SCA - MELO Notes Compiled

RULE 62 INTERPLEADER Diane Shayne
(WHAT) Elements:
• Parties with conflicting interest
• Party plaintiff has no interest or an interest not disputed by the
claimants
• Same subject matter
(WHEN)
• OCAMPO V TIRONA: interpleader is proper before judgment has
become final
• ALVAREZ V COMMONWEALTH: there must be an active assertion
or demand by the party with conflicting interest
• WACK WACK GOLF V LEE: party-plaintiff should not have been
adjudged of its liability with finality or not independently liable
• RAMOS V RAMOS: estate was already impleaded; an interpleader
is an action in rem, thus the individual heirs need not be sent
summons; interest must be actual, not inchoate
• BELTRAN V PHHC: conflicting interest was between PHHC and
GSIS; conflict of interest must be against the interest of the
party plaintiff
• SY-QUIA V SHERIFF OF ILOCOS: interpleader is an action
employed to avoid double vexation (not double liability) for the
same liability.
• DE JESUS V LA SOCIEDAD: to avoid risk of paying damages for
withholding payment of claims, file an interpleader; an
interpleader is an equity remedy, thus must be filed in good
faith.
• MESINA V IAC: an interpleader must be filed within a reasonable
time from notice (in GF); in this case, there was a sign of GF,
when the complaint was later amended to replace JOHN DOE as
MARCELO MESINA.
(WHERE TO FILE)
• depends on which court exercised jurisdiction pursuant to BP 129
• basis of jurisdiction: amount and nature of claim
• DE CAMILO V JP OF MALANGAS: an interpleader on real property

claims VS issue of ownership as defense
o NB: issue of ownership is within CFI jurisdiction;
o In this case, subject matters were distinct, thus no conflict;
party plaintiff has interest: to prolong his unlawful
detainer/occupation/possession.
• MAKATI DEV’T CORP V TANJUATCO:
o amt of vexation= amt of SM;
o Thus, jurisdiction was within the JP since the property was
valued at Php 5,198 and was capable of pecuniary
estimation.
• RCBC V METROCON: party plaintiff, with UD case amicably
settled, has no more conflicting claims with defendant
o Decision was fishy though: the amicable settlement
between the mortgagor (LEYCON) and lessee (METROCON)
was to the detriment of mortgagee (RCBC); obviously
there is history between LEYCON and METROCON and they
must’ve colluded against RCBC
dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

RULE 63 DECLARATORY RELIEF and RULE 64Diane Shayne
(WHO) any person interested
(WHAT)
• in a deed, contract, will or other written instrument or
• prejudiced by a statute, regulation, EO or ordinance
ALLIED BROADCASTING v REPUBLIC:

o petition for declaratory relied is not within the original
jurisdiction of the SC even if only questions of law are
involved
o belated complaint and estopped since Allied already
complied with the law
WHERE TO FILE:
• RTC
o Exception: case of SALVACION v CB
WHEN
• where there’s a justiciable controversy ripe for
adjudication;
• file before breach or violation
SALVACION v CB
o SC has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over petition
for declaratory relief
 Except: where the petition has far-reaching
implications and raised questions that should be
resolved and may be treated as one for mandamus
o Height of injustice: to be denied a civil action where the
heinous crime has undoubtedly been committed against
the rape victim
TOLENTINO v BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY:

o Relief asked is improper: No actual justiciable controversy
exists because there is no personal violation of a right to
speak of or any prejudice or damage to him by the said
law recognizing the right of accountants to use a trade
name.
o The law did not preclude other profession from use of trade
name
o Petitioner had no interest
o 4 element (JARL)
 justiciable controversy
 action must be before any breach or violation
 ripe for adjudication
 legal interest
CUTARAN v DENR
o definition of justiciable controvery: a definite and
concrete dispute touching on legal relations of parties
having adverse legal interest
o courts have no judicial power to review cases involving
political question and as a rule will desist from taking
cognizance of speculation or hypothetical cases, advisory
opinions and in cases that has been moot.
o Case was premature. DENR has not yet granted the
ancestral land claim by their Carantes. Action should have
been for forcible entry—a regular civil action.
CALTEX v PALOMAR
o Element of a justiciable controvery
 Assertion of a claim
 Denial of a right
 Legal interest
 Ripe for adjudication
o One must make positive antagonistic assertion of a right
and denial of such real right (NOT THEORETICAL) by the
other.
MIRANDO v WELLINGTON TY
o Lack of legal interest of squatters; petition for declaratory
relief will not prosper
DELUMEN v REPUBLIC (justiciable controversy)

o An active antagonistic assertion of a legal right on one side
and a denial thereof on the other concerning a real and not
a theoretical question or issue

o SC: dec. relief is not proper when issue is moot and
abstract.
LIM v REPUBLIC
o No controversy on citizenship
o Procedure to regain citizenship is to file a declaration or
oath of allegiance
DELA LLANA v COMELEC

o Not a justiciable controversy because it’s simply a
consultative referendum; it will not affect the constitution.
SAMSON v ANDAL
o Apply petition for declaratory relief BEFORE breach
OLLADA v CB
o Petition for declaratory relief will not prosper if filed after a
contract, statute, or right has been breached or violated
o It is proper only if adequate relief is not available through
other existing means/forms of an action or proceedings
(like specific performance)
o Asked for injunction because he already suffered injury;
petition inapplicable since there has already been a
violation of a right.
SARMIENTO v CAPADAS
o Ratio of prohibition of petition for declaratory relief after
breach: to avoid multiplicity of suits
o In the case at bar, if declaratory relief was allowed, the
judgment there, notwithstanding another action would still
lie against the importer respondent for violation of the
barter law. Instead of 1 case, 2 cases results: petition for
declaratory relief and complaint against illegal confiscation
of imported goods as a consequence of the breach of the
barter law.
o Barter permits were issued; the 1st shipment came in. The
defense of petitioner it that: it is a continuing violation

 SC held: breach, continuing or otherwise, is still a
breach, and thus petition for declaratory relief must
fail. He should file an injunction instead.
TANDA V ALDAYA
o Judicial decisions is not within the ambit of “instrument”
(as a basis of right to claim declaratory relief) because
otherwise action will be barred due to res judicata.
EDADES v EDADES
o Petition for DR is not the proper action in the determination
of hereditary rights
DEGALA v REYES
o In a petition for DR, non-joinder of necessary parties is
jurisdictional defect, because otherwise, that would deprive
the declaration of the final and pacifying function of the
action. It is calculated to subserve such function, as the
party will not be bound by the declaration and may raise
identical issues in another action.
o Without the necessary party, there’s no complete relief.
BAGUIO CITIZEN’S ACTION v CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO

o City council awarding public land to squatter
o DR, necessary party was the Mayor and the City Council
o Other squatters need not be impleaded for the court to
acquire jurisdiction (apply Rule 63 sec 5)
WHO SHOULD BE PARTIES?

• 2 or more contending interest
• SOLGEN- if issue involves constitutionality, validity of law
• CITY PROSECUTOR- issue involved validity of an ordinance
SEC 5, EXCEPTIONS
• Reformation of contracts (provided by law)
• Quieting of title (with notice by publication)
• Consolidation of ownership (with notice by publication)

RULE 64
• Review of judgment of COA and COMELEC
• Old ROC failed to mention the resort to Certiorari
ARATUC v COMELEC
o A petition fore review on appeal includes digging into the
merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari
deals exclusively with GAD, which may not exist even
when the decision is otherwise erroneous. Certiorari
implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness
and caprice, an omission to weigh pertinent considerations,
a decision derived at without rational deliberation. While
the effect of an error in judgment may not differ from that
of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters
that by their nature ought to be left for final determination
to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities,
reserving to the SC to insure the faithful observance of DP
only in cases of patent arbitrariness.
o Under the existing constitutional and statutory provision
(wait, ha, case was decided in 1979, so 1973 Consti to),
the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, rulings
and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to
be and should be confined to instances of GAD amount to
patent and substantial denial of DP.
DARIO v MISON
o The jurisdiction of the SC over cases emanating from the
CSC is limited to complaints of lack or excess of
jurisdiction, complaints that justify certiorari under R65.
o While RA6656 states tat judgments of the CSC are “final
and executory” and hence, unappealable, under R65,
certiorari precisely lies in the absence of an appeal.
Accordingly, the court accepts Commissioner Mison’s
petition which clearly charges the CSC with GAD, a proper
subject of certiorari, although may not have so stated in
explicit terms
AMBIL Jr v COMELEC (2000)
o Under the existing Constitutional scheme, a party to an
election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in

division cannot dispense with the filing of MR of a decision,
resolution or final order of the Division of COMELEC
because the case would not reach the COMELEC EN BANC
without such MR having filed and resolved by the Division.
The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized
exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases dispensing with an
MR prior to the filing of the petition. In truth, the
exceptions do not apply to election cases where an MR is
mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the
COMELEC EN BANC, whose final decision is what is
reviewable via certiorari by the SC.
ABS-CBN v COMELEC
o This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this
procedural requirement [of filing a motion for
reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent a
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle
of social justice or the protection of labor, when the
decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity, or
when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari
is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
o The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the
Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days
before the election itself. Besides, the petitioner got hold of
a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the
circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to
move for a reconsideration and to obtain a swift resolution
in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only
is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental
constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a
special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
REPOL V COMELEC
o Interlocutory orders merely rule on an incidental issue and
do not terminate or finally dispose of the case as they
leave something to be done before it is finally decided on
the merits.
o Since the Comelec 1st Division issued on the interlocutory
order of Jan 12 2004, the same Division should resolve
Repol’s MR of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved

party is neither to file an MR for certification to the
COMELEC EN BANC nor to elevate the issue to this Court
via a petition fore certiorari under R65.
RULE 64 v RULE 65
Rule 64 Rule 65
30 days to file
Filing of MR interrupted; left with 60 days to file after denial of MR
balance, days left at least not less
than 5 days
Attached a certified true copy of all Certified true copies of those
annexes questioned orders only
Only final judgments or orders can any
be elevated
Based on: GADALEJ Based on: GADALEJ

RULE 65 CERTIORARI Diane Shayne
R65: certiorari volumus

• Literally means: we wish to be certified
• Commanding the lower court to elevate records
• Involves questions of jurisdiction
(WHO) SEC 1: tribunal, board, officer exercising JUDICIAL or

QUASI-JUDICIAL decision
TUASON v RD
o President Marcos has no juridical power
o What is judicial/quasi-judicial function?
 Determination of facts
 Application of the law
 Adjudication
o PD 20: made a determination of facts and declared the
rights of parties, resulting to undue deprivation to the
Tuasons. Law should have an equal application of the law
to members of the same class.
o Certiorari: actions against a governmental body and not to
private courts/tribunal/board or officer
MERALCO SECURITIES v BOARD OF TAX

o Exercise of power over quasi-judicial agency
(WHAT) Acts:
• Without jurisdiction: without legal authority
• In excess of jurisdiction: conditions which authorize its
exercise are not present
• Grave Abuse of discretion: had jurisdiction but exercised in an
arbitrary, despotic, whimsical and capricious manner
• Cite Angara v Fedman as the case which distinguished the
disparity of the 3 acts
NO appeal, P,S, A remedy in the ordinary course of law
INTESTATE ESTATE OF CAMEN de LUNA v IAC

o Findings of the trial court are accorded with great respect
absent any evidence from the respondent, aside from
allegations that valuation was without basis and purely
conjectural; the valuation of the estate of 10M by the TC
was upheld.
o Determination of whether the administration and
liquidation of an estate have been attended with greater
difficulty and have required a high degree of capacity on
the part of the executor or administrator rests on the
sound discretion of the court which took cognizance of the
estate.
LALICAN v VERGARA
o Certiorari is not a remedy when a motion to quash has
been denied. Issue should have been raised on appeal
after the adverse result of the trial.
GOLD CITY INTEGRATED V IAC

o The issue of attorney’s fees was finally disposed of by
the RTC—meaning, nothing has left to be done by the
court. Appeal should have been the remedy and not a
petition for certiorari.
ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK INC V CAMPOS

o GR: the extra-ordinary writ of certiorari is not proper when
ordinary appeal is available. The writ is granted in cases
where it is shown that appeal would be inadequate, slow,
insufficient, and will not promptly relieve petitioner from
the injurious effect of the order complained of.
o Certiorari/injunction/mandamus was granted because
appeal would not be adequate. In an appeal, only the
evidence presented in the lower court will be admitted for
review. In this case, the appellant filed an MNT because of
a newly discovered evidence warranting that lot #19 of St.
Peter is different from the lot of private respondents. MNT
was granted, case was ordered to proceed.

VALENCIA v CA
o Certiorari lies against a judgment allowing execution
pending appeal, when such writ of execution was issued for
“no good reason”.
o Respondent court cannot insist that appeal was the proper
remedy, since as the title of writ states: it’s a WRIT
PENDING APPEAL. Appeal would not be the adequate and
speedy remedy.
NEA (NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN) v CA

o Dismissal of appeal for failure to comply with the requisite
ROA and amended ROA amounts to GADALEJ because the
lower court merely gave a vague judgment (of such failure
to comply) without saying what the deficiencies of the
records were.
o Certiorari lies when there’s no other P-S-A remedy. As in
this case, the land of NEA was going to be foreclosed or in
peril of disposition through an auction.
o ISSUE that no MR was filed-untenable. Issue is imbued
with public interest because petitioner is a power supplier.
If further delay in the proceeding is allowed, public service
will also suffer.
ABRAHAM v NLRC
o GR: file an MR before certiorari, to give the court the
opportunity to rectify its own mistake
 Except:
 Order is patent nullity
 Questions raised in the certiorari
proceeding have been duly raised and passed
upon by the lower court or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower
court
 Urgent necessity for the resolution of the
question and any further delay would prejudice
the Government/petitioner or SM of action is
perishable
 MR is useless

 Petitioner is deprived of DP and there is
extreme urgency for relief
 In criminal case, relief from order of arrest
urgent and the granting of such relief by the
TC is improbable
 Proceeding in the LC are a nullity for lack of DP
 Proceeding was ex-parte or petitioner had no
opportunity to object
 Issue is pure question of law or where
public interest is involved
METRO TRANSIT ORG. INC. V CA

o Petitioner should’ve filed an MR prior to Certiorari because
this case does not fall under the exception: that there
must be a concrete, compelling and valid reason for
failure to comply. Petitioner insists that Certiorari was
proper for fear that delay will make their COA moot and
academic.
o Certiorari is not a shield from the adverse consequence of
an omission to file the required MR.
o Also, Petitioner was ultimately asking the SC to weigh
evidence and correct the judgment of the CA. SC is not a
trier of fact, it can only hear the case on issues of
jurisdiction (GADALEJ). SC held that LA decision as
affirmed by NLRC and CA established that Petitioners failed
to establish the guilt of PR (no proof of stealing 2k tokens),
thus petition for certiorari is DENIED.
CONTI v CA
o CA was ordered to hear the petition for certiorari because
Conti was denied DP. Her MR in his dishonesty case before
the CSC has been pending for the last 2 years.
o Case was remanded to CA. Certiorari is proper.
o New rules in CivPro allows the CA to review
orders/resolutions of quasi-judicial agencies like the CSC
(see Rule 97, ROC or RAC No.1-95) by way of petition for
review within 15days from notice of the assailed judgment,
final order/resolution.

ESCUDERO v DULAY
o GR: SCA under R65 will not be a substitute or a cure for
failure to file a timely petition for review on certiorari under
R45
 Except: where the application of the rule will result in
a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice
 This case falls under the exception: because
evidence show that the transaction was not a sale
but loan (an equitable mortgage) due to the
inadequate consideration paid by the
“buyer”/creditor. The SP was P42,500 where the land
is values at P131,000 being located near the Mactan
Airport. Court granted the redemption by the Sps
Escudero.
LEONOR v CA
o Judgment, when void can be slain on plain sight!
o When court lacks jurisdiction, judgment is void and thus,
such judgment cannot be a source of right.
RELIEFS GRANTED:
• Annul or modify the proceeding of such T/B/O
• Such incidental reliefs as the law and justice may require
o In LEONOR v CA:
 SC proceeded with the merits of the case.
 SC is not just a toothless promoter of
procedural niceties, which are understood and
appreciated only by lawyers and jurists. It
cannot shrink from its quintessential role as the
fountain of speedy, adequate and substantial
justice. If the Court, as the head and guardian of
the judicial branch, must continuously merit the force
of the public trust and confidence—which is
ultimately the real source of its sovereign power,
possessing neither the purse nor the sword—and if it
must decisively discharge its sacred duty as the last
sanctuary of the oppressed and the weak, it must, in

appropriate cases like the one before us, proactively
provide weary litigants with immediate legal and
equitable relief, free from the delays and legalistic
contortions that oftentimes result from applying
purely formal and procedural approaches to judicial
dispensation (LUPET noh!? Ikaw man hiritan ni
Paganiban ng ganito, titiklop ka rin diba?! For your
reading pleasure lang yun succeeding sentences. The
entire paragraph was too poetic to ignore.)
• ATTY J MEJO posed a question:

o If it is a void decision, can you still file certiorari even if
beyond the reglementary period of 60D
o ANG HIRAP NAMAN! (Do not quote me. I’m guessing.)
 YES. Because it’s a void judgment. It can be treated
as if no binding judgment at all exist, thus not a
basis for reckoning the 60D period.
 NO. Because point of reckoning must be 60D from
the date of the notice of “void” judgment. Right of
action accrues at that point. If period is relaxed, it
may be subject to abuse. Period can be relaxed but
not stretched to absurdity. Court can deny petition
by virtue of laches, even if the petitioner argues that
the date of notice of “void” judgment doesn’t stand
as the proper reckoning period.
WHO CAN FILE

• Any person aggrieved thereby
PASTOR v CA
o “Daughter-in-law” was no party to the lower court
proceeding but aggrieved by the decision, and thus can file
the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
TANG v CA
o “ person aggrieved” is one who was party in the
proceedings before the lower court

RECONCILING CASE OF PASTOR AND TANG
PASTOR TANG
ISSUE Ownership Collateral
PARTY Daughter-in-law had direct Parties were merely adjoining lot
interest (indispensible) owners
ERROR Void decision of probate court Error in judgment of the RTC
for lack of jurisdiction
o TANG should’ve filed for easement or prohibition later but

definitely not a petition for certiorari
o ATTY MELO says: The Pastor decision is more liberal and in
accordance with substantial justice.
Certiorari deals with issues of jurisdiction not of facts
CASTRO V PPL
o OSG did not raise any errors of jurisdiction, certiorari will
not lie.
TANJUAN V PHIL POSTAL BANK

o GR: issue of fact cannot be entertained in a certiorari
o EXCEPTION:
 In NLRC cases, CA can adjudicate questions of fact
 Note however, if the same was raised to the SC, it
cannot prosper because the SC cannot receive
evidence, although it may have the power (e diba
omnipotent sila! Pwedeng umasa na exception yun
case mo due transcendental importance. Chances
are, dadaan ka sa butas ng karayom, mag-appeal ka
na lang kasi.)
COMPARING RULE 65 AND RULE 45

RULE 65 RULE 45
Grounds of GADALEJ Issues of fact
Applies to both final and Only final judgment can be
interlocutory orders questioned
Period of 60D Period of 15D
Respondent files Adverse party files

Generally requires MR MR not required
Appeal does not stay judgment appeal stays judgment
Atty Melo: Between the 2, which is better for you to file?

ANS: 45
• More expedient, because it has to be filed 15D from notice of
final judgment
• 65 cannot be used to replace a lost appeal
• In reality, more than 70% of petition for certiorari gets dismissed
summarily.

RULE 65 PROHIBITION Diane Shayne
Prohibition
MATAGUINA V CA
o SC: MENR had no jurisdiction to issue writ of execution
against a party who is not party to the instant case
(recognition of the separate juridical entity of Corp from
the individual-owner)
AURILLO V RABI
o When the TRO expired, there exist no legal bar for Aurillo
to file a case for prohibition.
o GR: prohibition is preventive; party acts on his own peril,
subject to the outcome of the petition
 Prohibition can also include UNDOING WHAT HAS
BEEN DONE
 Court retains jurisdiction to reverse what has been
done.
 More accurately, the case held:
 Jurisprudence has it that prohibition will give
complete relief not only by preventing what
remains to be done but by undoing what has
been done.
 ATTY MELO ASKED: How far back should it be
undone?
 ANS: Go back to the status quo (ante litem
motam). Go back to the last actual, peaceable,
uncontested situation between the parties
MORFE v JP of MALANGAS
o The write of mandamus has for its object to compel the
inferior tribunal in the proper case, as a JP, to comply with
the function which the law specifically prescribes as duty
resulting from its office when there is no other P-S-A
remedy; and that of prohibition, has for its object that of
preventing an inferior tribunal in the proper case, as a JP,
from executing or continuing to exercise an act in excess of
its jurisdiction, when there is no other P-S-A remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
VERGARA V RUGUE (1977)
o The function of prohibition is to prevent unlawful and
oppressive exercise of legal authority.
o The extraordinary remedy of prohibition is not to correct
judgment but to restrain usurpation and compel
observance of jurisdictional limitations. This is not intended
to provide a remedy for acts already accomplished. This
remedy will lie only to prevent an encroachment, excess,
usurpation, or improper assumption of jurisdiction on the
part of an inferior court or tribunal or to prevent some
great outrage upon the settled principles of law and
procedure, but if the LC/tribunal has jurisdiction of the
person and the SM of the controversy, the writ will not lie
to correct errors or irregularities in procedure, or to
prevent an erroneous decision or an enforcement of a
erroneous judgment or even in cases of encroachment,
usurpation, and abuse of judicial power or the improper
assumption of jurisdiction, where an adequate and
applicable remedy by appeal, writ of error, certiorari, other
prescribed methods of review are available.
o Vergara questions the reversal of the CA, but res judicata
has already attached. Vergara was merely finding ways to
delay execution. In this case, unlike in Rabi, you cannot
undo anything because the decision of the LC is valid.
Nothing needs to be undone.
• Difference between Aurillo and Vergara

Aurillo Vergara
Act can still be undone Cannot be undone
Prohibition was filed before the before filing (before filiing what?!
decision, but after filing pet. to hindi ko to gets, hindi kasi ako
nullify prelim investigation in the nakikinig, help!)
RTC
NACIONALISTA PARTY v BAUTISTA

o Case involved questioning the title to the authority of the
Comelec Chairman to hear the election complaint.

Petitioners should’ve filed for Quo Warranto, not a
prohibition, which questions one’s jurisdiction/authority.
o RATIO: the principle is one founded in policy and
convenience, for the right of one claiming a title or
interest under or through the proceedings of an officer
having an apparent authority to act would be safe, if it
were necessary in every case to examine the legality of the
title of such officer up to its original source, and the title of
interest of such person were held to be invalidated by
some accidental defect or flaw in the appointment, election
or qualification of such officer or in the rights of those from
whom appointment or election emanated; nor could the
supremacy of the law be maintained, or the execution
enforced, if the acts of the judge having colorable title
were to be deemed invalid.
ENRIQUEZ v MACADAEG
o When an MTD on the ground of improper venue is
erroneously denied, mandamus is not the proper remedy
for correcting the error. It being a case where the judge is
proceeding in defiance of the ROC by refusing to dismiss
an action, which should not be maintained in this court, the
remedy is prohibition.
ASINAS v CFI
o While the court exceeds its jurisdiction in ordering the
payment of said expenses, which are not administration
expenses, yet as the remedy of appeal is adequate to
correct the said error, the extraordinary remedy of
prohibition does not lie.

RULE 65 MANDAMUS and COMMON MATTERSDiane Shayne
SEC 3. When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
• Unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station, or
• Unlawfully excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a
right or office to which such other is entitled, and
• There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law
ANGCHANGCO JR v OMBUDSMAN
o GENERAL RULE: Mandamus is employed to compel the
performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, this
being its chief use, and not a discretionary duty.
o ALTHOUGH: It is also available to compel action, when
refused on matters involving judgment and discretion, but
not to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a
particular way or the retraction or reversal of an action
already taken in the exercise of either. (In simple terms,
mandamus will be used to direct the official to act, BUT
NOT to act one way or the other).
o EXCEPT: in cases of gross abuse of discretion,
manifest injustice or palpable excess in authority
o IN THE CASE AT BAR, the Court finds the inordinate delay
(of more than 6 years) by the Ombudsman in resolving the
criminal complaints against petitioner to be violative of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to due process and to
speedy disposition of cases
LAMB v PHIPPS
o Discretionary acts, defined: as the liberty to decide
according to the principles of justice and one’s sense of
right or wrong.
o Ministerial duty: performed in a given state of facts; to act
in a prescribed manner without using one’s sense of right
or wrong or principles of justice; action is prescribed by
law.
o Trent’s dissent, concept of “legal discretion”: means
reasonable and just discretion afforded by law. This is now
the main opinion ; in case of GADALEJ, file mandamus.
CARBUNGCO v AMPARO
o Mandamus is proper in this case.
o Rule 72, Section 8 of the Rules of Court states that the
appellant in a detainer case must deposit in court within
the first ten days of the succeeding month the rental
corresponding to the previous month. Otherwise, the
appellee would have the right to ask for execution pending
appeal. This provision is mandatory. The court is left no
discretion to either extend the period of deposit prescribed
by law, postpone the making of said deposit, or otherwise
relieve the appellant of the consequences of her failure to
make the deposit within the prescribed period. The law has
prescribed a period and this requirement must be complied
with strictly. Its compliance must be enforced by the
courts. In this case, the deposit was actually made 3 days
after the end of the 10-day period. Pending appeal, failure
to make the deposit of rental within the prescribed period,
however short the delay, gives the appellee the right to
execution of the judgment, which the court is bound to
grant and enforce.
UNIV OF SAN CARLOS v CA
o Award of academic distinction is within the academic
freedom of the Petitioner-university; mandamus will not lie
to obtain grant of such distinction.
PERALTA v SALCEDO
o Non-exhaustion of admin remedies
o The petition is clearly premature as when the petition was
filed, the Director had just submitted his recommendation
to the Secretary of Education, who had not yet acted on
the matter. The Court can only take action when the Sec.
of Educ. has rendered a decision on the matter. No
recourse to the courts can be had until all administrative
remedies have been exhausted and SCA have been held
not entertainable if superior admin officers could grant
relief.
MADRIGAL v LECAROZ
o Quo warranto was the apt remedy

G&S TRANSPORT CORP v CA
o Contract for taxi service is within the corporate prerogative
of NAIA; there is no legal duty to be enjoined, thus
mandamus will not lie.
Submit the ff:

1. Certification of NFS and verification must be submitted
(without which, it’s a scrap of paper); the former cannot be filed
by the counsel while the latter can be filed in behalf of the client.
2. Certified true copies of assailed main order or the order of
denial, within 60D
i. GR: non-extendible period
ii. Except: for compelling reasons
Where to file:
• SC, CA, RTC
• Sandiganbayan, in exercise of appellate jurisdiction
SEC 7
• Petition shall not stay unless there’s a TRO or writ of preliminary
injunction issued
Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus: COMMOM MATTERS

SANTIAGO v VASQUEZ
o Court may continue with the case since no TRO or writ of
PI. Miriam should’ve simply secured permission from the
Sandiganbayan to leave the country.
ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARK v CA
o CA already lost jurisdiction.
o Such issuance of decision rendered the pending SC case
moot.
JOY MART CONSOLIDATED CORP v CA
o SC: CA should’ve ruled on the matter, RTC committed
GADALEJ
o CA’s non-issuance of TRO is not equal to the RTC’s
authority to dispose of the writ of PI; it only meant that
the RTC can proceed to hear and decide the case.

GO v JUDGE ABROGAR
o Judicial courtesy only applies of the hearing in the lower
court, in a strong possibility, would render moot or
moribund the proceedings in the SC.
o Even if issue (execution) is resolved in LC, certiorari is
proper since petition in SC is not rendered moot by such
decision, because the property can still be recovered.
o Ang tanong ko naman: What if the SM is not subject to
recovery?

RULE 66 QUO WARRANTO Diane Shayne
AGAINST WHO?
• An action for the usurpation of a public office, position or
franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
a. A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
or exercises a public office, position or franchise;
b. A public officer who does or suffers an act, which, by
the provision of law, constitutes a ground for the forfeiture
of his office;
c. An association, which acts as a corporation within the
Philippines without being legally incorporated or without
lawful authority to do so.
Distinguished
Quo Warranto Mandamus
Remedy to try the right to an office Only lies to enforce clear legal
or franchise and to oust the holder duties, not to try
from its enjoyment disputed title
POTOT v BAGANO
o 2 years of abandonment, action for quo warranto has
prescribed
ABAYA v ALVEAR
o In times of war (Jap Occupation), there was an abnormal
condition. Change in composition of towns in each circuit
changed temporarily to meet exigencies of admin of
justice. As the RP government was losing control of certain
areas, the jurisdiction of the courts then was
correspondingly deduced. Such change, not attributable to
Abaya, thus he did not voluntarily leave his post: NO
ABANDOMENT.
TEVES v SINDIONG
o Doctrine of Abandonment is not strictly construed in a
period of war because the jurisdiction was re-arranged
because certain provinces were already occupied by the
enemy; no intent to abandon on the part of Teves.
SERAFIN v CRUZ
o “reinstatement of a dismissed officer” is not a valid ground
for removal of duly appointed and confirmed chief of the
municipal police (Admin Code)
o the extraordinary legal remedy of quo warranto DOES NOT
LIE against a duly and legally appointed chief of the
municipal police who has duly qualified for and has entered
upon the performance of his duties, in order to reinstate
another who has been legally dismissed from the office in
question.
LACSON v ROMERO
o 3 steps to appointment
 nomination
 confirmation of CA
 acceptance
o Lacson never accepted the “promotion” thus there was no
vacancy created. Romero’s appointment to replace Lacson
is invalid
o This situation amounts to removal without just cause.
o Ratio the rule: to prevent possible abuse of appointing
power
Who can file?

• SolGen, private prosecutor
• Private individual claiming the right to office.
ACOSTA v FLOR
o Acosta had no legal standing because plaintiff had no basis
to claim to office as the municipal president of Laoag.
o Ratio of the rule: quo warranto maybe be used as form of
harassment
o SC held: the court need not look at the validity of the title
of the incumbent, when petitioner clearly had no right to
the office; mere allegation of petitioner will not suffice.
GARCIA v PEREZ (the proverbial Inggitera!)

o Garcia has no legal right, to speak of, over the position

o Preference in appointment (say, by virtue of seniority)
cannot be equated to entitlement to appointment; the
former is not sufficient to sustain a quo warranto
proceeding.
CRUZ v RAMOS
o Quo warranto will not prosper because there’s no
dimunition of benefit/salary to the petitioners.
o They have no standing to sue because they are not
claiming the right to office of the one elected
o Remedy: the SolGen has the legal standing to file for quo
warranto.
VERAGUTH v ISABELA SUGAR Co.
MADRIGAL v LECAROZ
o Prescription of 1 year from ouster/usurpation or when the
right of office accrues
Where to file:
• RTC, CA, SC
• SolGen-Manila
• Comelec
Part C of quo warranto, as applied to associations, relatively a

dead provision because of PD902-A which deals with intra-corporate
matters, petition for rehabilitation, insolvency, suspension of payments
fraudulent schemes as a ground forfeiture of a franchise.
Election Protest and Quo Warranto:

An election contest is a special statutory proceeding designed to contest
the right of a person, declared elected, to enter and hold office. It is an
adversary proceeding for a controversy between two contending
candidates for the same office. It is neither a civil action nor a criminal
proceeding. Strictly speaking, it is neither an action at law nor a suit in
equity; it is a summary proceeding of a political character.
QUO WARRANTO (under the Omnibus Election Code)
A petition for quo warranto is filed within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election by any voter to contest the

election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional, provincial or
city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of
the Philippines.
The failure of the petitioner to question the eligibility of the

respondent before or during the election cannot be pleaded as putting the
petitioner in estoppel to institute quo warranto proceedings, because the
right to an elective provincial or municipal office can be contested under
existing legislation only after the proclamation.
In quo warranto proceedings, where the person elected is

ineligible, the court cannot declare that the candidate occupying the
second place has been elected, even if he were eligible since the law only
authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the person who has
obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of
candidacy.
When the grounds for quo warranto are separable from grounds
of election protest, two independent actions may be proceed.
The source of the provision on contest for disloyalty to the

Republic of the Philippines of the candidate-elect is Commonwealth Act
No. 357-766 and Commonwealth Act No. 657, to wit: “Any elector may
contest the election of a provincial or municipal officer-elect on the
ground of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines by filing a petition
for quo warranto within the same period and in accordance with the same
procedure prescribed in Section 173.” This is to recognize the common
provision that no person who has voluntarily borne arms or engaged in
rebellion against the Republic shall be eligible to office and such an act
constitutes a complete disability until removed. But take note, that in the
case of Casin v Caluag a person may be declared in a special civil action
of quo warranto to be disloyal to the Republic of the Philippines and
ineligible to hold public office, although said person has been or will be
acquitted of the crime of treason. Because the law provides as a ground
of disqualification, not the conviction of the candidate of the crime of
treason or any other act constituting disloyalty, but the mere fact of being
disloyal.

Candidate-elect may also be ineligible or disqualified to hold
position in the government for conviction for the following charges:
a. Espionage and other offenses against the national security;

b. Membership in the outlawed Communist Party of the Philippines
and similar associations;
c. Penalized of capital offenses under the Revised Penal Code;
d. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and
e. Illegal recruitment which the law considered as economic
sabotage

RULE 67 EXPROPRIATION Diane Shayne
Distinction between eminent domain and expropriation

• Eminent domain – one of the inherent powers of the state. It is the
right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for
public use or to meet a public exigency and is said to be an essential
part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus
inseparable from sovereignty. (Air Transportation Office vs. Gopuco,
Jr., as cited in Riano)
• Expropriation – the process by which the power of eminent domain is
carried out.
o A taking, as of privately owned property, by government under
eminent domain. (Black‘s Law Dictionary)
o The commencement of a complaint for expropriation is
necessary only when the owner does not agree to sell his
property or if he is willing to sell but does not agree with the
price offered. (Riano)
SEC 1
• Complaint
• Specific public purpose
• 2 phases:
o PUB USE
o JUST COMPENSATION
Who files
• RP, inherent to the state, executive branch
• Must have an enabling law
• Local government with delegated power
Where to file
• RTC
SEC 2
• Upon filing of complaint
• Proper Notice to defendant
• Deposit, in money or cert of deposit, assessed value of the real
property for purposes of taxation or for personal property,
provisionally determined by the court
• Certificate of deposit, in Manaay v Juico 175 SCRA 343: CARP involved
a lot of property; impossible for the government to pay LO the entire
value in cash so certificates of deposit were allowed
• PURPOSE OF DEPOSIT:
o Indemnity in case the property will not be condemned
o An advance to just compensation in case condemned
DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS (SEC 3)

• If a defendant has no objection or defense to the action or the taking
of his property,
o He may file and serve a notice of appearance and a
manifestation to that effect, specifically designating or
identifying the property in which he claims to be interested,
within the time stated in the summons. Thereafter, he shall be
entitled to notice of all proceedings affecting the same.
• If a defendant has any objection to the filing of or the allegations in
the complaint, or any objection or defense to the taking of his
property,
o he shall serve his answer within the time stated in the
summons.
o The answer shall specifically designate or identify the property in
which he claims to have an interest, state the nature and extent
of the interest claimed, and adduce all his objections and
defenses to the taking of his property.
o No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint shall be
alleged or allowed in the answer or any subsequent pleading.
• A defendant waives all defenses and objections not so alleged but the
court, in the interest of justice, may permit amendments to the answer
to be made not later than ten (10) days from the filing thereof.
• However, at the trial of the issue of just compensation, whether or not
a defendant has previously appeared or answered, he may present
evidence as to the amount of the compensation to be paid for his
property, and he may share in the distribution of the award.
ORDER OF EXPROPRIATION (SEC 4)

• If the objections to and the defenses against the right of the plaintiff to
expropriate the property are overruled, or when no party appears to
defend as required by this Rule, the court may issue an order of
  2 
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing
of the complaint, whichever came first.
• A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be
appealed by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall
not prevent the court from determining the just compensation to be
paid.
• After the rendition of such an order, the plaintiff shall not be permitted
to dismiss or discontinue the proceeding except on such terms as the
court deems just and equitable.
2 PHASES
• determination of the right to expropriate
o order issue of condemnation
o can be appealed
o period: 30 because multiple appeal (rule 109), roa required
o once deposit paid, writ of possession is ministerial
• determination of the right to just compensation
Stages of expropriation
Period to appeal from order of expropriation
• MUNICIPALITY OF BINAN VS. GARCIA (180 SCRA 576)
o There are two stages in every action for expropriation.
1. Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety
of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the
suit.
2. Determination by the Court of the just compensation of
the property sought to be taken.
o In actions of eminent domain, as in actions for partition, since
no less than 2 appeals are allowed by law, the period for appeal
from an order of condemnation is 30 days counted from notice
of said order and not the ordinary period of 15 days prescribed
for actions in general, conformably with the provision of Sec 39,
BP 129, in relation to par 19(b) of the Implementing Rules to
the effect that in ―appeals in special proceedings in accordance
  3 
with Rule 109 of the Rules of Court and other cases wherein
multiple appeals are allowed, the period of appeal shall be 30
days, a record of appeal being required. x x x‖
SEC 5 DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION

• Not more than 3 competent and disinterested person as commissioner
Meaning of just compensation

• Just compensation – the full and fair equivalent of the property
sought to be expropriated. The measure is not the taker‘s gain but the
owner‘s loss. The compensation, to be just, must be fair not only to
the owner but also to the taker. Even as undervaluation would deprive
the owner of his property without due process, so too would its
overvaluation unduly favor him to the prejudice of the public. (NPC vs.
De la Cruz, as cited in Riano)
• Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just
compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of
the Government.
• Republic vs. Gingoyon (478 SCRA 474)

o Rule 67 merely requires the Government to deposit with an
authorized government depositary the assessed value of the
property for expropriation for it to be entitled to a writ of
possession; The staging of expropriation proceedings in this
case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the
Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that
directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan vs. PIATCO
o Even assuming that RA 8974 does not govern in this case, it
does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After
all, adherence to the letter of Sec 2, Rule 67 would in turn
violate the Court‘s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there
must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before
the Government may take over the property. It is the plain
intent of RA 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule
67 with the scheme of ―immediate payment‖ in cases involving
national government infrastructure projects.
  4 
o RA 8974 plainly requires direct payment to the property
owner, and not a mere deposit with the authorized
government depositary – without such direct payment, no
writ of possession may be obtained.
BARANGGAY SAN ROQUE V HEIRS OF PASTOR

• An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation and
falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
o If it is primarily for a recovery of a sum of money, the claim is
considered capable of pecuniary estimation , and whether the
jurisdiction of the court is between the MTC and the RTS
depends on the amount of the claim.
o HOWEVER, where the basic issue is something other than to
recover a sum of money or where the money claim is purely
incidental or a consequence of the principal relief sought, the
court has considered such actions, where the SM of the litigation
may not be estimated in terms of money and are cognizable
only by the CFI
o RATIO: besides determination of damages, such cases demand
inquiry into other factors which the law has deemed to be more
within the competence of the CFI
• 2 phases of expropriation, citing NAPOCOR v JOCSON
in an expropriation suit, the court determines the authority of the
government entity, the necessity of expropriation and the observance
of due process.
NAPOCOR V JOCSON
• Cited the case of Biñan for the 2 stages of expropriation
o The first is concerned with the determination of the
authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit.
 It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action,
"of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a
lawful right to take the property sought to be condemned,
for the public use or purpose described in the
complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to
  5 
be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint."
 An order of dismissal, if this be ordained, would be a
final one, of course, since it finally disposes of the
action and leaves nothing more to be done by the
Court on the merits.
 So, too, would an order of condemnation be a final
one, for thereafter as the Rules expressly state, in the
proceedings before the Trial Court, "no objection to
the exercise of the right of condemnation (or the
propriety thereof) shall be filed or heard."
o The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned

with the determination by the Court of the "just
compensation for the property sought to be taken." This is
done by the Court with the assistance of not more than
three (3) commissioners.
 The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the
evidence before, and findings of, the commissioners
would be final, too. It would finally dispose of the
second stage of the suit, and leave nothing more to
be done by the Court regarding the issue. . . .
• PD 42 effectively removes the discretion of the court in determining
the provisional value.
o What is to be deposited is an amount equivalent to the
assessed value for taxation purposes.
o No hearing is required for that purpose.
o All that is needed is notice to the owner of the property
sought to be condemned.
• Determination of just compensation is a judicial function (citing EPZA v
Dulay)
VISAYAN REFINING V CAMUS

• Military and aviation purpose is a public purpose
• Expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive
initiative of the Governor-General, without the aid of any special
legislative authority (to pay for the land to be acquired) other than
that already on the statute books.
  6 
o if the Government complies with the requirements of law
relative to the making of a deposit in court, provisional
possession of the property may be at once given to it, just as is
permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized
by law to exercise the power eminent domain.
o Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of land by

the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of
pain; and in the case of a forced taking of property against the
will of the owner, all that can be required of the government is
that should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by
law (DUE PROCESS) as and when those conditions arise.
• The power of ED is inseparable from sovereignty, being essential to the
existence of the state and inherent in government even in its most
primitive forms. No law is necessary to confer this right upon any
government exercise sovereign powers.
CITY OF MANILA V CORRALES

• Just compensation= market value
• Reasonable Market Price: The owner of the property should not take
advantage of the necessity of the public purpose of requiring the
government to pay more than their property is worth; neither should
the government be permitted to the property of private persons at a
less price than it is reasonably worth at the time of the expropriation
• Owner has right to its value for the use for which it would
bring the most in the market.
• Market value: value which purchasers would generally pay for it
• LO is entitled to recover the value of the land at the time it was
expropriated. He should not be charged with the expense necessary to
put the property so taken in the condition in which the public desires to
use it.
• Method of Ascertaining Value
o Value of the property cannot always be fixed by its actual rental
value. There is a difference between the actual value of the
property and the price for which it is rented at any particular
time. Rent is variable quantity. Value of the property cannot
always be capitalized on its rental value. Neither can the value
  7 
of property for expropriation purpose be based upon its actual
cost of construction.
o The inquiry must always be: What is the property worth on
the market, not merely as to its current use, but with
reference to the use to which it is plainly adapted
(malamang, potential transformation of the land, say from agri
residentialcommercial); that is to say, what is it worth,
from its availability for a valuable purpose?
PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF RIZAL V CARO DE ARAULLO

• Just compensation
• MV: unaffected by the subsequent change in the condition of the
property
• Condition of the property at the time taken, not at filing since in this
case, filing came way later
• Increase and decrease in value: no such thing as steady increase in
value of land, value must be determined by the general economic
condition prevailing and must be established by proof.
REPUBLIC V VDA DE CASTELVI

• “taking”
o physical taking
o not momentary
o under a color of authority
o public purpose
o oust enjoyment of property
• ELEMENTS OF TAKING:
1. expropriator must enter a private property
2. entrance must be for more than a momentary period
3. under a warrant or color of legal authority
4. purpose must be devoted to a public use
5. utilization of the property for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all the beneficial
enjoyment of the property.
• Momentary: limited period, not indefinite
• Mere notice of intention to expropriate cannot bind the LO;
expropriation must commence in court
  8 
• lease contract: momentary taking, and enjoying rentals thus no oust of
enjoyment
• Under the ROC, just compensation must be determined as of the date
of filing of the complaint.
o Assumption: taking coincides with the commencement of the
expropriation proceeding or subsequent to the filing of the
complaint for ED
Market value (-consequential damage) + (consequential benefit)

• Consequential benefit cannot exceed damage, otherwise LO will be
deprived of proper compensation
EPZA V DULAY
• Short version: P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794 and 1533 was declared unconsti
because it deprives the court of its discretion, judicial determination of
just compensation
• We declared as unconstitutional and void, for being, inter alia,
impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives which
tends to render the Court inutile in a matter which, under the
Constitution, is reserved to it for final determination, the method of
ascertaining just compensation prescribed in P.D. Nos. 76 464, 794
and 1533, to wit: the market value as declared by the owner or
administrator or such market value as determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower in the first three (3) decrees, and the value
declared by the owner or administrator or anyone having legal interest
in the property or the value as determined by the assessor, pursuant
to the Real Property Tax Code, whichever is lower, prior to the
recommendation or decision of the appropriate Government office to
acquire the property, in the last mentioned decree.
SEC 8 REPORT
• Amend
• Study further
• Reject
• Accept
• Court has control of over commissioner
  9 
SEC 9
• Conflicting claimant
o Payment to court
SEC 11
• Appeal will not delay taking
• Will not stay order of expropriation
TAKING before FILING

• Because there’s maybe leasing
• There’s negotiation, then offer
• Nego necessary?
o Necessary:
 govt need not resort to court if there’s settlement
 in cases of delegated power of ED, law requires LGU to
make an offer
o Not necessary:
IF GOVERNMENT DOES NOT PAY

• Remedy:
o Cannot return
o Cannot execute because public funds cannot be executed
o Corcusuela, irrigation case by NIA, no payment
 Went to RTC for WRIT of exec
 SC: 10 years, government cannot escape liab, congress
has already allotted for the project, cannot say that
there’s no fund to pay, and the project was earning
money, NIA must pay through a writ of execution
APPROPRIATIONS FOR PAYMENT

• Specific
STATE CANNOT BE SUED WITHOUT ITS CONSENT

• By taking/filing case of expropriation, the RP government waives its
immunity
INTEREST
• From the time of taking (Benguet Consolidated inc v Republic)
  10 
• To hold government to pay immediately
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED v REPUBLIC

• the fact that Benguet had a subsisting mineral claim over the land will
not prevent the government from expropriating the land so long as it
will serve a public purpose (to build a PMA training institution for AFP
officers and DND
• Also, Benguet already waived their right to question the right to
expropriation, as they were already questioning the amount of
compensation in their MR.
  11 
RULE 68 FORECLOSURE Diane Shayne
Defendants
• Mortgagor
• Junior encumbrances
o If not included in the case
 Cannot annul but decision not binding
 Can exercise equity of redemption
• Purchasers etc
Indispensable and necessary parties in foreclosure complaint

• Indispensable: Mortgagor and mortgagee.
• Plaintiff: mortgagee
Modes of foreclosure of real estate mortgage

• Judicial – Rule 68
o Used if there is no special power inserted in or attached to the
REM contract allowing an EJF sale
• Extrajudicial – Act No. 3135, as am. by Act No. 4118
o Used if there is a special power inserted in or attached to the
REM contract allowing an EJF sale.
Modes of foreclosure of chattel mortgage

• Judicial – Rule 68; Replevin under Rule 60
SENO v PESTOLANTE
• RTC has jurisdiction, basis of value is the actual amount of the chattel
not the remaining balance of the debt
• Foreclosure or writ of replevin: valid to recover possession by M’gee
Complaint in action for foreclosure (Sec 1)

• In an action for the foreclosure of a mortgage or other encumbrance
upon real estate, the complaint shall set forth:
o The date and due execution of the mortgage;
o Its assignments, if any;
o The names and residences of the mortgagor and the mortgagee;
o A description of the mortgaged property;
o A statement of the date of the note or other documentary
evidence of the obligation secured by the mortgage, the amount
claimed to be unpaid thereon; and
o The names and residences of all persons having or claiming an
interest in the property subordinate in right to that of the holder
of the mortgage, all of whom shall be made defendants in the
action.
Sec 2 if facts in section 1 are true:

• Order payment of
o Equity of redemption 90-120 days, or before the confirmation of
sale
• Public auction R39
LIMPIN V IAC
• Assignees of mortgagor assumes the rights and obligations of the
mortgagor
• Limpin only assumes the right of Butuan Bay to redeem
• Effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the date of
registration of the mortgage
• It is well settled that a recorded mortgage is a right in rem, a hen on
the property whoever its owner may be. The recordation of the
mortgage in this case put the whole world, petitioners included, on
constructive notice of its existence and warned everyone who
thereafter dealt with the property on which it was constituted that he
would have to reckon with that encumbrance.
• Hence, Limpin's subsequent purchase of the "interests and
participation" of Butuan Bay Wood Export Corporation in the lots
covered by TCTs Nos. 92836 and 92837, as well as the sale of the
same to Sarmiento on November 21, 1981, were both subject to said
mortgage.
• On the other hand, Ponce's purchase of the lots mortgaged to him at
the foreclosure sale on October 12, 1983, was subject to no prior lien
or encumbrance, and could in no way be affected or prejudiced by a
subsequent or junior lien, such as that of Limpin. Petitioner Sarmiento
having acquired no better right than his predecessor-in-interest,
petitioner Limpin, his title must likewise fail.
• The fact that at the time Ponce foreclosed the mortgage on October
21, 1983, the lots had already been bought by Limpin and
subsequently sold to Sarmiento is of no consequence, since the settled
doctrine is that the effects of the foreclosure sale retroact to the
  13 
date of registration of the mortgage, i.e., March 1, 1973 in the
present case.
QUIMSON V CA
• Right of redemption (1 year) runs from date of registration of sale.
Actual notice of sale by the judgment-debtor or redemptioner is
immaterial.
• The person entitled to the right of redemption is necessarily the owner
of the property sold and not any third party.
• Redemption price: amount fixed by the court in the order of
execution with interest at the rate specified in the mortgage, and all
the costs and other judicial expenses incurred by reason of the
execution, sale and for the custody of the said property, not just the
amount for which the property was acquired at the foreclosure sale.
Right of Redemption
• Judicial foreclosure
o Applies only if a mortgagor is a bank or financial institution
o Period: 1 year from the registration of sale
• Extrajudicial
o 1 year period from date of sale
o except: mortagor corp with mortgagee bank, 3months to
redeem from date of foreclosure or registration in the RD,
whichever is higher
RAMOS V MANALAC
• After the confirmation of sale, writ of possession is ministerial
o the issuance of a writ of possession in a foreclosure
proceedings is not an execution of judgment within the
purview of section 6, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court, but is
merely a ministerial and complementary duty of the court
can undertake even after the lapse of five (5) years,
provided the statute of limitations and the rights of third persons
have not intervened in the meantime (Rivera vs. Rupac, 61
Phil., 201).
o This is the correct interpretation of section 6, Rule 39, in relation

to section 3, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. This is a case where
  14 
the judgment involved is already final executed, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and the
properties mortgaged sold by order of the court, and purchaser
thereof has transferred them to a third person, who desires to
be placed in their possession.
o In the exercise of its interlocutory duty to put and end to the

litigation and save multiplicity of an action, no plausible reason
is seen why the court cannot issue a peremptory order to place
the ultimate purchaser in the possession of the property.
o The general rule is that after a sale has been made under a
decree in a foreclosure suit, the court has the power to
give possession to the purchaser, and the latter will not
be driven to an action at law to obtain possession. The
power of the court to issue a process and place the purchaser in
possession, is said to rest upon the ground that it has power to
enforce its own decrees and thus avoid circuitous action
and vexatious litigation (Rovero de Ortega vs. Natividad, 71
Phil., 340).
GRIMALT V VELASQUEZ
• Notice of hearing needed
• Failure to notify: ground to nullify the foreclosure
• In this case however, foreclosure sale was not affirmed since the
mortgagor, even before the confirmation of sale, deposited to the
sheriff the full amount of the judgment, +interest+cost (validly
redeemed the mortgaged property). Sy, the purchases in the
foreclosure sale ordered to be reimbursed for his purchase price
without interest.
o Persons who bid at a foreclosure sale are assumed to know that
the mere fact of being the highest bidder does not vest such
bidder with the ownership of the property.
o The action by which the ownership of the property is
conveyed is the approval of the sale by the court.
o If the debtor discharges the obligation at any time before
a valid order is entered, confirming the sale, the right of
the bidder is limited to the return of the money paid by
  15 
him to cover his bid. The debtor, in paying the creditor the
amount of the judgment for the purpose of discharging his
property from the lien of the mortgage of discharging his
property from the lien of the mortgage, infringes no right
whatever of the bidder.
o Consequently, it is error to require the mortgagor to pay the
bidder interest upon sum deposited by him.
o Interest is payable by virtue of a contractual undertaking, or as
a result of the breach of an obligation after the obligor has been
put in default.
o With respect to one who becomes a bidder at a foreclosure sale,
the owner of the mortgaged property is in no sense a
debtor of any person who voluntarily takes part in the
bidding.
o The mortgagor by paying to the plaintiff the amount of her debt,
for the purpose of freeing her property from the lien of the
mortgage, makes use of a right, which in no sense violates any
right of the bidder. The latter, by making his bid and depositing
the money, does not acquire a right but a mere expectancy,
subject to the contingency of a valid approval of the sale by the
court before the mortgage on the property is discharged by
payment.
SY v CA, SIHI
• EJF: amount of redemption under sec 78 of the GBA amending 3135
WTR banks is = to mortgage debt +interest and cost/expenses
• SIHI is a financial intermediary is within the purview of sec 78 of the
GBA, which amends Act 3135 insofar as redemption price when the
mortgagee is a bank or banking or credit institution, that the amount
at which the property shall be redeemable from SIHI is the amount
due under the mortgage deed, or the outstanding obligation of
mortgagor + interest+expenses. Thus, when the petitioner failed to
pay this entire amount (Sy only paid the purchase price plus the
1% interest per month until date of redemption), no valid
redemption was effected by him and consequently, there was no legal
obstacle for SIHI to consolidate its title over the property.
  16 
TOLENTINO V CA
• Valid tender of payment: filing of action to enforce foreclosure (formal
offer to pay/redeem) + check payment (established as payment to
commercial usage
• Tolentino can redeem other property mortgage to BPI, but not
anymore the property validly redeemed by Dela Cruz pursuant to CA
141 (homestead patent) from BPI
• The right of redemption is not an obligation but an absolute privilege.
A bonafide tender of the redemption price and formal offer to redeem
is not essential where the redemption is being exercised by way of
judicial action. A redemption is not rendered invalid by the fact that
the sheriff accepted a check rather than casj. The exercise of this right,
being optional, no importance can be attached to the facts that a stop
payment order was issued.
• Redemptioner should pay: auction price + 1% interest per month upt
to the time of redemption, together with the taxes or assessment paid
by the purchaser after the purchase.
• Payment by check: A check as a medium of payment in commercial
transaction is too firmly established by usage to permit any doubt
upon this point at the present day
GRAVINA V CA
• Personal notice, not required in Act 3135
• Requires only posting and publication if the value is more than Php400
• DECISION
o Section 3 of Act No. 3135 (Mortgage Law) requires only the
posting of the notices of sale in three public places and the
publication of the same in a newspaper of general circulation.
Personal notice is not required.
Sec. 3 Notice shall be given by posting notices of the
sale for not less than twenty days in at least three public
places of the municipality or city where the property is
situated, and if such property is worth more than four
hundred pesos, such notice shall also be published once a
week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the municipality or City.
  17 
o In the case of Philippine National Bank vs. International
Corporate Bank, 129 SCRA 508, 509, the Court likewise ruled
that:
 The contention of private respondent in its opposition
that the extrajudicial foreclosure is null and void for
failure of the petitioner to inform them of the said
foreclosure and the pertinent dates of redemption so that
it can exercise its prerogatives under the law is untenable.
There being obviously no contractual stipulation therefor,
personal notice is not necessary and what governs is the
general rule in Section 3 of Act 3135, as amended, which
directs the posting of notices of the sale in at least three
(3) public places of the municipality where the property is
situated, and the publication thereof in a newspaper of
general circulation in said municipality.
o There is no merit in petitioners' contention that the sale of the

foreclosed property to Lucila Edna Tan, an employee of the
bank, was invalid. In the first place, the Tans did not buy the
property from the mortgagee, the Daily Savings and Loan
Association, but from the Mercantile Financing Corporation.
Secondly, it is not prohibited for the bank to sell to its employee
property acquired by the bank at a mortgage foreclosure sale.
The claim of the petitioners that there was collusion between
DLSA and the Tans was not proven. The Court of Appeals held:
 As to the argument of the appellant that there was
conspiracy and collusion among the plaintiffs and the third
party defendants, the trial court held that there was no
sufficient proof to sustain the defense and We see no
cogent reason for Us to disturb these findings of fact on
appeal.
OUANO V CA
• No republication provision as agreed: renders the foreclosure VOID
• Posting and republication is jurisdictional; it cannot be waived because
of public policy
• Purpose of notice: to inform the public of all interested parties to
participate in the auction
  18 
• To allow waiver amount to private auction
• DECISION:
o It is a well-settled rule that statutory provisions governing
publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be
strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations therefrom
will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable. In
a number of cases, we have consistently held that failure to
advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in compliance with
statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect
invalidating the sale. Consequently, such defect renders the sale
absolutely void and no title passes.
o Petitioner, however, insists that there was substantial

compliance with the publication requirement, considering that
prior publication and posting of the notice of the first date were
made.
o In Tambunting v. Court of Appeals, we held that

republication in the manner prescribed by Act No. 3135 is
necessary for the validity of a postponed extrajudicial
foreclosure sale. Thus we stated:
 Where required by the statute or by the terms of the
foreclosure decree, public notice of the place and time of
the mortgage foreclosure sale must be given, a statute
requiring it being held applicable to subsequent sales as
well as to the first advertised sale of the property.
[emphasis supplied].
o Petitioner further contends that republication may be waived
voluntarily by the parties.
 This argument has no basis in law.
 The issue of whether republication may be waived is not
novel, as we have passed upon the same query in
Philippine National Bank v. Nepomuceno
Productions Inc:
 Petitioner therein sought extrajudicial foreclosure of
respondent's mortgaged properties with the
Sheriff's Office of Pasig, Rizal. Initially scheduled on
August 12, 1976, the auction sale was rescheduled
  19 
several times without republication of the notice of
sale, as stipulated in their Agreements to Postpone
Sale. Finally, the auction sale proceeded on
December 20, 1976, with petitioner as the highest
bidder.
 Aggrieved, respondents sued to nullify the
foreclosure sale. The trial court declared the sale
void for non-compliance with Act No. 3135. This
decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals. Upholding the conclusions of the trial and
appellate court, we categorically held:
• Petitioner and respondents have absolutely
no right to waive the posting and publication
requirements of Act No. 3135
*in practice: bank post alternative dates of auction in case the original dates
don’t push through
* prove that the paper is of general circulation
YULIENCO V CA
• Under 3135, jurisdiction to issue writ of possession lies in the court
where the province, city, municipality, where the property is situated.
• DECISION
o Act 3135, otherwise known as “An Act to Regulate the Sale of
Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages,” mandates that jurisdiction over a
petition for a writ of possession lies in the court of the
province, city, or municipality where the property subject
thereof is situated. Section 7 of the said Act is clear on this
matter, thus:
 SEC. 7. In any sale made under the provisions of this
Act, the purchaser may petition the Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] of the province or place where
the property or any part thereof is situated, to give him
possession thereof during the redemption period,
furnishing bond in an amount equivalent to the use of the
property for a period of twelve months, to indemnify the
  20 
debtor in case it be shown that the sale was made without
violating the mortgage or without complying with the
requirements of this Act….
o Since the land subject of the controversy is located in Quezon
City, the city’s RTC should rightly take cognizance of the case, to
the exclusion of other courts.
o Neither can this Court consider the pendency of Special Civil

Case No. 93-2521 before Branch 61 of the Makati RTC a
procedural obstacle. Said action for injunction, reformation,
and damages does not raise an issue that constitutes a
prejudicial question in relation to the present case.
 A prejudicial question is one that arises in a case

the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the
issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It generally comes into
play in a situation where a civil action and a
criminal action are both pending and there exists in
the former an issue that must be preemptively resolved
before the criminal action may proceed, because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved
would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal case.The
rationale behind the principle of prejudicial
question is to avoid two conflicting decisions.
 Here, Special Civil Case No. 93-2521 and the present

one are both civil in nature and, therefore, no
prejudicial question can arise from the existence of
the two actions. It taxes our imagination how the
questions raised in Special Civil Case No. 93-2521 would
be determinative of Land Registration Case No. Q-11564
(99). The basic issue in the former is whether the
promissory note and mortgage agreement executed
between petitioners and private respondent ACC are valid.
In the latter case, the issue is whether respondent, armed
with a TCT in its name, is entitled to a writ of possession.
  21 
Clearly, the two cases can proceed separately and take
their own direction independently of each other.
o In the present case, petitioners cannot anchor their case

on the purported interest they have, as owners, over the
land and the improvements thereon. They have been
stripped of their rights over the property when, as
mortgagors, they failed to redeem it after foreclosure
took place. A mortgagor has only one year after
registration of sale with the Register of Deeds within
which to redeem the foreclosed real estate. After that
one-year period, he loses all his interests over it. This is
in consonance with Section 78 of Republic Act 337,
otherwise known as the “General Banking Act,” which
provides:
 SEC. 78. …In the event of foreclosure, whether judicially
or extrajudicially, of any mortgage on real estate which is
security for any loan granted before the passage of this
Act or under the provisions of this Act, the mortgagor or
debtor whose real property has been sold at public
auction, judicially or extrajudicially, for the full or partial
payment of an obligation to any bank, banking, or credit
institution, within the purview of this Act, shall have the
right, within one year after the sale of the real
estate as a result of the foreclosure of the
respective mortgage, to redeem the property by
paying the amount fixed by the court in the order of
execution… (Emphasis supplied.)
o Likewise, Section 6 of Act 3135 states:
 SEC. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made
under the special power hereinbefore referred to, the
debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial creditor
or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having
a lien on the property subsequent to the mortgage or
deed of trust under which the property is sold, may
redeem the same at any time within the term of one
year from and after the date of the sale;… (Emphasis
supplied.)
  22 
o Well established is the rule that after the consolidation of title in
the buyer’s name, for failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the
writ of possession becomes a matter of right. Its issuance
to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a
ministerial function.
 The writ of possession issues as a matter of course upon
the filing of the proper motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond.
 The judge issuing the writ following these express
provisions of law neither exercises his official discretion
nor judgment.
 As such, the court granting the writ cannot be charged
with having acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse
of discretion.
JUDICIAL FORECLOSURE
• Complaint
• Judgment
• 90-120 days
Equity of redemption 
• sale
• confirmation
• register w/ RD
• mortgage title remains but title is annotated
• if no right of redemption: new title issued
Judicial
• Pay fees
• Posting and publication
• Sale
• Certificate of sale
  23 
RULE 69 PARTITION Diane Shayne
Rule 69 Partition
(Sections 1 to 13)
Partition defined
• Villamor vs. CA (162 SCRA 574)
o Partition – a division between two or more persons of real or
personal property which they own as copartners, joint tenants or
tenants in common, effected by the setting apart of such
interests so that they may enjoy and possess it in severalty.
o The purpose of partition is to put an end to the common tenancy
of the land or co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the
individual interest of each joint owner vesting in each a sole
estate in specific property and giving to each one the right to
enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the
other.
MTC may have jurisdiction in actions for partition

• Real property - P20,000.00/P50,000.00
• Personal property – P300,000.00/P400,000.00
Final order decreeing partition and accounting appealable (Sec 2)

Appeal period – 30 days
• If after the trial the court finds that the plaintiff has the right thereto, it
shall order the partition of the real estate among all the parties in
interest. Thereupon the parties may, if they are able to agree, make
the partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance,
and the court shall confirm the partition so agreed upon by all the
parties, and such partition, together with the order of the court
confirming the same, shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the
place in which the property is situated.
• A final order decreeing partition and accounting may be appealed by
any party aggrieved thereby.
Note:
• Three stages in the action for partition each of which could be the
subject of appeal:
o Order of partition where the propriety of partition is determined;
o Judgment as to the accounting of the fruits and income of the
property;
o Judgment of partition
• The action hence, admits multiple appeals and would require a record
on appeal (Municipality of Binan vs. Garcia, as Cited in Riano) [hence
the 30-day appeal period]
Action for partition raises two issues

1. Whether plaintiff is co-owner of property
2. Assuming plaintiff is co-owner, how to divide the property between plaintiff
and defendant or among the co-owners
Who are indispensable parties

• All the co-owners (Rule 3, Sec 7)
Who may effect partition

• Alejandrino vs. CA (295 SCRA 536)
o Partition of the estate of a decedent may only be effected by:
1. The heirs themselves extrajudicially,
2. The court in an ordinary action for partition, or in the course
of administration proceedings,
3. The testator himself, and
4. The third person designated by the testator
Extrajudicial partition by heirs (Sec 1, Rule 74)

• If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of age, or
the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives
duly authorized for the purpose,
• The parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the
estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public
instrument filed in the office of the RD, and
• Should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary action of
partition.
• If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate
by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the RD.
• The parties to an extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition, or the
sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself by means of an
affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and as a condition precedent to
the filing of the public instrument, or stipulation in the action for
  25 
partition, or of the affidavit in the office of the RD, a bond with the said
RD, in an amount equivalent to the value of the personal property
involved as certified to under oath by the parties concerned and
conditioned upon the payment of any just claim that may be filed
under section 4 of this rule.
• It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files
a petition for letters of administration within 2 years after the death of
the decedent.
• The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or administration shall be
published in a newspaper of general circulation in the manner provided
in the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial settlement shall be
binding upon any person who has not participated therein or had no
notice thereof.
Partition of personal property (Sec 13)

• The provisions of this Rule shall apply to partitions of estates
composed of personal property, or of both real and personal property,
in so far as the same may be applicable.
• ATTY MELO: There’s no SC case involving partition of personal
property. Jurisdiction will most likely be based on the value of
the property.
Complaint in action for partition of real estate (Sec 1)

• A person having the right to compel the partition of real estate may do
so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his complaint the nature
and extent of his title and an adequate description of the real estate of
which partition is demanded and joining as defendants all other
persons interested in the property.
Commissioners to make partition when parties fail to agree

(Sec 3)
• If the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the court shall
appoint not more than 3 competent and disinterested persons as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to
the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of
the property as the court shall direct.
  26 
Oath and duties of commissioners (Sec 4)
• Before making such partition, the commissioners shall take and
subscribe an oath that they will faithfully perform
• their duties as commissioners, which oath shall be filed in court with
the other proceedings in the case.
• In making the partition, the commissioners shall view and examine the
real estate, after due notice to the parties to attend at such view and
examination, and
• Shall hear the parties as to their preference in the portion of the
property to be set apart to them and the comparative value thereof,
and
• Shall set apart the same to the parties in lots or parcels as will be most
advantageous and equitable, having due regard to the improvements,
situation and quality of the different parts thereof.
Assignment or sale of real estate by commissioners (Sec 5)

• When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate,
or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without prejudice to the
interests of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the
parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties
such amounts as the commissioners deem equitable, unless one of the
interested parties asks that the property be sold instead of being so
assigned, in which case the court shall order the commissioners to sell
the real estate at public sale under such conditions and within such
time as the court may determine.
Report of commissioners; proceedings not binding until confirmed

(Sec 6)
• The commissioners shall make a full and accurate report to the court
of all their proceedings as to the partition, or the assignment of real
estate to one of the parties, or the sale of the same.
• Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of court shall serve copies
thereof on all the interested parties with notice that they are allowed
ten (10) days within which to file objections to the findings of the
report, if they so desire.
• No proceeding had before or conducted by the commissioners shall
pass the title to the property or bind the parties until the court shall
  27 
have accepted the report of the commissioners and rendered judgment
thereon.
Action of the court upon commissioners‘ report (Sec 7)

• Upon the expiration of the period of ten (10) days referred to in the
preceding section, or even before the expiration of such period but
after the interested parties have filed their objections to the report or
their statement of agreement therewith, the court may, upon hearing,
accept the report and render judgment in accordance therewith; or,
• For cause shown, recommit the same to the commissioners for further
report of facts; or
• Set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or accept the
report in part and reject it in part; and
• May make such order and render such judgment as shall effectuate a
fair and just partition of the real estate, or of its value, if assigned or
sold as above provided, between the several owners thereof.
Accounting for rent and profits in action for partition (Sec 8)

• In an action for partition in accordance with this Rule, a party shall
recover from another his just share of rents and profits received by
such other party from the real estate in question, and the judgment
shall include an allowance for such rents and profits.
Power of guardian in such proceedings (Sec 9)

• The guardian or guardian ad litem of a minor or person judicially
declared to be incompetent may, with the approval of the court first
had, do and perform on behalf of his ward any act, matter, or thing
respecting the partition of real estate, which the minor or person
judicially declared to be incompetent could do in partition proceedings
if he were of age or competent.
Costs and expenses to be taxed and collected (Sec 10)

• The court shall equitably tax and apportion between or among the
parties the costs and expenses which accrue in the action, including
the compensation of the commissioners, having regard to the interests
of the parties, and execution may issue therefor as in other cases.
  28 
The judgment and its effect; copy to be recorded in registry of deeds
(Sec 11)
• If actual partition of property is made, the judgment shall state
definitely, by metes and bounds and adequate description, the
particular portion of the real estate assigned to each party,
o The effect of the judgment shall be to vest in each party to the
action in severalty the portion of the real estate assigned to him.
• If the whole property is assigned to one of the parties upon his paying
to the others the sum or sums ordered by the court, the judgment
shall state the fact of such payment and of the assignment of the real
estate to the party making the payment,
o The effect of the judgment shall be to vest in the party making
the payment the whole of the real estate free from any interest
on the part of the other parties to the action.
• If the property is sold and the sale confirmed by the court, the
judgment shall state the name of the purchaser or purchasers and a
definite description of the parcels of real estate sold to each purchaser,
o The effect of the judgment shall be to vest the real estate in the
purchaser or purchasers making the payment or payments, free
from the claims of any of the parties to the action.
• A certified copy of the judgment shall in either case be recorded in the
registry of deeds of the place in which the real estate is situated, and
the expenses of such recording shall be taxed as part of the costs of
the action.
Neither paramount rights nor amicable partition affected by this Rule

(Sec 12)
• Nothing in this Rule contained shall be construed so as to prejudice,
defeat, or destroy the right or title of any person claiming the real
estate involved by title under any other person, or by title paramount
to the title of the parties among whom the partition may have been
made;(in simple terms, hindi binding to a 3rd party who did not
take part in the partition case and he claims to have been
deprived of his right over the property)
• nor so as to restrict or prevent persons holding real estate jointly or in
common from making an amicable partition thereof by agreement and
  29 
suitable instruments of conveyance without recourse to an action. (nor
restricts the party from amicably settling to partition the
property)
Notes from Riano:

• Partition presupposes the existence of a co-ownership over a property
between two or more persons.
• Rule allowing partition originates from Art 494 that no co-owner shall
be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and he may demand at any
time the partition of the property owned in common.
• Instances when a co-owner may not demand partition:
o Agreement among the co-owners to keep the property undivided
for a certain period of time but not exceeding 10 years;
o Partition is prohibited by the donor or testator for a period not
exceeding 20 years;
o Partition is prohibited by law;
o Property is not subject to a physical division and to do so would
render it unserviceable for the use for which it is intended;
o Condition imposed upon voluntary heirs before they can demand
partition has not yet been fulfilled.
• Prescription does not run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his
co-owner or co-heirs as long as there is recognition of the co-
ownership expressly or impliedly.
• Action for partition cannot be barred by prescription as long as the co-
ownership exists.
• While action to demand partition does not prescribe, a co-owner may
acquire ownership thereof by prescription where there exists a clear
repudiation of the co-ownership and the co-owners are apprised of the
claim of adverse and exclusive ownership.
• Modes of partition:
o By agreement of the parties; or
o Judicial proceedings under Rule 69.
MELO LECTURE:
• WHO: co-owners of undivided interest
• WHEN: Partition anytime (imprescriptible)
o Except: if there’s an agreement not to partition; period of
indivision cannot exceed 20 years (Art 1083, NCC)
  30 
• WHERE: RTC
• PROCEDURE:
1. File complaint containing
a. Nature and extent of title
b. Adequate description if the real estate
c. Join defendant and interested parties
2. Answer
3. Trial
4. Order of Partition, 2 results:
a. If parties AGREES accounting of rents and profits
b. If parties DO NOT AGREE (see step 5)
5. Court appoints not less than 3 commissioners to report;
commissioners will consider the preferences of the
parties, order surveying, set apart the property in the
most advantageous and equitable division (considering
the improvements, situation and quality of the different
parts)
6. Upon filing of report, COC serves copies to the parties
who have 10 days to comment (sabi ng codal, object).
7. Court can either APPROVE or DISAPPROVE the report
8. If approved, there will be an order of execution, then
later, registration of the property in the RD. If disapprove,
the commissioners do the who process of determination
again.
MELO CASES:
RUSSEL V VESTIL
• RTC has jurisdiction over the case because an action to nullify
Declaration of heirs and Deed of Confirmation of Previous Oral
Partition is not capable of pecuniary estimation
o where the basic issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, where the money claim is purely
incidental to, or a consequence of, the principal relief sought,
this Court has considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of
money, and are cognizable exclusively by courts of first
instance.
  31 
o Examples of actions incapable of pecuniary estimation are
specific performance, support, foreclosure, annulling a deed of
sale or conveyance and to recover the price paid and rescission.
o Since the main purpose of the petitioners’ action is to
declare null and void the document which the private
respondents made, it is action which is incapable of pecuniary
estimation. While the complaint also prays for partition, it
is only incidental to the main action.
RUGIAN V RUGIAN
• Failure to implead the an indispensible party (a co-owner of the
property action for partition will not prosper
o There being no documentary evidence to support the contention
of defendant that the land was conveyed to him by his father,
and it appearing that a third person, Mariano Ruguian, had an
interest in the land, and he not being made party to this suit,
the SC held that the partition of the land cannot be granted. An
action will not lie for the partition of an undivided interest in
land without the joinder of all co-owners.
MIRANDA V CA
• After the issuance of the order of partition, such order is already
final/definitive judgment (since no appeal has been filed within the
reglementary period). If such order leaves out the rendition of
accounting, upon appeal, the succeeding judge can no longer review,
reverse or amend order of partition because the courts want to end the
controversy and determine with finality the rights of the parties (or
simply, put an end to litigation) already. Allowing such would result to
the possibility of 2 lower courts giving conflicting decision as to the
same case, thus prolonging litigation.
• Partition and Accounting are separate orders and are appealed
separately.
• NOTE here that Judge Tantuico, the successor, reviewed the evidence
only presented to the earlier Judge, Mendoza, and substituted his own
appreciation of the facts by reversing the earlier decision of Mendoza
to approve partition. Judge Tantuico based his new order from Dy
Chun v Mendoza where the order of partition was decided to be an
interlocutory. Court held that an order of partition is not interlocutory
  32 
because after such order, nothing is left to be done by the court on the
merits of the case WRT to partition.
• MELO summarized the doctrine as:
o the order of partition is not a interlocutory order, because what
was only left was the order of accounting.
o the succeeding judge had no authority to review the judgment
of the previous judge
 otherwise:
 it would result to an unsound policy where a new
judge can change an earlier judgment on the
merits of the case by a succeeding judge
 there would be a possibility of 2 orders on the same
issue by the same court which can be both subject
to an appeal
o doctrine under the case of Fuentabella and Dy Chun that an
order of partition is an interlocutory order is now
ABANDONED.
o Order of accounting: is incidental and an interlocutory order
which cannot be appealed per se; what you may only appeal is
the approval report by the commissioner by the court.
MUNICPALITY OF BIñAN V GARCIA

• Action for partition is subject to multiple appeals; it requires
ROA and given an appeal period of 30days from the receipt of
order
o In actions for eminent domain and for partition, no less than 2
appeals are allowed by law and the period for appeal is 30 days
counted from notice of order and not the ordinary period of 15
days prescribed for actions in general.
o A two-phase feature is found in an action for partition. The first
phase is the determination of w/n a co-ownership exists
and a partition is proper, and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase ends with a declaration (a) that plaintiff is not entitled to
have partition because a co-ownership doesn’t exist or the
partition is legally prohibited, or (b) that co-ownership exists,
partition is proper in the premises and an accounting of rents
and profits received by defendant is in order. In either case, the
  33 
decision is a final one and may be appealed by the party
aggrieved.
o The second phase commences when the parties fail to
agree upon the partition directed by the court. Partition
shall then be done for the parties by the court with the
assistance of not more than 3 Commissioners. This stage
may also deal with the rendition of the accounting itself
and its approval by the court after the parties have been heard
and awarded recovery of their share in the rents and profits in
the real property in question. This order shall also be final and
appealable.
 Accounting: basically which property goes to who
o the order of partition is final and executory and thus
appealable
MELO QUESTION:
• After the court approves the partition by the commissioners, is that
subject to appeal?
• ANSWER: YES. Appeal under Rule 45. Since there is nothing else to
dispose of and thus final and executory, the order is subject already to
appeal.
  34 
RULE 70 EJECTMENT Diane Shayne
Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer
Grounds One is deprived of physical One illegally withholds possession
possession of real property by after the expiration or
means of force, intimidation, termination of his right to hold
strategy, threats or stealth possession under any contract,
(FISTS). express or implied.
Start of Possession of defendant is
unlawful originally legal but became illegal
Possession of defendant is illegal
deprivation due to the expiration or
from the beginning
termination of the right to
possess.
Prior The issue is which party has prior Does not require prior physical
possession de facto possession possession
Procedure Action is summary in nature
Jurisdiction Jurisdiction lies in the proper MTC or MeTC
Prescriptive Action must be brought within 1 year from the date of actual entry
period on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last
demand, in case of unlawful detainer
Issue The issue is the right to physical possession
Nature of action Real actions
REYES V STA MARIA

• 3 actions to recover real property
o accion interdictal: to recover material possession or who has a
better right to possess
o accion publiciana: to recover possession de jure (fact of
ownership)
o accion reivindicatoria: to recover both ownership and
possession
• In accion interdictal, it is possible that the lessee has a better right to
possess over the owner while there is a lease contract subsisting
• CASE DECISION:
o The lower court erred in stating that the facts are only
constitutive of an action for unlawful detainer since the
complaint shows on its face that respondents' refusal to deliver
the possession of the property was due to their adverse claim of
ownership of the same property and their counter-allegation
that they had bought the same from a certain Pablo Aguinaldo
makes the petitioners' action one for recovery of their right to
possess the property (possession de jure) as well as to be
declared the owners thereof as against the contrary claim of
respondents.
o There are three kinds of actions for the recovery of possession

of real pro. property, namely, (1) the summary action for
forcible entry or detainer (accion interdictal) which seeks the
recovery of physical possession only and is brought within one
year in the justice of the peace court; (2) the accion publiciana
which is for the recovery of the right to possess and is a plenary
action in an ordinary civil proceeding in a Court of First
Instance; and (3) accion de reivindicacion which seeks the
recovery of ownership, also brought in the Court of First
Instance.
o The only issue in forcible entry and detainer cases is the

physical possession of real property possession de facto
and not possession de jure. If plaintiff can prove a prior
possession in himself, he may recover such possession even
from the owner himself. Whatever may be the character of his
prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has
the security that entitles him to stay on the property until he is
lawfully ejected by a person having a better right by either
accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria. Petitioners' action
was not merely for recovery of possession de facto. Their
action was clearly one of accion publiciana for recovery of
possession de jure if not one of accion reivindicatoria for
declaration of their ownership of the land. Such accion
publiciana or the plenary action in an ordinary civil
proceeding to determine the better and legal right to
possess (independently of title) clearly falls within the
jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance and not of the
Municipal Courts.
  36 
HILARIO V CA
• MTC has EOJ despite the defense of ownership was a raised
• Sec 16: defense of ownership MTC can determine provisional
ownership to determine the issue of possession, without prejudice to
an actual case in court to settle issue of ownership
• CASE DECISION:
o Issue: Whether or not the conflicting positions of the parties
would involve the question of ownership and thus divest the
MTC of its jurisdiction over the case?
 petitioner’s claim: their right to possess the subject
property pursuant to the deed of sale and
 private respondents’ insistence: they remained
owners of the realty because the purported deed of sale is
in reality a mortgage contract
Held: No. Sec. 33 of BP 129 stats that the Metropolitan Trial

Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible
entry and unlawful detainer, provided that when in such cases,
the defendant raises the question of ownership in his pleadings
and the question of possession cannot be resolved without
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall
be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. At
present, all forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases have to be
tried pursuant to the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure
regardless of whether or not the issue of ownership of the
subject property is alleged by the party. Decision of the MTC is
affirmed: that case involved UD, and thus MTC had jurisdiction.
WILMON AUTO SUPPLY V CA

• UD case in the MTC will not be abated when an action to annul the sale
is pending in the RTC
o UD case involves material possession
o Annulment of Sale involves possession de jure
• An ejectment case is not abated by the ff:
1. Injunction suits
2. Accion publiciana
  37 
3. Writ of possession case" where ownership is concededly the
principal issue
4. Action for quieting of title to property
5. Suits for specific performance with damages
6. Action for reformation of instrument
7. Action for reconveyance of property or "accion reivindicatoria"
8. Neither do suits for annulment of sale, or title, or document
affecting property
MUñOZ V CA
• Case differentiated FE and UD
Forcible Entry Unlawful Detainer
The possession of the land by the The possession of the defendant is
defendant is unlawful from the inceptively lawful but it becomes
beginning as he acquires it by force, illegal by reason of the termination of
intimidation, strategy or stealth his right to the possession of the
property under his contract with
plaintiff
The law does not require a previous Demand by plaintiff is jurisdictional

demand to vacate the premises
Plaintiff must prove that he was in Plaintiff need not be in prior

prior possession of the premises until possession
he was deprived of it by the
defendant
The one-year period is generally From the date of last demand

counted from the date of actual entry
on the land
  38 
• PR Garcia alleged that possession was illegal from the beginning (thus
implying forcible entry) BUT
o Garcia failed to show any muniment of title
o FISTS as ground were not raised
o Date of entry was not alleged to determine reckoning of
prescription
o Petitioner has been in physical possession for the last 12 years
• CASE DECISION:
o When the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible
entry or unlawful detainer, as where it does not state how the
entry was effected or how and when dispossession started, the
action should either be accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria.
o There was no mention in the complaint that he or his co-

owneres were in prior possession of the property. While it is true
that possession of the tenant is possession of the owner, the
complaint failed to state that Loreta Garcia was in prior
possession of the property at the time of entry by the
petitioners. While the complaint stated that the petitioners
obtained possession of the premises through stealth, it failed to
aver when this entry was accomplished or when the private
respondent learned of this entry. The failure of the private
respondent to allege the time when unlawful deprivation took
place is fatal because this will determine the start of the
counting of the one year period for the filing of the summary
action for forcible entry or unlawful detainer.
o If the private respondent is indeed the owner of the premises

and that possession of it was deprived from him for more than
12 years, he should present his claim before the RTC in an
accion publiciana or reinvindicatoria.
SUMULONG V CA
• Sumulong raised the ground of stealth and strategy
o BUT: the facts of the case defy the existence of stealth
(clandestine and secret) or strategy (by machination) because
negotiations between the parties for months
  39 
• It’s not the designation of FE in the complaint which governs but the
allegation which constitute elements of UD. In case of the latter,
ejectment prospers.
ONG V PAREL
• Case of no FE
• Counting of the period of prescription
o in case of stealth or strategy 1 year counted from discovery
o in case of UD  1 year from unlawful deprivation
• in this case, plaintiff failed to allege prior actual/physical possession
• court protects the one with the immediate need to the property.
• CASE DECISION:
o Section 1, Rule 70 provides that in actions for forcible entry, the
plaintiff is allegedly deprived of the possession of any land or
building by force, intimidation, threat, stealth, or strategy and
that the action is filed any time within one year form the time of
such unlawful deprivation of possession, except in stealth, in
which the one-year period is to be counted from the tine plaintiff
learned thereof.
o The spouses aver that the overhang and hollow block wall were
constructed through stealth and strategy. Stealth is defined as
any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid discovery and
to gain entrance into or remain within the residence of
another without permission. They failed to establish
encroachment of their property through stealth as it was not
shown when and how the alleged entry was made on the portion
of their lot. On the other hand, Parel stated that the overhang
and wall had already been existing when her grandmother was
in possession of the two lots, as she was the one who had them
made. Furthermore, Parel is in possession of the property; the
spouses have not proved any prior possession, which is required
in forcible entry cases.
o Spouses failed to allege and prove with specificity that Parel
unlawfully entered their portion of the lot either by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth; this action must thus
fail.
o It cannot also be considered as an action for unlawful detainer,
in which one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the
  40 
expiration or termination of his right to hold possession under
any contract, express or implied. There is no allegation that
Parel’s possession changed from legal to illegal anytime
from their alleged illegal entry before plaintiffs made
their demand to vacate. Nor was there any showing that
they merely tolerated Parel’s possession.
o Where the complaint fails to specifically aver facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how
and when dispossession started, the action should either
be accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
In UD, demand is jurisdictional.

• Exception to demand:
o FE
o Expiration of the term
Demand forms
• Oral, but subject to proof
• Written notice
• Posting allowed if no person is present in the premises
COTIAMCO V DIAZ
• Evidence of notice to vacate duly admitted, failure to allege the
existence of a notice to vacate in complaint is not fatal
• In the present ROC, case would not have prospered in favor of
Cotiamco, because demand is mandatory to be alleged in a UD
complaint
PENAS JR V CA
• UD, demand counted from the last demand (demand has to be a
new one)
o Except when the demand is only a reference to an earlier
demand, that will not reset the period. That the demand from
the earlier demand is still not waived. (Caniza)
CANIZA V CA
• Possession by mere tolerance is not indefinite and with an implied
promise to vacate upon demand
  41 
• It is also important to note that the 1 year period to file the complaint
for desahucio is reckoned from the date of last demand to vacate. The
reason being that the lessor has the option to waive his right of
action based on previous demands and let the lessee remain
meanwhile in the premises.
MUNOZ v CA 214 SCRA 216 1992

• Entry by FISTS, subsequently tolerated, cannot be transformed as UD
• RATIO: if this is allowed, no one will use FE, and the 1 year period
prescription therein; tolerance to stay will be allowed and plaintiffs will
simply rely on filing UD
CETUS DEVELOPMENT INC V CA

• No cause of action for UD because upon demand to pay, respondents
immediately paid
• In a month to month lease, there is no lease K. Thus, to incur delay,
there must be demand. Cetus made one demand to pay and vacate,
otherwise respondents will be ejected. After demand to pay and
payment within the prescribed period, THERE’S NO BREACH OF K yet.
Cetus should have made a second demand.
• CASE DECISION:
o Under Sec 2: Two requisites in an ejectment suit,
1) there must be failure to pay rent or comply with the
conditions of the lease, and
2) there must be demand both to pay or to comply and vacate
within 15 days in case of lands, and 5 days in case of buildings.
In this case, there’s no cause of action for ejectment since PRs
paid after the 1st demand.
• MELO SAYS:
o 1st demand is demand to put lessess in delay (mora)
 solution: in lease K, write that rent should be paid at a
certain date without need of demand (thus after that
date, there’s delay already)
nd
o 2 demand is demand to comply with section 2 (demand to
pay)
o There must be proper demand
 1st demand: specific performance
 2nd to pay and vacate
  42 
o Law gives lessee 2 opportunities to pay
HEIRS OF SUICO V CA
• The allegation of ownership was raised merely to underscore
respondents’ claim that petitioners’ demand for rental increase for
several times was harsh and oppressive disregarding the close
relationship between the petitioners’ grandma and the respondents’
parents. Notably, respondents never asked for the value of their bldg.,
but only sought that the complaint be dismissed, or in the alternative,
that the lease period be fixed, with moral damages, attorney’s fees,
and litigation expenses in either case. Also, the respondents in fact did
not set up the defense of MTC’s lack of jurisdiction on the basis of
issue of ownership.
• The parties to the oral lease in question (grandma Emilia and
respondents’ parents) did not fix a specified period therefor. However,
since the rentals were paid monthly, the lease, even if verbal, may be
deemed to be on monthly basis, expiring at every month. In such
case, a demand to vacate was not even necessary for judicial
action after the expiration of every month.
• As to the issue of RTC’s extension lease period for 5 years from 1993-
1998, the Court reversed this. Instead, the SC found MTC’s ruling
more in accord with justice and equity. The respondents and their
parents had been in possession of the premises for 43 yrs. At
first, respondents were paying relatively meager price at P30 a
month, then P360, before a demand to increase it at P1200 was
made. This meager rent was due to the fact that the original lessor,
grandma Emilia, and defendants’ parents were close. Obviously, the
respondents had already benefitted from this fact. Also, the
extension of 5 yrs was almost obtained (since this case was
resolved already in 1997).
• The RTC also erred when it ruled that after the expiration of the
5-yr lease period, the property vacated shall become the
property of the petitioners. The Civil Code provides that the lessors
would only become the owners if they choose to reimburse the
respondents, as of the termination of term, ½ of the value of the
house constructed. If they refuse to reimburse, the respondents’
remedy is to remove the house.
  43 
MARA INC V ESTRELLA
• A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may
within 10 days from the filing of a complaint present a motion to
secure from the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a
writ of preliminary injunction to restore him in his possession.
The court shall decide the motion within 30 days from the filing
thereof.” This has been incorporated in Sec. 3, Rule 70.
• Injunction initially dissolved by posting of counterbond by de Leon;
counterbond was a check and not given to the lessor
• The injunction contemplated in article 539 is an exception to
the general rule that the writ of injunction is not proper where
its purpose is to take property out of the possession or control
of one person and place it in the hands of another whose title
has not clearly been established by law.
• In this case, the Torrens titles of Mara, Inc. to the four lots appear
to be unassailable. De Leon in his answer merely pretended lack
of knowledge of said titles. He has also not shown any
indubitable right to possess the said lots. The judge should not
have dissolved the bond.
BALAGTAS V CA
• To stay execution
o perfection of appeal
o Supersedeas bond (past rental/damages) within the period of
appeal
o Periodically deposit monthly which becomes due during the
pendency of thhe appeal (amount depends on the amount or
rental adjudged by the court)
• Otherwise: issuance of writ of execution is ministerial
• CASE DECISION:
o Issue: Whether or not respondent Judge acted without and/or
in excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion
in denying petitioner's Motions for Immediate Ejectment
Execution.
  44 
o Held: Yes. Under Rule 701 of the Revised Rules of Court,
judgment in favor of the plaintiff must be executed immediately
in order to prevent further damages to him arising from
continued loss of possession. However, the defendant may stay
execution:
 (a) by perfecting an appeal and filing a supersedeas
bond, and
 (b) by paying promptly from time to time either to the
plaintiff or depositing with the Court of First Instance the
adjudged reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the property.
This rule is mandatory, the exception being when the delay is

2
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence. In
the case at bar, it is uncontradicted that private respondents
posted their respective supersedeas bonds to answer for
rentals and damages accruing down to the time of the
perfection of their appeals in January, 1977. What is
controverted is whether or not there is compliance with the
second requisite which is the payment of the monthly rentals
as they fell due. Private respondents insist that they correctly
                                                        
1
Section 8. If judgment is rendered against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal
has been perfected, and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond, approved by the municipal or
city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents,
damages and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless during the pendency
of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time under the
contract, if any, as found by the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. In the absence of a contract,
he shall deposit with the court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment, on or before the tenth day of each
succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the municipal or city court, with
the other papers, to the clerk of the Court of First Instance to which the action is appealed. Should the
defendant fail to make the payments above prescribed from time to time during the pendency of the appeal,
the appellate court, upon motion of the plaintiff, of which the defendant shall have notice, and upon proof of
such failure, shall order the execution of the judgment appealed from with respect to the restoration of
possession, but such execution shall not be a bar to the appeal taking its course until the final disposition
thereof on its merits.
  45 
paid P1,000 as rentals as provided in the Letter-Contract2
dated April 21, 1976 (Exhibit A), which was sustained and
upheld by the Pasay City Court as the new lease contract
governing the relations between the petitioner and private
respondents.
o The Court held that since the dispositive part of the decision of
the Pasay City Court adjudged and ordered the
respondents "to each pay to the petitioner Two Thousand
Pesos (P2,000.00) monthly rentals from May 1, 1976 until
each of them finally and respectively vacates his/her
respective apartment-premises subject matter of these
summary complaints," anything said in the body of the
opinion about the P1,000.00 discount if a lessee pays his/her
rental within the first three days of the month, is merely an
obiter.
o Where there is conflict between the dispositive part and
the opinion of a decision, the former must prevail over
the latter. When respondents effected monthly deposits of less
than P2,000.00, they violated the condition imposed by Section
8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court.
o The law providing that in case the defendant appeals, he
must pay to the plaintiff or into the CFI the amount fixed
as rent on or before the 10th day of each calendar month,
and that failure to do so shall cause the judgment to be
executed, is mandatory and cannot be evaded. The court
has no discretion to give or not to give effect to such failure to
pay. Failure of the defendant to deposit on time the
monthly reasonable value of the use and occupation of
the property or the rents fixed in the judgment is a
ground for execution of such judgment as a matter of
right the duty of the court to order such execution being
ministerial and imperative.
                                                        
2
Rental. P2,000.00 per month period payable by you to us, through our collector, within the first three days of
each corresponding month period; provided, however, that you shall be granted by us an initial discount of
Pl,000.00 for each monthly rental paid on time, but this discount shall not in anywise amend the aforesaid
rental,
  46 
CHUA V CA
• bond was filed out of time
• lame excuse that the amount of the bond is unknown to them: court
said, they could have mathematically computed back rentals
• excuse of not knowing where to file the supersedeas: should’ve been
filed in the MTC who issued the judgment (it’s in the ROC)
o Period to pay supersedeas: within period to file appeal
• CASE DECISION:
o Issue: After the expiration of the period for perfecting an
appeal, did the RTC have the authority to se the amount of and
accept a supersedeas bond to stay the immediate execution of
a decision in an ejectment suit pending appeal?
o Held: NO. As a genera rule, a judgment in favor of the plaintiff
in an ejectment suit is immediately executory, in order to
prevent further damage to him arising from the loss of
possession of the property in question. To stay immediate
execution of the said judgment while the appeal is pending, the
foregoing provision requires that the following requisites must
concur:
(1) the defendant perfect his appeal;
(2) he files a supersedeas bond; and
(3) he periodically deposits the rentals which become due
during the pendency of the appeal.
o In this case, the bond was filed out of time. The motion for
execution was filed 18 days from the date the petitioners
received a copy of the MTC’s decision, after the appeal had
already been perfected. Because no supersedeas bond has been
filed within the period to appeal, a writ of execution should have
been issued as a matter of right. Petitioners manifestly failed to
adduce a compelling reason to justify a departure from the
aforecited rule.
DE LAUREANO V ADIL
• The reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises
is that fixed by the inferior court in its judgment because the
rental stipulated in the lease contract that had expired might no longer
be the reasonable value for the use and occupation of the premises by
the reason of the change or rise in value.
  47 
• The purpose of the supersedeas bond is to secure payment of
the rents and damages adjudged in the appealed judgment.
Hence, the bond is not necessary if the defendant deposits in court the
amount of back rentals as fixed in the judgment. In other words, the
supersedeas bond answers only for rentals was in the judgment
and not for those that may accrue during the pendency of the
appeal which are guaranteed by the periodical deposits to be
made by the defendant.
• Since respondent only filed an inadequate bond based on the error of
the city court, he should be allowed to file the correct amount 30 days
from notice.
Complaint:
• Plaintiff has 5 days for writ of PMI
• Court can also dismiss the complaint outright
• 10 days to answer
• 10 days to answer to CC
o no MTD,
o all pleadings must be verified
o summary proceedings: your pleading forms part of evidence
o note the prohibited pleadings (see case of Wilmon v CA)
• preliminary conf
o like pre-trial
o failure to appear, order of default
• order prelim conf
o setting out facts, stipulations
• 10 days to submit evidence in the form of affidavits
o no hearings in ejectment
• decision
o sometime takes more than usual
o MTC decision immediately exec
 to stop/stay execution: appeal, supersedeas and periodic
deposit
 if RTC affirms, execution cannot be stayed anymore
because RTC decision is executory
LEASE K
• Can you include provision that lessor can eject for non payment?
  48 
o NO. Rule 70 exists to prevent self-help.
• Stipulation is not void per se, but cannot be enforced with force
(FUTILE DIBA?)
o If lessee doesn’t want to vacate, ejectment must be filed by
lessor.
o When can the provision be relevant?
 If lessee abandons the property (say, bumaha, dahil
kay Ondoy) and lessor enters possession (nung natuyo
yun baha, nasalisihan yung nangungupahan), lessee
cannot recover through an ejectment case anymore
(wala ka nang karapatan, overstaying ka na nga eh).
Ejectment
• Enforceable against heirs and successors
• Everyone in the bldg even if not related to the lessee is considered a
successor.
• Remedy against “new” successors/occupants: file a motion to include
the current occupants
  49 
RULE 71 CONTEMPT Diane Shayne
Contempt
1. Direct
• near or in the presence of the court
• generally, refusal to follow the order of the court
2. Indirect
Another Classification
• civil
o against the interest of a litigant
o equated to indirect
• criminal
o against the court, tending to impede or obstruct admin of justice
o equated to direct
Power of contempt
• Inherent in the court, no enabling
• Admin-needs implementing law
• Quasijudicial- empowered
ANG V CASTRO
• Not a case for direct contempt
• Order to appear: did not appear, not a direct contempt
• Indirect contempt
Rule on Subjudice
• Statements criticizing the court while proceedings are pending
• General rule
o Such statements can be punished for contempt if it will tend to
pressure the court to decide one way or the other or influence
decision of the court
o Defenses: fair reporting
o Diverse rules on post litigation comments:
 3 doctrines (GODOY CASE)
 English: attack on the institution and should not go
unpunished
 American: once terminated, free for all; more
importance to right of the ppl to comment or
criticize the action of the adjudge since the purpose
of subjudice is to prevent influence which is not
present anymore if the case has terminated;
criticism open for all; judge is a private citizen and
subject to criticism
 Philippine doctrine: balancing of interest
• Gr: American
• Except: if case results to degradation of faith
in the justice system by the public
• Differentiate insults from criticism
o Case of in re sotto: disciplined not as
Senator, but as a lawyer; contempt
can go side by side an admin case for
discipline; contempt does not preclude
libel
PROCEDURE
• DIRECT, summary judgment, no hearing, DP because in flagrente
delicto and endangering proceedings in the court
• INDIRECT, there must be a charged by a litigant of the court;
respondent is given opportunity to comment; decision can be
appealed; execution can be stayed by appeal +bond
Direct and indirect contempt (Español vs. Formoso)

Direct Contempt Indirect Contempt
Direct contempt is a contumacious act Indirect or constructive contempt is one
done facie curiae and may be punished perpetrated outside of the sitting of the court
summarily without hearing – one may be and may include misbehavior of an officer of a
summarily adjudged in contempt at the court in the performance of his official duties
very moment or at the very instance of or in his official actions, disobedience of or
the commission of the act of contumely. resistance to a lawful writ, process, order,
judgment, or command of a court, or
injunction granted by a court or judge, any
abuse or any unlawful interference with the
process or proceedings of a court not
constituting direct contempt, or any improper
conduct tending directly or indirectly to
impede, obstruct or degrade the
administration of justice.
  51 
Criminal and civil contempt (Riano)
Criminal Contempt Civil Contempt
Conduct directed against the authority and Failure to do something ordered to be done
dignity of the court or a judge acting by a court or a judge for the benefit of the
judicially; an obstructing of the opposing party therein and is therefore, an
administration of justice, which tends to offense against the party in whose behalf the
bring the court into disrepute or disrespect. violated order was made.
Purpose is to punish. To vindicate the Purpose is to compensate for the failure to
authority of the court and protect its do something ordered by the court for the
outraged dignity. benefit of a party.
Conducted in accordance with the principles Generally held to be remedial and civil in
and rules applicable to criminal case, in so nature, for the enforcement of some duty,
far as such procedure is consistent with the and essentially a remedy resorted to, to
summary nature of contempt proceedings. preserve and enforce the rights of a private
The strict rules that govern criminal party to an action and to compel obedience
prosecutions apply to prosecutions for to a judgment or decree intended to benefit
criminal contempt that the accused is to be such a party litigant. The rules of
afforded many of the protections provided in procedure governing contempt proceedings
regular criminal cases and that proceedings or criminal prosecutions, ordinarily are
under statutes governing them are to be inapplicable to civil contempt proceedings.
strictly construed. However, criminal
proceedings are not required to take any
particular form as long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.
  52 
MELO CASES:
• HALILI V COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
o Contempt defined
 Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or
dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring the
authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
to interfere with or prejudice parties litigant or their
witnesses during litigation (12 Am. jur. 389, cited in 14
SCRA 813).
 Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the
court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and
dignity. It signifies not only a willful disregard or
disobedience of the court's orders, but such conduct as
tends to bring the authority of 'the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to
impede the due administration of justice (17 C.J.S. 4).
o Contempt powers inherent in all courts
 And is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice
o Enunciated the 2-fold aspect of contempt, citing Slade Perkins
case
o Court may suspend or debar a lawyer whose acts show
his unfitness to continue as a member of the bar
 The Court may suspend or disbar a lawyer for any
conduct on his part showing his unfitness for the
confidence and trust which characterize the attorney and
client relations, and the practice of law before the courts,
or showing such a lack of personal honesty or of good
moral character as to render him unworthy of public
confidence (7 C.J.S. 733).
 It is a well-settled rule that the statutory grounds for

disbarment or suspension are not to be taken as a
limitation on the general power of the courts in this
  53 
respect. The inherent powers of the court over its officers
cannot be restricted (In re Pelaez, 44 Phil. 567).
• SLADE PERKINS C DIR. OF PRISONS

o The CFI of Manila had jurisdiction over the offense
charged against the petitioner – contempt of court. It had
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner who was properly
brought before the court. It has jurisdiction to hear and to
decide upon the defenses offered by her.
o The general rule is that when the court has jurisdiction

over the offense and over the person, its judgments,
orders or decrees cannot be collaterally attacked by
habeas corpus.
o The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts; its

existence is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of the courts, and
consequently, to the administration of justice. Statutes
recognize the power of the CFI and of the judges thereof to
punish contempts of court.
o There 2 kinds of contempts:

 1)Direct contempts, which may be punished summarily;
and
 2) constructive contempts, which may be punished only
after due hearing.
 Direct contempt is misbehavior in the presence of or so

near the court or judge as to obstruct the administration
of justice, including the refusal of a person present in
court to be sworn as a witness or to answer as a witness
when lawfully required.
 Meanwhile, any of the following acts constitutes an

indirect contempt:
  54 
a. disobedience or or resistance to a lawful writ,
process, order, judgment, or command of a court,
or injunction granted by a court or judge;
b. misbehavior of an officer of the court in the
performance of his official duties…;
c. a failure to obey a subpoena;
d. the rescue or attempted rescue of a person or
property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an
order of the court held by him;
e. the person defeated in a civil suit… shall entern or
attempt to enter upon the real estate for purpose
of executing acts of ownership or possession….
 As to constructive contempts, the court shall

determine whether the accused is guilty of the
contempt charged; and if he be adjudged guilty, he may
be fined or imprisoned.
 If contempt consists in violation of injunction, he

may be ordered to make restitution to the party injured;
when contempt consists of omission to do an act, he
may be imprisoned until he performs it.
 Exercise of contempt has 2-fold aspect:

 1) the proper punishment of the guilty party for his
disrespect to the court or its order, and
 2) to compel his performance of some act or duty
required of him by the court, which he refuses to
perform.
 Due to this 2-fold aspect, contempts are classified as civil

or criminal.
 Civil contempt is the failure to do something
ordered to be done by a court or judge in a civil
case for the benefit of the opposing party therein;
and
 criminal contempt is a conduct that is directed
against the authority and dignity of a court or of a
  55 
judge acting judicially, as in unlawfully assailing or
discrediting the authority and dignity of the court or
judge, or in doing a duly forbidden act.
 Because of this 2-fold attribute, contempt is sui generis

although it being largely criminal in nature is universally
conceded.
o In a case, the court reiterated the 2 classes of contempt:

1) criminal and punitive in nature – those prosecuted to
preserve the power and vindicate the dignity of the
courts, and to punish for disobedience of their orders; and
2) civil, remedial, and coercive in nature – those
instituted to preserve and enforce the rights of private
parties to suits, and to compel obedience to orders and
decrees made to enforce the rights and administer the
remedies to which the court has found them to be
entitled.
 In criminal contempt, the government, the courts, and

the people are interested in their prosecution.
 In civil contempt, the parties chiefly in interest in their

conduct, and prosecution are the individuals whose
private rights and remedies they were instituted to
protect or enforce.
 A criminal contempt involves no element of personal

injury.
 But if contempt consists of refusal to do an act which is

ordered by the court to do in favor of the other party,
then that person is committed until he complies with the
order of the court. Such commitment is in the nature of
an execution to enforce judgment.
 In another case, the court said that it is not the fact

of punishment but rather its character and purpose
  56 
that makes the difference between the 2 kinds of
contempts.
 For civil contempt, the punishment is remedial
and for the benefit of the complainant, and a
pardon cannot stop it.
 For criminal, the sentence is punitive in the
public interest to vindicate the authority of
the court.
o In the present case, the distinction between civil and criminal

contempts, is not an important consideration. The question
whether the contempt for which the petitioner was
committed is civil or criminal does not affect either the
jurisdiction or the power of the court in the premises. The
dividing line between these 2 kinds of contempts
becomes indistinct in those cases where the 2 gradually
merge into each other.
• LIM SE V ARGEL
o Issue: W/N Atty. Adaza should be cited for contempt.
o Held: Yes.
 Atty. Adaza’s characterization of the mandatory injunction
as “unjust and a miscarriage of justice” and as devoid of
factual and legal basis is unfounded and unwarranted. He
treated a resolution of the Court as if it were a pleading of
the adversary which he could assail in unrestrained or
abrasive language. His unjustified and disrespectful
characterization carries with it obvious derogatory
implications or innuendos which clearly constitute direct
contempt or contempt in facie curiae.
• ANG V CASTRO
o Petitioner is guilty of indirect contempt (NOT DIRECT).
o Respondent Judge Castro erroneously argued that failure of
petitioner to appear, despite notice, on the scheduled hearing of
the contempt charge for the use of derogatory language in his
two letters addressed to the Office of the Presidential Assistant
on Legal Affairs in an administrative complaint against him
  57 
constitutes direct contempt as the acts actually impeded,
embarrassed and obstructed him in the administration of justice.
o The use of disrespectful or contemptuous language
against a particular judge in pleadings presented in
another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the
presence of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the
administration of justice.
o If the pleading containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the
proceedings are pending, it is direct contempt because it is
equivalent to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice. Being guilty of indirect contempt, petitioner may he
may appeal pursuant to Section 10, Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court. which reads:
 SEC. 10. Review of judgment or order by Court of
appeals or Supreme Court; bond for stay. — The
judgment or order of a Court of First Instance made in a
case of contempt punished after written charge and
hearing may be reviewed by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, but execution of the judgment or order
shall not be suspended until a bond is filed by the person
in contempt, in an amount fixed by the Court of First
Instance, conditioned that if the appeal be decided
against him he will abide by and perform the judgment or
order. The appeal may be taken as in criminal cases.
• IN RE: KELLY
o Facts: Kelly was charged and found guilty of contempt by the
Supreme Court. On February 24, 1916 he filed a motion for
reconsideration of the contempt on order. While the said case
was under reconsideration, he composed a letter to Don Vicente
Sotto, the editor of the independent, criticizing the action of
contempt before the court. The Court found that the said letter
was intended to obstruct or interfere with and impede the
administration of justice in the Contempt proceedings and the
motion made therein. It also held that Kelly’s publication of the
  58 
said letter tended to influence and affect the decision of the
Court. It ordered Kelly to appear before it and show cause why
a contempt order should not be issued against him. Kelly
argued that there was no law in the Philippines authorizing the
Supreme Court to punish him for the alleged contempt
committed.
o Issue: Whether or not the Court has authority to punish Kelly

for contempt for his offense?
o Held: Yes. The power to fine for contempt, imprison for

contumacy, or enforce the observance of order, are powers
which cannot be dispensed with in the courts, because they are
necessary to the exercise of all others. Courts of justice are
universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation,
with power to impose silence, respect, and decorum in the
presence and submission to their lawful mandates, and as
corollary to this provision, to preserve themselves and their
officers from the approach of insults and pollution.
• IN RE: LOZANO AND QUEVEDO

o Issue: W/N the SC has the power to punish for contempt,
the editor and the reporter of a newspaper, for publishing
and inaccurate account of the investigation of a CFI judge
notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind
closed doors and its confidential nature?
o Held: YES.
 The power to punish for contempt is inherent in the SC of
the Phil. This power extends to administrative proceedings
as well as to suits at law.
 Newspaper publication tending to impede obstruct
embarrass or influence the courts in administering justice
in a pending suit or proceeding constitute criminal
contempt which is summarily punishable by the courts.
The rule is otherwise after the cause is ended.
 It is regarded as an interference with the work of
the courts to publish any matter, which their policy
requires should be kept private.
  59 
 The constitutional guaranty of freedom of speech and
press must be protected in its fullest extent; but license
or abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizen should
not be confused with liberty in its true sense. As
important as its maintenance of an unmuzzled press
and the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is
the maintenance of the independence of the
Judiciary.
 The administration of justice and the freedom of the
press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred
and neither should be violated by the other. The right of
legitimate publicity must be scrupulously
recognized and care taken at all times to avoid
impinging upon it. On the other hand, the courts must
be permitted to proceed with the disposition of their
business in a orderly manner free from outside
interference obstructive of their constitutional
functions. (BALANCING OF INTERESTS between 2
important rights)
 The editor and the reporter of a newspaper who published
an inaccurate account of the investigation of a CFI judge
notwithstanding the investigation was conducted behind
closed doors, and a resolution of the SC which makes
such proceedings confidential in nature. Lozano (editor)
and Quevedo (writer) were declared in contempt and
were fined.
• PEOPLE V GODOY
o Facts: Judge cited Reynoso for contempt based on the latter’s
article in the newspaper (allegedly libelous to said judge).
o Issue: whether contempt may be committed for criticizing a
tribunal after the same has rendered decision or taken final
action on a matter which is the subject of criticism
o Held: There’s a need to make a distinction between adverse
criticism of the court's decision after the case is ended and
"scandalizing the court itself." The latter is not criticism; it is
personal and scurrilous abuse of a judge as such, in which case
it shall be dealt with as a case of contempt. Contempt
  60 
proceedings dismissed. Such comments may constitute a
libel against the judge, but it cannot be treated as in
contempt of the court's authority.
o Doctrine: In case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair
criticism of the court, its proceedings and its members, are
allowed. However, there may be a contempt of court, even
though the case has been terminated, if the publication is
attended by either of these two circumstances:
(1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in
other words, to scandalize the court; or
(2) where there is a clear and present danger that the
administration of justice would be impeded. And this
brings us to the familiar invocation of freedom of
expression usually resorted to as a defense in contempt
proceedings.
• IN RE: SOTTO
o Mere criticism or comment of the correctness or wrongness,
soundness or unsoundness of the decision of the court in a
pending case made in good faith may be tolerated since it
might enlighten the Court and contribute to correction of
the error committed.
o However, in this case, Sotto did not only criticize the
decision of the Court. He even intimidated the Court to
change its members, and reorganized it. Sotto attacked the
honesty and integrity of the Court especially when he said that
the SC has committed in the past few years for many blunders
and injustices. It tends to undermine the confidence of the
peoplt in the integrity of the Court.
o His defense of good faith is not convincing because in his
petition he even alleged that the principal promoter of
this contempt proceeding was Justice Perfecto, conveying
the idea that the SC only acted in the case through the
instigation of Justice Perfecto. This Court added that as
important as the freedom of the press is the maintenance of the
independence of the judiciary. The court must be permitted to
proceed with its business without the obstruction from outside.
  61 
o Besides, as a lawyer, and thus, an officer of court, Sotto is
under special obligation to be respectful in his conduct
and communication to the courts. In view of the foregoing,
Sotto was found guilty of contempt by virtue of such
publication in Manila Times.
• ZALDIVAR V SANDIGANBAYAN
o The SC not only has plenary disciplinary authority over
attorneys but also has the inherent power to punish for
contempt.
 The former stems from the Court’s constitutional mandate
to regulate admission into the practice of law, which
includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of
law;
 the latter is “necessary for its own protection against an
improper interference with the due administration of
justice.”
The disciplinary authority over members of the Bar is
broader than the power to punish for contempt.
 A lawyer punished for contempt is also punished for
professional misconduct necessitating exercise of the
Court’s disciplinary power but the latter may be exercised
without the action constituting contempt as well.
 Any act on the part of the lawyer which visibly
tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and degrade
the administration of justice constitutes both
professional misconduct calling for the exercise of
disciplinary action against him, and contumacious
conduct warranting application of contempt power.
o Gonzalez’s call for the members to inhibit themselves as they

are “acting as offended party, prosecutor, and arbiter all at
once” misapprehends the nature of the proceeding and the
court’s role in it. Disciplinary proceedings are sui generis
(neither purely civil nor criminal); it is an investigation of the
Court into the conduct of its officers. There is no plaintiff or
prosecutor therein.
  62 
o Undeniably, members of the Court are, to a certain degree,
aggrieved parties. But in the exercise of disciplinary powers, the
Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the individual
personalities of its members. Finally, the power to exclude
persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of
its power to admit persons to said practice. This power is vested
exclusively in the Court and it cannot abdicate just as much as it
cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction legally vested upon it.
Public policy demands that as a Court, it should exercise the
power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. For all the
members to inhibit themselves in this case is to abdicate
the responsibility which the Constitution has burdened
them.
o Gonzalez did not deny that he issued the statements; he

acknowledges that the newspaper reports of the statements
attributed to him are substantially correct. He was in effect
saying the following:
 The SC deliberately rendered an erroneous or wrong
decision when its per curiam decision dated 27 April 1988.
 The SC has improperly pressured him to render decisions
favourable to their colleagues and friends, including the
dismissal of two cases against two members of the Court.
 The SC was preventing him from prosecuting “rich and
powerful persons.”
 The Sc has allegedly dismissed judges without rhyme or
reason and disbarred lawyers without due process.
o The total picture that Gonzalez is trying to show is that

the Court is an unjudicial institution able and willing to
render clearly erroneous decisions by way of reprisal
against its critics, and is a body that acts arbitrarily and
capriciously in denying judges and lawyers due process of
law.
o Respondent ‘s statements, especially the charge that the Court

deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the
Consolidated Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of
  63 
the Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon respondent here, constitute the grossest kind
of disrespect for the Court. Such statements very clearly debase
and degrade the SC and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country.
o Gonzalez invoked his constitutional right to freedom of

speech and expression. He should be reminded that said
freedom of speech and of expression, like all
constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom
of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and
accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests, in this case being the
maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of
the administration of justice, and the capacity of the
Court to effectively prevent and control professional
misconduct on the part of lawyers who are indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every man.
o Furthermore, the right of criticism is not unlimited; it must be

bona fide and not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
o Proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in

general is not essential for a finding of contempt or for the
application of the disciplinary authority of the Court.
o Lastly, while the remedy of libel suits by individual

members of this Court may well be available against
Gonzalez, it is not an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where it
is not only the individual members of the Court but the
Court itself as an institution that has been falsely
attacked, libel suits cannot be an adequate remedy.
ON FINALS:
10 question
1-2 objective
50%
  64 
comprehensive
bonus question
  65 

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RULE 62 INTERPLEADER Diane Shayne

• DE CAMILO V JP OF MALANGAS: an interpleader on real property

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

ALLIED BROADCASTING v REPUBLIC:

TOLENTINO v BOARD OF ACCOUNTANCY:

DELUMEN v REPUBLIC (justiciable controversy)

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

DELA LLANA v COMELEC

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

BAGUIO CITIZEN’S ACTION v CITY COUNCIL OF BAGUIO

WHO SHOULD BE PARTIES?

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

R65: certiorari volumus

(WHO) SEC 1: tribunal, board, officer exercising JUDICIAL or

MERALCO SECURITIES v BOARD OF TAX

NO appeal, P,S, A remedy in the ordinary course of law

INTESTATE ESTATE OF CAMEN de LUNA v IAC

GOLD CITY INTEGRATED V IAC

ST. PETER MEMORIAL PARK INC V CAMPOS

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

NEA (NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMIN) v CA

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

METRO TRANSIT ORG. INC. V CA

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

• ATTY J MEJO posed a question:

WHO CAN FILE

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

o TANG should’ve filed for easement or prohibition later but

Certiorari deals with issues of jurisdiction not of facts

TANJUAN V PHIL POSTAL BANK

COMPARING RULE 65 AND RULE 45

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

Atty Melo: Between the 2, which is better for you to file?

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

• Difference between Aurillo and Vergara

NACIONALISTA PARTY v BAUTISTA

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

Submit the ff:

Certiorari, Prohibition, Mandamus: COMMOM MATTERS

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

Who can file?

GARCIA v PEREZ (the proverbial Inggitera!)

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

Part C of quo warranto, as applied to associations, relatively a

Election Protest and Quo Warranto:

QUO WARRANTO (under the Omnibus Election Code)

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

The failure of the petitioner to question the eligibility of the

In quo warranto proceedings, where the person elected is

The source of the provision on contest for disloyalty to the

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

a. Espionage and other offenses against the national security;

dianelips2009 SCA MELO MIDTERMS REVIEWER

Distinction between eminent domain and expropriation

DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS (SEC 3)

ORDER OF EXPROPRIATION (SEC 4)