Kate Meehan

History 4368
April 30, 2012

Picketts Charge: Memorialization versus History

The state of Texas includes the study of the Battle of Gettysburg in its curriculum for all 8th grade
students. The Gettysburg National Park website describes the battle as a turning point in the Civil War
and the High Water Mark of the Rebellion.1 Each briefly describes Picketts Charge as the last attack
of the battle. The pictures painted by these textbooks and the monuments constructed on our national
parklands memorialize the events in hygienically patriotic ways, which provide sharp contrast for the
documents provided by officers, infantry, and bystanders. Using Picketts Charge, this paper seeks to
analyze the ways in which mere hours of history are distorted through the lens of time, intent and
memory, and to determine how events broke down on that afternoon.
Despite the Battle of Gettysburgs inclusion on the State of Texas curriculum, the Charge is
given two small paragraphs in Social Studies textbooks used in Texas classrooms:
On the third and final day of battle, Lee decided to launch an attack,
determined to create a panic and virtually destroy the [Union] army.
This last attack, led by General George Pickett, is remembered as Picketts
Charge. About 14,000 Confederate soldiers advanced across about one-half mile of
open ground toward the Union lines. They made easy targets for Union fire as they
marched. Barely half of the Rebels returned from the charge. Lee knew the battle
was lost. Its all my fault, he told his troops as they retreated to Virginia.2
Clearly, loss of 7,000 men in approximately two hours is more involved than these two
paragraphs can convey. The battles in and around Gettysburg, the strategies of the commanding
officers and the ways in which events unfolded are all critical in understanding how such a massive
1

Gettysburg National Military Park, National Park Service, http://www.nps.gov/gett/index.htm (accessed March
29, 2012).
2
Glencoe McGraw-Hill, The American Republic to 1877, Student Edition, 3 ed. (n.p.: Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, 2006),
page 486.

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tactical blunder could have occurred. By reducing such tragic events to two hygienic paragraphs, a
critical moment in our nations history is robbed of any emotional, philosophical or intellectual impact
on the students.
In June of 1863, General Lee began moving roughly 75,000 troops north, with the intention of
pushing into Union territory. Lincoln sent his new General, George Meade to meet the army in order to
protect Washington DC and Baltimore. They met on July 1st in the small town of Gettysburg,
Pennsylvania when the Union cavalry discovered Confederate soldiers raiding the small town in search
of shoes. The Union soldiers were outnumbered, but they fought to hold the town before being forced
to retreat to Cemetery Ridge, a crest of hills just south of town.
Overnight, both sides received reinforcements. An assault on Cemetery Ridge the following day
demonstrated the strategic advantage of the Unions position, and they maintained it with a counterattack. On July 3rd, after a mid-day bombardment of the Union line (most of which over-shot the Union
position), approximately 14,000 soldiers under three men (General George Pickett, J. Johnston Pettigrew
and Isaac R. Trimble) began a common time march across an exposed mile of valley to the Unions
defenses, which included a stone wall and artillery. Only approximately one hundred Virginians led by
General Lewis Armistead reached the stone wall before being forced to join the rest of the Confederates
in a retreat.3 On July 4th, the Confederate army retreated back to Virginia with a trail of wounded 14
miles long.4
At the Visitors Center at Gettysburg, tourists can visit the Battle of Gettysburg cyclorama5
depicting Picketts Charge, produced a decade after the battle by a French painter with the assistance of

Brendan Wolfe, Numbers at Pickett's Charge, Encyclopedia Virginia,

http://www.encyclopediavirginia.org/Numbers_at_Pickett_s_Charge (accessed March 29, 2012).
4
Maps of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (1863) Gettysburg - Pickett's Charge, July 3, 1863, Civil War Trust,
http://www.civilwar.org/battlefields/gettysburg/maps/pickettscharge.html (accessed March 29, 2012).
5
th
A 360 degree painting made popular at the end of the 19 Century.

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a handful of cavalrymen from the battle. When it was unveiled in Chicago in 1883, tourists marveled at
how teleporting and realistic it was. The painting is similar to many 19th century depictions of war,
including a smattering of artistically rendered corpses, a battlefield unstained by blood, a handful of
rearing horses, and a few cannons producing clouds of smoke.6 This artistic portrayal of war, billed as
historically accurate but billed as amusement, creates a popular distortion of the actualities of war.
Society becomes desensitized to its horrors. That the Civil War was the last war fought on American soil,
and that it had been spit-polished to a series of bloodless, heroic acts in under two decades, indicates
that Americans were losing touch with the grim reality of war for both soldiers and civilians.
The park service also provides a Battlefield Footsteps program, designed to walk students
grades 4-12 through the experience of one of the divisions during the charge, emphasizing group unity
and participation. Related material for the field trip includes the disclaimer that the overall
complexity of Civil War information is tremendous in scope. The exercise assigns the role of individual
soldiers to participating students with the intention that the students leave the excursion with a greater
understanding of the conditions under which the soldiers fought. Despite their fantastic work in
assembling compelling materials for the students to study, the obvious lack of cannon and musket fire,
corpses and immediate peril limit the realism of the battlefield. Their students, presented with all of the
data and none of the pathos, walk the path of history without truly understanding it. Like re-enactors,
the harrowing moments of battle are categorized and romanticized as those who engaged in valor or
heroic deeds and those that displayed cowardice.
The difficulty in describing Picketts Charge was made apparent from the start. Contrasting
reports in the New York Times and the various dailies in Richmond demonstrate how a series of events

See Appendix.

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may be distorted by those telling the story. The Times reported the events from a purported eye
witness as follows:
Then there was a full, and we knew that the rebel Infantry was charging. And
splendidly they did this work -- the highest and severest test of the stuff that
soldiers are made of. .. with war cries and a savage insolence as yet untutored
by defeat. They rushed in perfect order across the open field up to the very
muzzles of the guns, which tore lanes through them as they came. But they met
men who were their equals in spirit, and their superiors in tenacity.
About fifty yards in front of our batteries was a stone wall behind which laid
several of our regiments, picking off the enemy as they advanced up the slope
of the hill. Notwithstanding the terrible fire poured into their ranks from our
guns, so impetuous was the charge of the rebels that they drove our men from
their position, and were advancing noon our batteries, several of which they
captured, but the capture was only temporary.7
The tone of the correspondents report indicates both a respect for the charging officers while
maintaining a position of superiority for the Union army. This respect is carried forward in the
discussion of the Rebel casualties, which are usually reported as a sign of a victorious battle. Here, the
absence of such language indicates that the author recalls that he is fighting former countrymen:
Rebel officers with whom I have conversed frankly admit that the result of
the last two days has been most disastrous to their cause. The field in
front of the stone wall was literally covered with dead and wounded, a large
proportion of whom were rebels. Where our musketry and artillery took
effect they lay in swaths, as if mown down by a scythe. This field presented a
horrible sight -- such as has never yet been witnessed during the war. 8
That northern newspapers were earnest in their depiction of the south as a noble enemy
indicates that they had chosen not to dehumanize the enemy. The loss of rebel soldiers is treated as a
tragedy for the north, and the underlying presumption is that each of the fallen was an American, and
would return to being an American once the north won the war. By reporting the bodies strewn on the
battle field as being mown by a scythe is also interesting in that it evokes sympathy for the enemy while

7
8

Details from Our Special Correspondent, New York Times, July 6, 1863.
Ibid.

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painting a clear picture of northern victory. The irony of an agricultural metaphor used when describing
enormous southern casualties is not lost.
In the south, the Richmond Dispatch described the events at Gettysburg differently:
The battle of Gettysburgh was, on our part, a triumphant success -- an
overwhelming victory. We beat the enemy on all three of the days. That
[General Lee] was repulsed in his attack on the entrenchments -- that he fled
in disorder -- that his army was demoralized -- are Yankee lies of the first
magnitude. The slaughter of the Yankees was terrible beyond all former
example, and the telegraph operator was not so far wrong when he said we
had 40,000 prisoners. Gen. LEE had won the ground and could have held it,
but he chose, for military reasons, to fall back, offer having utterly broken
the backbone of the Yankee army. 9
Clearly, Gettysburg was not a triumphant Confederate success. The bizarre treatment of the
tragic events indicates that either the Dispatch was exceptionally misinformed, or that they were
purposefully distorting the facts in an effort to boost morale. The language used to describe the
fabricated story, whether or not the Dispatch knew what they were reporting was inaccurate, indicates
southern sentiment for their northern enemies. It wasnt enough for the Confederate Army to have
won on all three days, but the northern army was also demoralized and their backbones were utterly
broken. Such language indicates a more profound psychological division from the north than
demonstrated in northern newspapers. It wasnt enough that the south be allowed to secede, they
needed to leave the north with broken spirits, desperately lamenting their leaving.
On the subject of Rebel casualties, the Dispatch had the following to report:
It is stated upon good authority that our loss in killed, wounded and missing
did not exceed 10,000. If, as the Yankees assert, we lost 4,000 prisoners, then
our loss in killed and wounded was only 6,000 -- a very small loss considering

From the Rebel States.; The Rebels Beginning to Comprehend the Situation, New York Times, July 18, 1863.

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the number of combatants and the length of the battle. Our army is in
splendid order, and ready for another conflict.10
The Dispatchs characterization of the loss of Confederate men demonstrates how quickly an
event becomes subjected to the agenda of those relaying it. Suddenly, the capture, death or maiming of
10,000 young men over three days (whether its an accurate death toll or not) was a very small loss,
despite the impact of their loss on their family, friends, and military units.
The tone of both excerpts is markedly different from the respect proffered by the New York
Times, and the facts of the day are clearly not reported accurately. The Richmond Sentinel, however,
had a much more sober report of the events at Gettysburg:
The first report from it after the battle of Gettysburgh was the old story of
"cut all to pieces," and we deeply regret to announce that in the case of this
gallant regiment the report is too true. Maj.-Gen. PICKETT is represented to
have been deeply affected by the loss of so many of his gallant officers, and it
is said that he wept bitterly over the mutilation of his noble division. The
report that he was wounded turns out to be incorrect.11
The difference between the two papers is striking. At the time of their publication, Richmond
was home to five different daily papers. The Dispatch was the most widely circulated, and was
notorious for its unwavering southern patriotism. The Sentinel was started during the course of the war,
and represented the fifth daily newspaper in Richmond alone. The communications capacity at the time
meant reporting relied heavily on other newspapers for source material and eyewitness accounts.12
The differences in the two accounts indicate that either each had sources of drastically different
reliabilities, or that the Dispatch was reluctant to provide ill news. That the Dispatch was eager to
characterize Confederate losses as very small indicates they were earnestly trying to maintain public

10

Ibid.
Ibid.
12
Ted Tunnell. "Confederate Newspapers in Virginia During the Civil War." Encyclopedia Virginia. Ed. Brendan Wolfe. 3
11

Apr. 2012. Virginia Foundation for the Humanities. 18 May. 2011

<http://www.EncyclopediaVirginia.org/Newspapers_in_Virginia_During_the_Civil_War_Confederate>

6|Meehan

morale by controlling the narrative. The Sentinel appears to be less concerned with distorting the facts
to fit a narrative than they are with ensuring that southerners are portrayed in a particular manner.
Picketts division is twice referred to as gallant, and Major-General Pickett is described as tragically
lamenting the loss of his noble men. They are portrayed as gentlemen, almost knightly. Not included
is the fact that the battle started when these gallant gentlemen were caught by the Union soldiers
ransacking village for shoes, or that each of them had been provided one meal for the entirety of the
three day battle by their beloved Major-General. While the narrative provided by the Dispatch is not
perpetuating inaccuracies, its already developing a romanticized distortion of a chivalric war that would
so inspire later re-enactors.
From the point of view of the Confederate Generals, the attack was an organizational disaster.
Huge discrepancies between the attack plan and its execution were documented by James F. Crocker:
Longstreet and his batteries [were] placed in position which it was believed
would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hills artillery and part of
Ewells was ordered to open simultaneously and the assaulting column to
advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were
directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, to protect their
flanks. [The attack] was to be made in the morning The attack was not
made as here ordered. The attacking column did not move until 3PM, and
when it did move it was without accompanying artillery.13
General Lee himself wrote the following about the event:
[The enemy] batteries reopened as soon as [the charge] appeared. Our own
having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that
preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply or render the
necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was
unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to
throw a strong force of infantry against our left. 14

13

Richard Rollins, ed., Pickett's Charge: Eyewitness Accounts at the Battle of Gettysburg (Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2005), page 22.
14
Ibid, page 27.

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General Longstreet, Lees second in command, had apparently expressed much concern about
the charge, preferring a flanking maneuver.
On the following morning our arrangements were made for renewing the
attack by my right, with a view to pass around the hill occupied by the enemy
on his left, and to gain it by flank and reverse attack. ... A few moments
after my orders were given, [General Lee] joined me and ordered a column
of attack to be formed, the assault to be made directly at the enemys main
position, the Cemetery Hill. The distance to be passed over under the fire of
the enemys batteries, and in plain view, seemed too great to insure great
results, particularly as two-thirds of the troops to be engaged in the assault
had been in a severe battle two days previous, Picketts division alone being
fresh.15
Longstreet goes on to describe the results of this decision, likely with his own bias:
Picketts troops, after delivering fire, advanced to the charge, and entered
the enemys lines, capturing some of his batteries and gained his works.
About the same moment, the troops that had before hesitated, broke their
ranks and fell back in great disorder, many more falling under the enemys
fire in retiring than while they were attacking. This gave the enemy time to
throw his entire force upon Pickett, with a strong prospect of being able to
break up his lines or destroy him before Andersons division could reach him,
which would, in its turn, have greatly exposed Anderson.16
These documents clearly demonstrate a crisis of leadership among the Confederate officers.
According to Crocker, Lees orders of an early morning forward march protected by three batteries were
not followed. In addition, the fact that the Confederate batteries were out of ammunition was,
according to Lee, not conveyed to the leadership, and the charge was made without artillery support. In
these instances, there was plenty of time for Lee and his staff to see that his plan was no longer in effect
when the attack began hours after it should have, when the initial cannonade lasted significantly
longer than it should have, and again when the charge commenced without any artillery to back their
efforts. The fact that the cannonade was not only ineffective but continued to be ineffective for two
hours without correction represents a profound disconnect on the part of the Artillery. The fact that
15

Ibid, page 27-28.

Ibid, page 29. It should be noted that Longstreets depiction of Lees tactics came under extreme criticism by
other Confederate Generals after Lees death.
16

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Longstreet had been in the process of implementing a flanking attack before Lee intervened indicates
that there were other available strategies to be implemented in place of the charge. That none of these
elements caused a change in plans indicates a profound lack of communication amongst the officers,
directly contributing to the extreme loss of life.
None of this is discussed in our history books, or in the early media accounts. The loss of so
many men is portrayed as tragic on both sides, but neither side seems willing to discuss the terrible
tactical blunders that occurred. The text books discuss that Lee attempted to resign his post following
the Battle, but do not illuminate how or why things went so wrong. It appears that both sides preferred
to allow Lee the role of tragic hero, rather than openly discuss the crises of leadership that occurred.
The men under these Generals, directly involved in the chaos of that afternoon, share distinctly
different stories. For them, the battle was divided distinctly between the cannonade and the march.
Their documents paint the picture not shared in the media, and reject the notion of a gallant charge.
Sergeant David Johnston of the 7th Virginia in Kempers Brigade describes the cannonade:
The sun, but a moment before so brilliant, was now almost darkened by
smoke and mist enveloping and shadowing the earth, and through which
came hissing and shrieking, fiery fuses and messengers of death, sweeping,
plunging, cutting, ploughing through our ranks, carrying mutilation,
destruction, pain, suffering and death in every direction. Turn your eyes
whithersoever you would, and there was to be seen at almost every moment
of time, guns, swords, haversacks, human flesh and bone, flying and dangling
in the air, or bouncing above the earth, which now trembled beneath us as if
shaken by an earthquake.17
From the Union side, Major Thomas Osborn, of the 11th Corps artillery, described how, even
before the Confederate Army sent its infantry into a slaughter, the Confederate cannonade had spent
two hours firing over the heads of the Union soldiers and never bothered to correct it.

17

Ibid, page 113.

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As a rule, the fire of the enemy on all our front against Cemetery Hill was a
little high. Their range or direction was perfect, but the elevation carried a
very large proportion of their shells about twenty feet above our heads.
Indeed, if the enemy had been as successful in securing our elevation as they
did the range, there would not have been a live thing on the hill fifteen
minutes after they opened fire.18
Major Osborn also discusses a meeting between himself and Generals Hunt (Chief of Artillery),
Howard and Schurz on the hillside, during which they attempted to determine Lees plans. They
correctly assumed that the Confederates were hoping to destroy the Union batteries on the hill in
preparation for a charge, and decided to stop firing to draw the Confederates onto the open field.19
I went to my battery on the right, Wiedrichs, ordered him to cease firing and
for every officer and man to lie flat upon the ground covering themselves as
best they could by the unevenness of the ground, and to remain there until
further orders This required but a very few minutes and every gun on the
hill was silent, and the enemys officers with their glasses could see none of
our men on the hill. We had but a few minutes to wait after the artillery
ceased firing for developments. The moment that line [of advancing
Confederate infantry] appeared coming down the slope of Seminary Ridge,
every battery on Meads line opened on it.20
Major Osborns report of occurrences highlights how the deviation from the original attack plan
hurt the Confederate army. Had the artillery and charge happened concurrently, the Confederates
would not have run out of ammunition prior to the charge, and the Union would not have been able to
use such a simple ruse to the utter destruction of the advancing army.
The artillery officers had a unique vantage point of the battle from their respective ridges, and
while both sides suffered casualties, none were as extreme as those on the field. Their accounts remove
the romantic notions of gallant armies. Confederate Brigadier General Cadmus Wilcox provided the
following account of the charge in July of 1863:

18

Ibid, page 129.

Ibid, page 132.
20
Ibid, page 133.
19

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My men had had nothing to eat since the morning of the second day [of
the battle at Gettysburg], and had confronted and endured the dangers
and fatigues of that day. They nevertheless moved to the front to the
support of the artillery, as ordered. As soon as these troops rose to
advance, the hostile artillery opened upon them. Not a man of the
division that I was ordered to support could I see; but as my orders were to
go to their support, on my men went down the slope until they came near
the hill upon which were the enemys batteries and entrenchments.21
A number of other infantrymens recollections of the charge paint the absolute chaos of the
battlefield. While clearly all battlefields are a mass of confusion, the failure of the artillery to support
the infantry as planned was keenly felt as abandonment by those in the midst of the charge. Colonel
Joseph Mayo, who began the charge in command of the 3rd Virginia and ended it in charge of Kempers
brigade, submitted the following report on behalf of his brigade in 1863:
At this critical juncture when seconds seemed more precious than hours of
any former time, many an anxious eye was cast back to the hill from which
we came in the hope of seeing supports near at hand and more than once I
heard the desperate exclamation, why dont they come! But now help
came, and with a loss of two thirds of the men and more than 75 per cent
of the officers, our Division was compelled to relinquish the position it had
so nobly won and face back to the rear of our batteries. Accompanying
this report is the list of the casualties of the Brigade.
While the Confederate soldiers were in the midst of an unsupported march across open fields
under enemy fire, the Union soldiers under Brigadier General George Stannard were executing wild
maneuvers that hit both Kempers and Wilcox battalions. The speed with which these officers were
able to communicate commands and execute wind-milling fronts with their troops indicates that the
failures of leadership and communication on behalf of the Confederate army were not a result of poor
technology. Colonel Wheelock Veazey commanded the 16th Vermont under Stannards brigade, and
relates his experience thus:
As we advanced in that charge the enemy were in great masses, without
much order, and were rushing rapidly upon the lines to our right, and
regardless of the exposure of their right flank. As we moved down
21

Ibid, page 160-161.

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upon them the left of my regiment extended well around their flank, and
we took large numbers of prisoners. The ground over which we passed
after striking their flank was literally covered with dead and wounded
men. To the right I observed another force of the enemy charging
down at double quick I immediately conceived that I should change
front and charge the left flank of the new line when it came within
striking distance. Upon the order, the men cheered and ran forward at
a run without firing a shot and quickly struck the rebel flank and followed
it until the whole line had disappeared. The movement was so sudden
and rapid that the enemy could not change front to oppose us.22
Many accounts discuss the Confederate retreat, and the half-hearted pursuit by the Union army
that would be so chastised by President Lincoln. The accounts rarely, if ever, go into detail about what
happened after the battle, both to the participants on the field and the citizens that were affected.
There is no romance, valor or bravery in the discussion of mens limbs being amputated in
commandeered barns, or the loss of livestock and crops as troops trampled fences and farms, leaving
the entire county without food for the following year.
Late on July 3rd, General John Imboden arrived with his cavalry brigade, too late to participate in
the battle. He described the retreating Confederate army as more of a procession of the wounded. For
four hours I hurried to the front (of the wagon line), and in all that time I was never out of hearing of
the groans and cries of the wounded and dying. Scarcely one in a hundred had received adequate
surgical aid Their torn and bloody clothing, matted and hardened, was rasping the tender, inflamed
and still oozing wounds.23
Around noon on July 4, rains started. According to accounts from the docents at Gettysburg, a
creek flowed through a swath of the battlefield. As the creek rose in the rain, the bodies of the fallen
were carried off down the creek, eventually damming up a small bridge downstream. The wounded left
on the battlefield, unable to escape the rising waters, drowned. Reports of hogs, either feral or loosed
22

Ibid, page 222-223.

Imboden, John, The Confederate Retreat from Gettysburg in Buel, Clarence, and Robert U. Johnson, Battles
and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. IV (1888, reprinted 1982), excerpts online at:
http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/gtburg2.htm; visited on 4/6/2012.
23

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during the battle, rooting on the battlefield for carrion, along with biting ants and maggots, ensured that
the wounded not only died alone in a field of corpses, but in the most ignoble agony.
Tillie Alleman (Pierce), who was 15 at the time of the battle, reports her experience on July 5th
when she visited the crest of Little Round Top: By this time, the Union dead had been principally
carried off the field, and those that remained were Confederates. It was an awful spectacle! Dead
soldiers, bloated horses, shattered cannon and caissons, thousands of small arms.24 The Confederate
army, in their haste to flee the Union Army, left many of their wounded on the field, relying on the
charity of the overworked Union field medics to spare them from death.
After the Union armies left with their wounded, there were still the thousands of dead men and
horses to attend to. The number of wounded left behind outnumbered the entire population of the
surrounding county. On the day of the battle, the temperature was reported as being near 90 degrees.
Some bodies were not buried for nearly a month, and the stench of decay was reported as sickening.
Confederate soldiers were buried in long, shallow trenches, and for years afterwards, heavy rains would
push a hand or foot out of the soil.
Surrounding fences, trees, and structures were destroyed during the bloodshed, and it took
several years to erase the carnage of those three days. It had been a hard winter, and much of the
stores of food had been commandeered by armies of both sides. The battle destroyed many of the
crops in the region, and several farmers sued the government for compensation to help their families
through another winter. None of the litigants were ever paid.25

24

Alleman, (Pierce) Tillie, At Gettysburg, or what a Girl Saw and Heard of the Battle (1888, reprinted 1994),
excerpts online at: http://www.eyewitnesstohistory.com/gtburgcont.htm; Visited on 2/17/2012.
25

Sandy Allison, Battle of Gettysburg: 100 Things to Know. Mechanicsburg: Stackpole Books, 2007, page 59.

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It is only through ambiguity that we are able to view the three days of bloodshed at Gettysburg
with nostalgia or any sense nationalistic memory. Only a few names have been included here, but each
of the bodies buried had a name and someone who received terrible news. The people who lived in and
around Gettysburg witnessed the terrible events and then spent years trying to remove its stain from
their community. The soldiers who survived the battle lived as changed men, many of them suffering
from post-traumatic stress and survivors guilt ever after.

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Appendix A. 19th Century War Art

Battle of Gettysburg, by Paul Philippoteaux (1883)

La Bataille de Waterloo. 18 Juin 1815, by Clment-Auguste Andrieux (1852)

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Appendix B. Map of Picketts Charge

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Bibliography
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2/17/2012.
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Unpublished manuscript in the family of A.P. Carpenter, Dover, Minnesota. Online transcript at:
http://www.winonahistory.org/companyK/alfred.htm; Visited on 2/17/2012.
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manuscript in the University of Virginia Library. Online transcript at:
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Imboden, John, The Confederate Retreat from Gettysburg in Buel, Clarence, and Robert U. Johnson,
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