OnceEuropean

10.1177/0888325405281092
East
upon a Time
Politics
There
andWas
Societies
a Big Party

Once upon a Time There Was a

Big Party: The Social Bases of the
Romanian Communist Party (Part I)
Ca*ta*lin Augustin Stoica

Employing survey data, this article highlights the following characteristics

of the Romanian Communist Party (RCP): With an estimated membership of
33 percent of Romanias employed population, the late RCP was proportionally the largest Leninist party in Eastern Europe. Consistent with the socalled deproletarianization thesis, the RCP manifested a marked preference
toward recruiting well-educated individuals and professionals among its
ranks. The RCP also tended to recruit from among disadvantaged classes (in
particular, peasants and their offspring). Despite some prowomen affirmative action policies, women were underrepresented among Party members. Some ethnic minorities had fewer chances of joining the RCP than ethnic Romanians. As compared to other communist parties, the RCP had one
of the highest rates of intergenerational political reproduction among its
ranks. This article suggests that the amorphous character of the RCP and its
closed elite could also explain why Party members did not bother to save
their historically obsolete leader.
Keywords: political sociology; Eastern Europe; social stratification; communist party membership; Romania

Q: What is the difference between the U.S. and the Soviet

Russia?
A: In the U.S., you can always find a party. In the Soviet Russia,
1
the Party always finds you.

* I am extremely grateful to Vladimir Tismaneanu for his excellent comments on a previous

version of this article. The participants in Stanfords workshop Politics and Social Change
have been subjected to an imperfect draft of this article. Andrew G. Walder has patiently
read several versions of this article, providing comments that have sharpened and improved
my analyses. My thanks also go to Liviu Chelcea, Robin Marie Cooper, and Elaine Goetzke
for their substantive and editorial suggestions. Any errors and misinterpretations are my sole
responsibility.
1. Adaptation of the cold war joke of Yakov Smirnoff, Russian-born U.S. comedian.

686

East European Politics and Societies, Vol. 19, No. 4, pages 686716. ISSN 0888-3254
2005 by the American Council of Learned Societies. All rights reserved.
DOI: 10.1177/0888325405281092

The joke cited above also applies to Romania, whose Communist

Party was proportionally the largest in Central and Eastern
Europe. Official Party figures and other studies indicate that
approximately 3.7 million Romanians were Party members in
2
1988. Specifically, in the late 1980s, 15.8 percent of Romanias
3
4
population or 33 percent of its employed individuals were affiliated with the Romanian Communist Party (RCP). Some authors
deemed this fact an attempt by Ceaus,escu to increase the legitimacy of his rule, both domestically and internationally.5 Yet in
December 1989, when he and his wife were arrested, Ceaus,escu
seemingly realized that size does not matter. Party members did
not show up en masse to rescue him, and most of them probably
celebrated his and his wifes hasty trial and execution on Christmas Day 1989. Moreover, a few weeks later, on 12 January 1990,
dissatisfied with seeing too many former Party officials in the
new government, thousands of Romanians gathered in the front
of the governments headquarters and demanded the outlawing
of the Communist Party. Under the pressure of people who were
burning their Party membership cards, Ion Iliescuthe leader of
the provisional government and a former Party officialtold pro6
testers that the RCP would be banned.
In this article, I address the social bases of the once large RCP.
The exceptionalism of the RCP was nicely described by Ghit,a*
7
Ionescu in the early 1960s. In the early 1970s, Ken Jowitt
explored the Romanian communists nation-building strategy
8
and addressed the Romanian case in subsequent writings. Rob2. Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 5th ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 196.
3. Ibid., 195.
4. Library of Congress, Country Studies: Romania Area Handbook Studies 1989, http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/rotoc.html; Robert R. King, Romania, in Richard F. Staar, ed., 1989
Yearbook on International Communist Affairs (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press),
347-48.
5. See, for instance, Vlad Georgescu, Istoria romnilor: de la origini pna n zilele noastre
(Bucuresti, Romania: Ed. Humanitas, 1992).
6. However, the next day, the provisional government did not fulfill its promise and the
Romania Communist Party (RCP) was not legally banned.
7. Ghit,a* Ionescu, Communism in Rumania: 1944-1962 (London: Oxford University Press,
1964).
8. Ken Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs and National Development: The Case of Romania, 1944-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971); some of Jowitts other

East European Politics and Societies

687

ert R. King made a significant contribution to the general history

of the RCP and Michael Shafir wrote a solid monograph about
9
politics, economy, and society in socialist Romania. Recently,
Vladimir Tismaneanu has provided the most comprehensive account to date of the political history of Romanian commu10
nism. Tismaneanus and others studies, however, have mainly
addressed the fascinating struggles within the RCPs elite, as well
as its political, ethnic, and social composition. Such a focus on
the top levels of the RCP has been a matter of personal choice
and intellectual interest. However, the lack of survey data about
ordinary Party members has also limited other scholars inquiries
about the RCPs rank-and-file. Studies using survey data about
the social composition of communist parties of Hungary, the former Czechoslovakia, Poland, Russia, and China have been regu11
larly published in American journals since the late 1980s. Yet
similar works about ordinary Party members in Romania have
12
not been published.

9.

10.

11.

12.

important contributions are gathered in his volume New World Disorder: The Leninist
Extinction (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992).
Robert R. King, A History of the Romanian Communist Party (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1980); and Michael Shafir, Romania. Politics, Economics, and Society. Political
Stagnation and Simulated Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1985). The list of works presented above is by no means exhaustive; for other works about Romania, readers should
consult the bibliographies included in the studies mentioned here.
Vladimir Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003). Tismaneanus contributions to this
topic (in both Romanian and English) are extremely numerous. For a list of these contributions, see his Stalinism for All Seasons.
See, for instance, Eric Hanley, A Party of Workers or a Party of Intellectuals? Recruitment
into Eastern European Communist Parties, 1945-1988, Social Forces 81 (2003): 1073-1105;
Bobai Li and Andrew G. Walder, Career Advancement as Party Patronage: Sponsored
Mobility into the Chinese Administratative Elite, 1946-1996, American Journal of Sociology
106 (2001): 1371-1408; Szonja Szelnyi, Social Inequalities and Party Membership: Patterns of Recruitment into the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party, American Sociological
Review 52 (1987): 559-73; Andrew G. Walder, Career Mobility and the Communist Political
Order, American Sociological Review 60 (1995): 309-28; Andrew G. Walder, Bobai Li, and
Donald J. Treiman, Politics and Life Chances in a State Socialist Regime: Dual Career Paths
into the Urban Chinese Elite, 1949-1996, American Sociological Review 65 (2000): 191-209;
and Raymond S. K. Wong, The Social Composition of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian
Communist Parties in the 1980s, Social Forces 75 (1996): 61-90.
In contrast to other sisterly countries, public opinion polls and sociological surveys were
virtually absent in socialist Romania. In the late 1940s, Romanian sociology was branded a
bourgeois science and banned from academia. Following the ideological relaxation from
the mid-1960s, sociology programs were reinstituted in public universities. In the late

688

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

This is the first study that addresses the social bases of the RCP
using survey data. Admittedly, some authors from the flourishing
industry of market transition studies might deem the past less
interesting than the present or the future. Aside from filling up
knowledge gaps in a particular case, such a study of the past is
important for at least two reasons: Firstalong with Walder, Li,
and TreimanI contend that, before asking how market transition has modified the value of education and political status, we
must first possess an adequate understanding of their signifi13
cance under state socialism. Second, although communist parties formally disappeared from most East European countries,
news about their death might have been grossly exaggerated. As
Hanley puts it, The influence of these parties lives on in the
sense that Party members [in the region] continue to wield power
14
and enjoy privileges in the postcommunist period. In other
words, since past affiliation with the Communist Party still shapes
individuals life chances during transition, studying the features
of former communist parties is more than an exercise in twentieth centurys history. As Hanley rightfully stresses, such a study
1970s, however, Ceaus,escu banned again sociology from academia. Sociology courses
(with a strong Marxist flavor) continued to be taught sporadically within other departments,
but the only degree-granting program in sociology was at the Stefan Gheorghiu Party Academy. While public opinion surveys have flourished since Ceaus,escus demise, Romanian
sociologists have avoided asking questions about Party membership. Affiliation with the
RCP was a rather delicate issue in the early 1990s, when anti-communist parties and civic
organizations were calling for the exclusion of former Party members from public life. In
addition, in the early 1990s, it was quite difficult to conduct face-to-face interviews for public opinion surveys because most Romanians were suspicious of individuals who were asking political and other opinion questionsa thing that only Ceaus,escus infamous Secret
Police (Securitate) did. These facts explain the absence of Romanian survey data about RCP
membership.
13. Walder, Li, and Treiman, Politics and Life Chances, 191-92.
14. Hanley, A Party of Workers, 1075. For instance, Stoica has shown that, ten years after the
collapse of the communist regime, former Romanian cadres are more likely than ordinary
individuals to be employersan elite form of entrepreneurship. See Ca*ta*lin Augustin
Stoica, From Good Communists to Even Better Capitalists? Entrepreneurial Pathways in
Post-Socialist Romania, East European Politics and Societies 18(2004): 236-77. For the
advantages of former Party members in contemporary Russia, see Theodore Gerber, Membership Benefits or Selection Effects? Why Former Communist Party Members Do Better in
Post-Soviet Russia, Social Science Research 29:1(2000): 25-50. See also Akos Rona-Tas and
Alya Guseva, The Privileges of Post-Communist Party Membership in Russia and Endogenous Switching Regression: Comment to Theodore Gerber, Social Science Research
30:4(2001): 641-52; and Theodore Gerber, The Selection Theory of Persisting Party Advantages in Russia. More Evidence and Implications: Reply to Akos Rona-Tas and Alya
Guseva, Social Science Research 30:4(2001): 653-71.

East European Politics and Societies

689

has an immediate relevance for grasping the logic and effects of

post-socialist changes.
My study of the contours of the RCP attempts to answer the following questions: What was the sociodemographic composition
of the RCP? What role did education play for becoming a Party
member in Romania? Put differently (and paraphrasing Hanley),
was the late RCP a Party of intellectuals or a Party of workers?
How important was an individuals social origin for entry into the
RCP? What were the chances of social minorities (e.g., women
and ethnic others) to join the RCP? More generally, how did the
RCP fare as compared to other parties in the region in terms of its
social composition?
To answer these questions, I will rely on recent Romanian surveys that have addressed the issue of Party membership. This
article is divided into two parts and published in two issues of
East European Politics and Society. In the first part, I begin by discussing the history of the RCP. Since this history has been well
told by others (in particular by Tismaneanu), I will provide only a
sketch of it, emphasizing the historical shifts in the RCPs personnel policies and practices. The second section of the current article will present the survey data and measures employed in my
study. In the third section, I will discuss the sociodemographic
profiles of Party members in Romania and four other former
communist countriesBulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia,
Hungary, and Poland. In the second part of this article, which will
be published in the next issue of EEPS, I will detail the
sociodemographic profiles of Romanian Party members, Party
functionaries, and nonmembers. I will also examine, from a
causal perspective, patterns of recruitment into the RCP. Finally, I
will summarize the main findings of this study, followed by a
brief discussion of their relevance for political sociology and
transition studies.
1. The Romanian Communist Partys
personnel policies, 1944-1989
Previous sociological contributions to the topic of communist
parties personnel policies and practices have highlighted the fol690

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

15

lowing trends: First, in their attempt to transform and master

their societies, communist regimes have struggled with conflicting demands of rewarding either an individuals qualifications or
his or her political loyalty. Second, in different historical periods,
communist regimes have adopted different solutions to this red
versus expert dilemma. During the Stalinist period, Eastern
European regimes emphasized political loyalty at the expense of
individual merits. In particular, communist parties discriminated
against bourgeois and other enemy classes and tended to
recruit from among disadvantaged social categories, that is,
workers and peasants.
Facing serious legitimacy problems after Stalins death, East
European communist elites contemplated a series of reforms and
[invited] the technocracy and even the ideological intelligentsia
16
to share power. The invitation was accepted, and by the 1970s,
Konrad and Szelnyi claimed, the intellectuals were a dominant
class in statu nascendi. Or, in their now famous phrasing, intellectuals were on the road to class power. With the further advent
of industrialization, communist parties focused on recruiting
well-educated individuals. In the next sections, I employ
Hanleys term deproletarianization in reference to Konrad and
Szelnyis arguments, who emphasized that an increasing number of technical personnel and well-educated individuals entered
the Party at the expense of manual workers.
Despite common trends, Eastern European communist
regimes embraced specific institutional arrangements. In this section, I discuss the Romanian case. As I mentioned before, the
story of Romanian exceptionalism has been well covered by
others. Therefore, I provide readers with a sketch of the post
World War II history of the RCP, focusing on historical shifts in its
personnel policies and practices. My treatment of this topic, however, is by no means exhaustive. Readers interested in more

15. Space limitations prevent me from discussing in detail previous sociological analyses of
communist parties social composition. Comprehensive overviews of such studies can be
found in Hanley, A Party of Workers; Li and Walder, Career Advancement; S. Szelnyi,
Social Inequalities; and Walder, Li, and Treiman, Politics and Life Chances.
16. George Konrad and Ivan Szelnyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 3.

East European Politics and Societies

691

detailed accounts of Romanian communism are urged to consult

the original works on which this section heavily draws.
Romanian communists (among others) faced serious legitimacy problems dating back to the interwar period. PreWorld
War II Romania was a country with an undeveloped industry and
a large agricultural sector.17 Industrial workers, likely supporters
of the Communist Party, represented a meager 10 percent of
18
Romanias active population. Moreover, Romanian communists
were disliked domestically because [their] party championed
ideas and slogans with minimal appeal to the class it claimed to
represent, portraying Romania as a multinational imperialist
country and advocating the dismemberment of the Romanian
nation-state brought into being by the Versailles and Trianon
19
treaties of 1919-1920. Consequently, for most of the interwar
period and during the Second World War, Romanian authorities
banned the Communist Party. Many of its leaders were
imprisoned, while others sought refuge in the Soviet Union.
Near the end of the Second World War, Romania, Hitlers ally,
switched allegiance on 23 August 1944, and a pro-Allied government took power in Romania. At that time, Romanian communists were a minuscule, negligible political force: there were
only 80 [party] members in Bucharest, and fewer than 1,000
throughout the country, including those in prisons and concentration camps. . . . Proportionally, the Romanian Communist
Party was thus the smallest communist party in Eastern Europe.
In absolute terms, it equaled the membership of the Albanian
20
communist party. Yet at Stalins pressures, Romanian communists were given a central role in the new government.
When the RCP reemerged from underground, it was organizationally debilitated, it was unappealing to the masses, and it
lacked trained cadres. The RCP began to open its doors and consolidate its bases after the March 1945 installation of the new gov17. Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons.
18. Georgescu, Istoria romanilor, 215.
19. Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 24. As Tismaneanu notes, during the interwar
period, the Polish communistsfollowing strictly the Cominterns positionalso
denounced the Versailles and Trianon treaties. Contesting the very existence of postWorld
War I Poland and Romania was the worst strategy to gain popular support in two nations
that for a long period saw their territories divided among power ful neighbors.
20. Ibid., 279, n. 37.

692

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

ernment of Dr. Petru Grozathe figurehead of the communistcontrolled National Democratic Front. In seven months (February-October 1945), approximately 240,000 new members joined
the Party. Ten months later, the number of Party members
21
reached 720,000. During this time, recruitment policies targeted
workers, who were concentrated in the few industrialized cities
of Romania. King notes that the RCP had considerable success
among this group, which reached 55 percent within the Partys
22
ranks in 1945. Because peasants were a majority in Romania,
the peasantry was the second group that the RCP actively sought
to recruit. Recruiting Party members from this social group was
also successful, especially after the land reform initiated by the
Groza government, which favored poor and middle peasantry.
Consequently, the proportion of peasants among Party members
23
grew from one-third in 1945 to around two-fifths in 1947.
In its attempt to consolidate its bases, the RCPs leadership
closed its eyes when former supporters of the pro-Nazi government of Antonescu and members of the fascist movement the
Iron Guard jumped ship and entered the RCP in the late 1940s. In
the fratricidal struggles that would ensue in the early 1950s,
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej accused his rivals Ana Pauker, Teohari
Georgescu, andlater on, in 1961Miron Constantinescu for
admitting former fascists and other opportunists into the RCP.
Gheorghiu-Dej, with the support of Stalin, would win the battle
against his rivals and become the absolute leader of Romanian
communists. Yet as Tismaneanu, Levy, and King note, this policy
of dont ask, dont tell (about your fascist past) was actively pur24
sued by the entire leadership of the RCP. The cooperation with
former fascists was necessary because at the end of World War II,
the RCP lacked proper territorial representation, whereas the former Iron Guardists possessed superior organizational skills and
an impressive grassroots network in most Romanian regions.
Concomitantly, the RCP established and/or sought to infiltrate
other organizations, from trade unions to youth and womens
21.
22.
23.
24.

King, A History, 63.

Ibid.
Ibid., 65.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons; Robert Levy, Ana Pauker: The Rise and Fall of a Jewish Communist (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001); and King, A History.

East European Politics and Societies

693

organizations to professional associations to ethnic organizations

25
like the Hungarian Peoples Union. In addition, the RCP leadership focused on the development and training of its cadre aktif.
To this end, in February 1946, the RCP opened the Stefan
Gheorghiu Party School and instituted six-month courses at
26
regional party schools throughout the country.
With help from the Soviets, through intimidation, manipulation, and outright falsification, the communist alliance won the
general elections in November 1946. Thirteen months later, on 30
December 1947, King Michael of Romania was forced to abdicate
and went into exile. What followed afterwards is an example of
27
coercive as well as mimetic institutional change. Like other
communists in the region, Romanians adopted the institutional
blueprints provided by Stalins Soviet Union. In this first period of
institutional change, the new regime targeted a rapid develop28
ment via mobilization of all available resources, with a strong
emphasis on industrialization. According to Jowitt, Romanian
communists perceived industrialization as an essential part of the
29
breaking through task of nation building. The industrialization
policy would also manufacture most of the RCPs constituency
of industrial workers, which was a mere fiction in the mid-1940s.
These early years of copycat Stalinism also implied the nationalization of large and middle-size enterprises, of the housing stock,
and the collectivization of agriculture.
The growth of the RCP reached a peak in 1948 when it merged
with the Social Democratic Party (SDP) to form the Romanian
Workers Party (RWP). Approximately 260,000 SDP members
joined forces with the communists at the RWPs founding con25. King, A History, 68.
26. Ibid., 69-70.
27. For a definition of these types of institutional change, see Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell,
The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organization Fields, American Sociological Review 48 (1983): 147-60. In his discussion of how
Romanian communists imported the Soviet Unions institutional blueprints, Jowitt uses the
term emulation (see Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs). However, Jowitts emulation and Powell and DiMaggios coercive and mimetic institutional change refer to similar processes in this case.
28. Jowitt, New World Disorder.
29. Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs, 111. Breaking through, Jowitt notes, is the decisive
alteration or destruction of values, structures, and behaviors which are perceived by a revolutionary elite as comprising or contributing to the actual power or potential existence of alternative centers of power (p. 7).

694

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

gress in February 1948. Overall, between 1944 and 1948, the

number of Communist Party members grew from 1,000 to
800,000. As King states, with the addition of SDP members, the
proportion of workers in the newly formed RWP actually
decreased from 47 percent in 1947 to 39 percent at the time of the
30
merger. Such a decrease raised concern among the Party leadership regarding the improper representation of workers within the
RWP.
The founding congress marked an important shift in recruitment policies. First, the RWP leadership adopted new and stricter
criteria for entry into the Party: no members of the former
exploiting classes were to be admitted, a mandatory six-month
period of candidate membership would henceforth be required,
and those applying for admission were to be carefully screened
31
on an individual basis. Second, a few months later, the RWP initiated a verification campaign, which aimed to cleanse and
32
strengthen the party. The strengthening of the Party also translated into instituting direct control over other organizations such
33
as the Union of Working Youth and the womens front.
The verification campaign also aimed to increase workers
representation within the Party, who were supposed to represent
80 percent of the new Party members. To achieve this goal, the
Party promoted a proworker affirmative action, based on a threetier admittance system. The system gave priority to workers in
the heavy industry, followed by workers in other industrial
branches and agriculture, and ended with individuals from all
34
other social categories. Applicants from the first tier had the
shortest probationary period as candidate members. Moreover,
they were required to have fewer recommendations from other
Party members. In addition, such recommenders did not have to
be senior or veteran Party members. The requirements were
35
stricter for applicants from the second and especially third tiers.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

King, A History, 80.

Ibid., 72.
Ibid.
Ibid., 74.
Ibid.
Ibid.

East European Politics and Societies

695

At the official end of the verification campaign in 1950, it is

estimated that somewhere between 192,000 and 300,000 alien,
36
careerist elements were expelled from the Party. Notably, the
37
purges continued at a slower pace for a few more years. Yet in
assessing the results of this campaign, the leadership noted that
the Party still lacked strong links to the population, the cooperation between the Party and other organizations had plenty of
room for improvement, and regional and rural Party organizations had to be restructured. The leadership stressed the need for
the creation of a strong Party aktif of 80,000 to 100,000 cadres
38
selected from among the best qualified Party members. This
required the intensification and improvement of Party education.
Despite sustained efforts to train Party members in such establishments as the Andrei Zhdanov School for the Social Sciences,
the Stefan Gheorghiu Party School (and subsequently Academy),
and other regional institutions, the need for well-qualified cadres
39
was far from being fulfilled.
The admission of new members officially resumed in 1952,
with a few changes in recruitment policies. Entrance into the
Party remained organized in a three-tier system, but the probationary period of candidate membership was extended for all
40
applicants. While recruiting workers remained the top priority,
in line with the Partys preoccupation with massive industrialization, the leadership emphasized the need for incorporating welleducated individuals from technical fields into the RWP. The
shortage of highly qualified members from technical fields was
partly due to the Partys policies themselves, which sent to prison
a large number of preWorld War II intellectual elites. As Ionescu
notes, at first the Romanian communists treated intelligentsia as
class enemies. Yet the Partys obsession with industrialization
36. Ibid., 73.
37. One of the victims of this verification campaign was Lucret,iu Pa*tra*s,canu, who, in the words
of Tismaneanu, was one of the most distinguished, erudite, sophisticated, and urbane
Romanian communist, with a long tradition in the interwar communist movement in Romania. Gheorghiu-Dej perceived Pa*tra*s,canu as a rival, and the latter fell prey to the verification campaign in 1948, was tried, and was executed in 1954. See Tismaneanu, Stalinism
for all Seasons, 110-20 and 267-68.
38. Ibid., 75.
39. King, A History, 75-76.
40. Ibid., 78.

696

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

led the communists to distinguish between the creative and

technical intelligentsia. The former categorya mere bourgeois
luxury and potential source for troublewas never considered
indispensable by the Party, but the latter was badly needed to
41
rebuild the country. Hence, after 1949, a partial truce was
called in the prosecution of the former bourgeois architects,
agronomists, engineers, scientists, and all kinds of technicians.
Some of them were released from prison, quickly rehabilitated,
42
and quickly given jobs of responsibility.
This truce, Jowitt notes, was seen as a temporary solution until
43
the Party could form its own technical intelligentsia. The Party
set up intensive adult education programs for its members and
for individuals with healthy origins (i.e., workers, peasants, and
their offspring). Workers universities, with a two-year curriculum (and sometimes even shorter), were established for industrial and agricultural workers who had already obtained a fouryear school certificate and who had distinguished themselves in
44
production. Technical and trade schools flourished, but
according to Ionescu, the results of this rapid technical training
45
were disappointing, and the system began to be revised in 1953.
The era of copycat Stalinism would partially come to an end
with Stalins death. Fearful that he would be replaced with one of
Khrushchevs favorites, Gheorghiu-Dej refused to follow the deStalinization path preached by Moscow. Instead, he started to
mobilize various resources to impose an allegedly national road
to socialism. He began to show signs of autonomy from Moscow
by cultivating relations with Western countries, as well as with
46
other communist leaders deemed heretics by Moscow. Furthermore, Gheorghiu-Dej explicitly criticized and rejected the policies of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, which called
for economic specialization within the communist bloc and
imposed limits on Romanias economic sovereignty. Internally,
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, 176.

Ibid.
Jowitt, Revolutionary Breakthroughs.
Ionescu, Communism in Rumania, 174.
Ibid.
See Tismaneanu, Eastern Europe and Stalinism for All Seasons.

East European Politics and Societies

697

Gheorghiu-Dej sought popular support to resist de-Stalinization

by reviving Romanians anti-Russian sentiments. For example,
writings by Marx that had been previously banned or ignored
because they talked of Russias imperialistic tendencies toward
Romania were published. Also, some intellectual figures that had
been barred from the public sphere for their perceived
nationalism were rehabilitated.
Several changes in the Partys personnel policy also reflected
Gheorghiu-Dejs attempts to build internal support for his rule
and derail attempts at de-Stalinization. Admission into the Party
was made easier in 1962, when the three-tier system was
replaced by a two-tier system. The probationary period of candidate membership was reduced, and the leadership recom47
mended restraint in the expulsion of members. In a
reconciliatory attempt, admission of members of the so-called
bourgeois classes was relaxed, and a new emphasis was put on
48
recruiting engineers and technicians into the Party. Such
reconciliatory measures reflected Gheorghiu-Dejs increasing
self-confidence as the absolute leader of communist Romania.
Notably, these seemingly pacifying policies also coincided with
the Romanianization of the political elites, which implied the
elimination of ethnic Jews and Hungarians from the Partys com49
mand structures.
The policy of impregnating an externally imposed communist
model with nationalism was taken to new heights by Nicolae
Ceaus,escu, the person who succeeded Gheorghiu-Dej after his
death in March 1965. Ceaus,escu moved away from the coercive,
iron fist of Stalinism, to a subtler mode of domination through
the manipulation of national symbols. On one hand, Ceaus,escu
criticized Gheorghiu-Dej in a Khrushchevite manner, accusing
his former political patron of encouraging the development of a
personality cult and of excesses during the verification campaign. To further mark a new era of reconciliation, the Ninth RCP
Congress in 1965 relaxed the recruitment policies of the Party by
formally abandoning discriminatory categories, abolishing the
47. King, A History, 79.
48. Ibid.
49. I thank Vladimir Tismaneanu for his clarifications on this point.

698

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

two-tier admission system, and eliminating the candidate proba50

tionary status. At the same congress, the Romanian Workers
Party was renamed the Romanian Communist Party.
On the other hand, Ceaus,escu continued Gheorghiu-Dejs
moves toward autonomy from Moscow. He began to decry publicly the annexation of Romanian territories by the Soviet Union
in the 1940s. This independent stance and the internal support it
brought him culminated in August 1968, when Ceaus,escu
strongly criticized the Warsaw Pact troops invasion of Czechoslovakia. The effects of Ceaus,escus political stunt were large:
First, it portrayed him as an independent leader in the eyes of the
West. Second, by playing on Romanians anti-Russian sentiments,
Ceaus,escu managed to gain an unprecedented amount of support for his communist regime. Such support partly explains why
Romania, in contrast to Poland and Hungary in 1980s, had no significant oppositional movements. Beginning in August 1968, any
criticism of Ceaus,escu was treated as a sign of support for Romanias ages-old enemy, that is, Russia (then in the supersize for51
mula of the Soviet Union).
Politically, during 1965 to 1971, the Party opened itself up and
began accepting among its ranks former class enemies. Explicit
goals were set to incorporate an increasing number of welleducated individuals into the Party, and the proportion of highly
qualified professionals and college graduates grew significantly
52
in the late 1960s. Universalism or meritocracy was strongly
emphasized in the Partys personnel policies. These Golden
Years were accompanied by a decrease in the top-down control
of cultural production. Censorship was loosened, and intellectuals were able to gain access to information and ideas that had
been forbidden due to their subversive, Western origins.
Robert C. Tucker deems these general trends of ideological
relaxation and reform the de-radicalization of Marxist move53
ments. Unfortunately, communist Romania witnessed a
50. Ibid., 80.
51. Pavel Campeanu in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and
Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 348.
52. King, A History, 80.
53. Robert C. Tucker, The Marxian Revolutionary Idea (New York: Norton, 1969), 172-214.

East European Politics and Societies

699

reradicalization of its regime beginning in the early 1970s. Specifically, Ceaus,escus so-called Golden Years came to an end in
1971 when, while visiting China and North Korea, Ceaus,escu
became enamored with Maos and Kim Il Sungs models of communism and their near-total control over society. By 1974,
Ceaus,escu gained full control over the Party by outmaneuvering
and defeating his predecessors barons who, ironically, had promoted him as a leader back in 1965. He not only froze the relative
liberalization but also revived the Stalinist model, characterized
by the hypercentralization of the economy and decision-making
processes.
Around that time, Ceaus,escu lost any veneer of formalism and
began to shamelessly promote his close relativesmost notably,
his wifeto top positions of power. While, as Shafir notes, this
54
was not a uniquely Romanian phenomenon, Ceaus,escu took
party familialization to such new heights that some analysts
55
labeled his regime dynastic socialism. Specifically, in the late
1970s, Ceaus,escus wife, Elena, became one of the three First
Deputy Ministers in the Romanian government andmost
importantshe was appointed the chairwoman of the RCPs
56
Central Committee for State and Party cadres. Elena Ceaus,escus
brother was a member of the RCPs Central Committee, the Executive Bureau of the Socialist Democracy and Unity Front, and
57
deputy chairman of the General Confederation of Trade Unions.
In 1983, Ceaus,escus brother Ilie became deputy minister of
defense and head of the Higher Political Council of the Romanian
Army. Nicolae A. Ceaus,escuanother brother with the same first
name as the Party leaderwas a lieutenant general in the Ministry of Interior.58 Florea Ceaus,escu, another brother, was a member of the editorial staff of Scnteia (the Spark, the RCPs newspa59
per). A third brother, Marin, had a position in the foreign trade,
and Ion Ceaus,escuyet another brotherwas minister-secre54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Shafir, Romania, 89.

Georgescu, Istoria romanilor.
Shafir, Romania, 76.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 223.
Shafir, Romania, 78.
Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 223.

700

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

60

tary of state of the State Planning Commission. A sister of

Ceaus,escuu was deputy minister of education, and her husband
was the first secretary of the RCP in Olt, Ceaus,escus native
61
county. Ceaus,escus younger son Nicu held posts in the RCPs
Executive Committee and the Communist Youth Union and was
the head of the Sibiu County Party organization. Nicknamed the
Prince and a noted party boy, Nicu was groomed by his parents
to succeed Nicolae [his father] as Romanias leader (the only such
62
case in a European Leninist regime).
Ceaus,escu, who had previously denounced Gheorghiu-Dejs
personality cult, started presenting himself as the savior of Romania. In addition to the practices of propaganda and the personality cult, in the late 1970s and 1980s, with the help of the
Securitate (the Secret Police), Ceaus,escu managed to suppress
any oppositional movement. Inspired by Webers ideal type of
sultanism, Linz and Stepan describe Ceaus,escus extremely personalized rule as totalitarisnism-cum-sultanism. They note that
in such a regime, There is a strong tendency toward familial
power and dynastic succession, there is no distinction between a
state career and a personal service to the ruler, there is lack of
rational, impersonal ideology . . . and the ruler acts only to his
63
unchecked discretion, with no larger, impersonal goals.
The RCPs personnel policies after 1971 are aptly described by
64
Shafir as zigzags. Ceaus,escus interpersonal trust was confined
to his clique of sycophants and close family. Therefore, to prevent the formation of oppositional groups within the Party, he
instituted and pushed to the extreme the policy of rotating cadres. Through this policy, cadres were periodically transferred to
65
different administrative subunits across the country. The policy
of recruiting well-educated individuals also fluctuated. Following
Ceaus,escus minicultural revolution inspired by his visits to
China and North Korea, official Party figures indicate that the
proportion of intellectuals dropped from 23 percent in 1969 to
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 259.
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 52 and 349-56.
Shafir, Romania, 89.
King, A History, 94-95.

East European Politics and Societies

701

66

less than 19 percent in 1972. Seven years later, in 1979, official

statistics show that intellectuals represented 29 percent of Party
67
members. The interest in recruiting workers into the RCP
remained pronounced throughout the 1980s and was linked to
Ceaus,escus decision to continue with the extensive industrialization of the country at a time of global economic recession. At
the level of its cadres, the Party struggled with breeding a new
type of manager and ideologuenamely, cadres who were
simultaneously technocrats and ideologuesan aging Party
aktif, incipient intergenerational struggles among cadres, and
68
occasional cleansings of unworthy elements. In the 1970s and
1980s, the RCPs leadership raised concerns regarding the representation of ethnic minorities and women among Party members
and cadres. Several reformist outbursts aimed to increase the
presence of such groups (in particular, women) within the Party.
(I will discuss the outcomes of these affirmative action programs
in the next sections.)
Shafir notes that the only stable feature in the Partys convoluted personnel policies was its constant growth in membership,
69
especially in the late 1970s and 1980s. This constant growth is
visible in Table 1, which depicts the evolution of membership in
five communist parties by country and year.
While in the 1950s and 1960s, membership figures oscillated
due to initial mergers with other left-wing parties and subsequent
purge campaigns, beginning with 1970, communist parties in the
region grew constantly. The only exception to this is Poland,
which recorded a decrease in Party membership in the mid1980s, following the Solidaritys anti-government actions.
The RCP is the only Party in the region that grew at a substantially higher rate in the 1970s and in 1980s than other sisterly
political machines. Under Ceaus,escu, the big push to grow is visible in the 1970 membership figures. First, this sudden growth
was generated by the relaxation of admission policies adopted at
the Ninth Congress of the RCP in 1965. Second, the increase in
66.
67.
68.
69.

Shafir, Romania, 89.

Ibid.
Ibid., 90-93. See also King, A History, 80-84.
Shafir, Romania, 89.

702

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

703

Est. 1,000
1,060,000
595,000
834,600
2,194,627
3,150,812
NA
3,709,735

1944
1948/1949
1956/1957
1960/1961
1970/1971
1980/1981
1985/1986
1987/1988

NA
460,000
360,000
NA
699,990
826,000
932,055
NA

Bulgaria
27,000
1,788,383
1,385,610
1,379,441
1,173,183
1,325,150
NA
1,607,578

Czechoslovakia

Est. 3,000
887,000
102,000
467,000
662,000
812,992
870,992
NA

Hungary

Est. 20,000
1,500,000
1,344,000
1,270,000
2,270,000
2,942,000
2,125,762
2,130,000

Poland

Note: NA = not available.

a. For Romania, the 1944 to 1981 membership figures are from Michael Shafir, Romania. Politics, Economics, and Society. Political Stagnation and Simulated Change (London: Frances Pinter, 1985), 87. Membership figures for 1985 and 1988 are from Richard F. Staar, Communist Regimes in Eastern
Europe, 5th ed. (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), 196. Because membership figures were not available for either 1956 or 1957, the membership figure is from 1955.
b. For Bulgaria, the 1948 to 1981 membership figures are from Eric Hanley, A Party of Workers or a Party of Intellectuals? Recruitment into Eastern European Communist Parties, 1945-1988, Social Forces 81 (2003): 1073-1105, at 1076. Membership figures for 1986 are from Staar, Communist Regimes, 41.
c. For Czechoslovakia, the 1948 to 1981 membership figures are from Hanley, A Party of Workers, 1076. Membership figures for 1988 are from Staar, Communist Regimes, 156.
d. For Hungary, the 1948 to 1981 membership figures are from Hanley, A Party of Workers, 1076. Membership figures for 1985 are from Staar, Communist
Regimes, 132.
e. For Poland, all membership figures are from Staar, Communist Regimes, 156.

Romania

Evolution of Membership in Five Communist Parties by Country and Year

Year

Table 1.

Party membership was the result of Ceaus,escus opposition to

the 1968 Soviet intervention in the former Czechoslovakia. As
discussed previously, Ceaus,escus position vis--vis the invasion
of Czechoslovakia helped him gain a large amount of support for
his regime. Biographical accounts from that time and scholarly
works attest that politically indifferent individuals and even anticommunists decided to join the RCP due to Ceaus,escus antiSoviet stance.
Yet what did it take to join the RCP in the 1970s and 1980s? As
mentioned previously, the two-tier admission system and the
candidate probationary status were eliminated in 1965. According to the rules that, in theory, governed the RCP during 1970s
and 1980s, Party membership [was] open to persons who
70
reached the age of 18 years. Individuals younger than 26 years
could be admitted into the Party only if they were members of the
Union of Communist Youth (UCY). Furthermore, persons applying for admission to Party membership [had] to present recommendations from two Party members who had been in the Party
71
for at least three years. For individuals younger than 26 years,
one of the recommendations had to be given by the UCY organi72
zation to which the applicant belonged. Party members who
recommended an individual had to know the applicant from a
joint activity of at least one year. Admission to RCP membership
was decided upon by the general meeting of the basic organization. The decision to admit a new member had to be endorsed by
an upper-level Party organization (e.g., enterprise, county,
73
municipal, town, or communal).
In the RCPs hierarchy, the so-called basic Party organization
represented the foundation of the Party; such basic organizations
existed in government, industry agriculture, schools, and military units. Their size [varied] from a minimum of 3 to a maximum
74
of 300 members. County organizations were the intermediate
level between the basic organization and the Central Committee
70. The RCP, The Rules of the Romanian Communist Party (Bucharest, Romania: Meridiane
Publishing House, 1975), 26.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., 27.
74. Staar, Communist Regimes, 195.

704

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

(CC) of the RCP. The CC was elected by the RCPs Congress every
five years. In turn, the CC elected the Political Executive Commit75
tee and the Central Committee Secretariat. As Staar notes,
These bodies [were] not elective but actually consisted of leading Party personalities who were chosen by an inner group and
76
then rubber-stamped by the Central Committee. Notably, at the
Tenth Congress of the RCP in 1969, Ceaus,escu modified the rule
regarding the election of the RCPs general secretary. According
to the new rule, the general secretary was elected by the RCPs
Congress. [Ceaus,escus] arguments were that this should be
done for reasons of national autonomy because the Congress
would be harder for Moscow to manipulate, and for democracy,
because the Congress should be the sovereign body of the
77
party. In fact, by shifting the responsibilities of electing the
RCPs general secretary to the Partys Congress, Ceaus,escu
knowing all too well the fate of Khrushchevwanted to mini78
mize the risk of a similar intra-Party coup.
As mentioned previously, Romanian historian Georgescu
viewed Ceaus,escus preoccupation with beefing up the Party as
an attempt to silence domestic and especially foreign critics who
79
questioned the popularity of his brand of socialism. In a comparative perspective, in the 1970s and 1980s, when other socialist
countries were trying to rationalize, modernize, and reform their
economies, Ceaus,escus administration was becoming extremely
irrational (i.e., personalized and unchecked). Also, Ceaus,escus
emphasis on membership growth became more and more pronounced at a time when other sisterly countries (e.g., Poland
and Hungary) were contemplating the possibility of democratic
reforms. By the time when the RCP reached mammoth-like
dimensions of around 3.7 million members, Ceaus,escus
power . . . was falling apart. . . . He considered Gorbachev the
arch-traitor to Leninist ideals and tried to mobilize an international neo-Stalinist coalition. In August 1989, he was so irritated
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Ibid., 191.
Ibid.
Linz and Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition, 349.
I thank Vladimir Tismaneanu for his clarifications at this point.
Georgescu, Istoria romanilor.

East European Politics and Societies

705

by the formation of a Solidarity government in Poland that he

80
proposed a Warsaw Pact intervention in that country. In
December 1989, however, Romanians became so irritated by
Ceaus,escu that he was overthrown by a popular revolt, sum81
marily tried, and executed.
2. Data and measures
In the previous section, I reviewed the postWorld War II history of the RCP. Most of the studies I mentioned previously rely
exclusively on Party official statistics. In the remainder of this article, I employ survey data about Party membership to examine
the RCPs recruitment policies.
2.1. Data
The survey data come from two studies, conducted in May and
82
November 2000 at the request of Open Society Romania. The
two samples include 3,751 individuals, stratified by Romanias
so-called historical regions (eight regions plus Bucharest, the
capital city), residential milieu (urban and rural), and the size of
localities. In the final stage of the sampling, the subjects were
chosen using systematic sampling from the most recent electoral
lists. The samples are representative of Romanias adult population, ages eighteen years and over (in 2000). In my analyses I
include only respondents born before 1972 (N = 2,944). These
individuals were at least eighteen years old in 1989, the age at
which, in theory, an individual could have been considered for
Party membership.

80. Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons, 229.

81. For an excellent account of the December Events and the narratives that surrounded the
downfall of Ceaus,escu, see Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery, Romania after
Ceaus,escu: Post-Communist Communism? in Ivo Banac, ed., Eastern Europe in Revolution
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), 117-47. For an analysis of collective representations of December 1989 a decade later, see John F. Ely and Ca*ta*lin Augustin Stoica, ReMembering Romania, in Henry F. Carey, ed., Romania since 1989: Politics, Economics,
and Society (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2004), 97-114.
82. The surveys were conducted by two private research agencies: Metro-Media Transylvania
(May 2000) and the Center for Urban and Regional SociologyCURS (November 2000).

706

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

Before presenting the results of my analyses, I must, however,

offer a few caveats regarding the survey data described above.
The story of individuals recruitment into communist parties is
not a straightforward one. First, communist parties personnel
policies varied sharply by historical period. In the late 1940s and
early 1950s, East European Leninist parties primarily recruited
candidates with a proper social background (i.e., workers and
peasants). Individuals from bourgeois families and intellectuals
were discriminated against by recruitment policies. After Stalins
death, most East European communist parties relaxed their personnel practices. In the early 1970s, some communist parties
began to explicitly incorporate professionals among their ranks,
which led Konrad and Szelnyi to conclude that intellectuals
were on the road to class power (see, however, Szelnyis second
thoughts on this, as well as Hanleys study of recruitment into the
83
Communist Party in five countries). Second, the timing of entry
into the Party also shaped the contours of communist parties. As
Li and Walder show in the Chinese case, some candidates were
selected early on in their adult life, sponsored by the Party to
complete their education, and subsequently assigned important
84
positions of authority within the system. Other individuals
joined the Party at a later stage in life, which put them onto
different career tracks.
Against this background, life history data and event-history
modeling techniques would have been ideal to account for the
above mentioned historical complexities of recruitment into the
RCP. My data, however, are mostly cross-sectional and contain
information about respondents careers at two points in time:
1989 and 2000. This fact limits both my modeling strategies and
the conclusions one might draw from my analyses. Specifically,
lacking information about the timing of individuals careers, I
could not include a respondents occupation as a predictor in my
83. Konrad and Szelnyi, The Intellectuals; for Ivan Szelnyis self-criticism, see The Prospects
and Limits of the East European New Class Project: An Auto-Critical Reflection on the Intellectuals on the Road to Class Power, Politics and Society 15 (1986): 103-44; see also Conclusions, in Ivan Szelnyi (in collaboration with R. Manchin, P. Juhasz, B. Magyar, and B.
Martin), Socialist Entrepreneurs (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); and
Hanley, A Party of Workers.
84. Li and Walder, Career Advancement.

East European Politics and Societies

707

causal analyses. Also, readers should exercise some caution in

interpreting the effects of education on entry into the Party. My
survey data do not contain information that would have allowed
me to detail cases of sponsored mobility, as described by Li and
85
Walder.
Nevertheless, when proper modeling strategies are employed
and limitations acknowledged, studies using cross-sectional data
successfully highlight the intricacies of recruitment into communist parties.86 In addition, I reiterate that Romanian survey data
about Party membership have been uncommon. As far as I know,
this is the first study that uses survey data to answer important
questions regarding the RCPs personnel policies.
2.2. Measures
Although most of the variables employed in the following
analyses are self-explanatory, I owe readers additional clarifications regarding some of the measures I rely on. For Party membership, I use a source item that asked respondents whether they
were members of the RCP before 1990. Answers were recorded
with the following categories: No (1); Yes, [I was a] rank-andfile member (2); Yes, [I was a] Party member with a position of
authority at local level (3); Yes, [I was a] Party member with a
position of authority in the RCPs Central Committee or within the
Government (4); those who refused to answer were recorded
into a separate category. The surveys did not ask questions about
the year when respondents joined the Party, the duration of Party
membership, and whether they were ever excluded from the
Party prior to 1990. Thus, my Party membership variable captures whether a respondent has ever been affiliated with the RCP.
Also, these nationally representative samples included only
three respondents who held top positions of authority in the government or in the RCPs CC. The number of Party functionaries
included in these samples is thirty-three. This number is too small
to allow for separate, more refined causal analyses. Therefore, I
regrouped them as follows.
85. Ibid.
86. See, for instance, S. Szelnyi, Social Inequalities.

708

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

From the source item described above, I first constructed

Party membera dichotomous variable coded 1 if a respondent was a Party member (including those respondents who had
positions of authority at the local and top levels), and 0 otherwise. I employ Party member to examine general patterns of
recruitment into the RCP. To account for differences within the
Party, I rely on two additional measures: rank-and-file Party
member is coded 1 if a respondent was an ordinary Party member (with no position of authority in the party) and 0 otherwise.
Party functionary is a dummy variable indicating whether the
respondent was a party member with position of authority at
local or top level.
Fathers political affiliation with the RCP was coded from
similar source items that asked respondents whether their fathers
were RCP members. I use the following dummy variables to capture fathers RCP membership: father was a rank-and-file RCP
member (1 = yes), father was a Party functionary (1 = yes),
father nonmember (1 = yes). To avoid potential sample selection bias, I employ a dichotomous variable for cases where information about fathers political affiliation is missing.
An individuals social originusually captured by fathers occupationwas an important criterion for recruitment into the RCP.
In these surveys, fathers occupation was recorded through an
open-ended question. From the answers to this question, I constructed the following dummy variables to measure a respondents social origin: father professional (1 = yes), father
nonmanual worker (1 = yes), father manual worker (1 = yes),
father self-employed (1 = yes), father agricultural worker (1 =
yes), and father not in the labor force (retiree on disability
grounds, unemployed, etc.) (1 = yes). Respondents occupation
in 1989 was also recorded through an open-ended question. I
recoded the answers to these questions into the following dichotomous variables for respondents occupations before the collapse of Ceaus,escus regime: professional, nonmanual
worker, manual worker, self-employed, agricultural
worker, and not in the labor force. To avoid sample selection
bias, I employ two dummy variables for cases when information
about fathers and/or respondents occupations is missing. Also,
East European Politics and Societies

709

Party functionary was similar to holding a managerial or supervisory position. To avoid double-counting, I treat Party functionary as the primary occupation of respondents who declared that
they or their fathers were Party functionaries. In other words, if a
respondent (or his or her father) had a position of authority
within the Party, then his or her (or his or her fathers) occupation is Party functionary.
To highlight the effects of education on entry into the RCP, I
employ a series of dichotomous variables: college graduate
(1 = yes), high school graduates (1 = yes), vocational school
graduates (1 = yes), ten years of education or less (1 = yes).
High school graduates also includes graduates of the so-called
posthigh school programsusually one-year (and rarely twoyear) education programs in such fields as nursing, accounting,
and pedagogy. Also, previous studies have uncovered the communist parties propensity to appoint their members in supervisory positions. To account for this, I employ a dummy variable
coded 1 if a respondent had at least three subordinates in 1989
and 0 otherwise.
The communist project in Romania (and elsewhere) aimed to
eradicate all differences among individuals. This task, however,
was taken to new heights by Ceaus,escu. As Kligman notes, The
nation itself was to be reconstituted through a neo-Stalinist
social engineering project known as omogenizare (homogenization) to homogenize the populace and create the new socialist
person. . . . To this end, race, gender, and ethnicity were all to be
87
homogenized. At the same time, ethnic minorities were recognized as categories that required special protection and a fair representation in all Party and governmental bodies.88 But interview
evidence and other studies suggest that, in practice, minorities
access to such bodies was more restricted than the Partys politi89
cally correct discourse led us to believe. To account for this, in
bivariate analyses, I employ a series of dichotomous variables for
87. Gail Kligman, The Politics of Duplicity: Controlling Reproduction in Ceaus,escus Romania
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998), 33.
88. Mary Ellen Fischer, Women in Romanian Politics: Elena Ceaus,escu, Pronatalism, and the
Promotion of Women, in Sharon L. Wolchik and Alfred G. Meyer, eds., Women, State, and
Party in Eastern Europe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985), 126.
89. Shafir, Romania; Staar, Communist Regimes.

710

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

respondents ethnic background: Romanian (1 = yes), Hungarian (1 = yes), German (1 = yes), Gypsy (1 = yes), Other (1 =
yes). Due to the extremely small number of ethnic Germans,
Gypsies, and Others, in the causal analyses I employ three
dummy variables to capture a respondents ethnic background
Romanian (1 = yes), Hungarian (1 = yes), Other (1 = yes).
3. Cross-national profiles of Party members
In this section, I will examine the social composition of the
Party members and nonmembers in Romania, Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. For Party members
profiles in the latter four countries, I heavily rely on Hanleys
analyses. To ensure comparability with his data, in Table 2, I
regrouped some of my variables as follows: father nonmanual
occupation includes both father professional and father low
nonmanual occupation; tertiary education comprises college
graduates; less than secondary education also includes graduates of vocational schools. Missing observations are excluded
from the percentages reported in Table 2.
The large number of RCP members represents the first and
most striking difference between this Party and its comrades from
the region. According to Table 2, 38.5 percent of Romanian
respondents born before 1972 were Party members. Other studies that relied on Party official statistics indicate that in April 1988
90
the total number of RCP members was 3,709,735.00. Party
members at that time represented 15.8 percent of the adult popu91
92
lation and approximately 33 percent of its working adults. The
differences between these survey data and official statistics could
be attributed to the following facts: First, I remind readers that the
Romanian samples are representative of the adult Romanian
population in 2000. As mentioned previously, I employ a
subsample of individuals who were at least eighteen years old in
1989. Second, the percentage of Party members reported in Table
2 excludes missing observations. If missing observations are
90. Staar, Communist Regimes, 196.
91. Ibid, 195.
92. Library of Congress, Country Reports; King, Romania.

East European Politics and Societies

711

included, 35.5 percent of respondents born before 1972

93
belonged to the RCP. Third, the most recent available official
statistics cited by other studies are from April 1988. In contrast,
these surveys asked respondents whether they were Party members before 1990; respondents were not asked whether they
were ever excluded from the Party. Aside from those individuals
who were ever excluded from the Party, one might wonder
whether respondents overreported their past affiliation with the
RCP. I do not think this is the case because in the early 1990s, having been a Party member was similar to having a stigma. Thus, it
is unlikely that by 2000 a significant number of Romanians
became extremely nostalgic after communism and they declared
that they were Party members, even though they were not.
Keeping these limitations in mind, the first line in Table 2 indicates that the RCP had almost four times more members than the
communist parties of Hungary and Poland and almost three times
more members than the Bulgarian one. The communist parties of
the former Czech and Slovak Socialist Republics came in second
after the RCP in regard to their membership figures. Some
authors suggest that the mass character of the RCP should be
linked to Ceaus,escus attempts to increase the legitimacy of his
rule at a time when reforms were introduced in other socialist
94
countries. As Georgescu half-jokingly noted, in explaining the
mass character of the RCP, one should not exclude Ceaus,escus
megalomaniacal inclinations toward breaking all possible
records by seeking to reign over the largest Communist Party in
95
the region.
As shown in Table 2, university graduates were overrepresented among Party members in Bulgaria, the former
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. In Romania too, the proportion of university graduates is two times higher among Party
93. In the May 2000 sample, 36 percent of respondents born before 1972 reported that they
were Party members (excluding missing observations); the percentage of Party members
was 34.5 percent when missing observations were included in calculations. In the November 2000 sample, 41 percent of respondents of respondents born before 1972 reported that
they were ever Party members (excluding missing observations); when missing observations are included, the percentage of Party members is 36.5 percent.
94. Tismaneanu, Stalinism for All Seasons; Staar, Communist Regimes; Georgescu, Istoria
romanilor.
95. Georgescu, Istoria romanilor.

712

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

713

Bulgaria

Hungary

Poland

The Czech
b
Republic

Slovakia

11.4

15.2

14.7

Source: For Romania, Human and Social Resources in the Romanian Transition (see text), May and November 2000 (total N = 3,751). For all the other
countries, Eric Hanley, A Party of Workers or a Party of Intellectuals? Recruitment into Eastern European Communist Parties, 1945-1988, Social Forces
81 (2003): 1073-1105.
Note: Missing observations are excluded. Figures represent percentages (except where specified).
a. Authors analyses from Human and Social Resources in the Romanian Transition; figures are calculated only for respondents born on or before 1971.
b. The figures reported by Hanley are from the study coordinated by Ivan Szelenyi and Donald J. Treiman (1993, as cited in Hanley, A Party of Workers)
and include respondents born between 1923 and 1971.
c. Hanley, A Party of Workers, 1088.

18.4 45.5 14.5 37.6 12.7 20.8 16.1 21.5 22.9 45.0 17.9 35.0
1,672 1,045 3,189 622 3,287 409 2,626 339 3,766 693 3,538 623

Father Party member

Number of cases

10.9

11.6 14.1 13.2 18.5 13.6 16.4 16.1 20.8 20.7 29.0 18.8 26.8
3.6
2.1 19.5 18.7 18.9 19.1 35.6 39.9
8.5
5.6 10.4
9.5
1,672 1,045 3,661 593 3,231 397 2,583 327 3,881 677 3,552 622

Father nonmanual
Father self-employed
Number of cases

13.5

69.8 59.0 59.5 35.7 70.9 48.2 60.8 45.1 68.8 53.9 64.4 45.2
24.0 28.8 35.0 45.6 22.3 28.6 31.9 36.3 24.8 30.4 27.7 36.7
6.1 12.2
5.5 18.6
6.9 23.2
7.2 18.6
6.4 15.7
7.9 18.0
39.1 54.7 46.5 59.0 45.4 65.9 45.9 70.7 43.5 69.7 43.5 73.4
1,570 1,045 4,144 6,49 3,952 440 2,902 375 4,720 768 3,958 683

Highest education
Less than secondary
Secondary
Tertiary
Gender (male)
Number of cases

38.5

NonNonNonNonNonNonParty Party Party Party Party Party Party Party Party Party Party Party

Romania

Characteristics of Communist Party Members and Nonmembers in Six East European Countries

Ever Party members

Table 2.

members than among nonmembers, which seems to indicate that

the RCP targeted well-educated individuals for recruitment. Yet
as compared to all of the other brotherly parties, the RCP had
the lowest percentage of graduates of a tertiary school (i.e., 12.2
percent). The other outlier is Hungary, whose Communist Party
incorporated more college graduates (i.e., 23.2 percent) than any
other Party in the region. In particular, Hungarys Socialist Workers Party had two times more university graduates among its
ranks than the RCP. Some of these differences can be partly
explained by the overall proportion of college graduates in these
countries. For instance, previous studies estimate that, as compared to the other five countries discussed here, Romania had a
relatively low percentage of college educated individuals. Nevertheless, the variations in the number of university graduates
among Party members are also explained by the recruitment policies of communist parties in each countryan issue to which I
will return in the following sections.
In Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia,
individuals with less than a secondary degree (a category that
includes vocational education) were underrepresented among
96
Party members. The same is true for Romania if one compares
the proportion of individuals with less than a secondary degree
among Party members and nonmembers (see the first two columns in Table 2). Yet across countries, the RCP had the highest
percentage of Party members with less than a secondary degree
(i.e., 59 percent). The Czech Republic is the only other country
where respondents with less than a secondary degree were a
majority among Party members (i.e., 53.9 percent). High school
graduates were somewhat overrepresented among Party members in Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
Poland. This was also the case in Romania, where Party members
with a secondary education represented almost 29 percent.
Although women had a significant presence in the workforce
in all of the countries I examine, they were a minority among
Party members. Notably, Party membership disparities between
men and women were the lowest in Romania and Bulgaria,
96. Hanley, A Party of Workers, 1092.

714

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party

where women made up more than two-fifths of Party membership. In contrast, in Hungary, Poland, and the former Czechoslovakia, only one-third or less of Party members were women.
Individuals with fathers in nonmanual occupations were more
numerous among Party members than among nonmembers in
Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. The
same was true in Romania, but I would like to note that the RCP
had the lowest percentage of Party members with fathers in
nonmanual occupations. Interestingly, Hanleys analyses show
no clear evidence that individuals whose fathers were selfemployed experienced discrimination in Party recruitment processes [in Bulgaria, the former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and
97
Poland]. At this point, Romania is, again, an exception: across
countries, the RCP had the lowest percentage of individuals
whose fathers were self-employed. However, like in the former
Czechoslovakia and in Bulgaria, in Romania too the percentage
of offspring of self-employed is slightly higher among nonmembers than among Party members.
Overall, in all of the five countries analyzed by Hanley, Party
members offspring were overrepresented among the Partys
98
rank and file. In Bulgaria and especially in the former Czech
Socialist Republic, Hanley finds a higher proportion of Party
99
members who reported that their fathers were Party members.
As Walder argues, aside from social background, parents political affiliation was an important (ascribed) criterion in recruitment
100
policies of communist parties. As shown in Table 2, the RCP
had the highest proportion of Party members offspring among its
ranks (45.5 percent), followed closely by the Communist Party of
the former Czech Socialist Republic (45 percent). Put another
way, children of Party members were two times more numerous
within the ranks of the Romanian and the Czech communist parties than within the ranks of the Hungarian and Polish communist
parties.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid., 1090, 1092.
Andrew G. Walder, The Political Dimension of Social Mobility in Communist States:
Reflections on the Soviet Union and China, Research in Political Sociology 1 (1985): 105.

East European Politics and Societies

715

Yet the inbreeding of Party members seems less pronounced

within the RCP than within the Czech Communist Party. Given
that the late RCP was a mass organization, it is unsurprising that
more than two-fifths of ordinary Party members were offspring of
Party members. In contrast, the Czech Communist Party was significantly smaller than the RCP. According to Table 2, only 15.2
percent of adult Czechs were Party members as compared to 38.5
percent of adult Romanians who were Party members. Given the
relative size of these two communist parties, the degree of
inbreeding among Party members was more pronounced in the
Czech Republic than in Romania.
In the second party of this study, which will be published in
the next issue of EEPS, I will employ more refined categories to
highlight the differences between Party members and nonmembers in Romania. I will sharpen my interpretations of statistical
analyses with ethnographic evidence from different sources. I
will also examine patterns of recruitment into the RCP. In the final
section of the second part, I will summarize the main findings of
this study, followed by a brief discussion of their relevance for
political sociology and transition studies.

716

Once upon a Time There Was a Big Party