Comparative

Political Studies
http://cps.sagepub.com/

Book Review: Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman

Empire and Iran
Burak Kadercan
Comparative Political Studies 2012 45: 1310
DOI: 10.1177/0010414012452250
The online version of this article can be found at:
http://cps.sagepub.com/content/45/10/1310

Published by:
http://www.sagepublications.com

Additional services and information for Comparative Political Studies can be found at:
Email Alerts: http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts
Subscriptions: http://cps.sagepub.com/subscriptions
Reprints: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav
Permissions: http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

>> Version of Record - Sep 18, 2012

What is This?

Downloaded from cps.sagepub.com by elham kabir on October 21, 2012

452250
Book ReviewsComparative Political Studies
The Author(s) 2011

CPSXXX10.1177/0010414012452250

Reprints and permission: http://www.

sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav

Book Review

Comparative Political Studies

XX(X) 14
The Author(s) 2012
Reprints and permission:
sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav
http://cps.sagepub.com

Sohrabi, N. (2011). Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire

and Iran. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
Reviewed by: Burak Kadercan, Institut Barcelona dEstudis Internacionals, Barcelona,
Spain
DOI: 10.1177/0010414012452250

Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran maintains

that although the makings of modern Turkey and Iran are usually associated
with Ataturk and Reza Khan, it was the preceding revolutions that were
responsible for the radical reorientation to politics, institutions, religion and
nationality (p. 1). Without the Iranian revolution of 1906 and the Young
Turk revolution of 1908, the transformations later would indeed appear to
be outside history (p. 1). Sohrabi deals with multiple questions. First, where
do the Young Turk and Iranian experiences stand vis--vis the historiography
of revolutions? Second, who were the relevant actors and what kind of revolutions did they seek? Third, how can we explain the variant outcomes in
Iran and the Ottoman Empire, where revolution in the latter led to a considerably more resilient constitutionalism?
Sohrabi highlights that revolutions are usually associated with the unification of the [legislative] and the executive into one (p. 7) through sudden
and violent seizure of the executive and the overthrow of the entire structure
of the old regime (p. 9). However, revolutions are not timeless categories
with fixed definitions suitable for all eras (p. 9) and revolutionary models
are political constructions naturalized in different historical epochs (p. 13).
Although the conventional conceptualization is built on the unique Bolshevik
experience of 1917, the dominant rhetoric and theory of revolutions between
the French Revolution and 1917 emphasized constitutionalism, which aimed
not at unification but redefinition of the legislative and the executive, and
separation of the two (p. 7). The Iranian and Young Turk revolutions, it follows, are best understood in the context of constitutionalism.

Downloaded from cps.sagepub.com by elham kabir on October 21, 2012

Comparative Political Studies XX(X)

Sohrabi tackles his cases through a framework that is built on three levels of
analysis: global, regional, and local. While global master templates refer to
ideologies that are dominant at a particular historical epoch, regional factors
stand in for geopolitical pressures. Local dynamics, in turn, entail the individual characteristics of a polity. As far as global and regional dimensions are
concerned, the Ottoman and Iranian experiences shared a similar starting point.
Both states were facing external military threats, pushing them to seek strategies for self-strengthening. Given the global diffusion of constitutionalism
and the dominant belief that European states owed their prowess to their constitutions, similar geopolitical challenges turned constitutionalism into hopeful doctrines of self-strengthening in Iran and the Ottoman Empire (p. 16).
It was the differences at the local level in Iran and the Ottoman Empire
that led to variant paths to, and outcomes of, constitutionalism. Beyond the
variation with respect to ethno-religious homogeneity, the key difference
involved state structures. Although the Ottoman state, by the time of the
revolution, had penetrated into the layers of the social, not on the same
level as its European rivals, but certainly along the lines of a modern state,
the Iranian state was still governed through a decentralized patrimonial tradition (p. 24). In the Ottoman case, it was the partial rationalization of the
state (and subsequent neopatrimonialism) that created incentives for the
revolutionaries to intervene in state-making processes; in Iran, it was the
disintegration of the central authority that motivated revolutionaries.
The Ottoman modernization efforts included (state-sponsored) aggressive
educational reforms, which led to the emergence of an urban middle class
that eventually penetrated into the bureaucracy and military by the late 19th
century. This new class, which found its voice with the Committee of Union
and Progress (CUP), perceived the quasi-patrimonial structure of the state as
the biggest roadblock in front of their upward mobility. Constitutionalism, by
further rationalizing the state, could remove the barriers to merit-based
advancement. In such a setting, global, regional, and local factors simultaneously pointed toward the possibility of radical political transformation.
Acting as the agent of change and benefiting from its superior organizational
network, the CUP eventually orchestrated the constitutionalist revolution of
1908 in the wake of similar developments in Russia (1905) and Iran (1906).
The Iranian revolution, by contrast, was the product of a fateful contingency (p. 338). Although the global and regional dynamics hinted constitutionalism, the local factors were not favorable. Different from the Ottomans,
the Iranian state had not initiated educational reforms, ruling out the emergence of a large and cohesive urban middle class. The intelligentsia remained
small in size and carried marginal weight in politics and bureaucracy.

Downloaded from cps.sagepub.com by elham kabir on October 21, 2012

Book Review

Furthermore, the clerics, in the absence of a strong state, remained as important political actors. The chance factor worked for the revolutionaries when
the clerics, who were traditionally the leading actors in popular uprisings,
moved their protest outside Tehran in December 1905 during a crisis, creating an opportunity for the intelligentsia to rise to . . . leadership and capture the
center stage (p. 338), forcing the shah into radical constitutional reforms as
of early 1906.
The different local exigencies in Iran and the Ottoman Empire eventually
led to variant constitutional outcomes. The CUP-backed constitutionalism
proved itself to be resilient even in the face of counterrevolution in 1909, which
was instantly crushed by the CUP. The revolutionaries in Iran were in a far
more precarious position. The minimally reformed, decentralized, patrimonial
state structure rendered the consolidation of constitutionalism in Iran a daunting task (p. 336). Furthermore, revolutionaries had been compelled to make an
uneasy alliance with the clerics. Once the clerics comprehended the nature and
extent of the radical changes that revolutionaries had been devising, the alliance fell apart, prompting the way for counterrevolution. The constitutionalists
emerged victorious in the end, but theirs was a Pyrrhic victory; the confrontation lasted for months, and the outcome involved numerous and extensive compromises to the old regime that in turn diluted the constitution.
Although the revolutionaries in both states initially aimed to separate the
executive and the legislature, in the face of strong opposition they found
themselves compelled to mobilize organizations that resorted to extra-legal
or illegal methods and means (p. 427). Such measures implied the emergence of crucial ideological contradictions within the constitutional movement and, when combined with the ever-increasing geopolitical challenges,
prompted the erosion of constitutionalism. Regardless, the revolutionary
episodes, even though they were short-lived, had significant and variant
impacts on the state-building programs in both modern Turkey and Iran,
paving the way for a more resilient constitutionalist tradition in the former.
To sustain the arguments summarized above, Sohrabi draws on detailed
historical narratives that are built on an excellent command of not only the
relevant literature in social sciences and secondary sources but also primary
sources that range from official state documents to classical texts, from official state documents to classical texts, from novels to newspapers of the day.
It is difficult to find fault with the ways in which Sohrabi goes to lengths to
provide a rich narrative. However, the same richness in details and nuances,
at times, makes it difficult for the reader to evaluate the relationship between
the authors general claims and the dense narrative. Consequently, the book performs better as an exploration of these two revolutions than as an explanation of

Downloaded from cps.sagepub.com by elham kabir on October 21, 2012

Comparative Political Studies XX(X)

their origins and consequences. Although this is not necessarily an essential

problems for Sohrabi, who suggests that the fundamental indeterminacy of
agency and contingency make revolutions unpredictable (p. 29), it also
points toward the difficulty of recognizing the shortcomings of [the social
sciences, history, and area studies] and then overcoming them by relying on
the strengths of others, a task that Sohrabi intends to accomplish (p. 2).
While it is not fair to criticize Sohrabi for not fully accomplishing such a
momentous task, it should also be noted that the books attempt to create a
truly eclectic account sometimes leads to a narrative that brings too much to
the table without providing the reader with a theoretical handle to interpret
the link between the master framework and the details provided by the author.
Beyond concerns about eclecticism, two issues, both of which follow from
the authors exclusive emphasis on constitutionalism as the engine and the
outcome of the respective revolutions, deserve attention. First, Sohrabi avoids
the elephant in the room: the role of (ethnic) nationalism especially in the
Ottoman case. It is almost universally acknowledged that constitutionalism
and nation building went hand in hand before the Young Turk revolution as
well as during CUPs reign. Sohrabi tries to bracket this issue by claiming
that CUP was in fact trying to create an Ottoman nation (p. 174), which,
especially in the context of the early 20th century, would be an oxymoron. A
second issue involves the cultural nature of the changes that were sought
by the revolutionaries in both cases. The conventional wisdom suggests that
revolutionaries in both Iran and the Ottoman Empire, despite all the strategic references to religion, also aimed at Westernization of culture as well as
secularization of the society. Although Sohrabi occasionally seems to recognize this dimension, he never engages it. Reluctance to engage revolutionaries drive for nationalism and cultural Westernization, accordingly, weakens
the core arguments of the book such omission may lead to misleading interpretations of the revolutionaries intentions as well as the motives of the reactionary elements that opposed constitutionalism.
Such criticisms should not detract from the value of the book. By forcing
the readers to reevaluate their assumptions about revolutions and constitutionalism, it scrutinizes two of the most important revolutions in a region that
is once again going through radical political transformation. Sohrabi, pointing toward the importance of the interaction between the global zeitgeist and
local dynamics, makes a very strong case for historicizing revolutions by
considering the timesand the ideologies associated with those timesas a
chief organizing principle (p. 2). Revolution and Constitutionalism is a most
timely book that can help us understand not only the historical roots of revolution in the Middle East, but also its present-day incarnations.

Downloaded from cps.sagepub.com by elham kabir on October 21, 2012