EVIDENCE

TUESDAY
JUDGE DELA ROSA
Sections 26-42; 47-51 Rule 130
1. People vs. Badilla 48 Phil 718
2. People vs. Antonio L-25845 ( August 25, 1970)
3. People vs. Siscar GR No. 55649 ( December 3, 1985)
4. People vs. Pascua GR No. 130963 ( November 27, 2001)
Sections 10-18, Rule 132
1. People vs. Dela Cruz, GR No. 135022 ( July 11, 2002)

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-25845. August 25, 1970.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BRUNO

ANTONIO, ET AL.,Defendants, BRUNO ANTONIO and ALFONSO
DASALLA, Defendants-Appellants.
Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General
Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Augusto M. Amores for PlaintiffAppellee.
Manuel A. Cammayo, for Defendant-Appellant.

DECISION

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal taken by defendants Bruno Antonio and Alfonso Dasalla from a

decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija convicting them of the
crime of murder, with which they are charged, and sentencing them to life
imprisonment, and to joint]y and severally indemnify the heirs of Benjamin
Semana in the sum of P6,000, as well as to pay the costs.
In the morning of December 5, 1962, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m., Eugenio
Angellano, chief of the barrio police of Tibag, municipality of Talugtog,
Nueva Ecija, learned about a hogtied man west of said barrio, who was
wounded. Together with Ponciano Antonio, Ignacio Antonio and Simplicio
Tolentino, he, thereupon, repaired to the indicated place, where, between
9:00 and 10:00 a.m., they found a man seated at the foot of a tree and
reclining thereon, with his hands tied behind. His face was swollen and his
clothes were soaked with blood. He had several wounds in the head, the
neck and the buttocks. Upon inquiry from Angellano, the injured man said
that he was Benjamin Semana; that, while he was in the house of one Felix
Dalit, with a woman, early the previous night, several men suddenly
entered the premises, in view of which he got panicky and tried to escape
by jumping out through the window; that, as he hit the ground, a gunshot
rang and he was wounded in the buttocks; that unable to run away,
several men, who presumably accompanied those who entered the house,
held him and, together with the latter, tied him and brought him to the hut
of one Endring Enrico, in the barrio of Baloy, municipality of Cuyapo, where
he was maltreated; that, thereafter, they placed him on a sledge stating
that he would be brought to a hospital in Cuyapo; that, noticing, later, that
they were going in the opposite direction, he rolled out of the sledge and
then moved away, soon thereafter, as he noticed his former captors
walking about, nearby, with flashlights switched on, evidently looking for
him; and that he recognized only two (2) of the six or seven persons who
had beaten him up, and they were Bruno Antonio and Ponyong (or Alfonso)
Dasalla, both from the barrio of Baloy.

While Angellano was causing this statement of Semana to be written on a

sheet of paper, they noticed a group of seven persons approaching the
place. Led by appellant Bruno Antonio, the barrio captain of Baloy,
municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, they were drinking wine. His
companions were Alberto Agpalo, Tomas de la Cruz, Marcos Anselmo,
Gregorio Ronquillo and Idong or Pedro Dasalla, a brother of appellant
Alfonso Dasalla. Upon seeing Angellano, Bruno asked him, in a
commanding voice, what he (Angellano) was doing there. Angellano
answered that he intended to bring Semana to Talugtog for treatment,
whereupon Bruno said that he and his men would take Semana, inasmuch
as he (Bruno) had jurisdiction over the place where Semana was. Angellano
replied that the same formed part of the barrio of Tibag, municipality of
Talugtog, but Bruno angrily insisted that the place was subject to his
authority. After a brief exchange of words, with a tone of animosity, Bruno
forcibly took Semana, had him placed on a sledge, and then departed with
him and the other members of his group. It was then about 11:00 a.m.
At about 3:00 p.m., that same day, Semanas mother, Juanita Madronio,
was informed that her son had died. She found his body at the junction of
the roads from Paitan and Baloy, where she saw Bruno Antonio, together
with Cornelio Sumangil, Alberto Agpalo, "Gondo" (?) Dasalla and others
whom she did not know. Soon later, Dr. Pio Alberto, the health officer of
Cuyapo, came and performed an autopsy. He found the
following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. A well developed body measuring about 5 feet 4 inches brown with
rigor mortis and blood serum oozing from the nose and mouth. The clothes
are soaked in dried blood. The pants have holes corresponding to upper
left buttock and thorn on both knees.
"2. An irregular circular wound about 1 inch in diameter on the left frontoparietal region exposing the skull.
"3. An irregular almost circular lacerated wound about 1 inch in diameter
behind the lower third of the right sterno-cleido mastoid muscle going
inwards to about 2 inches deep.
"4. Echimoses of upper and lower conjuctiva of the left eye.
"5. Skin abrasions denuding almost half the thickness of the skin on the
base of the head and back of the neck and is about 2 inches long by 1 inch
wide.
"6. Gunshot wounds five small ones and five bigger ones on the upper and
middle portion of the left buttock, the wounds penetrating the skin and
muscles from back forwards and downwards.
"7. Skin abrasions on the left knee."cralaw virtua1aw library
and concluded that Semanas death had been due to hemorrhage and
shock.

Appellant Bruno Antonio maintains that, when the members of his group
decided to rest under the shade of a tree, in the barrio of Baloy, about two
kilometers from the place where Semana had been, in effect, wrested from
Angellanos custody, they noticed that Semana was dead already; that,
thereupon Bruno and his companions took their lunch; that thereafter, they
brought the body of Semana to the aforementioned junction, for the
purpose of going to Cuyapo, 14 to 16 kilometers away; that, upon reaching
the junction, Bruno Antonio and Cornelio Sumangil boarded a jeep and
proceeded to Cuyapo in order to report to the authorities and find a truck
that could pick up the body of Semana; that about two hours later, Bruno
and Sumangil came back, together with some policemen and Dr. Alberto,
who performed the autopsy; and that Semana must have died merely of
shock in consequence of the loss of blood due to the injuries he had when
they forcibly took him at the place above referred to.
Upon the other hand, Alfonso Dasalla would have the Court believe that he
was in his house, in the barrio of Baloy, up to about 3:00 oclock p.m. of
December 5, 1962, when Sumangil allegedly went to his (Alfonso Dasallas)
place and asked him to help carry the body of Semana: that, accordingly,
he joined, in Baloy, the group headed by Bruno Antonio, and assisted its
members in bringing said body to the aforementioned junction; and that he
had no participation whatsoever in the infliction of Semanas injuries or in
his death.
The lower court, presided over by Honorable Judge Placido Ramos,
accepted, however, the version of the prosecution, as well as gave no
credence to the evidence for the defense, and, accordingly, rendered
judgment, not only convicting and sentencing appellants herein, as pointed
out at the beginning of this decision, but, likewise, directing the Provincial
Fiscal of Nueva Ecija to conduct an investigation of the participation of
Alberto Agpalo, Tomas de la Cruz. Cornelio Sumangil, Marcos Anselmo and
Pedro Dasalla, and to file the corresponding information against them, for
the death of Benjamin Semana, should the evidence so warrant.
The first question raised by appellants herein refers to the admissibility in
evidence of the statement made by Semana to Eugenio Angellano
concerning the circumstances under which the former had been injured.
Appellants maintain that the trial court has erred in considering said
statement as a dying declaration, for, upon being asked how he felt,
Semana answered that he would not die if treated, and was then still
"strong," according to some witness. Said answer of Semana indicated,
however, an awareness of the danger of death on his part, should he not
be seasonably given the necessary medical treatment. Moreover, the
records show that he was so weak that several people had to help him, in
order that he could ride the sledge that brought him to Baloy. Again,
testifying for the defense Cornelio Sumangil explained that Semana was
strong, because he was "still breathing" and could answer some questions,
apart from asking for, and drinking, some water. Neither singly nor
collectively do these circumstances show that Semana was "strong" at the
time. Said factors may indicate that he was then neither dead nor

unconscious. Upon the other hand, Brunos failure to ask Semana about
the cause of his injuries suggests that the former did not feel he (Semana)
was strong enough to undergo an interrogation. Indeed, Bruno stated that
Semanas injuries were "serious." In fact, he had been bleeding profusely,
from at least midnight of December 4, or for over 8 hours. One can
imagine, therefore, the considerable amount of blood lost and the
weakness resulting therefrom. This explains, also, why Semana was unable
to take the food given to him and had been groaning perhaps in a state
of coma, coupled by stertorous breathing, which may have been mistaken
for groans since the group of appellant Bruno Antonio had taken him.
The fact that he expired one hour later strongly indicates the seriousness
of his condition when Angellano took his statement.
The defense cites the testimony of Dr. Alberto to the effect that none of the
wounds of Semana was fatal. No matter how true this may have been
when the injuries were inflicted, it is not necessarily so over 8 hours later.
during his interrogation by Angellano. In fact, Dr. Alberto qualified his
aforementioned testimony of adding that said injuries could cause bleeding
and produce a shock. Hence, the circumstances pointed out by the defense
do not sufficiently show that the lower court had no reasonable ground to
conclude that Semanas statement was made under the belief that he was
in imminent danger of death in consequence of said injuries as he died
soon thereafter-unless the same were treated soon enough.
In any event, that statement was made in the course of the unfortunate
odyssey of Semana that started on December 4, 1962 at about 7: 00 p.m.,
and ended with his death on December 5, around noon time. The aforesaid
statement formed part, therefore, of the res gestae and is competent
evidence in this case. 1
The next and most important question for determination is the sufficiency
of the proof of appellants guilt. In this connection, the following
circumstances deserve special attention:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. The witnesses for the prosecution testified that, in answer to questions
propounded by Eugenio Angellano, Semana said that he had recognized
only two of his assailants, namely, appellants Bruno Antonio and Ponyong
or Alfonso Dasalla; and that, when Brunos party showed up soon
thereafter, Semana asked Angellano not to deliver him to them, because
they might kill him. These facts were established by the testimony of
Ignacio Antonio and Simplicio Tolentino, who were corroborated
substantially by Eugenio Angellano, although the latter affirmed that
Semana had merely named Bruno and Ponyong the nickname of Alfonso
Dasalla without mentioning their respective surnames. Such affirmation
was, however contradicted by Angellanos statement, Exhibit "C"
subscribed and sworn to by him, on December 7, 1962. or two (2) days
after the occurrence, before the Justice of the Peace of Guimba, Nueva
Ecija in which he said that Semana had named, among his aggressors,
appellants herein, not only with their respective surnames, but, also,
adding that Bruno Antonio is the barrio captain of Baloy, and that Ponyong
Dasalla, likewise, hails from the same barrio.

The defense would have Us believe that, upon reaching the place where
Semana was found by Angellano, Bruno Antonio inquired from the latter
whether or not he had investigated Semana, and that Angellano answered
in the affirmative and allegedly revealed that Semana had not recognized
any of his assailants. Suffice it to say that his Honor, the trial Judge, found
the testimony thereon of the witnesses for the defense unworthy of
credence, and that the records before Us do not justify our disturbing such
finding.
2. It is not disputed that Angellano was unwilling to yield the person of
Semana to Bruno Antonio, who insisted on being entitled to take Semana,
alleging that he was in a territory subject to his (Brunos) jurisdiction as
Barrio Captain of Baloy. Said reluctance of Angellano and this insistence of
Bruno are, to be sure, quite significant. Indeed, Bruno had announced his
intention to take Semana to a hospital in Cuyapo, and both Bruno and
Angellano must have known that the most urgent matter at the moment
was to provide medical treatment for Semana. Moreover, in order to bring
Semana to the clinic in Talugtog, as Angellano wanted to, he and his men
would have had to carry him afoot 5 or 6 kilometers away, using therefor a
footpath, since there was no road to Talugtog from the place where
Semana had been found by Angellano. One would, therefore, expect him to
welcome the opportunity to avoid the trouble and the responsibility that
went with it. Angellanos willingness to take said trouble and to assume
this responsibility bear out his testimony, and that of Ignacio Antonio and
Simplicio Tolentino, to the effect that Semana had previously mentioned
Bruno Antonio as one of his assailants and had pleaded to Angellano not to
let Bruno Antonio and his men take him (Semana), because they may kill
him.
This version of the witnesses for the prosecution is further borne out by
Brunos attitude on that occasion. As a private citizen, and in the official
capacity in which he claimed to act, Bruno had no reason either to be
angry at Angellano for trying to take Semana to the health clinic in
Talugtog or to engage in an altercation with Angellano and forcibly take
possession of the person of Semana. He was, according to the very
evidence for the defense, 1-1/2 to 2 kilometers or one-hour walk from
Baloy. In other words, the place was not part of Baloy or within Brunos
jurisdiction. Appellants own witness, Cornelio Sumangil, confirmed
Angellanos assertion to the effect that said place is within the barrio of
Tibag, which is part of the municipality of Talugtog. Why, then, was Bruno
so anxious to take Semana, to the point of asserting falsely that he (Bruno)
had jurisdiction over the place where Semana was? And why was Bruno
Antonio so eager to undertake the inconvenient and difficult task of
carrying Semana along a footpath from said place to Baloy, about 2
kilometers or one hour walk away, thence to the junction, requiring
another one-hour walk, and thereafter to Cuyapo, 14 to 16 kilometers
away? Considering that Talugtog was less than half that distance from the
scene, of the occurrence; and that having reminded Angellano of the
responsibility that he would bear should Semana remain and die in his
(Angellanos) custody he (Bruno) assumed that responsibility, in taking

Semana with him, why was the former so keen about having the latter
under his custody, as to resort not only to threats, but, also, to force, in
order to attain his purpose? In short, Brunos aforementioned behavior
dovetails with the theory of the prosecution and reveals the artificiality of
the theory of the defense.
3. It appears from the testimony of Ignacio Antonio that, when Bruno
forcibly took Semana, he had the following injuries: two wounds at the left
rear portion of the neck, two at the left front portion of the neck, and one
on the upper left portion of the buttocks. Simplicio Tolentino testified that
Semana had a wound about one (1) centimeter below the left ear, another
on the left side of the neck, near the left jaw, two wounds at the lower left
portion of the neck, and still another on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr.
Alberto, however, found in the body of Semana an additional wound,
namely, an irregular circular wound, about 1 inch in diameter, on the left
fronto-parietal region, exposing the skull, probably caused with a semibladed instrument. Evidently Semana sustained this injury after he had
been forcibly taken by Bruno and when the former was under the latters
control. Considering that it was midway between the forehead and the
temple, and, hence, more visible than the injuries in the neck, said
witnesses for the prosecution could not have failed to notice said frontoparietal wound, were the theory of the defense true.
4. We have not overlooked that Semana had, according to Angellano, a
wound on the left portion of the head two inches above the left ear. This
witness had, however, turned hostile to the prosecution, thereby
compelling the latter to produce his aforementioned affidavit, Exhibit "C,"
and make him admit that he had informed the Provincial Fiscal that he
(Angellano) had transferred his residence from the barrio of Tibag to the
town of Talugtog, "because I was afraid of the threats of (to) my life," were
he to give evidence for the prosecution; and that many people including
Ignacio (Antonio) and Simplicio (Tolentino) had informed him about said
threats. It is, likewise, interesting to note that said reference to the alleged
wound above the left ear was made, on cross examination by counsel for
the defense, upon the latters request that the injuries of Semana be
described, a request made without anything to suggest its relevance to the
questions preceding the same. In other words, the surrounding
circumstances suggest that the one making the request knew beforehand
what Angellano would do or say in connection therewith. At any rate,
Semana did not have the injury described by Angellano, two inches above
the ear. This goes to show that he never saw either such injury or the one
found by Dr. Alberto at the fronto-parietal region; that Semana had neither,
when Angellano conferred with him; and ,that, having heard later about
said additional injury found by Dr. Alberto in the body of the deceased,
Angellano merely imagined the one the first he described on the
witness stand, apparently to help the defense. Indeed, in the affidavit
(Exhibit "C") made before the justice of the peace of Guimba on December
7, 1962, he claimed to have seen no such injury.
In an evident effort to offset the implications of the foregoing
circumstances, appellants intimated that there had been, between

Angellano and Bruno, a previous misunderstanding concerning a parcel of

land as if to imply that the testimony of the former, insofar as
unfavorable to the latter, had been prompted by ill-feeling or bad blood
between them. Of all the testimonial evidence for the prosecution, that of
Angellano was, however, the least adverse to Bruno. In fact, most of the
incriminating testimony of Angellano was given after the prosecution had
exposed his change of heart and the fear under which he was laboring. In
fact, Angellanos behavior on the witness stand was characterized by his
reluctance to reveal details or answer questions pregnant with implications
against him or the accused, and by his frequent lapses of memory as
regards the facts pertinent thereto.
Lastly, Angellanos testimony about the information given to him by
several persons, including Ignacio Antonio and Simplicio Tolentino,
concerning the threat to the life of those who may testify against
appellants herein, was, in a way, corroborated by the circumstance that
Eugenio Angellano, Ignacio Antonio, Ponciano Antonio and Simplicio
Tolentino refused to sign the subpoena requiring them to appear before the
lower court, to testify in the case at bar, in November, 1964, and that they
had to be arrested to insure their presence at the trial.
Despite the absence of proof of motive although Semanas panic upon
the sudden entry of two (2) men in the house of Felix Dalit, where he was
with a woman, followed by his immediate, but unsuccessful, attempt to
escape and, later (when he was found by Angellano), his fear of falling into
the hands of the people from Baloy, suggest that he and the woman were
probably doing, in said house, something wrong, which was offensive to
someone in Baloy, and that the beating he got thereafter was due thereto
We are satisfied that the guilt of appellant Bruno Antonio has been
established beyond reasonable doubt, and that the crime committed by
him is that of murder, qualified by treachery, Semana having been
maltreated while his hands were tied. 2 The penalty of life imprisonment
meted out to Bruno Antonio is, therefore, in accordance with law, but the
amount of the indemnity due to the heirs of the deceased should be
increased from P6,000 to P12,000. 3
We, however, entertain doubts on the sufficiency of the proof against
appellant Alfonso Dasalla. The very evidence for the prosecution shows
that he was not among those who accompanied Bruno, when he forcibly
took Semana in Tibag. Moreover, there is uncontradicted testimony for the
defense to the effect that Alfonso Dasalla did not join the group headed by
Bruno until after the death of Semana, when Cornelio Sumangil asked him
(Alfonso Dasalla), in Baloy, to help them bring the deceased to the
junction, where they expected to find a vehicle to take his body to Cuyapo.
The only evidence against Alfonso Dasalla is, therefore, the statement
made by Semana about the formers participation in the beating
administered to him. In the absence of any corroboration of said
statement, We do not believe that his guilt has been established beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, the judgment of conviction against him should
be reversed, and the case dismissed, insofar as he is concerned, with the
proportional part of the costs de oficio.

So modified, with respect to the civil liability of Bruno Antonio, and the
absolution of Alfonso Dasalla, as well as the dismissal of the case against
him, the decision appealed from is, accordingly, affirmed in all respects,
with one half of the costs de oficio. It is so ordered.

defendants. At the preliminary investigation held in the same day, the

fiscal presented a motion asking that Leocadia Desamparado and Jovito
Carmales be excluded from the complaint on the ground that they were the
least culpable of the accused and that their testimony was necessary to
establish a case for the prosecution. This motion was granted by the acting
justice of the peace. Upon the termination of the preliminary investigation,
the following information was filed in the Court of First Instance:

G.R. No. L-23792

February 17, 1926

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SEGUNDO BADILLA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Vicente Sotto, Block, Johnston & Greenbaum, A. P. Seva, and Araneta &
Zaragoza for appellants.
Assistant Attorney-General Reyes for appellee.
In the evening of March 7, 1924, Pedro Ferrer, justice of the peace of the
municipality of Sagay, Occidental Negros was fatally wounded in the house
of one Leocadia Desamparado, who stated that she had inflicted the fatal
wound in defense of her honor. She was immediately arrested and two
days later, while still in prison, made a confession implicating Segundo
Badilla, Restituto Tupas, Julian Domingo, Quirino Araez and Jovito Carmales
in the commission of the crime. The persons mentioned were thereupon
arrested and on the following day, March 10, Julian Domingo and Jovito
Carmales confessed that they were participants in the crime and on the
same day the provincial fiscal filed a complaint in the court of the justice of
the peace of Sagay charging Segundo Badilla, Restituto Tupas, Catalino
Gonzalez, Julian Domingo, Jovito Carmales, Quirino Araez, Agaton Dy-Cayco
and Leocadia Desamparado with the crime of murder. On March 12 an
amended complaint was filed including Epifanio Tupas as one of the

That on and before March 7, 1924, the defendants Epifanio Tupas,

Segundo Badilla, Restituto Tupas and Agaton Dy-Cayco in
connivance with one Leocadia Desamparado, Jovito Carmales and
their codefendants Catalino Gonzalez alias Mack Gonzalez, Julian
Domingo alias Julian Bongol and Quirino Araez all said defendants
being members of the local secret society known as Kusug Sang
Imol, desiring to take revenge for supposed abuses and arbitrary
acts of the justice of the peace Pedro Ferrer of the municipality of
Sagay of this Province of Occidental Negros in connection with his
official functions of which they believed without any ground that
the defendants Epifanio Tupas and his son Restituto Tupas,
specially, and Epifanio Tupas, Restituto Tupas, Segundo Badilla,
Agaton Dy-Cayco and all the defendants herein had been victims
being active members as they are of the aforesaid society Kusug
Sang Imol and desiring likewise the death of said justice of the
peace Pedro Ferrer to eliminate him from the office by any illicit
means so that he should not continue to commit similar supposed
abuses and arbitrary acts said defendants Epifanio Tupas, his son
Restituto Tupas, Segundo Badilla, and Agaton Dy-Cayco did
maliciously, intentionally and criminally induce said Leocadia
Desamparado by simulating that she had to legalize her marital
relations with her paranour Jose Lobaton which they had been
maintaining up to that time, to invite the justice of the peace Pedro
Ferrer to spend some time in her house situated in the municipality
of Sagay, Province of Occidental Negros, Philippine Islands, just on
the night of said March 7, 1924, which inducement was several
times and on several occasion ratified persistently by the
defendants Epifanio Tupas, Segundo Badilla, Restituto Tupas and
Agaton Dy-Cayco, with promise of reward, immunity and assurance
to furnish her an attorney who would defend her in the event that
by reason of her taking part in the perpetration of the crime to
which she was induced, she should be prosecuted in the courts of
justice; that Leocadia Desamparado, prompted by said
inducement, invited the justice of the peace Pedro Ferrer to come,
as he in fact did come, on the night of the aforesaid day, March 7,
1924 to her house for the aforesaid purpose and that once there

and seated on a chair with its back toward the door of the kitchen
where the defendants Segundo Badilla, Restituto Tupas, Agaton DyCayco, Catalino Gonzalez alias Mack Gonzalez, Julian
Domingo alias Julian Bongol and Quirino Araez had previously
placed themselves obeying the instruction and orders of the
defendant Epifanio Tupas given under the circumstances
aforementioned for the purpose of successfully killing said justice
of the peace Pedro Ferrer, and taking advantage of the fact that
the latter was unaware of the treacherous plot against him and had
no means of defense, the aforementioned Segundo Badilla,
Restituto Tupas, Agaton Dy-Cayco, Catalino Gonzalez alias Mack
Gonzalez, Julian Domingo alias Julian Bongol and Quirino Araez and
one Jovito Carmales, previously provided with daggers and canes
and other deadly weapons and cooperating with one another did
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally through craft, premeditation and
treachery and with abuse of superior strength and taking the law in
their own hands assault beat and attack said justice of the peace
Pedro Ferrer, inflicting the following bruises and injuries to wit: (1)
One penetrating wound, mortal by necessity, in the epigastric
region of the abdomen, 14 inches wide and 4 1/2 inches deep; (2)
one contusion on the back of the left hands; (3) one contusion on
the sides of both knees; (4) one contusion in the right iliac region;
and (5) several contusions on the superior and inferior parts of
both knees; as a result of which he died a few minutes later.
Contrary to article 403 of the Penal Code with the concurrence of
the sixth, eight, ninth, twelfth, fourteenth, fifteenth and twentieth
circumstances of article 10 of the same Code.
To this information the defendants pleaded not guilty but upon trial, the
court below found them guilty as charges and sentenced each of them to
suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua and to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000 with their
proportional shares of the costs. From this sentence all of the defendants
appealed.
It appears from the evidence that at the time the crime was committed
there were two secret societies or associations in the municipality of Sagay
of which one was called Kusug Sang Imol and the other Mainawaon; that
bitter feeling existed between the two associations which sometimes
resulted in personal violence; that the deceased was a "protector" of the
Mainawaon and was accused of favoritism by Kusug Sang Imol of which
society all of the defendants were members; that late in the afternoon of
March 7, 1924, while on his way to the house of one Bernabe Nunez to

perform a marriage ceremony the deceased was approached by Leocadia

Desamparado who asked him to come to her house that evening as she
had important matters to discuss with him; that the deceased accepted the
invitation and told Leocadia that he would come to her house after the
termination of the marriage ceremony and that he went there about 10
o'clock that evening.
As to what subsequently occurred, we have the testimony of Jovito
Carmales who on the witness stand stated among other things that in the
evening of March 7, 1924, the defendant Segundo Badilla, vice-president of
theKusug Sang Imol, came to his house and told him that Epifanio Tupas,
the local president of the same society wanted to see him; That he went
with Segundo Badilla to the house of Epifanio; that on their arrival there
they found all the other accused in this case present and a meeting was
held presided over by Epifanio Tupas; that upon the meeting being called
to order, Epifanio announced that the purpose of the meeting was to
inform the members present that in the town of Sagay there was a tyrant
and oppressor whose death was necessary for the prosperity of the Kusug
Sang Imol; that as long as this tyrant and oppressor was living there would
be no peace in the town of Sagay; and that this man was the justice of the
peace, Pedro Ferrer.
Carmales further testified that Segundo Badilla then expressed some
misgivings as to what would befall them if they killed the justice of the
peace but Epifanio Tupas answered that they needed have no fear because
they would have a lawyer to defend them and that the Government was
theirs; that Epifanio thereupon directed the defendant Quirino Araez to
read the form of the secret oath taken by the members of Kusug Sang
Imol upon their joining the society; that after the oath had been read,
Epifanio said dramatically: "Here is the dagger, the knife and the
flashlight," and thereupon delivered the dagger Exhibit O, knife Exhibit G,
and flashlight Exhibit L to Segundo Badilla, some of the other defendants
being given sticks or clubs of palma brava; that after the weapons had
been distributed the meeting adjourned and the defendants went to the
house of Leocadia Desamparado and entered the kitchen of the house;
that the door opening between the kitchen and the main part of the house
was covered through the curtain or petate; that Segundo Badilla peeped
through the curtain and found that the deceased was sitting on a bench
inside the house with his back towards the kitchen door, and that Leocadia
was sitting on another bench opposite the deceased with a table between
them upon which there was a lighted lamp; that thereupon Badilla followed
by the other defendants, entered the room, Badilla stealthily approaching
the deceased from behind and seized him by the neck blowing out the light
at the same time; that the other defendants also laid hold of the deceased

and overpowered and held him while Badilla, with the aid of the flashlight,
lifted up the undershirt of the deceased and stabbed him with the dagger
in the abdomen near the navel; that after having done so, Segundo Badilla
handed Leocadia the knife Exhibit G, and told her to cry out; that Leocadia
did so, whereupon the defendants made their escape, some of them
passing through the main door of the house and the others through the
kitchen; that after having left that house of Leocadia Desamparado the
defendants again went to the house of Epifanio Tupas to give him an
account of the result of their expedition and, upon arriving there, Segundo
Badilla said to Epifanio Tupas: "I doubt that he will survive."
It appears from the testimony of the other witnesses that after the
deceased was wounded he was with some difficulty able to walk to his own
house near by, where he expired in about six minutes after his arrival.
Leocadia Desamparado was also presented as a witness against the
accused, but, to the apparent surprise of the prosecuting attorney,
retracted her confession and testified that while she was sleeping in her
house on the evening in question she was awakened by the deceased who
attempted to force her to have intercourse with him and that in the
ensuing struggle, she remembered that she had a knife Exhibit G in her
bed and that seizing the knife she stabbed the deceased.
Though the testimony of Carmales seems straightforward and convincing
and remained unshaken by a very lengthy and ably conducted crossexamination, we are mindful of the fact that it is the testimony of a
coconspirator and accomplice and, as such, must be received with great
caution. As to the defendant Julian Domingo it is fully corroborated by the
latter's confession with which it is substantially in accord. In the appellant's
brief some stress is placed on the fact that Domingo began his commission
of the crime and that it was not until he had been examined at some
length that he admitted his participation therein and implicated most of his
codefendants. In our opinion, this fact, so far from weakening the
confession, rather strengthens it and tends to show that it was not
obtained by improper means; had it been the purpose of the investigating
authorities to extort a false confession from Domingo the first part of his
statement would hardly have been reported in full.
At the trial of the case the confession of Leocadia Desamparado was
admitted in evidence to contradict her testimony and the appellants assign
as error that the court below apparently took her confession and that of
Julian Domingo into consideration upon certain points affecting the whole
case. The general rule is that extrajudicial declarations of a coconspirator
made before the information of the conspiracy or after the accomplishment

of its object are inadmissible in evidence as against in a criminal case has

the constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him
and to cross-examine them. It has however, been held that where
extrajudicial confessions had been made by several persons charged with
a conspiracy and there could have been collusion with reference to the
several confessions, the fact that the statements are in all material
respects identical is confirmatory of the testimony of an accomplice. It was
so held in the important case of United States vs. Lancaster (44 Fed., 896)
where three persons were jointly charged with a conspiracy, one of whom
made a voluntary confession, another was permitted to become a witness
for the Government under implied pardon and testified and the third made
a declaration during the pendency of the criminals enterprise, the court
saying among other things that ". . . while the testimony of the
accomplices could not corroborate each other and while the confession of
Clemens cannot be considered as evidence against the other prisoners yet
the unanimity of statements of the three made without the opportunity of
conference or without proof that they did confer is a fact which tends to
corroborate the three statements so made. . . .
In other words while an extrajudicial declaration of a coconspirator may not
be directly introduced in evidence against another coconspirator as proof
of specific facts it may nevertheless under certain conditions be taken into
consideration as a circumstance in judging the credibility of the testimony
of an accomplice.
In the present case there is no indication that the three declarations were
the result of collusion or that the declarants had the opportunity of
conferring with each other before making the declaration. Neither is there
any valid reason to believe that the statements made by the declarants
were laid in their mouths by other persons. On the contrary, the
declarations themselves indicate that they were spontaneous expressions
of what was in the minds of the declarants at the time. All three
declarations were legally before the court and we do not think that in these
circumstances the court erred in giving some consideration to the fact that
they were very similar to each other and substantially in accord.
On other hand the court undoubtedly erred in using the confession of
Leocadia Desamparado as the sole source of the finding that she was
induced to cooperate in the killing of Pedro Ferrer by the promise of a
remuneration of P1,000 and five heads of carabaos; the confession was not
admissible as direct proof of that fact.
But even if the confessions are left wholly out of consideration, there is in
our opinion sufficient corroboration of Carmales' testimony to sustain the

judgment of the court below. It is abundantly proven that there was a very
bitter feeling on the part of the defendants against deceased and strong
motives for the commission of the crime. It is also sufficiently established
by additional evidence that several persons took part in the crime; the
widow of the deceased an apparently reliable witness, testifies that he, on
his arrival at his house after having been wounded said, "me han
traicionado" (they have betrayed me) and that he instructed her to close
the doors and windows because they were going to kill him. We have also
the testimony of the witness Teofilo Alvarado that he heard several persons
run away from Leocadia's house immediately after the wounding of the
deceased and the witness Tomas Rodriguez states that he about 9 o'clock
in the evening, saw Restituto Tupas and Agaton Dy-Cayco with two
companions in front of the house of Leocadia.
Another corroborating circumstance is that according to the testimony of
the two physicians who examined the body of the deceased the fatal
wound was inflicted by a double edged weapon such as the dagger Exhibit
O, the width of the blade of which was found to correspond to the length of
the lips of the wounds. This dagger was found hidden behind a post in the
house of Epifanio Tupas. The palma brava clubs in regard to which
Carmales testified were found in the same house hidden behind a trunk
and covered with rugs. The flashlight Exhibit L was also found in Epifanio's
house. The statement of Carmales that the deceased was sitting at the
table in Leocadia's house when attacked by the defendants is corroborated
by the facts that his cigarette holder together with ashes of cigarettes were
found on the table and that his slippers were found under the same table
together with his folded raincoat.
The theory of the defense that Ferrer was killed by Leocadia Desamparado
in defense of her honor is contradicted by the fact the he came to her
house at her invitation as testified to by Buenaventura Rodriguez. It is also
to be noted that her bed located in a portion of the house separated from
the sala by a curtain was found undisturbed and that the small knife with
which she claimed to have inflicted the wound is one edged and was found
on the floor of the sala; and that it was covered with an oily substance and
had no blood on it. This fact also corroborates the testimony of Carmales
that the knife was not used in wounding the deceased but was handed to
Leocadia by Segundo Badilla in the sala of the house. Another
circumstances which also corroborates Carmales testimony is that two
benches in the sala were overturned indicating that a struggle had taken
place in that part of the house.
It is also suggested by the defense that the crime might have been
committed by Jose Lobaton, a policeman with whom Leocadia was living

and who was the father of her two children. It appears however that
Lobaton was not in the town of Sagay on the evening in question.
Moreover, he was a member of Mainawaon society and probably on
friendly terms with the deceased. If, as we think has been clearly proven,
Leocadia and the deceased were merely sitting at the table in the sala of
the house conversing with each other. Lobaton could hardly have had
sufficient motive to resort to physical violence. That fact that the deceased
on his arrival at his house after being wounded asked his wife to close the
doors and windows and send for the police because they were going to kill
him is also strong argument against this theory and so is the fact that
when the fatal wound was inflicted upon the deceased the dagger
penetrated the lower hem of his undershirt thus showing that the garment
was pulled up to his waist at that time a fact which corroborated Carmales'
testimony and could not very well have occurred if there had been only
one assailant.
The case for the defense has been very ably argued and our attention has
been called to several apparent flaws in the evidence for the prosecution
but after a painstaking examination of the voluminous record we cannot
find that the judge of the court below erred in his appreciation of the
evidence and have no reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. It
may well be that Carmales in describing what occurred in the house of
Leocadia drew to some extent of his imagination in regard to details which
could hardly have been accurately observed in the darkness and
considering that he probably was anxious to exculpate himself as far as
possible, we need not necessarily believe that he was the last of the
conspirators to enter the room in which the crime was committed; but one
cannot read the transcript of his testimony without becoming impressed
with his apparent sincerity and without feeling that he in the main told the
truth.
There are certain things which have not been satisfactorily explained and
in regard to which the record leaves us more or less in the dark but which
are not of decisive importance. There is for instance, no explanation of the
fact that while there was blood on the undershirt and drawers of the
deceased, there were no signs of it on the trousers alleged to have been
worn by him on the occasion in question and it is quite possible that he did
not wear them at the time the dagger wound was inflicted. There is also
room for the suspicion that he did not visit Leocadia with the purest of
motives at such a late hour and that he in view of her invitation
entertained expectations which do not appear to have been fulfilled. In
these circumstances he may have felt reluctant to inform why he did not
give her any details when she asked him how he was wounded but limited
himself to saying "me han traicionado; me han traicioando." It is, of course

also possible that he at that time was too feeble to think coherently and to
describe what had taken place.
Counsel for the defense strenuously argue that the statement of Carmales
as to the manner in which the crime was committed is so improbable as to
be unworthy of belief. We do not think so; the facts narrated are unusual
but considering the situation as a whole, the story told by the witnesses for
the prosecution is not improbable, though it may suffer from minor
inaccuracies.
It is insisted that it had been the intention to kill Ferrer, all of his assailants
would have been armed. But when it is considered that the plan evidently
was to have it appear that the killing was done by Leocadia in self defense
the reason that for arming only one of the defendants with a cutting
instrument becomes quite apparent; had more then one of them been so
armed, it would perhaps have been difficult to control them and several
wounds might have been inflicted which would have rendered Leocadia's
theory less credible. There would also, in the deep darkness have been the
danger of wounding each other, Badilla seems to have taken special care
to place the wound in a vital spot and the persons who planned the crime
undoubtedly knew that a single deep dagger wound in that spot would
mean certain death and would serve their purpose.
Counsel also scout the idea the small knife Exhibit G was handed to
Leocadia by Badilla after he had wounded the deceased with the dagger
Exhibit O but we see nothing unreasonable or improbable therein. Exhibit G
is a small knife which might be used for peeling or cutting vegetables and
which a woman would be likely to have within reach and use, whereas her
possession of a dagger such as the Exhibit O might be more difficult to
explain. Badilla could, of course, have used the small knife in stabbing the
deceased, but naturally preferred to use the large weapon as the more
effective and sure.
The various assignments of error on legal points are in our opinion of little
merit. The court below unquestionably erred in allowing the fiscal, over the
objection of the defense, to have the alleged oath of the Kusug Sang
Imol read to the witness Carmales and then to ask the witness if that was
the oath he had taken. The question was leading and should not have been
allowed but as there is other evidence as to the main features of the oath
the error is of comparatively little importance and is non-prejudicial.
Neither is the failure of the court to make specific findings of fact in regard
to the defenses of alibi reversible error. Such defenses are frequently relied
on in criminal cases but oral evidence tending to prove alibi is so easily

manufactured and is usually so unreliable that it can rarely be given

credence. The evidence with which alibi is sought to be established in this
case is of the usual order and we do not think the trial judge greatly erred
in failing to discuss it at height.
We find nothing illegal in the examination of the defendants and other
witnesses by the fiscal previously to the filing of the complaint. This
proceeding is authorized by section 1687 of the Administrative Code and
while it in a sense may be inquisitorial, it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime so
as to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. In one form
or another similar investigations are permitted under all systems of
criminal procedure.
In answer to the contention that the court erred in refusing upon the
simple verbal request of counsel for the defense to compel the production
of the affidavit or confession of Jovito Carmales made during the
investigation held by the fiscal preliminary to the filing of the complaint we
can do no longer better than too quote the language of the court upon a
similar question in the case of United States vs. Baluyot (40 Phil., 385):
The fourth specification is addressed to the supposed error of the
court in refusing to compel the provincial fiscal to produce in court
at the request of the attorney for the accused certain written
statements which had been made by the witnesses Pedro
Gonzales, Gregorio de Guzman and Antonio Aranjuez in a
preliminary inquiry conducted by the fiscal preparatory to this
prosecution. It appears that after the witnesses above mentioned
had been examined in court for the prosecution, they were turned
over to the attorney for the accused and were by him fully crossexamined. Later, when the giving of testimony for the prosecution
had been concluded the defense proceeded to introduce sundry
witnesses who were examined in due course. After four had thus
testified and immediately before the accused was placed upon the
stand in his own behalf his attorney for the prosecution objected in
the ground that one party cannot be compelled to produce
evidence in favor of the other. The court was of the opinion that
the written declarations the production of which was sought were
of a privileged nature and accordingly overruled the motion. We
are of the opinion that the court not in error in refusing to compel
the production of the documents in question. They were not
original or independent evidence of such a character as to give the
accused as unqualified right to compel their production and no
power basis made those statements to justify their production with

a view to the impeachment of the declarants. The request was of

course based upon the supposition or expectation that if the
statements of the witness before the fiscal were produced they
might be found to contain something different from what was
contained in their testimony given in court.
We know of no rule of practice which sustains the contention of the
appellant. The statements in question were not the sworn
declarations of witnesses taken in conformity with the
requirements of section 13 of General Orders No. 58 and which are
commonly attached to the expediente' transmitted by the
committing magistrate to the Court of First Instance. In the case at
bar the preliminary examination before the committing magistrate
was waived by the accused and the declarations of the witnesses
for the prosecution were therefore not taken before the magistrate.
The declarations referred to were, on the contrary taken in an
investigation conducted by the fiscal under the authority of section
1687 the Administrative Code. This section authorizes the fiscal if
he deems it wise to conduct an investigation into the matter of any
crime or misdemeanor for the purpose of instituting or carrying
that this section shall not be construed to authorize a provincial
fiscal to act as a justice of the peace in any preliminary
investigation. The proceeding here contemplated is of an
administrative character and the information thereby acquired is
intended for the use of public prosecutor and are not subject to
production at the mere request of the attorney for the accused
where no ground therefore had been laid.
In order that we may not be misunderstood as well as for the
purpose of clarifying the practice in such matters a few words may
here be properly said in respect to the proper mode of proceeding
in a case where a party wishes to get before the court
contradictory statements made by a witness who is testifying for
the adversary party. For instance if the attorney for the accused
had information that a certain witness say, Pedro Gonzales had
made and signed a sworn statement before the fiscal materially
different from that given in his testimony before the court, it was
incumbent upon the attorney when cross-examining said witness
to direct his attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did
not make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did not
there make a statement before the fiscal or if he did not there
make a statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a
statement before the fiscal or if he did not there make a statement
different from that delivered in court. If the witness admits the

making of such contradictory statements the accused has the

benefit of the admission, while the witness has the opportunity to
explain the discrepancy if he can. On the other hand, if the witness
denies making any such contradictory statement the accused has
the right to prove that the witness did make such statements; and
if the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof would be
admissible. This process of cross-examining a witness upon the
point of prior contradictory statements is called in the practice of
the American court's laying a predicate for the introduction of
contradictory statements. It is almost universally accepted that
unless a ground is thus laid upon cross-examination evidence of
contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a witness;
though undoubtedly the matter is to a large extent in the discretion
of the court.
We wish to add that in a case of this kind if the accused had by
affidavit or otherwise made it appear to the satisfaction of the
court that the witnesses named had made statements in their
declarations before the fiscal materially at variance with their
statements in court and that the production of said declarations
was necessary or even desirable in the interests of justice, the
court would have had ample power to order their production. No
such showing or intimidation was made in this case; and the
attorney who made the motion was merely prove to be favorable
to his client. Too put a court inferior for refusing to entertain such a
motion would encourage frivolous delays and tend to embarrass
the speedy and proper administration of justice.
Counsel also assigns as error that the court below sanctioned the failure of
the fiscal to include Jovito Carmales and Leocadia Desamparado in the
information and afterwards permitted their presentation as witnesses for
the prosecution without following the procedure prescribed by section 2 of
Act No. 2709 which reads as follows:
When two or more persons are charged with the commission of a
certain crime the competent court at any time before they have
entered upon their defense may direct any of them to be
discharged that he may be a witness for the Government when in
the judgment of the court:
(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper

prosecution of the crime committed except the testimony of said
accused;

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff,

vs.
ROLANDO SISCAR y CAPIO, defendant.

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially

corroborated in its material points;

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Mindoro (Criminal Case No. C-1080) convicting the appellant for murder
and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the absence of any
modifying circumstance, aside from P12,000.00 civil indemnity.

(d) Said accused not appear to be the most guilty and

(e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of the crime
of perjury or false testimony or of any other crime involving moral
turpitude.
In this case the discharge of Carmales from the original complaint was
ordered by the justice of the peace upon motion was ordered by the justice
of the peace upon motion of the fiscal during the preliminary investigation.
Whether the justice of the peace exceeded his jurisdiction in doing so at
that stage of the proceedings need not here be determined. If he lacked
such jurisdiction it would merely have the effect of laying Carmales open to
another prosecution for the same offense but would affect his competency
as a witness for the prosecution at the trial of the case. An examination of
the section quoted shows clearly that its only object is to prevent
unnecessary or arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons guilty of
the crime charged, and that it has nothing to do with the admissibility of
their testimony or their competency as witnesses. Consequently the court
below did not err in permitting Carmales to testify (U. S. vs. Abanzado, 37
Phil., 658; U. S. vs. Enriquez, 40 Phil., 603; US vs De Guzman, 30 Phil., 416;
U. S. vs Alabot, 38 Phil., 698; and People vs. Velasco, 42 Phil., 75).
Considering the evidence and giving due weight to the findings of the trial
judge who had the opportunity to observe the witnesses and form as
estimate of their credibility we are of the opinion that the judgment
appealed from must be affirmed. The imposition of the death penalty
might, perhaps, be justified but in committing the crime, the defendants
were laboring under strong provocation and the court is not unanimous as
to the propriety of that penalty in this case.
The judgment appealed from is therefore affirmed each of the appellants to
pay one-seventh of the costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-55649 December 3, 1985

The Information against Rolando Siscar reads:

That on or about the 12th day of July, 1972, between 7:00
and 8:00 o'clock in the morning, at barrio Camansihan,
Municipality of Calapan, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the abovenamed accused Rolando Siscar y Capio,
with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot several times with
twelve (12) gauge rifle one Moises Capio thereby inflicting
upon the latter mortal gun shots wounds causing his
instantaneous death."
Siscar was arraigned only on January 19, 1978 or five and a half years after
the commission of the crime because he eluded arrest.
As summarized in the People's Brief, the facts are as follows:
In the morning of July 12, 1972, the deceased Moises Capio
prepared to leave for the poblacion of Calapan from his
residence in Bo. Camansihan Calapan, Oriental Mindoro to
attend the hearing of a criminal case filed against him for
grave threats. The complainant was his sister Dionisia
Capio, the mother of appellant (Exh. "O", p. 38, rec p. 5,
tsn, April 2, 1979; pp, 2-4, tsn, Nov. 8, 1979). He was
bringing important documents for the case, a bag
containing two chickens for his lawyer, and P700.00 in cash
(p. 7, tsn, April 2, 1979).
While Moises was making preparations for the trip, his wife,
Capio, was sweeping the yard (pp. 6-7, Id). She had earlier
tethered their carabao on a nearby bamboo grove from
where he saw appellant forty meters away carrying a long

shotgun and a small bag. Used to seeing her nephew

hunting wild ducks with a shotgun, Mercedes did not and
his presence nor call his attention 42, Id).
Mercedes was still sweeping the yard when Moises stepped
down and left as he followed a 200-meter stretch of
pathway towards the main road for the ride (pp. 6-7, Id).
Shortly thereafter, Mercedes heard three gun reports
coming from her husband's direction. Then Juana Caringal,
a neighbor, who at the time was at the window of her
house. called out loudly to Mercedes that appellant had
just shot Moises (pp. 8-9, 22-23, Id). As soon as she heard
Juana Caringal, Mercedes rushed to the place from where
she had heard the shots and saw her husband running
back to their house in a zigzag manner (pasuray-suray),
wounded. She embraced him to give support as he was
falling, and asked what had happened; he said that
appellant shot him (pp. 9-10, 28, Id). Juana Caringal, who in
the meanwhile approached the couple, repeated to
Mercedes that appellant was the one who fired the shots
(pp. 47-48, Id.).
Albino Manalo, a barrio councilman of Camansihan, also
heard the shots while tilling his land. Looking at the
direction from where the shots came, he saw appellant
carrying a long shotgun, run to the main road and board a
jeep for Calapan (pp. 4-8, tsn, May 10, 1978). Manalo was
then informed by Roberto Viaa that appellant had just
shot Moises Capio. Forthwith he went quickly with Viaa to
the scene fifty meters from the victim's house. Seeing
Moises lying down, wounded on the breast and back,
Manalo asked Moises what happened, and Moises
answered that he was shot by appellant (pp. 812, Id). Upon
Manalo's instruction, somebody got a hammock to bring
Moises to Calapan for treatment. But it was too late; Moises
died as he was placed on the hammock (pp. 12-13, Id; pp.
14-15, tsn, April 2, 1979).
Among the objects recovered from the scene of the crime were an empty
shell (Exh. "E"); a brown paper bag (Exh . "E") containing, among others, a
pair of pants and a native bag, "bankuwang" (t.s.n., February 21, 1978, pp.
27-28) in which the deceased put the chicken he was bringing to Calapan.

The necropsy report prepared by the Municipal Health Officer, Dr. Alberto
C. Montelibano, listed the cause of Moises' death as "Internal Hemorrhage
and shock due to the Gunshot Wound." It reads:
POST MORTEM FINDINGS
Wound, gunshot, thru and thru, thorax, perforating lobe of
right lung.
Wound of entrance, scapular region, right, level of the 2nd
intercostal space, 1 inch from the vertebral column. Wound
measures I inch at its longest diameter with powder burns
around.
Wound of exit, eight (8) in number. chest, right, scattered
around the 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, with seven (7) of
the wound Nos. 1 to 7 measuring about 2 inch at its
longest diameter while one of it, wound No. 8, measures
about 1/2 inch at its longest diameter.
Rolando Siscar put up the defense of alibi. According to him, on July L2
1972, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, he, together with his mother
Dionisia Capio and others, went to Calapan, Oriental Mindoro; that they
arrived at Calapan at about 8:00 o'clock in the morning, after which his
companions proceeded to the municipal building where they had an scheduled court hearing, while he boarded a tricycle and proceeded to
Calapan pier on his way to Batangas City; that he reached Batangas City
on the same day from where he proceeded to Taliba, San Luis, Batangas,
arriving there at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon. (t.s.n., Oct. 16, 1979,
pp. 7, 9 & 5.) Appellant also stated that at about 5:00 o'clock P.M. of July
12, 1972, he received news of his uncle Moises' death; that . he went back
to Camansihan, Calapan Oriental Mindoro, arriving there on the next day,
that after the burial of his uncle, he again went to Taliba, San Luis,
Batangas to work at a sugarcane plantation, returning to Camansihan once
in a while to give money to his mother; that in one of his visits to
Camansihan, he was told by his mother that police authorities were looking
for him but he did not give himself up because "it was martial law" and he
was afraid, having been informed that he could be subjected to
punishment. During the hearing, Rolando Siscar Identified the pair of pants
in the brown paper bag as own, but claimed that he had previously lost
them. He stated that he did not know any reason why the crime was
imputed to him. (Ibid., pp. 12, 22-23, 25 Rolando's mother, and his uncle,
Doroteo, corroborated Rolando's alibi.

This appeal is based upon the following assigned errors:

1. The court a quo erred in concluding without factual basis
at the testimonies of all prosecution witnesses were gospel
truths e t hose o the accused were devoid of truth.
2. The lower court erred in not considering that there was
no declaration presented, no motive shown, and no
circumstantial evidence to prove the guilt of the accused,

an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal

significance, may be received as a part of the res gestae.
There are three requisites for the admission of evidence of res gestae: (1)
that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the
statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive; and (3)
that the statements refer to the occurrence in question and its attending
circumstances (People vs. Ricaplaza, 23 SCRA 374.)
Mercedes Jimenez testified:

3. The lower court erred in not considering the failure of

the prosecution to present Juana Caringal, an alleged
eyewitness, and he reason why she was not presented, as
suppression of evidence.

Q. A few minutes before your husband left

did you hear anything unusual?
A. After a short while I heard something.

4. The lower court erred in giving so much importance on

the alleged flight of the accused as basis for conviction
without other evidence of guilt.
5. The lower court erred in admitting the documentary
evidence introduced by the prosecution without stating the
purpose of the offer in violation of Sec. 35 of Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
6. The lower court erred in not acquitting the accused of
the crime charged on the basis of the weakness of the
prosecution evidence and on the strength of the defense.
The appeal is mainly based on the posture that the guilt of appellant has
not been proven beyond reasonable doubt since no eyewitness was
presented by the prosecution and that the testimonies of Mercedes
Jimenez and Albino Manalo against appellant are hearsay and therefore
inadmissible.
The rule on res gestae is one of the well recognized exceptions to the
hearsay rule, It is embodied in Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
It reads:
Sec. 36. Part of the res gestae.Statements made by a
person while a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to
the circumstances thereof, may be given in evidence as a
part of the res gestae. So, also, statements accompanying

Q. What was that something?

A. The report of three shots coming from a
gun.
Q. Where did those shots come from?
A. According to my own estimate, the shots
came from the direction where my husband
was?
Q. So, what did you do upon hearing those
shots?
A. A certain woman called while I was
looking around and I learned that it was my
husband who was the target of those three
shots.
Q. When you were called upon, what did
you do?
A. I ran towards the place where the shots
came from together with my daughter.
Q. What was the age of your daughter?

A. About three years

Q. As you were rushing to the place where
the shots came from, what did you see?
A. I saw that my husband was already
running zigzagly and learned that he was
already wounded.
Q. Towards what direction was your
husband going when you saw him
"pasuray-suray"?

Albino Manalo testified that while he was tilling his land in the morning of
July 12, 1972 at Camansihan, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro, he heard three
successive shots after which, looking at the direction from where the shots
came, he saw appellant Rolando Siscar running towards the road carrying a
shotgun. Thereafter, a certain Roberto Viaa came to him (Manalo) and
informed him that Moises Capio had been shot. He then went to see
Moises. Manalo further testified:
Q. And did you see Moises Capio?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Do you know the house of Moises Capio?

A. Towards the direction of our house.

A. Yes sir.
Q. And what did you do when you saw your
husband coming and walking zigzagly?
A. I put down my daughter and then went
to his aid by em bracing him.
Q. And now, what did you do afterwards?
A. I asked what happened to him
considering the condition in which he was.

Q. Now, how far from his house was Moises

Capio when you saw him?
A. About fifty meters.
Q. When you arrived at the place where
Moises Capio was, what was the condition
of Moises Capio?
A. He was talking.

Q. And what did he tell you'?

A. I was told by my husband to keep calm
and not to get afraid and that he was shot
up by Rolando.
xxx xxx xxx

Q. What did you do upon reaching that

place?
A. I asked him something.
Q. What did you ask him?

Q. When your husband told you that he

was shot by Rolando, to whom was he
referring to?

A. I asked him something.

A. Rolando Siscar, his nephew. (t.s.n., April

2, 1979, pp. 811; Records, pp. 50-53)

A. I asked what happened to him.

Q. What did you ask him?

Q. And what was the answer?

A. He said he was shot.

Q. By whom?
A. Rolando Siscar.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. While you were interrogating Moises and
asked him who shot him, and he answered
that he was shot by Rolando Siscar, were
there any other persons present aside from
you?.
A. There were.
Q. Who, if you can remember, were these
persons?
A. Roberto Viaa, the widow, and many
others.
Q. Do you mean the widow of Moises?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. So, after talking with the wounded
Moises Capio, what else did you do?
A. I sent somebody to get a hammock for
the purpose of transporting the victim to
Calapan.
Q. Were you able to transport the victim for
medication?
A. While we were in the act of placing the
victim on the hammock he died. (t.s.n.,
May , 10, 1978, pp. 9-10, 12-13; Records,
pp. 19-20, 22-23.)

The shooting of Moises, the res gestae or the principal act, was a startling
occurrence. Almost immediately thereafter or before any opportunity to
contrive, Moises told his wife Mercedes and Albino Manalo that it was his
nephew, the appellant, who shot him. There was thus full compliance with
the requirements for the admission of the testimonies of Mercedes and
Manalo as evidence of res gestae. (See People vs. Alban, 1 SCRA 931;
People vs. Tiongson, 47 SCRA 279; People vs. Putian, 74 SCRA 133.)
No adverse implication can be drawn from the failure of the prosecution to
present as witness Juana Caringal, who witnessed the perpetration of the
crime. As pointed out in the People's Brief, Juana Caringal died in
November, 1972, some five months after the incident in question.
Therefore she could not have testified when the case was heard in 1978.
Appellant impugns the credibility of prosecution witnesses. He has however
failed to adduce any compelling reason why the factual findings of the trial
court should be overturned. We therefore affirm those findings in line with
the settled rule on the matter.
We have held in a long line of cases that when the issue is
one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will
generally not disturb the finding of the trial court,
considering that it is in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and
observed their deportment and manner of testifying during
the trial, unless it has plainly overlooked certain facts of
substance and value that, if considered, might effect the
result of the case. (People vs. Mercado, 97 SCRA 232.)
In assailing the credibility of the state witnesses,
appellants, unfortunately, are up against the formidable
wall protective of the validity of the findings of the trial
court. The well-established doctrine is that findings of trial
court relative to the credibility of the testimony of the
witnesses, as well as of the witnesses themselves, are
entitled to high respect, and, therefore, generally sustained
by the appellate court. The only exception arises when it
could be shown that the trial judge has overlooked or
misinterpreted any fact or circumstance of weight and
value as to impeach his findings or call for a different
finding. No such showing has been made by appellants, as
demonstrated convincingly by the Solicitor General who
refuted appellant's arguments intended to show the
incredibility, for being allegedly contradictory and

improbable, of the testimony of the three eyewitnesses for

the prosecution named above, in a manner We can do no
better than to quote from his brief were it not for the fact
that to do this would unduly lengthen this decision. Suffice
it to say that We are convinced from the discussion in
appellee's brief of the alleged contradictions,
inconsistencies or improbabilities in the testimonies of she
state witnesses that all these are either non-existent or
that they refer to details of no consequence that they could
not affect the integrity of said testimonies. (People vs.
Surban, 123 SCRA 218.)
That appellant allegedly returned to Camansihan one day after the killing
Moises, does not negate appellant's guilt. It be stated however that even
during he wake for Moises, the Calapan Police already asked for the
whereabouts of appellant, but Dionisia Capio, the mother, told the police
that Siscar was in Batangas working in a sugar plantation. Testifying on
direct examination, Dionisia Capio stated:
Q. Did you attend the vigil (lamay)?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Did any policemen ask you where was
your son, Rolando Siscar at the time'?
A. They inquired me and I told them that
Rolando was in Batangas working in the
sugar plantation. (t.s.n., July 6, 1979 p. 14;
Records p. 139.)
It must not be overlooked that Jimenez and Manalo testified not only on
Moises' Identification of appellant as the culprit but also on the fact that
they saw appellant immediately before and after the commission of the
crime. Jimenez categorically stated that when her husband was about to
leave for Calapan, she saw appellant carrying a shotgun and a small bag.
Manalo said that right after hearing the fatal shots he saw Siscar carrying a
shotgun, running from where the shots came and towards the direction of
the road. Manalo further testified that Siscar boarded a jeep upon reaching
the road (t.s.n., May 10, 1978, p. 8; Records, p. 18). The positive
testimonies of Jimenez and Manalo together with the Identification of
appellant by the victim, admissible as part of the res gestae, overcome the
alibi put up by the appellant.

Alibi is the weakest defense that an accused can avail of, and cannot
prosper, even where proof thereof is corroborated by defense witnesses,
when the Identity of the defendant as the person who committed the crime
is fully established by clear, explicit and positive testimony (People vs.
Yutila, 102 SCRA 264.)
The trial court did not err in taking flight as evidence of guilt. At the latest,
Siscar learned that the police was looking for him one week after Moises'
burial. According to Dionisia Capio, she went to Batangas to inform his son
that "he was wanted" (t.s.n., July 16, 1979, p. 41; Records p. 166). While it
may be true that since then, appellant used to go back once in a while to
Camansihan, Calapan to bring money to his mother, the fact is that, for
over five years, he never gave himself up to the police until he was
apprehended on January 19, 1978. Appellant's explanation that he did not
surrender because it was martial law and he was afraid of punishment, did
not justify his flight from justice. As stated in the People's brief, appellant
could have surrendered through intermediaries if he was really innocent.
That he did not, indicates consciousness of guilt. (People vs. Vengco, 127
SCRA 242, 248; People vs. Millape, 134 SCRA 555; People vs. Hecto, 135
SCRA 113.)
Appellant assails the admission of some documentary evidence presented
by the prosecution in the absence of a statement of the purpose for which
they were offered. The defect was, however, subsequently corrected when
the trial curt allowed the prosecution to state the purpose of the offer of
evidence. At any rate, the defense was not prejudiced thereby. For even in
the absence of documentary evidence, there would be enough evidentiary
support to sustain appellant's conviction.
Notwithstanding that appellant has been proven beyond doubt to be the
killer of Moises, his conviction for murder cannot be affirmed. The
information against him alleged treachery and evident premeditation; but
there has been failure of proof in this regard. Nowhere in the records is
there evidence of treachery or evident premeditation. Hence, appellant can
only be convicted for homicide. (People vs. Ramolete, 56 SCRA 66; People
vs. Putian, 74 SCRA 133.)
Accordingly, the appealed decision is modified and the appellant Rolando
Siscar y Capio is convicted of homicide. He is sentence to an indeterminate
penalty of eight years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as
maximum. The civil indemnity due the heirs of the victim is increased to
P30,000.00, Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.
PASCUA, JR. PEDRO & JOHN DOES, accused.

MARIANO

MARIANO PASCUA, JR. PEDRO, accused-appellant.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 32, dated April 28, 1997, in Criminal Case No.
993, finding accused-appellant Mariano Pascua, Jr. guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties inherent thereto, to
indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P120,000.00 as and for
actual and moral damages, and to pay the costs without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.[1]
In an Information dated November 27, 1992, accused-appellant
Mariano Pascua, Jr. alias Pedro, together with four John Does, was
charged of Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about 6:00 oclock in the evening of November 14, 1992 in
Barangay Doa Imelda, Municipality of Diffun, Province of Quirino,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused with intent to kill, armed with firearms of unknown calibers
and taking advantage of their superior strength and with the aid of armed
men and with treachery after conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot ERNESTO QUIMING, a Barangay Captain of the said place, hitting the
latter on the different parts of his body that caused his instantaneous
death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on November 14, 1992, at
about 6:00 in the evening, prosecution witness Sanita Quiming (Sanita),
wife of the victim. Ernesto Quiming (Ernesto), was gathering dry clothes in
the yard of their house at Doa Imelda, Diffun, Quirino when a man arrived
looking for the house of the barangay captain. She answered none sir
because she saw that the man was holding a gun with his two hands. Then
the man inquired about Ernesto and she replied that he was attending a
prayer meeting at Barangay Malayod together with their three children but
they will soon be back. Suddenly the man pointed his gun at her and
pushed her inside the house. She was told to keep quiet and was
threatened that her children will be killed if she talked.

Upon entering the house, Sanita was surprised to see three other
armed men pointing their guns at her two children. One of them, whose
face was covered with a bonnet, spoke and Sanita was startled when she
heard the voice because it sounded familiar. For a moment, Sanita
surreptitiously stared at the man with the bonnet and she became
apprehensive when she recognized him to be herein accused-appellant
because of the eyes, eyelids, nose, mouth, and beard which were not
covered. She knows accused-appellant well because they have been
neighbors ever since he was a child. Sanita also knows accused-appellant
as the person who threw a hand grenade at Ernesto during a barangay
meeting. However, she pretended not to recognize accused-appellant.
The man who approached Sanita in the yard told her that they want to
get the .38 caliber gun of Ernesto. When she told him that she did not
know anything about it, herein accused-appellant got angry, insisted that
Ernesto had a gun and forced her to bring it out. At this point, two of the
Quiming children, Aileen and Elizabeth, arrived from the prayer meeting.
The two were almost near the fence of the house when they heard
somebody whistle from behind. When they looked back, a man poked a
gun at them and ordered them to go inside the house and keep quiet.
Aileen recognized accused-appellant though he was wearing a bonnet
since his face was not totally covered. She has known accused-appellant
from childhood and the latters house is only 300 meters away from them.
Not long after, her brother Jonathan followed and was likewise forced into
the house by one of the armed men.
Knowing that her husband Ernesto would not be far behind, Sanita
stood up and peeped through the jalousy of the window. They were still
being heavily guarded by the four men inside the house. It was then that
she saw Ernesto walking towards the house, around ten meters away from
where she was standing. A man coming from the waiting shed located
along the road going to their house followed Ernesto and suddenly shot
him on the right arm. Ernesto fell to the ground facing downward. Upon
seeing this, accused-appellant and his three companions immediately ran
outside. One of them shot Ernesto a second time. Accused-appellant fired
the third shot that hit Ernesto on the head. Ernestos shoulder shook and
then his body turned limp. Sanita was so stunned that she kept jumping
helplessly. The five malefactors hurriedly ran away. Thereafter, Sanita and
her children rushed to Ernesto but he was no longer moving. They brought
him to the Quirino Provincial Hospital where he was declared dead on
arrival.
A few hours after the incident, several barangay officials and
members of the PNP went to the house of Sanita to investigate. When
asked if she knew the identity of the assailants, she said nobody had
killed my husband except the one who threw a hand grenade at my
husband. It was on November 26, 1992 that she gave her sworn
statement[3] to the police and disclosed the name and identity of accusedappellant as one of the assailants. According to Sanita, she was afraid that
accused-appellant might escape and hide if she immediately revealed his

name before a formal investigation could be conducted. On November 27,

1992, Aileen and Elizabeth executed their joint affidavit. [4]
According to Sanita, during a meeting of barangay officials on August
30, 1992, Ernesto, a barangay captain, and accused-appellant, a barangay
councilman, had a misunderstanding and the latter threw a hand grenade
at the former. When the hand grenade did not explode, accused-appellant
tried to shoot Ernesto twice inside the latters yard but failed. Sanita was
present when the first shooting incident happened.
Three days after the death of Ernesto, accused-appellant and his
family left their house at Doa Imelda, Diffun and moved to Ricarte Norte,
Diffun. Sanita testified that she spent P20,000.00 for the burial of Ernesto.

Intrathoracic hemorrhage secondary to Gunshot Wound.

Dra. Baguioen explained that the victim suffered a penetrating wound
on the right breast caused by a gun shot. The right lung was fatally
damaged. There was also a penetrating wound at the base of the heart
caused by a gunshot These wounds sustained by the victim were the most
fatal. Another gunshot wound entry was found on the right parietal bone
which is located on the right side of the head. When they opened the skull
of the victim, they recovered a slug inside. The orbital bone located just
below the lower left eyelid was also fractured and she discovered a bullet
lodged in this area Finally, she testified that the victim suffered severe
bleeding inside the chest which caused his death.
The defense relied mainly on denial and alibi.

Prosecution witness Leslie Chambers-Maalat, a forensic chemist at the

PNP Crime Laboratory Service in Camp Crame, Quezon City, testified that
as per her Chemistry Report No. C-436-92 dated May 20, 1992, [5] the
paraffin casts taken from both hands of accused-appellant gave positive
result to the tests for gunpowder nitrates because a blue reaction was
produced. She concluded that accused-appellant fired a gun. She said that
matches, cigarettes and fertilizers can also test positive for nitrate and
produce a blue reaction just like gun powder nitrate. However, she
explained that matches and cigarettes produce positive result for nitrate
only which is different from gunpowder nitrate. Also, the blue reaction
produced from nitrate contained in the former does not have dots and tails
whereas the blue reaction produced by gunpowder nitrate has dots and
tails.
The autopsy examination conducted by Dra. Mary Jean Baguioen,
Medical Officer III at the Quirino Provincial Hospital, showed the following
postmortem findings as contained in Autopsy Report No. 92-06-35-99: [6]
Intrathoracic Findings:
= Penetrating wound, middle lobe, right lung.
= Base of the heart.
= Inferior lobe of left lung.
Intracranial Findings:
= Gunshot wound entry right parietal bone.
= Orbital bone fractured, left.
= Bullet lodged at orbital area, inferior.
CAUSE OF DEATH :

Accused-appellant testified that in the afternoon of November 14,

1992, he went to Barangay Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela with his wife
and two children to attend the wedding of the daughter of his cousin,
Ernesto Aquino. He drove his tricycle from the town proper of Diffun to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. It was almost dusk when they reached the place. On
their way to the house of his cousin, he saw Barangay Captain Sabino
Carlos and invited the latter to the pre-nuptial party that night. Accusedappellant parked his tricycle at the house of Kagawad Abraham Martin.
There he saw Barangay Secretary Francisco Viernes and several others in a
drinking session. The group invited accused-appellant for a drink to which
he obliged. Shortly thereafter, they all proceeded to the house of Ernesto
Aquino where the pre-nuptial party was being held. The group of accusedappellant drank at the party until 9:00 p.m. They had to stop when trouble
erupted from a group of guests who were also drinking. Accused-appellant
decided to go upstairs and sleep.
The next day, November 15, 1992, the wedding ceremony was held
which ended at around 12 oclock in the afternoon. Thereafter, accusedappellant and his family left for Diffun town. They passed by Santiago City
to have the tricycle painted with the names of their children. Since it was
raining and the road going to their house was not passable because it was
muddy and slippery, they proceeded to Ricarte Norte and spent the night
at the house of accused-appellants uncle, Fred Antonino. That night,
accused-appellant was informed by his uncle about the killing of Barangay
Captain Ernesto Quiming.
The following day, November 16, 1992, accused-appellant left in the
morning to ply his tricycle from Ricarte to Diffun. He was at the parking
area in Diffun when two policemen approached him and invited him to the
police station for questioning. At the police headquarters, the Station
Commander asked him if he already knew what happened to Ernesto and
he answered that his Uncle Fred told him about it the night before.
Accused-appellant was informed that he is a suspect in the killing because
he was the person last known to have a grudge against the victim. He was
then brought to the Crime Laboratory Service in Cauayan, Isabela to

undergo paraffin test. That night, accused-appellant slept at Ricarte Norte

and only his wife and children went home. Since then, accused-appellant
has never returned to Doa Imelda, Diffun.
Accused-appellant admitted that during a barangay meeting
sometime in August 1992, he had a misunderstanding with Barangay
Captain Ernesto Quiming because the latter wanted to remove him as
barangay councilman. He felt embarrassed and humiliated before the
barangay officials and so he went home. But he went back to settle the
matter with Ernesto. And it was at this time when accused-appellant threw
a hand grenade to the victim. He alleged that it was Ernesto who shot him
first and he only fired back. He stated that the matter was settled in
October 1992 when he asked for forgiveness from Ernesto in the presence
of the barangay officials. Since then, he did not have any
misunderstanding with Ernesto anymore.
Defense witnesses Abraham Martin, Ernesto Aquino, Sabino Carlos
and Francisco Viernes corroborated the alibi that accused-appellant
attended a wedding party at Barangay Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela on
that fateful day of November 14, 1992. They testified upon request of the
father of the accused-appellant.
In this appeal, accused-appellant insists that he was not positively
identified by the prosecution witnesses and that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime.
Again, the basic issues in the case at bar deal with the credibility of
the prosecution witnesses. It is an established rule that when the issue
concerns credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally will not
overturn the findings of the trial courts. The latter courts are in the best
position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and spontaneity of
witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses manner of
testifying, demeanor and behavior in court. In the case at bar, we find no
basis to depart from the rule.[7]
I. Accused-appellant assails the conclusion of the trial court that he
committed the crime because he tested positive for gunpowder nitrate He
claims that the testimony of forensic chemist Leslie Chambers-Maalat
shows that other substances like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes
likewise produce positive results for nitrate, to wit:
Q: How many casts were given to you for examination, Mrs. Witness?
A: Two paraffin casts, sir.
Q: This (sic) paraffin casts were given to you for laboratory
examination, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you proceeded to the laboratory examination, did you
conduct also a physical examination on this case?
A: No, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not try to find out the presence of gun
power nitrate through physical examination, you did not do that?
A: No, sir.

Q:

Is it not a fact that aside from gun powder nitrate, there are other
particles which also gave (sic) positive nitrates like for instance
fertilizers?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: or matches?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: and also cigarettes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is there a different characteristic on blue reaction coming from
fertilizers and gun powders?
A: Yes, sir. A nitrate/gun powder nitrate produced blue reaction with
dot with tail; while in the other source like fertilizers, matches and
cigarettes, it only reacts blue reaction but without dots or tail.
Q: Did you indicate the appearance of blue reaction with tails in your
findings?
A: No, sir.
In an attempt to discredit the accuracy of the paraffin test conducted
on him, accused-appellant testified that while waiting for his paraffin test,
he smoked a cigarette which he lighted with a match. We are not
convinced.
Accused-appellant failed to recite the complete testimony of the
forensic chemist relevant to the issue. Such selective quotation is unethical
and will not exculpate accused-appellant. We quote the relevant testimony
of the forensic chemist to avoid its distortion, viz.:
Q: How many casts were given to you for examination, Mrs. Witness?
A: Two paraffin casts, sir.
Q: This (sic) paraffin casts were given to you for laboratory
examination, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And before you proceeded to the laboratory examination, did you
conduct also a physical examination on this case?
A: No, sir.
Q: In other words, you did not try to find out the presence of gun
power nitrate through physical examination, you did not do that?
A: No, sir.
Q. Because what you resulted to was the chemical test/diphenylamine
test?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you only concluded that the casts contains (sic) gun powder
nitrate?
A: No, sir.
Q: And you concluded, madam Witness, that because of the presence
of gun powder nitrate that produces blue reaction, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, you concluded madam Witness that the casts contains (sic)
gun powder nitrate just because of the blue reaction?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is it not a fact that aside from gun powder nitrate, there are other
particles which also gave (sic) positive nitrates like for instance
fertilizers?
A: Yes, sir.

Q: or matches?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: and also cigarettes?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when a person who have (sic) been contacted with this (sic)
particles is examined, is it not a fact that a blue reaction will also
take place?
A: They would only give positive result for nitrate but not gun powder
nitrate, sir.
Q: But it remains, Madam Witness, that a gun powder nitrate create
blue reaction, is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In the same manner like fertilizers, matches and cigarettes?
A: There is blue reaction but different characteristic, sir.
Q: Is there a different characteristic on blue reaction coming from
fertilizers and gun powders?
A: Yes, sir. A nitrate/gun powder nitrate produced blue reaction with
dot with tail; while in the other source like fertilizers, matches and
cigarettes, it only reacts blue reaction but without dots or tail.
Q:

Did you indicate the appearance of blue reaction with tails in your
findings?

A:

No, sir.[8] (italics are the omitted portions)

The ability to determine whether an individual has fired a firearm is of

great significance in the investigation of both homicides and suicides.
Thus, over the years a number of tests have been developed in an attempt
to fill this need The first of such tests was the paraffin test also known as
the Dermal Nitrate or diphenylamine test. In this test, the hands were
coated with a layer of paraffin. After cooling, the casts were removed and
treated with an acid solution of diphenylamine, a reagent used to detect
nitrates and nitrites that originate from gunpowder and may be deposited
on the skin after firing a weapon. A positive test was indicated by the
presence of blue flecks in the paraffin. Although this test may give positive
results on the hands of individuals who fired weapons, it also gives positive
results on the hands of individuals who have not fired weapons because of
the widespread distribution of nitrates and nitrites in our environment.
[9]
Thus, nitrates can also be found in many other materials, including
cigarette smoke, urine, fertilizers, and other kinds of chemicals such as
oxidizing agents.[10]
To be sure, negative gunshot residue results do not conclusively mean
that a subject did not fire a gun, and positive gunshot residue results do
not prove someone fired a gun either. Thus, this test for residue on skin
has been challenged in the courts and fell into disfavor and disuse because
of the ambiguity in conclusions whether an individual fired a weapon or
not.[11]

In our jurisprudence, we have consistently held that paraffin tests are

inconclusive, to wit:
". . . Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has . . .
proved extremely unreliable in use. The only thing that it can deliberately
establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or
nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one
or more of a number of substances which give the same positive reaction
for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa. A
person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposit on
his hands since these substances are present in the products of
combustion of tobacco.[12]
Be that as it may, the result of the paraffin test conducted on
accused-appellant in the case at bar still proves that he tested positive for
gunpowder nitrates. The allegation of accused-appellant that he smoked
while waiting for his test is of no consequence. According to witness Dr.
Chambers-Maalat, the blue reaction produced by nitrate coming from
cigarettes and matches has a different characteristic from the blue
reaction produced in gun powder nitrate, in that the former does not have
dots and tails which are present in the latter. It bears to stress too that the
fact that accused-appellant fired a gun is corroborated by the convincing,
straightforward and categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
II. Accused-appellant contends that it was physically impossible for
him to have been at the scene of the crime because on that fateful day he
went to Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven, Isabela to attend the wedding of his
cousins daughter. This was corroborated by the defense witnesses who
were all barangay officials of barangay Sta. Cruz.
There is no controversy that accused-appellant went to attend a
wedding on November 14, 1992 at Barangay Sta. Cruz, Benito Soliven,
Isabela. What is unclear and remains suspect, however, is his allegation
that before going to Barangay Sta. Cruz, he came from the house of his
employer, Board Member Natividad, in Diffun where he has allegedly been
staying even before November 14, 1992. The other defense witnesses
testified merely on the fact of his presence at the wedding, but none was
presented to prove that accused-appellant came from Diffun town.
Accused-appellant could have easily presented Board Member Natividad to
corroborate his testimony but he never did. If it were true that accusedappellant was already working for Board Member Natividad at that time, it
is perplexing why he did not return to his employers house after the
wedding and instead stayed with his uncle at Ricarte Norte, Diffun on the
pretext that he as going to ply his tricycle to earn a living. Also, accusedappellant allegedly bought his tricycle on October 29, 1992 but it is highly
dubious that he started to use it for hire only on November 16, 1992 - the
day he was invited to the police headquarters for questioning.

The stubborn truth is that accused-appellant came from Doa Imelda,

Diffun before going to Barangay Sta. Cruz. We are not convinced that it
was physically impossible for him to be in Doa Imelda at the time of the
incident considering that it is only around four hours drive going to
Barangay Sta. Cruz. The trite defenses of alibi and denial proffered by
accused-appellant cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
statements of the prosecution witnesses. For this defense to prosper, it
must preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the accusedappellant to be at the locus criminis at the time of the incident.[13]
III. Accused-appellant avers that it was impossible for Sanita and
Aileen Quiming to have recognized him since according to them the
assailant was wearing a bonnet. Moreover, when the police arrived at the
scene of the crime, Sanita failed to identify the assailant and it was only
several days thereafter, or on November 26, 1992, when she executed a
sworn statement before the police that she named the accused-appellant.
We are not persuaded.
First, prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen Quiming positively
identified accused-appellant as the one who fired the third and last shot
and killed the victim Ernesto. Although accused-appellant was wearing a
bonnet, his face was not totally covered because his eyes, nose, mouth
and beard were exposed. Sanita and Aileen were also able to recognize
accused-appellant through his voice and gestures. Identification by the
sound of the voice of the person identified is sufficient and acceptable
means of identification where it is established that the witness and the
accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of
years.[14] It is not disputed that the prosecution witnesses and accusedappellant have been longtime neighbors ever since the latter was a child.
Besides, the house was illuminated by a kerosene lamp.
Second, when the police and barangay officials arrived at their house
on that fateful day, Sanita told them that nobody killed my husband
except the one who threw a hand grenade to my husband. When accusedappellant testified in court, he openly admitted that he threw a hand
grenade at the victim during a meeting of barangay officials sometime in
August 1992. It is patently obvious that Sanita was referring to none other
than accused-appellant when she made that statement.
Third, during her cross examination, Sanita aptly explained that she
intentionally withheld the name of the real culprit because she feared that
accused-appellant might escape and hide. Delay or vacillation in making
an accusation does not impair the credibility of the witness if such delay is
satisfactorily explained.[15] Her apprehension was not absolutely baseless.
Indeed, three days after the November 14 incident, accused-appellant left
his house and moved his family to Ricarte Norte. On that day, November
16, 1992, accused-appellant was invited to the police headquarters and
was informed by the Station Commander of Diffun that he was a suspect in
the killing of Ernesto Quiming. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that, without
satisfactory explanation, flight is a clear and positive evidence of guilt. [16]

It bears to stress that of the five malefactors, it was only herein

accused-appellant who was wearing a bonnet. This is hardly surprising.
Accused-appellant is a barangay councilor and everybody in the barangay
knows him. He had to make sure that he will not be exposed and that it will
be difficult to recognize him. And true enough, in trying to impugn the
credibility of the prosecution witnesses, the defense made capital of the
fact that the face of the assailant was covered with a bonnet. We accord
greater weight however to the straightforward testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses that it was accused-appellant who shot the victim on
the head. The testimonies of prosecution witnesses Sanita and Aileen
Quiming were clear, direct and categorical. Their recollection of the
gruesome event remained steadfast and unperturbed even under the
grueling cross examination by the defense.
In addition, accused-appellant has failed to impute any bad motive on
the part of the prosecution witnesses in pointing to him as the culprit. In
contrast, it is accused-appellant who has a clear motive to want to kill the
victim. It appears that during a meeting of barangay officials sometime in
August 1992, the victim and accused-appellant had a misunderstanding
because the former wanted to remove the latter from his position as
barangay councilor. Accused-appellant told the victim that if he is no
longer deserving of the position, he will just go home. However, upon
reaching home, accused-appellant felt embarrassed and humiliated.
According to him, he decided to go back to settle the matter with the
victim.[17] Accused-appellant did try to settle it by throwing a hand grenade
at the victim. When it did not explode, he tried to shoot the victim but
failed. Accused-appellant had every reason to want to get even. Motive is
proved by the acts or statements of the accused before or immediately
after the commission of the offense, i.e., by deeds or words that may
express the motive or from which his reason for committing the offense
may be inferred.[18]He attempts to remove this cloud of suspicion by
testifying that he had already asked for forgiveness from the victim. His
statement is, at the least, self-serving and hence has no probative value
specially when it is not corroborated by other witnesses.
IV. The information charged that the killing was attended by treachery
with the aid of armed men and with abuse of superior strength. The trial
court considered the last two circumstances to have been absorbed in
treachery, and imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua, there being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances.
Treachery clearly attended the commission of the crime. There is
treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the
person, employing means, methods or forms in the execution thereof
which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to
himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.
[19]
The treacherous manner in which accused-appellant and his cohorts
perpetrated the crime was shown by the sudden, deliberate and
unexpected attack upon the unsuspecting victim. It has been clearly
established that Ernesto was walking towards his house when one of the
malefactors suddenly appeared from behind and shot him on the arm.

When Ernesto fell to the ground, accused-appellant came out of the house
where he and his companions were hiding, and shot the victim on the
head.
Considering the number of armed assailants against the lone unarmed
victim, there was also abuse of superior strength. [20] In a long line of cases,
we have held that abuse of superior strength and aid of armed men, when
present with treachery, are absorbed in the latter. [21] There being no
mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the trial court correctly imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the heirs of the
victim the sum of P120,000.00 as and for actual and moral damages. This
is
erroneous.
Prosecution
witness
Sanita
testified
that
she
spent P20,000.00 for the wake of her husband, but there were no receipts
presented to support the same, It is axiomatic that a party seeking the
award of actual damages must produce competent proof or the best
evidence obtainable to justify such award. [22] Since no receipts of expenses
were presented, actual damages should be disallowed. [23]
On the other hand, the heirs of the victim are entitled to receive moral
damages in the amount of P50,000.00. This award is mandatory and does
not require proof other than the death of the victim. [24] Under prevailing
jurisprudence, civil indemnity should be awarded in the amount
of P50,000.00.[25]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cabarroguis,
Quirino, Branch 32, in Criminal Case No. 993 finding accused-appellant
MARIANO PASCUA, JR. @ PEDRO, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Murder and imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is hereby
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim Ernesto Quiming the amount
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 135022. July 11, 2002]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BIENVENIDO
DELA CRUZ,accused-appellant.
DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

A man descends into the depths of human debasement when he
inflicts his lechery upon a minor, and all the more when he imposes such
lasciviousness upon a woman whose capacity to give consent to a sexual
union is diminished, if not totally lacking. Such is the case of Jonalyn
Yumang (hereafter JONALYN).
Upon a complaint[1] dated 5 July 1996 signed by JONALYN with the
assistance of her aunt Carmelita Borja, two informations were filed by the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz (hereafter BIENVENIDO)
with rape allegedly committed on 3 and 4 July 1996. The informations
were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 1274-M-96 and 1275-M-96. The
accusatory portion of the information docketed as Criminal Case No. 1275M-96, which is the subject of this appellate review, reads:
That on or about the 3rd day of July 1996, in the Municipality of Calumpit,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused [Bienvenido dela Cruz @ Jun]
did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously with lewd design
have carnal knowledge of one Jonalyn Yumang y Banag, a mentally
deficient female person, against her will and without her consent.
Contrary to law.[2]
Upon arraignment on 14 October 1996, BIENVENIDO entered a plea of
not guilty.[3] The cases were consolidated, and joint trial on the merits
ensued thereafter.
When JONALYN was presented as its first witness, the prosecution
sought to obtain from the trial court an order for the conduct of a
psychiatric examination on her person to determine her mental and
psychological capability to testify in court. The purpose was that should
her mental capacity be found to be below normal, the prosecution could
propound leading questions to JONALYN. The defense, through Atty. Jesus
M.
Pamintuan,
vigorously
opposed
the
prosecutions
manifestation. Nonetheless, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to
conduct direct examination on JONALYN so that if in its perception she
would appear to be suffering from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could
be permitted to ask leading questions. JONALYN was then made to identify
her signature in her sworn statement and to identify the accused, and was
asked about her personal circumstances. Thereafter, noticing that JONALYN

had difficulty in expressing herself, the trial court decided to suspend the
proceedings to give the prosecution sufficient time to confer with her. [4]
At the next hearing, the trial court allowed the prosecution to put on
the witness stand Dr. Cecilia Tuazon, Medical Officer III of the National
Center for Mental Health, Mandaluyong City. Dr. Tuazon testified that she
conducted a psychiatric examination on JONALYN on 12 July 1996. She
found that JONALYN was suffering from a moderate level of mental
retardation and that although chronologically the latter was already 20
years of age (at the time of the examination), she had the mental age of
an 8-year-old child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. Dr.
Tuazon also found that JONALYN could have attained a higher degree of
intelligence if not for the fact that she was unschooled and no proper
motivation was employed on her, and that she had the capacity to make
her perception known to others. She, however, observed that she had to
prompt JONALYN most of the time to elicit information on the sexual
harassment incident. She then narrated that JONALYN was able to relate to
her that she (JONALYN) was approached by a tall man named Jun-Jun who
led her to a house that supposedly belonged to her cousin, and that Jun-Jun
disrobed JONALYN and raped her twice.[5]
After said testimony or on 11 March 1997, the trial court issued an
order[6] allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN in
accordance with Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the Rules on Evidence. [7] Thus,
JONALYN took the witness stand. She again identified her signature and
that of her aunt on herSinumpaang Salaysay. She also identified
BIENVENIDO as the person against whom she filed a complaint for
rape. She declared in open court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice inside
the house of a certain Mhel located at Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit,
Bulacan. She stated that BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of her and
inserted his private part into her womanhood.[8]
Dr. Edgardo Gueco, Chief and Medico-Legal Officer of the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory, Camp Olivas, Pampanga, testified that he
examined JONALYN on 8 July 1996, and the results of the examination were
indicated in his Medico-Legal Report. [9] He found that she was in a nonvirgin state physically, as her hymen bore deep fresh and healing
lacerations at 3, 8 and 11 oclock positions. He then opined that the
hymenal lacerations were sustained a week before the examination and,
therefore, compatible with the time the rapes were allegedly committed. [10]
Carmelita Borja, aunt of JONALYN, testified that on 5 July 1996, she
accompanied JONALYN to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Office in
Calumpit, Bulacan, to lodge a complaint against BIENVENIDO. With them

were JONALYNs mother Conchita Yuson and Barangay Councilman Roberto

Dungo. Carmelita testified that in instituting this case, their family incurred
expenses amounting to P30,000.[11]
After the prosecution rested its case and formally offered its exhibits,
the defense filed a motion for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence,
which was granted. Thus, the defense filed on 5 December 1997 a
Demurrer to Evidence[12] on the following grounds:
(a) That the court had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the cases; and
(b) The presumption of accuseds innocence had not even [sic] been
overcome by the prosecution due to the insufficiency of its evidence.
Expounding its theory, the defense first admitted that it could have
moved to quash the information but it did not because the complaint on
which the information was based was on its face valid, it having been
signed by JONALYN as the offended party. However, the undeniable truth is
that JONALYN had no capacity to sign the same considering her mental
deficiency or abnormality. The assistance extended to JONALYN by her
aunt Carmelita Borja did not cure the defect, as the enumeration in Article
344 of the Revised Penal Code of the persons who could file a complaint for
rape is exclusive and successive and the mother of JONALYN was still very
much alive.
The defense also insisted on assailing the competency of JONALYN as
a witness. It claimed that JONALYNs testimony, considering her mental
state, was coached and rehearsed. Worse, she was not only asked leading
questions but was fed legal and factual conclusions which she was made to
admit as her own when they were in fact those of the prosecution.
In its Order of 26 January 1998, [13] the trial court denied the Demurrer
to Evidence and set the dates for the presentation of the evidence for the
defense. However, BIENVENIDO filed a Motion for Judgment, stating in part
as follows:
[A]fter going over the Records and carefully analyzing the proceedings
as well as meticulously evaluating the evidence presented and offered
[by] the private complainant, in consultation with his parents, and assisted
by undersigned counsel, [he] had decided to submit the cases for
judgment without the need of presenting any evidence to explain his terse
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY to the charges upon his arraignment. [14]

Noting this new development, the trial court, in its Order of 17

February 1998, considered the case submitted for decision. [15]
In its Joint Decision of 3 April 1998, [16] the trial court convicted
BIENVENIDO of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but
acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of evidence.
While conceding that JONALYNs narration of how she was sexually abused
by BIENVENIDO was not detailed, the trial court, nonetheless, concluded
that it was candidly related by one who had the mental age of an 8-yearold child. The trial court was convinced that JONALYN was able to show in
her own peculiar way that she was indeed raped by BIENVENIDO on 3
July 1996. Finally, the trial court ruled that BIENVENIDOs culpability was
further bolstered by his choice not to offer any evidence for his defense
despite ample opportunity to do so. Accordingly, it sentenced him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand to pay JONALYN the amount
of P60,000 by way of civil indemnity.
In his Appellants Brief,[17] BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial court
committed the following errors:
1. ... in having taken the fatally defective criminal complaint for a
valid conferment upon it of jurisdiction to try and dispose of
said two (2) charges of rape.
2. ... in having accepted as competent the mentally deficient
private complainant even without first requiring any evidence
of her capacity as such a witness.
3. ... in having considered the narration read to the complaining
witness from prepared statements and asked of her simply to
confirm as true, as her own.
4. ... in having given full credence and weight to complainants
conclusions of facts merely put to her mouth by leading
questions of the prosecutor.
5. ... in having convicted the accused-appellant in Criminal Case
No. 1275-M-96, but acquitting in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96,
on the basis of private complainants purported sworn
versions supposedly given in both charges.
BIENVENIDO reiterates the issues he raised in his Demurrer to
Evidence. He assails the competency of JONALYN as signatory to the

complaint she filed. He adds that the defect in the complaint was not
cured by his failure to interpose a motion to quash nor by the assistance
lent by JONALYNs aunt, which contravened Article 344 of the Revised Penal
Code. Consequently, BIENVENIDO asserts that the trial court had no
jurisdiction to try the case.
BIENVENIDO also stresses the incompetency of JONALYN as a trial
witness for the reason that the prosecution failed to prove her competency.
Further, JONALYN was merely asked to affirm the legal and factual
conclusions of the prosecution which evinced quite clearly the girls lack of
comprehension of the court proceedings and the nature of her oath.
Besides, her statements concerning the alleged sexual penetration were
elicited a month after her initial offer as a witness, which reinforces the
rehearsed and coached nature of her testimony.
Finally, he wonders why he was convicted in Criminal Case No. 1275M-96 but acquitted in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 when it was a joint trial
and the evidence was the same. He insists that he should also be
acquitted in the case at bar.
In the Appellees Brief,[18] the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
counters that the trial court had jurisdiction over the case, since the
complaint and information filed were valid. JONALYNs mental retardation
does not render her incompetent for initiating the prosecution of the crime
committed against her and for testifying in court. If minors are allowed not
only to initiate the prosecution of offenses under Article 344 of the Revised
Penal Code and Section 5, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, but also to testify under the Rules on Evidence, JONALYN, who
had the mentality of an 8-year-old child, was competent to sign the
criminal complaint and to be a witness in court. JONALYNs competency as
a court witness was aptly proved when she was able to answer the leading
questions asked of her as allowed by Section 10(c), Rule 132 of the Rules
on Evidence. Moreover, the OSG asseverates that JONALYNs testimony on
the fact of rape is corroborated by medical and physical evidence. As to
BIENVENIDOs quandary that he should be acquitted also in this case, it is
convinced that he should have been convicted for two counts of rape, as
JONALYN
expressly
testified
that
she
was
raped
twice
by
BIENVENIDO. Finally, the OSG seeks an award of moral damages in the
amount of P50,000 for JONALYN, as well as a reduction of the award of civil
indemnity to P50,000 in conformity with current jurisprudence.
We shall discuss the issues in seriatim.
I.

Validity of the Complaint for Rape

We agree with the disputation of the OSG that the trial court validly
took cognizance of the complaint filed by JONALYN. The pertinent laws
existing at the time the crimes were committed were Article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353 [19] otherwise
known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which took effect on 22 October
1997[20]) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Article 344. Prosecution of the crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction,
abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness. --

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall

not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case
may be.
Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.All criminal actions
either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted
under the direction and control of the fiscal. However, in Municipal Trial
Courts or Municipal Circuit Trial Courts when there is no fiscal available, the
offended party, any peace officer or public officer charged with the
enforcement of the law violated may prosecute the case. This authority
ceases upon actual intervention of the fiscal or upon elevation of the case
to the Regional Trial Court.

The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall

not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or
her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender
has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case
may be. In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before
she could file the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents, or
guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf.
The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the
prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing

so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is
a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian
may file the same. The right to file the action granted to the parents,
grandparents or guardians shall be exclusive of all other persons and shall
be exercised successively in the order herein provided, except as stated in
the immediately preceding paragraph.
A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes
against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her
family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go
through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser
policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to
expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault,
and disgraceful acts occurring in the family.[21]
It has been held that [w]hen it is said that the requirement in Article
344 (that there shall be a complaint of the offended party or her relatives)
is jurisdictional, what is meant is that it is the complaint that starts the
prosecutory proceeding. It is not the complaint which confers jurisdiction
on the court to try the case. The courts jurisdiction is vested in it by the
Judiciary Law.[22]
The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement
under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which
vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the
criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the
prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her
mother, was a superfluity. JONALYNs signature alone suffices to validate
the complaint.
We agree with the OSG that if a minor under the Rules of Court can
file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20
years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl,
could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her
complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor.
The overriding intention of BIENVENIDO is to challenge the validity of
the complaint by assailing the competency of JONALYN to file the
complaint. But even he admits in his Demurrer to Evidence that the
complaint is proper and valid on its face for which reason he did not move
to quash the information. Thus, even he admits and recognizes the futility
of his argument.

II.

Competence of JONALYN to Testify

The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests

primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and
observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well
as their understanding of the obligation of an oath.[23]
The prosecution has proved JONALYNs competency by the testimony
of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony
of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-year-old child,
does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to
consider her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor. Even
a mental retardate is not, per se, disqualified from being a witness.
[24]
JONALYN, who may be considered as a mental retardate but with the
ability to make her perceptions known to others, is a competent witness
under Section 20 of Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence. [25]
JONALYNs competency is also better established in the answers she
gave under direct examination relative to the harrowing defilement she
suffered in the hands of BIENVENIDO, thus:
Q

And the nature of your complaint was that you were abused or you
were raped by the herein accused Bienvenido de la Cruz y
Santiago, is that correct?

Yes, sir.

Court: Where?
Fiscal: Where?
Witness: On top of the wooden bed, sir.[27]
Q

And do you know in what place where you raped by the accused,
Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago?

Inside the house, sir.

Whose house?

In the house of Mhel, sir.[26]

How many times were you raped by the herein accused Bienvenido
dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun?

You said you were raped twice by the herein accused, Bienvenido
dela Cruz alias Jun-Jun on a papag inside the house of Mhel at
Barangay Gatbuca, Calumpit, Bulacan, how did Jun Jun the herein
accused rape[] you?

Court:

On the first time?

He layed [sic] me to bed, sir.

After you were layed [sic] on the bed what happened next?

He went on top of me, sir.[28]

Last time, you stated that the herein accused whom you called
Jun laid you on top of a bed and after that, he went on top of
you. My question is, when he went on top of you, what did he do
to you, if any?

A:

Pumaloob sa akin.[29]

...
Q

Twice, sir.

Now, when the accused, which you called Jun, pumaloob sa iyo,
what did you feel at that time?

I felt a hard object, sir.

Now since you said it [was] a hard object, you could now tell the
Court, what that hard object [was]?

I cannot remember.[30]

No further question, Your Honor.[32]

Public Prosecutor:
Q

When you said the last time around, you were asked about, what
you mean by pumaloob siya sa akin and then you said that there
was a hard object inserted and after that, the follow-up question
was asked on you, you said you cannot remember, what is that
hard object, what do you mean when you say I cannot
remember?

Atty. Pamintuan:
Leading.

Witness may answer, subject to your objection.

Witness:
His private part was inserted in my private part, sir. [31]

Court:
But there was an answer a while ago. Witness may
answer.
Witness:
Yes, sir.

Public Pros.:
Q

And, when you say he did the same to you, he inserted his penis to
your vagina?

Yes, sir.

Public Pros.:

Credibility of JONALYN as a Witness

The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYNs

competency but also her credibility. Moreover, considering her feeble mind,
she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge against
BIENVENIDO. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that no improper
motive was shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or
falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. A rape victims testimony as to who
abused her is credible where she has absolutely no motive to incriminate
and testify against the accused. [33] It has been held that no woman,
especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts, and thereafter permit herself to be
subjected to a public trial if she is not motivated solely by the desire to
have the culprit apprehended and punished. [34]
We, therefore, affirm the trial courts decision to lend full credence to
the testimony of JONALYN on the circumstances of the rape, thus:

Court:

III.

In so few a word, complainant has made herself clear about the sexual
molestation she suffered in the hands of the accused. Plain and simple her
testimony may have been, unembellished, as it is, with details, yet, it is in
its simplicity that its credence is enhanced. Certainly, we cannot expect
complainant, in her present state of mind, to come out with a full account
of her misfortune with all its lurid details. That, to this Court, is simply
beyond the reach of her enfeebled mind. She came to talk on her sad
plight from the viewpoint of an 8-year-old child, and she must, by all
means, be understood in that light. [35]
Absent any cogent reason warranting a disturbance of the findings of
the trial court on the credibility and competency of JONALYN, this Court has
to give these findings utmost respect, if not complete affirmation. Settled
is the rule that the trial courts evaluation of the testimonies of witnesses is
accorded the highest respect, for it has an untrammeled opportunity to
observe directly the demeanor of witnesses on the stand and, thus, to
determine whether they are telling the truth.[36]
IV.

Propriety of Propounding Leading Questions to JONALYN

We likewise agree with the trial courts conclusion that JONALYNs

testimony should be taken and understood from the point of view of an 8year-old child. JONALYNs testimony is consistent with the straightforward

and innocent testimony of a child. Thus, the prosecutions persistent,

repetitious and painstaking effort in asking leading questions was
necessary and indispensable in the interest of justice to draw out from
JONALYNs lips the basic details of the grave crime committed against her
by BIENVENIDO.
The trial court did not err in allowing leading questions to be
propounded to JONALYN. It is usual and proper for the court to permit
leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is
immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated;
ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced;
unsophisticated; feeble-minded; of sluggish mental equipment; confused
and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in
comprehension of questions asked or slow to understand; deaf and dumb;
or unable to speak or understand the English language or only imperfectly
familiar therewith.[37]
The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put
into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely
confirmed as true. The questions were indeed carefully phrased and
sometimes based on her Sinumpaang Salaysay to make JONALYN
understand the import of the questions. In the same vein, the
prosecutions referral to JONALYNs Sinumpaang Salaysay to refresh her
memory was also reasonable. The purpose of refreshing the recollection of
a witness is to enable both the witness and her present testimony to be put
fairly and in their proper light before the court.[38]
Thus, JONALYNs behavior merely conformed to Dr. Tuazons clinical
and expert observation that JONALYN had to be continuously and
repetitiously prompted so that she could answer and recount a terrible
experience. JONALYNs constant eyeball fixature towards her aunt and
mother does not by itself indicate coaching, in the face of a dearth of other
evidentiary bases that the latter did coach her. There was nothing in the
behavior of JONALYN which was indicative of her failure to understand the
import of the trial proceedings. Her identification of BIENVENIDO as her
assailant is quite telling on how simple, yet unassuming, her grasp of the
situation was. Thus:
Stenographer:
Reading back the question.

Because you understand that this was explained to you, I would

like to read to you particularly question number 3.
Tanong: Sino naman ang ibig mong idemanda?
Answer: Si Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun
Jun po.
Was this explain[ed] to you?

Atty. Pamintuan:
I stand correct[sic].
Witness:
Yes, sir.
Fiscal:
(to the witness)
Q

Now, this Bienvenido dela Cruz y Santiago alias Jun Jun, which was
the person whom you are filing the complaint of [sic], will you
kindly look around to this Court and tell us whether or not he is
inside.

Yes, sir.

Would you mind to point him?

Interpreter:
Witness pointing to a man wearing orange T-shirt and when asked
his name answered Bienvenido dela Cruz.[39]
V.

Sufficiency of Prosecutions Evidence

It is, therefore, beyond doubt that JONALYNs

was found to be credible by the trial court, is
conviction.[40] At any rate, medical and physical
corroborated JONALYNs testimony. Time and again

lone testimony, which

enough to sustain a
evidence adequately
we have held that the

laceration of the hymen is a telling, irrefutable and best physical evidence

of forcible defloration.[41]

hereby reduce it to P50,000.[42] An award of moral damages in the amount

of P50,000 is also just under the circumstances.[43]

On the basis of the foregoing, we agree with the trial courts

conviction of BIENVENIDO under Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96. His
acquittal under Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 is, at this point, beyond the
review powers of this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,

Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96 finding accusedappellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is ordered
to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduced amount
ofP50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.

Since the information charges BIENVENIDO with simple rape only and
no other modifying circumstances has been proved, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, which is the lesser of the penalties prescribed by
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, was
correctly imposed by the trial court.

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

We rectify the error of the trial court in granting JONALYN the amount
of P60,000 as civil indemnity. In conformity with current jurisprudence, we