON, MELISSA JUDGE:
PETERSON, AND SHERRY HORNE, ALL
MAGISTRATE:
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS LAWFUL HEIRS OF AND
TO THE ESTATE OF CLINTON EUGENE
CHAVEZ PETERSON, DECEASED, AND
ESTATE OF CLINTON EUGENE CHAVEZ
PETERSON, DECEASED,
Plaintiffs,
V.
CITY OF DUNCANVILLE, DALLAS COUNTY,

TEXAS, ROBERT D. BROWN, JR., IN HIS
CAPACITY AS CHIEF OF POLICE, AND
OFFICERS JOHN DOE I, JOHN DOE II, AND
JOHN DOE III, IN THEIR RESPECTIVE
INDIVIDUAL AND OFFICIAL CAPACITIES,
Defendants.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
I.
1.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE:
The present action arises out of the October 28, 2013, tragic shooting death of Clinton
Eugene Chavez Peterson, (Peterson), a competent adult of the full age of majority and
consent who died after being shot at point-blank range by City of Duncanville Police Officer(s)
John Doe I (Doe I), John Doe II (Doe II), and/or John Doe III (Doe III).
2.
Officer Doe I discharged his firearm in Petersons direction on multiple occasions, with
one (1) of the officers shots striking the right side of Petersons head directly behind the ear and
causing Petersons agonizing death in the minutes which followed.
3.
Officer(s) Doe II and/or Doe III likewise discharged firearm(s) into, at, near, and/or in the
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.
PAGE 1 OF 18
direction or vicinity of Peterson.

4.
The Dallas County Medical Examiners Office performed an autopsy upon Petersons
body and conclusively ruled his death to be a gun-inflicted homicide.

II.
5.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE:
This Honorable Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this civil action[] arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1331.
6.
In particular, Plaintiffs allege, inter alia, Defendants are liable pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 for violating both their own Constitutional rights as well as those of Peterson through the
use of plainly excessive, unreasonable, unnecessary, and ultimately deadly force.
7.
This Court also has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1343(a)(3-4).
8.
This Court has pendent jurisdiction over Plaintiffs state law claims against the City of
Duncanville, Texas, including those claims brought pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
Sec. 101.001, et. seq., all pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1367.
9.
Sovereign immunity has been waived for Plaintiffs state law claims against the City of
Duncanville, Texas pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Secs. 101.021, 101.025, and
101.0215.
10.
The events giving rise to this action occurred completely within the City of Duncanville,
County of Dallas, State of Texas, a geographical location which is wholly ensconced within the
jurisdictional boundaries of the United States District Court in and for the Northern District of
Texas. < http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/forms/scripts/showcitylink.cfm?city=Duncanville>
11.
Venue is proper in this Honorable Court through 28 U.S.C. 1391(b)(1-2) where, upon
information and belief, each and every named party Defendant herein works, resides, lives,
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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and/or is domiciled within the County of Dallas, State of Texas, a region which is within this
Honorable Courts geographical boundaries.
III.
12.
PARTIES:
Until his untimely death at age twenty-eight (28), Clinton Eugene Chavez Peterson was
at all times relevant to this Complaint a legal citizen of the United States of America and a
competent adult of the full age of majority and consent, domiciled, living, and residing in the
City of Duncanville, Texas, County of Dallas, State of Texas.
13.
There is no legal representative for Petersons estate; Peterson died intestate, and no
administration of the estate is required.

14.
Plaintiff Kendra Peterson is a minor child and the only descendant of decedent Peterson.
15.
Plaintiff Kendra Peterson appears herein by and through her mother, Kristine Peterson, a
competent adult of the full age of majority and consent, and both mother and daughter reside and
are domiciled within the County of Sevier, State of Utah.
16.
Kristine Peterson is decedent Petersons former spouse; however, Kristine Peterson and
the decedent were fully and finally divorced at the time of decedents death, and Kristine
Peterson appears herein solely in a representative capacity on behalf of the minor child Kendra
Peterson.
17.
The survival portion of this Complaint is brought by Kristine Peterson as legal
representative for and on behalf of decedent Petersons sole heir and descendant, the minor child
Kendra Peterson, which representation is made and done pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code Sec. 71.021.
18.
Kendra Peterson, by and through Kristine Peterson, is therefore entitled to bring the
instant survival action on behalf of decedent Peterson pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 3 OF 18
Secs. 71.004(b) and 71.021.

19.
In support of the foregoing allegation regarding the assertion of any/all tenable survival
claims, Plaintiff Kendra Peterson, by and through Kristine Peterson, would show she is the sole,
exclusive, and only descendant heir at law unto Petersons estate, and, therefore, she is entitled to
prosecute the survival claims made herein: Heirs at law can maintain a survival suit during the
four-year period the law allows for instituting administration proceedings if they allege and
prove that there is no administration pending and none [is] necessary. Shepherd v. Ledford, 962
S.W.2d 28, 31-32 (Tex. 1998), as quoted in Austin Nursing Center, Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d
845, 850-851 (Tex. 2005).
20.
Alternatively / conjunctively, and notwithstanding any statement heretofore made,
Plaintiffs aver the survival action asserted herein is brought by, for, through, and on behalf of the
Estate of Clinton Eugene Chavez Peterson, Deceased, an entity for which Plaintiff Kendra
Peterson, the decedents minor child who appears herein through her mother and guardian ad
litem Kristine Peterson, is and/or shall hereafter be the duly nominated and appointed personal
representative.
21.
Therefore, Plaintiff Kendra Peterson, by and through Kristine Peterson, brings the
survival action asserted herein in the capacity of personal representative of the Estate of Clinton
Eugene Chavez Peterson, Deceased, with the said entity being itself a named party plaintiff
herein.
22.
Plaintiff Melissa Peterson is the sister of Peterson, and she is a resident and domiciliary
of the City of Duncanville, County of Dallas, State of Texas.

23.
Plaintiff Sherry Horne (Horne) is the mother of Peterson, and she is a resident and
domiciliary of the County of Sevier, State of Utah.

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 4 OF 18
24.
As decedent Petersons sole surviving parent, Plaintiff Horne is entitled to join with
Plaintiff Kendra Peterson, decedents child, in bringing this wrongful death action on behalf of
decedent Peterson pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 71.004(b).
25.
Defendant City of Duncanville is a municipal government in the State of Texas that may
be served by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the City of Duncanvilles
Interim City Secretary, Shirley Acy-King, 203 East Wheatland Road, Duncanville, Texas 75116.
See, Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 17.024(a).
26.
The City of Duncanville operates and is responsible for the police department and is
therefore liable for the conduct of the Officers named as defendants; furthermore, the City of
Duncanville is liable for the said police departments constitutional violations as described
herein.
27.
Defendant Chief of Police Robert D. Brown, Jr. (Brown), is alleged upon information
and belief to be a citizen and resident of the State of Texas and an employee of Defendant City
of Duncanville, a municipal government within the State of Texas.
28.
Defendant Brown may be served with service of process at 203 East Wheatland Road,
Duncanville, Texas 75116, or wherever he may be found.

29.
Defendants Officer John Doe I (Doe I), Office John Doe II (Doe II), and Officer John
Doe III (Doe III) are all individuals who, upon information and belief, are citizens, residents,
and domiciliaries of the State of Texas and employees of Defendant City of Duncanville, a
municipal government in the State of Texas.
30.
At all times herein relevant, Doe I, Doe II, and Doe III acted as agents, servants, and/or
employees of the City of Duncanville and under color of the state law of Texas.
31.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this complaint in order to formally name and serve
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 5 OF 18
the officers temporarily identified as Doe I, Doe II, and Doe III.
32.
Plaintiffs reserve the right to supplement and amend this complaint to name and serve
such other individuals and/or entities whose liability for the action(s) herein alleged is shown,
proven, and/or revealed by and through pretrial discovery.
IV.
33.
CONDITIONS PRECEDENT:
Any/all required conditions precedent have been performed or have already occurred, and
this matter is presently ripe for adjudication on the merits.

V.
34.
COMPLIANCE WITH NOTICE PROVISIONS:
Plaintiffs timely presented their claims to Defendants, and Defendants have therefore
received ample and sufficient actual and constructive notice of Plaintiffs claims as required by
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 101.101.
VI.
35.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
On or about Monday, October 28, 2013, at or near 08:00 AM CST, Peterson was
cornered, attacked, pursued, shot, and killed by Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, all police officers
with the Duncanville Police Department who had been summoned to the 400 block of Kelly
Court in the City of Duncanville in response to a 911 call.
36.
Peterson was in the area on this date making a social call upon the home where his sister,
Defendant Melissa Peterson, was currently residing.

37.
Peterson maintained an intermittent relationship with one of Melissa Petersons
housemates, Debra, and by all accounts he traveled to the home on the morning of October 28,
2013, to speak with this acquaintance.
38.
Melissa Peterson advised her brother that Debra did not wish to speak with him, and,
after Melissa was unable to convince Peterson to depart, Debras daughter, Shyanna, came out to
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 6 OF 18
speak with Peterson.

39.
Peterson told the daughter he was departing, and he asked for a cigarette to take with him
when he left.
40.
Meanwhile, Debra, Petersons acquaintance, was indoors calling 911 to report Peterson
remaining on the premises after being asked to depart.

41.
Shyanna asked Peterson to wait outside, and Shyanna went indoors to retrieve the
requested cigarette.
42.
While back indoors, Shyanna heard her mother (Debra) speaking with the 911 operator.
43.
Shyanna related to her mother than Peterson was soon to depart, and she also told her
mother to relate a warning unto the 911 operator that Peterson was not violent and was unlikely
to harm anyone, including himself.
44.
Debra related this message to the operator, specifically stressing that Peterson was not
violent, had made no threats, was unarmed, had committed no serious crime(s) / violation(s), and
was very unlikely to harm anyone.
45.
Shyanna, Debra, and Melissa Peterson all came back outside to find Peterson walking
away from the home as two (2) or more Duncanville police officersDoe I, Doe II, and/or Doe
IIIdrove toward him and parked along the street.
46.
These officers quickly disembarked from their vehicle(s) and pursued the departing
Peterson on foot.
47.
The officers managed to corral Peterson into a corner whereupon one of the officers
presumed to be Defendant Doe IIdeployed a TASER device towards Peterson.

48.
At the moment of the TASER deployment, Peterson was standing face-to-face with the
officers, and he was slowly backing away.

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 7 OF 18
49.
At no point during the entire encounter did Peterson make any verbal or physical threats
unto the officers.

50.
At all points during the encounter, Peterson acted defensivelyattempting at all times to
withdraw from his encounter rather than engage with Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III.
51.
At no point during Petersons encounter with Defendants Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III
did Peterson evidence any predilection towards causing a significant threat of death or serious
physical injury to the officer or others. See, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct.
1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
52.
Instead, and much like the victim in Echols v. Gardiner, H-11-0882 (S.D.Tex.
12/3/2013), --- F.Supp.2d ---, 2013 WL 6243736, Peterson simply attempted to walk away.
53.
Even after Defendants Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III initiated a physical encounterby
cornering Peterson and deploying a TASERPeterson separated himself from his assailants and
tried to get away.
54.
Unfortunately, when the TASER deployment failed to stop Petersons attempted peaceful
departure, Defendant Doe I once again needlessly escalated the situation by firing two (2) rounds
at Peterson, a passive, non-violent, and wholly unarmed victim.
55.
Doe I fired these two (2) shots at close range, both shots were made in quick succession,
and it is believed that it was the second shot which fatally struck Peterson in the right side of the
head, just behind his right ear.
56.
Both of Officer Doe Is shots were fired while Peterson was attempting to disengage and
flee from the encounter.

57.
After being struck in the head by a bullet travelling slightly back to front, right to left,
and downward, Peterson collapsed into a nearby driveway.

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 8 OF 18
58.
Officers Doe II and/or Doe III also each discharged a firearm into, at, near, and/or in the
direction or vicinity of Peterson.

59.
Thereafter, Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III stood guard over Petersons body as he
lay dying, and they specifically prevented Petersons family and friends from touching or even
approaching Peterson.
60.
Shockingly, neither officer even checked to see if Peterson were still alive; instead,
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III simply stood guard over Petersons dying body until a
medical unit appeared some fifteen (15) minutes laterby which time Peterson had quite
literally bled to death on the ground in full view of his friends and family (including his sister
and bystander claimant, Plaintiff Melissa Peterson).
VII.
61.
CAUSES OF ACTION:
Plaintiffs adopt, restate, and incorporate those allegations contained in Paragraphs One
(1) through Sixty (60) in their entirety, as if fully copied and set forth in extenso herein.
A.
62.
42 U.S.C. 1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III are liable unto Plaintiffs under 42 U.S.C. 1983
because they used excessive force against Peterson in violation of Petersons rights under the
Fourth Amendment.
63.
The force utilized by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III caused Peterson to suffer
injury (i.e., death) resulting directly, solely, singularly, and only from a use of force that was
clearly excessive, and the excessiveness of the utilized force was clearly unreasonable. See,
Freeman v. Gore, 483 F.3d 404, 416 (5th Cir. 2007).
64.
The force utilized by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III was excessive, unreasonable,
and unnecessary because:

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 9 OF 18
a.
Well-established jurisprudence provides: A police officer may not seize an

unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. Tennessee v. Garner,
471 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 1701, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
b.
Peterson was unarmed, known to be unarmed, and in close physical proximity to

three (3) fully armed officers;
c.
Peterson never threatened the safety of Officer Doe I, Officer Doe II, Officer Doe
III, nor any other person;
d.
Peterson thus posed no threat (immediate or otherwise) to himself, to the officers,

or to others;
e.
Peterson was at all times attempting to disengage and remove himself from the
seizure attempted by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III;
f.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III failed to obtain and/or heed available
information relating to Petersons relatively peaceful demeanor before pursuing
and attempting to forcibly detain Peterson;
g.
Officer Doe I utilized a method of force (close-range firearm discharge) which

was clearly excessive to the need;
h.
Officer Doe I fired two (2) shots at or near Petersons head, although shots
deployed on a lower trajectory could have effected Petersons apprehension
(albeit still unlawfully) while being much less likely to cause Petersons
immediate, traumatic death;
i.
Officer Doe II and/or Officer Doe III each discharged a firearm into, at, near,
and/or in the direction or vicinity of Peterson;
j.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
There were a sufficient number of officers on the scene to subdue Petersona

PAGE 10 OF 18
young man who was non-violent, unarmed, and who failed to present any threat
(real or otherwise) to himself or those surrounding himwithout the use of
deadly force;
k.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III caused the use of deadly force against
Peterson while Peterson was actively seeking to disengage and flee; and,
l.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III utilized deadly force even though Peterson
remained in close proximity and well-within the immobilization range of a
deployed TASER device.
65.
It would have been obvious to a reasonable officer that the conduct of Officers Doe I,
Doe II, and/or Doe III was excessive, unreasonable, unnecessary, and unlawful in the
circumstances of this case.
66.
The force used by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III was objectively unreasonable
under the circumstances, and these officers actions violated Petersons clearly established
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable and/or excessive force.
67.
At all times herein relevant, Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III were acting under
color of state law.

68.
The unreasonable, unnecessary, and wholly excessive use of force by Officers Doe I, Doe
II, and/or Doe III proximately caused Peterson to suffer personal injury and, ultimately, caused
his painful, traumatic, tragic, and utterly needless death.
69.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III are also liable unto Plaintiff Melissa Peterson for
her bystander injury claims.

70.
Melissa Peterson is the decedents sister, and she was present both when Peterson was
fatally shot and while he lay unattended and dying on a nearby driveway.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 11 OF 18
71.
Accordingly, Melissa Peterson suffered acute shock as a result of the direct emotional
impact sustained from the contemporaneous, eyewitness observance of her brothers homicide.
72.
Melissa Peterson suffered and continues to suffer extreme emotional distress as a result
of the conduct of Defendants Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, and Ms. Melissa Peterson is therefore
entitled to past (i.e., accrued) and future (i.e., prospective) mental anguish damages.
B.
73.
42 U.S.C. 1983 Claims Against City of Duncanville
Petersons injuries and resulting death were also proximately caused by the grossly
negligent and consciously indifferent conduct of the City of Duncanville.

74.
Specifically, the City of Duncanville formally or informally adopted, maintained, and
implemented official customs, practices, and policies by which the City of Duncanville:
a.
Failed to properly train and supervise its police officers in the use of deadly force,
including training and supervision concerning when deadly force should be
withheld;
b.
Provided its police officers with excessively broad discretion in both the use of
force and the amount of force used without considering less drastic alternatives;
and,
c.
Permitted and encouraged the unprovoked use of force to intimidate, coerce, or

subdue non-violent individuals.
75.
The City of Duncanville knew or reasonably should have known that these customs,
practices, and policies would result in the violation of constitutional rights of individuals like
Peterson.
76.
Upon information and belief, the grossly negligent and deliberately indifferent nature of
the City of Duncanvilles customs, practices, and policies is established by numerous official
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 12 OF 18
and/or unofficial complaints of police misconduct as well as lawsuits / claims made against the
City of Duncanville relative to police incidents involving excessive use of force.
77.
As a direct result of the City of Duncanvilles customs, practices, and policies, Officers
Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III employed improper and excessive force by:
a.
Seeking to seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect through the use of lethal

force;
b.
Using a TASER when the use of such instrumentality was grossly inappropriate in
the premises;
c.
Failing to properly utilize and deploy the said TASER device in a manner which
would have (however unlawfully) detained Peterson without the subsequent
escalation of force which followed;
d.
Deploying a firearm in the direction of Petersons head;
e.
Shooting a fleeing suspect (Peterson) in the head rather that at a point lower in the
body; and,
f.
Discharging a firearm in the direction of an unarmed and non-dangerous suspect

who was actively fleeing;
78.
The City of Duncanville had actual or constructive knowledge that its customs, practices,
and policies were dangerous and certain to result in the violation of constitutional rights.
79.
Upon information and belief, the City of Duncanville knew or reasonably should have
known from multiple complaints and lawsuits that injuries and death were resulting and/or likely
to result from its officers misuse of force before Peterson was gunned down.
80.
The City of Duncanvilles failure to address and correct these customs, practices, and
policies demonstrates the City of Duncanvilles deliberate disregard for the constitutional rights
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 13 OF 18
and safety of individuals subject to the City of Duncanvilles law enforcement activities.
81.
The Citys customs, practices, and policies, therefore, amounted to conscious indifference
to the rights of citizens such as Peterson, especially considering the magnitude of harm that was
likely to result from the misuse of a TASER device and/or a high-powered firearm.
C.
82.
The Citys Unlawful Policy and Custom
Chief of Police Robert D. Brown, Jr. is an official policymaker in and for the City of
Duncanville.
83.
Causing the deployment of dangerous and deadly weaponry against unarmed, non-violent
suspects forms an official municipal policy and custom of the City of Duncanville.
84.
This policy is attributable unto the City of Duncanvilles Police Department because the
said Departments policymaker, Chief Brown, has tolerated and acquiesced to such behavior.
85.
Such policy and custom do violate the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections
which were due unto Peterson.

86.
The City of Duncanvilles Chief of Police had policymaking authority both explicitly
through the Citys written ordinances and implicitly as a result of the delegation of authority and
the customs and practices of the City of Duncanville City Council.
87.
Chief Brown had authority to establish binding city policy respecting matters relating to
the police department and to adjust that policy for changing circumstances.
88.
Such authority is reflected in the City of Duncanvilles ordinances delegating all
policymaking authority for the police department unto Chief Brown.

89.
The unreasonable and excessive use of force by Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III
was made and done in accordance with the City of Duncanvilles policies, procedures, practices,
and customs.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 14 OF 18
90.
In fact, the City of Duncanvilles practices and customs allowed for and even directed an
excessive use of force in response to the Peterson circumstance.

91.
These deficient customs, policies, and practices are a direct and proximate cause of the
unlawful use of excessive force against Peterson.

92.
These deficient policies, procedures, practices, and custom proximately caused the
unconstitutional use of force against Peterson.

93.
As a direct result of these constitutional violations, Peterson suffered severe injuries,
damages, and death, and the named Plaintiffs herein suffered a multiplicity of damages and
attendant losses arising out of, by, and through these said violations.
D.
94.
Claims under the Texas Tort Claims Act
The City is also liable pursuant to Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Sec. 101.021 because
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III acted within the course and scope of their respective
employment when they individually and/or collectively utilized tangible personal property in
effecting the negligent injury of Peterson.
95.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, together with the City of Duncanville, owed the
following affirmative duties unto Peterson:

a.
Exercising reasonable care to avoid foreseeable risk of injury to others;
b.
Taking appropriate, affirmative action(s) to control or avoid increasing the risk of

danger to others;
c.
Exercising reasonable care to protect others from dangers that are under the
Defendants control;
d.
Using force only when reasonably necessary;
e.
Using only reasonable force;
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 15 OF 18
f.
Using only the minimum amount of force necessary to subdue or restrain an

individual absent the need for the use of deadly force; and
g.
96.
Ceasing the use of force once it becomes unnecessary.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III breached these duties in their use of force in this
case as described in detail above.

97.
The negligent acts of Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III, together with those of the
City of Duncanville, proximately caused Petersons injuries and death.

98.
Consequently, the City of Duncanville is liable under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Secs.
71.001 et seq. (wrongful death action) and 71.021 (survival action).

VIII. PUNITIVE DAMAGES:
99.
Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III acted with malice and gross neglect in their use of
force against Peterson, resulting in Petersons injury and death.

100.
The City of Duncanville acted with malice or gross neglect in the development,
maintenance, and/or implementation of its formal and informal customs, practices, and policies
that violated Petersons constitutional rights and resulted in Petersons injury and death.
101.
Consequently, both the City of Duncanville and Officers Doe I, Doe II, and/or Doe III are
liable for exemplary / punitive damages.

IX.
102.
JURY DEMAND:
In accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Plaintiffs demand a trial by jury
of all issues raised in this case.

X.
103.
ATTORNEYS FEES:
Plaintiffs are entitled to recover attorneys fees, costs, litigation expenses, and expert
fees, all as allowed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988.

ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 16 OF 18
XI.
104.
JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY:
All Defendants are jointly and severally liable.

XII.
105.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the stated premises, Plaintiffs request that Defendants
be summoned to appear and answer, and that on final trial, judgment be granted against
Defendants, jointly and severally, for the following damages:
a.
Past and future medical expenses;
b.
Past and future compensatory damages;
c.
Past and future pain and suffering;
d.
Past and future mental anguish;
e.
Past and future lost wages;
f.
Funeral expenses;
g.
Punitive and exemplary damages;
h.
Pre-judgment and post-judgment interest;
i.
Costs of suit and attorneys fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1988;
j.
All other legal and equitable relief which may be necessary and proper to
effectuate the purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1983; and,
k.
Such other and further relief to which Plaintiffs may be justly entitled in these
premises.
SIGNATURES ON NEXT PAGE.
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
PAGE 17 OF 18
Respectfully Submitted,
LAW OFFICE OF J. CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, SR., LLC
Attorney and Counselor at Law

/s/ J. CHRISTOPHER ALEXANDER, SR., ESQ.
J. Christopher Alexander, Sr., Esq.
Louisiana Bar Roll No.: 26591
3751 Government Street, Suite A
Baton Rouge, Louisiana 70806
225-761-9456 (telephone)
225-761-7899 (facsimile)
chris@jcalaw.us
COHEN & ZWERNER, LLP
Attorneys at Law
/s/ DAVID F. ZWERNER, ESQ.
Mr. David F. Zwerner, Esq.
Texas Bar Roll No.: 22296800
211 North Record Street
Suite 450, LB 15
Dallas, Texas 75202
214-748-0681 (telephone)
214-742-7313 (facsimile)
cohzwerlaw@sbcglobal.net
ALEXANDER & ALEXANDER, P.C.
Attorneys and Counselors at Law
/s/ BRIAN BIENVENU ALEXANDER, ESQ.
Brian Bienvenu Alexander, Esq.
Mississippi Bar Roll No.: 99365
220 Bookter Street
Bay St Louis, Mississippi 39520
228-467-0048 (telephone)
228-467-3118 (facsimile)
brianalexander@bellsouth.net
ORIGINAL COMPLAINT
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Case 3:15-cv-00247-M Document 1 Filed 01/23/15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CITY OF DUNCANVILLE, DALLAS COUNTY,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE:

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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direction or vicinity of Peterson.

body and conclusively ruled his death to be a gun-inflicted homicide.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE:

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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administration of the estate is required.

The survival portion of this Complaint is brought by Kristine Peterson as legal

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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Secs. 71.004(b) and 71.021.

Alternatively / conjunctively, and notwithstanding any statement heretofore made,

of the City of Duncanville, County of Dallas, State of Texas.

domiciliary of the County of Sevier, State of Utah.

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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Duncanville, Texas 75116, or wherever he may be found.

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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this matter is presently ripe for adjudication on the merits.

COMPLIANCE WITH NOTICE PROVISIONS:

Defendant Melissa Peterson, was currently residing.

Peterson maintained an intermittent relationship with one of Melissa Petersons

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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speak with Peterson.

remaining on the premises after being asked to depart.

presumed to be Defendant Doe IIdeployed a TASER device towards Peterson.

officers, and he was slowly backing away.

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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unto the officers.

flee from the encounter.

and downward, Peterson collapsed into a nearby driveway.

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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direction or vicinity of Peterson.

42 U.S.C. 1983 Claims Against Individual Defendants

and unnecessary because:

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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Well-established jurisprudence provides: A police officer may not seize an

Peterson was unarmed, known to be unarmed, and in close physical proximity to

Peterson thus posed no threat (immediate or otherwise) to himself, to the officers,

Officer Doe I utilized a method of force (close-range firearm discharge) which

There were a sufficient number of officers on the scene to subdue Petersona

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color of state law.

her bystander injury claims.

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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42 U.S.C. 1983 Claims Against City of Duncanville

negligent and consciously indifferent conduct of the City of Duncanville.

Specifically, the City of Duncanville formally or informally adopted, maintained, and

Permitted and encouraged the unprovoked use of force to intimidate, coerce, or

CLINTON PETERSON, ET AL. V. DUNCANVILLE, ET AL.

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Seeking to seize an unarmed, non-dangerous suspect through the use of lethal

Deploying a firearm in the direction of Petersons head;