Onkaichora.

SituatingHeideggerbetweentheSophistandtheTimaeus
Onkaichora.SituatingHeideggerbetweentheSophistandtheTimaeus

byNaderElBizri

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StudiaPhaenomenologica(StudiaPhaenomenologica),issue:IV(12)/2004,pages:7398,on
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STUDIA PHNOMENOLOGICA IV (2004) 1-2, 73-98

ON KAI XPA

SITUATING HEIDEGGER BETWEEN

THE SOPHIST AND THE TIMAEUS
Nader EL-BIZRI
(University of Cambridge)
Abstract: In attempting to address the heideggerian Seinsfrage, by way of situating it between the platonic conception of n in the Sophist and of cra in
the Timaeus, this paper investigates the ontological possibilities that are opened
up in terms of rethinking space. Asserting the intrinsic connection between the
question of being and that of space, we argue that the maturation of ontology as
phenomenology would not unfold in its furthermost potential unless the being
of space gets clarified. This state of affairs confronts us with the exacting ontological task to found a theory of space that contributes to an explication of the
question of being beyond its associated temporocentric determinations. Consequently, our line of inquiry endeavours herein to constitute a prolegomenon to
the elucidation of the question of the being of space as ontokhorology.

I. Heidegger and the Ontological Problem of Space

Despite a longstanding history of philosophical theories of space,
the ontological nature of space remains uncanny and its kind of being
is hitherto vexingly unclear. In view of this thought-provoking ontological problem1 , we shall investigate some of the veiled possibilities that
are to be found in Martin Heideggers interpretation of Platos Sophist
and Timaeus, which may ultimately assist us in our attempt to elucidate the ontological question of space.
If the history of metaphysics has been oblivious of being, it has also
been a history that neglected the ontological question of space. This dif1 This ontological problem gains its initial significance from the implications it has
on the unfolding of Heideggers fundamental ontology and its elucidation of the question of being. Regarding this ontological endeavour, see: M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit,
Gesamtausgabe Band 2, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, 4; M. HEIDEGGER, Being and Time, English trans. by J. Stambaugh, New York: State University of New York Press, 1996, 4.

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ficult inheritance has ultimately led to a gradual unfurling of a contemporary wake of a hesitant interest in investigating the ontological entailments of Platos cra2. If the Sophist has highlighted the primacy
of being (n), the Timaeus did posit space (cra) as a challenge to ontological thinking3. In view of this, we will attempt to situate our inquest between the Sophist and the Timaeus, between n (Sein; being)
and cra (Raum; space), wherein the thesis that guides this situational confrontation (Auseinandersetzung) entails that: an ontological elucidation of the question of being progresses by way of elucidating the
question of the being of space. Consequently, ontology as phenomenology
would not adequately progress unless the question of the being of space
is clarified by way of ontokhorology.
Whilst displaying a great interest in appealing to the Sophist, Heidegger did not show a comparable enthusiasm in reading the Timaeus.
This hermeneutic choice partly explains why the Sophist may have in2

In view of the growing contemporary interest in cra, I refer the reader to: J. DER-

RIDA, Positions, Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, 1972; J. DERRIDA, Khra, Paris: Galile,

1993; J. DERRIDA, Foi et Savoir, Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1996; J. DERRIDA, A. DU-

FOURMANTELLE, De lhospitalit: Anne Dufourmantelle invite Jacques Derrida rpon-

dre, Mayenne: Calmann-Lvy, 1997; J. KRISTEVA, Smiologie et Grammatologie:

Entretien avec Jacques Derrida, in Positions, Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, 1972; J.
KRISTEVA, La rvolution du langage potique: lavant-garde la fin du XIXe sicle:
Lautramont et Mallarm, Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1974; J. KRISTEVA, Pouvoirs de lhorreur: essai sur labjection, Paris: ditions du Seuil, 1980; J. SALLIS, Chorology: On Beginning in Platos Timaeus, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999; J. SALLIS,
Platonism at the Limit of Metaphysics, in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol.
19, no. 2 Vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, pp. 299-314; J. SALLIS, Spacings Of Reason, Chicago: University of Chicago, 1987; L. IRIGARAY, Place, Interval: A Reading of Aristotles Physics IV, in An Ethics of Sexual Difference, English trans. by C. Burke, G. C.
Gill, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993; L. IRIGARAY, Une mre de glace, in Speculum of the Other Woman, English trans. by G. C. Gill, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1985; E. S. CASEY, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History, Berkeley, CA.: University
of California Press, 1997; A. BENJAMIN, Distancing and Spacing, in Philosophy and
Architecture, ed. A. Benjamin, London: Academy Editions, 1990, pp. 6-11; M. THEODOROU, Space and Experience, in AA Files, Vol. 34, 1997, pp. 45-55; N. El-BIZRI,
Qui tes-vous, Khra?: Receiving Platos Timaeus, in Existentia, Vol. XI, Issue 3-4,
2001, pp. 473-490; N. El-BIZRI, A Phenomenological Account of the Ontological Problem of Space, in Existentia, Vol. XII, Issue 3-4, 2002, pp. 345-364.
3 Although many philosophers believe that the Sophist is the more mature work
of Plato than the Timaeus, and although it has been claimed that the former does not
display a tissue of linguistic confusions like the latter, nonetheless we are attesting
a renewed philosophical interest in the Timaeus. Concerning the allusion to the reception of Platos Timaeus during the wake of the anti-metaphysical turn of Logical
Positivism, see: PLATO, Timaeus, English trans. by D. J. Zeyl, Indianapolis: Hackett
Publishing Company, 2000, p. xv.

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deed pre-set the itinerary of Sein und Zeit4 , whilst the relative neglecting
of the Timaeus may have undermined the standing of space in Heideggers ontological investigations5. This state of affairs may have partially solicited him to devalue space (Raum) by contrastingly positing
time (Zeit) as the structuring horizon (Horizont) against which his investigation of the question of being (Seinsfrage) was conducted. What
concerns us herein is medially suggested by what is left unsaid in his
laconic confession, in the seminar Zeit und Sein (1962), that the attempt
in Sein und Zeit ( 70) to derive spatiality from temporality has been
untenable6. In view of this, it may be argued that a closer examination of Platos account of cra in the Timaeus would have ultimately
led Heidegger to establish a more informed position that recognizes the
axiality of space in this inquiry about being. After all, the ambiguous
ontological status of cra does resist the derivation from temporality
and confronts us from the outset with an ontological challenge that is
no less difficult than that of the question of being itself.

II. Sein und Raum in Sein und Zeit

Heidegger proclaims in Sein und Zeit that the fact that space shows
itself in a world does not tell us anything about its kind of being. This
is the case given that the being of space cannot be conceived as the
same kind of being as that of the res extensa or the res cogitans. Consequently, space is not simply reducible to a geometrically-determined
extensio, as Descartes proclaimed, nor is it an objective absolute, like
Newton argued, or relational, as Leibniz conjectured. Moreover, space
is not simply reducible to an a priori subjective form of intuition or that
of the appearances of outer sense, as Kant held, or to being constituted by transcendental subjectivity as Husserl claimed. Radically dissatisfied with the way his predecessors addressed the ontological problem
of space, Heidegger says:
Regarding the affinity between the Sophist lectures and Sein und Zeit, see: J.
TAMINIAUX, Lectures de lontologie fondamentale, Grenoble: Millon, 1989, pp. 182189. Concerning the intellectual context of the Sophist lectures and Sein und Zeit, see:
R. BRISART, La phnomnologie de Marbourg, ou la rsurgence de la mtaphysique chez
Heidegger lpoque de Sein und Zeit, Paris: Grasset, 1993.
5 It is compelling to notice that whilst appealing many times in Sein und Zeit to
the Sophist (242c, 244a, 245e6-246e1), the Timaeus (37d) is mentioned only once in
the context of talking about time (Zeit) not space (Raum).
6 M. HEIDEGGER, On Time and Being, English trans. by J. Stambaugh, New York:
Harper, 1969, p. 23; Zeit und Sein, in M. HEIDEGGER, Zur Sache des Denkens, Tbingen: Niemeyer, 1969.
4

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The perplexity still present today, with regard to the interpretation of the
being of space is grounded not so much in an inadequate knowledge of
the factual constitution of space itself, as in the lack of a fundamental transparency of the possibilities of being in general and of their ontologically
conceived interpretation. What is decisive for the understanding of the
ontological problem of space lies in freeing the question of the being of
space from the narrowness of the accidentally available and, moreover,
undifferentiated concepts of being, and, with respect to the phenomenon
itself, in moving the problematic of the being of space and the various
phenomenal spatialities in the direction of clarifying the possibilities of
being in general7.

Accordingly the question of the being of space may be better understood if the question of being is adequately attended to in accordance with the spatiality (Rumlichkeit) of Daseins being-in-the-world
(In-der-Welt-sein). Given that Heidegger holds that temporality provides the meaning of Dasein, he initiates a serious attempt to derive spatiality from it8. Furthermore, his stress on Daseins being-in-the-world
is itself an eloquent affirmation of the inherence of the incarnate subject in the world that points to the originary (originr) character of
space as opposed to taking it to be constituted or derived from what
is other than itself, be it time, Dasein, or transcendental subjectivity.
Having said that, it nonetheless remains to be the case that temporality (Zeitlichkeit) is grasped in Sein und Zeit as being the horizon of the
existential analytic of Dasein (existenziale Analytik des Daseins)9.
Heidegger affirms that the temporality of the spatiality characteristic of Dasein is unlike that of the objective world-space that is marked
by Vorhandenheit, which is itself founded on the functional and temporal mode of Daseins being-in-the-world. In this sense, the phenomenological maxim, that calls for going back to things themselves10,
is itself manifested in the way Heidegger goes back to space itself in his
description of spatial experience without an appeal to the vorhanden
world-space. Given Heideggers belief that the constitution of Dasein
is ontologically possible only on the foundational basis of temporality, Daseins spatiality is itself seen as being grounded in time whilst concomitantly granting the possibilities of the disclosing of space in the
world. However, this state of affairs does not correspond with the claim
M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 24.
M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 70.
9 Regarding the axial role assigned to temporality in Heideggers thinking, see: F.
DASTUR, Heidegger et la question du temps, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France,
1990. Also refer to Janicauds line in thinking, which was partly influenced by Heideggers thought, in questioning humanism and temporality, see: D. JANICAUD,
Chronos: pour lintelligence du partage temporal, Paris: B. Grasset, 1997.
10 M. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 7.
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that time has an ontic (ontisch) priority over space as it is attested with
Kants account of the forms of intuition in Kritik der reinen Vernunft.
Heidegger does assert that Dasein can be spatial (rumlich) only as
care (Sorge). Hence, manifesting a factical (faktisch) mode of being that
is not reducible to an objective presence (Vorhandenheit), and whose
spatiality is unlike that of other beings, given that Dasein is not positional but rather takes space in by way of making room (Einrumen)
for a leeway (Spielraum) and clearing (Lichtung)11. This spatial state
of affairs does in itself lay down the conditions that allow a geistig Dasein to inquire about space, to theorize about it, thematize it, make representations of it, or attempt to produce it12. The making room of Daseins
spatiality is herein constituted by directionality (Ausrichtung) and dedistancing (de-severance, Ent-fernung) due to which ready-at-hand useful things (zuhanden) and their instrumental groupings are encountered
in the surrounding world. By coming across these things and handling
them, Dasein already reveals a region (Gegend) that is founded on handiness (Zuhandenheit). After all, being-in-the-world is the mode of being of a being that takes care of things, which in doing so becomes directed
as well as directing itself. In this sense, the self-directive discovering of
a region is itself set against the horizon of a discovered world in which
making room is a bringing-near as a de-distancing of handy things, which
is grounded by a making-present (Gegenwrtigen) that belongs to the
unity of temporality.
Daseins making room for space is not reducible to a locational position, but is rather a leeway or clearing of the opened up range of useful present things that are encountered and moved around in a directional
de-distancing. The making-present of these things lets space presence
by way of making room for it as leeway or clearing. However, this making-present is absorbed in the nearness of what the directional de-distancing brings near, which makes the handling of things possible. This
involving state of affairs, which is restricted to what is made-present,
does allow Heidegger to proclaim that only on the basis of temporality would it be possible for Dasein to break into space through a self-directive de-distancing that discloses a region in the world. However,
Heidegger does also concede that, although space is founded on tem11 The verbal rumen is itself indicative of the act of clearing. As for the phenomenon of clearing qua Lichtung, it is in a more basic sense also conceived as a clearing
qua Rumung. In this regard, Raum and Lichtung may be seen as being etymologically entangled.
12 Most serious architectural endeavours are aimed at producing space, and this is
particularly confirmed within the unfurling of 20th century modernist architecture and
is furthermore attested in many cases of avant-garde modern art.

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porality, Dasein would nevertheless reveal a dependency upon space,

which is made manifest in the articulation of signification and representation, and is itself intelligible from the standpoint of the self-interpretation of Dasein, wherein the priority of the spatial is grounded in
the kind of being of that being. Temporality may itself be understood here
from the standpoint of the spatial relations that making-present finds
in what is present-at-hand or in what is objectively-present. So, if temporality does indeed depend on spatiality, would it then be the case that
space is readily derivable from time?
Although it is said that Dasein as care is spatial due to a circumspect
directionality and de-distancing, the space that is discovered in the resultant phenomenon of a region may still be seen as being merely a context to which handy and present things belong. However, making room,
as a mode of giving space (Raum-geben), frees things from their entrapping positional locality and lets them be encountered as innerworldly
(innerweltlich) beings. Space is itself disclosed originarily within this
absorption with things by way of making room for them. It is from
the grounds of this constitutive directed de-distancing that space becomes accessible to cognition as what is found in the world by way of
Daseins being-in-the-world that discloses it. It is in this sense that one
may understand Heideggers proclamation that space is neither in the
subject nor is the world in space, and that it is rather the case that Dasein is spatial in a primordial sense, and that space is discovered in the
world whilst showing itself as being a priori; namely as being encountered in a discovered region. On this view, Heidegger is not advocating the existence of an absolute and objective space that belongs to a
subjectless world, nor is he claiming that space exists in a radical transcendental sense as what belongs a priori to a supposedly wordless subject. The spatiality of the totality of innerworldly things at hand loses
its sense of circumspect relevance in thematization. Spatiality thus turns
into an object of research and study, and the places of things at hand
are thus turned into a multiplicity of random or ordered positions. In
this sense, the surrounding world is itself neutralized to pure measurable positional dimensions by way of being construed as a homogeneous
natural world-space that warrants the connections that exist between
extended objectively present beings. However, whether in showing itself in the world through a region that is disclosed by directionality and
de-distancing, or whether being disclosed as the totality of extended
objectively present beings, the kind of being of space remains obscure
and its ontological problem persists. For, the kind of being of space is
unlike that of useful things-at-hand, unlike that of objectively present
things, and unlike the kind of being of Dasein. But if these are the only

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kinds of being that are discoverable in the world, then, from the standpoint of being-in-the-world, what would the kind of being of space be
if space does show itself in the world? The confusion that we face in
our investigation of the being of space may indeed be attributed to the
ontological lack of a fundamental transparency of the possibilities of
being and its interpretation. So, what is decisive for the understanding
of the ontological problem of space depends on the priority (Vorrang)
of attending to the question of being.
The phenomenon of space can only be understood by going back
to the world and by being founded on the essential spatiality of Dasein. This insight is derived from the interpretation of Dasein as time
as it is early-on set in Der Begriff der Zeit. Therein, it is said that Dasein is not in time but rather that Dasein is temporality13. This view corresponds with the accounts presented in Sein und Zeit with respect to
Daseins mode of being-ahead-of-itself, wherein its potentiality of being has an unfinished quality and its wholeness (Gnze) is reached only
in death (Tod). For as long as Dasein is, it has not-yet attained its wholeness14. If the views in Der Begriff der Zeit correspond with the interpretation of Dasein against the horizon of temporality in Sein und Zeit,
and if it were indeed the case that the spatiality of Dasein is not readily derivable from temporality, then re-thinking space becomes necessary for the clarification of the question of being. However what might
need to be observed in this regard is that the elucidation of the ontological problem of space should proceed by way of pondering over the
question of the being of space away from setting time as the horizon
of such inquiry. We thus ought to avoid Heideggers persistent temporocentrist commitment to the accentuation of the principality of temporality over that of spatiality, which has haunted Sein und Zeit15. For,
even towards the end of this treatise, Heidegger does assert that although
dated-time is determined numerically in terms of spatial distances and
locational changes, by no means does time turn into space. Rather, what
is ontologically decisive lies in the specific making-present that renders
the measured spatialization of time possible; and this is taken to be of
13 M. HEIDEGGER, The Concept of Time, English trans. by W. McNeill, Oxford:
Blackwell, 1996, p. 20. Der Begriff der Zeit, Gesamtausgabe Band 64.
14 M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 46. We have also discussed this matter
elsewhere in: N. EL-BIZRI, The Phenomenological Quest Between Avicenna and Heidegger, Binghamton, N.Y.: Global Publications SUNY, 2000, pp. 63-69.
15 This temporocentrism arises also in Der Begriff der Zeit and in Prolegomena zur
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Gesamtausgabe Band 20, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1994.

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the order of the Vorhandenheit16. Nonetheless, and in spite of this inclination in thinking, it is quite fair to say that Heidegger did not dogmatically continue to think that being cannot be conceived but on the
basis of time, given that in his Logik, Die Frage nach der Wahrheit17, he
speculated about some potential other possibilities to be disclosed. Furthermore, the instrumental and temporocentric interpretation of space
in Sein und Zeit, that is mainly mediated by an analysis of Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit, and the issuing directionality, de-distancing,
and regionality, was ultimately relinquished in the middle period of his
intellectual development. And it is in view of this opening that our inquiry might constitute a humble preparatory step on the way to attending
to the question of being on the basis of space.

III. Critical Responses to the

Conception of Space in Sein und Zeit
Aided by developments in hermeneutic phenomenology, we could
appeal to some unequivocal as well as tacit critical responses to Heideggers instrumental and temporocentric consideration of space in Sein
und Zeit. As Didier Franck eloquently observes, in a manner that is informed by what he encounters with Maurice Merleau-Pontys conception of la chair du monde (flesh of the world), the hands and
the flesh undermine the positing of temporality as the comprehensive
primordial (ursprnglich) horizon for the existential analytic of Dasein18.
This view is confirmed by what is enunciated in Le visible et linvisible, wherein Merleau-Ponty observes that the experience of ones own
flesh is a prototype of being (lexprience de ma chair comme prototype de ltre). In this sense, and based on the conception of the ZuhanM. HEIDEGGER, Sein und Zeit, op. cit., 80.
M. HEIDEGGER, Logik, Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe Band 21,
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1995, p. 267.
18 D. FRANCK, Heidegger et le problme de lespace, Paris: Les ditions de Minuit, 1986; M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Le visible et linvisible, Paris: ditions Gallimard, 1964.
We have also addressed this matter in: N. EL-BIZRI, The Body and Space, in CAST,
Vol. III, 2000, pp. 92-95; N. EL-BIZRI, A Phenomenological Account of the Ontological Problem of Space, art. cit. In view of eschewing any implied confusion, it must
be noted herein that, in spite of evident chronological or philosophical gaps that separate philosophers (who found their own traditions in thought) from exegetes, an appeal to figures like Merleau-Ponty and Franck, or, to that effect, to Levinas and Arisaka,
does in this context creditably highlight the variegated nature of the responses to the
heideggerian Seinsfrage, together with their embedded bearings on explicating the ontological problem of space and addressing its exigencies.
16
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denheit and the Handlichkeit, and from the standpoint of the living body
(Leib; le corps vcu) and its Handwerk, space ought to be seen as detemporalized. This matter is furthermore reflected in Merleau-Pontys
stress on the body-subjects (le corps propre) inherence in the world
wherein being is taken to be synonymous with being-situated (ltre
est synonyme dtre situ)19. According to this line in thinking, the ontological significance of space is tightly linked to the kinaesthetic bodily movements of Daseins engaged corporeal being-in-the-world. This
is even accentuated in the phenomenon of dwelling, which is indicative of Daseins inherence in the world20.
It is perhaps worthy stating herein that the question of embodiment,
which has generated significant polemics among heideggerian commentators, does carry some bearings on endeavours to address the ontological problem of space. Whilst some exegetes affirm that Daseins
spatiality is characteristic of Leiblichkeit, others maintain that this notion does not sufficiently figure in Heideggers thought, given his seeming unwillingness to confront it satisfyingly. It is moreover argued,
that whilst Daseins spatiality might indeed be accounted for in terms
of embodiment, Heideggers own stress on the corporeal mode of being-in-the-world did paradoxically lead him to eschew the use of appellations like body and embodiment21.
In another context, and in view of further highlighting the problematic of instrumentalism that surrounds the question concerning space,
one could also evoke the poignant critique of the existential analysis
that Heidegger offers in Sein und Zeit that Emmanuel Levinas puts forward in Le temps et lautre. Therein, Levinas argues that since Heidegger
has written Sein und Zeit, we have been habituated to consider the world
19 M. MERLEAU-PONTY, Phnomnologie de la Perception, Paris: Gallimard, 1945,
p. 291.
20 See R. SCHRMANN, Symbolic Praxis, English trans. by Ch. T. Wolfe in Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol. 19, no. 2 Vol. 20, no. 1, 1997, pp. 54-63.
21 In further elucidating the particulars of this controversial account of embodiment in Heideggers thinking, I refer the reader to the following tracts: S. OVERGAARD,
Heidegger on Embodiment, The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology,
Vol. 35, No. 2, 2004, pp. 116-131; D. CERBONE, Heidegger and Daseins Bodily Nature: What is the Hidden Problematic?, in International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 8, 2000, pp. 209-230; D. M. LEVIN, in The Ontological Dimension of Embodiment:
Heideggers Thinking of Being, in The Body: Classic and Contemporary Readings, ed.
D. Welton (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), pp. 122-149. A special emphasis would be placed
in this regard on the compelling thesis that was lately advanced by Overgaard, in Heidegger on Embodiment, which partly builds its case on an appeal to the recently edited volume 18 of the Gesamtausgabe (GA 18), namely: M. Heidegger, Grundbegriffe
der aristotelischen Philosophie, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2002.

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as being a set of tools (ensemble doutils). Levinas adds that what seems
to escape from Heideggers attention is the fact that before being a system of tools, the world is rather a set of nutrition and food (le monde
est un ensemble de nourritures) that fill us in and sustain our being-inthe-world. Accordingly, we are already in space (dans lespace) in handling and consuming the food that nourishes our being. This view
overcomes the self-return of the self to itself and rather opens it to whatever is necessitated by its existing (exister)22. Levinas thus opposes what
he identifies as being a solitude that characterizes Heideggers existential analytic of Dasein wherein even the notion of Miteinandersein,
which evokes the reciprocal mode of being-with-one-another (tre rciproquement lun avec lautre), is seen as being none other than a mere
association around a common term or truth (Wahrheit; vrit; lqeia)
rather than being a face-to-face relation with the other (Ce nest pas la
relation du face--face). After all, Levinas holds that all the analysis in
Sein und Zeit was conducted in view of an impersonal everyday life of
a lonely Dasein (un Dasein esseul)23.
In a recent reconsideration of Heideggers theory of space, Yoko
Arisaka offers a critical analysis of his endeavour to derive spatiality
from temporality, wherein she argues that the attempt to clarify Die
Kehre may require a closer consideration of section 70 of Sein und Zeit.
Henceforth, she tries to deconstruct Heideggers foundational approach
to spatiality by way of showing that the relation between space and time
is more likely to be equiprimordial (gleichursprunglich) than foundational qua fundamental. Accordingly, space and time are not to be distinguished through a hierarchical order of dependency, rather both are
to be revealed as being co-dependent in their belonging to a unified
whole24.
Despite what we encounter with these diverse fine critics of Sein und
Zeit, be it phenomenologists who stand in their own right or exegetes,
it seems that the turn we attest with Heideggers ontological concern, from
focusing on the question of the meaning of being to focusing on the truth
and place of being, may have implicitly ushered a new phase in his think22 E. LEVINAS, Le temps et lautre, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991,
pp. 45-46.
23 E. LEVINAS, Le temps et lautre, op. cit., pp. 17-19. Also refer to N. EL-BIZRI,
The Phenomenological Quest Between Avicenna and Heidegger, op. cit., pp. 69-73.
24 Y. ARISAKA, Spatiality, Temporality, and the Problem of Foundation in Being
and Time, in Philosophy Today, Vol. 40, no. 1, 1996, pp. 36-46; Y. ARISAKA, On
Heideggers Theory of Space: A Critique of Dreyfus, in Inquiry, Vol. 38, no. 4, 1995,
pp. 455-467.

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ing about space25. The shift in Heideggers articulation of the question

of being away from a strict adherence to the existential analytic of Dasein might be traced back to the Kehre, which marked a reversal in his
thinking that passes from Dasein to being itself as it is addressed from
the standpoint of Wesen, Ursprung, and Ereignis26. One might speculate herein whether Heideggers philosophical angst might have led
him to shrink back from the challenges posited by the ontological problem of space and the uncanny possibilities it opens up, which cannot
simply be accounted for in terms of his familiar notions like Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit. After all, he might have realized in his later works that the ontological problem of space altogether might have
not been possibly accounted for with adequacy if it were set against
the horizon of time27, and it is indeed unfortunate if this may have potentially destined him on a seeming misleading path within the dense
intricacies of Sein und Zeit28.

IV. Reading n in Platon: Sophistes

Opening Sein und Zeit, Heidegger cites Platos Sophist:
[] for manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when
you use the expression being (n). We, however, who used to think
we understood it, have now become perplexed [] (Sophist, 244a).

This classical and deeply-rooted philosophical perplexity may have

posited an ontic-ontological priority to raise anew the question of being, thus calling for the reawakening of an understanding of the meaning of this question by way of positing time as its horizon. Given that
the classical question of being may have historically sustained the research of Plato and Aristotle but thenceforth has ceased to be an axial
thematic question of philosophical investigation, Heidegger initiated his
monumental attempt to retrieve the question of being from its histo25 This shift in Heideggers ontological concern may have also been accentuated
in his investigation of the Topologie des Seins in his account of the Lichtung that makes
room for Ereignis. Regarding this matter, refer to: E. S. CASEY, Proceeding to Place
by Indirection, in The Fate of Place, op. cit., pp. 278-279.
26 See: W. RICHARDSON, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, The
Hague: Nijhof, 1964, p. 238; Th. SHEEHAN, Geschichtlichkeit/Ereignis/Kehre, in Existentia, Vol. XI, Issue 3/4, 2001, pp. 247-249.
27 This point is analyzed in detail in E. S. CASEY, Proceeding to Place by Indirection, in The Fate of Place, op. cit., pp. 254-255, 258-259.
28 For instance, Dreyfus believed that Heideggers discussion of spatiality in Sein und
Zeit was fundamentally confusing. See H. DREYFUS, Being-in-the-World: A Commentary
on Heideggers Being and Time, Division I, Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1991, p. 129.

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ry of oblivion in the attempt to reformulate it anew. He thus endeavoured to investigate the precedence that is partly set in Platos Sophist
in view of achieving this end; and it is in this regard that passage 244a
of the Sophist may have acted as the directive motto that sets the tone
of Sein und Zeit rather than serving as a mere decoration29. Nonetheless, it is understandable that such state of affairs does not readily entail that Platos ontology became simply assimilated to the unfurling
of Heideggers elucidation of Seinsfrage.
Heideggers reading of Platos Sophist, which appeared in German
under the title Platon: Sophistes30, was a reconstruction of a lecture
course that he delivered under the same title at the University of Marburg in the winter semester of 1924-192531. For the purposes of our inquiry, we shall primarily restrict our focus on the second chapter of
the second section of this text (principally 63-71 on passages 242b250e of the Sophist) that is dedicated to the discussion of the ancient
(pre-Platonic) and contemporary (contemporaries of Plato) doctrines
of n. In view of this, and from the standpoint of the consideration of
the question of being, one could say in general, and in a manner that
is akin to what we encounter with Aristotle, that metaphysics inquires
about being qua being (n n). As for Platos original venture in this
regard, it consisted of carrying the ontological (ontologisch) explication
of being over and against the ontic (ontisch) description of beings32; thus
showing early-on that there exists an ontological difference between
being and beings. For, Plato presented a general characterization of the
first ontological attempts to put forward some theses about n in opposition to those who merely say that being is many or that being is
one (Sophist, 242c-243d). He thus initially advanced a position by virtue
of which being, which is one (n), is also said to be manifold33. He then
M. HEIDEGGER, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, ed. Richard Taft, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, p. 163; M. HEIDEGGER, Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 3, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1991.
30 M. HEIDEGGER, Platon: Sophistes, Gesamtausgabe Band 19, Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostermann, 1992; M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, English trans. by R. Rojcewicz and A. Schuwer, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997. For a consideration of the historical context of Heideggers Sophist lectures, see: M. J. BRACH,
Heidegger, Platon: vom Neukantianismus zur existentiellen Interpretation des Sophistes, Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann, 1996.
31 Regarding Heideggers thinking during that period, see R. BRISART, La phnomenologie de Marbourg, op. cit.
32 M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op. cit., 63, p. 303 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,
pp. 438-439).
33 M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op. cit., 64, p. 307 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,
pp. 443-444).
29

ON KAI XRA

85

offered a critical consideration of theses that hold that beings are manifold versus those that hold that beings are one or that being is both
many and one (Sophist, 243d-245c). According to Heidegger, Platos
aim was not like what the traditional scholarly commentators on Platonism might have implied, namely to generate a monism by accentuating the n as n34, rather Platos pondering over the expression lgein
t nta was meant to show that in all speaking about beings something
else is said, namely being itself. This is ultimately seen as being a radical turn in philosophical thinking which suggestively anticipates the
preparation of an ontological ground for addressing the question of being. However, Heideggers own insistence on the priority of the question of being is illustrated in his construal of the principal task of
ontology as being that of preparing the ground for questioning the meaning of being. In this regard, the question of the meaning of being stands
at the beginning of any inquiry rather than being the derivative of ontology or its end-result, wherein questioning (Fragen) as the piety of
thought35 would be understood as being an interrogating (Befragen).
Heidegger claims that ontology is guided in its account of the question of being by the lgoj and thus moves in the lgein (addressing)36.
In Wegmarken, he tells us that the lgoj of the n means the lgein of
beings as beings, which designates that with respect to which beings
are addressed (legmenon)37. Now, if those who hold that being is manifold face many difficulties, what could then be said with regard to those
who assert that being is one? For if we consider the position of those
who say, after Parmenides, that being is one, what they maintain is none
other than the claim that there are two names, n and n, that are used
for one thing. Furthermore, such consideration is not yet clear in terms
of whether what it designates is being as such, or whether it is merely
a being or beings. The thesis that: being is one, or that beings are one,
is made significant by saying: being is one, or beings are one. Yet,
in already being said, as lgein, something else is said along with this
34 Herein, Heidegger opposes the readings offered by Platonist commentators like
Zeller and Bonitz. See: E. ZELLER, Die Philosophie der Griechen, Leipzig, 1922, pp.
648-649; H. BONITZ, Platonische Studien, 3, Berlin, 1886, pp. 161-164.
35 M. HEIDEGGER, The Question Concerning Technology, in Basic Writings, Op.
Cit., p. 317.
36 M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, Op. Cit., 65, p. 310 (Platon: Sophistes, Op.
Cit., pp. 448-449); M. HEIDEGGER, Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe Band 9 (Frankfurt
am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1996).
37 M. HEIDEGGER, On the Essence of Ground, English trans. by W. McNeill,
in Pathmarks (Wegmarken), ed. William McNeill, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, p. 104.

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NADER EL-BIZRI

assertion, namely being itself. A similar difficulty does also arise with
the thesis that: n (being) is a lon (whole); for, if lon is posited as
something that is itself other than n, then this may entail that neither
is as such38.
Being guided by lgoj, Platos ontology is dialectic. A similar strain
is also attested in Aristotles Metaphysics, book Q. Therein, it is mentioned that the dealing with beings in the primary sense leads any
inquiry to what all other beings are referred back to; namely osa
(substance)39. Based on this reading, everything that is, namely all the
categories (other than osa), must carry the saying of osa. Moreover, it is said that the first being and what is in the primary sense
is osa, which is said to be originary in definition, knowledge, and time.
The longstanding metaphysical question: what is that which is?
(namely what is being?) is hence reducible to the question: what
is substance? (Metaphysics Z, 1, 1028b 2-4, t t n, tot sti tj
osa). In this regard, Aristotles doctrine of being, which is reduced into
a doctrine of substance, will likewise have the two determinations: t sti
and tde ti; whereby it answers the question about the essence of something whilst also simply being an individual (Metaphysics Z, 1, 1028a 10).
In addition, Aristotle believes that being has many meanings that are
related to sub-stantia (standing-under), which acts as some sort of
pokemenon; namely as what always already lies present at the basis of
all the meanings of being (Metaphysics Z, 1, 1003a 33). Referring to the
first sentences of Q 1, one reads that the sustaining and leading fundamental meaning of being, to which all the other categories are carried back
is osa. As noted in the Beitrge zur Philosophie40, this [ousiological]
38 This reflects the ontological difficulty that confronts any thinking that ponders
over the relation between something and its attributes. This issue is further accentuated in the case of mediaeval accounts of divinity, wherein the divine attributes might
be said to be other than the divine essence whilst being inseparable from it. This state
of affairs cannot be accounted for adequately from the standpoint of a thinking that
is polarized by the binary logic of non-contradiction of either/or, true or false, this or
that. For the particulars of my investigation of this matter, see: N. EL-BIZRI, Gods
Essence and Attributes, in The Cambridge Companion to Islamic Theology, ed. T.
Winter, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming.
39 M. HEIDEGGER, Aristotles Metaphysics, Q 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of
Force, English trans. by W. Brogan and P. Warneck, Bloomington & Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1995, p. 2; M. HEIDEGGER, Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1-3: Von
Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft, Gesamtausgabe Band 33, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981. Regarding Aristotles Metaphysics, see the revised Greek text
with introduction and commentary by W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
40 M. HEIDEGGER, Beitrge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis), Gesamtausgabe Band
65, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989, 157.

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87

interpretation belongs to the first beginning (Der erste Anfang) insofar that n as fsij is related to osa by the movement of thought as
metabol. We are also told in Wegmarken, that fsij (natura) is osa
insofar that it is the beingness (Seiendheit) of a being, which, as Vorliegen (lying-present) and Vorliegendes (something that lie present), lets
something originate from itself41. After all, in the doctrinal dispute
among Platos contemporaries over n, which is described in evocative
terms as being a battle of the giants over being: gigantomaca per tj
osaj (Sophist 246a4), one already notices the linguistic interchangeability of n with osa as designators of being.
In elucidating the ontological dispute of his contemporaries, Plato
holds that one group reduces being to a body or to becoming (Sophist
246e-248a), by holding that osa = sma (body), or osa = gnesij
(becoming), whilst the other faction reduces being to a form, by holding that osa = edoj (qua form or outer look; Sophist 248a-250e). Platos interest in the gigantomaca per tj osaj (Sophist 246a4) is
manifested in his attempt to elucidate the meaning of osa in view of
positing the question of being anew. According to him, the Greeks do
not take the question of the meaning of osa as being an ontological
theme as such, but they rather demonstrate it by way of producing the
beings which satisfy the meaning of being42. Based on Heideggers reading, this process is oriented by the temporal grasping of being as presence (parousa; Anwesenheit); namely as that which is already there from
the outset along with beings. Given this interpretation, the battle of the
giants is over the meaning of presence, while being as such guided by
asqhsij (sense-perception) or lgoj. In view of this, it is more likely
that Plato would side with those directed by the latter rather than the
former, given the difficulty he faces in siding with those who deny the
existence of anything that is invisible (qua non-sensible). After all, the
faction that rigidly holds that osa = sma (Sophist 246a-248a) does
refute lgoj (ratio, intellectus) on the basis of denying smaton (the
non-bodily).
Turning to those who say that osa = edoj, it is believed that they
also hold that sma, which is marked by gnesij (generation qua becoming), is a m n (Nichtsein; non-being), given that it is by way of
logismj that we keep with osa as edoj. However, one could still ultimately say that Plato would conceive osa as da, and ultimately as
41 M. HEIDEGGER, On the Essence and Concept of fsij in Aristotles Physics B,
I, English trans. by Th. Sheehan, in Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 104.
42 M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op. cit., 67, p. 323 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,
pp. 466-467).

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being-present43, and that this gets set against the context of the veiling
of being, wherein being remains absent in an uncanny way by maintaining itself in concealment. However, it is in such concealing that lies
the essence of the forgetfulness (Vergessenheit) of being as experienced
by the Greeks44. After all, in commenting on Hegels reading of classical Greek philosophy, Heidegger holds that the terms n of Parmenides,
lgoj of Heraclitus, da of Plato, and nrgeia of Aristotle (possibly
along with osa), are all understood within the horizon of being45. What
this amounted to within the history of metaphysics is none other than
the reduction of being into something that is other than itself, thus letting the question of the meaning of being fall into oblivion. In this context, the thinking attempted in Sein und Zeit sets out to overcome
metaphysics by way of recalling being to itself, and retrieving it from
its history of forgetfulness. After all, Heidegger believes that metaphysics
is founded upon that which remains concealed in the n, wherein the
retrieval of the n for thinking would not thus reproduce Platos and
Aristotles ontological efforts46.

V. Between n of the Sophist and cra of the Timaeus

The formula osa = edoj excludes gnesij and knhsij from n qua
being, whilst the formula osa = sma excludes stsij from n qua
being. The former implies that all is at rest, whilst the latter entails that
all is in motion, and both hence deny the possibility of knowing being
and consequently undermine noj and noen47. As a living disclosure,
noj should be marked by both knhsij (Heraclitus) and stsij (Parmenides) wherein both are construed as nta (beings). However, one
wonders whether a trton (third) is already posited besides knhsij and
stsij. For when it is said that knhsij is, and that stsij is, it is this
is qua n which is posited as a trton. Yet, a similar state of affairs is
attested with cra which is also an in-between trton gnoj. For cra
is neither in motion nor at rest, and it is neither sensible nor intelligiM. HEIDEGGER, Platos Doctrine of Truth, English trans. by Th. Sheehan, in
Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 179.
44 M. HEIDEGGER, On the Question of Being, English trans. by W. McNeill, in
Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 313.
45 M. HEIDEGGER, Hegel and the Greeks, English trans. by R. Metcalf, in Pathmarks, op. cit., pp. 328, 331.
46 M. HEIDEGGER, Introduction to What is Metaphysics?, English trans. by W.
Kaufmann, in Pathmarks, op. cit., p. 288.
47 M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op. cit., 70, p. 337 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,
pp. 487-488).
43

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89

ble (Timaeus, 48e, 52a-52b). If cra itself is posited as a trton in-between knhsij and stsij, would we not then say that the is which
marks these three kinds is itself to be posited as a fourth? And given
this, would we not question Heideggers leap in positing this is as
third as being indicative of a bypassing of the platonic trton of the
Timaeus, namely cra? So, in view of this, are we not facing a problematic ontological lacuna? And what would the consequences be in this
regard if we address the dialogues of the Timaeus and the Sophist in a
gathered togetherness in view of preparing the groundwork for asking
the question of the meaning of being by evoking what self-announces
itself through and through, namely cra? After all, such a move seems
to have eluded Heideggers reading of the Sophist; and we conjecture in
this regard that if he has ever ardently grappled with this ontological assay, perhaps the course of development of Sein und Zeit and what emanated from it would have itself been partially altered. We thus may
need to re-highlight the entailments of Platos extraction of n as trton
in the Sophist from the pre-given knhsij and stsij, and to do this from
the standpoint of presence. This is reflected in the weighty question for
the Greeks, as reconstructed by Heidegger, namely the one that is set
by way of asking: how can there be something which is neither at motion nor at rest, and yet nonetheless is, given that beings are either moved
or are at rest? However, although there seems to be something that
resides beyond mere rest or motion, which nevertheless is, it is nonetheless the case that such mode of being is not solely reserved to n as set
in the Sophist, but we argue that it is also attested with the case of cra
in the Timaeus.
Whilst n as trton constitutes proper being (Sein) in the Sophist, cra
as trton in the Timaeus is posited as a difficult and hard to grasp perplexing matter for ontology that itself re-posits the question of the meaning of being anew. Perhaps this matter renders Heideggers ontological
task more difficult, given that cra remains to be exemplary of whatever is resistant to thinking48. It may well be the case that this matter
is itself reflected in Heideggers highlighting of the difficulties that face
attempts to elucidate n through its positing as trton alongside knhsij
and stsij whilst also encompassing them as n. In this, being (in the
Sophist) announces itself as a third kind, and this is itself akin to what
we encounter with the manner cra lets itself be seen in the Timaeus.
Both being (n; Sein; tre) and space (cra; Raum; espace) appear as
what is other than what is either moved or at rest. In this sense, n and
48 At least this is what we attest in the contemporary reception of Platos Timaeus
by thinkers like Derrida, Kristeva, Irigaray, Sallis, and Casey.

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cra, as both occupying the baffling place of the trton, are thus an teron
(other) over and against knhsij and stsij which do not render being
intelligible. In this, Platos ontology un-grounds itself by way of highlighting the question concerning the meaning of being within the binary system that distinguishes motion from rest. This double-fold
logical/onto-logical model of sensible versus intelligible, motion versus
rest, does not only fail to elucidate the meaning of n (as Heidegger observes), but it also fails to elucidate the meaning of cra (as Heidegger does not observe)49. In this regard, n and cra, as both being a trton
qua teron, are the most impossible of all to understand and clarify.
Heidegger holds that Platos determination of n as dnamij (potentiality
or possibility) is revealed as being an teron (other)50. Thus, osa is
posited separately cum differently as cwrj, wherein cra is a way of
affecting a cwrzei (separating) by way of placing a cwrismj (separation). After all, Heidegger concedes elsewhere that place constitutes the
possibility of the proper presence of beings51. This state of affairs might
itself point to an axial claim held by him regarding the ontological difference between being and beings. For, he tells us that this difference
remained un-thought in the history of metaphysics, given that the differing dimension, that allows for this ontological difference to take place,
was itself left un-thought. Yet, if this differing determines and delimits the ontological difference between being and beings, whilst at the
same time overcoming it, then would it not be the case that this very
differing is of the workings of cra? After all, cra does determine
and delimit the ontological difference between being and becoming, between the intelligible and the sensible, between rest and motion, whilst,
at the same time, and as a trton gnoj, it overcomes it52. So, would it
not then be the case, that in the context of Heideggers examination of
the Sophist, and in view of our reading of the Timaeus, the ontological difference between being and beings would remain un-thought unless it passes by way of thinking about cra? And would it not be the
case that the clarification of the question of being has to pass by way
Refer to J. DERRIDAs interpretations in Positions, Khra, Foi et Savoir, and De
lhospitalit (Ut supra note 2).
50 M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op. cit., 68, p. 329 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit.,
pp. 475-476).
51 This is particularly the case with Heideggers reading of book IV of Aristotles
Physics, wherein it is claimed that place has a certain power. See: M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op. cit., 15, p. 73 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit., pp. 105-107); ARISTOTLE,
Physics, ed. W. D. Ross, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936, IV. 1, 208a27-209a30.
52 As J. Sallis also says, the One and khra are beyond being and beings. See J. SALLIS, Chorology, op. cit., pp. 113-124.
49

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91

of elucidating the ontological problem posited by what falls under the

appellation cra? Plato must have indeed experienced the distinction
between being and beings or else he would not have been able to think
the cwrismj between them53. In considering Was heit Denken? Heidegger observes that what prevails between being and beings is the
cwrismj (namely the posited cra as locus, site, and place?). Being and
beings are thus in different places; they are located with difference54.
Given that their ontological difference is that of emplacement, would
it not then be the case that thinking about that difference is a khorological undertaking that attends to being by way of thinking about the
cwrismj of cra?
Like the n of the Sophist, the cra of the Timaeus is a trton gnoj
qua teron that cannot be accounted for from the standpoint of logos
nor muthos, hence requiring a third genre of discourse55. After all, cra,
which pertains to the question of the stranger (la question de ltranger),
remains resistant to metaphysical thinking. However, as Derrida reminds
us, the stranger herein is also the interlocutor in Platos dialogues, namely the one who asks the critical questions, and who lies between the factions that are in dispute over the question of being. This emplacement
is itself affirmed in the Sophist, wherein the stranger asks the intolerable question that defies the principal thesis of Parmenides56; namely by
daring to posit m n (non-being; non-tre; Nichtsein) as itself being,
thus polemically implying that n (being; tre; Sein) is not (nest pas).
The question of the stranger is itself taken to be the question of hospitality (la question de lhospitalit) which evokes the unconditional receptivity of cra57. So, do we not herein attest the veiled sense of a
possible ontological entanglement between n and cra that points to
the spatial signification (Raumbedeutungen) of the question of being?
This observation may be accentuated by the positioning of Plato himSee: W. MARX, Heidegger and the Tradition, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, p. 128.
54 M. HEIDEGGER, Was heit Denken?, Tbingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1954,
p. 135, Gesamtausgabe Band 8, 2002; M. HEIDEGGER, What is Called Thinking?, English trans. by J. G. Gray, New York: Harper & Row, 1968, p. 227.
55 I have also discussed this matter in N. EL-BIZRI, Qui tes-vous, Khra?: Receiving Platos Timaeus, op. cit., pp. 473-490.
56 It is also the stranger who inquires about the provenance of measure in Platos
Laws (NOMOI), namely whether the legal measure is of a divine origin or of a human making. See: PLATO, Laws I, ed. R. G. Bury, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952, book I, 624a. I have addressed the ethical-political horizon of the
question of the stranger in: N. EL-BIZRI, Religion and Measure, in Phenomenological Inquiry, Vol. 27, 2003, pp. 128-155.
57 J. DERRIDA, De lhospitalit, op. cit., pp. 11-15.
53

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NADER EL-BIZRI

self in the mson (Mitte), namely in the space between the opponents of
the raging battle over being, which itself hints to the workings of cra
as what determines the mson, the middle in-between, the neither/nor.
Drawing on the affinity between the difficulties faced in elucidating n and m n, it might indeed be the case that if we succeed in bringing one of them to show itself in a more clear way, then by that very
token the other becomes visible and shows itself58; and perhaps this may
well apply to what we are attempting to do with regard to cra. The
ontological transition affected by Plato, and picked-up by Heidegger,
shows that the challenges posited up and against thinking are still worthy being pursued even if we are not yet well prepared to deal with them.
It is in this sense that we could grasp Sein und Zeit as being a preparatory work that lays down the grounds for the consideration of the question of being. However, if Heideggers ontological preparation was set
in view of facing the difficulties posited by thinking about n and m
n, it may still be the case that his Ontologie arguably remained incomplete in scope given its polemical seeming exclusion of cra from
such undertaking.

VI. Cra in the Timaeus

To recapitulate some of what we have highlighted above, and based
on what is relegated to us on the authority of the Pythagorean astronomer Timaeus of Locri, we learn that cra (space), as a decmenon
(recipient or receptacle) and mthr (mother), is a trton gnoj (third
genus) that is neither sensible nor intelligible (Timaeus, 48e, 52a-52b)59.
In spite of being phenomenally invisible and unshaped, cra is nevertheless said to be apprehensible by a kind of bastard reasoning (logismj tini nqJ) by the aid of non-sensation, and is barely an object of
belief (Timaeus, 52a-52b). Always receiving all things without ever taking on the character of what enters it, cra is amorphous and free from
all characters (Timaeus, 50b - 51a). Like edoj (form), it is an everlasting (dioj) place that admits not of destruction (Timaeus, 52a-52b).
Accordingly, it constitutes an originary depth (bqoj), that is like the
boundless peron60 , whilst even being akin to coj.
58 Alluding to the Sophist 250e8 and 251a1 in: M. HEIDEGGER, Platos Sophist, op.
cit., 71, p. 344 (Platon: Sophistes, op. cit., pp. 497-498).
59 PLATO, Timaeus, English trans. by R. G. Bury, Loeb Classical Library, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999, 8th reprint.
60 If cwrismj, which is determined by cra, allows for the occurrence of boundaries, whilst being beyond them, then it is possible to say that cra is akin to peron.

ON KAI XRA

93

Thinking about this cra, in view of the spatial significance of the

question of being, leads us to the poetic turn in Heideggers later thinking in the 1950s from the other side of Die Kehre. In quest of hearing
the speaking of language, some aspects of the topological account of being get pronounced in Heideggers reading of Georg Trakls Ein Winterabend (A Winter Evening) as set in Die Sprache61. What interests
us in this poem is the verse: Pain has turned the threshold to stone62.
As Heidegger explains, the startling words in this saying name something that has persisted and continues to persist. It is only by turning
into stone that the threshold (Limen) qua ground-beam persists as what
sustains the middle and bears the in-between, in which the outside and
the inside co-penetrate each other, without itself yielding either way.
What persists as such is hardened by a petrifying pain that rends63.
This pain is the rift (Riss) that separates yet at the same time that gathers back into itself what it rends. It thus joins in separating, and rends
while drawing what it disperses back to itself. As a separating that gathers, pain is the joining of what is held apart by the rift. It is a threshold that settles the liminal self-opened middle in-between and gathers
difference. Pain is ultimately the difference itself as the separation of
the between and the gathering of the middle that self-shows itself as a
recollected presence. The rift of difference is a primal calling of the world
and things into their intimacy, wherein the seam that binds their being toward one another is pain. This primal calling, which bids the intimacy of world and things by way of bidding them to come to the
between of difference, occurs in the poem as the speaking of language
which commits the bidden to the bidding of difference that stills the thing
into the world. For, in stillness, world and thing never escape the workings of difference, which commands their gathering into the oneness of
the pain of intimacy. In this, language speaks as the command of the difference, and takes place as the occurring of a difference between being
Regarding this point see: Ch. H. KHAN, Anaximander and the Origins of Greek Cosmology, New York: Columbia University Press, 1960, appendix 2; P. Seligman, The
Apeiron of Anaximander: A Study in the Origin and Function of Metaphysical Ideas,
London: Athlone Press, 1962; N. EL-Bizri, Qui tes-vous, Khra?: Receiving Platos Timaeus, op. cit., pp. 482-486.
61 See G. TRAKL, Ein Winterabend, in Die Dichtungen. Gesamtausgabe mit einem
Anhang: Zeugnisse und Erinnerungen, edited by K. Horwitz, Zrich: Arche Verlag,
1946. M. HEIDEGGER, Die Sprache, in Unterwegs zur Sprache, Pfullingen: Neske,
1959, Gesamtausgabe Band 12; M. HEIDEGGER, Language, in Poetry, Language,
Thought, English trans. by A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper & Row, 1975; hereinafter Language.
62 M. HEIDEGGER, Language, op. cit., pp. 196, 203-205.
63 M. HEIDEGGER, Language, op. cit., pp. 204-205.

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and beings that challenges us to think about the differing that is at work
in this difference64. After all, and as indicated in Die Grundprobleme
der Phnomenologie65, phenomenology is grounded on the ontological
distinction (Unterscheiden) that splits being apart from beings.
In Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, Heidegger also pictures the strife
between clearing and concealing, in the opposition of world and earth,
as a rift that is not merely a cleft ripped open, but that is also an intimacy within which the opponents belong to each other. This rift carries the opponents into the provenance of their unity by virtue of their
common ground; thus not letting what it separates break apart. In this,
the rift is a drawing together into unity of design and common outline. Truth establishes itself here as a strife that opens up within a being and brings that being forth by bringing it into the rift that sets itself
back into the heaviness of stone, the mute hardness of wood, or the dark
glow of colors. What emerges from this bringing forth and setting back
is the generation of a work wherein truth gets fixed in a Gestalt qua
figure or shape (morf), namely as a structure in whose shape the rift
composes itself. The Riss, as a cleft, tear, crack, and laceration, is also
what releases a design, plan, sketch, blueprint or profile. Insofar that
it is a strife, it designs, outlines and configures. The Gestalt that surges
from this Riss is to be thought in terms of a particular Stellen (placing)
qua qsij, and as a Ge-Stell (en-framing or framework) that occurs as
a work that places itself up and sets itself forth. In this, the earth is used
in the fixing in place of truth in the figure. In the creation of a work
(rgon), the strife, as rift, must be set back into the earth, and the earth
must itself be set forth and put to use66. The fixing in place of truth in
the figure, entails that a thesis is posited in outlining by way of which
presencing occurs, wherein something is admitted into a boundary
(praj). The limit of something is thus not fixed as something motionless, for the limit of something is not where that thing ends but is rather
where that thing shines and presences. By its contour, a thing stands in
repose in the fullness of motion. Thus a being comes forth into the riftdesign as bounding outline. This bringing forth of something, either occurs out of itself being brought into the open, or is brought forth by
64 M. HEIDEGGER, Language, op. cit., pp. 205-207. I have also argued elsewhere
that even the movement of Derridas diffrance does itself manifest veiled khric traits,
see N. EL-Bizri, Qui tes-vous, Khra?: Receiving Platos Timaeus, op. cit.
65 M. HEIDEGGER, Die Grundprobleme der Phnomenologie, Gesamtausgabe Band
24, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997; M. Heidegger, The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, English trans. by A. Hofstadter, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
66 M. HEIDEGGER, The Origin of the Work of Art, op. cit., pp. 188-189.

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95

Dasein who performs this bringing that lets what is present come to
presence67.
In Einfhrung in die Metaphysik68, as well as the Beitrge zur Philosophie and Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, we notice that Dasein is construed in rather metaphorical terms as being the Sttte (site) of the strife
(Streitraum) between earth and world, which Sein requires in order to
disclose itself. Therein, Heidegger breaks away from the hegemony of
Zuhandenheit and Vorhandenheit69. Moreover, in Bauen Wohnen
Denken, he argues that the thinging (dingen) things act as the Ort (locus) for the gathering (versammeln) of the fourfold (das Geviert) by
making room for the bringing together of earth, heaven, mortals, and
divinities70. This is also confirmed in his consideration of the role of
language in building, plastic creation, and place-making. For, in Der
Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, he asserts that place-making always happens already in the open that guides the saying and naming and acts as
the clearing of truth that makes room for Ereignis (disclosing event of
appropriation or en-owning)71, by gathering the fourfold and allowing
them to come to light; hence, letting the authentic mode of being-inthe-world as dwelling occur, wherein the meaning of being is sheltered72.
67 Refer to the addendum of 1956, which was added to the German text of the
Reclam edition and translated into English in Basic Writings: M. HEIDEGGER, Addendum to The Origin of the Work of Art, op. cit., pp. 208-209.
68 M. HEIDEGGER, Einfhrung in die Metaphysik, Gesamtausgabe Band 40, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; M. HEIDEGGER, An Introduction to Metaphysics, English trans. by R. Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959, p. 205.
69 M. HEIDEGGER, The Origin of the Work of Art, in Poetry, Language, Thought,
English trans. by A. Hofstadter, New York: Harper and Row, 1971. Regarding Heideggers investigation of the role of space in plastic arts, see M. HEIDEGGER, Die Kunst und der Raum (1969), in Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens, Gesamtausgabe Band
13, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983; M. HEIDEGGER, Art and Space,
English trans. by Ch. H. Seibert, Man and World, Vol. 6, no. 1, 1973, pp. 3-5.
70 M. HEIDEGGER, Bauen Wohnen Denken, in Vortrge und Aufstze, Pfullingen: Gnther Neske Verlag, 1954, pp. 145-162 [Gesamtausgabe Band 7, 2000]; M. Heidegger, Building Dwelling Thinking, in Basic Writtings, ed. D. F. Krell, 2nd ed., New
York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1993, p. 356.
71 The term en-owning was coined by P. Emad and K. Maly as a rendition of
Ereignis, which was usually translated as event, appropriation, event of appropriation, and befitting. For further particulars refer to the Translators Foreword in M. HEIDEGGER, Contributions to Philosophy (From En-owning), English trans.
by P. Emad and K. Maly, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999, pp. xix-xxii.
Also see M. HEIDEGGER, Beitrge zur Philosophie, op. cit., particularly 127, 156159 on Die Zerklftung (cleavage).
72 See M. HEIDEGGER, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, in Holzwege, Gesamtausgabe Band 5, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977; M. HEIDEGGER,
The Origin of the Work of Art, English trans. by A. Hofstadter, in Basic Writings,
op. cit., pp. 143-203; esp. pp. 198-199.

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After all, and as Heidegger notes in the Beitrge zur Philosophie, Dasein is itself to be grasped as being the self-opening middle (die sich ffnende Mitte) and between (Zwischen) as the occurrence of the
Erklftung as Er-eignung that grounds the Zeit-Raum relation73.
Taking these developments into account, one wonders why Heidegger did not give cra the attention it deserves in his attempt to elucidate the question of being. This matter remains puzzling when we find
that the workings of cra seem to be akin to what we attest with the
rift, gap, threshold, middle, open, cleavage, in-between, which we particularly encounter in Die Sprache, Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes, and
Beitrge zur Philosophie. One senses in these instances the hint of a wake
of a significant interest in space that lets itself surface from the depth
of Heideggers thought. Perhaps this rather un-thought phenomenon
reflects an anticipatory philosophical state of affairs that is gradually
manifesting itself in the post-humous unfolding of his thought74. For,
it is indeed confounding that the (khric) observations that Heidegger
makes in this regard are ultimately missing from his most direct consideration of cra as set in his reading of passage 50e of the Timaeus
in Einfhrung in die Metaphysik75. For, cra is taken therein to be the
medium in which the thing that is in process of becoming forms itself
and out of which it emerges once it becomes. However, Heidegger draws
a careful distinction between what we, as moderns, call space (Raum;
espace) and what the Greeks refer to as cra and as tpoj. In this regard, he aptly observes that the Greeks did not have a word for space
(Raum; espace) as such, given that they experienced the spatial on the
basis of tpoj rather than extensio76. It could therefore initially be said
that the Greeks experienced the spatial as cra; insofar that cra is akin
M. HEIDEGGER, Beitrge zur Philosophie, op. cit., 190, 191.
See E. STRKER, Investigations in Philosophy of Space, English trans. by A. Mickunas, Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987, pp. 13-170; R. FRODEMAN, Being
and Space: A Re-reading of Existential Spatiality in Being and Time, in Journal of
the British Society for Phenomenology, Vol. 23, no. 1, 1992, pp. 33-41; G. SEFFER, Heideggers Philosophy of Space, in Philosophy Today, Vol. 17, 1973, pp. 246-254; M.
D. VILLELAPETIT, Space According to Heidegger Some Guidelines, in tudes
Philosophiques, Vol. 2, 1981, pp. 189-210; P. FAVARON, The Problem of Space in Heidegger, in Verifiche, Vol. 29, 2000, pp. 229-270; S. ELDEN, Heideggers Hlderlin
and the Importance of Place, in Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, vol.
30, no. 3 (1999), pp. 258-274; Vide supra notes 2, 18, 24.
75 M. HEIDEGGER, An Introduction to Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 65-66.
76 I have argued elsewhere that the most evident shift in the conception of spatiality, from a focus on topos to a construal of a notion of extensio, is attested earlyon in the geometrization of place as demonstrated in the Treatise of Place (Qawl
fl-makn) of the 10th century polymath, Alhazen (Ibn al-Haytham, ca. 965 CE Basra
73
74

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97

to tpoj and not to extensio. Nonetheless, and as Heidegger interestingly adds, cra is simply neither space nor place. Rather cra is that
which is occupied by what stands there.
In interpreting Aristotles Physics (Book B), we learn from Heidegger
that fsij as osa is the rc of the knhsij of what moves of itself77.
Herein, the essence of osa is said to be understood by the Greeks as
being a stable presencing (Anwesung) that is a mode of coming forth
into the unhidden (parousa) that is not a mere presenteness as Anwesenheit nor an objective presence as Vorhandenheit, which is also grasped
as Raum geben78. The lgoj, which belongs to the lgein, also contributes to the gathering into the unhidden of presencing as parousa
by letting beings be unconcealed in their self-showing79. The question
of presencing is ultimately revealed as being a topological/khorological
question concerning the locus-character of being. The tpoj thus belongs to the thing itself, and all that becomes is received within cra
and presences from it. This reading is further confirmed by Reiner Schrmann who remarked that in moving from the Sinn of being to the lqeia
of being to the topology of being, we are brought closer and nearer to
the appropriate starting point in Heideggers thinking. Accordingly, the
question of the meaning of being construes the manifold as regions: entities ready for handling, entities given as objects, being-there (Da-sein).
The question of the truth of being approaches the manifold as epochs:
Greek, Latin, Modern, Technological. The question of the place of being, construes the manifold as neither being regions nor epochs but as
rather acting as a-coming-to-presence. It is thus an event (Ereignis)
of multiple origination which renders the spatial, temporal, linguistic,
and cultural loci possible80. We would add that this coming-to-presence, as a coming forth into the unhidden, that orients the elucidation
of the question concerning the place of being, happens by way of what
presences in the standing there that occupies cra.
To reconsider the pathways that we have traversed so far, it seems
that what is lost in our transformed modern conception of space as ex- 1039 CE Cairo). See N. EL-BIZRI, La perception de la profondeur: Alhazen, Berkeley et Merleau-Ponty, in Oriens-Occidens, Cahiers du centre dhistoire des sciences
et des philosophies arabes et mdivales, CNRS, Vol. V, forthcoming 2004.
77 M. HEIDEGGER, On the Essence and Concept of fsij in Aristotles Physics B,
I, op. cit., p. 203.
78 M. HEIDEGGER, On the Essence and Concept of fsij in Aristotles Physics B,
I, op. cit., pp. 206-208; M. HEIDEGGER, Beitrge zur Philosophie, op. cit., 150.
79 M. HEIDEGGER, On the Essence and Concept of fsij in Aristotles Physics B,
I, op. cit., pp. 213-215.
80 R. SCHRMANN, How to Read Heidegger, Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal, Vol. 19, No. 2 Vol. 20, No. 1 (1997), pp. 3-6.

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tensio is that the barely apprehended essence of cra gets overlooked.

Hence, the ontological problem of space has fallen into a historical oblivion that may have even been initiated by Platos reduction of being to
the order of idea. Free from all modes of appearance, and in relation
to the way being is set between appearing and the phenomenon of permanence, cra is abstracted from every particular, yet not as what withdraws. Xra admits all beings and makes room for them as what stands
in being, whilst itself being resistant to thinking and hardly itself attested
in sense-perception. What we have advanced in this initiatory inquiry
and preparatory questioning shows us that space remains unheimlich and
its ontological status continues to be resolutely problematic and unclear.
This faces us with the formidable ontological challenge to establish a theory of space whose absence so far has impeded, if not even interdicted, the significant progress to be made in our strenuous attempts to clarify
the exacting question of being. Based on our endeavour to situate Heideggers thought between the Sophist and the Timaeus, we draw the ineluctable conclusion that we ought to elucidate the question of the being
of space in anticipation of a future unfolding of an ontological clarification of the question of being, and that our inquiry herein may act as
a prolegomenon to a future ontokhorology.