Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
normal increases which complainant would have received during the period
of her separation.
- Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the
NLRC which decided in favor of petitioner but was later reversed on appeal
with the NLRC.
- The Union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB)
of its intention to strike on the grounds of petitioners refusal to bargain.
Later, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and start
negotiating a new 5 year CBA for which the Union submitted its proposals.
Ambas protested a recent changing of her schedule and petitioner sent the
Union a letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination after which the
Union amended its notice of strike to include the said dismissal.
- Both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation
but petitioner stopped the negotiations after purportedly receiving
information that a new group of employees (ACEC) filed a petition for
certification election, giving rise to the issue of majority representation of
the employees.
- The Union finally went on strike and the Sec. of Labor and Employment
assumed jurisdiction, ordering those on strike to return to work and for
petitioner to accept them under the same terms before the strike. All were
readmitted except Ambas. The Sec. issued an order declaring petitioner
guilty of unfair labor practice and directing the reinstatement of Ambas
with backwages. Letrans MFR was denied and the CA affirmed the Sec.s
decision, hence this petition.
ISSUES:
1. WON petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain
with the union
2. WON the termination of the Ambas amounts to an interference of the
employees right to self-organization
HELD
1. YES
- Petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its stern refusal to bargain in
good faith with respondent union.
- Article 252 defines collective bargaining as the performance of a mutual
obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith
for the purpose of negotiating an agreement. The Union, in sending its
proposals during the 2nd CBA negotiations, kept up its end of the bargain
while Letran devised ways and means to prevent the negotiation.
- Letran also failed to make a timely reply to the Unions proposals (no
counter-proposal a month later), violating Article 250 which requires such a
reply within 10 days upon receipt of a written notice of said proposals.
Letrans refusal to reply is an indication of bad faith, showing a lack of
sincere desire to negotiate.
- In a last ditch effort, Letran suspended the bargaining process on the
ground that it allegedly received information that ACEC had filed a petition
for certification election. The mere filing of a petition for certification
election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of negotiations when
there is no legitimate representation issue raised; also, such an action for
intervention had already prescribed.
2. YES
- While we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of
an employee for just cause, the dismissal of employees must be made
within the parameters of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair
play and must be exercised in good faith. It must not amount to interfering
with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise of their right to selforganization as it would amount to unlawful labor practice under Article
248.
-It would appear that Letran terminated Ambas in order to strip the union
of a leader who would fight for her co-workers rights at the bargaining
table and frustrate their desire to form a new CBA. The charge of
insubordination was a mere ploy to give a color of legality to the action to
dismiss her. Management may have the prerogative to discipline its
employees for insubordination but when it interferes with employees right
to self-organization, it amounts to union-busting which is a prohibited act.
Disposition petition is DENIED for lack of merit
SALVADOR V PHILIPPINE MINING SERVICE CORP
395 SCRA 729
PUNO; January 22, 2003
FACTS
- JOSE V. SALVADOR was first employed by respondent in 1981. He rose
from the ranks and assumed the position of Plant Inspection Foreman in
1991. He was tasked to: (1) supervise plant equipment and facility
inspection; (2) confirm actual defects; (3) establish inspection standards
and frequency; (4) analyze troubles and recommend counter measures;
and (5) prepare weekly/monthly inspection schedule.[3]
- As early as March 1, 1985, respondent instituted the shift boss scheme
whereby the foreman from the Plant Section and the foreman from the
Mining Section rotate as shift boss throughout their night shift to oversee
and supervise both the mining and plant operations. The shift boss was
entrusted with the care, supervision and protection of the entire plant.
- Aside from his employment with respondent, petitioner co-owned and
managed LHO-TAB Enterprises, with his partner Ondo Alcantara. They were
engaged in the manufacture and sale of hollow blocks. On September 29,
1997, petitioners employment relation with respondent was tainted with
charges of pilferage and violation of company rules and policy, resulting to
loss of confidence. Respondents evidence disclose that on September 29,
1997, at about 9:30 a.m., Koji Sawa, respondents Assistant Resident
Manager for Administration, was on his way back to his office in the plant.
He and his driver, Roberto Gresones, saw petitioner operating respondents
payloader, scooping fine ore from the stockpile and loading it on his private
cargo truck. As the truck was blocking the access road leading to the
stockyards gate, Sawas car stopped near the stockpile and the driver
blew the horn thrice. Petitioner did not hear him because of the noise
emanating from his operation of the payloader. Sawas driver found a
chance to pass through when the payloader maneuvered to get another
scoop from the fine ore stockpile.
- As it was contrary to respondents standard operating procedure for the
plant foreman to operate the payloader, Sawa went to the administration
office to check the delivery receipt covering the loading operation of
petitioner that morning. However, sales-in-charge Eduardo Guangco was in
Indeed, in cases of this nature, the fact that petitioner has been employed
with the respondent for a long time, if to be considered at all, should be
taken against him, as his act of pilferage reflects a regrettable lack of
loyalty which he should have strengthened, instead of betrayed.
Disposition The petition is DENIED.
SANTOS V SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
399 SCRA 172
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ; March 14, 2003
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari
FACTS
Petitioner Carmelita Santos was appointed Finance Director of
respondent SMCs Beer Division for Luzon Operations.
On September 15, 1987, SMC issued a Memorandum prohibiting the
encashment of personal checks at respondent's Plants and Sales Offices.
Thereafter, SMC noticed that petitioner encashed her 3 personal checks in
various Metro Manila Sales Offices.
SMC commenced an audit investigation. Petitioner received from
respondent an inter-office memorandum requiring her to explain in writing
why no disciplinary action should be taken against her in view of her
unauthorized encashment of her 3 personal checks at respondent's sales
offices.
Petitioner admitted that she encashed three personal checks at
respondent's sales offices but claimed that such act was not irregular since
all personnel in respondent's Beer Division were allowed to encash their
personal checks at any sales office upon clearance from the region
management concerned. She stated that her encashment of personal
checks had prior clearance. She further clarified that only two of the three
checks she encashed were dishonored for insufficiency of funds, but she
promptly funded the checks upon receipt of notice of such dishonor,
thereby causing no damage to respondent.
- Meanwhile, the audit results revealed that, aside from petitioner's
reported encashment of 3 personal checks, she had previously encashed
50 personal checks in varying amounts, which were not endorsed by the
Sales Operations Manager or the Region Finance Officer. Additionally,
petitioner encashed 2 other personal checks. After receiving such report,
SMC formed an Investigating Panel to conduct a full-blown investigation.
- The Investigating Panel found the encashment by petitioner of her
personal checks with the region/sales offices as highly irregular
transactions to the detriment of the Company. It recommended that Santos
be terminated from employment.
- In a memorandum, SMC adopted the findings of the Investigating Panel
and informed petitioner of her termination from employment for abuse of
position as Finance Director, engaging in highly irregular transactions to
the detriment of the company and employer's loss of trust and confidence.
- The complaint filed by petitioner against SMC for illegal dismissal was
dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. The NLRC reversed the
Labor Arbiters decision. Upon an MR filed by SMC, the NLRC dismissed the
complaint filed by Santos. Hence, this recourse.
ISSUE: WON SMC dismissed the petitioner from employment without just
cause
HELD: NO
- Under the Labor Code, a valid dismissal from employment requires that:
(1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in Article 282 of
the Labor Code and (2) the employee must be given an opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself.Article 282(c) of the same Code provides that
"willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer" is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer.
This ground should be duly established. Substantial evidence is sufficient
as long as such loss of confidence is well-founded or if the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible
for the misconduct and her act rendered her unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded of her position. It must be shown, though, that the
employee concerned holds a position of trust. The betrayal of this trust is
the essence of the offense for which an employee is penalized.
- Petitioner argues that her position as Finance Director of respondent's
Beer Division is not one of trust but one that is merely functional and
advisory in nature. She possesses no administrative control over the plants
and region finance officers, including cashiers. She reports to two
superiors. Petitioner's argument is misplaced. As Finance Director, she is in
charge of the custody, handling, care and protection of respondent's funds.
The encashment of her personal checks and her private use of such funds,
albeit for short periods of time, are contrary to the fiduciary nature of her
duties.
- Moreover, petitioner has functional control over all the plant and region
finance officers, including cashiers, within the Luzon Operations Area. In
fact, she is the highest ranking managerial employee for the finance
section of the Luzon Beer Division Operations. Obviously, her position is a
factor in abetting the encashment of her personal checks.
- Indeed, there is substantial ground for respondent's loss of confidence in
petitioner. She does not deny encashing her personal checks at
respondent's sales offices and diverting for her own private use the latter's
resources. The audit investigation accounted for all the checks she
encashed, some of which were dishonored for insufficiency of funds. The
Investigating Panel concluded that petitioner not only encashed her
personal checks at respondent's sales offices, but also used company
funds to temporarily satisfy her insufficient accounts. This Court has held
that misappropriation of company funds, although the shortages had been
fully restituted, is a valid ground to terminate the services of an employee
of the company for loss of trust and confidence.
- Petitioner contends that there is a prolonged practice of other payroll
personnel, including persons in managerial levels, who encashed personal
checks but remained unpunished by respondent. She asserts that her
administrative superiors even encouraged her to encash her checks at the
nearest sales office since her appearance at the bank for encashment
would entail undue digression from her daily work routine.
- Prolonged practice of encashing personal checks among respondent's
payroll personnel does not excuse or justify petitioner's misdeeds. Her
willful and deliberate acts were in gross violation of respondent's policy
against encashment of personal checks of its personnel, embodied in its
JGB and Associates, Inc. vs. NLRC, G.R No. 10939, March 7, 1996
FACTS
- On February 25, 1990, before the expiration of his contract of
employment, private respondent was given notice by his employer that his
employment was terminated for the reason that his performance both in
productivity and efficiency was below average. The termination of his
employment took effect on the same day. He was immediately scheduled
to depart Saudi Arabia and on February 28, 1990, three days after his
dismissal, he found himself already in the Philippines.
- On March 12, 1990, private respondent filed with the POEA a complaint
against JGB and Associates, Inc., Tariq Hajj Architects and Country Bankers
Insurance Corporation, alleging illegal dismissal and seeking payment of
salaries corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment
contract, salary differential, refund of S.R. 1,000 which was withheld from
him for telephone bills, moral damages and attorneys fees.
- Petitioner averred that private respondent was dismissed for neglect of
duties and performance below par. Petitioner also alleged that although no
prior notice of dismissal was given to private respondent, he was given in
lieu thereof a notice pay equivalent to one month salary.
HELD
- Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones
duties.[2] Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties
for a period of time, depending upon the circumstances. On the other
hand, fraud and willful neglect of duties imply bad faith on the part of the
employee in failing to perform his job to the detriment of the employer and
the latters business.
- None of these causes is stated in the two letters of the employer as
reasons for dismissing private respondent. None of the reasons there
stated even approximates any of the causes provided in the contract of
employment for the termination of employment by the employer.
- Indeed, the grounds given for private respondents dismissal are nothing
but general, vague and amorphous allegations. As the NLRC noted, the
letters do not state particular acts which show that private respondent was
indeed negligent and that his performance was below par. Nor did
petitioner show the tangible financial loss which it claimed it suffered as a
result of private respondents alleged neglect of duty.
ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC erred in holding that CCBPI afforded petitioner due
process
2. WON the NLRC erred in upholding the dismissal despite its initial finding
that the CCBPI had implicitly tolerated petitioners driving without a license
3. WON the infraction committed by petitioner warrants the penalty of
dismissal despite the fact that it was his first offense during his 18 long
years of satisfactory and unblemished service
HELD
1. NO
Ratio The essence of due process does not necessarily mean or require a
hearing but simply a reasonable opportunity or a right to be heard or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side.
In labor cases, the filing of position papers and supporting documents fulfill
the requirements of due process.
Reasoning
- Aparente was fully aware that he was being investigated for his
involvement in the vehicular accident that took place on November 9,
1987. It was also known to him that as a result of the accident, the victim
suffered a 2 cm fracture on her skull which led to the latter's surgical
operation and confinement in the hospital for which CCBPI incurred
expenses amounting to P19,534.45 which FGU Insurance Corporation
refused to reimburse upon finding that he was driving without a valid
driver's license. Thus, being aware of all these circumstances and the
imposable sanctions under CCBPI's Code of Disciplinary Rules and
Regulations, he should have taken it upon himself to present evidence to
lessen his culpability.
2. NO
Reasoning
- According to Aparente, he informed the company that he had lost his
license five months before the accident. Notwithstanding such fact, the
company allowed him to continue driving the vehicle assigned to him.
Thus, he shifts the blame to the company, claiming that it should have
simply ordered him to desist from driving the vehicle once it was informed
of the loss of his license. His contention is belied by his very own admission
in his position papers filed before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the
company had in fact prohibited him from driving immediately after he lost
his license, and had requested him to secure a new license. However,
through misrepresentations, he led CCBPI to believe that he had procured
another driver's license. Thus, he was permitted to drive again.
3. YES
Ratio The law warrants the dismissal of an employee without making any
distinction between a first offender and a habitual delinquent where the
totality of the evidence was sufficient to warrant his dismissal. In
protecting the rights of the laborer, the law authorizes neither oppression
nor self-destruction of the employer.
Reasoning
- Company policies and regulations, unless shown to be grossly oppressive
or contrary to law, are generally valid and binding on the parties and must
be complied with until finally revised or amended, unilaterally or preferably
sales agent. This was tantamount to a demotion . She might not have
suffered any diminution in her basic salary but GLOBE et al. did not dispute
her allegation that she was deprived of all benefits due to another of her
rank and position, benefits which she apparently used to receive .
- Far from blaming SANTOS alone, FLORENDO also attributes her degraded
state to GLOBE et al. She cited GLOBE et al.'s indifference to her plight as
she was twice left out in a salary increase, without GLOBE et al. giving her
any reason. It eludes belief that GLOBE et al. were entirely in the dark as
the salary increases were granted across-the-board to all employees
except FLORENDO. It is highly improbable that the exclusion of FLORENDO
had escaped GLOBE et al.'s notice. The absence of an evaluation report
from SANTOS should have been looked into by GLOBE et al. for proper
action. If a salary increase was unwarranted, then it should have been
sufficiently explained by GLOBE et al. to FLORENDO. And despite GLOBE et
al.s claim that FLORENDO did not brought her problem against SANTOS to
the company's grievance machinery, it remains uncontroverted that
FLORENDO had inquired from GLOBE et al. why her other benefits had
been withheld and sought clarification for her undeserved treatment but
GLOBE and SANTOS remained mum.
- Thus, the dispute was not a mere private spat between FLORENDO and
her superior; the case overflowed into the realm of FLORENDO's
employment. And at the very least, GLOBE et al. were negligent in
supervising all of their employees.
- In constructive dismissal, the employer has the burden of proving that the
transfer and demotion of an employee are for just and valid grounds such
as genuine business necessity. The transfer must not involve a demotion in
rank or a diminution of salary and other benefits. If the employer cannot
overcome this burden of proof, the employee's demotion shall be
tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. The award of back wages in
the instant case is justified upon the finding of illegal dismissal.
Disposition CA decision that FLORENDO abandoned her work, SET ASIDE.
GLOBE et al. to pay FLORENDO full back wages from the time she was
constructively dismissed until her reinstatement, and to cause immediate
reinstatement of FLORENDO to her former position, without loss of
seniority rights and other benefits.
SECOND DIVISION [G.R. No. 156963. November 11, 2004.]
THE PHILIPPINE AMERICAN LIFE AND GENERAL INSURANCE CO.,
petitioner, vs. ANGELITA S. GRAMAJE, respondent.
SYNOPSIS
The respondent herein was employed by the petitioner as Assistant Vice
President and Head of the Pension Department and in concurrent capacity
as Trust Officer of Philam Savings Bank, a Philam Life subsidiary. Later, the
respondent was offered to leave her position without any explanation from
the management. She declined the offer, but was ordered to be transferred
to the legal department. She again declined to follow the order explaining
that she had been and would be more effective to her present position
than in the legal department. However, while on official sick leave, she
received a message on her pager that another officer was appointed to
handle her position at the pension department and that the office itself
was physically transferred to another place. When she returned, she found
out that her name was no longer on the official list of Philamlife employees.
Thereafter, she filed a case for illegal or constructive dismissal against
petitioner. The labor arbiter found that the respondent was not illegally
dismissed. The NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter. On appeal,
the Court of Appeals reversed the decision and ordered the petitioner to
pay respondent separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, plus other benefits
accruing to her. Hence, this petition. The issue to be resolved herein was
whether the respondent was constructively dismissed or was her transfer a
legitimate exercise of management prerogative.
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals.
According to the Court, bad faith and discrimination on the part of the
petitioner were profusely perceived from its actions. The managerial
prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law, collective
bargaining agreements, and general principles of fair play and justice.
(2) where the terms of settlement are unconscionable on their face are
invalid. In these cases, the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. There is no showing here that private respondents are
unsuspecting or gullible persons. Neither are the terms of the settlement
unconscionable.
Indeed, private respondents received a generous
separation package, as set out in the narration of facts above.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED and the decision of the NLRC ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE. TRO LIFTED
HELD: NO
- Clearly (under the Labor Code), retrenchment or reduction of the
workforce in cases of financial difficulties is recognized as a ground for the
termination of employment.
- Although petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit organization,
retrenchment as a measure adopted to stave off threats to its
existence is available to it.
- However, the employers prerogative to layoff employees is subject to
certain limitations set forth in Lopez Sugar Corporation v. Federation of
Free Workers as follows:
- Firstly, the losses expected should be substantial and not merely de
minimis in extent. If the loss purportedly sought to be forestalled by
retrenchment is clearly shown to be insubstantial and inconsequential in
character, the bonafide nature of the retrenchment would appear to be
seriously in question. Secondly, the substantial loss apprehended must
be reasonably imminent, as such imminence can be perceived objectively
and in good faith by the employer. There should, in other words, be a
certain degree of urgency for the retrenchment, which is after all a drastic
recourse with serious consequences for the livelihood of the employees
retired or otherwise laid-off. Because of the consequential nature of
retrenchment, it must, thirdly, be reasonably necessary and likely to
effectively prevent the expected losses. The employer should have taken
other measures prior or parallel to retrenchment to forestall losses, i.e., cut
other costs than labor costs. An employer who, for instance, lays off
substantial numbers of workers while continuing to dispense fat executive
bonuses and perquisites or so-called golden parachutes, can scarcely
claim to be retrenching in good faith to avoid losses. To impart operational
meaning to the constitutional policy of providing full protection to labor,
the employers prerogative to bring down labor costs by retrenching must
be exercised essentially as a measure of last resort, after less drastic
means - e.g., reduction of both management and rank-and-file bonuses
and salaries, going on reduced time, improving manufacturing efficiencies,
trimming of marketing and advertising costs, etc. - have been tried and
found wanting.
- Lastly, but certainly not the least important, alleged losses if already
realized, and the expected imminent losses sought to be
forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence.
The reason for requiring this quantum of proof is readily apparent: any less
exacting standard of proof would render too easy the abuse of this ground
for termination of services of employees.
- In addition to the above, the retrenchment must be implemented in
a just and proper manner. As held in Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v.
Ople:
there must be fair and reasonable criteria to be used in selecting
employees to be dismissed, such as: (a) less preferred status (e.g.
temporary employee); (b) efficiency rating; and (c) seniority.
- There is substantial evidence in the record to support the NLRCs finding
that the Society suffered financial distress as a result of growing deficits
which were not likely to abate. Petitioner presented to the NLRC the
balance sheets, financial statements, and the reports of its external
auditors for the years 1989 and 1990. We cannot, therefore, say that the
otherwise, a company could easily feign excuses to suit its whims and
prejudices or to rid itself of unwanted employees."
- In the case at bar, Petitioner Corporation claimed that the retrenchment
of private respondents was justified, because it suffered business losses, as
evidenced by its Comparative Statement of Revenue and Expenses for crop
years for two years. In their rebuttal, petitioners allege the following: (1)
the comparative financial statement of the corporation duly reflects its
income and expenses in a given taxable year and, despite its different
nomenclature, is substantially the same as a profit and loss statement or
any other financial statement; and (2) the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC) requires the certification of an independent certified public
accountant only if the taxpayer's gross receipts exceed P25,000 in any
quarter of any taxable year.
- The contentions of petitioners are untenable. A comparative statement of
revenue and expenses for two years, by itself, is not conclusive proof of
serious business losses. The Court has previously ruled that financial
statements audited by independent external auditors constitute the normal
method of proof of the profit and loss performance of a company. While
Petitioner Corporation avers that it was not required to file audited financial
statements under Section 232 of the Tax Code, it failed to establish its
exemption through any evidence showing that its quarterly gross revenues
did not exceed P25,000. Thus, its claim that it did not need to have its
financial statements certified by a certified public accountant is without
basis in fact and in law and does not excuse it from complying with the
usual requirement. Besides, the requirement of the Tax Code is one thing,
and the requirement of the Labor Code is quite another. Moreover, the
financial statement of Petitioner Corporation for two crop years is
insufficient proof of serious business losses that would justify the
retrenchment of private respondents.
MAYA FARMS EMPLOYEES ORGANIZATION, MAYA REALTY AND
LIVESTOCK SUPERVISORY UNION, MAYA FARMS EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION, and MAYA FARMS, INC. SUPERVISORY UNION,
petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MAYA
REALTY & LIVESTOCK, INC., MAYA FARMS, INC., and LIBERTY FLOUR
MILLS, INC., respondents.
ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB V NLRC (ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB
INDEPENDENT EMPLOYEES UNION)
466 SCRA 329
CARPIO-MORALES; August 9, 2005
NATURE: Petition for review on certiorari.
Alabang Country Club Inc.
(ACCI) seeks to set aside the appellate courts decision which denied its
motion for reconsideration, and ordered the reinstatement of herein 63
respondents-members of the labor organization Alabang Country Club
Independent Employees Union, without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges, and payment of full backwages.
FACTS
the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. Article 282 of the Labor
Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the employer: (a)
serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or the latters representative in connection with the
employees work; (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his
duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in
him by his employer or his duly authorized representative; (d) commission
of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer
or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized
representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
- In this case, Agabon abandoned their job. Abandonment is the deliberate
and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a
form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment
by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors
should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without
valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever employeremployee relationship, with the second as the more determinative factor
which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the
employees has no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the
employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and
unjustified.
2. YES
- Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of
statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or
ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the
violation of his statutory rights.
* It is worth noting that this ruling has evolved through times.
> Prior to 1989 - the rule was that a dismissal or termination is illegal if
the employee was not given any notice.
> In the 1989 case of Wenphil Corp. v. National Labor Relations
Commission - where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal
may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to
the employee. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process
Rule.
> On January 27, 2000, in Serrano - violation by the employer of the
notice requirement in termination for just or authorized causes was not a
denial of due process that will nullify the termination. However, the
dismissal is ineffectual and the employer must pay full backwages from the
time of termination until it is judicially declared that the dismissal was for a
just or authorized cause.
Reasoning
a. Constitutional due process is different from statutory due process. The
former protects the individual from the government and assures him of his
rights in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings; while statutory due
process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects
employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice
and hearing.
b. The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant
to be a sword to oppress employers. The commitment of this Court to the
cause of labor does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is
in the right, as in this case.
Disposition DENIED. But the private respondent is ORDERED to pay each
of the petitioners the amount of P30,000.00 as nominal damages for noncompliance with statutory due process.
JAKA FOOD PROCESSING CORPORATION, vs. DARWIN PACOT,
ROBERT PAROHINOG, DAVID BISNAR, MARLON DOMINGO, RHOEL
LESCANO and JONATHAN CAGABCAB.
G.R. No. 151378. March 28, 2005
Facts: Respondents were earlier hired by petitioner JAKA Foods Processing
Corporation until the latter terminated their employment because the
corporation was in dire financial straits. It is not disputed, however, that
the termination was effected without JAKA complying with the requirement
under Article 283 of the Labor Code regarding the service of a written
notice upon the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment
at least one (1) month before the intended date of termination.
Respondents filed complaints for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages
and nonpayment of service incentive leave and 13th month pay against
JAKA. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the termination
illegal and ordering JAKA to reinstate respondents with full backwages, and
separation pay if reinstatement is not possible. The Court of Appeals
reversed said decision and ordered respondent JAKA to pay petitioners
separation pay equivalent to one (1) month salary, the proportionate 13th
month pay and, in addition, full backwages from the time their
employment was terminated.
Issue: What are the legal implications of a situation where an employee is
dismissed for cause but such dismissal was effected without the
employers compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code?
Held: It was established that there was ground for respondents dismissal,
i.e., retrenchment, which is one of the authorized causes enumerated
under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Likewise, it is established that JAKA
failed to comply with the notice requirement under the same Article.
Considering the factual circumstances in the instant case, the Court deem
it proper to fix the indemnity at P50, 000.00. The Court of Appeals have
been in error when it ordered JAKA to pay respondents separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service. In all cases of
business closure or cessation of operation or undertaking of the employer,
the affected employee is entitled to separation pay. This is consistent with
the state policy of treating labor as a primary social economic force,
affording full protection to its rights as well as its welfare. The exception is
when the closure of business or cessation of operations is due to serious
business losses or financial reverses; duly proved, in which case, the right
of affected employees to separation pay is lost for obvious reasons.
- October 2, 1995, Virgilio Ababon, et al. filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the SC. Pursuant to St. Martin's Funeral Home v. NLRC, it was referred to
the CA for appropriate action and disposition.
- October 21, 2002, the CA set aside the decision on the 2 nd petition for
relief of the NLRC and reinstated its initial decision and resolution.
- Both filed their respective MFRs which were denied, hence, the present
consolidated petitions for review
ISSUES
1. WON NLRC should have taken cognizance of the most recent MFR
2. WON Ababon, et al. were illegally dismissed due to the closure of ITC's
business; and whether they are entitled to separation pay, backwages, and
other monetary awards
HELD
1. YES
- Substantial justice is best served by allowing the petition for relief despite
procedural defect of filing MFR
- Under Art 218 (c) LC, NLRC may, in the exercise of its appellate powers,
correct, amend, or waive any error, defect or irregularity whether in
substance or in form. Further, Art 221 LC provides that in any proceeding
before the Commission or any of the LA, the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and
intention of this Code that the Commission and its members and the Labor
Arbiters shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in
each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of
law or procedure, all in the interest of due process.
- Sec14 Rules of Procedure of the NLRC that MFR shall not be entertained
except when based on palpable or patent errors, provided that the motion
is under oath and filed within 10 calendar days from receipt of the order,
resolution or decision should not be interpreted as to sacrifice substantial
justice to technicality. The limitation of the period is to forestall or avoid an
unreasonable delay in the administration of justice, from which the NLRC
absolved ITC and IPGC because the filing of their MFR was due to
excusable negligence.
2. NO
- The records reveal that respondent ITC actually underwent 'no plant
operation' since 19 March 1990 due to lack of log supply. This s admitted
by complainants. Since then several subsequent incidents prevented
respondent ITC to resume its business operations. Without the raw
materials respondent ITC has nothing to produce. Without the permits it
cannot lawfully operate the plant. And without the contract of lease
respondent ITC has no option but to cease operation and turn over the
plant to the lessor.
- The right to close the operation of an establishment or undertaking is one
of the authorized causes in terminating employment of workers, the only
limitation being that the closure must not be for the purpose of
circumventing the provisions on termination of employment in the LC.
- According to Art 283 LC, a partial or total closure or cessation of
operations of establishment or undertaking may either be due to serious
business losses or financial reverses or otherwise. Under the first kind, the
Facts: This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000.
Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot started working as a
truck helper for petitioners family-owned trucking business named Vicente
Sy Trucking. In 1965, he became a truck driver of the same family
business, renamed T. Paulino Trucking Service, later 6Bs Trucking
Corporation in 1985, and thereafter known as SBT Trucking Corporation
since 1994. Throughout all these changes in names and for 36 years,
private respondent continuously served the trucking business of
petitioners.
In April 1994, Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring
absences as he was suffering from various ailments. Particularly causing
him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his
task as a driver. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with
the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25, 1994, but discovered that his
premium payments had not been remitted by his employer.
Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. But found
himself in a dilemma. He was facing dismissal if he refused to work, But he
could not retire on pension because petitioners never paid his correct SSS
premiums. The NLRC NCR ruled that there was no illegal dismissal in
Sahots case. Private respondent had failed to report to work. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission modified the judgment of the
Labor Arbiter. Petitioners assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court
of Appeals.
Issues
(a) Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between
petitioners and respondent Sahot?
(b) Whether or not there was valid dismissal?
(c) Whether or not respondent Sahot is entitled to separation pay?
Held: But dealing the Labor Arbiter a reversal on this score the NLRC,
concurred in by the Court of Appeals, held that: While it was very obvious
that complainant did not have any intention to report back to work due to
his illness which incapacitated him to perform his job, such intention
cannot be construed to be abandonment. Instead, the same should have
been considered as one of those falling under the just causes of
terminating an employment. The insistence of respondent in making
complainant work did not change the scenario.
It is worthy to note that respondent is engaged in the trucking business
where physical strength is of utmost requirement (sic). Complainant
started working with respondent as truck helper at age twenty-three (23),
then as truck driver since 1965. Complainant was already fifty-nine (59)
when the complaint was filed and suffering from various illness triggered
by his work and age.
On the last issue, as held by the Court of Appeals, respondent Jaime Sahot
is entitled to separation pay. The law is clear on the matter. An employee
who is terminated because of disease is entitled to "separation pay
equivalent to at least one month salary or to one-half month salary for
every year of service, whichever is greater xxx." Following the formula set
in Art. 284 of the Labor Code, his separation pay was computed by the
appellate court at P2,080 times 36 years (1958 to 1994) or P74,880. We
agree with the computation, after noting that his last monthly salary was
P4,160.00 so that one-half thereof is P2,080.00. Finding no reversible error
nor grave abuse of discretion on the part of appellate court, we are
constrained to sustain its decision. To avoid further delay in the payment
due the separated worker, whose claim was filed way back in 1994, this
decision is immediately executory. Otherwise, six percent (6%) interest per
annum should be charged thereon, for any delay, pursuant to provisions of
the Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated February 29, 2000 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners must pay
private respondent Jaime Sahot his separation pay for 36 years of service
at the rate of one-half monthly pay for every year of service, amounting to
P74,880.00, with interest of six per centum (6%) per annum from finality of
this decision until fully paid.
ROQUERO V PHILIPPINE AIRLINES INC
401 SCRA 424
PUNO; April 22, 2003
NATURE: CERTIORARI
FACTS
- Roquero, along with Rene Pabayo, were ground equipment mechanics of
PAL.
- From the evidence on record, it appears that Roquero and Pabayo were
caught red-handed possessing and using shabu in a raid conducted by PAL
security officers and NARCOM personnel.
- The two alleged that they did not voluntarily indulge in the said act but
were instigated by a certain Jojie Alipato who was introduced to them by
Joseph Ocul, Manager of the Airport Maintenance Division of PAL.
- Alipato was unsuccessful, until one day, he was able to persuade Pabayo
to join him in taking the drugs and who in turn persuaded Roquero.
- Inside the company premises, they locked the door and Alipato lost no
time in preparing the drugs to be used. When they started the procedure of
taking the drugs, armed men entered the room, arrested Roquero and
Pabayo and seized the drugs and the paraphernalia used.
- Roquero and Pabayo were subjected to a physical examination where the
results showed that they were positive of drugs.
- They were also brought to the security office of PAL where they executed
written confessions without the benefit of counsel.
position. He took the drugs fully knowing that he was on duty and more so
that it is prohibited by company rules
- There is no question that petitioner Roquero is guilty of serious
misconduct for possessing and using shabu. He violated Chapter 2, Article
VII, section 4 of the PAL Code of Discipline which states:
Any employee who, while on company premises or on duty, takes or is
under the influence of prohibited or controlled drugs, or hallucinogenic
substances or narcotics shall be dismissed.
- Philippine Aeolus Automotive United Corporation vs. NLRC (2000): Serious
misconduct is defined as the transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in
character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. For
serious misconduct to warrant the dismissal of an employee, it (1) must be
serious; (2) must relate to the performance of the employees duty; and (3)
must show that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the
employer
- PAL complied with the twin-notice requirement before dismissing the
petitioner. The twin-notice rule requires (1) the notice which apprises the
employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is
being sought along with the opportunity for the employee to air his side,
and (2) the subsequent notice of the employers decision to dismiss him.
2. NO
- The order of reinstatement is immediately executory
- Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. vs. NLRC, (1999): The unjustified refusal
of the employer to reinstate a dismissed employee entitles him to payment
of his salaries effective from the time the employer failed to reinstate him
despite the issuance of a writ of execution. Unless there is a restraining
order issued, it is ministerial upon the Labor Arbiter to implement the order
of reinstatement. In the case at bar, no restraining order was granted.
Thus, it was mandatory on PAL to actually reinstate Roquero or reinstate
him in the payroll. Having failed to do so, PAL must pay Roquero the salary
he is entitled to, as if he was reinstated, from the time of the decision of
the NLRC until the finality of the decision of this Court.
- Article 223 (3rd paragraph) of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 12
of RA No. 6715, and Sec 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules on Appeals under RA
No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code, provide that an order of
reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter is immediately executory even pending
appeal.
- The rationale of the law has been explained in Aris (Phil.) Inc. vs.
NLRC:
In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of
a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which,
once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution
on labor and the working man.
xxx xxx
xxx
These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much
to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and
meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force,
which the Constitution also expressly affirms with equal intensity. Labor
is an indispensable partner for the nations progress and stability.
xxx xxx
xxx
x x x In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law
itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its
execution pending appeal.
xxx xxx
xxx
x x x Then, by and pursuant to the same power (police power), the State
may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a
decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving
act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be
decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the
survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and his
family.
3. YES.
- Even if the order of reinstatement of the LA is reversed on appeal, it is
obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of
the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court.
- If the employee has been reinstated during the appeal period and such
reinstatement order is reversed with finality, the employee is not required
to reimburse whatever salary he received for he is entitled to such, more
so if he actually rendered services during the period.
Disposition The dismissal of petitioner Roquero is AFFIRMED, but PAL is
ordered to pay the wages to which Roquero is entitled from the time the
reinstatement order was issued until the finality of this decision.
MILAGROS PANUNCILLO v. CAP PHILIPPINES, INC.
515 SCRA 323 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The protection of the rights of the laborers does not authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer.
Milagros Panuncillo was hired as Office Senior Clerk by CAP Philippines Inc.
In order to secure the education of her son, Panuncillo procured an
educational plan which she had fully paid but which she later sold to
Josefina Pernes for P37,000. Before the actual transfer of the plan could be
effected, however, Panuncillo pledged it for P50,000 to John Chua who,
however, sold it to Benito Bonghanoy. Bonghanoy in turn sold the plan to
Gaudioso R. Uy for P60,000.
Having gotten wind of the transactions subsequent to her purchase of the
plan, Josefina informed CAP Philippines Inc. that Panuncillo had "swindled"
her but that she was willing to settle the case amicably as long as
Panuncillo will pay the amount involved and the interest.
CAP Philippines Inc. terminated the services of Panuncillo. Panuncillo
sought reconsideration of her dismissal. Acting on Panuncillos motion for
reconsideration, CAP Philippines Inc. denied the same. Panuncillo thus filed
a complaint for illegal dismissal, 13th month pay, service incentive leave
pay, damages and attorneys fees against CAP Philippines Inc.
The Labor Arbiter, while finding that the dismissal was for a valid cause,
found the same too harsh. He thus ordered the reinstatement of Panuncillo
to a position one rank lower than her previous position. On appeal, the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the
Labor Arbiter. It held that Panuncillos dismissal was illegal and accordingly
ordered her reinstatement to her former position.
CAP Philippines Inc. challenged the NLRC Decision before the appellate
court via Petition for Certiorari. The appellate court reversed the NLRC
Decision and held that the dismissal was valid and that CAP Philippines Inc.
complied with the procedural requirements of due process. Hence, the
present petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Milagros has been illegally dismissed
HELD:
Panuncillos repeated violation of Section 8.4 of CAP Philippines Incs Code
of Discipline, she violated the trust and confidence of CAP Philippines Inc.
and its customers. To allow her to continue with her employment puts CAP
Philippines Inc. under the risk of being embroiled in unnecessary lawsuits
from customers similarly situated as Josefina, et al. Clearly, CAP Philippines
Inc. exercised its management prerogative when it dismissed Panuncillo.
Under the Labor Code, the employer may terminate an employment on the
ground of serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of
the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work. Infractions of company rules and regulations have been declared to
belong to this category and thus are valid causes for termination of
employment by the employer.
The employer cannot be compelled to continue the employment of a
person who was found guilty of maliciously committing acts which are
detrimental to his interests. It will be highly prejudicial to the interests of
the employer to impose on him the charges that warranted his dismissal
from employment. Indeed, it will demoralize the rank and file if the
undeserving, if not undesirable, remain in the service. It may encourage
him to do even worse and will render a mockery of the rules of discipline
that employees are required to observe. This Court was more emphatic in
holding that in protecting the rights of the laborer, it cannot authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer.
There can thus be no doubt that Panuncillo was given ample opportunity to
explain her side. Parenthetically, when an employee admits the acts
complained of, as in Panuncillos case, no formal hearing is even necessary.
SENTINEL SECURITY AGENCY INC V NLRC (CABANO)
295 SCRA 123
PANGANIBAN; September 3, 1998
FACTS
- The complainants were employees of Sentinel Security Agency, Inc. They
were assigned to render guard duty at the premises of [Philippine
American Life Insurance Company] at Jones Avenue, Cebu City. On
December 16, 1993 Philippine American Life Insurance Company [the
Client, ], sent notice to all concerned that the [Agency] was again awarded
the contract of security services together with a request to replace all the
security guards in the companys offices at the cities of Cebu, Bacolod,
Cagayan de Oro, Dipolog and Ilagan. In compliance therewith, [the Agency]
issued a Relief and Transfer Order replacing the complainants as guards [of
the Client] and for then to be re-assigned to other clients. As ordered, the
complainants reported but were never given new assignments but instead
they were told that they were replaced because they are already old.
Precisely, the complainants lost no time but filed the subject illegal
dismissal cases and prayed for payment of separation pay and other labor
standard benefits.
- Defendants Comment
"[The Client and the Agency] maintained there was no dismissal on the
part of the complainants, constructive or otherwise, as they were protected
by the contract of security services which allows the recall of security
guards from their assigned posts at the will of either party. It also advanced
that the complainants prematurely filed the subject cases without giving
the [Agency] a chance to give them some assignments.
- On the part of [the Client], it averred further that there [was] no
employer-employee relationship between it and the complainants as the
latter were merely assigned to its Cebu Branch under a job contract; that
[the Agency] ha[d] its own separate corporate personality apart from that
of [the Client]. Besides, it pointed out that the functions of the
complainants in providing security services to [the Clients] property [were]
not necessary and desirable to the usual business or trade of [the Client],
as it could still operate and engage in its life insurance business without
the security guards. In fine, [the Client] maintains that the complainants
have no cause of action against it."
ISSUES
1. WON the complainants were illegally dismissed
2. WON the Client is jointly and severally liable for their thirteenth-month
and service incentive leave pays
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The transfer of an employee involves a lateral movement within the
business or operation of the employer, without demotion in rank,
diminution of benefits or, worse, suspension of employment even if
temporary. The recall and transfer of security guards require reassignment
to another post and are not equivalent to their placement on "floating
status." Off-detailing security guards for a reasonable period of six months
is justified only in bona fide cases of suspension of operation, business or
undertaking.
Reasoning
a. The legally recognized concept of transfer was not implemented. The
agency hired new security guards to replace the complainants, resulting in
manner that was whimsical and capricious. On the other hand, the
respondent invokes Article 283 of the Labor Code in defense of the
questioned dismissal.
- The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal but
directed BENECO to extend the contract of each complainant, with the
exception of Viernes who was ordered to be appointed as regular
employee, a months salary as indemnity for failure to give the 30-day
notice, and backwages.
- The NLRC declared the complainants dismissal illegal, thus ordering their
reinstatement to their former position as meter readers or to any
equivalent position with payment of backwages limited to one year but
deleting the award of indemnity and attorneys fees. The award of
underpayment of wages was affirmed.
ISSUES
1. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of petitioners to their former position as meter readers on
probationary status in spite of its finding that they are regular employees
under Article 280 of the Labor Code
2. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in limiting the
backwages of petitioners to one year only in spite of its finding that they
were illegally dismissed, which is contrary to the mandate of full
backwages until actual reinstatement but not to exceed 3 years
3. WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in deleting the
award of indemnity pay which had become final because it was not
appealed and in deleting the award of attorneys fees because of the
absence of a trial-type hearing
4. WON the mandate of immediately executory on the reinstatement
aspect even pending appeal as provided in the decision of Labor Arbiters
equally applies in the decision of the NLRC even pending appeal, by means
of a motion for reconsideration of the order reinstating a dismissed
employee or pending appeal because the case is elevated on certiorari
before the Supreme Court
HELD
1. YES
Ratio There are two separate instances whereby it can be determined that
an employment is regular: (1) The particular activity performed by the
employee is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer; or (2) if the employee has been performing the job for at least a
year.
Reasoning
- Petitioners fall under the first category. They were engaged to perform
activities that are necessary to the usual business of BENECO. We agree
with the labor arbiters pronouncement that the job of a meter reader is
necessary to the business of BENECO because unless a meter reader
records the electric consumption of the subscribing public, there could not
be a valid basis for billing the customers. The fact that the petitioners were
allowed to continue working after the expiration of their employment
contract is evidence of the necessity and desirability of their service to
BENECOs business. In addition, during the preliminary hearing of the case
- Torres filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal suspension and
violation of R.A. 6727, and for having been required to sign on a blank
payroll.
- On Nov 10, 1989, Torres received a letter from the agency informing her
that she was re-assigned and required to report at the respondent's Manila
office for further instructions. On Nov 27, the agency terminated her
services for abandonment when she failed to report for work in her new
assignment.
- Torres filed with the Labor Arbiter an amended complaint charging
respondent with underpayment of wages under R.A. No. 6640 and
harassment.
- Labor Arbiter ordered agency to reinstate Torres to her former position,
pay her salary for Oct 1989, and salary differentials under RA 6640 and RA
6727
Agency appealed to NLRC. The NLRC denied the appeal on the ground of
non-perfection due to lack of appeal bond and that there was no reason to
disturb the decision.
- The decision having become final, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution on the reinstatement aspect, but it was not implemented
because the monetary aspect of the decision remained to be determined.
- On Nov 8, 1991, Torres asked the Labor Arbiter to issue an alias writ of
execution based on the completed computation of back wages of
P104,396.00 worked out by NLRC's Research and Information Unit.
- NLRC Sheriff issued a Notice of Garnishment which was served the
agencys deposit account with PNB, in the amount of P105,296.00 inclusive
of the execution fee of P1,000.00.
- On Nov 27, 1991, Labor Arbiter directed PNB to release the garnished
amount and to make it payable to NLRC cashier for the account of Torres
pending ultimate release to her. PNB issued a Manager's Check dated Dec
6, 1991.
- Meantime, on Dec 3, 1991, the agency filed with the Labor Arbiter an
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Quash the Alias Writ of Execution on the ground
that there has been a change in the situation of the parties which makes
the execution inequitable. Respondent contended that Torres accepted
employment from another security agency without previously resigning
from it.
- On Feb 2, 1992, Labor Arbiter issued an order for partial execution
directing the release of the uncontested salary differential amounting to
P15,523.48, to be deducted from the amount of P105,396.00, and to
withhold the balance, pending resolution of the Motion to Quash the alias
Writ of Execution.
- On March 19, 1992, petitioner filed with NLRC a petition for mandamus
and injunction to compel the Labor Arbiter to issue an order directing the
NLRC Cashier to release the entire amount deposited with the latter to
petitioner.
- On Aug 11, 1992, NLRC issued a resolution denying the petition for
mandamus and injunction and ordered Labor Arbiter to immediately
resolve respondents Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Execution.
- Petitioner contends that the release of the judgment award is purely a
ministerial duty of the Labor Arbiter.
respondents
Constitution
promotion of
Disposition
3 months for
- We affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that there was no violation
of the conditions of the study leave grant. Thus, respondent could not be
charged with serious misconduct warranting her dismissal as a teacher in
petitioner School. Petitioner has failed to convince us that the alleged
violations of the study leave grant constituted serious misconduct which
justified the termination of respondents employment. The most
respondent could be charged with was simple misconduct
- Misconduct is improper or wrongful conduct. It is the transgression of
some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction
of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error
of judgment. Under Article 282 of the Labor Code, the misconduct, to be a
just cause for termination, must be serious. This implies that it must be of
such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or
unimportant.
- We similarly affirm the Voluntary Arbitrators decision that respondent is
not entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees because
there is no evidence showing that bad faith or malice attended the
dismissal of respondent. Moral damages are recoverable only where the
dismissal is attended by bad faith or fraud, or constitutes an act oppressive
to labor, or is done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy. A dismissal may be contrary to law but, by itself alone, it does not
necessarily establish bad faith
Disposition Petition is DENIED.
C. Retirement
HELD: NO
- The CBA is the law between the Union and the company.
- The conservator can only preserve assets and reorganize management.
He cant revoke an existing valid contract. Even the legislature cannot
infringe on this Constitutional right, much less can it delegate such nonexistent powers to the conservator. The conservator can assail defective
contracts; but cant repudiate valid ones.
- Apart from the non-impairment clause, it is also well-settled that when
the conflicting interests of labor and capital are weighed on the scales of
social justice, the dominant influence of the latter must be counterbalanced by the sympathy and compassion the law must accord the underprivileged worker.
- The retirement of an employee does not, in itself, affect his employment
status especially when it involves all rights and benefits due to him, since
these must be protected as though there had been no interruption of
service. It must be borne in mind that the retirement scheme was part of
the employment package and the benefits to be derived therefrom
constituted, as it were, a continuing consideration for services rendered, as
well as an effective inducement for remaining with the corporation. It is
intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life,
releasing him from the burden of worrying for his financial support, and are
a form of reward for his loyalty.
- When the retired employees were requesting that their retirement
benefits be granted, they were not pleading for generosity but were merely
demanding that their rights, as embodied in the CBA, be recognized. Thus,
when an employee has retired but his benefits under the law or the CBA
have not yet been given, he still retains, for the purpose of prosecuting his
claims, the status of an employee entitled to the protection of the Labor
Code, one of which is the protection of the labor union.
Disposition Petition denied. NLRC decision affirmed.
BRION V SOUTH PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH DAY
ADVENTIST CHURCH
ROMERO; May 19, 1999
FACTS
- Petitioner Delfin A. Brion became a member of respondent South
Philippine Union Mission of the Seventh Day Adventist Church (hereafter
SDA) and worked his way up the ladder until he became an ordained
minister and president of the Northeastern Mindanao Mission of the
Seventh Day Adventist Church in Butuan City. Petitioner worked until he
retired in 1983. As was the practice of the SDA, petitioner was provided a
monthly amount as a retirement benefit.
- Sometime thereafter, petitioner got into an argument with Samuel Sanes,
another pastor of the SDA. This disagreement degenerated into a rift
between petitioner and the SDA, culminating in the establishment by
petitioner of a rival religious group which he called the "Home Church."
Petitioner succeeded in enticing a number of SDA members to become part
of his congregation even as he continued disparaging and criticizing the
SDA. Because of his actions, petitioner was excommunicated by the SDA
and, on July 3, 1993, his name was dropped from the Church Record Book.
As a consequence of his "disfellowship," petitioner's monthly retirement
benefit was discontinued by the SDA.
- RTC ruled in favor of petitioner. CA reversed taking into account the
disloyalty after retirement.
ISSUE: WON the conditions for eligibility for retirement be met only at the
time of retirement
HELD: YES
- The following provisions on retirement, contained in the General
Conference Working Policy of the SDA, are of primary importance in
resolving the issue at hand:
Beneficiaries of Retirement Plan The benefits of the retirement plan are
designed for those who have devoted their lives to the work of the
Seventh-day Adventist Church and are eligible to retire for reasons of old
age and/or disability.
xxx
xxx
xxx