/';-=09

)(8*=-0/']

13:55:04 PM

VIVARIUM
AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY
AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND
RENAISSANCE
inparticular
totheprofane
sideofmediaeval
vivarium
is devoted
philosophy
andtheintellectual
lifeoftheMiddle
AgesandRenaissance.
- C.H. Kneepkens,
- H.A.G.Braakhuis,
L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden)
EDITORS
(Nijmegen)
- D. Perler,
E.P.
Bos,
(Leiden)
(Madison)
(Groningen)
W.J.Courtenay,
- M.G.M.vanderPoel,(Nijmegen).
(Basel)
Board:
Prof.
C.H.Kneepkens.
oftheEditorial
Secretary
be addressed
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ADVISORY
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13:55:04 PM

Introduction

WILLIAMJ. GOURTENAY

One mightthinkthatafterdecades of intensiveresearchon Jean Buridan

therewould not be room foranothervolume of essays.The factremains,
however,as Jack Zupko recentlyobserved,"Buridan left an enormous
number of writings,most of which have never been edited, let alone
properlystudied.Althoughinterestin Buridan has increasedat least tenfold since the 1970s, many of the finerpoints of his thought,his exact
positionson a varietyof particulartopics and locad debates,are stillnot
in this special issue of Vivarium
seek to
well known."1The contributions
on
those
local
debates
of
Buridan
the
understanding
specifically
improve
cenat the Universityof Paris in the second quarter of the fourteenth
contextin whichBuridanwas teachturyby lookingboth at the university
ing, debating,and writingas well as specificdebates on issues of crucial
importancein the facultyof arts at that time.
contextat Paris and bringsinto
The firstessay exploresthe university
and
the discussiona numberof recentdiscoveriesabout the institutional
social structureof the facultyof arts that modifythe understandingof
Buridan's role as teacher and disputant.Among these are the masterpupil relationship,especiallyas it concerns the teachingcareers in the
is providedon those
facultyof arts.Along the way some new information
with whom Buridan debated in the 1330s and 1340s. Hans Thijssen
expands on one of those themes,namelythe extentto which therewas
a Buridan school, by exploringthe relationof Buridan and Albert of
of quantityand projectilemotion.
Saxonyon two issues:the understanding
From several different
standpoints,institutional,
geographical,and intellectual,Thijssen rejectsthe notionof a Buridan school in the fourteenth
century.
The next two essaystreatspecificissues in Buridan's thought,placing
and earlierapproaches.Jack Zupko
themin the contextof contemporary
of the human
addressesBuridan'sviews on the nature and immortality
1J. Zupko,
Buridan
, NotreDame,IN 2003,xiv.
John
Vwarium
42,1

BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

13:55:10 PM

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

intellect,disputingOlaf Pluta's recent assertionthat Buridan favored

of the intellecton
Alexander of Aphrodisias'denial of the immortality
the grounds of its material nature.2Similarly,Stefano Caroti looks at
Buridan's treatmentof the problem of intensionand remissionof forms
in his finalcommentaryon the Physics{de ultimalectura
), comparingit to
the approaches of Walter Burley,Nicole Oresme, Albertof Saxony, and
JohannesMarcilius of Inghen.
The last two essaysexamine debates that engaged Buridan at an earlier point in his career.Jean Celeyrettelooks at Buridan'streatiseon the
point, which he developed in debate with Michael de Montecalerio.
Celeyrettefollowsthe developmentof Buridan's thinkingon this topic
fromthatearliertreatisethroughthe two last versionsof Buridan'scomFinally,Dirk-JanDekkerconcludesthe volmentaryon Aristotle'sPhysics.
ume with an introductionand edition of Buridan's treatiseon relation
etconvenientiis.
The treatisealso provides
diversitatibus
entitledDe dependentiis,
withwhom
a view of the argumentsof two of Buridan'scontemporaries
from
a
master
and
one
the
he debated, Picard
English-Germannation.
the debate on Buridan'srelationto Ockham or the
Beyond furthering
existenceof a Buridan school, these essaysprovideimportantnew information that may help uncovermore on the identitiesand viewpointsof
Buridan's immediatecontemporariesat Paris. And that,in turn,should
of Buridan in the academic world in
lead towarda betterunderstanding
which he lived.
Universityof Wisconsin
Department
ofHistoiy

2 O. Pluta,Persecution
TheParisian
Statute
andtheArtofWriting.
1, 1272,andIts
ofApril
Etudes
mdivale.
Bakker
delapense
, in:P.J.J.M.
offertes
(ed.),Chemins
Consequences
Philosophical
Z^non
Kaluza
, Turnhout
2002,563-85.

13:55:10 PM

The University
of Pans at theTimeofJean Buridanand Nicole Oresme
WILLIAMJ. COURTENAY

The purposeof the followingremarksis to exploremore deeplythe institutionalcontextin which Buridan and Oresme pursued theiracademic
careers, namely the thirty-five
year period between the beginningof
Buridan's teachingcareer at Paris (c. 1325) and the date of his death
(c. 1360), whichprecededby only a fewyears Oresme's move fromParis
to Rouen to assume his dutiesas dean of the cathedral(1364). Much has
been writtenabout both men as well as the Universityof Paris at this
time,but a more precise (and updated) understandingof the structure,
operation, and resources of the universityat that time has not been
broughtto bear on the relationshipof theircareers and of othersassociated with them.
and itsMeaning
and Discipleship
Institutional
Structure
for Communication
The medievalUniversityof Paris was a corporationcomposed of largely
autonomousgroups.This applies not only to its divisioninto fourseparate facultiesof arts,theology,canon law, and medicine,but was true of
the fournationsof the facultyof arts.Colleges of secularstudentsas well
as the conventsthatservedas houses of studyforvariousreligiousorders
Colleges came under thejurisoperatedforthe mostpart independently.
dictionof the university,
faculties,or nationsonly insofaras the masters
and studentswho held bursesin them also belonged to nationsand faculties.Conventswere even more autonomousand came under thejurisdictionof the university
only insofaras theirstudentmemberssoughta
university
degree or theirregentmasterparticipatedin the meetingsand
academic exercisesof the facultyof theology.
At the same time the boundariesthat separatedthese different
groups
were porous and allowed a certaindegreeof contactand communication.
This was notsimplybecausetheschoolsof thenationsin therue du Fouarre
and theconventsand collegesthroughout
the Latin Quartertopographically
existedside by side. Studentsin the facultyof artshad the rightto attend
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2004
online- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable

Vivarium
42,1

13:55:15 PM

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

lecturesof mastersoutsidetheirnation,1especiallywhenduringa particular

term or year no master in their own nation offeredlectureson some
beforeproceeding
curricular
authoritative
textneeded to fulfill
requirements
their
and determination.2
to examination
by
verynaturebrought
Disputations
membersof these various groups togetherboth as participantsand as
audience.Accessprivilegesto libraries,even the librariesof religiousorders,
could be extendedto favoredindividuals,althoughborrowingprivileges
to theirown members.Thus, althoughmuch ofa
were usuallyrestricted
student'sacademic lifewould be spentwithinthe confinesof the groupto
whichhe owed his allegiance,it would have been almostimpossibleforhim
not to be exposed to the ideas and viewpointsof those in othergroups.
and the interactionof the groupsthat comBoth the self-containment
are
the
university importantin order to understandissues of conprised
intellectual
and discipleshipor schoolsof thought.Inasmuch
influence,
tact,
as Buridanbelongedto the facultyof arts,as did Oresme beforebecoming
a masterof theologyby 1342, albeit in two different
nations,we need to
theiracademic
of thatfacultyaffected
structure
look at how theinstitutional
their
careers and
potentialrelationship.
In lieu of a matriculationlist, which neitherthe universitynor the
nationsat Paris maintainedin the fourteenth
century,incomingstudents
in artsenrolledby mutualagreementwitha masterwho wouldsubsequently
be responsibleforoverseeingtheirstudies.The masterso chosen had to
on thebasis
belongto the nationwithwhichthe studentwould be affiliated
the
of geographicalorigin.3For purposes of enrollmentand affiliation,
1 See thestatute
Parisiensis
citedas
Universitatis
of 1290in Chartularium
(henceforth
4 vols.,Paris1889-1897,
ed. H. Denifleand . Chtelain,
II, 46-7,#570.
CUP),
2
in theartsfaculty
surcoursesattended
no listoflecture
bya student
Although
ofViennain the
vivesfromthisperiodforParis,an examplefromtheUniversity
Parisiensis
Chartularii
Universitatis
citedby Deniflein Auctarium
latefourteenth
century,
vol.I, Paris1894,xxixcitedas AUP), ed. H. Denifleand E. Chtelain,
(henceforth
in thefacmasters
different
whotookcoursesunderthirteen
showsa student
XXX,
theRhenish,
butat leastfivefrom
theAustrian
nation,
ultyofarts,mostofthemfrom
and practices
of Viennawerebased
and Saxonnations.The structure
Hungarian,
on theParisianmodel.
3 In mostcasestheboundaries
of
withtheboundaries
of thenationscoincided
all thediocesesin theecclesiastigroupsof dioceses.The Frenchnationcomprised
and Lyon,as wellas thedioceses
of Sens,Tours,Bourges,
cal provinces
Besanon,
in thearts
ofReims,Soissons,
Metz,Verdun,
Toul,andstudents
Chlons-sur-Marne,
Partsof thediocesesof Lige,Trier,and
fromItaly,Spain,and Portugal.
faculty
Rouen(theFrenchVexin)werealso includedin theFrenchnation.The Norman
of
ofRouen,withtheexception
to thediocesesoftheprovince
nationcorresponded
thosefromthediocesesofBeauvais,
theFrenchVexin.The Picardnationincluded
and all diocesesnorthand east
edgeofPicardy,
Noyon,and Laon on thesouthern

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

specifictown or village,and in some cases even the bank of the riveron

whichit was located,would determinethe nationto whichone belonged.4
In all probabilitythe masterselectedhad to be a regentmaster,that is
one activelylecturingat the time,just as the masterunder whom one
eventuallydetermined,was licensed,or inceptedhad to be regentunless,
in specialcircumstances,
one obtaineda dispensationto be promotedunder
a non-regent
master.5Once havingenrolledwitha master,one was legally
a studentin the nation,faculty,and university.
The supervising
masterchosen by the studentnot onlybelongedto his
nation;in most cases he was chosen initiallyfromthose who came from
The choice mightbe based on
the same countryor regionas the student.6
a recommendationfromsomeone in the home region or throughthose
at Paris a studentmightknow fromhome or througha network.Or the
choice mightsimplyresultfromavailable residentialspace in the house
or rentedrooms of a master.7Given these limitationson choice for an
incomingstudent,it is unlikelythat the choice would have been based
on the scholarlyreputationof the master,and even less on his intellectual
outlook.At the same time,shared accommodationswitha masteracross
meantthattheywouldcome to knoweach other
a periodofyearsinevitably
would
masters
who also servedas house-masters
and
that
well,
supervising
have close oversightof the academic and personal developmentof their
students.

Cambrai,
Tournai,
(thus
Lige)up to theleftbankoftheMeuse/Maas
(Throuanne,
ofthedioceseofUtrecht).
a portion
ofHollandand a smallportion
including
4 A bitter
and Picardnationsover
in 1358between
theEnglish
erupted
struggle
whocamefromtheboundary
of a student
theproperaffiliation
regionof thetwo
a preciseboundary
was drawnup, marking
considerable
nations.
After
negotiation,
border(AUPI, 233-6;CUPIII,
and townsthatlayalongtheagreed-upon
therivers
56-9,#1240).
5 In 1370
to be allowedto overseethedetermiHenryofLangenstein
petitioned
nationof twostudents,
regent
duringthat
despitethefactthathe was notactively
del'enDe l'organisation
seeAUPI, xxxii;Ch. Thurot,
year(AUPI, 375).On regency,
de Pasau Moyen-Age
dansl'universit
1850,91; Madelaine
, Paris-Besanon
seignement
lafinduXVe
del'Universit
dePansdesorigines
Toulouse,La Nation
Anglaise-Allemande
deParis
del'Universit
sicle
, Paris1939,108-9;MineoTanaka,La nation
anglo-allemande
Paris1990,150-3.
la finduMoyen
Age,
6 Most
whichmarked
thetranmasters
at thetimeofdetermination,
supervising
or regionof thecandidate,
werefromthecountry
sitionfromauditorto bachelor,
oftheEnglish
as can be seenin therecords
nation;see Tanaka1990(op.cit.,above,
n. 5), 169-70.
7
in theEarlyFourteenth
Parisian
Scholars
1999,
, Cambridge
Century
W.J.Courtenay,
81-91.

13:55:15 PM

WILLIAM
J. COURTENAY

A studentmight need to change his supervisingmaster during his

course of studiesbecause the latterwas for a time not in residenceor
activelyteaching,or for other reasons.8Such changes were withinthe
group of regentmastersin the nation to which the studentbelonged,a
patternthat can be seen in the Proctor'sRegisterof the Englishnation
forthe fourteenth
centuryand in thoseforthe Frenchand Picard nations
in the fifteenth
at the degreestage,
Changes occurredfrequently
century.9
in
a
result
of
the
of regencyof
often
as
pattern
interruptions
probably
masters.In the course of these shifts,studentssoughtout long-termmasters whose control of the space resourcesof the nation, whose power
and whose influencein theirhome region would
withinthe university,
their
careers.
help
Usually two or threemasterswere responsibleforhalf
to two-thirds
of thosedetermining,
beinglicensed,or incepting.And when
senior mastersaccepted new applicantsfor tutelageor sponsorship,evidence suggeststhat financialconsiderationsplayed an importantpart.10
Cases of supervising
mastersfromoutsidethe nationof the studentwere
and
rare
fromthenation.11
Almost
extremely
requireda specialdispensation
all theseexceptionswere occasionedby the quota limitations
forlicensing,
which obliged nations that had reached their annual limit to seek an
available opening in the quota of another nation.12Such arrangements
and temporary,not instructional.
were administrative
The outside master sponsoringthe candidatewould have to be sufficiently
informedabout
the latter'sacademic and moral qualifications,
but no directsupervision
was required.
8 Tanakahas tracedin detailthe
masters
at
ofchangesin supervising
frequency
seeTanaka1990(op.cit.,above,n. 5), 141-85.A caseofa change
timesofpromotion;
in thesupervising
in theFrenchnationin 1329-1330
master
ofa student
thatmay
in Gourtenay
reasonsis described
1999(op.cit.,
havebeenbasedon morepersonal
whocamefromthedioceseof Meauxand thus
above,n. 7), 49-56.The student,
of theFrenchnation,was,in 1329,underthe
belongedto theParisianprovince
ofa regent
master
fromthedioceseofTroyes,
whichfellwithin
theSens
supervision
of thenation.In 1330thestudent
masterfrom
province
changedto a supervising
hisowndiocese.
9 See AUPI forthe
nationin thefourteenth
oftheEnglish
AUP
register
century;
vol. IV, ed. C. Samaranand E.A. Van Mo, forthePicardnationfromthelate
fifteenth
and AUP, vol. V, ed. C. Samaranand E.A. Van Mo, forthe
century;
Frenchnationin themiddleofthefifteenth
century.
10Tanaka1990 cit.,above,n. 5), 171.Whether
students
(op.
wealthy
sought
superor seniormasters
to accepta highpervisionfromseniorregent
masters,
preferred
was thesame.
ofwealthy
theresult
students,
centage
11See the
of the case ofJohannesNicolaiand masterMichaelde
discussion
below.
Montecalerio
12Tanaka1990(op.cit.,above,n. 5), 153-4,268.

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

master
In normalcircumstances,
how much directiondid the supervising
over
In
a
master
who
took
the
case
of
what
kind?
and
of
sponsorgive,
ship at the time of licensingor inception,the relationshipwas probably
and financial.If the same mastersupervisedthe stusolelyadministrative
dent fromhis time as auditorthroughto inception,the relationshipwas
or
obviouslylonger and more personal,but not necessarilyinstructional
ideological.
How oftena student'ssupervisingmasterwas also his teacheror tutor
is not known.Even if the studentchose or feltobliged to attendthe lectures of his master,one need not, and probably could not, fulfillthe
requirementsof the arts curriculumby attendingonly lecturesgiven by
one's master.The nationdid expect and certainlypreferredthatstudents
would take theirinstructionaltrainingfromamong the lecture courses
providedby the mastersin the nation. In 1290, however,the facultyof
artsprohibitednationsfrommaintaininga closed shop, and studentswere
free to attend lecturesofferedby mastersoutside their nation.13Thus,
of any maswhilestudentscould hear lecturesand, obviously,disputations
ter in the facultyof arts,instructionalsupervisionand promotion,with
very few exceptions,had to be fromamong the regentmastersof the
nation. Close extended contact between a studentand a master only
occurredwithinthe nationand probablytook the formof advisingrather
than intellectualformation.The latter,where it occurred,was probably
a private,developmentalexperiencebased on attendanceat various lecturesand disputations,and on extensivereadingof texts,commentaries,
and treatises.
determinations,
What does thisanalysismean forthe relationof Buridanand Oresme,
or of Albert of Saxony or Marsilius of Inghen with either?And what
does it have forthe existenceand meaningof a Buridanschool
implications
at Paris? Firstof all, the proceduresoutlinedabove mean that although
Nicole Oresme mighthave attended lecturesby Jean Buridan, would
probablyhave heard him dispute,and certainlyhad access to his written
work,Buridanwould not have been the supervisingmasterunderwhom
thatrole.
he studied.One or more mastersin the Norman nationfulfilled
of
for
Albert
holds
true
The same principle
Ricmestorp Saxony, whose
licensing,and inception
supervisingmasterat the time of determination,
was Albertof Prague, a prominentmasterin the Englishnation but not
Marsilius of Inghen
one fromthe same home region as Ricmestorp.14
13CUPII, 46.
14AUPI, 149,150,152.

13:55:15 PM

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

inceptedunderWilhelmBuser,both of whom were in the Englishnation

and came fromthe same regionof Holland.15Similarly,HenryHeimbuch
of Langensteindetermined,was licensed,and inceptedunder Hermann
Consul of Saxony, again both in the English nation and both from
None of these was a pupil or discipleof the famouspredeGermany.16
cessorwithwhom theirnames are oftenlinkedin the literature.Oresme
was not a discipleof Buridan or studiedunder him in any officialway,
nor did Albertof Saxony studyunder the directionof eitherof them.
theremay
Each belonged to a different
nation,and whateversimilarities
be in theirthoughtof specificissues,thatwould have been derivedfrom
readingor occasionalattendanceat disputationsor lectures,not fromlong
This is not to deny
personalcontactin the same academic environment.
It
is
to
of
their
ideas.
some
only say that the lattertwo
parallelsamong
in the normal sense of that
Buridan
or
students
of
were not disciples
phrase. If a Buridanschool existed,and I thinkit is a label thatobscures
of intellectual
more than it enlightens,it was based on a compatibility
context.
outlookon certainissues,not on any institutional
One case of a studentin the facultyof arts who was allowed to have
thatextended
a supervising
masterfromoutsidehis nationin a relationship
across six weeksor more is of particularinterest,both because it was unusual and because it relates to Buridan's career. In November 1345 a
obtaineda dispensation
fromtheEnglish
Danish student,
JohannesNicolai,17
nation to allow him to respondand determineduringLent 1346 under
Michael's
a masterfromthe French nation,Michael de Montecalerio.18

15AUPI, 272.On Buser,seeG.H. Kneepkens,

Willem
Buser
ofHeusden's
ObligationesScholastische
'Obrogatum'
in: K. Jacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie.
Treatise
zu
Forschungen
York-Kln
korrekten
Leiden-New
undsemantischen
denlogischen
1993,343Folgerns,
Regeln
62, at 343-4.
16AUP I, 279,284,285.
17UnlessthedateM.CCC.XXIXin themanuscript
sourceis a scribalerrorfor
fromanother
Nicolaide Dacia shouldbe distinguished
M.GGC.XLIX,thisJohannes
of thesamenamewhostudiedat Parisin 1329and whomadean
Danishstudent
De puntate
artislogicae
thatcomplemented
ofWalterBurley's
extract
ofthosesections
Nicolaiwas later
The earlier
withOckham'sSumma
or contrasted
Johannes
logicae.
in Linkping;
Wiss.Bibl.,CA 8 67,
lectorat theconvent
theFranciscan
Erfurt,
lector
frater
IoannesNicholai,
de logicaBurleordinavit
f. 123v:"Hancextractionem
Parisiusanno Domini
de custodiaLincopensi,
Daciae, quandostuduit
provinciae
M.CCC.XXIX. . ."
18Montecalerio,
Leben
Buridan.
Studien
discussed
zusnm
,
Johannes
byBerndMichael,
desspten
Mittelalters
Theorien
imEuropa
seiner
undzurRezeption
seinen
Werken
, doc. diss.
in thisissueof
Berlin1985,vol.II, 451-2,and byJeanCeleyrette
FreieUniversitt
willbe thesubjectofa separate
Vivarium,
study.

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

familyname or place name correspondsto Moncalieri on the southern

edge of Turin in Italy,and he would thus have belonged to the Bourges
of the
provinceof the Frenchnation. In 1342, in responseto the rotulus
of
Paris
submitted
at
the
time
of
the
coronation
of
Clement
University
VI, Michael receiveda provisionas canon with expectationof prebend
in the cathedralchapterat Turin.19Presumablythatexpectationhad not
been realized by 1346, since he was stillregentmasterat Paris.20How
long before 1342 Montecaleriohad been a masterof arts is not known.
He wrote a determinato
de puncto
, which attacked the opinions of Jean
Buridan on the same subject,to which Buridan respondedin his own
determinatio
de puncto
. Both treatisesappear in the same manuscript.21
If
these two textsdate to the same period as Buridan's questiodepossibilitate
existendi
secundum
eademet nonexistendi
simulin eademinstanti
, which appears
later in the same manuscriptand is dated 1335, then Montecalerio's
career as a masterin the facultyof arts spanned at least a decade.22
master,and why
Why didJohannesNicolai seek an outsidesupervising
did he choose Montecalerio?No Danish master appears to have been
regentin the Englishnation at the time he asked fora dispensation,but
otherregentmastersin the Englishnationwere available.Johannes'petimusthave been argued on different
tion,therefore,
grounds.It would be
to conjecturean early stage of the Wegestreit,
that the student
interesting
wanted a supervisingmasterwho was a realistand could not findsuch
among the available mastersin the English nation. This is unlikelyin
lightof the campaignwithinthe Englishnation in 1341 againstthe secta
Occamica
, and because Conrad of Megenberg,a leading opponentof the
Ockamists,apparentlyreturnedto Paris in the winterof 1346 to oversee the Lenten determinationof anotherstudentin the English nation,
Albertof Prague.23Althoughchangesin the inceptionoaths between1355
and 1365 removed the language forbiddingthe scientiaOccamica?*
it is
improbablethatJohannesNicolai could not have founda realistmaster
19Rotuli
Parisienses.
tothePopefrom
theUniversity
Supplications
ofPans, vol. I: 13161349, ed. W.J.Courtenay,
Leiden2002,118.
20AUP I, 94, wherethenameis written
as MonteCalvario.
21One ofthetwo
Buridan's
treatise
is Paris,Bibl.Nat.lat.
manuscripts
containing
16 621,if.196r-202r.
The onlyknowncopyofMontecalerio's
treatise
is in thesame
ff.214r-223v.
is in theprocessofediting
Montecalerio's
manuscript,
JeanCeleyrette
work.
22Ibid.,ff.233r-237r.
23AUPI, 93.
24W.J.
TheRegisters
the
Courtenay,
oftheUniversity
ofPansandtheStatutes
against
Scientia
Occamica
29 (1991),13-49,at 40-4.
, in: Vivarium,

13:55:15 PM

10

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

had ontologybeen a major consideration.A

forhis 1346 determination
later
he
under
LaurentiusPetriof Denmark,who had been
year
incepted
trainedby Nicholas Drukken,who in turnowned worksof Ockham and
whose writingson physicswere anti-realist.25
Johannes Nicolai's decision to seek a supervisingmaster outside his
nationwas probablyoccasionedby the limitedavailabilityof lecturespace
under the controlof his nation,and his inabilityor reluctanceto pay the
rentalcostsof a privatearrangementoutsidethe nation. 1346 was a highdemandyearon lectureroomsfordetermination
by studentsin the English
in
exceeded
three
times
the
remainder
of the century.26
nation,
only
Parallel to the arrangementby which a candidate in one nation seeking
to be licensedcould avoid the quota limitsin any one year by arranging
to be licensedunder a masterin a nationthathad not filledits quota, so
faced withthe inabilityto finda
perhaps a candidate fordetermination,
masterin his own nationwho controlledspace forlecturesby thosedetermining,mightreceive permissionto make arrangementswith a master
in anothernation that did have space. As a masterwho had probably
been regentformanyyearsin the Frenchnation,yetwho, as an Italian,
underhis supervision,
Michaelde Montecaleiio
mayhave had fewerstudents
for
a determiningstudent
have
been
able
to
lecture
may
provide
space
at a mutuallyacceptable financialarrangement.
The case ofJohannesNicolai and masterMichael de Montecaleriois
an exceptionto the rule that studentswere supervisedby a masterfrom
theirown nation,usuallyby one fromtheirown countryor region.This
particularinstancewas probablya resultof temporaryexpediencybrought
on by an unusuallyhigh demand forlecturespace forthose determining
in the English nation. The selectionof a supervisingmasterin normal
circumstanceswas based on geographyand, if a change was needed, on
the power and self-advantagea senior masterin the nation could offer
- and
to a student.But magisterialsupervisiondid not necessarily
probably
- include
rarely
any intellectualformation.The shaping of philosophical
was more likelya resultof classroomexperience,
outlookor commitment
libraryaccess, privatereading and study,and personal contactsoutside
of the nation and the curriculum.
the formalstructures

25See introduction
de Dacia, Opera
toNicolausDrukken
, ed. N.G. Green-Pedersen
and K.H. Tachau,
and S. Ebbesen,Hauniae1997,xvii-xxi,
xxiv;WJ. Courtenay
of
at Paris,1339-1341
andtheEnglish-German
Ockham
Nation
, in: History
, Ockhamists,
2 (1982),53-96.
Universities,

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

11

in medievalParisis difficult
intellectual
formative
relationships
Identifying
of the facultyof arts,
because it could occur outsidethe normalstructures
because it was rarelyacknowledgeddirectly,and because in most cases
it was probably a resultof listeningand reading ratherthan personal
contact.The highera reputationof a particularmaster,the largerwas
And the moreprolific
the audienceforhis ideas and supporting
arguments.
To thatextentwe can assumethat
he became,thelargerwas his readership.
Buridanhad an impactamong studentsand mastersin the facultyof arts
far outfar outsidethose in the Picard nation and, throughhis writings,
side Paris. For example, Buridan's commentarieson Aristotle'sPhysics
were disseminatedby manyscholarsoutsidehis nation,especiallythrough
German scholars in the English nation who carried copies to Prague,
Erfurt,and elsewherein centraland easternEurope, and throughItalians
in
in the French nation who carried those worksto Italian universities,
some cases well beforethe Great Schism.Anotherexample would be the
influenceof Ockham's writingsand thoughtat Paris, since it would be
a fair assumptionthat those associated with the sectaoccamicaas well as
otherswho, like Gregoryof Rimini,adopted much of Ockham's natural
philosophynever met Ockham personally.
In a fewcases the intellectualdebt of a studentor junior colleague to
a regentmasteris acknowledged.One mustbe careful,however,not to
confuseacademic courtesy(forexample,such expressionsas "my reverend
master"or "my reverendfather")with academic filiationin the sense of
a master/pupilrelationship.Yet there seems to be more than mere
at stake when the secular masterof arts and later theologian,
Hflichkeit
Marsiliusof Inghen,referredto the Cistercianmasterat Paris,James of
Eltville,as "magistermeus bone memorie,magisterJacobus de Erbaco,"
whose opinionshe oftenechoed.27This same master,a theologianlecturing
in a religiousconventat Paris, also had a profoundinfluenceon Henry
of Langenstein,who upon leaving Paris in 1382 spent severalmonthsat
s monasteryof Eberbach, where the latterwas abbot, and where
Eltville'
com"reread"
to the monksEltville'scommentaryon the Sentences
Henry
at
Paris.28
and
read
initially
posed

26Tanaka1990(op.cit.,above,n. 5), 282.

27Marsilius
libros
sententiarum
of Inghen,Questiones
1501;
, Strasbourg
super
quattuor
Frankfurt
/Main1966,f. 475v.
repr.
28D.
6 (1956),146, in:Augustiniana,
Theolog))
ofthe14thCentury
Trapp,Augustinin
274,at 252.

13:55:15 PM

12

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

It would be unwise and unnecessary,however,to expand these cases

of intellectualinfluenceinto "schools".Those concernedprobablydid not
thinkof themselvesor their intellectualformationin that way. More
it highlightssimilaritiesof thoughton a few issues at the
importantly,
in otherareas. We are betterservedby
of
expense neglectingdifferences
scholasticsissue by issue rather
medieval
of
the
relationship
analyzing
than in termsof "schools of thought".
Scholars
for University
Support
of artsshaped
of thefaculty
structure
Otherfactorsoutsidetheorganizational
the academic environmentat Paris in the time of Buridan and Oresme.
Among the more importantof thesewere financialresourcesof students
and masters,the impact of colleges,and access to books and libraries.
In the second decade of the fourteenth
centurythe leadershipof the
to
a
Paris
launched
of
strengthenand expand the
campaign
University
financialsupportavailable to studentsand masters.They called upon cardinals,bishops,and abbots,eitherdirectlyor by means of papal pressure,
to increasethe amountof supportforscholarsfromtheirdiocesesthrough
the reservationand assigningof beneficesand prebends.A number of
prelatesrespondedfavorablyto this plea, which in 1316 coincidedwith
a shiftin papal policy thatpermittedthe Universityof Paris to submita
list of petitionsfrommastersto which pope John XXII mightrespond
by assigningexpectationsof beneficesin the giftof variouspatrons.Several
prelatesalong witha few secularpatronsestablishedcollegesat Paris for
the ostensiblesupportof poor students.Withina twenty-year
period(13141334) the numberof collegesat Paris almostdoubled.29Althoughfinancial
addressed in the eyes of university
need was never sufficiently
scholars,
had been achievedin the firsthalfof the fourconsiderableimprovement
teenthcentury.
Behind the language of "supportforpoor scholars"statedin university
lettersand petitionsas well as in the statutesof college foundations,the
specificgroup that was targetedor that benefitedby the new sourcesof
fundingwere not thepooreststudents,and in mostcases were not students
submittedto
at all. The rotuli
, or scrollsof petitions,that the university
29H. Rashdall,TheUniversities
in theMiddle
, ed. F.M. Powickeand
Ages
ofEurope
inthe
A.B. Emden,3 vols.,Oxford1936,I, 537-539;A.L. Gabriel,TheCollege
System
Fourteenth
Movement
the
Forward
The
F.L.
in:
Universities
Fourteenth
,
of
(ed.),
Udey
Century
, Columbus1961,79-124.
Century

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

13

the papacy were limitedto thosewho were alreadymastersin one of the

fourfaculties.
Viewed fromthatperspective,
theuniversity
intendedbenefice
supportto be directedto teachers,not students,and achievinga place
on the listwas based on seniorityand the abilityto pay the requiredfee,
not on thebasis of financialneed, althoughoccasionallysuch considerations
were used to structurethe lists.30Similarly,appointmentto bursesat the
newlyfoundedcollegeswere grantedto mastersof arts or advanced stuwho were alreadyat Paris.The system
dents,oftenthosewithconnections,
did not facilitate,nor was it probablyintendedto facilitate,the abilityof
poor scholars to come to Paris. One had to be there already, and to
have been therefora numberof years.Moreover,specificlimitationson
the amount of ecclesiasticalor personal income that could be received
whileholdinga bursewere usuallystatedin the college statutes,although
such provisionswere not always strictly
observed.Thus the targetgroup
forcollegefellowships
or burseswere youngmastersin the facultyof arts
who were studyingfora higherdegree,or advanced studentsin the facultyof artswho had alreadyshownthe talentthatwould resultin a similaracademiccareer.Most students,
especiallythosewhosemainqualification
was poverty,were passed over. In the case of the rotuli
, the limitations
on wealth or income that were legislatedin college statutesplayed no
role in the process. Masters of noble background,who could and often
did petitionthe pope directlyor throughfamilymembers,also petitioned
rotulus
throughthe university
alongsidetheirless fortunatecolleagues.
Both Buridanand Oresme profitedby the availabilityof collegeburses.
Early in his career,probablyas a youngmasterof arts,Buridanobtained
a burse at the Collge du Cardinal Lemoine, foundedin the firstdecade
of the fourteenth
century.If the statutesof the college were enforced,31
he resignedhis fellowshipwhen he was elected rectorof the university
in December 1327. Between then and his acquiringa benefice,namely
the parish church of Hies northof Lens in Picardy,his principalif not
sole means of incomewas fromthe feesof his students.When he obtained
thatfirstbeneficein 1330, it was not a resultof the expectationhe had
received in the rotulus
of 1329 but was provided by the abbot of the
monasteryof St-Vaast at Arras.32In the case of Oresme, he receiveda
30For
in therotulus
of 1349,all fournations
listedfirst
thosemasters
who
example,
had notyetobtained
a benefice,
followed
bythosewhohad one or morebenefices
butat a levelof incomethepetitioner
considered
see Rotuli
Parisienses
insufficient;
,
vol.I, 305-443.
31M. Flibien,
Histoire
dela villedeParis
, vol.5, Paris1725,608,611.
32For Buridan's
in 1329and 1330,see Rotuli
Parisienses
, vol. I, 52-4.
provisions

13:55:15 PM

14

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

burse in theologyin 1348 at the Collge de Navarre,six or seven years

afterbecomingregentmasterin the facultyof arts.33Navarre,unlikethe
Collge du Cardinal Lemoine, allowed fellowsof the college to receive
income froman ecclesiasticalbeneficeup to a certainlevel,withoutlosing theirburse in the college.
College affiliationplayed an importantrole in scholarlyproduction.
Althoughthe majorityof those who receivedburses in various colleges
have leftno worksthathave survived,mostmasterswhose workswe have
were associated with colleges at some time in their academic career.
Buridan is not known to have held a college burse afterleaving the
Collge du Cardinal Lemoine,but his earlierassociationwould have given
him continuedaccess to its library,should he have needed it. Oresme
was connectedwith the Collge de Navarre, as were severalproductive
34
masters,and he became its Grand Masterin 1356. The Sorbonne,albeit
a college for theologians,had one of the largestlibrariesin medieval
Paris,and manyof itsmemberswere activein publication,again illustrating
For
and scholarlyproductivity.35
the close connectionof college affiliation
is
known
to
of
not
like
Marsilius
scholar
who,
Inghen,
everyproductive
have been associatedwitha college,thereare manymore who were.And
whetheror not Conrad of Megenberghad any connectionwiththe college
forGermanmastersand students,his earlyconnectionwiththe Cistercian
house of studiesgave him access to that library,one of the largercolrichin textsfromOxfordand Cambridge.36
lectionsin Parisand particularly
The supportthat came by way of papal provisions,althoughunequal
did
in distribution
and influencedby social class and personalconnections,
between
masters.There is not,however,a directcorrelation
benefituniversity
the numberof ecclesiasticalpositionsand income acquired and the productivityof Parisian scholars.The point has been made by comparing
the careers of Buridan and Oresme.37A comparisonof two contemporariesin the Picard nation,Buridanand Egidiusde Feno, is equallytelling.
Reward:
discussion
ofthisissue,see W.J.Courtenay,
Fora moreextended
Philosophy's
mdietphilosophie
de thologie
Income
theEcclesiastical
, in:Recherches
ofJeanBuridan
68 (2001),163-9.
vales,
33On Oresme'sacademiccareer,see NathalieGorochov,
deNavarre
de
Le Collge
duXVesicle(1418),Paris1997,680-1;W.J.Courtenay,
safondation
(1305)au dbut
Oresme
TheEarlyCareer
, in: Isis,91 (2000),542-8.
ofNicole
34Gorochov1997
cit.,above,n. 5), 680-1.
(op.
35R. Rouse,TheEarlyLibrary
in: Scriptorium,
21 (1967),42-71,
oftheSorbonne,
227-51.
36On
seeW.J.Courtenay,
withtheCollgede St-Bernard,
connection
Megenberg's
35 (1937),102-24.
in: Vivarium,
ThePansTears,
Conrad
of
Megenberg.
37
2001 (op.cit.,above,n. 5).
Courtenay

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

15

Both Buridanand Feno were regentmastersof artsin the 1330s. Feno,

a realist,was one of the opponentsagainstwhom Buridan argued in sevin his De depenbetween 1332 and 1335, specifically
eral determinations
et
convenientiis
de diversidiver
sitatibus
determinationis
dentiis,
(1332), Defensiones
38Buridan
ad speciem
his
Tractatus
de
relationibus
tategeneris
and
(1333),
(1334).
mastersin the Picard nation who
and Feno were among the sixty-four
petitionedBenedictXII foran expectationof beneficeat the time of the
new pope's coronationin 1335.39Buridanreceivednothing.Feno was among
the eightwho did receive an expectation.Many of those in the faculty
of artswho were awarded something,
includingthosein the Picard nation,
were simultaneously
studentsin a higherfaculty,usuallytheology.In the
case of Feno, his provisionwas not a simplebeneficebut an expectation
of a canonicalprebendin a much sought-after
collegiatechurch,St-Pierre
at Lille. Feno had probablyjust begun his studiesin the facultyof theology
by 1335, since by 1343 he was a fellowof the Sorbonne,had completed
his twoyearsas biblicalcursor,and was preparingto read the Sentences
.40By
thattimehe had obtainedtheprebendat Lille and receivedfromClement
VI an expectationof a canonical prebend in the cathedral chapter at
Tournai. Withinthe next fewyears he obtained a canonical prebend at
Courtrai,became dean of its chapter,and in 1350, by then doctor of
theology,he was granteda canonical prebend and the lectorshipin theologyat Arras.41Buridan,by contrast,had receivedverylittlein the way
of beneficesupportduringhis career,and the expectationof a canonical
prebend at Arras that he had been grantedby ClementVI never materialized. The differencebetween their different
rates of success in this
area can probablybe ascribedto Feno's havingstudiedtheology,obtaining
a burse at the Sorbonne,knowingits provisorPierre Roger (the future
ClementVI) personally,and completinghis doctorate.AlthoughBuridan
sometimesreferredto a fellowarts masteras "doctor,"substantialecclesiasticalincomewentlargelyto thosescholarswho were doctorsin thenormal senseof thattitle,namelymastersof theology,canon law, or medicine.

38Michael1985 cit.,above,n. 427-43.

{op.
5),
39CharlesVulliez,
Autour
d'unrotulus
adress
deParis Benot
XII (1335):
parl'Universit
lerledesmatres
sartsdela nation
de Rome.
, in: Mlangesde l'Ecolefranaise
picarde
114 (2002),359-369.On Feno'sprovision,
see Rotuli
Parisienses
I, 75.
Moyen
Age,
40Rotuli
Parisienses
191-2.
I,
41Analecta
deClment
VI(1342-1352),
ed.U. Berlire,
, vol.I: Suppliques
Vaticano-Blgica
Rome-Bruxelles-Paris
1906,#1955.

13:55:15 PM

16

WILLIAM
J. GOURTENAY

in Arts
Buridanand theLength
Careers
of Teaching
It has long been supposed that Buridan was unique in teachingin the
and seekinga degreein
yearswithoutstudying
facultyof artsforoverthirty
a higherfaculty.He was certainlythe most famousmasterto followthat
career path, but it now appears that he was not the only one to do so.
Before examiningthe other cases, some cautionaryremarksneed to
be made. First,it would be incorrectto state categoricallythat Buridan
never studiedin a higherfaculty,such as theology.We simplyhave no
evidence that he did, and there are several examples of arts mastersat
Paris whose supplicationsto the papacy or lettersof provisiondescribe
themsimplyas mastersof arts,althoughone supplicationdated in between
the othersmentionsthat the individualwas also studyingin theology.
Thus the failureto mentionstudyin a higherfacultywhen supplicating
the pope is no guaranteethat the individualmasternever did so. We
have very few documentsconnectedwith Buridan that are of the type
that would mentiontheologicalstudyeven had he undertakenit. Thus,
while he never attaineda degree in theologyor in any otherhigherfaculty,we cannotsay withcompleteassurancethathe neverstudiedtheology.
As to the length of his teaching career withoutevidence of higher
study,thereare severalotherexamplesfromthe same period.42Petrusde
Vallepartiswas masterof arts by 1331, supplicatedin the rotuliof 1342
that
and 1349, and again in 1362. If his regencywas not interrupted,
The
same
would mean a teachingcareer in artsof over thirty-one
years.
holds true for Robertus Fabri, Honoratus de Porta, Henricus Bobei,
JohannesChacardi,JohannesDurandi,JohannesSieranviller,and Petrus
Melmete- illwith teachingcareers in arts of thirtyyears or more. In
the case of Guillelmusde Moreto,regentin artsforover thirty-four
years,
years,and Andreas de
JohannesBaril, regentin arts forover thirty-four
Sancto Clodoaldo, regentin arts for over thirty-seven
years, we know
thattheyalso studiedin a higherfaculty,canon law in the case of Moreto
and theologyin the case of Baril and Sancto Clodoaldo. Long careers
withoutevidence of studyin a higherfacultyare certainlyrare, but the
uniquenessof Buridan in this regardcan no longerbe maintained.
This should caution us against seeing in Buridan the beginningof a
devotedsolelyto philosophyand intentionally
careerself-consciously
passthat a theologicaldegree offered.Those
career
the
opportunities
ing up
42Thefollowing
Rotuli
vol.I, andRotuli
Parisienses
aretakenfrom
Parisienses,
,
examples
and E.D. Goddard,
Leiden2003.
vol.2: 1352-1378
, ed. W.J.Courtenay

13:55:15 PM

THE UNIVERSITY
OF PARISAT THE TIMEOF JEANBURIDAN

17

who completedstudyin a higherfacultygained ecclesiasticalpositions

that broughtconsiderableincome. It is possible, of course, that these
otherexamples of long teachingcareers in arts were also attemptingto
make the teachingof philosophya career in itself.I suspect,however,
records
thatmotivationswere more mixed,and the absence of university
that would prove continuousregencyor the certainabsence of studyin
a higherfacultymakes conclusionsin this area hypothetical.
The availabilityof new sources and evidence forthe Universityof Paris
in the fourteenth
centuryputs the careers of Buridan and Oresme in a
richercontext.It helps us understandmore preciselythe academic strucin whichtheylived and wrote.It clarifiesthe means
tureand environment
of influenceamong mastersand students,separatingthose contextsthat
were unlikelyto have produced any shapingof intellectualoutlookfrom
those that are more viable. It has also broughtto lightnew information
Michael de Montecalerio
on some of the opponentsof Buridan,specifically
In
the
de
Feno.
so
and Egidius
originalityand importance of
doing
Buridan and Oresme has not been diminishedbut ratherenhanced by
seeing them more clearlyin the contextin which theylived.
Madison, Wisconsin
of Wisconsin
University

13:55:15 PM

The BuridanSchoolReassessed.
JohnBuridanand Albertof Saxony*

J.M.M.H.THIJSSEN

Introduction
and sixteenthcenturiesJohn Buridan enjoyed
Throughoutthe fifteenth
a reputationas a prominentmasterof artsat Paris. The manuscriptsand
early printededitionsof his workswere widelydisseminatedin all corsuch
ners of Europe and became requiredreadingat many universities,
as Vienna, Prague, Krakow, Rostock,and Saint Andrews.1But how was
his impact among thosewho knew him personally,among those residing
in Paris in the firsthalfof the fourteenth
century?Did Buridanhave any
close followersor students?As far as I am aware, thereis no contemporary Parisian evidence to the effectthat there existed a school of
"Buridanists"in the same way as there were schools of Thomists or
Scotists.Even so, one mightask whetherthereis some evidenceto idenParis.2
tify,in retrospect,a school of Buridan in fourteenth-century
* Thisarticle
in every
meus
senseof
is dedicated
to HenkBraakhuis,
magister
possible
ofhissixty-fifth
Partsofthisarticle
formed
thebasis
theword,on theoccasion
birthday.
de la Renaissance
I gavein March2000at theCentre
d'Etudes
oflectures
Suprieures
in NewYork.I thank
in Toursandin April2002at theMedieval
JoelBiard
Academy
DirkI thank
PaulBakker,
William
kindinvitations.
andGyulaKlimafortheir
Courtenay,
fortheir
andMichiel
Streijger
helpful
suggestions.
JanDekker,
Sarnowsky
Jrgen
1 B. Michael,
Werken
undzurRezeption
seiner
. Studien
Leben
Buridan
zuseinem
, seinen
Johannes
FreieUniversitt
Mittelalters
Theorien
imEuropa
desspten
Berlin,
, 2 vols,Ph.D.dissertation
1985,vol.1,239-398.
2 AtthispointI should
thatin 1551a "Maison
de Buridan"
is attested
mention
already
andindicated
on oldmaps.See note15.Could
ofthePicardnation,
amongtheschools
leftto theuniversity
at hisdeath?See Michael
thishavebeenthehousethatBuridan
ofthesources,
which
1985[op.cit.,
above,n. 1),vol.1,237,esp.n. 533foran indication
from
Therealsois someevidence
thefifteenthareall laterthanthefourteenth
century.
a viewwhichis heldby
Dominicus
ofFlandria
thinker
(d. 1479),whomentions
century
XII libros
of Flandria,
See Dominicus
"Buridanists."
IV,
Quaestiones
super
Metaphysicorum,
Frankfurt
am Main,1967,fol.16ra:"Aliivero
1523,reprinted
q. 2, a. 5; ed. Venetiis
analoestunusunitate
unumconceptum
suntquiponunt
quitamen
conceptus
praecisum,
sicutsuntburidanistae
entis,
, quiponunt
univocationis,
quodconceptus
giae,etnonunitate
est
ex partereiconceptibilis
si veroaccipiatur
secundum
si accipiatur
se, estunivocus;
tamen."
analogus,
praecisus
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,1

13:53:55 PM

THE BURIDAN
SCHOOLREASSESSED

19

If we take PierreDuhem (1861-1916) as a startingpoint,thisquestion

seemsto have been examinedfornearlya century.EspeciallyafterDuhem's
studies,the Buridan School at the Universityof Paris won everybody's
admirationand was established as a historicalfact. In brief,Duhem
claimed that the accomplishmentsof seventeenth-century
science, as
in
in
Galilei
and
had
essence
been
achieved
Descartes,
exemplified
already
in the fourteenth
centuryat the facultyof arts in Paris, and particularly,
the
school
of
by
John Buridan.3With respect to this school, Duhem
offeredthe followingobservationsin his Systme
du monde
:
Les enseignements
furent
trsfidlement
reuset dvelopps
[de Buridan]
pardes
matres
de Helmstoedt,
surnomm
Albert
de Saxe,parTmon
minents,
parAlbert
le filsduJuif,
La facult
desArts
parNicoleOresme,
parJeanMarsile
d'Inghen.
unedemi-sicle,
l'Ecolede Buridan.4
de Parisfutainsi,pendant
And again:

et Albert
de Saxe,la Scolastique
ne trouve
plusriende nouveau
AprsBuridan
il advient
la lecture
diresurla nature
du mouvement;
comme
des
presque
toujours,
nousannonce
le dclinde l'colede Paris.5
oeuvres
de Marsile
d'Inghen
Nowadays,historiansof scienceagree thatDuhem's visionof the Buridan
school as an anticipationof seventeenth-century
natural philosophyis
in
this
has
not
diminished
the
any way
high esteemforthe
wrong.Yet,
Buridan school. Even severe criticsof Duhem, such as AnnelieseMaier
and Marshall Clagett,have emphasized that the school of Buridan was
one of the two most prominentschools of medieval naturalphilosophy
(the otherbeing the school of Thomas Bradwardine(d. 1349) at Merton
College in Oxford,also knownas the Oxford Calculators).Accordingto
Maier, the precise teacher-studentrelations between the members of
the Buridan school were unknown,althoughthe school was clearlycharacterizedby "its unitaryteachingtraditionand its intellectualphysiognomy."6Even thoughMaier was more cautiousthan Duhem, the picture
that thus emergedwas that of the Buridan school as a coherentinner
circle of studentsand followers,withJohn Buridan himselfat its center.
The existenceof a Buridan school in fourteenth-century
Paris has been

3 Pierre
Lesystme
dumonde.
Histoire
desdoctrines
dePlaton
Copernic
Duhem,
,
cosmologiques
vol.6, 697 andalsovol.8, 200,215-6,and225.I am notsuggesting
Paris,1914-1958,
thatthenotion
ofa Buridan
schooloriginated
withthestudies
byDuhem.
4 Duhem1914-1958
(op.cit.,above,n. 3),vol.6, 698.
5 Duhem1914-1958
(op.cit.,above,n. 3),vol.4, 361.
6 Anneliese
im14.Jahrhundert
Galileis
Maier,Die Vorlufer
, Roma1949,3.

13:53:55 PM

20

J.M.M.H.
THIJSSEN

repeated in many subsequentpublications,if sometimesonly as a label

of convenience.7
Since the timeof Duhem, muchfurther
knowledgeof Buridan'sthought,
of that of his alleged followers,and of the intellectualand institutional
Paris has accumulated.8In
lifein fourteenth-century
aspectsof university
in criticaleditions,or
have
become
available
some
crucial
texts
addition,
are in the course of completion.All this material,broughttogetherby
many scholars,providesan invitationto draw togethersome threadsand
of the so-called Buridan school.
to offera new interpretation
A portrait
of theBuridanschool
In orderto set the stage forthisstudy,I would like to recallbrieflysome
striking
biographicaldetailsof the membersof the Buridanschool. It has
been portrayedto consistof the followingfive thinkers:
John Buridan
(d. ca. 1360), Albertof Saxony (d. 1390), Nicole Oresme (ca. 1320-1382),
ThemonJudeus{flor.1349-1360),and Marsiliusof Inghen{ca. 1330-1396).9
JohnBuridanoriginatedfromthe diocese of Arras,and hence,belonged
We do
to the Picard nation. He twice servedas rectorof the university.
not know under which masterBuridan took his degree,but it certainly
was not Ockham, as the seventeenth-century
historianDu Boulay claimed
in his Histoirede l'universit
de Paris.John Buridan was the most prolific
Aristotlecommentator
of the group,ifnot of the entirefourteenth
century.
He made major contributions
to logic, physics,metaphysics,
and ethics.
7 Somescholars
caution.
Michael1985{op.cit.,
haveexpressed
See,forinstance,
above,
n. 1),vol.1, 281-2,andmostrecently
Michael
Albert
J. Fitzgerald,
ofSaxony's
Twenty-Five
A Critical
Edition
onLogic.
circaLogicam,
Leiden-BostonQuestions
ofHisQuaestiones
Disputed
ofSaxonywasa pupilof
Kln2002,1-14,whotakesissuewiththeviewthatAlbert
Buridan.
8 Fora survey
oftheliterature
seeJ.M.M.H.Thijssen,
LateMedieval
Natural
Philosophy.
inScholarship
Some
Recent
Trends
de Philosophie
etThologie
67
Mdivales,
, in:Recherches
ofa
oftheproblematic
and 188fora first
sketch
(2000),158-90,
esp. 177-85,
concept
coherent
"Buridan
school."
9 Forthebiographical
I haverelied
Michael1985
onthefollowing
studies:
information,
Theorie
Diearistotelisch-scholastische
above,n. 1),esp.vol.1,79-238;
Sarnowsky,
{op.cit.,
Jrgen
Alberts
vonSachsen
desAristoteles
derBewegung.
Studien
zurPhysik
zumKommentar
, Mnster
1989,
Oresmes
Kommentar
desAristoteles
Mcolaus
zurPhysik
Kirschner,
, Stuttgart
esp. 11-54;Stefan
deThmon
matre
L'oeuvre
1997,esp.15-37;HenriHugonnard-Roche,
astronomique
Juif,
parisien
vonInghen,
libros
duXIVesuele,Genve-Paris
1973;Marsilius
Quaestiones
quattuor
super
vonManuelSantos
Bd.I. Super
Sententiarum.
1-7;bearbeitet
Qmestiones
Noya,Leidenprimm,
Kln-Boston
2000,esp.pp.xvii-xxvi.

13:53:55 PM

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21

Albertof Saxonyis probablybestknownas thefounderof theUniversity

howof Vienna in 1364. Beforehis involvementwiththisnew university,
career in Paris. He took his degreesin
ever, he enjoyed a distinguished
the artsfacultyin Paris in 1351, under masterAlbertof Bohemia. Before
he arrivedin Paris, he probablystudiedin Erfurt.Originatingfromthe
regionof Helmstedt,he belonged to the English-Germannation. Several
officesat this nation. In 1353 he startedstudyingthetimes,he fulfilled
but
ology,
probablynevertook his degree. From 1366/67 untilhis death
on July 8, 1390, he was Bishop of Halberstadt.Alberttoo wrote many
commentaries.Especially his commentarieson De celoand the Physics
were influentialand survivein many copies.
Nicole Oresme was born in thevicinityof Caen. His name firstappears
in university
recordsin 1346, as a studentof theologyat the Collge de
Navarre. From a papal letterthat was recentlyrediscovered,we now
know that in 1342, he alreadywas a masterof arts.10In 1356, Oresme
became rectorof the Collge de Navarre, which means that he must
have had his doctoratein theologyby then. In 1377, he was nominated
Bishop of Lisieux. He died on July 11, 1382. Oresme is well knownfor
of some of Aristotle'streatises.He also wroteLatin
his Frenchtranslations
et corruptione
commentarieson De anima
, Metheora
,
, De celo,De generatione
Besides the factthat he belonged to the Norman nation,
and the Physics.
not much is knownof Oresme's career at the arts faculty.
ThemonJudeusoriginatedfromMnsterin Westphalia,and, as a consequence, belonged to the English-Germannation. Like Albert,he too
career as an officerof thisnation.Between 1349 and
had a distinguished
1353 he was absentfromParis,probablybecause of the Plague, as Henri
Hugonnard-Roche conjectured.During this period Themon taught in
Erfurtat the school of the Scotch BenedictineAbbey of St. Jacob, one
Note that Albertof Saxony also
of the so-called German Schottenklster.
stayedin Erfurtduringthat period. It is unknownwhetherthey knew
each otherfromErfurt,but theycertainlymust have knowneach other
fromthe English-Germannation. In 1361 Albertsucceeded Themon as
receptor of that nation. Themon wrote a commentaryon Aristotle's
His otherworksare treatiseson astronomy.11
Metheora.
10See William
TheEarly
Career
Oresme
, in:Isis,91 (2000),542-8.
ofNicole
J. Courtenay,
11It hasnowbeenestablished
thatThemondiedin 1361.See William
J. Courtenay
tothePopeFrom
theUniversity
Rotuli
Parisienses:
andEricD. Goddard,
,
ofParis
Supplications
vol.II: 1352-1378
2004,5.
, Leiden-Kln-Boston

13:53:55 PM

22

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

Marsiliusof Inghen was born near the city of Nijmegen. He is first

mentionedin the recordsin 1362, when he took his degree in arts at
WilliamBuser of Heusden. Like Albert
Paris underhis Dutch countryman
and Themon, he belonged to the English-Germannation,in which he
offices.He was rectortwice (1367; 1371), and
held many administrative
at
the
papal court. In 1366 he startedto studytheuniversity
delegate
ology in Paris, but only took his degree in 1395/96 in Heidelberg.His
to Germanywas connectedwith his involvementwith the
transference
foundationof the new universityof Heidelberg (1386). Most influential
among the many Aristotlecommentarieshe wrote,was the one on De
et corruptione.
generatione
If one reviewsthe biographiesof thesefivemasters,severaldetailsare
striking.With the exceptionof Themon, they all commentedon many
worksby Aristotle,some of them even several timeson the same work.
All of them were secular mastersat the arts facultyin Paris. However,
nations.All of them held importantadministheybelonged to different
trativeofficesfortheirrespectivenation.Two of them,Albertof Saxony,
and Marsiliusof Inghen,became even involvedin the foundationof new
universities,
namelyVienna and Heidelberg.With the exceptionofJohn
Buridan, they all at some point in theircareer, moved on to theology.
Two of them,Albertof Saxony and Nicole Oresme, eventuallybecame
bishops. In brief,theyall were prominentpersonalities,both in intellectual affairsas in mattersof governmentand administration.
In my attemptto seek new perspectiveson the Buridan school,I have
been followingtwo, ratherobvious, lines of inquiry.The firstapproach
is institutional.
The second line of inquiryis doctrinal.Both hark back
hison medieval notionsof "school" that are stillused in contemporary
toriography.12
The BuridanSchool:theInstitutional
Perspective
The basic medievalmeaningof "school" was thatof the classroomwhere
the teaching took place. The city of Paris hosted many such schools,
located in specificareas. They were the venues of medieval intellectual
life.What role did specificlocationshave in the makingof late-medieval
(natural)philosophy?Or, in otherwords,how probable is it that Albert
12William
inFourteenth-Centwy
Schools
andScholars
, Princeton,
NJ
England
J. Courtenay,
au XIIIesicle
desuniversits
, Roma1987,43-5.
1987,171-5andOlgaWeijers,
Terminologie

13:53:55 PM

THE BURIDAN
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23

of Saxony,Nicole Oresme,ThemonJudeus and Marsiliusof Inghenwere

studentsin Buridan'sschool, as has been assumed in much of the scholarlyliterature?Do occasional referencesto "my master"in the worksof
some of these authors,if they apply to Buridan at all, have a deeper
significance,or are they standardformsof courtesyto address (senior)
colleagues?13
The facultyof artsin Paris was the combinationof foursmallerunits,
the French,Picard, Norman and English-Germannations.Geographical
origin determinedto which nation a master or studentwould belong.
Together,the nations acted as the facultyof arts,presided over by the
rector.In addition to theircommon duties,such as the confermentof
degrees and the establishmentof the curriculum,the nations exercised
activitiesas separate corporate components.Each nation had its own
revenues,treasury,seal, patron saints,and authorityto regulate
officers,
its own members.The head of the nationwas the proctor.Among other
things,he summonedthe assembliesof the membersof his nation and
presidedover theirmeetings.
Since teachingwas organisedby nation,the questionwhich I needed
to investigatewas, whetherthe "Norman" Oresme, and the "AngloGermans" Albertof Saxony, Themon Judeus, and Marsilius of Inghen
could possiblyhave been studentsof the "Picard" John Buridan.14This
lead questionraisedotherquestionssuch as how the schoolsof the nations
were organised,and which studentstheyrecruited.Probablydue to the
littlehas been writtenon theseaspects
povertyof the sources,surprisingly
In
what
of university
follows,I shall presentboth well-knownand
history.
less widelyknownaspects of the schools of the nationsin Paris.15
13Courtenay
of
attention
tothisdimension
1987(op.cit.,above,n. 12),191hasdrawn
In theQuaestiones
etcorruptione
master."
libros
Degeneratione
theepithet
,
super
"my(reverend)
of
ed.Venice1501(photomechanical
Frankfurt
a.M.,1970),fol.106va,Marsilius
reprint
in thisway:"Etquiahecopiniomihiprobabilis
nescio
refers
toBuridan
apparet,
Inghen
Bridan
ideoearn
sipassionatus
ex opinione
meimagisti
Johanni
magisti
quiearnposuit,
in suispartibus
to
et earnimmediate
declarare
intendo."
propono
According
persuadere
Laphysique
deBruges
deBuridan
etletrait
ducield'Albert
deSaxe
Benot
Patar,
, 2 vols,Longueuil
inAlbert
ofSaxony's
three
suchreferences
Quaestiones
super
(Qubec)2001,vol.1,507*-8*
libros
De celo
should
alsobe readas references
toJohnBuridan.
Patarconsiders
thecourofSaxony
as proof
thatAlbert
wasa pupilofBuridan.
tesytitles
14Notethat,forreasons
ofchronology,
of
itmayhavebeenimpossible
thatMarsilius
everpersonally
metJohnBuridan,
sincethelatter
havebeendead
Inghen
mayalready
whenMarsilius
cameto Paris.
15Whatfollows
is heavily
indebted
to thefollowing
Auctarium
Chartularii
publications:
Universitatis
Parisiensis
andEmileChatelain,
Paris1894,vol.1,pp.xxvi, ed.HenriDenifle
duvieux
Paris
xxxiii;
, 5 vols,Paris1866-1897,
Adolphe
Berty,
Topographie
historique
esp.vol.5

13:53:55 PM

24

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

From the minutesof the meetingsheld by the English-Germannation

it appears that many
as recordedin its proctors'book {liberprocuratorum),
of the nation'sexpenseswent to the purchase,upkeep,and repairof the
schools. On the basis of these records,it is even possible to reconstruct
more or less accuratelythe location of the nations'severalschoolsin the
Rue de Fouarre.The schoolsof the Frenchnationwere adjacent to those
of the Normans,which in theirturnwere next to those of the Picards
and the English-Germannation. On the oppositeside of the streetwere
additionalschools of the Picards and of the English-Germannation. At
As fromthe second half
times,the nationswould even share a building.16
of the fourteenth
century(1358), the Rue de Fouarre was closed offat
barriers.
wooden
They servedto preventthe depositof litterin
nightby
the streets,about which the mastershad bitterlycomplained.Although
according to regulationsfromthe early fourteenthcentury,it was forbidden to set up schoolsoutsideof the Rue de Fouarre,in the latterhalf
of that century,the nations had to seek other locations for schools,in
order to accommodatethe increasingnumberof studentsand masters.
In any case, it is clear that each of the nations rented,owned and
maintainedbuildingswhich theydistributedamong theirmastersforthe
purposeof teaching.From the Frenchand Picard nationswe have records
about how the schools were assigned to theirmasters.Only the regent
masters,thatis, those masterswho were activelyteaching(notjust residing) duringthe Grand Ordinary,a definedperiod of timewhichran from
October 1 untilEaster,were entitledto have a school assignedto them.
By 1371, underthe rectorshipof Marsiliusof Inghen,the old customwas
abolished under which masterswere to retainthe schools theyhad used
in the previousyear. Instead, the schools were now distributedamong
the regentmasterseach year betweenthe feastof Bartholomew(August,
24) and Saint Remigius(October, 1), the beginningof the academic year.
One of the major dutiesof any master,of course,was to supervisethe
studyof his students.But where did these studentscome from?Thanks
to a prosopographicalstudyby Mineo Tanaka it is possible to give an
impressionof the geographicaloriginsof the studentpopulation of the

ofthedifferent
thelocations
a map,showing
which
includes
centrale
del'universit),
(Rgion
theMiddle
intheUniversity
Nation
schools;
ofParisduring
GrayC. Boyce,TheEnglish-German
Universities
intheMediaeval
PearlKibre,TheNations
, Cambridge,
1927,113-49;
Ages,
Bruges
Mass.1948,82-97.
16In 1393Picards
ofschools
ownedbytheEnglish-Germans.
theupperstory
occupied
ofthebuilding.
aroseoverthemaintainance
Controversy

13:53:55 PM

THE BURIDAN
SCHOOLREASSESSED

25

English-Germannation.17Tanaka was interestedin studyingthe relations

whichstubetweenstudentsand masters.To thispurpose,he investigated
dentstook a degree underwhich master.He focusedon the threemajor
the license
(determinatici),
stagesin the academic career: the determination
in the
interested
Tanaka
was
licentia
and
the
mainly
),
(i
inception(inceptio).18
instance
in
academic
for
the
of
the
that
occurred
study,
supervision
patterns
in the number of studentswho took all three degrees under the same
master,or who switchedto another supervisorafterthe determination,
or afterthe license. His prosopographicstudymakes one point abundantlyclear.Studentstooktheirdegreeswithmastersof theirown nation.19
More in particular,they seemed to seek out mastersfrom their own
Occasionally,it did happen thata candidateobtainedhis license
region.20
under a master from another nation. However, this practice was due
to the fixednumberof bachelorsthat each nationwas allowed to examine for the license each month.21The proctor's book of the EnglishGerman nation singlesout the candidateswho took theirlicense under
a masterof anothernationwithan epithet.They are called normanizatus
,
, but they remained members of the Englishdizatus,or gallicatus
jbicar
German nation.22
The nations did not take lighdytheirprerogativeover the academic
degrees. Two bitterdisputesabout the boundaries of the nations were
over the inceptionof candidates.In 1266,
precipitatedby controversies
Jean de Ulliaco, residentof a diocese of Beauvais, and hence belonging

17MineoTanaka,La nation
deParis lafinduMoyen
del'Universit
Age,
angio-altemande
Paris,1990.
18Notethatonlyregent
Thisis
thedetermination.
masters
wereallowedto supervise
twoexams.
nottruefortheother
19Tanaka1990(op.cit.,above,n. 17),156-85.
20The results
of
ofa geographical
coincide
withtheresults
ofTanaka'sstudy
analysis
onthebasisofdifferent
carried
outbyWilliam
theParisacademic
Courtenay,
community
forinstance,
thelodgHe tooconcluded
andtoa different
source
material
that,
purpose.
ties.See William
to regional
or linguistic
wasaccording
community
ingoftheacademic
A Social
Portrait
Fourteenth
Parisian
Scholars
inthe
1999,
, Cambridge
Century.
Early
J.Courtenay,
81-91.
21"On March16, 1338,thefaculty
whowouldbe
ruledthatofthesixteen
scholars
the
in artsat Ste.Genevive
eachmonth,
sixwereto be from
examined
forthelicense
andtwofrom
theEnglishandPicardnations,
theNorman
French
foureachfrom
nation,
at eachaudition."
See Kibre1948
German
ofwhichhalfwouldbe examined
nation,
and
ed. HenriDenifle
Universitatis
Parisiensis,
(op.cit.,above,n. 15),101,and Chartularium
4 vols,Paris1889-97,
vol.2, 474.
mileChatelain,
22Tanaka1990(op.cit.,above,n. 17),153-4.

13:53:55 PM

26

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

to the Picard nation,wishedto inceptin the Frenchnation.The Picards,

however,not only claimed him, but seized him bodily.23
More interesting
for our purpose is another conflict,which arose in
1356, and which involvedsome of the main charactersof the Buridan
school. In that year, a certainJohn Mast passed throughthe Rue du
Fouarrewiththe beadles of the Picard nationto seek the permissionfrom
the mastersof artsto incept,as was the custom.24
Master ThemonJudeus
from the English-Germannation, however, refusedhis approval. He
pointedout thatJohnMast had alreadydeterminedin the English-German
nation.25The earlierdisputebetweenthe two nationsover Mast's degrees
stillhad not been resolved.For thisreason,he had to refrainfromattaching himselfto eithernation. The ensuing discussionsbetween the two
nations,which dragged on untilthe end of 1358, are well documented.
The conclusion of the debate was that the English-Germansand the
Picards settledon the riverMeuse in the Low countriesas the boundary betweentheirtwo nations.The geographicaland linguisticramifactionsof the debate need not concernus here. What is interesting
is, that
Buridan
the
case
of
the Picards beforethe committeeof
John
presented
deputieswhich had to decide the dispute;26that Themon Judeus substitutedthe absent proctorof the English-Germannation,and that among
thosemasterswho signedthe finalagreementwere not onlyJohnBuridan,
but also Albertof Saxony. As usual, the meetingwas rounded offin a
tavern.Afterthe treatywas signed,the masterscelebratedin a pub called
"At the grange" (Ad grangiam).
Part of the bill was paid by a master
William Buser of Heusden, who not only happened to be a local from
the contestedregion,but who also was the masterunderwhom Marsilius

23Chartularium
Universitatis
vol.1,nr.409.
Parisiensis,
24See GrayC. Boyce,TheControversy
over
the
Between
the
andPicard
Boundary
English-German
in:H. Vander
Linden
e.a. (eds),tudes
d'Histoire
intheUniversity
Nations
ofParis(1356-1358),
ddies
la mmoire
deHenri
Pirenne
oftheincident
, Bruxelles
1937,55-66foran analysis
anda discussion
ofthesources.
25Auctarium
Parisiensis
Chartularii
Universitatis
mensis
, vol.1, 206:"Item19adieejusdem
factaeratcongregado
nomine
bacalario,
Julianum
apudSanctum
pauperum
super
quodam
volebat
ettransiisset
cumbedellis
nacionis
Mast,Leodiensis
Johannis
dyoc.,
quidumincipere
ad petendum
licenciam
a magistris
facultatis
ut
artium,
Pycardie
pervicumStraminis
morum
suaindictafacltate
eisplaceret,
Themo
est,siincepcio
respondit
magister
Judeus
insuanacione,
nacionis
fuit
etsuperhoc
Anglicane,
quodnon,eo quodaliasdeterminans
ortafuisset
lisinter
nacionis
etnacionis
exeoquod
Pycardie
Anglicane
predictarum,
maistros
ad suamnacionem,
fuisset
nacioeumdicebat
et superhocdiscussum
pertinere
quelibet
infacltate
setenere
debetad unamnacionem
predicta,
quodnecmagis
quamad aliam..."
26Auctarium
Chartularii
Universitatis
Parisiensis
, vol.1, 212-8.

13:53:55 PM

THE BURIDAN
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27

of Inghenwould inceptfouryearslater.27At the basis of the disputeover

the nations'boundarieswere financialconcerns.The studentshad to pay
a fee to the nation for theirexams, and it was this financialdimension
which caused the commotion.
I believe,that it is highlyquestionableto view
The episode illustrates,
Albertof Saxony,Nicole Oresme and ThemonJudeus as studentsat the
schoolsof the PicardJohn Buridan.As mentionedabove, in the cases of
Albertof Saxony and Marsiliusof Inghen, it is even attestedthat they
took their degrees with masterAlbert of Bohemia and William Buser,
who came fromthe same regionsas theirgraduates.On the
respectively,
basis of the above evidencefromuniversity
sources,the most immediate
the doctrinalaffiliations
taskin Buridanresearchlies,I think,in untangling
that are reflectedin the writingsby Buridan himselfand in those by his
alleged followers.
TheBuridanschool:thedoctrinal
perspective
With respectto examiningBuridan's doctrinalfollowingin fourteenth,
centuryParis,I willlimitmy attentionto his commentarieson the Physics
and relate them to the commentaryby Albert of Saxony. This choice
on the Physics
seemsnaturalforseveralreasons.First,Buridan's Quaestiones
stood at the heart of the entireconcept of a Buridan school. Moreover,
thereare a fewindicationsin the scholarlyliterature,about which more
And finally,we can now benefit
below,thatAlbertused Buridan'sPhysics.
on the Physics
fromthe editionof Albertof Saxony's Quaestiones
by Benot
Patar and the nearlycompletededitionof one of Buridan's texts.28
If we want to understandthe impact of Buridan'sPhysics
upon Albert
of Saxony, we must rememberbrieflysome factsabout its transmission.
are being attribon the Physics
At presenttwo long versionsof Quaestiones
uted to John Buridan. One has been handed down in fourmanuscripts
The otherversionhas
and is sometimesreferredto as the tertialectura.29
27Auctarium
Parisiensis
Chartularii
Universitatis
, vol.1, 233-6.
28Albert
etQuaestiones
in
hasbeeneditedin BenotPatar,Expositio
ofSaxony's
Physics
1999.
Edition
deSaxonia
attrbutae.
Aristotelis
adAlbertm
, 3 vols,Louvain-Paris
critique
Physicam
ultimam
secundum
octolibros
A critical
ofJohnBuridan's
edition
Quaestiones
Physicorum,
super
OlafPluta,
lecturam
is beingprepared
Dekker,
Dirk-Jan
including
bya teamofeditors,
and Renaissance
at theCenterforMedieval
and thepresent
MichielStreijger
author,
at Nijmegen
Natural
University.
Philosophy
29Thisimplies
ofBuridan's
earlier
versions
be twoother,
thatthereshould
Quaestiones
Iftheyexistat all,theyhavenotbeenidentified
on thePhysics.
yet.

13:53:55 PM

28

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

been preservedin 31 manuscriptsand one printededitionfrom 1509.30

it is commonlylabeled as the ultimalectura.
In the survivingtestimonies,
The latteris longer,
seems to precede the ultimalectura.
The tertialectura
in thatthereare more quaestiones
, but also more elaborateargumentsand
a more polishedstyle.There seem to be few,ifany,doctrinaldivergences
In the shortpreface to the Quaestiones
between the two versions.31
super
ultimam
lecturam
octolibrosPhysicorum
Aristotelis
, secundum
, as the fulltitleusually runs,this textis introducedas Buridan's authorizedversion.32
Aristotelis
have
Albertof Saxony's Quaestiones
superoctolibrosPhysicorum
been handed down in 18 manuscriptsand at least fiveprintededitions.33
in the manuscripts,
I thinkthat thereis
On the basis of the attributions
of thiswork:it is a genno reason whatsoeverto doubt the authenticity
uine text by Albertof Saxony. This observationmay seem redundant,
were it not that Benot Patar, the editorof the Quaestiones
superoctolibros
Aristotelis
, has rejectedAlbert'sauthorship.He believesthatthis
Physicorum
textis aprimalectura
byJohnBuridan,and consequendyrefersto Buridan's
as the secundalectura
.34In addition,it seems that the firstfive
tertialectura
30See Dirk
De tijdlosofie
vanJohannes
Buridanus
% Ph.D.thesis,
(f ca. 1360
Jan Dekker,
ofNijmegen,
2003,99-103.
University
31The tidesofthequaestiones
oftheultima
lectura
aregiveninJ.M.M.H.Thijssen,
The
onthePhysics
andtheir
Relation
totheQuestions
onthePhysics
Short
Redaction
Questions
ofBuridan's
toMarsilius
doctrinale
etlittraire
du moyen-ge,
attributed
d'histoire
, in:Archives
ofInghen
in M. Markowski,
lectura
areprovided
52 (1986),237-66,esp.240-5.Thoseofthetertia
I-VIIIlibros
Aristotelis
deNicolas
Oresme
in:Mediaevalia
LesQuaestiones
retrouves?,
super
Physicorum
26 (1982),19-41,esp.37-41.See nowalsoBenotPatar2001
Polonorum,
Philosophica
fora comparison
ofthetitles.
A. Maier,^wei
., above,n. 13),vol.2, 350-419,
{op.cit
Das Problem
derintensiven
derscholastischen
, dieImpetustheorie,
Naturphilosophie.
Gre
Grundprobleme
withrespect
totheimpetus
Roma1968,370-8compared
bothversions
theory.
J.M.M.H.
over
hetoneindige.
Eenonderzoek
naarzntheorie
over
hetoneindige
in
Buridanus
Thijssen,
Johannes
hetkader
vanznwetenschapsennatuurfilosofie
, 2 vols,Nijmegen
1988,vol.1, 7-71compared
oftheinfinite.
withrespect
to Buridan's
bothversions
theory
32Approximately
uthabetur
halfofthemanuscripts
offer
thefollowing
"Bonum,
preface:
tantoestmelius
etdivinius.
Ethicorum
communius,
, quantoestmultis
Propter
quod
primo
meisprecibus
inclinatus
multorum
de discipulis
seuscholaribus
egoaliquascribere
praeethancillisscripturam
commude difficultatibus
libriprimi
Aristotelis,
Physicorum
sumpsi
- utdicunt
- multa
inscholis
audita
adiutorio
sinealicuius
nicare,
scripturae
quianonpossent
de omissis
etminus
benediccommendare.
memoriae
Superquibusegopetoetsupplico
autemsi quaefuerint
convenientia
multas
haberegrates
tisobtinere
de inventis
veniam,
See Dekker
orationes."
etbonorum
scholarium
2003{op.cit.,above,n. 30),11 and 102.
33Sarnowsky
1989{op.cit.,above,n. 9), 439-40,and 450,and Patar1999{op.cit.,
above,n. 28),38*-59*.
34I cannotgo intothearguments
whichseems
here,butletthefollowing
quotation,
BenotPatar2001{op.cit.,above,
to capture
Patar'spointofdeparture,
speakforitself.
du
n. 13),vol.2, 399*:"Il fautdoncaffirmer
dsmaintenant
avecforceque la Physique
477n'estpaset nepeutpas tred'Albert
de Saxe,quandbienmmetousles
manuscrit

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29

books of a laterversionof Albert'sQuaestiones

have been preservedin one
has
It
not
been
studied
here.
manuscript.35
For the presentcomparisonof Albert'sand Buridan's Physics
, I have
singledout two case-studies.The firstconcernsthe problem of quantity
or spatial extension,whereas the second one concernsBuridan's theory
of impetus.I was led to thischoice by a suggestionfirstmade in Jrgen
Its implicaSarnowsky'sfundamentalstudyof Albertof Saxony's Physics.
tionsforthe whole idea of a Buridanschool,however,were,to myknowledge, neverfurtherexplored.Sarnowsky'sthesis,forwhich I will provide
on the
some additional evidence, is that Albert of Saxony's Quaestiones
lectura
and his ultimalecneed to be placed betweenBuridan'stertia
Physics
tura.Albertknew Buridan's tertialectura
of the Physicsand respondedto
it. Buridan in his ultimalectura
, in turn,respondedto Albertof Saxony's
36
on
the
Quaestiones
Physics.
Substance
and Quantity
In general,medievalthinkersbelieved that spatial extensionbelonged in
the categoryof quantity,and that some substances,such as bodies, have
extensionas theirmost importantfeature.However, not only the substance of body, but also many of its qualities were considered to be
forinstance,werebelieved
extended.The dimensionsof Socrates'whiteness,
to coincide with Socrates himself,that is, with substance.But is it really
or
accurate to equate quantitywith substanceand quality,respectively,

dela plante
le luiattribueraient.
etde touslesincunables
de touslesmanuscrits
colophons
connue
a conIl fautau contraire
soutenir
oeuvre
queBuridan
qu'ils'agitde la premire
477preserves
an anonymous
." Themanuscript
sacr la Physique
copyofthetext
Bruges
Noneoftheknown
manuis attributed
to Albert
ofSaxony.
thatin othermanuscripts
attributes
thistexttoJohnBuridan.
scripts
35Thelaterredaction
inthemanuscript
Welcome
Medical
hasbeenpreserved
London,
L 15,fols.lra-99vb.
Books6-8inthismanuscript
coincide
with
Albert's
Historical
Library,
in Sarnowsky
and
arestudied
1989(op.cit.,above,n. 9),451-60,
usualtext.Bothversions
inJrgen
PlaceandSpaceinAlbert
Commentaries
on
further
Sarnowski,
ofSaxony's
compared
andPhilosophy,
9 (1999),25-45.Mostrecendy,
thePhysics
, in:ArabicSciences
Sarnowsky
onthePhysics
attributed
toAlbert
ofSaxony,
hasestablished
thatyetanother
commentary
ofErfurt.
See EinAlbert
vonSachsen
wasac tually
zugeschriebener
byTheodoric
composed
ausderMitte
des14.Jahrhunderts
27 (2002),449-74.
, in:Medioevo,
Physikkommentar
36Sarnowsky
oftherel1989(op.cit.,above,n. 9),50-1,and58-9.Notethateditions
invol.2 ofPatar2001(op.cit.,
evanttexts
areavailable
above,n. 13),vol.2. Pataredited
as partofhis,as I believe,
failed
toprovethatBuridan
theseandother
attempt
fragments
ofthetextgenerally
attributed
to Albert
ofSaxony.
Forthesake
is theauthor
actually
I willrefer
ofconvenience,
to Patar'sedition
ofthepassages
thatarequotedhere.

13:53:55 PM

30

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

should quantitybe considereda separateentity?Originally,thisontological question arose in the theologicalcontextof Christ'squantityin the
Eucharist,but it came to be developedinto a genuinephilosophicaldocIn additionto theoreticalarguments(eitherof a theologicalor a
trine.37
philosophicalnature),also argumentsfromexperienceplayed a role in
the debate. The most importantof these is the argumentfromcondensation and rarefaction.Brieflystated,the phenomenonof condensation
seemed to teach thatthe extensionor quantityof a given
and rarefaction
substancecan vary,whereas the "amount" of substanceand its quality
remainconstant:no new partsof substanceare added, nor any destroyed
(in contrastto the phenomena of growthand diminution).This experience was taken as a proof that extensionand quantitywere reallydistinctfromsubstanceand its qualities. It was the extensioninheringin
substancethat was corruptedand generatedin the process of condensation and rarefaction,not the substanceitself.William Ockham, on the
other hand, argued that the condensationand rarefactionof substances
is caused by the local motionof the parts of substance.In condensation
and rarefaction,
the parts come spatiallycloser togetheror more distant
fromeach other,respectively,
than theywere before.38
Anneliese
Maier
had
noticedthatJohn Buridanand Albertof
Already
held
Saxony
divergentopinionson the issue of the ontologicalstatusof
Buridan
quantity.
argues that quantity,or more accurately,magnitude
Albertof Saxony, on the
, and substanceare reallydistinct.39
[magnitudo)
otherhand,deniesthatsubstanceand quantityare reallydistinct.
According
to Maier, Albertof Saxony in his commentaryon the Physics
seemed to
respond to two argumentsof Buridan.40She did, however,not include
in the comparison,and did not furtherdevelop the
Buridan's tertia
lectura
of
her
implications
insightsforthe chronologyof these worksor forthe
37The mostrecent
to thetheological
of the
ramifications
large-scale
studydevoted
debateaboutquantity
is P.J.J.M.
La raison
etle miracle.
Lesdoctrines
Bakker,
eucharistiques
1999,esp.vol.1, 120-55.
(c. 1250-c.
1400),2 vols.,Nijmegen
38Ockham's
views
arediscussed
inAnneliese
der
Maier,
Hintergrnde
Metaphysische
sptscholastischen
McCordAdams,William
Ockham:
, Roma 1955,192-3and Marilyn
Naturphilosophie
orNaturalist?,
Voluntarist
2 vols.,NotreDame 1987,vol.1, 178-84.
39Buridan
inhisdiscussion
ofthisontological
refers
tomagnitude,
problem
consistenly
is actually
moreprecise,
rather
thanquantity.
Histerminology
sincethedebatewasabout
thosequantities
thatarecontinuous,
as a quantitas
continua
i.e.,magnitudes
(defined
permaSee alsoMaier1955{op.cit.,above,n. 38),
nens
), andnotaboutthosethatarediscrete.
210forthispoint.
40Maier1955{op.cit.,above,n. 38),219-21.Buridan's
viewsare discussed
on pp.
210-8.

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31

relationshipbetween Buridan and Albert of Saxony. Nevertheless,her

doctrinalobservations,and those by JrgenSarnowskyand Jol Biard,
who also studiedthis debate, provide an excellentcontextto reveal the
on the Physics
.41
betweenBuridan'sand Albert'scommentaries
relationship
and
The intricaciesof the different
con
need
not
conargumentspro
cern us here. What I would like to focus on, are the two argumentsin
Buridan'stextto whichAlbertseems to respond.They both hingeon an
of the phenomenonof condensationand rarefaction.Even
interpretation
medieval
authors frequentlyreferredto condensationand rarthough
efactionwhen seekingsupportfortheirown view of substanceand quantity,these two particularargumentsdid not appear in the debate prior
to Buridan and Albertof Saxony.42
In the tertialectura
of his Quaestiones
on the Physics
, rightat the begin), Buridandevelopsan argumentfrom
ningof his own solution(determinatio
condensationand rarefactionthatinvolvesan elaborate experiment.The
argumentis expresslydirectedagainst those who claim that substance
to
and quantitycoincide,and who attributecondensationand rarefaction
local motion,which causes the parts of substanceto be more distantor
closer togetherfromone another,withoutthe additionor corruptionof
quantity.
viamantiquam
est
secundum
Adistam
quodnullasubstantia
quaestionem
respondeo
nonestmagnitudo.
Et ad hocadducoprimounam
sivequodmateria
magnitudo
resextensa
sitmagnitudo
concedunt
enimquodomnis
rationem
naturalem:
ponentes
localemsecundum
fieripermotum
rarefactionem
et condensationem
quempartes
ad invicem
ad obtinendum
ab invicem
vel approximantur
substantiae
elongantur
locumabsquehocquodquantitas
minorem
corrumpatur.43
derivedfromexpeAgainstthisview,Buridanpresentsa counter-example,
fill
them
with air [and
to
rience.If one opened a pair of bellows (vesica
)
thenpluggedthe opening],"you would be unable to noticeablycondense
the air in the bellowsby compression,such thatit would noticeablyobtain
41Sarnowsky
dela
1989{op.cit.,above,n. 9),92,andJolBiard,Conception
smiologique
dela quantit
danslenominalisme
duXIVesicle
science
etstatut
, in:G. Federici
ontologique
parisien
Vescovini
andFr.Barocelli
e astrologia
nelTrecento
scienza
, Padova1992,
(eds),Filosofia,
europeo
andJoelBiard,
De la logique
laphysique:
etmouvement
selon
Albert
135-54,
quantit
esp.150-3,
deSaxe
3 (1996),361-74,esp.366-7.Patar2001{op.cit.,
, in:Les Etudesphilosophiques,
andBuridan's
believes
thatAlbert's
textsareabout
above,n. 13),vol. 1, 355*wrongly
different
doctrinal
andthattheir
viewsarecompatible.
issues,
42I am basingmyself
in Maier1955{op.cit.,above,n. 38),141-223.
on thematerial
refer
andrarefaction,
areRichard
theauthors
tocondensation
who,inthiscontext,
Among
ofMediavilla,
William
andFrancis
de Marchia.
Ockham,
43JohnBuridan,
tertia
in:Patar2001{op.cit.,above,n. 13),vol.2, 21,1.75-82.
lectura,

13:53:55 PM

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

32

a smaller space." Buridan wonders why this is so. Accordingto him,

neitherthe air's matter,nor its substantialform,nor its qualityare the
obstacle.44Consequendy,anotherdispositionof the air resiststhe efforts
to condense its parts closer togetherin the bellows,and thisis the air's
"magnitude":"et illa non erit aliud quam magnitudo."In otherwords,
on the basis of this experiment,Buridan concludes that magnitude,i.e.,
quantity,is distinctfromthe air's matter,formor quality.
Tuncponoquodvesicaimpleatur
aere:manifestum
estquodtupercompressionem
nonpoteris
iliumaeremnotabiliter
condensare
itaquodnotabiliter
obtineat
minorem
tubenehabespotestatem
movendi
Petoergoquid
locum;et tarnen
ipsumlocaliter.
etquidresistit
inminorem
locum.
Constat
prohibet
quodtunonpotesipsum
ponere
nonresistit,
loco;nec
quodmateria
quia multoplusde materia
possetin minore
forma
aerisresistit,
forma
salvata
aerem,
sua,posse
quiaperalterationem
experimur
condensali
et rarefieri
ad duplum.
fiolam
vitQuod sicpotest
experiri.
Capiamus
reamet calefaciamus
earnsupercarbones,
os fiolaein aqua;videposteaponamus
bimus
condensabitur
quod,quandoaerinfilainclusus
refrigerabitur,
quodintantum
in fiolaet replere
medietatem
fiolaene remaneat
quodoportebit
aquamascendere
aerisnonrepugnabat
vacuum;
ergoex forma
quintupossesiliumaeremcompriSednecetiamrepugnabat
expartecaliditatis
mendo
condensare.
velfrigiditatis,
quia
multo
veletiamde frigiditate
loco.Ergopraeter
plusde caliditate
possetin minore
hoceritibialiadispositio
hocprohibens
et illanonerataliudquammagnitudo,
de
cuiusnaturaestfacere
distare:
tuncenimnonpoteras
illamcorrumpere
persuam
sednatura
actionem
etrarefacere
condensare
compressionem,
perhuiusmodi
poterat
et nontupercompressionem.45
Buridan proves the same point by anotherargumentfromcondensation
and rarefaction,which followsrightafterthe experimentwith the bellows. Suppose that God would condense or rarefya lump [globus)of air
The condensationor rarefactionwould entail
which includeseverything.
a change or motion fromone dispositioninto another one. Hence, in
additionto the substanceof air, one has to assume the existenceof other
whichexplainthischange. Or, in otherwords,if air rarefies,
dispositions,
it is in a different
state[modus
se habendi)than before.Since, however,the
air itselfremainsthe same, the different
mode of being can only have
been caused by an additionaldisposition;and this preciselyis the air's
magnitude.
Item.Ponamus
casumquodsitunusglobusaeris,omnibus
aliiscircumscriptis,
et
autcondenset;
constat
etomnis
mutatio
Deusiliumrarefaciat
quodibieritmutatio;
in aliam;igitur
velmotus
estde unadispositione
substantiam
aeris
oportet
praeter
44Thattheformoftheair is nottheobstacle
in a separate
is proven
experiment,
theheating
ofairin a cup{fiola).
involving
45JohnBuridan,
tertia
lectura
, in:Patar2001(op.cit.,above,n. 13),vol.2, 21,1.83-22,
1.5 witha slighdy
modified
punctuation.

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THE BURIDAN
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33

secundum
Et nonpotestdici
ponerealias dispositiones
quas eritilia mutatio.
suntloca,quia secundum
dietam
nonessetibi
quodillaedispositiones
positionem
et noscircumscribebamus
omnia
extrinsecum;
aliquislocus,cumlocussitcontinens
extrnseca.
Item.Illeaer,si rarefieret,
aliomodose haberet
nonesset
quamante;et tarnen
aliusaer;igitur
illemodusse habendi
differt
ab aere,et nonpotest
differre
nisisit
Etistaratiopotest
fortificari
addita;etiliaestmagnitudo
dispositio
quamquaerimus.
. . ,46
persyllogismum
expositorum.
In quaestio6 of book 1 of his Quaestiones
on the Physics[utrum
omnisres
extensasit quantitas
Albert
of
takes
on
both
),
Saxony
arguments.They
, that is, in the argumentsagainst his
appear in the argumentsquodnon,
own thesisthatsubstanceand quantitycoincide.Argumentsix and seven
which Albertlists,and which he attributesto quidam
, clearlyecho the
above line of reasoning,culled fromBuridan's tertia
lectura
. Argumentsix
is a paraphrase of Buridan's experimentof the condensationand rarefactionin a pair of bellows. It repeatsthat neitherthe air's matter,nor
its form,nor its qualitypreventsthe bellows frombeing compressed.
utrum
omnis
resextensa
sitquantitas.
Consequenter
quaeritur
Arguitur
quodnon.. . .
Sexto.Arguunt
sic'situnavesicaplenaaere;tunccomprimenti
illamaliquid
quidam
invesicaresistit;
existens
sedhocnecestmateria
aerisnecforma
aerisnecqualitas
aeris.Tuncsic:quantitas
aerisin vesica
aeris;videtur
ergoquodhocsitquantitas
resistit
et nonmateria
equequalitas
comprimenti
equeforma
ipsiusaeris;igitur
aerisestdistincta
ab his,etperconsequens
istanonsuntquantitas;
etcum
quantitas
nonomnem
remextensam
istasintextensa,
essequantitatem.
sequitur
Quodautem
materia
aerisnonrsistt,
aerisnonrepugnarei
staresubquanpatet,
quiamateriae
titate
ex eo quodilianondeterminat
sibialiquam
Nec
certam
extensionem.
minore,
etiamforma
aerisresistit,
formae
aerisnonrepugnarei
staresubextenquiasimiliter
sioneminore;
undesubmultominore
extensione
salvaretur
forma
aeris.Necetiam
diciquodqualitas
aerissicutestcaliditas,
humiditas,
rsistt,
potest
quiaillissimiliter
nonrepugnaret
essesubextensione
minore.47
, rephrases
Argumentseven, also explicitlyattributedto the same quidam
Buridan'sargumentthatthe rarefactionof a body witha size of one foot
intoa body of twofeet,everything
else beingdestroyed[by divineomnipotence], can only be explained if one assumes that somethingnew has
been added to the body. But only its size (<quantitas
) seems to have been
added. Consequently,quantityis different
fromsubstance.
istiadidem.
anniNam,posito
Arguunt
Septimo.
quodaliquodpedale,omniextrnseco
rarefiat
habetse aliter
hilato,
tunc,
quodfiatbipedale,
ipsosicrarefacto,
ipsum
quam
46JohnBuridan,
tertia
lectura
, in:Patar2001{op.cit.,above,n. 13),vol.2, 22,1.6-23
1. 18.
47Patar1999(op. cit.,above,n. 28),vol.2, 81,1.44-82,1.58,witha slightly
modified
punctuation.

13:53:55 PM

34

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN
sednonperhabitudinem
et comparationem
eiusad aliquodextrinpriusse habuit;
sibiextrinsecum
ex quo quodlibet
videtur
annihilatum;
secum,
ponitur
igitur
quod
intrinsece
se habeataliterquampriusse habuit.
Sed nonpossetintrinsece
aliterse
haberequampriusse habuit,
nisialiquaresde novoessetsibisuperaddita;
sednon
et extensior;
videtur
essealiaquamnovaquantitas
videtur
sit
igitur
quodquantitas
unaressuperaddita
reiextensae.48

Albertresolvesthe experimentfromthe bellows by pointingout that it

- not
is the formof "the mass of air" [formaexistens
in tantamassamateria)
the air's formabsolutelytaken- which resiststhe compression.The rarefactionof a body fromone to two feet,on which the other argument
hinges, is attributedto the local motion of the parts [solumper motum
In the hypothetical
case thateverything
externalto the body has
localerri).
been destroyed,and, consequently,the body is not in a different
dispositionrelativeto anythingexternally,
it is stilltruethatits partsare more
distantfromone another.
Ad sextam
de vesicadicoquodnecmateria
aerisresistit,
necforma
sed
abstracta,
forma
intantamassamateriae.
existens
Undebeneverum
estquodforma
aerispossetbeneessesubminore
cumtarnen
quantitate
quandononessetintantamateriae;
estintantamassamateriae,
cumnonpossit
stareinmateria
densa,
quantumcumque
ipsaestilludquodresistit
comprimenti.
Ad aliamdicoquodsi aliquodcorpus
rarefiat
annihilato,
pedale,omniextrinseco
dicoquod,quamvis
ad nihilextrinsecum
se habeataliterquam
quodfiatbipedale,
adhucquaelibet
prius,tarnen
parseiusad aliamhabetse aliterquamprius,
quia
ab ea quampriusdistabat
et nonperacquisitionem
alicuius
reinovae,
magisdistat
Ex hocpatetad argumentum.49
sedsolumpermotum
localem.
Buridan,in Book 1, q. 8 of his ultimalectura
, seems to provide a direct
in
to
As
Albert's
text.
the
tertia
lectura
, Buridanhere too defends
response
the thesisthat substanceand magnitudedo not coincide: nullasubstantia
est magnitudo.
The structureof the argumentwhich Buridan presentsin
supportof his thesisis rathercomplex. FirstBuridan presentsa number
of traditionalargumentsagainst the thesis that substanceand quantity
coincide. Even thoughthese argumentssupportBuridan's own view, he
findsthe majorityof themunconvincing.In orderto disclosetheirflaws,
Buridan sets out to refutethemone by one, as if he himselfwere a proponent of the view that substanceand quantityare identical.50
Istaquaestio
estvaldedifficilis.
Multienimponunt,
etspecialiter
moderni
quodomnis
resextensa
estmagnitudo
auctoritates
etrationes,
etdifficile
est
priusfactas
propter
demonstrare
Underationes
deductae
utinpluribus
sunt,
oppositum.
quaeinoppositum
48Patar1999{op.cit.,above,n. 28),vol.2, 82,1.59-83,1.68.
49Patar1999{op.cit.,above,n. 28),vol.2, 90,1.3-91,1. 15.
50See alsoMaier1955[op.cit.,above,n. 38),211.

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35

evadi.Ne aliquisaliquibus
illarum
rationum
sunt.Ideopossunt
faciliter
sophisticae
et utilli,qui voldemonstrationibus,
acquiescat
tamquam
quodessetinconveniens,
sciantevadereillasrationes
sibi
untistamopinionem
tenere,
quae in contrarium
factae
volorespondere
ad illasrationes.51
sunt,egoac si essemde illaopinione,
Afterthus having willinglyassisted his opponents by refutingthirteen
argumentsin supportof his own view, Buridan stillmaintainsthat no
substancecoincideswith quantity.
Nonobstante
tamenquodsicpossunt
solvivelevadirationes
praedictae,
egopono
conclusionem
estmagnitudo.52
quodnullasubstantia
, Buridan providesthe argumentswhich
Only at this stage of the quaestio
he findsreallyconvincing.The most importantproof for his own view
withthe bellows.The ultima
lectura
basicallyrepeats
again is the experiment
the experimentfromthe tertialectura
, thoughin a more carefullydeveloped versionand with a more drawn-outconclusion.
idemsecundum
substantiam
Hoc declaratur
potest
supponendo
quodaer manens
et frigefactionem.
rarefieri
et condensali
multum
Quod experipercalefactionem
multum
calefiat
aerinterior
mentaliter
quia,si fiolavitrea
supercarbones,
apparet,
in aqua frigida
culoversosuperius,
cum
intantum
rarefit
quod,si os fiolaeponatur
illein tantum
hormtemporis
aerinterior
condensabitur
refrigerabitur,
perparvam
in fiolam
ne
eiusrepletionem,
aquamascendere
usquead mediam
quodoportebit
obtinet
minorem
locuminsubduplo
condensatus
sitvacuum,
quam
quiaaerinterior
velcomPosteaperexperientiam
ante,cumessetrarior.
egosuppono
quodtrahendo
tu nonpotesaeremin tantum,
aeremsinecalefactione
velfrigefactione,
primendo
tupotesper
velrarefacere,
sicutdictum
scilicet
ad duplum
condensare
est,quantum
Namsi laterafollis
sintpervelfrigefactionem;
calefactionem
quodpatetinfollibus.
beneomniaforamutintra
sitaerisplenitudo
etobstruantur
fecte
ab invicem
elevata,
latera
follis
ad subduplum,
immonecad aliquam
inafollis,
tunonpoteris
comprimere
condentu nonpotesnotabiliter
notabilem
quantitatem;
igitur
percompressionem
silaterasintnonperfecte
sedmediomodoab invicem
sareaerem.
elevata,
Similiter,
tunonpoteris
notabiliter
elevare
laterafoletomniaforamina
obstruantur,
amplius
Hoc tamentu posses,si possespertractionem
notabiliter
lis,ne sitdarevacuum.
Tuncigitur
rarefacere
aeremsicuttupossespercalefactionem.
quaero,quidprohicondensare
notabiliter
aeremexistentem
inter
laterafollis
betquodegononpossem
Constat
laterum
veletiamnotabiliter
rarefacere
percompressionem
perelevationem?
a
dimensionem
distinctam
benequodcausahuiusreddinonpotestnisiponamus
a caliditate
ethuiusmodi
materia
etforma,
etfrigiditate
qualitatibus;
quaepraedicta
51The passages
ofBuridan's
libros
secundum
ultimam
Ieduram
Quaestiones
super
Physicorum,
arequotedfrom
theforthcoming
critical
edition.
BooksI andII havebeenprepared
by
OlafPluta.
Thefollowing
twomanuscripts
havebeenusedtoestablish
thetext:
Copenhagen,
Det kongelige
cod. 1801fol.(C),fol.13rbandKrakw,
Bibliotk,
Nykongelig
Smling,
Bibliotka
cod. 1771(G),fol.lOra.A slightly
different
edition
ofBookI,
Jagielloska,
in Patar2001[op.cit.,above,n. 13),vol.2,
ultima
lectura
canbe found
q. 8 ofBuridan's
120-4.
52JohnBuridan,
ultima
lectura
, C, fol.14raandG, fol.lOvb.

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36

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN
omniasintextensa
sicut
unomodomotu,
solum
cumomnibus
localem,
quemvocamus
sibiinhaerentibus
movetur.
Sedhuiusmodi
dimensionem
nospossumus
totum
salvare.
Dicimus
enim
ponendo
sicmagnitudo,
dat
quodsicutalbedodatessealbumformaliter,
quaeestextensio,
esseextensum
etmagnum.
Etsicutineodemsubiecto
datessealbius
plusde albedine
etplusde caliditate
itaplusde magnitudine
maiusetextensius.
Ideoetiam
calidius,
sicutidempriusalbumnonpotest
fieri
albiusnisipergenerationem
in eo
albedinis
cumalbedine
necfieri
minus
albumnisipercorruptionem
albepraecedente,
partis
itaidemexistens
nonpotest
fieri
maiussinealiquageneratione
dinis,
magnum
magnitudinis
cummagnitudine
nec fieriminusexistens
sine
praeexistente,
magnum
Modoultradicimus
ad hoc habilibus
corruptione
magnitudinis.
quodin subiectis
sicutad calefactionem
naturaliter
levitatis
etad frigefactionem
consequitur
generatio
levitatis
etgeneratio
sicetiam
ad huiusmodi
calefactionem
corruptio
gravitatis,
sequitur
naturaliter
et ad frigefactionem
levitatis
et
generatio
partialis
magnitudinis
corruptio
Et credoquodhocsitrarefactio
et condensatio.
Raritas
enim
generatio
gravitatis.
nihilaliudestin materialibus
multamagnitudo,
etdensitas
quamin paucamateria
estin multamateria
Et dicimus
ultraquodde huiusmodi
paucamagnitudo.
magnitudine
nonpotest
velcorrumpi
vel
aliquiditanotabile
generali
percompressionem
tractionem
sicutpercalefactionem
et frigefactionem,
sicutnecetiamde gravitate
et
levitate.
Et sicapparet
causaet ratiopraedictorum
essedispositasicmagnitudine
a substantia
tincta
etqualitate.53

Next, in the section that immediatelyfollows,Buridan takes issue with

otherscholars(alii),who attributethe condensationand rarefaction
"solely
to the local motionof the parts [of air]."
Sed videtur
mihiquodaliide praedictis
nonpossunt
convenienter
reddere
causam,
cumenimdicunt
velrarefactio
velcorquodnonfiatcondensatio
pergenerationem
sedsolumpermotum
localem
ruptionem
magnitudinis,
partium
perquemapproximantur
ad invicem
velelongantur.
Et egopossum
movere
localiter
undique
corpora
veltrahendo.
simul
pellendo
Quidenimprohibet
quodegononpossum
comprimere
aeriscondensando
ad obtinendum
minorem
locum?
Materia
enimnonobstat,
partes
inmulto
minori
loco.Necforma
substantialis
aerisobstat,
quiaplusdemateria
posset
sitin minori
locoaerecondensato
sicutdicquiailiatotaforma
perfrigefactionem,
tumest.Neccaliditas
obstat
secundum
seipsam,
licetforte
obstet
inquantum
sequitur
ad earngeneratio
nammulto
invaldeminori
magnitudinis,
plusde caliditate
posset
ferro
estmulto
Si tudicasquodobstat
loco,quiainparvoignito
plusde caliditate.
ex parteraritatis,
distincta
est,egoconcedo,
quaea praedictis
quiatuneillararitas
estmagnitudo
veldimensio
quamegoquaero.Illienimsicutnonpossunt
magnia praedictis
tudinem
distinctam
itanecraritatem.54
ponere,
Althoughthisview was also defendedby William Ockham, it is directed,
I think,againstAlbertof Saxony. In the tertialectura
, Buridan also mentionedthe view thatcondensationand rarefaction
were sometimesattributed to local motion, but only now, in the ultimalectura
, this view is
restructured
as a counter-argument
his
with
thebellows.
against experiment
53JohnBuridan,
ultima
lectura
andG, fol.lOvb-llra.
, C, fols.14ra-14rb,
54JohnBuridan,
ultima
lectura
andG, fol.lira.
, C, fols.14rb-14va,

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37

Buridan concludes his argumentfromthe bellows with an additional

argument,which we already encounteredin Albert of Saxony's text,
namely the argumentof the rarefactionof a one-footbody into two
mode of being
feet.The rarefactioncauses the body to be in a different
than before. However, since everythingoutside of this body has been
mode of being is not
annihilatedby divine omnipotence,this different
with respectto somethingexternalto the rarfiedbody, but intrinsically.
modes of being are preciselywhat Buridan labels
And these different
"magnitudes."
Si enimcorpus
aliisrationibus.
sicpersuaden
Conclusio
nostra
aliquibus
pedale
principalis
potest
divinam
et rarefiat
sibiextrnseca
sintannihilata,
et omniacorpora
perpotentiam
etnon
constat
doneesitbipedale,
quodalioetaliomodose habetpriusetposterius,
Etistosmodosexpartereialiosab invicem
intrinsece.
ad aliquodextrinsecum,
igitur
aliamatecumnosponamus
vocemus
quodnonsitpriusetposterius
'magnitudines,'
Et sicde aliis.55
autfrigiditas.
velaliacaliditas
riavelaliaforma
substantialis
There is some further
evidence,not previouslynoticed,thatstronglysug, and was
geststhatAlbertof Saxony respondedto Buridan's tertialectura
In the tertia
lectura
, Buridanlabels his own
priorto Buridan'sultimalectura.
are
different
as the via antiqua
and
substance
that
, the
quantity
position
traditionalview, which harksback on Aristotleand Averroes.
est
secundum
viamantiquam
Ad istamquaestionem
quodnullasubstantia
respondeo
nonestmagnitudo.56
sivequodmateria
magnitudo
Albertof Saxony,however,when he comes to speak of the positionthat
reportsthatit was held by some of
quantityand substanceare different,
his contemporariesand most thinkersfromthe past. Albertsinglesout
the two argumentsthe "sixth" and the "seventh,"which were deemed
particularlyimportantby proponentsof thisview.
ad
secundo
recitabo
unamopinionem;
In istaquaestione
ponamconclusiones
primo
scienad primum
illiusopinionis.
Quantum
quibuspatetimprobatio
quaestionem,
sit
modernorum
etplurium
dumestquodestopinio
antiquorum
quodquantitas
aliquorum
a re
et quanta,rectesicutalbedoestresditincta
a re extensa
una resdistincta
multum
Et istirationem
sextm
etseptimm
albedinem.
habente
reputant
proistaopinione.01
The "sixthand seventharguments"to which Albertrefers,are the sixth
and seventhargumentsquodnondiscussedabove: the argumentfromthe
bellows,and the argumentof the rarefaction
by divineomnipotence,both
55JohnBuridan,
ultima
lectura
, C, fol.14va,andG, fol.lira.
56JohnBuridan,
deBruges
lectura
in Patar,La physique
tertia
, 21,1.75-76.
57Patar1999{op.cit.,above,n. 28),vol.2, 85,1. 14-86,
1.21 (Book1,q. 6).

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38

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

advanced by Buridan and reportedby Albert.This contextties the opinio

modernorum
to the positionofJohn Buridan.
aliquorum
The change of perspectivebetweenAlbert'sQuaestiones
on the Physics
,
and Buridan's tertialectura
is interesting.
Buridan perceiveshimselfas a
followerof the "ancientway," the via antiqua.But throughthe eyes of his
Parisiancontemporary
So the same docAlbert,he is one of the moderni.
trinalposition,namelythatsubstanceand quantityare distinct,can both
be labelled "antiquus" and "modernus."
In the ultimalectura
, Buridan introducesyet another change of perhe
can
claim thatin particular"moderns"hold theviewspective.There,
opposite to his own that substance and quantityare identical. The
observationis absentin the tertia
lectura
, but,then,he had not yetencountered Albertof Saxony, a modernus
a
who defendedpre, contemporary,
this
and
who
had, moreover,challengedsome of Buridan's
cisely
position
own arguments.
Istaquaestio
utrum
omnis
resextensive
etsitualiter
habens
extra
[seil,
partem
partem
estmagnitudo]
estvaldedifficilis.
Multienimponunt,
etspecialiter
moderni
quodomnis
resextensa
estmagnitudo
auctoritates
et rationes,
etdifficile
est
propter
priusfactas
demonstrare
oppositum.58
The impetus
Theory
The second case studyconcernsthe theoryof impetuswhichJohnBuridan
and others developed to explain the continuationof projectilemotion
afterthe contactbetweenmover and moved object had been dissolved.
Buridanintroducedthe notionof "impetus"to denotean impressedforce,
which he conceivedas a qualitywhose natureit is to move the body in
which it is impressed.In what way does this theoryteach us anything
about the relationbetweenBuridan and Albert?
In her groundbreaking
studyabout the impetustheory,AnnelieseMaier
compared Albert of Saxony's discussion of the impetus theoryin his
on the Physicsto Buridan's ultimalectura
Quaestiones
, and concluded that
the formerheavilydepended on the latter.However,she noted one peculiar fact:Albertseemed to avoid the terminology
of impetus
, and preferred
the termsvirtus
motiva
or qualitasmotiva.
Let us recurto the relevanttexts,
which had alreadybeen edited by AnnelieseMaier.60
58JohnBuridan,
ultima
lectura
, C, fol.13rb,andG, fol.lOra.
59Maier1968(op.cit.,above,n. 31),264.
60Maier1968(op.cit.,
thetextofBuridan's
ultima
above,n. 31),207-14provides
lectura,

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39

a proiicient)
In book 8, q. 13 (undemoveatur
post separationem
proiectum
views as
Albertdiscussesprojectilemotion.61He presentsfour different
to why a projectilecontinuesits motion afterit has lost contactwith a
mover. The firstthree views which he discusses,have their origin in
The fourthview, which he qualifiesas the truestview
Aristotle'sPhysics.
veriorem
nunc
), is Buridan's theory.It attributesthe projecreputo
(quampro
tile's motion to a certainmotiveforce,a virtusmotiva.Six times in this
motiva
sibi impressa
motiva
, or just talis
, virtus
, Albertrefersto virtus
quaestio
is identifiedas a quality,which is innate to move.
motiva
virtus.
This virtus
veriorem.
Et estquodproiiciens
Aliaopinioestquampronuncreputo
imprimit
motivam
quae estquaedamqualitasquae innataest
proiecto
quandamvirtutem
movere
. . .62
Even thoughAlberthere adheres to Buridan's view, his terminologyis
In book 8, q. 12
in sharp contrastto the one used in the ultimalectura.
which is devoted to the causes of projectilemotion (utrum
proiectum
post
moveatur
ab aerevela quo moveatur
exitm
a manuproiicientis
), Buridanuses the
no less than 41 times.Only once does he use the termvirtermimpetus
for the
and
then only when he introducesthe term impetus
tusimpressa
,
firsttime in his quaestio.
sibiquendam
mobile
movendo
mihidicendum
Ideovidetur
impeimprimit
quodmotor
motivam
illiusmobilis.63
virtutem
tum
velquandam
Why would Albert of Saxony preferthe term virtusmotivaover impetus
when he expresseshis adherenceto Buridan's theory?Unless, of course,
he was not familiarwith this term,because he did not know the ultima
lectura
, as I have been arguingabove. A comparisonbetweenAlbert'stext
seems to settlethe matter.
and Buridan's tertialectura
In the tertia
lectura
, Buridan discussesprojectilemotionin book 7, q. 5
extrnseco
moveatur
a motore
eiusa manuproiicientis
postexitm
(iutrum
proiectum
Seventeentimes,Buridan refersto virsibi inhaerente).
intrinseco
vela motore
vis impressa
tusmotiva
, or just ilia vis, when explainingthe con, vismotiva,
tinuationof a projectile'smotion. There, he also gives his well-known
characterizationof this vis motivaas a qualitywhich is naturallyapt to

the
onpp. 372-5sheprovides
text.In theaddenda,
ofSaxony's
andonpp.260-3Albert
tertia
lectura.
textofBuridan's
61Patar1999(op.cit.,above,n. 28),vol.3, 1070-5.
62Patar1999(op.cit.,above,n. 28),vol.3, p. 1074,1.94-96.
63Patar2001(op.cit.,above,n. 13),vol.2, p. 211,1.34-36.

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J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

40

move the subject upon which it has been impressed.For as Buridan

quotes with approval:
estquaedam
natuDicuntaliqui:probatur
qualitas
permanentis
quodiliavismotiva
subiectum
suum. . .64
raequaeestinnatamovere
It is the same definitionwhich Albertof Saxony gave (see above). The
' occurs
term ' impetus
, always in cononly threetimesin the tertialectura
if
as
Buridan
were
nectionwiththe term'visimpressa
,'
explainingan unfamiliarsynonym.All threeoccurrencesstand togetherin one passage.
Ex hocetiamredditur
continue
ratioquaremotusnaturalis
ipsiusgravis
magiset
Nama principio
solagravitas
movetipsumgrave,et movendo
magisvelocitatur.
seuquondam
vim
motivam
inipsogravi,
ettunc
impetum
imprimit
ipsicummotuquendam
movetur
istudgravenonsoluma gravitate
sedcumhoccumiliavi;ideovelocius
iliavissive
ilkimpetus
movetur.
Etperconsequens
ideoiterum
velocius
moveaugeatur;
turet siccontinue
motus
velocitatur.
Sed nuncestvaldemagnadubitatio:
quaeres
estiliavissiveilleimpetus
?65
The way in which Albertof Saxony discussesBuridan's impetustheory
seems to providefurther
evidenceforthe thesisthathis Quaestiones
on the
between
Buridan's
tertia
lectura
his
are
located
and
Physics chronologically
m
ultimalectura.When writinghis Quaestiones
, Alberthad no access to the
ultimalectura
, avoided the neologism
, and, in line with the tertialectura
the
of virtus
motiva
He
traditional
which
"impetus".
preferred
terminology
was also used in the tertialectura
,67
Conclusion
on the
The relativeorderof Buridan'sand Albertof Saxony's Quaestiones
, whichwas was based on textualand doctrinalcomparisons,seems
Physics
to be confirmed,or in any case, not contradicted,by the littlethat is
is
knownabout the dates of originof these works.Buridan's tertialectura
dated around 1350, whereas the ultimalecturawas composed sometime
64JohnBuridan,
tertia
lectura
, in Patar2001{op.cit.,above,n. 13),63,1.71-73.
65JohnBuridan,
lectura
tertia
, in Patar2001(op.cit.,above,n. 13),61,1.51-52,1.57.
66As indicated
this
1989(op.cit.,above,n. 9),50 already
above,Sarnowsky
suggested
ofAlbert
ofSaxony's
hedid
on thechronology
butsincehewasfocusing
order,
writings,
fortheconnection
between
ofthisrevised
notdrawoutthefullimplications
chronology
andAlbert.
Buridan
67Thisis notto suggest
whocoinedthetermimpetus.
The term
thatit wasBuridan
ofMarchia.
See Maier1968(op.cit.,
virtus
motiva
above,
ultimately
maygo backtoFrancis
between
on1.202-203
and1.204.Thephilosophical
n. 31),166-80,
forinstance
relationship
on pp. 200-1.
de Marchia
andBuridan
is briefly
discussed
Francis

13:53:55 PM

THE BURIDAN
SCHOOLREASSESSED

41

between 1352 and 1357.68Albert of Saxony's Quaestiones

superoctolibros
This
is
date
after
1351.
are
to
be
dated
suggestedby
shortly
Physicorum
remarkstie the textto Albert'sopenone of itscopies,whose introductory
,69Since Albert of Saxony
) on Aristotle'sPhysics
ing lecture (principium
the Quaestiones
on the Physics
1
1
it
seems
that
in
of
35
the
summer
,
incepted
at
Paris
after
the
was the firstworkthathe read
completionof his studies there.
that
Furtherstudyof passages fromBuridan's and Albert'sQuaestiones
doctrinaldisagreementsmay corroboratethe proposed
reveal significant
At the same time,theymay help solve new questionsabout
chronology.70
the productionof scholasticworks,and about the impact that Albertof
(ratherthan the reverse).
Saxony may have had on Buridan'sultimalectura
the
have
been
must
Buridan
Physicssince the late
teaching
Although
in
1330s, he wrote his commentariesmuch later life.Albertof Saxony,
on the other hand, wrote his commentaryrightafterhaving completed
his degree. Why did Buridan feel it necessaryto revise his tertialectura
,
remarkthat the work
and writea new commentary?Is the introductory
is writtenat the request of his studentsmerelya commonplace;and if
not, what about the previousgenerationsof his studentswho had to do
Did the appearance of Albert'scomwithouthis writtencommentary?71
:? Was it, for
in
role
a
shaping the ultimalectura
mentaryplay pivotal
68The evidence
known
to Edmond
wasalready
thedatesofcomposition
concerning
Maier.See Michael1985[op.cit
FaraiandAnneliese
., above,n. 1),vol.2, 606-8.
69It is themanuscript
was
F. 345,which
Wissenschafdiche
Erfurt,
Allgemeinbibliothek,
'a comdickPhilosophus
readsas follows:
in 1360inCologne.
Itsincipit
written
"Quoniam
informationem
ideopropter
etprioribus
munibus
inbuicionemque
priusestinchoandum',
dismeo
voloistamquestionem
librotanquam
in istoprimo
scolarium
iuvenum
proprincipio
1989(op.cit.,above,n. 9), 18-9,and49.
. . ." See Sarnowsky
Utrum
scientia
putare:
70Onesuchfurther
ofplace{locus)
is thediscussion
explored
topicthatcanbe fruitfully
1989[op.cit.,above,n. 9), 51, n. 199,andfurther
in book4, suggested
bySarnowsky
Phnomene
unddie
. . Extrakosmische
mundum
in his eSiextra
aliquod
corpus
fieret
developed
' des
andAndreas
Schule
14.Jahrhunderts
der'Pariser
, in:JanA. Aertsen
Speer
Raumvorstellungen
York1997,131-44.Different
imMittelalter
, Berlin-New
(eds),RaumundRaumvorstellungen
fromGod'sabsolute
to reasoning
withrespect
Buridan
andAlbert
between
approaches
andthe
God's
Absolute
inJrgen
Power,
Experiments,
Thought
Sarnowsky,
powerareindicated
Carotiand Pierre
Paris
in the'NewPhysics'
, in: Stefano
ofXlVth-Centuiy
ofNature
Concept
duXIVesicle
Souffrin
1997,179-201.
, Florence
(eds),La nouvelle
physique
71Although
arelinked
toteachandQuaestiones
thatExpositio
itisgenerally
acknowledged
relation
between
theprecise
unclear
muchisstill
attheartsfaculty,
concerning
ingpractices
therelationA first
startofstudying
andactualteaching.
ofsuchworks
theproduction
From
Oral
texthasbeenmadebyChristoph
orallecture
andwritten
Fliieler,
shipbetween
onAristotle's
Buridan's
Commentaries
Commentaries:
Lecture
to Written
, in: Sten
Metaphysics
John
inLanguage
andCognition
Medieval
L. Friedman
& Russell
Ebbesen
, Copenhagen
(eds),
Analyses
1999,497-521.

13:53:55 PM

42

J.M.M.H. THIJSSEN

thatBuridanexpanded
instance,underthe influenceof Albert'sQuaestiones
in comparisonto his previoustertialectura
the ultimalectura
, and that he
moved the discussionof projectilemotionfrombook 7 to book 8?72Recent
work on the logic ofJohn Buridan and Albertof Saxony shows a pattern similar to the one broughtto attentionhere: it is Buridan who
respondsto Albertof Saxony, ratherthan the reverse.73
Althoughall I have covered here are a few passages fromBuridan's
on the Physics
and Albert'sQuaestiones
, the main driftof thisarticleis that
the common notion of a Buridan school needs to be qualified.I hope
that the reader has come to share my thoughtthat futurestudiesin this
area would benefitfroma greaterreadinessto perceiveJohn Buridan,
Albert of Saxony, Nicole Oresme, Themon Judeus, and Marsilius of
mastersof
Inghen as a small intellectualnetworkof nearlycontemporary
other's
work
and
at
times
who
were
familiar
with
each
arts,
responded
to one another.This conceptseems more adequate than thatof a unified
Buridan school in explainingthe dynamicsof conflictand alliance that
we encounterin the texts.74
Nijmegen
Instituut
Philosophisch

72Aristotle's
to disbook8, esp.266b 27-267a 5 is themostlogicalcontext
Physics
inconnection
withPhysics
theproblem
canalsobe raised
motion.
cussprojectile
,
However,
ofthings
thatdo nothave
discusses
themotion
book7, esp.241 b 24,whereAristotle
thatis inmotion
must
inthemselves,
andtheaxiomthateverything
ofmotion
thesource
. . .).
be movedbysomething
[omne
quodmovetur
73Christoph
derTermini.
EineUntersuchung
zurPerutilis
Kann,DieEigenschaften
logicaAlberts
to the
York-Kln
vonSachsen,
Leiden-New
1994,14-8hasconvincingly
contrary
argued,
isprior
toBuridan's
Summa
Perutilis
ofSaxony's
received
view,thatAlbert
(that
logicae
logica
See also
Summulae
deDialctica
Buridan's
thatcontains
is,a treatise
plushiscommentary).
from
Buridan's
derived
2002[op.cit.,above,n. 7),esp.5-30forother
examples
Fitzgerald
works
on logic.
74It alsobetter
in
unraveled
Carotiandpublished
fitsthelatestevidence,
byStefano
on thePhysics
Oresme's
ofSaxonytookintoaccount
thatAlbert
thisfascicle,
Quaestiones
andRemission
Discussion
onIntention
Some
Remarks
onBuridan's
as well.See Stefano
, in
Caroti,
whichalsopoints
theforthcoming
article
See further
thisfascicle.
Sarnowsky,
byJrgen
Oresme
andAlbert
Oresme:
onNicholas
ofAlbert
ofSaxony
Nicole
ata dependency
ofSaxony's
in:Stefano
Caroti
intheVoid
TheProblems
Vacuum
andMotion
onthePhysics:
,
of
Commentar))
"
. . .", Florence
dissensio
doctores
estmagna
andJeanCeleyrette
2004,161-74.
(eds), Quiainter
onAristode's
viewisThemon
ofthisalternative
Yetanother
illustration
commentary
Judeus'
seemsto have
NicoleOresmein histurn,
Albert
ofSaxony.
In it,he attacks
Metheora.
1989(op.cit.,above,
See Sarnowsky
Themon's
from
commentary.
copiedlongpassages
citedthere.
n. 9),esp.p. 41 n. 150,andp. 52,andtheliterature

13:53:55 PM

and Natural
On Buridan'
s AllegedAlexandrianism:
Heterodoxy
Paris
in
Philosophy Fourteenth-Century
JACKZUPKO

'De Anima'John
In the thirdand finalversionof his Questions
onAristotle's
Buridan devotes four questions near the beginningof Book III to the
nature of the human intellect:whetherit is the substantialformof the
human body (Q.3); whetherit is a forminheringin the human body
(Q.4); whetherthereis one intellectby which all men understand(Q.5);
and finally,whetherthe human intellectis everlasting[ perpetuus]
(Q.6).
What is unusual about these questionsis that they discuss not a problem or puzzle fromthe actual text of De Anima
, which was the subject
that arose among authoritiestryof Buridan'slectures,but a controversy
ing to fillout Aristotle'sambiguous remarksabout whetherthe human
soul can survivethe death of the body. As is well known,Aristotlesays
that only the part of the soul that actuallydoes the thinkingis "immortal and eternal"when separatedfromthe body {De An. III.5.430a23-25).
to say.1But what he could have
What Aristotlemeant by thisis difficult
in late antiquityas well as
meant was a matterof enormouscontroversy
of the human
in the Middle Ages, when the questionof the immortality
soul was treatedby Christian,Islamic, and Jewishthinkersalike. Indeed,
modernphilosophicalpsychologyowes much to the intensediscussionof
this question throughoutthe medieval period.2 It is no accident that
Descartesarrivesat the conclusionthathe is a thinkingthing;the notion
has been withwestthatthinkingis somehowbound up withimmortality
ern philosophyalmost since the beginning.
Althoughthe vast majorityof questionsin Buridan'scommentariescorrespond to lemmas fromthe text he is lecturingon, only Q.6, the last
of the fourquestionson the nature of the human intellect,is based on
1 See,e.g.,D. W. Hamlyn,
II andIII, Oxford
Aristotle's
De Anima,
Books
1968,139-40.
2 I havesketched
in mySubstance
someoftheconnections
andSoul:TheLateMedieval
F. Brown
Minds:
TheRelations
Modern
, in:Stephen
ofEarly
(ed.),Meeting
ofthe
Origins
Psychology
Between
Medieval
andClassical
Modern
, Turnhout
1998,121-39.See also
European
Philosophy
13ofmyJohn
Buridan:
Portrait
Arts
Master
, NotreDame2003.
ofa FourteenthCentury
chapter
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,1

13:55:32 PM

44

JACKZUPKO

somethingAristotleactuallysays in thiscase the aforementioned

ambiguous remark.So we need to ask why he feltbound to raise the issue,
devotingseveral questionsto topics hardlyeven mentionedin Aristotle,
given that he was supposed to be lecturingon De Anima.The answeris
that he was doing what any good teacherwould do: divergingfromthe
He
assignedtextin order to help his studentsappreciateits significance.
is absolutelycandid about his intentionshere. In the firstquestionof the
group, aftersettingout the initialargumentsfor and against the thesis
thatthe intellectis the substantialformof the human body,he says,"this
question has been raised to distinguishopinions about the intellect,so
thatwe will see how theyagree and disagree;later,we will inquireabout
theirdifferences".3
famosae
Accordingto Buridan,"therehave been threerenowned[magis
]
opinions about this intellect":that of Alexander of Aphrodisias,that of
Averroes,and finally,what he calls "the truthof our faith[ventas
fideinos"
tra^ (QDA3 III. 3: 22-23). He proceeds to summarizethem for his students.There is the materialistview of Alexander,accordingto whichthe
human intellectis the materialformof the body, and hence unable to
surviveits death; the monopsychismof Averroes,who argues that the
human intellectis a unique, immaterialformable to survivebodilycorruptionbecause it is not actuallyin the body; and the truthof the faith,
accordingto whichthe human intellectis actuallyin the body as itsform,
but also able to survivebodilydeath and corruption.These appear to be
the only "renownedopinions". No othersare mentioned.And only the
opinion of the Catholic faithis designatedas "the truth[veritas]".
There is a remarkin Q.6, the last question of the group,that nicely
bookends the entirediscussion."The truthof this question is apparent
fromthe preceding",Buridan says,meaningthe opinion of the Catholic
faiththat the human intellectis everlasting,"but it has been raised so
thateverything
mightbe reviewedtogether".4
By way of summarizingthe
discussionof the previousquestions,he then statesthe conclusionssome3 "Istaquaestio
in
de ipsointellectu
utvideatur
motaestad distinguendum
opiniones
All
et quodposteainquiratur
de differentiis
earum."
etin quo differunt,
quo conveniunt
from
Buridan's
inlibros
Aristotelis
DeAnima
secundum
tertiam
siveultimam
Quaestiones
quotations
Buridan's
Mind:
AnEdition
andTranslation
Ieduram
of
of
myJohn
Philosophy
[QDA^' arefrom
'
with
andCritical
onAristotle's
De Anima
III ofhis Questions
Book
(Third
Redaction),
Commentary
1989(UMI #9001313).
andInterpretative
CornellUniversity
, Ph.D. dissertation,
Essays
arebybook,question,
andpagenumber.
References
4 "Veritas
ex praecedentibus,
sedmotaestutomniarecollihuiusquaestionis
apparet
simul"
(QDA3III.6:48).
gantur

13:55:32 PM

S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM
ON BURIDAN'

45

rationibus
one mightreach ifhe were "to use naturalargumentsalone [solum
his
and
intelnaturalibus
means
of
evident
to
senses
uteretur^'
by
principles
lect, "withouta special and supernaturalrevelation[sinespecialiet supernaturali
.5 There followsa listof seven conclusionswe can reach
revelatione]"
about the metaphysicalattributesof the human intellectualsoul on the
basis of naturalreason alone. Buridan describesthem almost as if he is
settingout the logical space withinwhich reason can operate:
CI If the human intellecthas always existed,it will always exist in
the future.6
This is the standardmetaphysicalclaim that the human intellect'severmeaningthatit cannot cease to existat some
lastingnessis bi-directional,
futuretime if it has always existedin the past. It is worthpointingout
that on Buridan'sview, naturalreason does not assentto anything
having
been made throughcreation.It is properlyconcernedwith thingsthat
come into existencethroughgenerationonly (QDA3 III.6: 49).
it would be (i) generated
C2 If the human intellectis not everlasting,
and also (ii) corruptible,(iii) derivedfroma materialpotentiality,
(iv)
materiallyextended,and (v) numericallymany, in keeping with the
numberof individualhuman beings.7
Accordingto the second conclusion,an intellectthat is not everlasting
fromits body, as we could subwill be metaphysically
indistinguishable
stitute'body' for 'intellect'above and attributes(i)-(v) would still hold.
Indeed, with the addition of the thesisthat the human soul inheresin
the human body, which seems naturalto associate with (i)-(v),we arrive
at what Buridan calls as "the opinion of Alexander" (QDA3 III. 6: 51).
C3 If the human intellectis not generated(or corruptible,or derived
froma materialpotentiality,
etc.), it would be everlasting.8

5 "Et enumero
si sinefidecatholica
solum
primoconclusiones
quas aliquisponeret
rationibus
ex speciebus
habentibus
evidentiam
sensus
uteretur,
perprincipia
pernaturam
etintellectus,
sinespeciali
et supernaturali
revelatione"
(QDA3III.6: 48-9).
6 "Prima[conclusio]
estquodsi intellectus
essetperpetuus
a parteante,ipseessetpera partepost"(QDA3
III.6:49).
petuus
7 "Secunda[conclusio]
estquodsi intellectus
nonessetperpetuus
a parteanteet a
et corruptibilis
et eductus
de potentia
materiae
et extensus
partepost,ipseessetgenitus
extensione
et multiplicatus
materiae
individuorum"
(QDA3III.6:49).
multiplicatione
8 "Tertia
conclusio
infertur
exsecunda
exopposito
ad opposipraecedendo
consequentis
tumantecedentis:
scilicet
nonesteductus
de potentia
materiae,
quodsi intellectus
ipseest

13:55:32 PM

JACKZUPKO

46

Buridan notes that C3 followsfromC2 above by the logical rule permittingus to move "fromthe opposite of the consequentto the opposite of the antecedent"in a good consequence.
C4 If the human intellectis not derivedfroma materialpotentiality,
it does not inherein matter.9
C4 followsfromC3, we are told, because if an everlastinghuman intellect inheredin the matterof the body, it would continueto inherein it
when thatbody becomes a corpse or continuouswiththe earth- which,
"
Buridan insists,"no one would say [nullusdiceret]
(presumablybecause it
is contradictory
forthe human intellectto informanythingotherthan a
living,human body) (QDA3III. 6: 50). Althoughhe does not explicitlysay
so, the positiondescribedin C3-4 correspondsto what Buridan earlier
refersto as "the opinion of Averroes"(QDA3 III. 3: 22).
We then move on to a series of 'meta-conclusions',or conclusions
based on the conclusionsalready statedin C 1-4:
C5 In the followingtwo groups,six attributesare "consequences of
each other":10
The Alexandrian Position
The human intellectis:
(i) not everlasting
(ii) generatedand corruptible
(m) derivedfroma material
potentiality
(iv) inherentin matter
(v) materiallyextended
(vi) numericallymany

The Averroist Position

The human intellectis:
(i) everlasting
(ii) not generatedor corruptible
(iii) not derivedfroma material
potentiality
(iv) not inherentin matter
(v) not materiallyextended
(vi) not numericallymany

Buridansaysthatthesetwoattribute
lists(whichI have labeled'Alexandrian'
and 'Averroist')can be inferredfromCI -4. In other words, the metasi nonestextensus,
et si nonestmultiplicatus,
et similiter,
perpetuus;
ipseestperpetuus;
III.6:49).
ipseestperpetuus"
{QDA3
9 "Quartaconclusio:
de potentia
materiae,
ipsenoninhaeret
quodsi nonesteductus
materia"
(QDA IIL6: 50).
10"Quinta
esseperpetuum,
intellectum
conclusio:
consequuntur:
quodhaecsexsemutuo
nonesseeductum
depotentia
noninhaerere
nonessegenitum
neccorruptibilem,
materiae,
Et similiter
extensione
et nonessemultiplicatum.
nonesseextensum
materiae,
materiae,
nonesseperpetuum,
essegenitum
sexopposita
illorum
se mutuo:
scilicet,
consequuntur
inhaerere
esseextende potentia
vel corruptibilem,
esseeductum
materiae,
materiae,
Haec enimtotaconclusio
infertur
ex praecedentibus"
sumet essemultiplicatum.
(QDA
III.6: 50).

13:55:32 PM

ON BURIDAN'
S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM

47

physicalattributesassociated with Alexandrianmaterialismforma logiassociatedwithAverroistmonopsycallyconsistentset,as do the attributes

the
members
of
one
set
are
chism;
simplythe negationsof the members
of the other.What Buridan appears to be doing here is presentingthe
of human
opinionsof Alexanderand Averroesto his studentsas antinomies
reason, i.e., as equally plausible positionsbetween which we have no
rationalgroundsto decide. This is the 'logical space' on the questionof
the soul's immortality
alluded to above.
C6 The human intellectinheresin the human body.11
Buridan says that this sixthconclusionis "categorical",meaning that it
can be assertedall by itselfratherthan as followingfromsome other
assumptionabout the human intellect,such as its being everlastingor
materiallyextended.He adds thatthis"was previouslypositedand proved
[haecfuitpriuspositaetprobata
:]", a referenceto his presentationin Q.4 of
four"naturalarguments"againstthe Averroistpositionthat the intellect
is not actuallyin the body. These argumentsare not explicitlyidentified
with the Alexandrianposition,although Buridan does think"a pagan
philosopherwould maintainthe positionof Alexander [putoquodphilosoAlexandi
phuspaganusteneret
opinionem
]" 'QDA3 III. 4: 32]. They are:
Al A separateintellectwould not be part of the essence or substance
of a human being because it would be extrinsicto it.12
A2 A separate intellectwould be eitherone or many; not one since
contradictory
psychologicalstateswould be in the same subjectat the
same time,e.g., ifyou believe P and I believe not-P (the argumentfor
thisalternativeis givenin the next question,at QDA3III. 5: 42-43); not
many, because in that case our separate intellectswould not move
when our bodies do, leading to the absurditythat my intellectis no
closer to me than it is to you.13
11"Sextaconclusio
estcategorica:
humnus
inhaeret
humano"
quodintellectus
corpori
addition
fromseveral
(QDA3III.6: 50). I heredropthepossibly
spurious
manuscripts,
in thehuman
"inheres
thematter
in thehuman
'inheres
bodywithout
(or
perhaps,
bodyor
'- the
'sine
' or'sive
matter
inquestion
haveeither
matena
anditis hard
materiae'
manuscripts
to tellwhich,
in scribal
a
giventhatthewordsarevirtually
indistinguishable
shorthand),
which
in oneofthebestmanuscripts,
is attested
Wien,NB 5454.
reading
12"Prima
estquiaaliterillanonessetde essentia
velhomononessetessenhominis,
tialiter
unumaliquid"(QDA.3
III.4: 32).
13"Secunda
ratioestquiavelponeretur
intellectus
omnium
hominum,
quodessetunicus
velquodessent
secundum
hominum.
Sed utrumque
inconveplures
pluralitatem
apparet
niens.
Primum
inconveniens
estquodponatur
sicutpostvidebitur.
Etetiamdeclaro
unicus,

13:55:32 PM

48

jack zupko
A3 Many separate intellectswould not explain how Socrates understandssomethingbut not Plato, since thereis no relationbetweenthe
intellectand theirbodies; therefore,
parsimonycompelsus to positonly
one separate intellect(Buridanconcedes that this argumentis "close"
to the precedingone).14
A4 A separateintellectwould have to be everlastingand unique, since
naturalreason does not recognizeany way for thingsto come to be
- in which case it would also be corin timeotherthan by generation
ruptible,like the body.15

With the shortcomings

of the Averroistpositionnow evident,we can
turnto the Alexandrian:
C7 The humanintellectis generableand corruptible,
extended,derived,
inherent,and multiplied.16
Buridanexplicitly
identifies
C7 as "the opinionof Alexander",notingthat
it is "inferred",althoughhe does not say what it is inferredfrom(presumablyfromC6, the categoricalassertionof whichwould yieldthe other

quodnondebetponialiusmihiet aliustibi,si nonessetinhaerens,

quia:Ponamus
quod
ilHsintA (tuus)et B (meus).
Tuncoportet
et quodnonsint
rationis,
quodsinteiusdem
ad motum
mobiles
tuumvelmeum,
cumnoninhaereant
nobis.Ideointellectus
A non
essettibiproximior
velmagisapproximatus
B estmihi,
nece converso,
quamintellectus
scilicet
nostrum
Ideorationaturalis
nondictaret
antequam
uterque
intelligeret.
quodA
essetmagistuusquammeus"(QDA III.4: 32).
14"Tertiaratioestpropinqua
scilicet
Sortis
velmovetur
praecedenti:
quodintellectus
de locoad locumcumSorte,
velnon.Si dicasquodsic,hocnonvidetur
naturaliter
dicsibi(nonenimpossetdarimodusperquemhocfieret,
utrum
tum,cumnoninhaereat
tactuvelpulsu;nonenimpossetdiciqualisessetalligatio
intellectus
ad corpusSortis,
moveretur
cumcorpore
hocnonpotest
anteSortis,
dici,specialiter
propter
quodcontinue
Si verodicasquodnonmoveretur
de locoad locumcum
quamSortes
aliquidintelligeret).
tuncdistaret
ab intellectu
suo.Ideononposset
nisitudiceres
Sorte,
intelligere
peripsum,
essetubiqueperindistantiam,
sicutdiceremus
de deo.Et tuncnon
quodilleintellectus
essetponendus
nisiunus,quia ita essetmihiproximus
sicuttibi,specialiter
antequam
nostrum
Ideo possemperistumita intelligere
sicuttu,et ita esset
uterque
intelligeret.
fictitium
aliumtibietaliummihi.Undeob hoccredidit
Commentator
ponere
quodesset
unicus,
(QDA III.4: 33).
quodposteaimprobabitur"
15"Quartaratioestquiahumana
autetiam
nondictaret
fide,
ratio,
fides,
circumscripta
tuusessetantequam
tu esses,nisiponeretur
et unicus,
sicut
quodintellectus
perpetuus
Si autemessetfactus
voluit
Commentator.
de novo,hocautessetpermodum
creationis,
authocessetpermodum
fide,nondictaret,
quodrationaturalis,
circumscripta
generationsnaturalis,
et tuncesseteductus
de potentia
materiae
et inhaerens"
(QDA3III.4:
33-4).
16"Septima
conclusio
infertur
etcor(quaeeratopinioAlexandi):
quodestgenerabilis
inhaerens
et multiplicatus"
extensus,
eductus,
(QDA3III.6: 51).
ruptibilis,

13:55:32 PM

S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM
ON BURIDAN'

49

fiveAlexandrianattributessaid to be consequencesof each otherin C5).

C7, or of claiming
Notice, however,that Buridan stops shortof asserting
that the opinion of Alexanderis true,since he has alreadyreservedthat
judgmentforthe opinionof the faith.In fact,he says thatwe mustfirmly
maintainthat"not all of theseconclusionsare true,since theyare against
the Catholicfaith",even though"the opposingconclusionsare not demonstrablewithouta special and supernaturalrevelation".17
Our tour of Q.6 is almostcomplete.The doctrineof the faithis next
enumeratedin six conclusionsor theses parallel to those found in the
Alexandrianand Averroistpositions.Accordingto thisview:18
The Doctrine of the Faith
The human intellectis:
(i) everlasting
(ii) not generatedor corruptible
(iii) not derivedfroma materialpotentiality
(iv) inherentin matter
(v) materiallyextended
(vi) numericallymany
In other words, the position of the faithon the nature of the human
intellectcombinesthe firstthreeattributes(i-iii)of the Averroistposition
and the last threeattributes
(iv-vi)of the Alexandrianposition.Good logician that he is, Buridan realizes that these attributescannot be conseopposed
quencesof each other.Therefore,he tellsus, "all of the authorities
to these conclusions must always be denied, even though we cannot
demonstratetheiropposites".19
17"Sed tarnen
suntverae,quia
tenendum
estquodnonomnesconclusiones
firmiter
conclusiones
nonsuntdemonfidem
catholicam.
Sed credoquodoppositae
suntcontra
revelatione"
et supernaturali
strabiles
sinespeciali
(QDA III.6: 51).
18"Nuncnarrandae
conclusiones
velpropositiones
suntsineprobationibus
quaein hac
sunttenendae.
fidem
catholicam
materia
secundum
Quarumprimaestquodintellectus
a partepost.Secundacona parteante,sedestperpetuus
humnus
nonestperpetuus
sedcreatus;
nec
nonestproprie
clusioestquodintellectus
naturali,
genitus
generatione
et tarnen
nonannihilisedestannihilabilis,
estproprie
naturali,
corruptibilis
corruptione
nec
de potentia
estquodisteintellectus
nonesteductus
batur.
Tertiaconclusio
materiae,
hominum.
estquodestmultiplicatus
secundum
extensus.
multiplicationem
Quartaconclusio
vivithomo,et est
humano
seumateriae
quamdiu
Quintaestquodestinhaerens
corpori
revertetur"
a corpore
et iterum
(QDA III.6: 51).
separabilis
19"Etomnesauctoritates
suntsemper
opponuntur
negandae,
quaehiisconclusionibus
earumdemonstrare"
licetnonpossumus
(QDA3III.6: 51).
oppositas

13:55:32 PM

50

JACKZUPKO

Buridan signalssomethingimportantto his studentsby not asserting

the opinion of Alexander. For if none of the propositionsdefinitiveof
the Alexandrianpositionis categoricallyasserted,no consequenceswill
follow from them, in which case we can conclude nothingabout the
nature of the human intellectfromhis assumptions.For demonstrative
which Buridan definesas a
proofit is necessaryto constructa syllogism,
Otherwise,
"consequencethatassertsthe antecedentand the consequent".20
whetherthe human intellectis everlastingremainsa dialecticalquestion,
where doubt cannot be eliminated.In Buridan's mind, the difference
between the dialecticianand the demonstratoris in how theyask their
questions."The dialecticianasks his questionsin the formof a disjunction of both sides of a contradiction,givingthe choice to the respontheproposition
dent",he says,"but the demonstrator
propoundsassertively
to be proved,and then it is a question,forit is a dubitableproposition,
but the same [proposition]afterthe demonstrationis the conclusion".21
Since demonstrationis aimed at removingdoubt concerninga proposition fromthe minds of those consideringit, therecan be no optionsfor
the respondent,no alternativewaysforthe dialecticto unfold.The movementis alwaysfroma questionor "dubitableproposition,whichis turned
into a certainand known conclusion".22
by a demonstration
Now it mightbe objectedhere thatthe Alexandrianpositionis demonstrablefor Buridan because he assertsC6 categorically.C6 appears to
satisfythe fourthmemberof that position,and we know fromC5 that
if we can demonstratejust one of the attributesthe otherswill follow
because theyare all consequencesof each other,as follows:
PI If anythinginheresin matter,it is not everlasting.
P2 The human intellectinheresin matter[fromC61
C Therefore,the human intellectis not everlasting
20Johannes
Buridan:
Summulae:
De syllogismis
, 5.1.3,in:GyulaKlima(tr.),
Buridanus,
John
et
deDialctica
'Summulae
2001,309: "consequentia
' NewHaven-London
consequentis
antecedentis
assertive."
21Johannes
Summulae:
Dedemonstrationibus
Buridanus,
, 8.3.2,ed.L. M. deRijk,Groningenenimquaerit
subdisiunctione
de utraque
Haren2001,64, 17-20:"Dialecticus
parteconautemproponit
assertive
. . . Demonstrator
danselectionem
tradictions,
respondenti
et
etillatuncestquaestio,
demonstrandam,
quiaestdubitabilis
propositio,
propositionem
in Klima2001(op.cit.,above,n. 20),
estconclusio";
transi,
eadempostdemonstrationem
666-7.
22Summulae
8.3.3,ed. De Rijk,69, 2-3:"dubitabilis
propositio,
quae perdemonstrain Klima2001(op.cit.,above,n. 20),
certaet scita";transi,
tionem
efficitur
conclusio
670-1.

13:55:32 PM

S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM
ON BURIDAN'

51

And so on for the other attributesin the Alexandrianposition.Buridan

thus appears committedto Alexandrian materialismabout the human
he has said about the truthof the opinintellect,contraryto everything
ion of the faith.
conundrum.But its
Obviously,the textof C6 presentsan interpretive
in
of
Olaf
the
is
much
Pluta, who in a recent
eyes
greater
significance
article argues that Buridan was an Alexandrian materialistabout the
human intellectwho, because of the threat of persecutionby Church
"did not dare to give all his argumentsagainstimmortality".23
authorities,
Instead, he expresses his materialism obliquely, arguing in favor of
Alexander's position on the basis of natural reason "leaving aside the
Catholic faith [fidecatholica
circumscripta
:]", and leaving it for "the reader
to draw the finalconclusion[fromC5 and C6] concerningthe question
of immortality,
namelythatthe human intellectconsequentlyis not everlastingand hence immortal".24
is not new. CommentatorsfromGeorg Schwartz
This interpretation
have read
in the fifteenth
centuryto KonstantyMichalskiin the twentieth
as
evidence
that he
Buridan's apparent ambivalencetowardsAlexander
But as AnnelieseMaier observedin replyto Michalski's
was an Alexandrist.25
"one
cannot reallysay that he [i.e., Buridan] decides in
interpretation,
favorof the teachingof Alexanderof Aphrodisias;throughouthis argumentsand conclusions,Buridan goes his own way, and then statesonly
As we have seen,Buridan
thathis resultsagree withthoseof Alexander".26
when
he
tries
to
Alexander
with
imaginewhata pagan philosoonly
agrees
alone. But Buridan is not
on
natural
reason
based
would
conclude
pher
a pagan philosopher.Indeed, any claim thatBuridanwas an Alexandrian
is goingto run headlonginto the followingfacts:(1) he neverassertsthat
Alexander'sopinionon the intellectis true(thoughhe does say thisabout
23OlafPluta,Persecution
Statute
ArtofWriting.
TheParisian
andthe
1, 1272,andIts
ofApril
dela pense
mdivale.
Etudes
, in:PaulJ.J. M. Bakker
(ed.),Chemins
Philosophical
Consequences
Turnhout
(non
2002,575.
Kaluza,
offertes
24Pluta2002(op.cit.,above,n. 23),583.
25ForSchwartz,
seeL'Influence
seePluta2002(op.cit.,
above,n. 23),584-5.ForMichalski,
Internationale
dansla psychologie
duXIVesicle
dAverros
etdAlexandre
, Bulletin
dAphrodisias
Classed'Histoire
et
et Lettres,
Classede Philologie,
de l'Academie
Polonaise
desSciences
de Philosophie
(1928),14-6.
26Anneliese
Maier:"mankannauchnicht
eigentlich
sagen,dasser sichfrdieLehre
undSchliessen
Buridan
Alexanders
vonAphrodisias
entscheidet:
gehtimArgumentieren
mitdenen
dannnur,dassseineErgebnisse
durchaus
seinen
eigenen
Wegundkonstatiert
dersptscholastischen
Alexanders
bereinstimmen"
,
Naturphilosophie
(Metaphysische
Hintergrnde
derSptscholastik
Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
, vol.4, Roma1955,27).

13:55:32 PM

52

JACKZUPKO

the contraryopinion of the faith);27

(2) he does assertthat "not all [of
conclusions
are
true";28(3) he says thingselsewherethatare
Alexander's]
with
what
he
would
have known of Alexander'sposition,29
incompatible
forexample,thatAlexanderdoes not positan immaterialintelremarking,
lect, "as we do [sicutnosponimus
]";30 and (4) there is never any suggestionin the Quaestiones
in libros
Aristotelis
De Animaor elsewherein his writings
that he hopes to redeem Alexander for Christianphilosophy,which is
surelythe sortof projecthe would take up ifhe reallythoughtAlexander
was right.
But Pluta is undeterred.He argues that Buridan had good reason to
his truepositionon the intellectbecause of the ArtsFacultyStatute
disguise
of April 1, 1272, which he describesas a "landmarkstatutein the history of persecutionof philosophicalthought"that became "a forceful
instrumentto curtail and control any heterodoxphilosophicalthought
during the later Middle Ages".31Originallydirected against the Latin
the statutedecreed that mastersand bachelorsin the faculty
Averroists,
of arts at Paris could no longer dispute properlytheologicalquestions,
e.g., concerningthe Trinityand the Incarnation,and thatwhen a question concernedboth faithand philosophy,it mustbe determinedon the
side of the faith,and any argumentsgoing against the faithmust be
resolvedor declared to be simplyand absolutelyfalse.32Violatorsof the
27"TertiaopinioestVeritas
fideinostrae
. . (QDA3III.3: 22).
28"Sed tarnen
firmiter
tenendum
estquodnonomnesconclusiones
suntverae..."
butpresumably
he meansthefirst
threecon(
QDA3III.6: 51).He doesnotsaywhich,
clusions
(i-iii)oftheAlexandrian
position.
29I say"wouldhaveknown"
becauseit is relevant
to thisdebatethatBuridan
seems
withAlexander
whodiscusses
andcritiques
Averroes,
acquainted
onlyindirectly,
through
hismaterialist
viewin theCommentarium
inDe Anima
knewwell.
, whichBuridan
Magnum
ThereAlexander's
viewis described
as an opinion,
butit is opposed
to theopinions
of
Themistius
andTheophrastus,
whoseemcloserto theposition
Averroes
adoptshimself.
If Buridan
didknowsomeofAlexander's
ofDe Inteliectu
workdirectly
(a translation
by
GerardofCremona
hadbeenaroundsincethetwelfth
he givesno indication
century),
ofthis.
30Speaking
howintelligible
inthesoul
oftheproblem
ofexplaining
canremain
species
after
theactofthinking
is complete
andlaterbe recalled
atwill,Buridan
almost
concedes,
wouldnottouchAlexander,
"itis apparent
to methatthisdifficulty
whodoes
wistfully,
mihiquodiliadifficultas
notpositan immaterial
soulas we do [apparet
nontangeret
nonponentem
intellectum
immaterialem
sicutnosponimus]"
Alexandrm,
(QDA3III.15:
seeRolfSchnberger,
Relation
ab Vergleich:
DieRelationstheorie
172).Foradditional
passages,
desJohannes
Buridan
imKontext
seines
Denkens
undderScholastik
, Leiden1994,425,n. 31.
31Pluta2002{op.cit
., above,n. 23),569.
32The LatintextoftheStatute
is citedin Pluta2002(op.cit.,above,n. 23),570,
n. 21.

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ON BURIDAN'
S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM

53

statutefaced the stiffpenaltyof being permanentlyexcluded fromthe

facultyand branded as hereticsunlesstheypubliclyrecantedwithinthree
days. "Sufficeit to say", Pluta remarks,"that this statuteforced the
philosophersto modifytheirwritingsubstantially;
theyhad to startwrit'between
the
lines'".33
ing
Was Buridan cowed by the threatof exclusionto hide his heterodox
beliefs'betweenthe lines'? He does seem to thinkAlexanderhas the best
positionif one cleaves only to natural reason, but why do that if you
knowthe truthas revealedin scriptureand churchteaching?That would
be like sayingthat if I put my telescope away and relied on naked-eye
- an interobservations,I would conclude that the universeis geocentric
estingintellectualexercise,perhaps,but not to be confusedwithwhat is
actuallythe case. In addition,the assumptionthat Buridan was theologelse we know about him
icallysubmissiveclashes withalmost everything
as a teacherof philosophy.He was a staunchdefenderof the autonomy
of his facultywho, thoughsensitiveto curricularboundaries,frequently
crossedthem anywayin treatingimportantquestionsin naturalphilosophy.34Thus, we findin his writingsdiscussionsof God as omnipotent,as
, as impartinginexhaustible
capable of freelycreatingotherbeingsex nihilo
motionto celestialorbs at the momentof theircreation,as possessedof
a perfectintelligencewhose activitymakes human understandingpossible, and as the source of the beatitudethat is the perfectionof human
happiness.What these examples share, of course, is a creaturelyorientation.God is in each case studiedin relationto creatures,whose matter and motionnaturallydraw our mindsupwardsto theirprinciples,as
well as providingus with evidentappearances throughwhich the divine
author of these principlesmay be known. This much is proper to the
arts faculty.In theology,however, God and creaturesare considered
throughthe divinelightof revelation:"theologyhas foritsprinciplesarticles [of faith],which are believedquite apart fromtheirevidentness' the
artculos
crditos
'35 There is an
ologiaverohabetproprincipiis
absqueevidential
33Pluta2002{op.cit.,above,n. 23),571.
34See Zupko2003{op.cit.,above,n. 2), 139-45,
andEdithSylla,'Ideoquasimendicare
intellectum
humanum':
TheRoleofTheology
inJohn
Buridan's
Natural
oportet
, in:J.M.M.H.
Philosophy
andJackZupko(eds.),TheMetaphysics
andNatural
Buridan
Thijssen
, LeidenPhilosophy
ofJohn
Boston-Kln
2001,221-45.
35JohnBuridan,
In Metaphysicen
Aristotelis
Paris1518,BookI,
Questiones
argutissimae,
a. M. 1964.The
zurAristotelischen
, Frankfurt
Q. 2, f.4ra-rb.
Rpr.as Kommentar
Metaphysik
dateis erroneously
ofthereprint
original
publication
givenas 1588on thefrontispiece
edition.

13:55:32 PM

54

JACKZUPKO

betweenthe two approaches,whichcan be

importantpracticaldifference
seen in the way Buridan argues forthe existenceof intellectualmemory
in humans withoutspeculatingabout the role such a facultymightplay
in a disembodiedintellect,or examines the relationbetween God and
creatureswithoutgoing on to considerthe relationbetweendistinctpersons of the Trinity.Since the latterquestionsinvolveexaminingthe consequencesofparticulardoctrinesor articlesof faithratherthanconstructing
fromevidentprinciples,theyare off-limits
demonstrations
to the philosoif
even
the
is
the
matter
same.
pher,
subject
But perhapsBuridanwas not being submissivein endorsingthe orthodox position.Perhaps he was only being crafty,sayingwhat needed to
be said in public to remainabove suspicion,leavinghintsof his real views
in his commentariesfor his followersand other cognoscentito read
'between the lines'. Here Pluta invokesthe godfatherof the hermeneutics of suspicion,Leo Strauss.Citing Strauss's 1941 essay,Persecution
and
theArtof Writings
he contendsthatthe constantthreatof persecutionmade
medievalphilosophers"particularly
inventivein developingtechniquesof
which
enabled
them
to
shroud
theirtrue beliefs".36One techwriting,
Strauss
identifies
is
contradiction
of the orthodoxview:
nique
surreptitious
... ifan ablewriter
whohasa clearmindanda perfect
oftheorthodox
knowledge
viewand all itsramifications,
contradicts
and as it werein passing
surreptitiously
oneofitsnecessary
or consequences
whichhe explicidy
presuppositions
recognizes
andmaintains
thathe wasopposed
to
else,we can reasonably
everywhere
suspect
theorthodox
as suchand wemuststudy
hiswholebookalloveragain,with
system
muchgreater
careandmuchlessnavet
thaneverbefore.37
"As a result",Pluta argues,"it makes no sense to enumeratepassages in
which a givenauthoraffirms
that,forexample,the human soul is incorand hence immortal,if the very same
indivisible,
poreal,
incorruptible,
author providesstrongphilosophicalargumentsfor the mortalityof the
soul somewhereelse- withoutmakingany attemptto refutethese argumentson naturalgrounds".38
The slightest
hintof unorthodoxy
is sufficient
to undermineour assumptionthat an author means what he says. This
turnsBuridan'sclaims that are inconsistent
reading,of course,effectively
withAlexander,includinghis explicitrejectionof materialismas regards
the humanintellect,
intoevidenceforthe thesisthathe was an Alexandrian.

36Pluta2002{op.cit
., above,n. 23),564.
37Strauss
1941,32; quotedin Pluta2002(op.cit.,above,n. 23),568,n. 19.
38Pluta2002[op.cit.,above,n. 23),569.

13:55:32 PM

S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM
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55

It is
to know what to say to such an interpretation.39
It is difficult
not
evidence
where
a
to
close
contrary
conspiracytheory,
uncomfortably
only does not count against the theory,but also confirmsthe existence
of a conspiracy.Be that as it may, I do not believe Pluta's interpretation can be sustainedon textualgrounds.To see why not, we need to
conundrummentionedabove. Recall
returnto its source,the interpretive
that Buridan does not actuallyrefuteAlexander'sheterodoxpositionon
the intellectby naturalarguments,as seems to be requiredby the 1272
of resolvingit: "sednobisestdifficilis
Statute,but onlypointsto the difficulty
"
solutio (QDA3 III.6: 52). Furthermore,his categoricalassertionthat the
humanintellectinheresin the humanbody seemsto entailtheAlexandrian
position,althoughhe does not actuallydraw this conclusion.Why does
he leave it at that?
To begin with the conundrum,Buridan does not conclude that the
fromC6 to theAlexandrian
is materialbecausetheinference
humanintellect
This
is
not
is
fallacious.
immediatelyevidentfromthe text of
position
if
two
we
look
but
just
questionsearlierwe will see BuridandefendQ.6,
ing, in replyto Averroes,the view that the human intellectinheresin
the human body in a definitiveor non-commensurable
way (i.e., whole
in whole and whole in part),ratherthan circumscriptively
(i.e., whole in
whole and partin part),as materialformsdo (QDA3III. 4: 30-36).40Thus,41
we canspeakofit
is movedbycontrary
whenit is saidthattheintellect
motions,
carin theconsecrated
hostwhenonepriest
justas wespeakofthebodyofChrist
to theleft.ForthebodyofChrist
andanother
to theright
riesthebodyofChrist
init,justas thesizeofthehost
norbya motion
movedinitself
is neither
inhering
in it
doesnotinhere
This is exactlywhat we would expect Buridan to argue if he holds that
the human intellectis not a materialform.But then the sense of the
39I saythisin partbecauseStrauss
ofphilosophy
is nottakenseriously
byhistorians
thecanstillbe found
hisdisciples
intheEnglish-speaking
world,
among'political
though
owesomeforthissurely
science(thereasons
in departments
ofpolitical
ory'specialists
of
The bestknown
owndisdainforprofessional
to Strauss'
critique
philosophy).
thing
texts
is MylesBurnyeat's
ofphilosophical
Strauss
as an interpreter
entitled,
provocatively
inPlatonic
Political
Studies
a Secret
without
, inthe
, a review
Philosophy
essayofStrauss's
Sphinx
NewYorkReview
ofBooks,39.9(May30, 1985),30-6.
40Thistextis discussed
A Study
toBodies?
in myHowAreSouls
Related
at length
ofJohn
11in
as chapter
46.3(1993),575-601,
ofMetaphysics,
Buridan
, in:TheReview
reprinted
Zupko2003{op.cit.,above,n. 2), 175-82.
41". . . quandodicitur
dicisicutde corpore
motibus
contrariis,
potest
quodmoveretur
ad dextram
etalterad
fert
Christi
inhostia
consacrata
cumunuspresbiter
Christi
corpus
sicutnec
necmotusibiinhaerente,
NonenimcorpusChristi
sinistram.
perse movetur,
hostiae
sibiinhaeret"
(QDA3III.4: 35).
magnitudo

13:55:32 PM

56

JACKZUPKO

betweentheproposition
Buridan
predicate'. . . inheresin matter'is different
in
asserts
C6
and
the
fourth
of
the
Alexandrian
categorically
proposition
position.Therefore,the inferencefailsby the fallacyof equivocation.42
Movingto thefirst
point,a muchmoreplausibleexplanationof Buridan's
concessionthat it is not easy to refuteAlexander'spositionby natural
argumentsis that he was simplybeing honestwith his audience. There
are no decisive argumentsagainst the thesisthat the human intellectis
a materialformif we limitourselvesto what appears to be true based
on sense, memory,and experience.In fact, none of the three famous
opinions not that of Alexander,not that of Averroes,and not that of
the faith turnsout to be demonstrableby naturalreason.But thismeans
that the question of whetherthe human intellectis everlastinghas for
Buridan the statusof a dubium
, or a questionwhere doubt can alwaysbe
be
and
legitimately entertained, demandsthathis approachto it be dialectical ratherthan demonstrative.
Needless to say,Buridanhimselfis hardly
agnosticon the question,thoughhe realizes that neitherhe nor anyone
else is in a positionto demonstratethe truthabout the human intellect
by means of principlesin naturalphilosophy.Whetherit can be demonis anotherquestion,whichthe theologiansmustresolve
stratedtheologically
forthemselves.That is why he pointsout that "the determination
of this
doubt pertainsmore to metaphysicsor to the facultyof sacred theology",43in connectionwithwhich "severaltheologianshave raised the following quodlibetalquestion:whetherChristwas a human being during
the triduum
, i.e., the threedays when his body was in the sepulcherwithout a soul and his soul was among the dead withouta body".44
As for what Buridan actuallybelieved,it seems to me that we must
invoke here anotherhermeneuticalprinciple,the principleof charityin
to theAlexandrian
whichrequiresthatwe takehis non-assent
interpretation,
42Plutamisses
all
thisin hisdiscussion,
onlythat"Weneednotenumerate
remarking
forth
thearguments
Buridan
Averroes"
(Pluta2002{op.cit.,above,n. 23),
brings
against
581).
43Plutacorrectly
oftheimmortality
oftheinteloutthatthere
is no discussion
points
he treats
thisas further
on Aristotle's
lectin Buridan's
, though
commentary
Metaphysics
evidence
ofBuridan's
tacitAlexandrianism
above,n. 23),584,n. 53).
(Pluta2002{op.cit.,
is notraisedin his
theimmortality
Butthereis againa better
question
explanation:
and
forthesimplereasonthatAristode
didnotraiseit there,
commentary
Metaphysics
on Aristotle.
Buridan
first
andforemost
tobe commenting
tookhimself
44"Etfinaliter
ad metaphysicam
huiusdubitationis
dicamus
pertinet
quoddeterminatio
illudquodlibetum:
moverunt
vel ad facultatem
sacrae.Undeplurestheologi
theologiae
in triduo
sineanimaeratin sepulchro
erathomo,scilicet
utrum
Christus
quandocorpus
in inferno"
III.6: 53-4).
et eiusanimasinecorpore
{QDA3

13:55:32 PM

S ALLEGEDALEXANDRIANISM
ON BURIDAN'

57

positionat face value, to mean that he was not an Alexandrian.This

thesisis neitheresotericnor controversial.Its only virtueis that it fits
what Buridan actuallysays.
Atlanta,Georgia, USA
EmoryUniversity
Department
ofPhilosophy

13:55:32 PM

*
SomeRemarkson Buridan1
s Discussionon Intension
and Remission

STEFANO CAROTI

In his recentpaper on John Buridan'sdiscussionon intensionand remission of qualitiesJoel Biard1fillsa gap in AnnelieseMaier's analysis,whose
firstpart of Zwei Grundprobleme
derscholastischen
Naturphilosophie
(namely
Das Problemderintensiven
Grsse
)2 is still the most complete introduction
to the medieval Parisian discussionon this topic; Edith Sylla's contributions,3importantas they are, are focused on English authors. In this
paper I will: a) lay stresson the importanceof the commentarieson
Aristotle'swritingson natural philosophyfor this topic as well as for
setsofproblems,suchas thosediscussedin RichardSwineshead's
establishing
Libercalculationum
, just to mentionone of the workswhose influencecontinued in the XVth Century;4b) try to set in a larger contextJohn
Buridan's discussionon intensionand remissionin his Physicscommen.5
taryde ultimalectura
first
The
point actuallydoes not need much stress,because in recent
years researchon the medieval traditionof commentarieshas substan-

* I am verygrateful
William
toJeanCeleyrette,
and Edmond
Mazetfor
Courtenay
their
remarks.
1J. Biard,L'tre
etla rmission
de
etla mesure
dansl'intension
desformes
Blaise
Buridan,
(Jean
in:Medioevo,
27 (2002),415-47(415-33onJohnBuridan).
Parme),
2 A. Maier,^weiGrundprobleme
Das Problem
derintensiven
derscholastischen
Naturphilosophie.
Roma1968,3-109,see74,n. 2 concerning
Grsse.
DieImpetustheorie
Aufl.,
, 3. erweit.
John
Buridan.
3 E.D. Sylla,Medieval
theOxford
Calculators
, in: Archives
ofthelatitude
offorms:
concepts
du MoyenAge,48 (1973),223-83;ead.,Medieval
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
et Littraire
fortheHistory
The"Merton
Schoolin:Archive
ofExactSciences,
ofQualities:
Quantifications
andtheMathematics
8 (1971),9-39;ead.,TheOxford
Calculators
1320-1350
, New
ofMotion
York-London
1991.
4 C. Lewis,TheMerton
inLateSixteenth
Seventeenth
andKinematics
andEarly
Tradition
Century
, Padova1980.
Italy
5 Acutissimi
octo
Buridani
Subtilissime
reverendi
super
Johannis
questiones
Magisti
philosophi
Dullaert
de
et revisea Magistro
libros
Aristotelis
, diligenter
Johanne
recognite
Physicorum
a./M.1964),
in edibusDionisii
Nachdr.:
Frankfurt
Roche,Paris1509(unver.
Gandavo,
hereafter
QPhy.
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,1

13:55:38 PM

SOMEREMARKS
ON BURIDAN'
S DISCUSSION

59

new evidence as far as intentiallyincreased.6I shall present,therefore,

sion and remissionis concerned.
1. Intension
and Remission
and RelatedTopicsin XIVthCentury
Parisian
Commentaries
The questionsof Buridan'sPhysics
, hereafter
commentary(ultimalectura
u.l.) devotedto intensionand remissionare the questions3-5 of the third
book:
1) III, 3: "utrumqualitatescontrarie ut albedo et nigredo,caliditaset
frigiditaspossintse compatisimulin eodem subiectosecundumaliquos
gradus ipsarum".
2) III, 4: "utrumqualitas secundum quam est alteratioper se proprie
dictacontinuaet temporalisacquiriturtota simulvel pars postpartem".
3) III, 5: "utrumin alterationepars qualitatisque priusacquiriturmanet
cum parte que posteriusacquiritur".7
8 the
In Buridan's Physicscommentaryknown as de tertialectura
sequence
of the questionsis different:
the firstdiscussed(the thirdquestionof the
Illrd book) correspondsto the fourthof the ultimalectura
, the second one
to the fifth,and the thirdand last one to the thirdof the ultimalectura
,
whichis the openingquestionof thisredaction.9The Physics
commentary
6 A. Maier,University
inMedieval
Leiden, tr.anded. byD.N. Pryds,
Training
Europe
NewYork-Kln
desdisciplines
la Facult
1994;L. Holtzet O. Weijers
(eds),L'enseignement
desArts(ParisetOxford
XIIIeXVesicles).
Actes
ducolloque
international
, Turnhout
1997;G.
C. Leonardi,
S. Perfetti
nelV
occidente
latino
Fioravanti,
(eds),Il commento
(sec.XIII-XV).
filosofico
Attidelcolloquio
dallaSISMELe dallaSISPM
19-22ottobre
Firenze-Pisa
2000,organizzato
,
Turnhout
hasgivenmanybasiccontributions
in thisfieldeither
2002.OlgaWeijers
as
3danslesFacults
an author
oras an editor;
I shallquotehereonlyherLa edisputatio
desarts
au moyen
Turnhout
2002.
,
ge
7 Buridan,
if.42vb-48ra.
Q.Phy.,
8 B. Michael,
Buridan:
Studien
seinen
Werken
undzurRezeption
seiner
zuseinem
Leben,
Johannes
Theorien
imEuropa
desspten
Mittelalters
FreieUniversitt
, Berlin,
1985,Bd. 2, 578-94for
theredaction
deultima
lectura
detertia
lectura.
OnJohnBuridan
, and574-7fortheredaction
seenowJ.M.M.H.
andJ.Zupko(eds),TheMetaphysics
andNatural
Thijssen
Philosophy
ofJohn
Leiden-Boston-Kln
Buridan.
Portrait
2001; J.Zupko,
Arts
Budan,
John
ofa Fourteenth-Century
Master
, NotreDame,Ind.2003.
9 I quotefrom
themsCittdelVaticano,
III, 3: "utrum
ChigiE VI 199,ff.37va-38rb:
dictaacquiratur
simulvelcontinue
qualitas
que estalteratio
proprie
parspostpartem,
verbi
utrum
incalefactione
totacaliditas,
gratia
queperalterationem
acquiritur,
acquiratur
totasimulvel una parseiuspostaliam";ff.38rb-40ra:
III, 4: "utrum
parsqualitatis
maneat
cumpartequeposteaacquiritur";
ff.40ra-42rb:
acquisita
peralterationem
III, 5:
"utrum
contrarie
se invicem
simul
ineodemsubiecto
secundum
qualitates
possunt
compati

13:55:38 PM

60

STEFANO
CAROTI

editedunderthename ofJohannesMarciliusInguenhas thesame sequence

of questions as Buridan's commentaryde tertialectura
, while the other
Parisian commentatorsfollow the order of Buridan's ultimalectura.If
Oresme's Physicscommentarycan be dated no later than 1347/8,10he
could be creditedwith the responsibility
of changingthe order of disin his commentaryde ultima
a
also
Buridan
cussion, change accepted
by
lectura
, which is probablylater than Oresme's.11
is not,however,the onlyplace whereBuridan
The Physics
commentary
discussesthe intensionand remissionof forms.In the firstbook of hisDe
he deals with the related topics of
et corruptione
generatone
commentary12
:
the permanenceof the elementaryqualitiesin the mixedbody and reactio
1) I, 19: "utrumomne agens agendo repatiaturet omne passumpariendo
reagat".
2) I, 20: "utrumpossibilesit esse actionema proportioneequalitatisvel
etiam a proportioneminorisequalitatis".
3) I, 21: "utrum forme substantialeselementorumsuscipiantmagis et
minus".
4) I, 22: "utrumformesubstantialesmaneant in mixto".
5) I, 23: "utrummixtiosit possibilis".13
Problems concerningthe permanence of the elementaryqualities in a
can be foundin
mixed body, as well as intension,remission,and reactio
et corruptione
,14Aegidius
Albert the Great's paraphrases of De generatione
on the firstbook of De generatione
Romanus also discussesin his quaestiones

ineodemsubiecto
utrum
secundum
eandem
rationem
verbigratia
ipsarum,
aliquosgradus
I amvery
cumaliquograducaliditatis".
frigiditatis
ipsiuspossetsimulessealiquisgradus
detertia
lectura
comforthetranscriptions
from
Buridan's
toJeanCeleyrette
Physics
grateful
mentary.
10S. Kirschner,
mitEdition
Kommentar
desAristoteles.
Kommentar
Oresmes
Nicolaus
zurPhysik
vonVier
sowie
derQuaestionen
zu Buch5,
zu Buch3 und4 deraristotelischen
Quaestionen
Physik
1997,28-37.
Stuttgart
11Michael1985(op. cit.,above,n. 8),Bd. 2, 606-8.
12We havetworedactions
either
oftheExpositio
or oftheQuaestiones
, Michael1985
I haveusedthetextofthemsBerlin,
Staatsbibliothek,
above,n. 8),Bd.2, 628-48.
{op.cit.,
lat.fol.387,if.129ra-156vb.
13Ms Berlin,
lat.fol.387,ff.141va-146rb.
Staatsbibliothek,
14Albertus
elementorum,
loci,De causis
omnia,
V, 2: De natura
proprietatum
Opera
Magnus,
i. W. 1980,I, 1,p. 24 "EtestdigresMnster
Degeneratione
etcorruptione
, ed. P. Hossfeld,
ethabetcontrarium",
substantia
siodeclarans
p. 131and
magiset minus
recipit
qualiter
: I, 6, pp. 169-76.
thelastTractatus
ofthefirst
bookon mixtio

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
ON BURIDAN'
SOMEREMARKS

61

"utrumsubstantiasuscipiatmagis et minus,utrumin acciet corruptione

dentibuspossitinvenirimagis et minus proprie".15
In commentingon Aristotle'sPhysicsmedieval authorsblend together
different
materials,not onlyfromAristotle'sotherphysicalworks,but also
fromoriginaltreatises,especiallythosewrittenforuniversity
students,like
habenunitate
et augmentatione
de activitate,
Walter Burley'sTractatus
formarum
to mentionone of the mostimportiumcontraria
magisetminus,16
suscipientium
to the medievaldiscussionon intensionand remission.
tantcontributions
William Ockham resortsto a quotaIn his Quaestiones
in librosPhysicorum
in discussing"whetheraccordetcorruptione
tionfromAristode'sDe generatane
and
ing to the Philosophercontraryformscan be in the same subject",17
in the last questionshe deeply analysesBurley'spositionsconcerningthe
activityof elementaryqualities in alterationand problems of temporal
limitsconnectedto thiskind of motion.18
Ockham's use of Burley'sTractatus
providesstrongevidenceof the circulation of ideas in the higher level of education. This circulationis
confirmedby Burley'sfinal redactionof his Physicscommentary,where
he repliedto Ockham's objections.19
Taking into account that problems
were raised
de activitate
discussedin Burley'sTractatus
primus)
(or Tractatus
one can easily realize how intricateis the
also in a theologicaldispute,20
15Aegidius
libro
De generatione
subtilissime
, Venetiis,
Romanus,
Quaestiones
primo
super
De generatione
See NicoleOresme,
Giunta1518,ff.60ra-61ra.
Lucantonio
Quaestiones
super
ofSaxony's
Albert
for
Mnchen
S. Caroti,
etcorruptione
1996,139-58
, hrsg.
JohnBuridan's,
on thesetopics.
etcorruptione
commentaries
De generatione
ofInghen's
andMarsilius
16I useherethetitleoftheexplicit
in ms.Vat.lat.817,
contained
oftheTractatus
an
with
So-called.
"Tractatus
seeL.M. de Rijk,Burley's
f.203ra.On theTractatus
primus",
34
in:Vivarium,
sitmaxima
"Utrum
contradictio
Additional
Edition
ofthe
Questio
oppositio",
(1996),161-91.
17Guillelmus
naturalis
et
Summula
libri
Brevis
summa
de Ockham,
philosophiae
Physicorum,
N.Y. 1984
St.Bonaventure,
Aristotelis
inlibros
, q. 86,ed. St.Brown,
Quaestiones
Physicorum
contrariae
sintin eodem
sitquodformae
intentio
Philosophi
(OPh,VI), 630: "Utrum
I De
"Contra:
to theproblem:
a positive
answer
theargument
subiecto
against
primo";
se".
noncompatiuntur
etperconsequens
uniusestcorruptio
e: generatio
alterius,
generation
18Fromquestio
sitcausasufficiens
sufficienter
139("utrum
quodcalorignis
possit
probari
remississitotalis
<formae>
ponensfrigiditatem
ignis")to theend,questio151("utrum
formae
fieri
remissionem
rationabiliter
mametcaliditatem
peradmixtionem"),
ponere
possit
inlibros
, ed. Brown
Ockham,
Quaestiones
(above,n. 17),773-813.
Physicorum
'
19E.D. Sylla,Walter
onAristotle's
Practice
as a Commentator
, in:Medioevo,
Physics'
Burley's
'
andtheMathematics
commentaries
27 (2002),301-72;Ead.,Walter
ofAlteration,
Burley's
Physics'
6 (2001),149-84.
in:EarlyScienceandMedicine,
20De Rijk1996{op.cit.,above,n. 16),162-4,(and164,n. 16forGeraldOdonis'use
Giraldus
OdonisOFM, Opera
sitmaximaoppositio";
"utrum
contradictio
of Burley's
York-Kln
Vol.1 Logica
1997,8, n. 25)
, ed. byL.M. De Rijk,Leiden-New
Philosophica.
andSylla2002{op.cit.,above,n. 19),302-3.

13:55:38 PM

62

CAROTI
STEFANO

the medievalphilophilosophicaltraditionin the Middle Ages. In studying

from
the
universities
one
should, in any
sophical productionstemming
case, avoid runningthe riskof consideringthe presenceof the same topics in the same places (eventuallyalso in different
ones) merelyas the
outcomeof teachingroutine.The evidentanalogiesin the topicsdiscussed
do not always conceal a slavish attitudetoward either a master or a
school; sometimesfroma set of questionson the same topic it is possible to ascertainthe different
positionsheld in the classrooms.
and intension
This is the case also for the discussionon contrariety
ParisianPhysics
commentariesby
and remissionin the fourteenth-century
John Buridan,Nicole Oresme, Albertof Saxony and JohannesMarcilius
of Inghen. There is a certainagreementamong them about the need to
discuss togetherthe problem of the presence of contraryqualities in a
but not concerningtheplace where
substanceand intensionand remission,
one should discussthese topics:John Buridan and JohannesMarciliusof
Inghen21discussthemin the thirdbook,whileNicole Oresme22and Albert
of Saxony23do so when commentingon the fifth.There is no complete
agreementalso concerningthe orderof discussion,as we have seen, with
lectura
and JohannesMarciliusof Inghen's
Buridan'scommentaryde tertia
as
the
last
with
topic, contraryto all othercommencontrariety
dealing
ultima
lectura
included.
Buridan's
de
taries,
In both commentariesthat we can consider models of fourteenthcenturyParisian commentaries I mean John Buridan's and Nicole
Oresme's we find a heavy presence of Walter Burley's Tractatus
primus
21Johannes
Marion
octo
libros
Marcilius
, Lugduni,
perJohannem
Super
Physicorum
Inguen,
in alteratione
a./M. 1964),III, 3-5:"utrum
1518(unver.
Nachdr.Frankfurt
qualitas
maneatcumpartesecundo
in intensione
utrum
subito;
parsprimoacquisita
acquiratur
essesimul",
ff.37rb-40va.
forme
contrarie
utrum
possint
acquisita;
22 NicoleOresme,
ineodem;
contraria
sintsimul
, V, 6-9:"utrum
Questiones
super
Physicam
ad partem;
utrum
ad gradum
sivepartis
forma
intendatur
utrum
gradus
peradditionem
alteronon
utrum
contrarium
intendatur
ex extremis;
mediaintercontraria
componantur
cf.Kirschner
1997{op.cit.,above,n. 10),395-417.
remisso",
23Albertus
coninAristotelis
de Saxonia,
, V, 9-11:"utrum
Quaestiones
Physicam
qualitates
ineodemsubiecto;
utrum
se simul
earum
trariae
secundum
compati
possint
aliquosgradus
totasimulvel secundum
in intensione
post
partem
acquiratur
qualitasquae acquiritur
maneat
cumqualitate
in intensione
alicuius
utrum
que primoacquiritur
qualitas
partem;
ad
inAristotelis
et Quaestiones
cf.B. Patar,Expositio
'Physicam'
acquiritur";
quae posterius
- Louvain-Paris
On Albert
Louvain-la-Neuve
Albertm
deSaxonia
1999,III, 825-64.
attributae,
derBewegung.
Studien
Theorie
Die aristotelisch-scholastische
seeJ. Sarnowsky,
of Saxony,
zum
1989;seealsoJ. Sarnowsky,
desAristoteles
Alberts
vonSachsen
Kommentar
zurPhysik
, Mnster
des14.Jahrhunderts
ausderMitte
EinAlbert
vonSachsen
, in:
zugeschriebener
Physikkommentar
on thefifth
book.
27 (2002),449-73and472forthequestions
Medioevo,

13:55:38 PM

SOMEREMARKS
ON BURIDAN'
S DISCUSSION

63

without
and secundus.
John Buridan uses Burley'sso-called Tractatus
primus
a
Nicole
Oresme
introduces
solution
mentioninghim;24
explicitlyattributed to Gualterus
, a positionwhichpresentssome analogieswiththatwhich
Oresme consideredthe best one25and has recourseto Burley'sarguments
withoutmentioninghis source.
The use of thiswork by the two masters,and above all by Buridan,
has a certainimportance,because in the Tractatus
Walter Burleysystemdesinit
aticallyresortsto some of the new languages of analysislike incipit/
and maximum/
with
intension
and
remission
and
minimum,
which,together
in
reactio
can
be
considered
a
relevant
innovation
the
Parisian
,
philosophicaluniversity
productionsof the second halfof the XlVth century.26
Buridan's implicitquotation of Burleyis in the ^-argumentsof the
opening question III, 3 of his Physicscommentary(u.L), afterthe first6
The implicit
argumentsdedicatedto stressingthe notion of contrariety.27
referenceto the Tractatus
primusis introducedas an argumentagainstthe
interactionof contrarydegreesin alteration;28
actuallythisargument(the
seventhof the openingorc-arguments)
is apparentlythe firstof a second
series of argumentsagainst the presence of contrariesin the same sub24Biard2002(op.cit.,above,n. 1),416-7.
25S. Kirschner,
Oresme
onIntension
andRemission
inHisCommentary
onAristotle's
ofQualities
'
38 (2000),255-74,
, in:Vivarium,
Physics'
esp.272-4.
26E.D. Sylla,Transmission
totheconofthenew
ofthe
fourteenth
physics
century
from
England
tinent
duXIVesicle
, in:S. CarotietP. Souffrin
, Firenze
1997,65(eds),La nouvelle
physique
110. Theinfluence
ofBurley's
workis notlimited
tothepassageI amstudying
here;the
between
thearguments
usedinthethree
couldreveala greater
use,
comparison
questions
eventhough
we haveto be verycautious,
sincethesearguments
in
werewidely
diffused
university
teaching.
27In thethird
Buridan
refers
forthefirst
timein thesequestions
togradus
,
argument
f.42vb:"Item,oppositio
contrarietatis
attenditur
secundum
rationem
non
QPhy,
speciei,
secundum
rationem
hocegosuppono
. . . Secundoquiain eodemdecimo
individuorum,
videtur
Aristoteles
intendere
sitdifferentia
et
(seil.Metaphysice)
quodcontrarietas
specifica
secundum
differentiam
Ex hocautemsupet formalem.
quoddebeatattendi
specificam
ab omnifrigiditate
differt
postovidetur
sequiquodomniscaliditas
specieet perconseab omnigradufrigiditatis
differt
quensetiamomnisgraduscaliditatis
specie,et per
cumnonpossint
staresimulineodem,
caliditatis
consequens,
sequitur
quodnullus
gradus
staresimulcumaliquogradufrigiditatis";
itis probable
thatalsohereBuridan
has
possit
in mindBurley's
conviction
thatcontraries
It is thefourth
belongto thesamespecies.
conclusion
thatis deemed
seemsCittdelVaticano,
dubious,
BAV,Vat.lat.
presented
videlicet
caloretfrigus,
albedoet
817,f.203ra:"Quartaconclusio:
contrare,
quodforme
sunteiusdem
nigredo,
speciei
specialissime".
28Buridan,
starecum
., f. 42vb:"Itemomnessie concedentes
Q.Phy
graduscaliditatis
in calefactione
dicunt
de caliditate
gradibus
frigiditatis
quodomnino
quantum
acquiritur,
tantum
de frigiditate
et e converso.
Et ideosi potest
ostendi
corrumpitur
quodcaliditas
remitti
sinegeneratione
alicuius
iliapositio
etopinio
debetextotoauferri".
possit
frigiditatis,

13:55:38 PM

64

STEFANO
CAROTI

stance,and againstthe explicationof the intensionof a qualitythrough

the remissionof the contraryquality.I thinkthatwe have enoughevidence
that this sectionof the firstpart was directedagainstBurley'sposition.
In additionto precisetextualelements,whichwill be presentedbelow,
thereare some otherindicationsabout Buridan'sborrowingsfromBurley.
The first,and probablythe weakest,is the presencein thisseriesof cowargumentsof at least three arguments,which are to be found also in
;29the scholasticoriginof both works,however,
primus
Burley's Tractatus
makes this evidence ratherscanty.
the
afterthe determination
In the repliesto the opening cow-arguments,
firstargumentof thisseriesis called ratiolonga,30
probablybecause Buridan
consideredthispart of the questionas a whole, which can be confirmed
by the factthat his repliesdo not followthe openingargumentsas precisely as the previousones. By far the greaterevidence for the use of
by Buridanis providedby the verytextof the firstarguBurley'sTractatus
ment of this second seriesof cow-arguments:
and
without
canbe reduced
Sometrytoprovethathotness
anycoldness;
generating
toprovethistheyargueas follows.
arepermanent
hotness
andcoldness
First,
things.
butno last
ofa permanent
instant
oftheexistence
is a first
there
Second,
thing,
Aristode
forthisreasonin theVlllthbookofthePhysics
instant;
saysthatthelast
from
whichresults
to thething
as belonging
mustbe considered
instant
change.
in time;itis clearfrom
theVlthbookofthe
arenotimmediate
instants
Third,
there
is time.31
twoinstants
thatbetween
every
Physics
29Theconfirmatio
ofsudouttheimpossibility
ofthisseries
ofthefirst
points
argument
thesame
Tractatus
in Burley's
a topicwhichis central
denchangein alteration,
primus'
ofthisseries
couldbe saidoftheseventh
.,f.43ra:"Itemsequitur
(Buridan,
Q.Phy
argument
in nigrum
. . ."),seemsVat.lat.817,
priusdeveniretur
quodin motude alboin rubeum
The
colors.
andif.210rb-211va
f.210vb,
hot,coldandlukewarm
concerning
concerning
f.43ra:"Itemex quo tudicisquodper
ofthisseries(Buridan,
fourth
Q.Pty.,
argument
unusgradus
removetur
caliditatis
unumgradm
sequitur
quod
frigiditatis,
qui acquiritur
. . .") is thesameas thatused
et repugnantiam
illihabent
ad invicem
incompossibilitatem
see
ofa form;
instant
oftheexistence
in thefirst
theneedofan agens
against
byBurley
msVat.lat.817,f.208rb.
30Buridan,
., f.44rb:"Adaliamrationem
longam".
Q.Phy
31Buridan,
"Tuncergoaliquinituntur
., if.42vb-43ra:
quodcaliditas
probare
Q.Phy
et ad hocponunt
remitti
sinealiquageneratione
suppositiones.
frigiditatis
potest
suntresnature
et frigiditas
permanentis.
Quarum
primaestestquodcaliditas
inesseetquodnonestdare
reipermanentis
instans
Secunda
estquodestdareprimum
debetattribui
dicitur
in esseipsius;
undeoctavoPhysicorum
instans
ultimum
quodinstans
posteriori
passioni.
intemsiveimmediata
nonsuntsibiinvicem
Tertiasuppositio:
prxima
quodinstantia
inter
ostendetur
ubi
enim
huius
debet
ex
sexto
hoc
et
,
quecumque
quod
apparere
pore,
medium".
esttempus
duoinstantia

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
SOMEREMARKS
ON BURIDAN'

65

Of these threesuppositiones
, the second and thirdrelyupon the twofondamenta
introducedby Burleyin discussingthe fourthconclusion32
of his
Tractatus
:
primus
I takeforgranted
inAristotle'
twobasicnotions
natural
Thefirst
is that
philosophy.
of theexistence
thereis a first
instant
of a permanent
thingwhichis produced
a qualitative
Thereis no problem
evenif
thisnotion,
through
change.
concerning
Aristotle
wouldneverhavesaid:thelastinstant
oftimein whichchangeoccursis
thefirst
instant
of thething
thatchange,
otherwise
produced
through
something
wouldmovetoward
a form
thatitalready
has.
The secondbasicnotion
is thatofsomething
or destroyed
permanent
produced
alteration
there
is nolastinstant
ofitsexistence.
Thisnotion
is recorded
through
by
and it wouldbe trueevenhad he notwritten
Aristode,
it,becauseoncehaving
thelastinstant
ofitsexistence,
itwouldpassawaynotin time,andtheregranted
forenotthrough
alteration.33
of Burley'sTractatus
Actuallythe twofondamenta
correspondto the second
in
Buridan's
and
the thirdsuppositio
is a
suppositio
Physicscommentary,
directconsequenceof Burley'stwofondamenta
. The notionexposed in the
firstsuppositio
of Buridan's commentaryis a very importantelementin
34
the discussionconcerningthe second conclusionof Burley'sTractatus.
32Vat.lat.817,f.209vb:"Nuncrestt
viderede quartaconclusione
et de rationibus
suis.Quartaconclusio
eratquodforme
videlicet
caloretfrigus,
albedoetnigredo,
contrarie,
sunteiusdem
Istamconclusionem
etauctoritates.
speciei
specialissime.
probavi
perrationes
Perrationes
secundo
tertio
moralem,
primo
logice,
phisice,
perrationem
quarto
perrationem
medicinalem.
Primaratiotalisest:quandocumque
distant
distantia
aliquaduo equaliter
formali
a perfectissimo
inaliquaspecie,
siunumillorum
duorum
sitinillaspecie,
reliquum
eritin illaspecie".
33Vat.lat.817,f.21Ora:"Etsuppono
duofundamenta
in scideclarata
ab Aristotele
entianaturali.
Primum
estquodreipermanentis
de novoproducte
inesseperalterationem
estdareprimum
in quo habetesse.Et hecestplanaetsiAristoteles
instans
nondixisset
eam:quodin ultimo
instanti
mensurantis
alterationem
habetterminus
alteratiotemporis
nisprimo
ad formam
esse,quiaaliteraliquidmoveretur
quamhabet.
Secundum
fundamentum
estquodreipermanentis
velcorrupte
producte
peralterationem
nonestdareultimum
in quo habetesse.Et hancscribit
instans
Aristoteles,
et veraessetquamvis
Aristoteles
eamnonscripsisset,
instans
quiasi essetdareultimum
in quo talisreshaberet
nonin tempore,
et ita nonper
esse,ilia rescorrumperetur
alterationem".
34It is thesecondratio
thatconcerning
in
usedbyBuridan
, after
, a notion
repugnantia
thisseries
ofwz-arguments
(seenote29),Vat.lat.817,f.208rb:"Secundo
potest
probari
interformam
successivam
et formam
perdifferentiam
permanentem
que esttalis:forma
sedsemper
et in potentia,
successiva,
quianonesttotasimul,
aliquaparseiusestfutura
ideoforma
successiva
dumest,requirit
causamefficientem.
Sed forma
semper,
permacausamagentem,
eo
nens,eo quodesttotasimul,
ideo,quandoforma
est,nonrequirit
iamhabitaest.Cumergoinprimo
inquoiaminducta
instanti
estforma
quodtotaforma
substantialis
totaforma
estfactainmateria,
nonrequiritur
subiecto,
protuncaliquodagens
velefficiens
formam".
Alsothecasus
Buridan's
theabsence
, inwhich
following
suppositiones
of a contrary
an alteration
in whicha quality
is diminished
quality
during
(remissio
) is

13:55:38 PM

66

STEFANO
CAROTI

I thinkthat these elementstogetherare enough to permitthe hypothA comparisonbetween

fromBurley'sTractatus.
esis of Buridan'sborrowings
the two last redactionsof Buridan's Physicscommentary,that is de tertia
and de ultimalectura
, providesfurtherevidence. Buridan's commentaryde
with the
has the same break in the opening row-arguments,
tertialectura
of a seriesof argumentsagainstthosewho tryto prove that
introduction
intensionand remissioncan be explained throughthe varyingpresence
commenof degreesof contraryqualities.The textof the de tertialectura
the
at
even
in
more
is
this
confused,
though
problem stakeis
tary
place
there
is
some
remissqualityin a
that
that
to
demonstrate
is,
identical,
substancewithoutthe presence of a contraryquality.35What in the de
ultimalectura
commentaryis introducedthroughan orderedseriesof supof Burley'sdiscussion
a
(in way verynear to the twofondamenta
positiones
is
of the fourthconclusion of his Tractatus
primus) here presentedas a
series of quotationsfromAristotle'sPhysics
, and notablyfrompassages
limits.
and
and
minima
maxima
temporal
concerning
Furtherevidence for the use of Burleyin discussingthe topic of the
role of contraryqualitiesin intensionand remissionis providedalso by
Albertof Saxony's Physics
commentary.Albertdiscussesthe topic of the
in a substancein book five,as did Nicole
of
contrary
qualities
presence
Oresme. But even thoughwhen choosingthe place of discussionhe follectura
lows Oresme,Albertreliesupon the textof Buridan'sde tertia
, from
whichhe takesa long passage in his fourthwz-argument.36
Albert,moreover, dedicates the last arguments(here numeratedseparately,afterthe

in Burley's
Tractatus
thesecond
to thatfollowing
is verysimilar
, even
stated,
fundamentum
thatcontrary
is different
atstake
heretheproblem
belong
qualities
(todemonstrate
though
to thesamespecies).
35I usethetextofthemsCittdelVaticano,
somecorBAV,ChigiE VI 199,(with
Wissenschafltliche
from
themsErfurt,
rections
Allgemeinbibliothek,
Ampl.F. 298),which
hasbeentranscribed
(seenote9),ChigiE VI 199,f.40rb:"Itemaliqui
byJeanCeleyrette
dicunt
caliditatis
demonstrare
credentes
frigiditatis,
quod
compati
gradui
gradm
ponendo
de caliditate
remissa
estaliquisgradus
in caliditate
corrumpitur
quiaquantum
frigiditatis,
ostendi
Et sicideo,sipotest
de frigiditate.
tantum
inremissione
caliditatis,
quod
generatur
concludi
debebit
sinealiquafrigiditate,
remissam
sitdarecaliditatem
(thatis
propositum
ostendo
arenotin thesamesubstance).
thatcontrary
quodsitdarecalidiIgitur
qualities
sine
remississimam
estdarefrigitatem
sinefrigiditate
remissam
tatem
pertaleenthimema:
Antecedens
sinefrigiditate.
remissa
estcaliditas
Primo,
quiain
caliditate,
probatur.
igitur
illud
ut habetur
naturalibus
estdareminimum,
Secundo,
primoet octavoPhysicorum.
dareprisicoportet
ad frigidum,
de calidissimo
antecedens
confirmatur,
quiasi sitmotus
ex octavoPhysicorum
in quo eritfrigiditas,
mminstans
quodestdare
quiasoletallegari
estnature
etfrigiditas
in essereipermanentis,
instans
permanentis".
primum
36See Thijssen's
Ed. Patar1999{op.cit.,
above,n. 23),III, q. V,
paperinthisvolume.

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
ON BURIDAN'
SOMEREMARKS

67

first)in discussingBurley'sposition.37That Albertis discussingBurley's

positioncan be easilydetectedby the presenceof some of Burley'sarguments38
as well as by the introductionof a second opinion in the second
the
of
question,just beforethe repliesto the openingrow-arguments:
part
is contrary
to every
ofhotness
totheother
degree
every
degree
According
position,
Thisposiwithanyofcoldness.
ofhotness
is compatible
andno degree
ofcoldness,
themixture
ofcontrary
andremission
obtainthrough
tionexcludes
thatintension
thepresence
of
doesnotfollow
from
ofhotness
Forinstance,
theremission
forms.
from
tothisposition,
Intension
offorms,
ofcoldness.
somedegree
depends
according
remissam
cumqua nonstataliquis
Estdarealiquamcaliditatem
9, 826,27-39:"Quarto.
formas
contenet
exeo quodponentes
tatis
falsa.Consequentia
; ergoquestio
gradus
frigidi
remissionem
hoc propter
secundum
trarias
se compati
ponunt
aliquosgradusipsarum
contrariarum
undevolunt
ad invicem;
quantum
qualitatum
quodin remissione
ipsarum
caliditate
remissa
de alia;ergocumqualibet
de una,tantum
introducitur
abiicitur
ponunt
remissam
staresinefrigidiSi ergoprobabitur
aliquamcaliditatem
aliquamfrigiditatem.
estdarefrigiditatem
illorum
nonvalet.Antecedens
remississimam,
tate,positio
probatur:
Antecedens
seucumquanonstatfrigiditas.
remissam
sinefrigiditate,
ergoestdarecaliditatem
inprimo
utvidetur
velieAristoteles
estdareminimum,
exeo quodinnaturalibus
probatur
text.
et octavohuius
"; seenote35 forBuridan's
37Ed. Patar1999(op.cit.,above,n. 23),828,88-92:"Nono.Ponentes
talemcomposearum
secundum
contrariarum
sibilitatem
posuerunt
quodremisaliquosgradus
qualitatum
suicontrarii".
nonfieret
nisiperadmixtionem
sioqualitatis
38Ed. Patar1999(op.cit.,above,n. 23),828-9,96-100:"Tertio.
sic
Nam,si remissio
essent
simul
suicontrarii,
tuncin coloremedio,sicutin pallido,
fieret
peradmixtionem
Sed
ex eo quodibiestalbedoremissa.
hocfalsum.
albedoetnigredo;
tenet,
Consequentia
sedcolorem
necnigredinem,
ex eo quodsensus
nonpercipit
ibialbedinem
falsitas
patet,
Ed. Patar1999(op.cit.,
msVat.lat.817,f.219va-b.
cf.Burley,
above,
Tractatus,
medium";
cumergoaersit
Elementi
debetessequalitas
n. 23),829,5-9:"Quinto.
simplex;
simplicis
simestqualitas
elementm
quameiushumiditas
sequitur
quodtameiuscaliditas
simplex,
remissa
sinepermixeiusestqualitas
remissa;
ergoestaliquaqualitas
plex;sedcaliditas
msVat.lat.817,f.210vb.Ed. Patar
cf.Burley,
tionequalitatis
sibicontrariae";
Tractatus,
fieri
tran1999(op.cit.,above,n. 23),829-30,21-6:"Septimo.
quodnonposset
Sequitur
hocinconfieri
transitm
de alboin nigrum;
nisipriusoporteret
situsde alboin rubeum
remittitur
videtur
tenere
ex eo quodintalitransitu
veniens.
albedo;et,cum
Consequentia
videtur
suicontrarii,
scilicet
nonpossit
essesinepermixtione
talisremissio
sequi
nigredinis,
Thislastargument
Tractatus
, msVat.lat.817,f.211rb-va.
est";cf.Burley,
quoddictum
in Buridan's
canbe found
alsoin whatI havecalledthesecondseriesof^-arguments
f.43ra).Another
deultima
lectura
Q.Phy.,
JohnBuridan,
commentary,
(arg.5 ofthisseries,
thesecondseries
ofSaxony's
canbe found
three
ofAlbert
commentary
among
arguments
deultima
lectura
ofJohnBuridan's
1) ed. Patar1999(op.cit.,above,n. 23),
commentary:
. . ."; cf.JohnBuridan,
essetduplexmotus
829, 1-4:"Quartosequitur
quodcalefactio
. . ."); 2) ed.
essetduplexmotus
f. 43ra(arg.6: "Item,sequitur
Q.Phy.,
quodcalefactio
Patar1999(op.cit.,
above,n. 23),829,10-20"Sexto.Sequitur
quodessetdarecaliditatem
f.43rb(arg.9); 3) ed. Patar1999(op.cit.,above,
infinitam
. . ."; cf.JohnBuridan,
QPhy.,
ettarnen
nonhabetconn. 23),828,90-2:"Sedproboquodnon,quialumenremittitur,
fitperadmixtionem
suicontrarii";
cf.JohnBuridan,
trarium;
ergononomnisremissio
ofthisseries
aremanyreferences
tolightalsoin
f.43rb,thelastargument
(there
QPhy.,
Tractatus).
Burley's

13:55:38 PM

68

STEFANO
CAROTI
fromthehighest
fromtheirdistance
fromdegree0, and remission
theirdistance
between
that,as whatis in themiddle
up and
Theythink
degreeoftheseforms.
a quality
which
is between
in contrary
downis notactually
places,thuslukewarm,
andcoldofhotness
ofdegrees
is notconstituted
hotness
andcoldness,
bya mixture
andfareither
increase
itshotness
cancontinuously
ness.Lukewarm
bybeingfarther
likewhat
ofhotness,
tothehighest
andnearer
0 ornearer
therfrom
degree
degree
thecentre
andhigher
is higher
is continuously
bygoingawayfrom
moving
upward
to thesphere
oftheMoon.In sucha
nearer
andnearer
oftheworldandgetting
tothisposition.
obtain
andremission
Theyaddalsoanother
according
wayintension
remitted
without
andsometimes
is intended
hotness
sometimes
simile:
anymixture
withtherectiwithout
as a lineis moreor lesscurved
withcoldness,
anymixture
one.39
whilethefirst
is thecommon
is true,
I think
thatthissecondposition
linear.

This long quotationcloses withAlbertof Saxony's evaluationconcerning

solutionsabout the presence of contraryqualitiesin a
the two different
substance as well as the way in which intensionand remissionoccur.
Somethinghas evidentlychanged in the academic milieu: if Buridan's
commentariespermitus to grasp a certaingrowinginterestin the topic
of the presence of contraryqualities and the related problem of intenin
sion and remissionfromthe de tertiato the ultimalectura
redaction,40
39Ed. Patar1999[op.cit.,above,n. 23),838,20-41:"Aliaopinioponitquemlibet
calidinecaliquem
essecontrarium
caliditatis
cuilibet
gradum
frigiditatis
gradui
gradum
et remisEt istaopinioponitintensionem
tatispossestarecumaliquogradufrigiditatis.
nonponitremissionem
formae.
Verbigratia,
alterius
nonfieri
sionem
peradmixtionem
formarum
sedponitintensiones
alicuius
fieri
caliditatis
frigiditatis,
gradus
peradmixtionem
earuma gradibus
et remissionem
illarum
formarum
a nongradibus
fieri
penesrecessum
Undeistaopinioimaginatur
earundem.
summis
quod,sicutilludquodestin locomedio
necitatepiditas,
nonoportet
et deorsum
intersursum
quae
quodsitin lociscontrariis,
etaliquosfrigicaliditatis
habetaliquosgradus
etfrigiditatem,
caliditatem
inter
estqualitas
a mediomundi
et
continue
fitaltiusperrecessum
sursum
et sicutquodmovetur
ditatis;
eiusa nongradu
orbislunae,ita aliquatepiditas
ad concavum
accessum
perrecessum
incalefaciendo.
Sic
continue
fitintensior
summum
eiusad gradum
etaccessum
caliditatis
etadducit
aliud
de remissione;
etproportionaliter
deintensione
ergoistaopinioimaginatur
alicuius
minor
sinepermixtione
estmaior,
simile:
nam,sicutcurvitas
aliquando
aliquando
alicuius
remissior
sinepermixtione
estintensior,
itacaliditas
rectitudinis,
aliquando
aliquando
The
verocommuniorem".
Istamsecundam
veriorem,
primam
reputo
opinionem
frigiditatis.
in quesofSaxony
is introduced
thesetwosolutions
between
sameopposition
byAlbert
cumqualimaneat
alicuius
inintensione
tionV, 11 ("utrum
acquiritur
qualitas
queprimo
ed. Patar1999{op.cit.,above,n. 23),848-9,18-23;855,
tatequaeposterius
acquiritur"),
unatenet
suntduaeopiniones.
67-71:"De istaquaestione
qualiQuarum
quodquaelibet
licetbenesitdivisibilis
in partes
divisione
et indivisibilis
tasestforma
graduales,
simplex
non
Et istaopinioponitquodqualitas
subiecti.
secundum
praecedens
quantitativas
partes
istam
inintensione,
ethocoportet
manet
cumsequente
ponit
postquam
opinionem
ponere,
. . . Aliaopinioponitquodinintensione
indivisibilem
talemqualitatem
qualitas
praecedens
et quodintenestdivisibilis
et quodquaelibet
manetcumsequente,
gradualiter,
qualitas
a gradu,
recte
etremissio
ad prius,
siofitperadditionem
gradus
perablationem
posterioris
ad gradum".
sicutintensio
gradus
peradditionem
40In bothcommentaries
ofarguments
to setaparta series
chooses
theauthor
(whatI

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
ON BURIDAN'
SOMEREMARKS

69

Albertof Saxony's Physics

commentaryan explicitdescriptionof the solution is introducedaccordingto which the presence of contraryqualities
in a substanceis untenable,and, what is more relevant,this solutionis
consideredsuperiorto the common view (the only one to be found in
Buridan's commentary,if we except the argumentsin the second series
of arguments).
There is another reason for a so long a quotation fromAlbert of
Saxony's Physicscommentary:the two examples he gives to betterillus- the
trate this position about the absence of contrariesin a substance
local motion and a curved line- are those used by Nicole Oresme in
introducingwhat he presentsas the fourthopinion,the one he holds as
the best one:41
andtheeasis themostreasonable
itis tobe notedthatthefourth
Second,
position
howa degree
iestone;itdoesnotinvolve
problems
concerning
passesawayorcomes
the
or howtheycanbe together.
to thisposition
to be before
another,
According
otherthanto be nearer
andnearer
to thehighest
intension
ofa quality
is nothing
while
ifthereis sucha degree,
or to becomemoreand morequalified,
degree,
from
thequality's
is either
to be lessandlessqualified
or to be removed
remission
perfection.42

in thedeultima
lectura
havecalledthesecondseries
oftheopening
, morecow-arguments);
in a moresystematic
hints
to Burley's
is presented
over,thediscussion
way,withclearer
as we haveseenabove.
Tractatus,
41Thefourth
in thefirst
dedicated
tocontrariety
cursorily
presented
question
opinion,
in thelastofthisseries
contrariandremission,
is discussed
andintension
(V, 9: "utrum
and
nonremisso",
ed.Kirschner
1997(op.cit.,
umintendatur
altero
above,n. 10),410-7),
"In questione
videndum
est
as representing
thegenuine
aristotelian
solution:
considered
contraria
suntsimul,
esseAristotelis,
secundum
que videtur
qualiter
quartam
opinionem,
et secundo
de quesito",
1997(op.cit.,above,n. 10),
Oresme,
V, 9, ed. Kirschner
KPhy.,
411,35-6.
42Ed. Kirschner
sciendum
1997(op.cit.,
"Secundo,
above,n. 10),p. 414,157-62:
quod
necoportet
facere
difficultates
unusgradus
estrationabilior
etfacilior
quarta
opinio
qualiter
autgeneratur
aut qualiter
suntsimul,
sed iuxtaearnaliquidintendi
priuscorrumpitur
nonestnisiaccedere
et approximari
ad summum,
si est
secundum
aliquamqualitatem
estfieri
minus
taleetrecedere
ab
daresummum,
velquodilludfiatmagistale,etremitti
Ulamqualitatem".
solution
themeasure
of
esseperfecto
secundum
Oresme's
concerning
in Richard
Liber
calcuintension
andremission
is thefirst
recorded
Swineshead's
position
lationum
ofSaxony's
is thesecond,
seeRichard
Liber
calculationum
,
, whileAlbert
Swineshead,
cuius1498,f.Ira:"Prima
Girardengum
positio
ponitquodintensio
Papi,perFranciscum
illius
etremislibetqualitatis
attenditur
summo
latitudinis,
penesappropinquationem
gradui
a gradusummo.
Secundapositio
habetattendi
siopenesdistantiam
ponitquodintensio
In his
a nongradu,
etremissio
a graduperfectissimo".
penesdistantiam
penesdistantiam
mentions
theGreat's
intenWalter
Albert
Burley
Physics
commentary
position
concerning
sionandremission,
whenalteration
is notbetween
seeWalter
contraries,
Burley,
Expositio
inocto
libros
de Luere1501(unver.
Hildesheim, Venetiis,
Nachdr.,
Physicorum
perSimonem
NewYork1972),f. 159va:"Notandum
secundum
dominum
hicquodnonfit
Albertm

13:55:38 PM

70

CAROTI
STEFANO

fromOresme's,sincehe measuresintenAlbertof Saxony'ssolutiondiffers

sion on the basis of a quality'sdistancefroma zero degree("penes recessum a non gradibusillarumformarum")and remissionon the basis of
the distancefromthe highestdegree,while Oresme favorsa solutionconsideringonlythegreateror lesserdistancefromthe highestdegree.Oresme,
however,as far as I know43is the firstParisian commentatorto give to
Burley's
Burley'ssolutionso relevantan importance.He presentsexplicitly
on
third
as
the
contrariety:
opinion
position
the
nordoesonefollow
aretheytogether
neither
to thethird
position
According
instant.
Thisis
at every
newform
is a completely
there
alteration
butduring
other,
Walter
Burley's
position.44
fromthe thirdone, as can be
The fourthsolutionis not very different
easily grasped fromthe final remarkin the general presentation,where
thissolutionfromthe thirdone (that
Oresme feelsobliged to distinguish
is Burley's),layingstresson the different
ontologicalconvictionsconcerning
in
accidents("et in quolibet instanti, quo est alterado, est novum accidens, sed non sicut imaginaturtertiaopinio"). The differencebetween
Oresme and Burleyconcerningthe ontologicalstatusof accidentsrelies
and innovative
actuallyupon what can be consideredthe mostinteresting

a contrario.
aut separationem
contrarii
et remissio
intensio
peradmixtionem
semper
ut
de
non
habet
intenditur
illud
enim
bono,
contrarium,
quodnon
patet
quod
Aliquando
alicui.Et quando
nonadmiscetur
et privatio
sedprivative
habetcontrarium
oppositum;
Hoc
ab optimo.
et remissio
ex recessu
fitex accessuad optimum
sicest,tuncintensio
Albertus".
43Thisis true,ofcourse,
on
of Oresme's
thepriority
commentary
Physics
accepting
ofSaxony's.
Albert
44Oresme,
1997{op.cit
., above,n. 10),396,46-8:"Tertia
V, 6, ed. Kirschner
QPhy.,
etposteaalia,seddumest
suntsimulnecestunaperunumtempus
estquodnumquam
secundum
estnovaforma
in quolibet
instanti
alteratio
sui,et illa estopinio
quodlibet
comcontraria
mediainter
inquestion
is discussed
Thissolution
Gualterii".
V, 8 ("utrum
soluTheother
1997{op.cit.,
ed.Kirschner
exextremis",
above,n. 10),406-10).
ponantur
estquodtaiesforme
1997{op.cit.,above,n. 10),396,44-8:"Prima
ed. Kirschner
tions,
suntsimul
Secundaestquodnumquam
et intenso.
essesimulsubesseremisso
videntur
sunt
unapostaliam. . . Quartaest,utcredo,quodnullomodocontraria
nisisuccessive
et in
et deorsum,
sicutintersursum
nisisolumin respectu,
necestibi medium
simul,
tertia
sednonsicutimaginatur
estnovum
in quo estalteratio,
accidens,
instanti,
quolibet
in questions
are discussed
andthesecondsolutions
The first
V, 6
respectively
opinio".
1997{op.cit.,above,n. 10),395-400)
ed. Kirschner
sintsimulin eodem",
("u.contraria
ad partem",
sivepartis
ad gradm
intendatur
andV, 7 ("u.forma
gradus
peradditionem
inhis
is Ockham's
1997{op.cit.,above,n. 10),400-6).Thesecondsolution
ed.Kirschner
IV-VIII, ed.
in libros
de Ockham,
Aristotelis,
Physicorum
, see Guillelmus
Expositio
Expositio
St.Bonaventure,
G. Etzkorn,
G. Leibold,
F. Kelley,
G. Gi,J.Giermek,
R. Wood,R. Green,
N.Y. 1985(OPh,V), 500,36-37.

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
SOMEREMARKS
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71

by Oresme in his Physics

philosophicalsolution adopted systematically
modi
rerum.A
Since
Oresme'
s
the
Physicscommentarywas
commentary,
, it is highlyprobprobablywrittenbeforeBuridan's one de ultimalectura
able that Buridan'sdecisionto change the order of discussionas well as
the way of introducinga series of argumentsthat is closer to Burley's
textis a directconsequence of Oresme's sympathiestowardBurley.
The order of discussionis not somethingof minorimportance.In the
scheme of Buridan's de ultimalectura
commentary,as well as in Oresme's
and Albertof Saxony's,the solutionconcerningthe presenceof contrary
qualities in a substance is considered a preliminarystep in discussing
intensionand remission.In the scheme of Buridan's de tertialectura
and
in JohannesMarciliusof Inghen's commentary,the problemof continuity in the alterationhas priorityover that of the presence of contrary
qualitiesin a substance.
If the positiondefendedby Oresme is probablyat the originofJohn
to the de ultimalectura
Buridan's changes fromthe de tertialectura
Physics
is
it
Buridan's
and
not
Oresme's
model that imposes itself
commentary,
on theParisiancommentators
likeAlbertof SaxonyandJohannesMarcilius
of Inghen,46
who probablyalso knewthe textscomingfromOxfordwhere
intensionand remissionplay a centralrole.
'
45S. Caroti,
Laposition
deNicole
Oresme
surla nature
dumouvement
(eQuestiones
super
Physicam
etsmantiques
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
III, 1-8):problmes
, in:Archives
gnosologiques,
ontologiques
etLittraire
du Moyenge,61 (1994),303-87,
etE. Mazet,La
J. Celeyrette
esp.335-42;
hirarchie
desdegrs
d'tre
andPhilosophy,
8 (1998),45-65;
chezOresme
, in:ArabieSciences
Kirschner
2000{op.cit.,n. 25),255-74.
46In question
inintensione
forme
maneat
cumparte
III, 4 ("utrum
parsprimo
acquisita
secundo
ofInghen
Marcilius
introduces
fourwaystosolvethisprobJohannes
acquisita")
Marcilius
de Inghen,
f.38va-b:
"Notandum
lem;seeJohannes
QPhy.,
quodde istaquestionesuntquattuor
vierespondendi.
Primavia estquodintensio
fitsolumper
qualitatis
a contrario.
Verbigratia
si ignisagatinaquamcaliditas
inaquanonintendepurationem
diturperadditionem
caliditatis
ad caliditatem,
sedpercorruptionem
frigiditatis
apparet
caliditas
intensior
... Et sic dicentes
est
ponunt
quodquilibet
gradusalicuius
qualitatis
sedtarnen
remissus
mixtionem
contrarii
. . . Secunda
viaestquod
summus,
apparet
propter
intensio
in adventu
fitpermaiorem
additionem
tarnen
illiusmaioris
qualitatis
gradus,
. . . Tertiaviaestquodintensio
fitperadditionem
gradus
precedens
corrumpitur
qualitatis
ad gradum
simul
. . . Quartavia,quenondiffert
a precegradus
utroque
graduremanente
dentinisimodoloquendi,
intenditur
necremittitur,
sedsubiecponitquodnullaqualitas
tumdicitur
intendi
et remitti
secundum
As forthepresence
of contrary
qualitatem".
in a substance
Marcilius
records
three
Marcilius
de
solutions;
Johannes
qualities
Johannes
forme
contrarie
essesimul.
Et de hocsunt
Ill, 5, f.39va:"utrum
Q.Pky.,
Inghen,
possunt
tresviedicendi.
Primaestquodin alteratione
de summo
calidoad summum
frigidum
estaliquem
uniusstarecumaliquogradualterius,
in
continue
impossibile
gradum
ymmo
alteratione
estqualitas
totaliter
nova,itaquodnonestadditioalicuius
gradusad alium
de eademqualitate,
nec etiamad suumcontrarium
. . . Secundavia estquod
gradum

13:55:38 PM

72

STEFANO
CAROTI

s de ultimalectura
and Remission
inJohnBuridan'
2. Contrariety
, Intension
PhysicsCommentary
In orderto have more elementsfora deeper acquaintancewithBuridan's
discussionon contrariety,
intension,and remission,it is usefulto bear in
mind the different
positionsdiscussedin the ruedu Fouarrein the middle
of the fourteenthcentury.We have already quoted Albert of Saxony's
solutionsconcerningthe presenceof contraryqualrecordof two different
in
as
ities a substance;47 forthe waysintentionand remissionoccur,Albert
and the sucalso mentionstwo different
solutions,the addition-theory
Nicole Oresme, who defendsa succession-oftheories.48
cession-of-forms
formstheory,is more generousand listsfoursolutions,withthreedifferent
ones insidethe succession-of-forms
theory(probablyincludingOckham's).49
JohannesMarciliusof Inghen,who sideswiththe additiontheory,ascribes
the Thomisticpositionto the additiontheory.50
In John Buridan'sPhysics
commentary(u.l.)we do not findsuch explicit
hintsto consentto
mentionof different
solutions,but thereare sufficient
intensionand remissionin the general
put his discussionon contrariety,
et in hoc
poteststarecumaliquogradualterius,
numquam
gradusuniuscontrariorum
de
in modoponendi,
Seddiffer
convenit
cumprecedenti.
quiaponitquodin alteratione
inducatur
successive
totafrigiditas
ad calidum
aliquis
priusquam
primoexpellitur
frigido
ad calidcontinue
habilitatur
subiectum
itaquodremovendo
caliditatis,
frigiditatem
gradus
. . . Tertiaviaestquodaliqui
caliditas
introducitur
et tuncexpulsa
totafrigiditate
itatem,
caliditas
nunsedsumma
starecumaliquibus
caliditatis,
gradibus
frigiditatis
possunt
gradus
caliditatis
citrasummum
tamen
starecumsumma
gradus
frigiditate.
Quilibet
quampotest
de summo
ete converso.
Et ideoin alteratione
starecumaliquofrigiditatis
frigido
potest
alius
inducitur
unusgradus
calidum
ad summum
statm,
frigiditatis
quandocorrumpitur
caliditatis".
47See p. 68.
48Albert
ofSaxony,
V, 10,ed. Patar1999(op.cit.,above,n. 23),844,56-66:
QPhy.,
velsecundum
totasimul
in intensione
"utrum
partem
acquiratur
quaeacquiritur,
qualitas
afterthedistinction
thetwosolutions
Albert
introduces
in thisquestion
postpartem";
thelatandqualitative
ofthequantitative
thedivisibility
between
partsofthesubstance,
admitcommuniter
omnes
"Primam
divisionem
terbeingdenied
theory:
bythesuccession
intensibilem
unaponitqualitatem
suntopiniones,
divisione
sedde secunda
tunt,
quarum
etipsaesseintensiorem
habere
etremissibilem
graduum
plurium
peraccumulationem
gradus
Aliaautemopinioponithuiusaccumulationem
et remissiorem
graduum.
pauciorum
per
subiecti.
divisionem
nisisolumsecundum
nonessedivisibiles
modiformas
quantitativam
et indicontinue
estaliaet aliaqualitas
Et istaopinioponitquodin intensione
simplex
In thefollowsubiecti".
divisione
visibilis
quantitativas
partes
quaeestsecundum
excepta
maneatcum
in intensione
alicuius
quae primoacquiritur
qualitas
("utrum
ingquestion
see Patar1999
is introduced,
thesamedistinction
acquiritur")
qualitate
quae posterius
(op.cit.,above,n. 23),849,18-25;855,67-71.
49It is thesecondsolution,
seen. 44.
50See note46,thefourth
via.

13:55:38 PM

SOMEREMARKS
ON BURIDAN'
S DISCUSSION

73

contextof university
debates. We have already seen that the changes in
the
discussing problemof the presence of contraryqualitiesfromthe de
tertialectura
to the de ultimalectura
commentarycould suggesta growing
intereston this topic.
In questionIII, 5 of Buridan's de ultimalectura
in
Physicscommentary,
a replyto an argumentagainst the addition theory,we find the same
attitudewe have alreadyseen inJohannesMarciliusof Inghen(who probably depends on Buridan)to prove that the positionaccordingto which
it is the subjectto be changedin intensionand remission(a positionheld
can't be used against
by the 'thomistic'party,to use a genericdefinition)
the additiontheory:51
I reply,
totheother,
andsaythatproperly
noquality
isincreased
probability,
speaking
normademoreintense;
it is rather
thesubstance
thatis mademoreintense.
We
thatquality
is intensified
grant
onlyin thisprecise
way.52

51Thefourth
if.45vb-46ra:
JohnBuridan,
cow-argument,
QPhy.,
"Quarto,
arguitur
quod
modum
nonpossitfieri
caliditas
intensior
perpredictum
quamante,quiavelpriorpars
essetintensior
veltotum
ex eisaggregatum.
Sed quodlibet
ilioquamantevelposterior
rumestimpossibile.
Probatio:
nonpotest
diciquodparspriorsitintensior
primo,
quam
sicutde magnitudine;
modosi lineepedalialialineapedlis
ante,quiaoportet
imaginari
addatur
nonpropter
hocillaprimalineapedliseritmaiorquamante,immosolumesset
licetcongregatum
essetbipedale.
Itaergoprima
additionem
pedlis,
parscaliditatis
propter
secunde
nonessetintensior
essetintensius.
Etiamnonpotest
quamante,licetcongregatum
dicide hoccongregato,
cumfitintensius
quiaquodintenditur,
quamessetante,necesse
estquodpriussitminus
intensum
etposterius
sedcongregatum
nonerat
magisintensum;
et pariratione
necparsposterior
intensum,
intenditur,
priusminus
quianoneratprius,
I amverygrateful
forme".
toJeanCeleyrette
quianoneratante,ergosicnonfitintensio
forhaving
thissolution;
on thistopicseeJ. Celeyrette,
suggested
J.-L.Solre,Godefioid
deFontaines
etla thorie
dela succession
dansl'intensification
desformes
E. Faye,
, in:P. Bakker,
C. Grellard
delapense
mdivale.
Etudes
J^non
Kaluza
, Turnhout
2002,
(eds),Chemins
offertes
ofInghen
seen. 46.
79-112.ForMarsilius
52JohnBuridan,
., f. 48rb:"Ad aliamrespondetur
Q.Phy
probabiliter
quodloquendo
nonintenditur
necfitintensior,
sedsubiectum
id estfitintenintenditur,
proprie
qualitas
siustale.Et ad talemsensum
et nonad aliumconceditur
intenditur".
The
quodqualitas
Thomistic
solution
is regarded
as compatible
withtheaddition
theevidently
byBuridan
thatexplains
intension
offorms
oryandalsowitha formofthesametheory
through
addition
is thelatinwordfortheresult
oftheformer
andlatter
("congregatum"
quality
an intensification),
diciquodquali., f.48rb:"Velpotest
undergoing
JohnBuridan,
Q.Phy
eademessetpriusminus
tasnonsicintenditur,
intensa
etpostmagis
intensa;
quiatotaliter
sedad istum
sensum
dicitur
estintensior
intendi,
quiacontinue
qualitas
que estposterius
et plurium
tantorum
graduum
quamessetqualitas
que essetprius.Et aliietiamdicunt
necparsposterior
sedcongregatum;
ad istum
intenditur,
sensum,
quodnecparsprior
quia
esseintensior,
nonquodipsaeratante,sed intensior
qualitascongregata
incipit
quam
estquodhecsolutio
et precedens
revertuntur
in
qualitas
que eratante.Et manifestum
estex parterei,et suntvere".
idem,quantum

13:55:38 PM

74

STEFANO
CAROTI

In this part of the fifthquestion of the thirdbook we can find some

tracesof othersolutions.I shall returnto thisquestionlater.I shouldlike
beforehandto point out the presencein questionV, 3 of an explicitreference to an adversarius
, whose solutionis obviouslyagainstthe presence
of contraryqualitiesin a substance(the thirdquestionof the thirdbook
deals with this topic, as already mentioned):
of the de ultimalectura
to thecoldis changing
from
thehottest
thatifsomething
degree
Again:I assume
butcontinuously,
hotness
cannot
est,themostintense
part
passawayinstantaneously,
couldsay,therefore,
later.The opponent
after
part;andthiswillbe demonstrated
until
hotness
is totally
comestobe inthatsubstance
thatnocoldness
passedaway.53
withWilliamOckham,whose
could be identified
Here Buridan'sadversarius
convictionsabout intensionand remissionare echoed in this passage.
Some indirectsuggestionsto an alternativesolution,however,can be
detectedin the second questionon the thirdbook, where the natureof
alterationis the topic at stake (III, 4). Before analysingthis passage it
should be noted that Buridan'spositionabout alterationis ratheranomalous if compared with his position concerningthe nature of motion,
motions.54
anothertypeof the threeAristotelian
Actuallyas foralteration
Buridan is convincedthat thereis no need to explain such a qualitative
fromthe changingqualityitself,while
change throughsomethingdifferent
for the local motion he admittedexplicitlya special qualityin addition
53JohnBuridan,
ad frigidissimum,
de calidissimo
si fiatmotus
., f.48vb:"Iterum,
KPhy
intensissima
totacaliditas
et probabitur
post,quodnonsimulcorrumpitur
egosuppono,
Diceret
sedcorrumpitur
motus,
ergoadversarius
parspostpartem.
que eratanteinitium
estcorrupta".
It
in subiecto
de frigiditate
ilio,doneetotacaliditas
quodnichilgeneratur
intoaccount
thatBuridan,
in replying
oftheadversarius
to thisposition
is precisely
taking
arecorrectly
on whatcontrary
hisposition
considered,
lukewarm,
John
qualities
develops
scilicet
f.49ra:"tuncergoponoquartam
conclusionem,
Buridan,
quodimpossibile
KPhy.,
essesimulin eodemsubiecto,
contrariarum
formarum
estaliquosgradus
quia,quamvis
tamennullasunt
caliditatis
et aliquigradus
sintsimulin tepidoaliquigradus
frigiditatis,
simul
velpartes,
immohecestimpossibilis:
illigradus
sintgradus
contraria
gradus
quorum
nonsuntgradus
velpartes
Dlienimgradus
velpartes
contrariorum.
suntgradus
existentes
velintensissime
intensissime
caliditatis
quiaillenonsunt,et eiusquodnichil
frigiditatis,
scilicet
sextaconclusio,
... Ex dictis
estparsvelgradus
estnichil
quodcontrarisequitur
sed ex quantitate
rationibus
ex simplicibus
nonattenditur
etasformarum
formarum,
sed
earumincompossibilitas,
sicutapparet
attendi
contrarietas
Sic enimdeberet
graduum.
Sedfrigiditatis
cumpossint
essesimul.
nonestincompossibilitas,
ad caliditatem
frigiditatis
ad intenutintensissime
estincompossibilitas,
ad caliditatem
tantorum
tantorum
graduum
velmedio
Sed intense
ad remissam
intensam.
ad multum
intense
velmultum
sissimam,
ofintensity
Thehighest
nullaestincompossibilitas".
ad invicem
modoremissarum
degree
are
both10 degrees
andtherefore
twocontrary
is fixedto 10 degrees,
having
qualities
See Biard2002(op.cit
., above,n. 1),430-1.
incompatible.
54Biard2002(op.cit.,above,n. 1),416.

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
ON BURIDAN'
SOMEREMARKS

75

to the mobile.55The same economyprincipleis followedby Buridan in

identifying
qualityand its degrees.
solutionsof the problemdiscussedin questionIII,
The two conflicting
4 are the "tota simul" vs. the "gradualis" acquisitionof the quality in
Buridan agrees with the firstsolutionas far as the essential
alteration.56
of
stability form,and reliesupon a linguisticanalysisin order to explain
the intensionof qualitiesthroughdifferent
degrees:
isintensified,
thatform.
Whenhotness
Theform
is thesame,likethenamesignifying
aresignified
as whensomething
whichgradual
thenamesthrough
changes
change,
as suchdo notchange:
hotness
Namessignifying
theessence
is hotter
andhotter.
motion
canbe continuthesame. . . Duringtheheating
is always
process
actually
whenhot
hotter
andhotter,
andthisoccurs
becomes
ousonlyifthesamesubstance
in the
essential
or through
either
is acquired
changes
successively
through
changes
therefore
thatessence
cannotchange,
Butit hasbeenalready
established
degrees.
as folofhotness.
Thisconclusion
canbe confirmed
thischangeconcerns
degrees
in thesamewayin
lows:it mustbe granted
thatsomechangeoccursin theform
namessignifying
forms
as suchcanwhichnamessignifying
forms
actually
change;
in theform
like
canchange,
likehotness,
butnamessignifying
notchange,
degrees
hotter
andlesshot.57
between
This solutionis acceptedby Buridanas valid onlyifno distinction
main
and
is
introduced.58
Buridan's
preoccupationin dealgradus
qualitas
ing with alterationis to grant continuitywithoutintroducinga change
between
intothe qualitativeform'sessence,as well to refuseany distinction

55J. Biard,Le statut

dumouvement
dansla philosophie
naturelle
buridanienne
, in: Carotiet
Souffrin
(eds)1997(op.cit.,above,n. 26),141-59.
56JohnBuridan,
utrum
estsicdivisif.45ra:"Multiergodubitaverunt
Q.Phy.,
qualitas
duasconbilisetutrum
sicparseiuspostpartem
Et quidamde hocposuerunt
acquiritur.
totasimulessentialiter;
secundafuitquod
clusiones:
primafuitquodqualitas
acquiritur
nonacquiritur
totasimul,
<sed> gradualiter".
qualitas
57JohnBuridan,
f. 45ra-b:"Sicutmanetidemnomensignificans
sic
formam,
QPhy.,
manet
forma
eadem.Sed,cumcaliditas
continue
nomen
intendatur,
significans
gradualiter
Sednomen
benemutatur,
utquodpriusestminus
calidum,
signifiposteamagiscalidum.
canssimpliciter
essentiam
nonmutatur:
estenim<caliditas>
anteetpost. . .
(ed.calidum)
Sedin calefactione
nullaessettalissuccessio
fit
quandoidemsubiectum
quodfitcalidum
nisiacquireretur
caliditas
velsecundum
distinctionem
essentialem
calidius,
parspostpartem
velsecundum
Seddictum
estquodnonsecundum
essentialem,
gradualem.
ergodicendum
nomen
estquodsecundum
Et confirmatur
istaconclusio:
sicutenimmutatur
gradualem.
ita proportionabiliter
debetconcediquodmutetur
licetnon
formam,
forma,
significans
mutetur
nomen
formam
secundum
essentiam
ut. . . caliditas,
forme,
significans
simpliciter
tamen
mutatur
nomen
formam
utminus
calidum
etmagis
calidum".
significans
gradualiter
58JohnBuridan,
f. 45rb:"Istaopiniononapparet
michivera<si> (ed.nisi)
QPhy.,
ad sensum
videtur
enimymaginari
distincti
ab
exponatur
improprium;
quodsintgradus
essentia
caliditatis
et quodcontinue
sitaliuset aliusgradus
et nonsitalia et alia essentia.Et hocnoncredoesseverum".

13:55:38 PM

76

STEFANO
CAROTI

degreesand qualities.His convictionsabout the natureof motionas somethingintrinsicto the mobile are anticipatedhere, and theywill be more
deeply discussed in the questions devoted to local motion. Buridan is
in order to grantto alterationthe
forcedto have recourseto a dispostilo
essentialpropertyof motion:
Thefirst
conclusion
is thatduring
theheating
somehotness
is acquired
sucprocess
in thesamesubstance
andin thesamepartofthesubstance,
becauseif
cessively
thisprocess
is continuous,
thesubstance
mustbe successively
hotter
and
necessarily
hotter.
Thischangein thedegreeofhotness
canbe explained
onlybyintroducing
a newdisposition,
which
in thesubstance;
in fact,be
wasnotpreviously
itcannot,
therelationship
between
thatsubstance
andsomething
other
outexplained
through
sidesubstance,
becauseifeverything
is excluded
thesubstance
which
is hotexcept
terand hotter,
thischangestillexists.
It cannotbe explained,
moreover,
through
either
different
connections
or different
localdispositions
between
thepartsofthe
substance.59
In alterationthisdispositio
is not somethingdifferent
fromthe qualityitself,
to
what
for
local
motion.
Buridan's
solutionconcerncontrarily
happens
in
because
he introduces
alteration
is
therefore
some
ing
way anomalous,
two different
of
ways conceivingmotion.
EvidentlyBuridan is here confrontedwith a solutionthat maintains
the distinctionbetweengradusand qualitas
, a solutionhe findsso untenable as to run the risk of abandoning the commonlyadmittedunitary
view of the different
Aristoteliantypesof motion (namelylocal motion
59JohnBuridan,
estquodcontinue
in calefactione
., f. 45rb:"Primaconclusio
Q.Phy
caliditatis
ineodemsubiecto
caliditatis
etaliquid
aliquid
acquiritur
prius
acquiritur
posterius
et secundum
eandem
estquodsi a calefit
eius,quianecesse
continue,
partem
quodcontinuesitminus
calidum
etmagiscalidum.
Sedipsam(seil,caliditatem)
sicaliter
se habere
nonposset
salvalinisiperaliquam
existentem,
posterius
dispositionem
quenoneratprius
vele converso,
cumnonpossitsalvari
ipsiusad aliquemextrinsecum,
perhabitudinem
retento
solumquodcontinue
calefiat,
circumscripta,
quiaomniextrnseco
perintellectum
adhucsicaliter
etaliter
se haberet
etcumhocetiamsalvari
nonpossit
habiperdiversam
velsitum
The reference
is notto thediscussion
on
tudinem
partium
ipsiusad invicem".
ofthesecond
Buridan
aboutartificial
localmotion,
buttothequestions
book,where
speaks
a figurato
f.45ra:"Naminquestione
de distinctione
seeJohnBuridan,
Q^Phy^
figure
things,
visum
fuitquodnonpotest
nisialtero
modorum
salvari
priusdictorum
quodaliquisaliter
etaliter
Sedconcesso
se habeatad posterius.
est,si a sitcalidius
quodnecesse
quamante,
nonsolum
sedinipsoa, omnes
extrinsece,
aliquidessequodantenoneratvele converso,
velaliquidcaliditatis,
scilicet
aut
concederent
parsautgradus
quodilludaliudsitcaliditas
"utrum
estresdistineta
huiusmodi".
SeeJohnBuridan,
ff.30va-31rb:
II,
3,
QPky.,
figura
3e 'res
3inalcuni
a figurato";
commenti
alla'Physica3
seeS. Caroti,'Modirerum
artificiales
parigini
Studi
inmemodelsecolo
XIV, in:S. Carotie R. Pinzani
meorum
sociorum3.
(eds),e0brogatum
a diLorenzo
Pozzi
, Milano2000,189-213;
J. Celeyrette,
'Figura/
figuratum3
parJeanBuridan
etNicole
doctores
estmagna
dissensio33.
Oresme
, in:S. CarotiandJ. Celeyrette
(eds),"Quiinter
Lesdbats
dephilosophie
naturelle
ParisauXIVesicle
, Firenze
2004,97-118.

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
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77

between
and alteration).Accordingto Buridan,arguingforthe distinction
to
a
and
is
tantamount
alteration
fluxusadded
considering
degrees
qualities
to the quality,a solutionrejectedby him, at least as far as alterationis
considered.60
to identify
Buridan'stargethere. As alreadyremarked,it
It is difficult
is unlikelythat he is refuting
Burley,as is the case in the previousquestion concerningthe presenceof contraryqualitiesin the same substance.
The positionwhich forBuridan is the worstone, so much so that he is
solutionsconcerninglocal motion and
ready to propose two different
- the distinction
alteration
betweendegreesand qualities- is not Burley's.
Even if one doesn't take into account Buridan's strangedecision of
adoptinga twofoldview of motion,his solutionof grantingthe intension
of a qualitythroughthe acquisitionpart by part of such a quality,and
at the same timeof excludingdegreeswhen consideredsomethingdifferent
fromquality,is ratherastonishing.Actuallythe same objectionthatcould
be directedagainst the additiontheorythroughthe addition of degrees
is valid for the part by part additionas well.
One could venturea hypothesis:in his Tractatus
primusWalter Burley
.61In the middle of the
uses the term 'modus'as synonymouswithgradus
in
fourteenth
Nicole
Oresme
his
was sponsoring,
century
Physics
commentary

60JohnBuridan,
f.45rb-va:
"Secunda
conclusio
estquodgradus
caliditatis
non
Qhy.,
scilicet
si ponamus
illudquodpriusacquiriestaliaresa caliditate,
quodin calefactione
Tuncergoconclusio
turetquodposterius
vocentur
caliditatis.
acquiritur
gradus
probatur,
et quodcontinue
quiaponamus
quoda sitcalidum
perunamtotamdiemfiatcalidius.
Tuncergocontinue
caliditas
acquiritur
gradusaliuspostalium,sednonacquiritur
que
iamerat;ergo,cumomnisillaalteratio
sitcalefactio,
nonest
sequitur
quodcalefactio
motusad caliditatem
ad terminm
ad quem,quodestinconveniens
. . . Item
tamquam
illigradusadditiponerentur
omnino
frustra,
illos,salquia quicquidsalvatur
ponendo
varetur
sineillis,scilicet
ut aliasdicebatur,
et continuitas,
successio,
quia ita possumus
dicerequodcontinue
sicutgradus
...
acquiritur
parscaliditatis
postpartem,
postgradum
Iterum
rationes
alicuius
videntur
sitpartibilis
quecumque
apparentis
arguere
quodqualitas
inpartes
unapriusetaliaposterius
ineodemsubiecto,
illesimiliter
queacquiruntur
argurentde illisgradibus,
illeessetuna forma
acciquoniam
quicumque
gradussignaretur,
in parteque priusacquiritur
dental sicutcaliditas
et essetdivisibilis
et in partem
que
Ettuncquereretur
utrum
illepartes
essent
eiusdem
rationis
ad invicem
posterius
acquiritur.
veldiversarum,
sicutquerebatur
de caliditate,
et sic nichilprodest
poneretalesgradus
additos.
Et iterum
hoc essetponerein alteratione
fluxum
additum
secundum
qualitati
quamestalteratio,
quodpriusfuitimprobatum".
61Vat.lat.817,f.215vb:"Dicoquodcontraria
distant
formaliter
ratione
seu
graduum
in eis";on theidentification
modorum
andmodus
between
seeJ.L.Solre,Plusou
gradus
moins:
levocabulaire
dela latitude
desformes,
in:J. Hamesseet C. Steel,L'laboration
duvocabulaire
auMoyen
Actes
duColloque
International
deLouvainetLeuven,
12la-Neuve
philosophique
Age.
14 septembre
ThomasofSutton.
1998,Turnhout
2000,437-88,esp.477 concerning

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78

CAROTI
STEFANO

as a very effectivetheoryfor
in a very systematicway, the modirerum
in
natural
philosophy.It is possiblethatBuridan's
solvingmanyproblems
as somethingdifferent
fromquality
viewed
steadyrefusalof the degrees
fromthe
are different
is directedto Oresme's convictionthat modirerum
is not like two res.
reswhose modithey are, even thoughthis difference
Oresme explicitlyremarksthatthisparticularontologyis more efficacious
than Burley's,not only in introducingthe fourthsolution,but also in
questionI, 6, always dealing with intensionand remission.62
This problemdeservesmore research.Here I limitmyselfin noticing
thatwe can findin Buridan'sdiscussionconcerningintensionand remission an implicitreferenceto Oresme's positionin the thirdand last questo theopening^-arguments,
tiondedicatedto thistopic(III, 5). In replying
solutions:
and preciselyto the last one,63Buridan presentstwo different
andwill.Godcooperates
Somesaythatthisorderis produced
byGod'sknowledge
He is theprincipal
or better,
thathappens,
witheverything
agent.Andthereand will.
to God'swisdom
others
foresomedegrees
according
passawaybefore
to be and
to coming
Otherssaythatthereis an inverse
according
arrangement
arethefirst
to
laterthanothers
whicharegenerated
away:thatis degrees
passing
passaway.64
The second solutionis probably Oresme's, who in his Physicscommentary argues for such a solutionin replyingto an objection in which a
recurs:65
secundus
passage fromBurley'sTractatus
62Oresme,
"Tertia
f.4ra-rb:
Biblioteca
7-7-30,
Sevilla,
Capitular
y Colombina,
QPhy.,
de albedine
sicutymaginatur
sitdivisibile
si aliquodaccidens
difficultas:
intensa,
intensive,
Ad quoddicobreviter
ex gradibus.
quodnon;ymoalbedoestforma
quodsitcomposita
ideoquando
vel'essealbum'simpliciter
intensive>
<indivisibilis
accidentalis
indivisibilis;
continue
habetaliudetaliudessealbum.
velfieri
intendi
subiectum
dicitur
magisalbum,
necunum
<et> aliudest'essealbumremisse',
estaliud'essealbumintense'
Undetotaliter
solvit
essent
contra
ex alio.Modomulterationes
eas,et
hoc,sedGualterus
componitur
dicoquodtaliscompositio
istamviam.Secundo,
facilius
secundum
adhucsolverei
graduin disputatione.
Et possunt
etgratia
admicti
alispotest
assigexempli
perymaginationem
nonquoditasitin re,sedpropter
naritalesgradus
proportiones
quasdam
pernumros,
de talibus".
velconsequentia
mathematicas
que habentur
63JohnBuridan,
calif. 46ra:"Deindeetiamarguitur
quodnonestpossibile
QPky.,
aliisremanentibus,
ditatem
sicremitti
quiaomnes
graduum
aliquorum
percorruptionem
coretiamsuntuniformiter
etomnes
ad invicem,
rationis
sunteiusdem
approximati
gradus
invicem.
Ideonullaessetratioquarealiqui. . . prius
extra
cumnonsintsitualiter
rumpenti,
velomnes".
simulcorrumperentur
quamalii,et ideomulti
corrumperentur
64JohnBuridan,
ex Dei
f.48rb:"Adaliamdicunt
aliquiquodordoprovenit
QPhy.,
Illi
immo
fit
ad
omne
scientia
etvolntate,
ergo
gradus
agit
principaliter.
quod coagit,
qui
Aliidicunt
quodilligradus
quosDeusseitetvultpriusesseauferendos.
priusauferuntur
illipriuscorrumpuntur".
et quiposterius
generantur,
generantur,
postetposterius
65Ed. Kirschner
1997(op. cit.,above,n. 10),405,175-0:JNono,
sequitur
quodtota

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79

andremission
of
as follows:
thereis a simile
between
theintension
One canreply
remisanddownward:
intension
islikemotion
whiteness
andmotion
upward,
upward
Alltwo-foot
areas suchidentical,
buttheyare
downward.
sionlikemotion
segments
becauseoneis naturally
aboveanother
different
as faras their
is concerned,
position
itis at another
whenitmoves
anda moving
is at oneofthembefore
upward,
thing
in thiskindofmotion
is thefirst
to be leftwhenthe
andthelastto be reached
movesdownward.
thing
thissegment,
which
doesn't
refer
toplace
Wemustconceive
thesameconcerning
I mean:these
aresonaturally
areequivalent,
butthey
buttoessence;
degrees
arranged
a difference:
is thefirst
to be lost.Thereis,however,
thatthelastto be obtained
intension
andnotthrough
localmotion.
We can reply
forms
cometo be through
areequally
on thefactthatdegrees
on thisbasisto theargument,
distant;
relying
butnotaccording
their
formal
thisis trueaccording
tolocaldistance,
arrangement.
On thecontrary,
thedegree
whichfirst
comesto be is notyetnearto theagent,
havebeencorrupted,
likea thing
which
canactuponitonlyafter
thoseinbetween
thelowerpartsbefore
theupperones.66
downward
cannot
moving
passthrough
One could wonder if Buridan's actual targetwas Nicole Oresme, since
the solutionhe explicitlyregardsas the best is the succession-of-forms
as modirerum
.67Oresme'sdiscussionof intentheory,withformsinterpreted
sion and remissionin his Physicscommentaryis, however,rathercomplex, because even if he does not conceal his sympathyfor the fourth
solution,he also presentssome argumentsforthe additiontheoryin questionV, 7. ProbablyAnnelieseMaier had in her mind thisquestionwhen
she placed him among the advocates of the additiontheory.68
caliditas
simul
etsubito
Patetconsequentia,
sinteiuscorrumperetur.
quia,cumistigradus
demrationis
et <sumendo
corrumpenti,
quodsint>equaleset equaliter
aproximad
pari
aliumetequecito,etitaarguitur
de partiratione
eademratione
unum,
qua corrumperet
buseorum,
et videtur
citiusdebeatcorrumpi,
resistit
et etiam
quiaminus
quodremissus
Et <quero>si estibiordo,et
quiaillequiintroducebatur
primo,
<primo>corrumpatur.
onein Burley's
De intensione
etremissione
echoesthethird
(ed. 1496,
quare";theargument
ff.2vb-3rb),
1997{op.cit.,above,n. 10).
quotedbyKirschner
66Ed. Kirschner
1997{op.cit.,above,n. 10),405,181-95"Respondetur
quodymaginandum
estsicutde albedine
et motusursum
et deorsum:
intensio
estsimili<s>motui
suntequales
sursum
etremissio
motui
distantie
deorsum;
modo,sicutomnes
partes
pedlis
et eiusdem
unaestsupra
speciei
quoadhoc,tamenquoadhocdifferunt
quodnaturaliter
mobile
essesubunadeindesubalia,quandoadscenaliam,etprimo
oportet
perordinem
turquandodescendit.
Itaquodammodo
dit,<et> iliaqueultimo
acquiritur,
primo
deperdi
estin proposito
de istadistantia
nonlocalisedformali,
ymaginandum
quodistigradus,
licetsintequales,
tamen
suntsicordinati
etideoquiultimo
naturaliter,
acquiritur,
primo
tur.In hoctamen
estdissimille:
talisforma
etnon
deperdi
quodperintensionem
acquiritur
localem.
Tuncad probationem,
cumdicitur
permotum
quodsuntequaliter
aproximad;
verum
estproximitate
eorumformalem;
ordinem
locali,sed nonsecundum
ymoprimo
introductus
nonestaproximatus
doneccorrumpe<re>t
sicquodagenspossit
agereinilium,
aliossuperiores,
sicutetiammobile
nonpotest
inferiorem
nisi
deorsum
transir
distantiam
pertransiret
superiorem".
67Kirschner
2000(op.cit.,above,n. 25),265-74.
68Maier1968(op.cit.,above,n. 2), 358-9.

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80

STEFANO
CAROTI

That the actual target of Buridan's criticismwas probably Nicole

Oresme69is suggestedalso by the persuasio
followingthe argumentfor a
the
same quality,whereBuridan
different
of
order
degrees
among
precise
revivesa topic on which he was completelyat variance with Oresme,
viz. the relationshipbetweenmatterand privation:
wantsforms
thatit at present
has
is presented:
matter
Forthisa certain
argument
The morematter
bookofthePhysics.
as Aristotle
saysin thefirst
onlypotentially,
informs
andtherefore
thisquality
matter
themoreitwants,
lackshotness,
strongly.
andtherefore
the
moreat thebeginning
oftheheating
lackshotness
Matter
process,
inform
itmorestrongly.70
ofhotness
degrees
and appetitus
materie
In discussingprivatio
John Buridanis resolutein rejecting any distinctionbetweeneitherof them and matter:
as privated
is thesamething
It seemsthatthisquestion
(I, 23 "Whether
privation
ofthese
thatwhatlackssomeforms,
canbe easily
setded
privation
matter")
bysaying
this
arethesame. . . Andmoreover
whichhasthempotentially
andmatter
forms
andthesentence
'matter
thatthename'privation'
couldbe solvedsaying
problem
Andin
is abletohave'havethesamedenotation.
which
itnaturally
lackstheform
in the
thissameform,
ofa form
is thesameas matter
thiscaseprivation
lacking
man.Andifwe consent
is therunning
samewayin which'thata manis running'
'thatthisform
can
as thesentence
hasthesamemeaning
thatthename'privation'
in thiscaseprivation
wouldbe that
is notthere',
be in thatmatter,
butit actually
in matter
. . .71
form
which
is potentially

69We don'tfindin Oresme's

in
recorded
someoftheelements
Physics
commentary
on whichmorewillbe saidbelow,
likethepersuasio
thissolution,
Buridan's
concerning
to it,seeJohnBuridan,
andtheobjection
., f.48rb:"Sedaliquiobiciunt
ponendo
Q.Phy
etultrapermitcalididatem
intensam
faciat
simulinstanter
casumquodDeusin subiecto
illigradus
a frigido
tunccorrumperentur
modonaturali.
tatprocedere
naturam
Quomodo
velaliquipriusetaliiposterius.
utrum
simul
omne
Respondetur
quod,licet
superveniente,
ad forineisponere
ordinem
tamen
omne
Deusgeneraret
simul,
quantum
posset
gradus
etiterum
essent
ac sisuccessive
etmodonaturali
illisubiecto,
tiorem
adherentiam
generati,
et conservare
etiamtaliter
corrumperentur".
quodnumquam
posseteosgenerare
70JohnBuridan,
videlicet
., f.48rb:"Etad hocponitur
quod
quedampersuasio,
QPhy
utapparet
ratione
futuras
sivegenerandas
formas
materia
huius,
privationis,
primo
apptit
caliditantomagisapptit
id estratione
qua careteis.Quantoergomagiscaretcaliditate,
careat
sibi.Ergo,cummagis
caliditas
sibiadveniens
ideoetiamtanto
tatem,
magisadheret
adherent".
fortius
in principio
caliditate
calefactionis,
priusadvenientes
gradus
71JohnBuridan,
"Videtur
., ff.26vb-27ra:
(I, 23: "utrum
priquodistaquestio
Q.Phy
etprivafaciliter
vatioestmateria
quodidemestprivatum
possetsolvidicendo
privata")
dicendo
modopossetsolviistaquestio
. . . Adhuctertio
tioetmateria
quodidem
privata
carere
'materiam
et perhancorationem
intelligere
perhoc nomen'privatio'
possumus
'hominem
sicut
carens
ista
Et
sic
est
materia
est
habere'.
innata
forma,
forma,
privatio
quam
idemquod
vellemus
Etsiperhocnomen
currere'
esthomoquicurrit.
intelligere
'privatio'
et nonessetalemin ea', tunc
'talemformam
posseessein materia
perhancorationem
in potentia".
essetforma
privatio

13:55:38 PM

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81

is notsomething
is thatthematter's
desiretoward
theform
Thesixth
conclusion
different
from
matter.72
if only
Oresme, on the contrary,is a firmchampion of theirdistinction,
In
that
between
res
and
modus
rei.
a
weak
like
distinction,
questhrough
tion I, 15 of his PhysicscommentaryOresme presentsthree different
solutionsconcerningprivatio
, of which the firstis identical with Buridan's.73This solutionis the firstto be criticisedonce the thirdsolution
is introduced:
andwith
withAristotle,
withexperience
Thethird
is themostconsonant
way,which
anditis thefirst
conclusion
oftheoldphilosophers,
is thefollowing,
theconvictions
is notmatter,
butrather
substance.
Thisis theproof:
thefirst
way.Privation
against
ifmatter
werethesame,'thatwhich
lackssomething'
and'privation',
andprivation
wouldbe synonymous.
'blind'and'blindness'
it,buttheconsequent
Theyconcede
as
whoin Categories
is against
Aristotle,
saysthatif'blind'had thesamemeaning
ofthesamesubstance;
but'blind'canbe said
'blindness',
theycouldbe predicated
manis notblindofa man,whileblindness
cannot
be saidofa man.Andtherefore
In a secondway:ifmatter
andprivation
were
is notprivation.
ness,
justas matter
the
wouldbe no difference
between
Aristotle
andPlatoconcerning
thesame,there
ofnatural
. . . Thethird
is according
toAverroes:
basicnotions
argument
philosophy
arenotthesame. . .
andmatter
matter
doesn't
privation
passaway,andtherefore
alltypes
ofprivation,
suchas ugliness,
mala general
argument
concerning
Fourthly,
hasthesamemeaning
as 'a man
etc.;andI assumethat'blindness'
ice,blindness
is thefollowing:
whoisblind'and'malice'
as "a manwhois bad". . . Theargument

72JohnBuridan,
f.28ra:"Sextaconclusio
estquodappetitus
apptit
QPhy.,
quomateria
formam
nonestresdistincta
a materia".
73Oresme,
f.lira:"Primus
msSevilla,
Biblioteca
7-7-30,
QPhy.,
Capitular
y Colombina,
estaliquid,quia estmateria
ita quodhecnomina
modusest<quod> privatio
privata,
et'privatio'
sedtarnen
<connotat>
'subiectum'
'materia',
supponunt
proeodem,
'privatio'
scilicet
carere
forma
subiectum,
que nataestessein <ipso>.Et ideouniversaliter
aliquid,
<sunt>sinonima
et 'privatio',
'cecum'et 'cecitas',
et sicde aliis.
istanomina
'privatum'
velfuit,
itaetiamprivatio
Et sicutresprivata
erit,que noneritprivata
erit,que nonerit
velfuit.Istapotest
intentio
Aristotelis,
privatio
probari,
quiahecvidetur
quiadicitquod
suntunumin numero,
et differunt
ratione.
Et exponitur:
id estdiffimateria
et privatio
idemsignificent,
tamen
nonunum
nitione
quia,licethecnomina
exprimente
quidnominis,
connotant.
frustra
fitmultitudo
ubisufficit
etperhocprobatur
Secundo,
paucitas;
primo
nonsuntpluratribus,
Modoomniapossunt
salvari
huius
quodprincipia
quia sufficiunt.
tantum
duoprincipia,
sicutpatetex solutione
ponendo
argumentorum,
queomniasolvunnominum".
The secondsolution
is thatbased
turpertalesexpositiones
et connotationes
a position
Oresmeattributes
thatin othercontexts
analysis,
exclusively
upona linguistic
toOckham,
seeOresme,
f.lira: "Secundus
modus
estquodprivatio
nonestmateQ.Pky.,
hocestprotantoquod
nonestprivatio,
esseprincipium,
ria,ymoproprie
sed,si dicatur
hocnomine
esseveram;
etestista:
intelligitur
quedam
propositio
copulativa,
quamoportet
'subiectum
estetquedamforma
nonestinsubiecto
esthabere'.
Etideonon
quamnatum
estaliuddicereprivationem
esseprincipium,
nisiquodad transmutationem
naturalem
sitvera,ac si hocnomencausabrevitatis
loco
requiritur
quodheccopulativa
poneretur
istarum
propositionum".

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STEFANO
CAROTI
andbeloved
andbad,new,unknown
which
arerespectively
good,old,known
things
andhatedaredifferent.
The humannature
ofa manwhois a murderer
is good,
andbeloved,
whilemurder
or to be murderer,
or blindor something
old,known
likethatis hated,
etc.It is,thus,
tomakesuchan expository
bad,unknown
possible
heisa fellow
thatSocrates
Socrates
must
be lovedbyme,because
creature;
syllogism:
orthatSocrates
is blindis thesameas Socrates;
therefore
is thekiller
ofmyfather,
I mustloveSocrates
whois thekiller
ofmyfather
etc.Theconclusion
is falseand
theminor
is false.It is clearfrom
is true,therefore
thecommon
themajorpremise
nonecouldsaythatI must
isfalse,
because
lovethatSocrates
usethattheconclusion
is bad etc.74

The same criticismagainsta reductionistattitudecan be foundin quesnature

:
tion I, 20 concerningthe appetitus
74Oresme,
f. lira: "Tertius
Biblioteca
7-7-30,
Sevilla,
QPhy.,
Capitular
y Colombina,
concordat
dictis
Aristotelis
etetiam
sensui
naturali
etetiam
dictis
modus,
antiquoquimagis
contra
modum.
Et estista:quodmateria
non
rum,estiste:etsitprimaconclusio
primum
Probosic,quiasequeretur
estprivatio,
sedsubiectum.
quodistaessent
synonima:
'privaestcontra
'cecitas'.
sedconsequens
'cecum',
tum','privatio',
Consequentiam
ipsiprobant,
in Postpredicamentis,
ubidicitquod,si cecu<m><esset>cecitas
de
Aristotelem
utrumque
verohomonullo
tuncverominime;
sedcecusdicitur
eodempredicaretur,
homo,cecitas
itanecmateria
est.Secundo,
mododicitur.
Et ideosicuthomononestcecitas,
privatio
etpositionem
inter
Aristotelis
sic:siitaesset,
positionem
sequitur
quodnonessetdifferentia
ratione
de principiis
rerum
naturalium
. . . Tertio,
Piatonis
Commentatoris,
arguitur
quia
nonestmateria
. . . Quarto,
materia
manet
etnoncorrumpitur;
arguogeneergoprivatio
de quacumque
sicutde turpitudine,
de malitia,
cecitate
raliter
etc.,et supono
privatione,
essececum';aut'malitia'
nonestalliudquam'hominem
quam'hominem
quod'cecitas'
et re
Tuncarguitur
sic:illadistinguntur
essemalum',
nisiin casuubiestunushabitus.
et dilectum,
et aliudper
unumestbonum,
nonsuntidem,quorum
antiquum,
cognitum
Modosicestquodnatura
hominis
<et> oditum.
estmalum
etnovum,
ignotum
oppositum
et tamenhomicidium
velessehomicidam
homicide
et dilecta,
estbona,antiqua,
cognita
esseetdebetesse<oditum>,
etmalum,
velcecumvelaliquidtaleincasupotest
ignotum
sic:Sor
taliposset
fieri
unussillogismus
ettalia.Etideode quolibet
expositorius
arguendo
Sortem
essehomicidam
esta <me> diligendus,
patrismeivelSor esse
quiaproximus;
Conclusio
estfalsa,
etc.esta me<diligendum>.
cecumestSor;ergoSoressehomicidam
usuloquendi,
estfalsa.
sitfalsapatetexcommuni
etmaior
vera,ergominor
Quodconclusio
Wefindin
'Sortem
essemiserum'
etc.esta me<diligendum>".
diceretur
quianumquam
inordertojusdivisions
inside
schematic
thisquestio
I, 15oneofthenumerous
ontology
rerum
f. 1Iva: "Proistoestunadistinctio
modi
, see Oresme,
Q.Phy.,
quodensdicitur
tify
et ideoimpossibile
estinvestigare
veriet equivoce,
sicutpatetprimohuius,
multipliciter
essedivisio
talis:quod
'ens'diciunomodo.Ad propositum
tatem
potest
quiymaginatur
et
<ut> individuum
'ens'proalicoperse existente,
unomodoaccipitur
demonstratum,
estens,sicutSor;ethocquiahabetoperationem
sictotumde genere
substantie
proprie.
vel
Secundomodo,accipitur
'ens','esse'proessentia
aliqua,sicutpropartesubstantie
< accidentali;
manusetalbedo
forma
etsicdicuntur
essemateria,
forma
<substantialis>,
subdividi.
secundum
communem
viam.Etistemodus
Tertio,
prosignificabili
posset
capitur
currere'.
sicutest'Sortem
sicutin conditione
affirmativa,
Quarto,
procondicomplexe,
> affirmative
< significabili
verbigrada'Sorpossemoveri
etnegative;
tionequasiypotetica
sub
continetur
estquedamconditio
et nonmoveri'
'quies';et omnisprivatio
que dicitur
< sicut'Sor>
ad condi
tionem
merenegativam
extendi
istomodo.Ulterius
possetlargius
non<movere>"'
noncurrere'
vel'intelligentiam

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
SOMEREMARKS
ON BURIDAN'

83

itmustbe notedthatsucha natural

desire
is nothing
different
from
either
Secondly,
an inclination
or an appetite
or a natural
motion.
ForthisreasonAverroes
saysin
comment
81 thatmatter's
desireis itsinclination
in thesameway
to be informed,
inwhich
wesaythatwhena stick
is bentitwillbendbacktotheopposite
side.For
thisreasonit couldbe defined
a natural
ofthethird
potency
typein thecategory
in orderto distinguish
ofquality,
itcarefully
a specialname;thatis to say
through
thata termbelonging
to thiscategory
denotes
a natural
itsdesire
thing,
connoting
fora form
ithasonlypotentially.75
In both cases, namelyprivatio
and appetitus
nature
, Oresme has a position
from Buridan's, who probably is the implicittargetof
quite different
Oresme's criticisms.
Dealing withintensionand remissionBuridandoesn't
raise the problemofprivatio
and appetitus
nature
, butjust mentionsit while
discussinga solutionthat can also be found in Oresme's Physicscommentary.I wonderif Buridan'sreferenceto thesequestionsfromthe first
book rightat thisplace, that is when a solutionidenticalwith Oresme's
is introduced,can be regardedas casual or ratheras deliberate.I leave
open the question,providingonlythe textsreferredto by Buridanas well
as those fromOresme's Physics
commentary.
3. Conclusions
I thinkthatJohn Buridan's discussionon intensionand remissionin
his Physics
is veryimportantfora numberof
commentaryde ultimalectura
different
reasons. Firstand foremost,it is importantbecause we findin
it some precious hintsof the growinginteresttoward a topic which is
one of the most relevantaspects of the new physicaland logical problems debated in Paris in the centralyears of fourteenth
century.Walter
Tractatus
De
and
intensione
et
remissione
Burley's
primus
conveythe essential
, minima,
philosophicalproblems raised by intension,remission,maxima
and reactio
. Even thoughhe is less enthusiastic
forthesetopics
, desinit
incipit
thansome of his contemporaries,
likeNicole Oresme,Buridanwas certainly
aware of the foundationalelementsthroughreadingBurley'swritings.

75Oresme,
Biblioteca
f.15rb:"Secundo,
., Sevilla,
7-7-30,
Q.Phy
Capitular
y Colombina,
notandum
naturalis
nonestaliudnisiinclinatio
velquidamappetitus
quodtalisappetitus
seumotus
nature.
UndeCommentator
eodemcommento
81: appetitus
materie
estquod
materia
habetde motuad recipiendum
id estde inclinatione,
sicutdiceremus
formam,
inclinatur
ad replicandum
ad unampartem
velad aliam.Ideopotest
dicinatuquodvirga
ralispotentia
de secunda
itaquod<sit> alicaresdistincta
speciequalitatis,
signata
per
nomen
illiusspeciei;
velsaltem
talisspeciei
remnaturalem,
connoaliquodnomen
signt
tandotalemappet
tum".

13:55:38 PM

84

STEFANO
CAROTI

In the threequestionsdevotedto the discussionof intensionand remishimsion thereis, moreover,some evidence that Buridan is confronting
selfnot onlywithpositionsof past masters,likeWalterBurley,the advocate
of the succession-of-forms
theory;thistheory,in fact,was defended,even
in a modifiedform,by Nicole Oresme in the same yearswhen Buridan
I thinkthat the argumentsagainstthe dislecturedon Aristotle'sPhysics.
tinctionbetweendegreesand qualitiesin dealing with the way intension
and remissionoccur could be directedagainstNicole Oresme, and precisely against his way of defendingthe addition theory,the theoryto
which in itselfBuridan also adheres.
To put the philosophical debates transmittedby fourteenth-century
commentarieson Aristotleinto theirhistoricalcontextis essentialas well
as difficult.
Behind the term 'aliqui' some of the more widespreadand
- but not
discussed
alwayseasilyidentified importantdoctrinesare often
concealed. Buridanis more reticentthan Oresme,who mentionsOckham
and Burleyin his Physics
commentary.But even Oresme doesn't mention
the name of Ockham when introducingthe second solutionconcerning
intensionand remission.
Albertof Saxony sides withthe succession-of-forms
theory,contraryto
Buridan, even though,at least as far as these questionsare concerned,
his model is certainlyBuridan.Albertis, togetherwithOresme, the most
authoritativeadvocate of this theory.Johannes Marcilius of Inghen, a
solutions,withchampion of the addition theory,recordsfour different
fromOresme,who omittedtheThomistic
out includingOckham's,different
view, which can be foundin JohannesMarciliusof Inghen's.
records
Moreover,Buridan in his Physicscommentaryde ultimalectura
some solutionsconcerningeithercontraryqualitiesor intensionand remission, but he is not as explicitin presentingthem as are the otherscommentatorsconsideredhere. He certainlyadheres to the additiontheory
solution,and thereforethe seriesof argumentsagainstthe succession-ofevokes no surprise.In discussing
formstheoryechoing Burley's Tractatus
how intensionand remissionoccur, however, Buridan is very critical
againsta distinctionbetweendegreesand qualities,which is defendedin
of the additiontheory;Oresme is probablyreferred
Oresme'spresentation
to again as far as the order of parts or degrees that undergointension
and remissionis concerned.If we considerthese elements,togetherwith
naturediscussedin some
and appetitus
the referenceto topics like privatio
refrain
from
cannot
the
first
we
of
book,
suspectingthat one
questions
of the principaltargetsof Buridan'sdiscussionis actuallyNicole Oresme
or some othermasterof arts under Oresme's influence.

13:55:38 PM

S DISCUSSION
SOMEREMARKS
ON BURIDAN'

85

What remainsinexplicableforme is Buridan's decision to change his

point of view concerningmotion: alteration,in fact,is not a property
added to the changingquality,as is the case for local motion.Buridan
between
is quite criticaleven againstthosewho tryto introducedistinctions
has
to be
A
coincidence
noted.
curious
as
and
degrees
qualities, already
emphasized: in the questions of the firstbook cursorilyreferredto in
are analysedfroma philosophicalperand appetitus
nature
q. Ill, 5, privatio
is
to
be foundin dealing with alteration.76
similar
to
that
which
spective
Universitdi Parma
di Filosofia
Dipartimento

76See alsoS. Caroti,

inJohn
Buridan's
natural
Generatio/
ontological
problems
philosogenerare:
27 (2002),373-413.
, in:Medioevo,
phy

13:55:38 PM

du pointchezJean Buridan
La problmatique
JEANCELEYRETTE

La richessede la physiquede Buridan n'est plus dmontrer:la rigueur

de la mthodedu matrepicard et la cohrencede ses positionsfontde
ultimam
un des ouvrages
ses Questionssur la Physique
, ditessecundum
lecturam'
de philosophienaturelleles plus achevs du Moyen Age tardif.Une autre
, dite de tertialectura
,
version, indite, de ces Questions sur la Physique

des
considre
comme
enseignements
gnralement
correspondant
antrieursdu matre,a probablementt rdigepar lui2. Cette version
faitapparatrequelques variationsremarquablesavec celle de Yultimalectura
3. En revanche les versions abrges utilisespour l'enseignement
notammentdans les universitsd'Europe centrale4n'ont probablement
pas t rdigespar Buridan,mais par des matresde ces universits.
Dans la physiqueburidanienneun problmeremarquableest celui du
point car la question de son existencephysique et de son statutsont
non seulementdans les deux versionsdes Questions
traits,et diffremment,
mais
sur la Physique
,
galement dans une question spare, dite en
1961 par V. Zubov5. Cette questiona t critedans le cadre d'une po1Johannes
octo
libros
Aristotelis
acutissime
, Paris1509.
Buridanus,
Questiones
super
Physicorum
cettedition
en UL.
Les citations
seront
abrge
2 Les rfrences
au manuscrit
Erfurt
manuscrits
seront
298,notTL, maisles autres
n 6, Cracovie
635.Surlesdiffrents
onttconsults:
ChigiVI 199,Arch.dp.Toulouse
des diverses
versions
de sa Physique
et l'tatactuelde leur
manuscrits
buridaniens
seinen
Werken
und
Buridan:
Studien
authentification
voirB. Michael,
zu seinem
Leben,
Johannes
desspten
Mittelalters
dedoctorat,
Universit
seiner
Theorien
imEuropa
zurRezeption
, Thseindite
de Berlin,
1985,560-616.
3J. Celeyrette,
dans:S. Caroti
atum
et NicoleOresme,
Figura
/figur
parJeanBuridan
Florence
doctores
estmagna
etJ. Celeyrette
dissensio,
2004,97-118.
(eds),Quiainter
4J.M.M.H.
onthePhysics
TheShort
Redaction
ofJohnBuridan's
Questions
Thijssen,
Attributed
to Marsilius
ofInghen,
dans:Archives
to theQuestions
and TheirRelation
duMoyen
etLittraire
d'Histoire
Doctrinale
Age,52 (1985),237-66.
5 Les rfrences
et les concepts
du pointau
l'd.V. Zubov,JeanBuridan
seront
en QP, faite
Studies
andRenaissance
XIVesicle,
dans:Medieval
, 5 (1961),63-95,abrge
et 203v,et BN Lat.2831,123r-129v.
BN Lat.16621,196r-202v
partir
des manuscrits
trsgnrale
surla question
d'unemiseen perspective
sondition
Zubovfaitprcder
Guillaume
sontcitsoutreBuridan,
danslaquelle
ducontinu
etdesindivisibles
d'Ockham,
de Saxe,NicoleOresme
etc.
Gauthier
Albert
Burley,
BrillNV,Leiden,
Koninklijke
2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42,1

13:55:43 PM

LA PROBLMATIQUE
DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN

87

lmique avec un autre matreparisiendit de Montescalerioaujourd'hui

mieux connu6,les textes des deux adversairesfigurantdans le cahier
scientifiqued'Etienne Gaudet (BN Lat. 1662 1)7. Le problme est repris
dans qu. IV-3 de la tertialectura
(TL), et enfindans qu. VI-4 de Yultima
lectura
(UL)8.
Dans cettedernirequestionil nonce successivement
que le point,qui
n'est pas rien, est une partie divisibledu continu.Cette position,a priori paradoxale, est diffrente
de celle qu'il dfenddans QP, ce que n'a
vu
Zubov9.
De
plus le savant russe n'a pas regardla
pas parfaitement
Il fautajouter que le problmepos par le concept de point
tertia
lectura.
renvoie celui du rapportentreobjet physiqueet objet mathmatique,
et la notion
ici gomtrique,dont on connatl'importancepour Buridan10;
TL
de
est
trs
dans
mais
l'est
prsente
peu, tant
mathmatique point
dans QP que dans UL. Tout ceci justifieun examen complmentaireet
quelque peu dtaill.
Nous examineronssuccessivementcommentBuridan traitedu statut
sont diffrents
du point dans les troistextes.Ces traitements
et, de plus,

buridanienne
doit
tre
celle
de
Guillaume
d'Ockham,
l'approche
compare
et dans l'article 1
notammentdans ses questions58 63 sur la Physique
de sa questionDe quantitatexx
. Cette comparaisonsera faite la suite de
la prsentationde la questionsur le point.

6 A proposde l'identit
de ce matre,
Michael1985{op.cit.,supra
, n. 2),451-2envitravaux
de W.J.Courtenay
la question
est
sageplusieurs
hypothses.
Aprsles rcents
dsormais
Voirla contribution
ce volume
tranche.
de W.J.Courtenay
de Vivarium
et
unetudesurMichelde Montecalerio
paratre.
7 Surlescahiers
d'Etienne
GaudetvoirZ. Kaluza,Thomas
deCracovie,
Wroclaw
1978.
8 On notequ. IV-3 la question
3 surle livreIV de la Physique.
Dansla tertia
lectura
les
surla structure
du continu
sontabordes
dansle livreIV et nondansle livre
questions
VI comme
dansYultima
lectura
descommentaires
surla Physique).
(etla plupart
9 Aprsavoirnotquelquesdiffrences
de dtailentreles deuxtextes
Zubov1961
toutes
cesmodifications
on trouve
despas, n. 5),46 crit:Malgr
{op.cit.,supra
parfois
/.. ./ En peude motsonpourrait
direquele texte
desQuestions
sagespresque
identiques
surla Physique
et le textede la Questio
depuncto
, sontcomplmentaires.
10J.M.M.H.Thijssen,
Buridanon Mathematics,
dans: Vivarium
, XXIII (1985),
55-78.
11Guillelmus
de Ockham,
Brevis
summa
libriPhysicorum,
Summula
naturalis
et
philosophiae
inlibros
Aristotelis
OPhVI, StBonaventure,
NY 1984,
Quaestiones
, ed. St.Brown,
Physicorum
de Ockham,Tractatus
de quantitate
ettractatus
de corpore
Christi
555-73;Guillelmus
, ed.
C. Grassi,
OTh X, St Bonaventure,
NY 1986,3-85.

13:55:43 PM

88

JEANCELEYRETTE

La question
surle point( QP)
Comme nous l'avons dit la question de Buridan se situe dans le cadre
d'une polmique avec le matrede Montescalerio.En faitle traitadverse
(TM)12, commence par rfuterplusieursargumentsde Buridan,mais la
question de celui-ci contientaussi des contre argumentsrpondantaux
rfutationsde Montescalerio,rfutationsqui d'ailleurs ne semblentpas
toujourstre prises trs au srieux;si bien que la question de Buridan
donne une ide assez claire des points en dbat.
Elle est divise en trois parties dcrites de la faon suivante dans
Yexplicit:
Io argumentsde Buridan et rejet de la solutionadverse
2 expos des argumentsadverses,rejet de ces dernireset solution
3 prsentationpuis rejet de certainsdoutes contrela solution13.
La partie polmique proprementdite correspondaux deux premires
parties que nous allons rsumer grands traits;lorsque des arguments
de Montescalerioserontvoqus nous les resitueronsen note par rapport
au plan gnral de son trait.
Dans la premirepartie14Buridan tablitclassiquementque les points,
qu'ils soient continuantsou terminants,ne peuvent existerni en puissinonils seraientl'un ct de l'autre,
sance ni en acte dans le continu15;
ce que ni lui ni son adversairene concdent.La positionde Montescalerio
est qu'il y a deux typesde partiesdu continu,certainesdivisibles,d'autres
et que le toutn'estpas ses parties;son objectionest que toute
indivisibles,
prsentepour les pointsvaudraitgalementpour les parl'argumentation
ties proportionnellesdu continu,ce qui est rfutpar Buridan. Enfin

12Notonsque dansla tablede fol.195rdu manuscrit

BN Lat.16621,il estindiqu
11 foliosalorsqu'enfaitil s'tendde fol.214r fol.223v.On voit
commecouvrant
Par ailleurs
fol.22lr unelacuneest
ontt arraches.
d'ailleurs
feuilles
que certaines
conserv
estdoncincomplet.
Le texteactuellement
indique
parvacat.
13QP 95: Explicit
Io
Bridam
continens
de puncto
determinata
permagistrm
questio
rationum
adversarii
cum
solutionis
rationes
eiuscumexclusione
2 recitationem
adversarii,
conetremotionem
dubitationum
earumetsolutione,
3 motionem
exclusione
aliqualium
3danslesFacults
desarts
aumoyen
La 'disputatio
VoiraussiO. Weijers,
tradicta.
ge,Turnhout
2002,46-7.
14QP, 63-73.
15L'argumentation
Brevis
Summa
estchezOckham,
, n. 11),qu. 61,562.
{op.cit.,supra

13:55:43 PM

LA PROBLMATIQUE
DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN

89

contre Montescaleriopour qui le point est un accident rel, Buridan

prouve qu'un point ne peut tre ni une substanceni un accident16.
trois
Buridanprsenteet rfutesuccessivement
Dans la seconde partie17
comme
une
succesLe
se
Montescalerio.
de
prsente
premier
arguments
sion de 8 propositions,tendant tablirque la divisiondu continuest
une corruption;cela signifiequ'une chose est corrompue,et ce ne peut
les 8
treque le point continuant.Buridan rfuted'abord soigneusement
il
ont
t
faites
en
ces
rfutations
Puis
supposant
ajoute que
propositions.
comme son adversairequ'une divisionest un changementinstantan;or,
dit-ilil n'existepas en physique de divisionqui ne soit une sparation
de parties,si bien qu'une divisionn'est autre qu'un mouvementlocal ou
plusieurs mouvementslocaux. Le second argument,qualifi d'ancien,
affirmeque si le point continuantn'tait pas une chose distinctede la
ligne on pourraitcarterles unes des autrescertainespartiesdu continu,
puis les rapprocher,et que rien ne seraitdtruitni cr; ainsi les parties
qui taient en continuitdeviendraientcontiguset tout continu serait
un contigu.La rfutation
s'appuie notammentsur une analysedu procescas physiques,la divisiondes pierres,le feu,l'eau etc.
sus dans diffrents
Le troisimeargumentaffirmeque puisqu'on voit la couleur d'un corps
il faut bien que la surface
opaque et que cette couleur est superficielle,
soit quelque chose. La rfutationtrs rapide nie que la couleur soit
avec l'exemple d'une feuilled'or. Buridan ne prend visiblesuperficielle
mentpas l'argumenttrs au srieux18.
C'est dans la troisimepartie19que Buridan va donner sa propre solution. Cette partie commencepar une liste d'objections- nommes logice
dubitationes
qui tendent tablirque les pointssont des choses distinctes
des corps dans lesquels ils sont. Ces mmes objections,ou presque, se
de la Physique
et de Yultimalectura
dans les questionsde la tertia
retrouvent
Nous
constituent
les
rationes
allons
elles
nous
examiner;
principales.
y
que
16La prsentation
la premire
desarguments
de Buridan
correspond
parpolmique
etlesparLe paralllisme
entre
lespoints,
tiede TM. Cf.TM 214r-v.
indivisibles,
parties
la seconde
tiesproportionnelles,
esttablien unesuitede propositions
qui constituent
nonseulement
l'existence
du point
se termine
de TM. Celle-ci
parla proposition:
partie
il existe.
Cf.TM 214v-217v.
n'estpas absolument
maisau contraire
impossible,
17QP, 73-78,
QP, 83-84pour
QP, 78-83pourle deuxime;
pourle premier
argument;
le troisime.
18Les troisarguments
la troisime
constituent
et unepartiede leursrfutations
partie
en 218r-221v,
en 221v-222v,
et en 222vsuccessivement
de TM. Ellessontprsentes
223v.
19QP, 84-95.

13:55:43 PM

90

JEANCELEYRETTE

en prsenterons
plus loin quelques-unes,avec leursrponsesdans les trois
textes.
La solutionest ensuitenonce sans justificationparticulire:point
est un nom privatifcomme ccit. Car, dit Buridan, de mme que
ccit signifieabsence de vue dans l'il, point signifieabsence de
divisibilitou d'extensiondans la grandeur,et instantabsence de succession dans le temps20.Les significations
des deux typesde point qui
interviennent
classiquementdans le continu,point terminant{punctum
et point continuant( punctum
sont alors donnes: un
terminons)
continuons)
entre
continuant
est
une
absence
d'extension
deux parties de la
point
ligne qui se touchentcontinment,et un point terminantune absence
d'extensionde la ligne au-del de sa grandeur.Tout ceci est appuy par
une srie de citationsd'Aristoteet d'Averros.
L'objection immdiate cette solutionest alors qu'un certainnombre
de propositions
affirmatives
qui ontle motpointpour sujetsonthabituellement considrescomme vraies. Buridan d'ailleursne le contestepas et
par exempleil concde que: un point est dans une ligne ou un point
est indivisiblesont des propositionsvraies. Mais alors, comme il admet
A est B soit vraie il faut
aussi que pour qu'une propositionaffirmative
A
B
un
mme
et
ens,
que
supposentpour
point, qui est sujet,
devraitsupposerpour une chose relle. La rponse de Buridan est alors
la suivante:un termeprivatif,en soi, implique le syncatgormenon
, et
un tel termene suppose pas pour un ens,c'est--direpas au sens propre;
si bien que quand le mot est est adjacent un nonensil n'est pas pos
vraimentet affirmativement
de celui-ci21.C'est le cas pour les propositionsprcdenteset la signification
des phrasesprcdemmentcitess'obtientcomme pour la propositionla ccit est dans l'il (cecitasest in
oculo
), quivalente l'oeil est, et il n'y a pas de vue en lui (oculusestet
nonestin eo visus).Ainsi dans une ligne il y a un point terminant{punctumterminons
estin linea
) est quivalente une ligne est et il n'y a pas
eius
en elle d'extensionau-del de sa grandeur{lineaestetultraquantitatem
nonestin ea extensio
), et la propositionun point est indivisible{punctum
20QP, 86: Adevidentiam
omnium
sciendum
solutionis
istarum
questionum
quodhoc
Namsicutcecitassignificai
carennomenpunctum
estnomenprivativum,
sicutcecitas.
in magcarentiam
divisibilitatis
seuextensionis
tiamvisusin oculo,itapunctum
significai
in tempore.
successionis
et similiter
instans
carentiam
nitudine,
21QP, 87: hocverbum
de nonente.
'est'adjacensnonponitur
vereet affirmative
in se dictionem
sciDicendum
eritquodterminus
sincategorematicam,
privativus
implicai
nonsupponit
'non'.Ideoquia dictiosincategorematica
licethancdictionem
significative
nonsupponit.
privativus
proprie
sumpta,
sequitur
quodterminus

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DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN
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91

entre les parties de la ligne il n'y a rien de divisible

est indivisibile)
etc.
linee
nihilestdivisible)
{inter
partes
Dans la conceptionadopte dans QP, un point n'est donc pas une
chose rellementexistante.Le faitqu'il puissetreune imaginationmathmatique n'est pas mentionnbien que Buridan le dise propos de la
ligne et l'explique de faon trsclassique: cetteimaginationqui est fausse
car ceux-ci ne considrentla quantit qu'en
suffitaux mathmaticiens,
tant qu'elle est mesureou mesurable,or le rsultatde cette mesure ne
change pas quand on suppose qu'existentdes lignesayant des longueurs
sans largeur,et quand on ne le suppose pas. Ce point de vue sera largement dvelopp dans qu. IV-3 (TL).
EnfinBuridanvoque, pour la rejeter,une autre opinionqui pose que
les mots point, ligne, surface,supposentpour une mme chose le corps dans lequel sont le point,la ligne,la surface-tout en connotant
diffremment.
Pour les tenantsde cette opinion,dit-il,cettepropritest
commune tous les noms privatifs;pour eux les propositionssuivantes
sont vraies: un point est un corps, une ligne est une surfaceetc, de
mme que la privationest la matireprive et la ccit est l'il.
Nous retrouverons
cetteopinionlorsque nous feronsla comparaisonavec
Ockham.
Il faut s'arrtersur l'argumentationdonne pour rejetercette dernire
opinion. Le point de dpart est une citationdes Catgories:privation
n'est pas tre priv ( privari
), car la ccit est une privation;or tre
esse
n'est
cecum)
aveugle(
pas ccit,sinonl'un et l'autretermedevraient
treprdiqusde la mme chose; et, dit Aristote,ce n'est pas du toutle
cas, car un hommeest dit aveugle,en aucune manireil n'est dit ccit22.
Buridan refuseici l'identification
de la privationet de la chose prive,
identification
dans
ses
deux versionsde la Physique23;mais
qu'il accepte
22QP, 89: Aliiautemaliquidicunt
linea,superficies
quodpunctum,
proeademre
licetaliudetaliudvelaliter
etaliter
connotant.
hasproposupponunt
Propter
quoddicunt
sitiones
esseveras:"punctum
estcorpus",
"lineaestsuperficies"
ethuiusmodi.
Etitadicunt
in aliisnominibus
Ideoconcedunt
estprivatio,
privativis.
quodmateria
quodoculusest
cecitas.
Sedilludnonvidetur
mihiverum
necessede intentione
Aristotelis.
Quodapparet
in Postpredicamentis
ubidicitur
sie:"Privari
veroet haberehabitm
nonesthabitus
etprivatio.Privatio
namestcecitas,
cecumautemessenonestcecitas.
Cecumveroesseprivariestetnonprivatio".
"Namsi dicitur
dicens:
idemcecitas
etcecumesse,
Quodprobat
de eodempredicaretur.
Nuncverominime;
sedcecusdicitur
vero
homo,cecitas
utrumque
homonullomododicitur".
mihimelius
Ideovidetur
diceresicutdictum
fuit.
Cf.Catg.,
10,12b.
23Celey
rette
, n. 3).
(op.cit.,supra

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JEANCELEYRETTE

surtoutpour justifiercette positionil soutientque ne peuventpas tre

assimilsprivationet tre priv,ccit et tre aveugle,alors que
o
cette assimilationest accepte de faon constantedans la tertialectura
elle est le pointde dpartde plusieursargumentations.
Voyonspar exemple qu. 1-21 (TL), la privationest-ellela matirepriveou en est-elledistincte24.Dans cette question aprs avoir affirml'identitin re de la
te sembledire
privationet de la matirepriveil soulve un doute: Aristo
7 que le faitd'tre m est la mme chose que le moudans Mtaphysique
vement; le fait d'tre figurque la figure,le fait d'tre blanc que la
blancheur.De la mme faon le faitd'tre aveugle et la ccit seraient
la mme chose, de mme que le faitd'treprivet la privation;or l'aveugle et le faitd'tre aveugle ne sont pas la mme chose non plus que la
chose priveet le faitd'trepriv.Il semblealors qu'on puisseen dduire
que la chose priveet la privationne sontpas la mme chose. La rponse
est la suivante:tout comme la blancheurest le faitd'tre blanc, la privation est le fait d'tre priv (et donc ccit est synonymede tre
aveugle).Mais le faitd'treprivet la chose privesontla mme chose,
tre blanc qui
car "tre priv" n'ajoute rien au sujet,contrairement
suppose pour une dispositionrelle (la blancheur)ajoute au sujet25.On
sont directement
voit que conclusionet argumentation
opposes ce qui
est dit dans QP.
avecOckham
Comparaison
Les conceptionsdu point voques dans QP doivent tre rapproches,
comme il a t dit plus haut, de celles d'Ockham. Regardonsplus prcismentcommentce derniertraitede l'ontologiedu point. Les deux
textesockhamistesmentionnstantvoisins,nous nous appuieronssur la
sermonis
que un point
question 63: est-ce qu'on doit concder de virtute
estens")26et
sermonis
de virtute
hecsit concedenda
est un ens?(utrum
Upunctus
donneronsgalementles rfrencesau traitsur la quantit.
Ockham commence le traitementde la question en annonantdeux
faonsde rpondre,c'est--diredeux conceptionsselon lui acceptables.
La premireest prsenteainsi: le nom point a une signification
dtermineet peut supposerpour quelque chose,c'est nanmoins,comme
24TL, 10ra-va:
a materia.
velquodsitdistincta
sitmatenaprivata
Utrum
privatio
25Argumentation
citedansCeleyrette
, n. 3).
(op.cit.,supra
26Ockham,
63. Le
in libros
, n. 11),question
., ed. Brown(op.cit.,supra
Quaest.
physic
ed. Grassi(op.cit.,
dequantitate,
dansle Tractatus
mmedveloppement
, n. 11).
supra
figure

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DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN
LA PROBLMATIQUE

93

le nom privation,un nom connotatifet dans sa dfinitionquidnominis

on doit poser une ngation:point suppose pour une ligne et connote
l'absence de continuitou de longueurau-del de la dimensionde cette
ligne. Dans cette conception,privationest mis pour sujet ou matire
prive,pointterminantpour lignede tellelongueuret pas plus (linea
sermonis
on peut bien
tantelongitudinis
et nonultra)etc., si bien que de virtute
dire que les propositions:un point est une ligne (punctusest linea
) ou
estres)sont vraies. Point dnote alors
un point est une chose (punctus
une chose relle,et ceci est exprimen disantqu'il s'agit d'un nom positif27.C'est la dernirepositionprsentedans QP et qui est rejetepar
Buridan.
La seconde conception pose que le nom point est quivalent en
un complexequi, grammaticalement,
ne peut supposerpour
signification
chose.
Le
de
ce
complexe par le nom point
quelque
remplacement
n'estjustifi,dit Ockham, que par des raisonsd'lgance ou de brivet,
si bien que lorsqu'un nonc contientle mot point, il n'est pas intermais doit tre considrcomme une expression
sermonis
prtablede virtute
figure;ceci peut permettrede concderque des propositionscomme un
pointest une chose indivisibleou un point n'a pas de partiessont des
propositionsvraies. Mais quel est ce complexe?Ockham l'exprimepour
point terminant:la ligne est tenduejusque l mais pas plus loin
lineaetnonultra
)28,le complexequivalantau mot point
(tantum
protenditur
tantici une proposition.Plus loin se demandantsi point est positifou

27Question
In istaquestione
n. 11),567.9-568.3:
sunt
63, ed. Brown(op.cit.,supra,
duo modidicendi.
Primus
estquodhoc nomen'punctus'
estnomencategorematicum
certam
etprecise
habens
etfinitam
habetvimnominis
significationem,
potentis
supponere
et nonabsolutum
ita quodin eius
proaliquo/.. ./ Esttamennomenconnotativum
definitione
debetponinegatio,
sicutde omnibus
nominibus
exprimente
quidnominis
'primodum
tamenistum
dicoquodde virvatio','cecus','limen'etc.Intelligendo
ponendi,
tutesermonis
hecestvera"punctus
estens","punctus
estaliquid",
estres".Cf.
"punctus
Tractatus
dequantitate,
ed. Grassi{op.cit.,supra
, n. 11),21.367-23.396.
28Question
Secundus
modus
dicendi
63,ed.Brown
, n. 11),568.42-569.62:
(op.cit.,
supra
insignificando
estquodhocnomen
/.. ./ aequivalet
alicuicomposito
exnomine
'punctus'
rectoetverbovelexnomine
reddere
verbo,
obliquoetverboquodnonpotest
suppositum
etideode virtute
sermonis
nonpotest
grammatice
loquendo;
proaliquosupponere.
Logice
insignificando
isticomplexo
"tantum
lineaetnon
loquendo
'punctus'
equivalet
protenditur
ultra"
/.. ./Ettaliaponuntur
ingrammatica,
causametri
causaornaaliquando
aliquando
tusutin rhetorica,
causabrevitatis
utin philosophia.
/.. ./ Intelligendo
istum
aliquando
modum
dicoquodistanonestconcedenda
de virtute
sermonis
estens",
dicendi,
"punctus
sedestdistinguenda
eo quod'punctus'
velimproprie.
Primomodo
potest
accipiproprie
estfalsaquiadenotatur
estunaparvaresindivisibilis
quodpunctus
quae sitens,et hoc
Si secundo
estfalsum.
modoaccipiatur
sicestverasecundum
intentionem
et
auctorum,

13:55:43 PM

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non il raisonneainsi: de mme que les propositionsle faitde voir un

homme est quelque chose de positifet le faitde voir un homme n'est
les propositions
pas quelque chose de positifne sontpas contradictoires,
ne pas tre tendu au-del est quelque chose de positifet ne pas tre
tendu au-del n'est pas quelque chose de positifne sont pas contradictoires;ainsi un point est quelque chose de positifet un point n'est
Si bien
pas quelque chose de positif ne sont pas contradictoires29.
totalement
disle
n'est
une
crire:
pas
privation
point
qu'Ockham peut
ni
de
sermonis
ce
n'est
chose
tinctede la ligne,car de virtute
,
quelque
positifni quelque chose de privatif30.
de celle
Cette seconde conceptiond'Ockham parat a prioridiffrente
de Buridan en ce que pour ce dernier,le concept de point est purement
privatif.En faitla positionburidaniennes'accorde avec celle d'Ockham
sur le faitque le point est un complexeprivatifqui peut s'exprimerpar
comme le faitpour la ligned'tretenduejusque
une expressioninfinitive
l mais pas plus loin. Pour Ockham, en effet,touteexpressioninfinitive
est mise pour la propositioncorrespondante,ici la ligne est tendue
jusque l mais pas plus loin ce qui explique que les complexesquivalents au mot point soientdans le texteockhamistetanttdes proposiBuridan au contrairedistingue
tions, tanttdes expressionsinfinitives.
dans tous ses textesla propositionde son signifi,tout en se refusant
considrerque ce signifipuisse treune entitrelleseulementsignifiable
de faon complexe(<complexe
)31, la ralitmoindreque les subsignificabile
stanceset les qualits. Ceci explique que chez Ockham point suppose
pour une proposition,et que chez Buridan (dans QP) pour qui le signifi
dequantitate,
Cf.Tractatus
etnonulteriorem".
"lineahabetcertam
estsensus
longitudinem
ed. Grassi(op.cit.,supra
, n. 11),23-24.
29Question
tamende
, n. 11),569.76-570.82:
63,ed. Brown
Loquendo
{op.cit.,supra
hominem
est
"videre
secundo
modo,dicoquodsicutistanonsuntcontradictoria
puncto
ultenecista"nonhabere
hominem
nonestaliquid
"videre
positivm",
aliquid
positivm"
nonest
ulteriorem
"nonhabere
estaliquidpositivm",
riorem
protensionem
protensionem
itanecistasuntcontradictoomnesterminos
significative;
accipiendo
aliquidpositivm"
Danstractatus
de
nonestaliquidpositivm".
estaliquidpositivm"
ria"punctus
"punctus
"homovidet
. . .",
estdonnmaisavecdespropositions:
, 24,le mmeexemple
quantitate
..."
"lineanonhabetprotensionem
30Question
non
Dicoquodpunctus
, n. 11),570.101-3:
63, ed. Brown{op.cit.,supra
sermonis
a linea,quia de virtute
totaliter
distincta
estaliquaprivatio
punctus
loquendo
necprivativum.
nonestaliquidpositivm
31Surla question
Theories
voirG. Nuchelmans,
descomplexe
ofthePropositions.
significabilia
1973.
andFalsity
andMedieval
Ancient
, Amsterdam-London
ofTruth
oftheBearers
Conceptions
de la position
de Buridan
et sa rfutation
surla conception
Plusprcisment
ockhamiste,
surl'objetdu savoir
deJolBiard,Lescontroverses
243-50.Voiraussila contribution

13:55:43 PM

LA PROBLMATIQUE
DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN

95

de cette proposition,distinctde la proposition,est une pure privation,

point ne suppose pour rien. Il n'empche que les deux points de vue
ne provient
sontau fondidentiques:un pointest un non ens;la distinction
non
ens
du
fait
les
deux
du
de
diffrentes.
faons
que
que
philosophesparlent
3 surPhysique
IV (tertia
est-ceque lespointssontdes choses
Question
lectura):
indivisibles
de la ligne
?32
Donnons d'abord brivementle plan de la question.
Aprs les raisonsprincipales,celles qui ont dj t signalesqui tendent prouver qu'un point indivisibleexiste,Buridan montre,comme
dans QP mais de faon beaucoup moins dtaille,qu'il ne peut exister
dans une ligne de choses indivisibles,appeles points,et qui seraient
distinctesde celle-ci,car on pourraiten dduire,d'une part que la ligne
serait compose de ces points,d'autre part que ceux-ci seraientl'un
ct de l'autre. Or dans les deux questionsprcdentes33
il a montrque
chacune de ces deux situationstaitimpossible.Certainsdes autresarguments figurantgalementdans la premirepartie de QP sont ajouts,
par exemple que les points ne peuvent tre ni en acte ni en puissance,
que Dieu pourraitles enlever de la ligne, qui ensuite serait finie sans
avoir de termesetc. Si bien qu'il est rpondu brivement la question,
et de faon videmmentngative.
En fait cette rponse n'est prsenteque comme un pralable. Car
c'est la rsolutiondes raisonsprincipalesqui constituele corps de la question. Cette rsolutionest faitedans le cadre de deux conceptionsdont il
dit qu'elles sont toutesdeux acceptables34.
Uimagination
mathmatique
La premireconceptionest la suivante:lorsqu'on considreun continu
physiqueon imaginequ'existentdans une ligne des choses indivisiblesqui
en sont les extrmits,
ou qui fontque les partiesse touchentou sont en
continuitou sur lesquels se faitla divisionde la ligne en ses parties.Le
etlescomplexe
Parisau XIVesicle,
dans:CarotietCeleyrette,
2004(op.cit.,
signiftcabilia
, n. 3).
supra
32TL, 23vb-24vb:
utrum
in linea.
punctasintresindivisibiles
33Qu. IV-1 (TL), 23ra-rb:
utrum
in linea;qu.
punctasintsibiinvicem
prxima
utrum
IV-2(TL),23rb-vb:
lineacomponatur
ex punctis.
34TL, 24ra:Propter
solutiones
rationum
notandum
estquodduplexinvenitur
usus
huiusnominis
et uterque
ususestconveniens.
"punctum"

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mot point a alors la mme signification

que l'nonc: chose indivisible ayantune positiondans la ligne,et lorsqu'onl'utiliseon faitcomme
si ces choses indivisiblesexistaient;mais dit-ilcettesignification
est fictive,
car le mot point est mis pour une fiction,exactementcomme l'est le
mot vide. Ainsi les propositionsun point est indivisible,un point
est dans une ligne sont faussesde virtute
sermonis
car point ne suppose
pour rien.
Il y a l une vraie difficult,
et on a vu que dans QP Buridan admetet d'autresdu mme genresontvraies.Ici l'chaptaitque ces propositions
qu'elles sontvraies,
patoireestla suivante:on peut concderimproprement
en prenantle mot point et l'expressionchose indivisiblematriellement.Car du faitqu'il a la mme signification
que l'nonc chose indivisibleayant une positiondans une ligne, on peut dire que point est
chose indivisibleayant une positionsur la ligne et donc concder les
deux propositionsprcdentes,exactementcomme on peut concderque
la propositionsuivanteest vraie le vide est un lieu non remplide corps.
Buridan souligneque comme cette premireconceptiondu point est
elle est lgitimecar ceux-cin'affirment
celle des mathmaticiens,
pas l'existence relle des pointsmais l'imaginent,et c'est de cette existenceseulementimaginequ'ils tirentdes conclusions.Plus prcismentla gomtrie
alors. . .,
ne faitque des raisonnements
(si les pointsexistaient
hypothtiques
si dans le ciel existaientles picyclesou les excentriques,etc), mme si
pour des raisons de brivet ses noncs semblentimpliquer que les
hypothsessont vraies. Ce type de raisonnement,dit-il,suffitau mathmaticien car il ne s'intresseaux grandeurs qu'en tant qu'elles sont
mesurables;or pour mesurerune grandeurde troispieds par exemple (
d'un pied) il peut tre plus commode d'imaginer
l'aide d'un instrument
la longueur,et comme cela n'influepas sur le
des
sur
qu'existent
points
les imagineen sachantqu'il s'agit d'une fausse
le
mathmaticien
rsultat,
c'est
ce
est
dit dans QP propos de la ligne. Mais en
qui
imagination;
car
philosophienaturelle,un raisonnementhypothtiqueest insuffisant,
on doit dterminers'il en est ainsi des choses ou non. L o la gomtrie
la philosophienaturelle,elle, doit dterminer
raisonnehypothtiquement,
s'il en est ainsi rellement.
On voit que l'imaginationmathmatiquea dans TL une importance
beaucoup plus considrableque dans QP, surtoutelle y est thorise.
Alors qu'elle a fait l'objet d'une simple remarque incidenteelle est ici
l'une des deux conceptions acceptables du point, qui va permettre
Buridande rpondre toutesles objections.Dans QP il en va diffremment
et lorsque pour rpondreil est faitappel aux mathmatiques,ce qui est

13:55:43 PM

DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN
LA PROBLMATIQUE

97

rare c'est simplementpour dire que l'objectionvientdes mathmatiques

et que la rponse doit se fairedans le mme cadre.
nomprivatif
point
La seconde conceptiondu mot point est dcritede la faon suivante:
le nom point est un nom privatif.On retrouvealors la formulation
par
laquelle Buridan a introduitsa solutiondans QP, et on s'attend ce que
la mme conceptionsoit expose, ce qui semble confirmpar l'explica propos de la grandeuret du
tion qui suit: point, instantsignifient
la
ou, ce qui revientau mme, signifient
tempsl'absence de divisibilit,
divisibilitngativement35.
Mais cet endroit au lieu de reprendrele dveloppementde QP,
Buridanintroduitune distinctionsur le mot ngation,disant propos de
la grandeurou du temps,qu'on peut comprendreune ngation de la
divisibilitde deux faons, une premirequ'il nomme absolue, une
autre secundum
quid.
Des pointsou des instantsqui correspondraient
une divisibilitnie
de faonabsolue,n'existeraient
pas, car aucune grandeurou aucun temps
n'existesans divisibilit.Le point de vue voqu ici est celui de QP. Et
il ne le retientpas.
Buridan envisage ensuitele cas o la ngationest comprisesecundum
, mais non de faonabsolue. Il commencepar une explicationgnrale
quid,
et peu claire: la ngationporte sur tout utilisdistributivement
et distribuantles partiesquantitatives.
Le mot pointest expliqupar l'nonc:
une grandeurmaisjamais toutela grandeur,le mot instantpar: un
temps et jamais tout le temps36.Tout en conservantla mme termide celle de QP: le mot
nologie la solution donne est trs diffrente
il
est
encore
dit
mais
ici
point
privatif,
suppose pour quelque chose.
Le point,terme(ou commencement)d'une ligne,est une partie divisible
de la ligne; c'est une grandeur, mais on dit que ce n'est pas toute
la grandeurpour la raison suivante: on prend tout distributivement
35TL, 24rb:istanomina'punctum'
'instans'
circamagnitudinem
et temsignificant
vel significant
circamagnitudinem
et tempus
divisibilitatem
divisibilitatis,
puscarentiam
negative.
36TL, 24rb:Aliomodopotest
circamagnitudinem
autemet tempus
divisibilinegari
tasitaquodnonsimpliciter
sedtarnen
distributione
factaperhocnomen'totum'
quod
distribuit
Ettunchocnomen
partes
quantitativas.
'punctum'
exponitur
perhancorationem:
et nullatotamagnitudo,
'totum'
/.. ./ et sicetiamhoc
distributive
magnitudo
capiendo
nomen'instans'
idemsignificai
etnullum
totum
quodhecoratio:
tempus
tempus.

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JEANCELEYRETTE

on le faitportersur les par(c'est--direau sens divis)et implicitement

tiesquantitativesde cettegrandeur;comme certainesd'entreelles ne sont
pas l'extrmit(ou au dbut) il n'est pas vrai que toutesles partiesde
la grandeursont terme(ou commencement).Une objectionpourraittre
qu'avec cette dfinitionune ligne a plusieurspoints commencementset
plusieurspoints extrmitscar commentun point (c'est--direune parde
tie) commencementest-ildtermin?Les exemplesdonns permettent
dfinis
et
extrmit
ne
sont
terme
ils
font
car
pas
que
apparatre
rpondre
une divisiondterminede la ligne: si
absolumentmais relativement
on imagine un morceau de bois de 10 pieds, son commencementn'est
pas une chose indivisiblemais en est une partie, savoirla premire;et
il en est ainsi, car si on imaginece bois divisen deux parties,une sera
dite la premirepartie et l'autre la dernire,et si on l'imaginedivisen
trois,ou en cent, il y aura encore une premirepartie et ainsi de suite.
de premirespartiesde
Par consquentil est clair qu'il y a infiniment
ce morceau de bois, savoir une moiti, un tiers,un quart et ainsi
Mais entretoutesces premirespartiesil n'y en a aucune
indfiniment.
qui soitpremiretotalement/. . ./; car si on en diviseune en deux, seule
une des deux moitissera dite premire,et l'autre non.37.
Dans cette conceptionpoint suppose pour une partie et pas pour
rien, et cela n'empche pas Buridan de dire qu'il s'agit d'un nom privatif.En fait point, ligne, surface et corps supposentpour la
mme grandeurdivisiblesuivantles troisdimensionsmais ils la signifient
Une grandeur,en tantqu'elle
en l'envisageantselon des raisonsdiffrentes.
est divisiblesuivantles troisdimensions,est appele corps,suivantdeux
dimensions,est appele surface, suivant une dimension,est appele
on l'apligne,et lorsqu'on l'envisagecomme dgage de sa divisibilit,
pelle point38.
37TL, 24rb:Undegratiaexempli
huius
X pedum,
principium
lignum
ymaginemur
scilicet
sedestaliquaparsipiusligni,
pars;unde
prima
ligninonestaliquaresindivisibilis,
unaeritprima
in duasmedietates,
dividi
sicestdareprimam
quiasi ymaginetur
partem
et
unaeritprima,
in trestertias,
adhucillarum
dividi
et si ymaginetur
etaliaeritultima,
Ideopatet
in centesimas
adhucessetunaillarum
si divideretur
primaet sicin infinitum.
unatertia,
unaquartaet sic
unamedietas,
suntprimepartes
ligni,scilicet
quodinfinite
nullaestquesitprimatota;undesi tusignes
illasprimas
Tarnen
ininfinitum.
inter
partes
iam
in duemedietates
si dividatur
centesimam
ipsanonesttotaprimaquoniam
primam
ideononeratverum
unaestprimaetalianonprima;
medietatum
illarum
quodillatota
le motinfinite
infinite
suntprimepartes,
Dansl'expression
essetprima.
centesima
de
a un senssyncatgormatique
en premire
parinfiniment
que nousrendons
position
infinite
continuo
in quolibet
utrum
Cf.qu. III-18 (UL),61rb-62vb:
parties.
premires
6Ibisrb-vb.
suntpartes;
particulirement:
38TL, 24va:Aliquando
secundum
quodipsaestdivisibilis
magnitudinem
intelligimus

13:55:43 PM

LA PROBLMATIQUE
DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN

99

de celle de QP et des
C'est cette dernireconceptiontrs diffrente
deux conceptionsdveloppes par Ockham, qui est seule retenue dans
Yultimalectura
(qu. VI-4) et y est longuementdveloppe et argumente.
4 surPhysiqueVI (ultimalectura):
est-ceque lespointssontdes choses
Question
indivisibles
de la ligne?39
Disons toutde suiteque dans cettequestionle point comme imagination
mathmatiquen'estpas voqu. Buridany dveloppeuniquementsa conception d'un point divisible.Mais alors que dans TL il l'a donne sans
il l'nonce ici au termed'un processusargumentatif
marqu
justification,
immdiatement
rationes
huit
conclusions.
Celles-ci
suivent
les
principales
par
et Voppositum.
La premireconclusionest que les corps sontlimits,et que pour qu'ils
le soient il faut que les limitesexistentrellement.Quoi qu'elles soient
on les appelle surfacespour un corps,lignespour une surface,points
pour les lignes40.Les pointsexistentdonc rellement,et ils ne sont ni de
pures privations(comme dans QP), ni de simplesfictionsmathmatiques
(comme dans la premirepositionde TL).
La deuximeconclusionest que dans une ligne,ou plus gnralement
une grandeur,des points qui seraientdes choses indivisiblesn'existent
pas41.Il l'a montrdans les questionsVI- 1 et VI-2 en montrantque de
l'existencede pointsindivisibleson peut dduire deux propositionscontradictoires:
dans la premireil a tabli que de l'existencede pointsindivisibleson peut dduire qu'ils sont ct l'un de l'autre et qu'ils ne
peuvent pas l'tre, et dans la seconde que sous les mmes hypothses
touteligne finieseraitcompose de points,et qu'aucune ne le serait.La
conclusionest confirmepar des argumentscomplmentaires
dj utiliss
dans QP.
etmensurabilis
etsecundum
istam
rationem
vocamus
earn'corpenesillastresdyametros,
autem
estdivisibilis
etmensurabilis
secundum
duasdyametpus';aliquando
intelligitur
prout
rosnoncurando
de tertia,
et sicillamagnitudo
vocatur
tertio
modopotest
'superficies';
et mensurabilis
secundum
unamdyametrum
noncurando
de
intelligi
proutestdivisibilis
aliisduabus,
etsecundum
illamrationem
vocatur
intel'linea';seddicatur
'punctum'
prout
absolvi
ab omnitotadivisibilitate.
ligitur
39UL, 96rb-98va:
utrum
in linea.
punctasuntresindivisibiles
40UL, 96va:Prima/.. ./ quodnecesseestin corporibus
essesuperficies,
lineaset
suntterminata
et noninfinita,
et nonsuntterminata
sineterminis,
punctaquiacorpora
ideonecesse
estesseterminos
corporum.
41UL 96vb:Secundaconclusio
estquodnonsuntin lineavelmagnitudine
puncta
que sintresindivisibiles.

13:55:43 PM

100

JEANCELEYRETTE

La troisimeconclusion dduite logiquement des deux prcdentes

nonce que pointset instantssont des choses relles,qui n'tantpas indivisiblessont divisibles:tout point est une ligne, toute ligne est une surface, toute surfaceest un corps, si bien qu'on peut dire que tout point
est un corps42.
La quatrimeconclusionprcisece que sont ces choses: toutpoint est
une partie de la ligne,et il ne s'agit pas de la ligne totale car une ligne
totale est ce qui n'est pas une partie d'une autre ligne43.Autrementdit
un point est une partie propre de la ligne donne, c'est--direque non
seulementce n'est pas la ligne donne, mais que ce n'est mme pas une
ligne en acte sinon ce seraitune ligne totale.Par ailleurstoutpointpeut
d'une ligne;mais,ajoute Buridan,
toujourstreconsidrcommeextrmit
cette extrmitn'est pas quelque chose d'extrinsqueet de spar de la
ligne,car le corps (la ligne on le rappelle est un corps) est limitet il le
resteraitmme s'il n'existaitrien d'autre en dehors de lui.
La positionayantt clairementdonne,les troisconclusionssuivantes
s'en dduisent.
La cinquimenonce que la ligneest compose de pointset est divise
en points, savoir en ce qui avant divisiontaient des points (c'est-dire des partiespropres)quoique aprs divisionce ne soit plus des points
(puisque ce sont des lignesen acte, c'est--diredes lignestotales)44.
La siximeconclusionest que de n'importequelle ligneil y a un terme
qui en est la premirepartie et un termequi en est la dernirepartie45.
Il ne s'agit l que de la rptitionde ce qui est dit plus haut.
La septimeconclusionreprendla dfinitionqui a t donne dans
TL, une grandeurmaisjamais toutela grandeur,en disantqu'aucun continu n'a pour termetoute une partie en prenanttout syncatgormatiquement46.

42UL, 97ra:Tertia
et
suntresdivisibles
etinstantia
conclusio
quiasunt,
quodpuncta
/.. ./ ideoetiamsequitur
nonsuntindivisibles,
quodomnepunctum
ergosuntdivisibiles
esttempus.
et omneinstans
estcorpus
43UL, 97ra:Quartaconclusio
estparslinee,itaquodnon
estquodomnepunctum
linee.
linemque nonestparsalterius
estaliquatotalis
linea,etvocototalem
44UL, 97rb:Quintaconclusio
expunctis
et
manifeste
quodlineacomponitur
sequitur
erantpunctalicetnonsintpunctapost
in puncta,
scilicet
dividitur
que antedivisionem
linee.
divisionem
quiasunttotales
45UL, 97rb:Sextaconclusio
estprima
lineeterminus
estquodcuiuslibet
parseiusvel
suntprimaet ultima
ultima
parseius.
pars,immoeiustermini
46UL, 97rb:Septima
continui
conclusio
estquodnullius
aliquatotaparsestterminus
eius,etcapiohocnomen"tota"sincategorematice.

13:55:43 PM

LA PROBLMATIQUE
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101

Cette conclusionest videntecar si on imagine une divisionen deux

de la partieconsidre,seule une des deux moitissera termedu continu.
A prioriune des grandesdifficults
de la positionexpose ici est la relation avec le concept mathmatique.Un point est dfinidans les Elments
comme ce qui n'a pas de partie,et donc est indivisible.Commentpeuton dire que les pointsburidanienssont indivisibles?C'est l'nonc d'un
doute pos immdiatement
aprs la septimeconclusion.La rponse est
en quatre parties.
Elle commencepar rappelerque l'indivisibilit
seraitune propritdes
pointsmathmatiquessi ceux-ci existaient;mais que ceux-ci ne sont que
des fictionsqui suffisentaux mathmaticiens.Le lien avec les points
physiquesn'apparatqu'ensuite,notammenten soulignantqu'une extrmit
d'une ligne (et tout point peut toujourstre considrcomme tel) n'est
sermonis
mais seulementau sens o il n'est pas
pas dit indivisiblede virtute
divisible en parties dont chacune serait extrmitde cette ligne. Un
point buridanienpeut donc tre dit indivisiblemais ce n'est qu'en un
sens driv.
On peut toutefois
noncerla propritsuivante:un continutantdonn,
il a une extrmitinfiniment
petiteet c'est la huitimeconclusion.Cette
conclusionest explique ainsi: le point extrmitd'une ligne peut tre
aussi petitqu'on veut. On peut en effetenvisagerune divisionde la ligne
en deux, ou en quatre,en huitet ainsi indfiniment.
Mais un pointdtermin n'estjamais infiniment
petitpuisqu'il s'agit d'une partie47.Bien au
contraireil peut tre deux fois plus grand qu'un autre, ou quatre fois
etc. L'apparentecontradiction
tientau faitque dans le premiercas point
est pris de faon confuse(pour une infinitde parties),dans le second,
de faon dtermine(pour une partie fixe).
Il n'en restepas moinsque la propritqui vientd'tre donnejustifie
d'une lignecomme un point,
que les mathmaticiens
imaginentl'extrmit
indivisible
et que ce pointmathmatiquepuissetreconsidrcomme
fictif,
une abstractiondu point physique.
La conceptiondu point dveloppe dans UL de faon trs labore
est bien semblable la seconde des conceptionsjuges acceptablesdans
TL mais avec un caractreachev qu'elle ne possdaitpas dans la version prcdente.
47UL,97va:Octavaconclusio
scilicet
ininfinitum
continui
finiti
quodcuiuslibet
parvum
estterminus
/.. ./ Sedtarnen
nonsequitur
scilicet
sitininfinitum
econverso,
quodpunctum
immopunctum
parvum,
potestdiciduodecima
parsalicuiuscontinui
que nonestin
infinitum
parva.

13:55:43 PM

102

JEANCELEYRETTE

Les rponses
aux dubitationeslogice
La modificationsuccessivede points de vue de QP TL puis UL a
du
t me semble-t-ildmontre- en tout cas au niveau des dfinitions
Il

voir
comment
ces
modifications
de
reste
conceptuelles
concept point.
sont mises en oeuvre dans les solutionsdes objections.Nous pouvons en
avoir une ide assez clairecar, comme nous l'avons dit,ce sontles mmes
que Buridan a rsoluesdans les troistraits.C'est l quelque chose de
suivantla positionqui est adopte ces
remarquablecar, naturellement,
objectionssont plus ou moins pertinentes.Ceci nous conduit revenir
sur leur place dans les troistraits.Dans QP c'est partird'elles et de
leurs solutionsqu'est construitela 3e partie,celle o Buridan expose sa
position; dans TL elles constituentcomme il a t dit le corps de
qu. IV-3; dans UL si leur importancerelativeest moindre,elles occupent nanmoinsl'quivalentde deux foliossur les quatre consacrs qu.
VI-4. On ne peut donc pas les considrercomme de simplesarguments
il est mme possible de dire que c'est tout autant partir
prliminaires;
de ces objections que des conceptions thoriques du point que veut
dfendreBuridan que sont construitsles textes,au moins la 3e partie
de QP et qu. IV-3 (TL). Si bien qu'il nous fautles examinerau moins
partiellement.
Dans QP ellessontnumrotesde 1 14, dans TL puis dans UL plusieurs
sont regroupesmais pour plus de clartnous garderonsla numrotation
de QP. Par souci de brivetnous n'en prsenteronsque quelques-unes
avec leurs rponsessuccessivementdans QP, dans TL avec le point de
vue de l'imaginationmathmatique,not TLb dans TL avec le second
point de vue, not TL2, enfindans UL.
Objection n 1. Dans la dfinitionde la sphreou du cercle,qui sont
de vrais entia,on pose un point (le centre).Si donc celui-ciest une privation la dfinitionn'est pas acceptable car elle dfinitle plus connu (le
cercle ou la sphre) partirdu moins connu (une privation)48.
Rponse de QP: L'objection est rfutecar il n'est pas ncessaireque
tous les noms intervenantdans la dfinitionsupposentpour des choses
relles,et que certainssoient des noms privatifsne prsentepas d'inconvnient.Par exemplecercle est un nom connotatif
qui contientdans
sa dfinitiondes termes comme ligne ou surface qui sont aussi
48QP, 85:Hocpunctum
autspere,
etnon
indifinitione
verientis,
putacircuii
ponitur
ibitamquam
perignotiora.
privatio,
quiaessetdifinitio
ponitur

13:55:43 PM

LA PROBLMATIQUE
DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN

103

Buridan ajoute qu'on pourraitrpondreautrementen disant

privatifs49.
les
dfinitions
du cercle et de la sphresont mathmatiques;en effet
que
un corps sphrique ou circulairenaturel a un centre qui n'est pas un
point mais un corps.
Rponse de TLji Conformment ce qu'il pose en pralable aux
mathmarponsesdonnesavec la conceptiondu pointcommeimagination
tique, il rcritl'objectionsous formeconditionnelle:si les points existaientla dfinition
du cercleseraitetc. Et une telledfinition
ne prsenterait
aucun inconvnient.Il rptequ'on peut imaginerque les pointsexistent
car pour tout ce qui concerne les mesures et les propritsmathmatiques qui font intervenirle cercle, le rsultatne dpend pas de leur
existence50.
Rponse de TL2: Elle affirmequ'un concept positifpeut tre dfini
d'un nom privatifmais videmmentpas du nom expripar l'intermdiaire
mant la privationdudit concept (une ligne ne peut tre dfinie partir
d'une absence de ligne). En effet,s'il est vrai que la signification
d'un
termeprivatifest toujoursmoins connue que celle du termepositifdont
il est l'oppos, il n'est pas vrai qu'elle soit moins connue que celle de
tout termepositif51.
Rponse de UL: Quand dans la dfinitiondu cercle on pose le mot
point ce mot suppose pour quelque chose qui est la premireou la
dernirepartie d'un corps52.Et il explique plus loin cette rponseen disant qu'un cercle (ou une sphre) a une partie centralequi est appele
centreet une partie priphriqueappele circonfrence.
La partie centrale est termedes rayonsdu cercle (ou de la sphre),et si elle n'est pas
indivisibleabsolument,elle est indivisibleau sens qu'il a donn plus haut
49QP, 90:Adprimam
diciquodhocnomen
'circulus'
estnomen
connotativum
potest
etnonsolumrerum
insuasignificatione
sedclaudit
dictiones
connotativas
extra,
quasdam
"linea"et"superficies";
claudit
enimin se significationem
terminate
etsicclausuperficiel
ditin sua ratione
rationem
Dico:nonoportet
nomenacceptum
in
privationis.
quodlibet
eiusdiffinitione
/.. ./ supponere
si describitur
proaliquaverare,necestinconveniens
peraliquodprivativum.
50TL, 24rb:Undediffinitiones
circuii
etspereessent
bonesi essent
taliapuncta,
etiam
essequiasivesintsivenonsintprovenit
idemquantum
ad mensuras
etpropoymaginantur
sitiones
mathematicas.
51TL, 24rb:Dicendum
estigitur
describitur
quodnomenpositivm
aliquando
per
nomenprivativum
nontarnen
sibioppositum,
pernomenprivativum
quia omneprivativum
estminus
notum
cuiopponitur,
sednonoportet
omneprivaquamilludpositivm
tivum
omnipositivo
esseignotius.
52UL, 97v:Dicitur
circuii
velspereponitur
dicetur
quodindifinitione
punctum,
post
hocdebeatintelligi;
conceditur
etiamquodhocnomen'punctum'
quomodo
proaliquo
supponit,
quiaprocorpore
quodestprimavelultima
parsalicuius
corporis.

13:55:43 PM

104

JEANCELEYRETTE

dans le doute qui suit la 7e conclusion.Cette solutionest confirmepar

le fait que la terrequi est un corps est dite centrenaturelde toute la
sphre du monde53.
Objection n 2: Il y a quelque chose par quoi les partiesdu continu
sont unies54.
Rponse de QP: Les partiesdu continuqui se touchentcontinment
ne sont unies par aucune chose distincted'elles; elles sont unies l'une
l'autre55.
Rponse de TL^ La formeconditionnellede l'objectionest: les parties du continu seraient unies par un point si le point existaitet les
extrmitsdes deux parties seraientle mme point indivisible.Elle ne
prsentealors aucun inconvnient56.
Rponse de TL2: Il y a quelque chose par quoi les moitisd'un continu sont unies, et c'est une certainepartie qui a une partie commune
avec chaque moiti;on l'appelle point du faitqu'il n'est pas vrai que
touteune partiea cetteproprit(celle d'avoir une partiecommuneavec
chaque moiti)en prenanttout syncatgormatiquement57.
Rponse de UL: C'est la mme que la prcdentemais plus dtaille:
si une ligne A et une ligne B sont en continuitet si on les imagine
toutesdeux divisesen 10, alors partirde la dernirepartiede A (vers
B) et la dernirede B (versA), est formeune ligne continuedont une
partie est termede A et l'autre est termede B. C'est en ce sens qu'on
peut dire que deux continussont unis par un termecommun58.

53UL, 98r:Sedsecundum
in circulo
velsperaestparsmediaque vocatur
veritatem
etomnium
circuii
centrum
etparsextrema
circumferentia,
semidyametrorum
quevocatur
indivisiet illaparsmedianonestsimpliciter
velspereillaparsmediadicitur
terminus;
sitterinplures
indivisibilis
bilisseddicitur
partes
quarum
quelibet
quianonestdivisibilis
illiuscircuii
velspereet quiaetiamin infinitum
minus
omnium
parva
semidyametrorum
lineevellinearum
esttalisparsmedia,et dicitur
semidyamepunctum
quiaestterminus
naturale
totalis
essecentrum
Undedicimus
terram
tralium.
speremundi.
54QP, 85: Aliquid
continui
estad quodpartes
copulantur.
55QP, 90:Partes
ab eiscopuad nullam
remdiversam
se continue
continui
tangentes
ad aliam.
sedutraque
lantur,
copulatur
56TL, 24rb:Ad punctum
si essetcopularentur
parteslineeet ultimacontinuorum
indivisibile.
idempunctum
essent
57TL, 24 va: Concedo
lineecopulantur
et
etiamquodaliquidestad quodmedietates
sedquianullatotaestutramque
medietatem
illudestparsquedam
communicans,
utramque
ideoillamvocamus
medietatem
communicans
'punctum'.
58UL 97v:Si lineaA et lineaB suntadinvicem
et utrumque
continue
imaginetur
B etultima
decimaipsius
A versus
decimaipsius
tuncex ultima
in decern
decimas
dividi
lineeA etaliaparsesttercuiusunaparsestterminus
B versus
A estunalineacontinua
communem.
ad terminm
continua
sensum
lineeB; sicergoad istum
minus
copulantur

13:55:43 PM

DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN
LA PROBLMATIQUE

105

Objection n 5: La sphre touche le plan selon quelque chose59.La

suite du syllogismequi manque dans QP et se trouvedans TL (et UL)
s'exprimeainsi: et ce n'est que selon un point,donc un point est quelque
chose60.
Rponse de QP: Quand un corps en touche un autre il le touche en
mais pas divisive
tant que tout, en prenanttout unitive
parce que cela
signifierait
que n'importequelle partiedu premiertouchen'importequelle
C'est ici la mineure,implicite,du syllogismequi est
de
l'autre61.
partie
rfute.
Rponse de TL^ La propositionconditionnelleest: si le point existait
la sphretoucheraitle plan selon un point62.
Rponse de TL2: C'est la mme que dans QP mais les expressions
.
et distributive
utilisessont categorematice
pour unitive
pour divisive
selon
la
Buridan ajoute: tant donn une partie du plan
sphre
quoi
touche le plan, on peut toujoursen enleverune partieselon quoi elle ne
le touche pas; et c'est la raison pour laquelle on dit qu'elle touche le
plan selon un point63.Non seulementla mineureest rfute,comme dans
QP, mais Buridan explique galementici pourquoi on dit que le contact
se fait en un point, et il le fait en reprenantce qu'il a dit pour expliquer en quel sens un point est divisible.
Rponse de UL: C'est la mme rponse que dans TL2, un peu plus
.
, syncategorematice64
dtaille,avec la terminologie categorematice
Objection n 7: si le point n'existaitpas, tirerune ligne d'un point
un autre,comme l'admet le mathmaticien,seraittirerde rien rien.
Rponse de QP: dire qu'une ligne est tired'un point un autre c'est
simplementdire que la ligne a une extensiondtermineet n'est pas
tendueau-del.Que cetterponsecorrespondebien la solutionthorique
expose dans QP, o le point est une pure privation,est confirmpar
aprs: de mme la ccit est dans
l'analogie dveloppeimmdiatement
l'il ne signifiepas que quelque chose qui serait la ccit soit dans
l'il65.
59QP, 85: Speratangit
secundum
planum
(Zubov:supra)
aliquid.
60TL, 23vb:etnonnisisecundum
estaliquid.
punctum,
igitur
punctum
61QP, 91: Oportet
alterum
se
scirequodcorpustangens
corpus,
ipsumsecundum
'totum'
unitive
/.. ./ sednonsecundum
totum
divisive.
totum
alterum,
tangit
capiendo
62TL, 24 rb.
63TL, 24 va: Undesignata
quacumque
partesivemagnasiveparvasecundum
quam
adhucpotest
de illaparteauferri
ideodicaliquaparssecundum
quamnontangit,
tangit,
iturtangere
secundum
punctum.
64UL, 97vb.
65QP,92:Dicendum
ad punctum
depuncto
ducisignificat
illam:
secundum
quodlineam

13:55:43 PM

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JEANCELEYRETTE

Rponse de TL^ La propositionconditionnelleest: si les points existaienton pourraittirerune ligne d'un point un autre66.
Rponse de TL2: La propositiond'un point un autre on peut tirer
une droite est concde, mais avec le sens suivant:d'une grandeur
une grandeuron peut tirerune grandeurrectiligne,mais pas de toute
une grandeur toutel'autre(touttantpris syncatgormatiquement)67.
de la
Rponse de UL: L'explicationest semblablemais la signification
la
distance
entre
deux
ainsi:
est
corps
quelconques
proposition exprime
est une dimensioncorporellerectiligne68.
Bien entendunous l'avons dit, selon le point de vue dfenduces objec rsoudre.
ou plus ou moinsdifficiles
tionssontplus ou moinspertinentes,
Il est clair que celles qui viennentde propositionsmathmatiquescomme
les objections1, 5, 7 ont des solutionsimmdiatesdans TLb mais beaucoup plus dlicates avec les autres points de vue. On peut mme dire
que les solutionsdans TL2 et UL de l'objection 7 ne sont pas trsconvaincantes.Il n'en est que plus remarquableque Buridan ait tenu y
rpondresans se borner dire que la propritproblmatiquevientdes
ce qui reviendrait peu prs
mathmatiqueso elle ne faitpas difficult,
la rponsede TLj. Les rponsesde TL2 et UL sont en gnralproches
mais la rdactionde UL, beaucoup plus labore,est plus claire,en particulierdu faitde l'introductiond'exemples. Surtouttoutesces rponses
sont en cohrence avec la positionthoriqueexpose dans la question.
Il n'en est pas de mme avec QP o plusieurssolutionsalternatives
peuvent tre donnes dont certainesne correspondentpas la conception
du point comme pure privation.Enfinmme si le second point de vue
de celui de QP le mot
de TL (qui est celui de UL) est trs diffrent
faitde cette terminoloet
du
nom
est
encore
privatif;
appel
point y
celle
comme
de
certaines
commune
qui est faite l'obrponses QP,
gie
de

leurs
n
5, sont analogues
homologues TL2.
jection
esse
Et sicutcecitatem
nonultraextendi.
hincindeextensam
certam
quantitatem
aliquam
idemquod illudesse in oculo,ita de punctoad punctum
in oculonon significat
ut
earnducide nihiload nihilsedhabetaliamreductionem,
linemducinonsignificat
dictum
est.
66TL, 24 rb.
67TL, 24va:Dicoetiamquodde punctoad punctum
linearecta,id estde
ducitur
de nullatotaad aliamtotam
sedtarnen
rectamagnitudo
ad magnitudinem
magnitudine
rectamagnitudo.
ducitur
68UL, 98ra:Dico quod sic de omnipunctoad omnepunctum
rectam
contingit
cordistantia
estdimensio
ab invicem
duocorpora
linemducerequiainter
quecumque
recta.
porea

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LA PROBLMATIQUE
DU POINTCHEZJEANBURIDAN

107

Conclusion
En dcrivantles conceptionsdiffrentes
prsenteset mises en oeuvre
dans les troistextes,nous avons soulignque la conceptionprivativedu
point dfenduedans QP est beaucoup plus conformeaux conceptions
ockhamistesque cellesqui sontexposes,et adoptes,dans les deux autres
textes.Faut-ilpour autant dire que QP est un texte davantage marqu
par l'influenceockhamisteque les deux autres?Certainementpas partout
car par exemple la positionqui est exprimedans QP sur la privation
est la plus loignede celle d'Ockham. L'analyse des diffrentes
positions
de Buridan ne peut srementpas se faireen renvoyantmcaniquement
une influenceplus ou moins grande du Venerabilis
inceptor.
Un autre point importantest la rintgration
de l'imaginationmathmatique.Que le pointsoitune pure imaginationmathmatiqueestprsent
dans TL comme une des deux rponsespossibles,ces deux rponsesapparaissantcomme les deux termesd'une alternativepuisque aucun lien n'est
fait entre elles. Dans UL la descriptionplus riche que dans TL de la
mathconceptionphysiquedu point,justifiela possibilitd'une abstraction
du
aboutit
au
matique qui partant
point physique
point mathmatique.
L'expos de UL cre ainsi une cohrence entre les deux conceptions
exposes dans TL.
Aucun lmentmatrielne permetde dire, entreQP et TL, quel est
le textele plus ancien. Ni les indicationsdonnes dans BN Lat. 16621, ni
les quelques renseignements
fournispar W. Courtenay sur Michel de
Montecalerio,s'il est bien le matrede Montescalerioavec qui a dbattu
de trancher.Toutefoisl'examen internedes textes
Buridan,ne permettent
bien
aller
dans
le
sens d'une prioritde QP et malgr tous les
parat
a

dangersqu'il y
proposerune telleconclusionon est trstentde parler d'une modificationde point de vue de QP TL puis UL, incontestablementpostrieuraux deux autres textes. En effetalors que les
sur des sujets importants(ralitdes
conclusions,sinon l'argumentation,
statut
de
la
TL
de
sont analogues celles de UL, sur
points,
privation)
les mmes sujets les conclusionsde QP et celles de UL sont opposes.
Bien entenduil serait naf de croire que le traitle plus ockhamiste
est ncessairementle plus ancien.
Les exemplesdans l'uvre de Buridan de tellesmodifications
de point
de vue sont trs rares et mme si nous ne pouvons expliquervraiment
celle-ci,nous pouvons dire qu'elle est le signe de l'existenced'un dbat
universitaire:
selon touteprobabilitla structure
du continua t un sujet
de discussionsvives l'Universitde Parisjusqu' la findes annes 1350.

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108

JEANCELEYRETTE

De faon plus gnrale pour un matre la carriresi longue, distinguerentreles positionsconstammentsoutenueset celles sur lesquelles
il a vari ne contribuepas seulement une meilleureconnaissancede
Buridan,mais au-del fournitdes renseignements
prcieux sur le climat
intellectuelde la Facult des arts au milieu du XIVe sicle.
de Lille III
CNRS-Universit
UMR Savoirset Textes

13:55:43 PM

s Treatise
JohnBuridan'
et convenientiis:
De dependentiis,diversitatibus
An Edition

DIRK-JANDEKKER

Introduction
The treatiseDe dependentiis
et convenientiis
counts among the
, diversitatibus
earliestworks ofJohn Buridan. It was writtenas a contributionto a
philosophicaldebate at the universityof Paris that began in 1331 and
continueduntil 1334. The debate probablystartedwithBuridan'smeta, several conclusions of
physical treatiseDe diversitate
generisad speciem
In reply,Buridan wrote
which were attackedby other Parisian magisti.
two new treatises.One of these,our De dependentiis
etconveni, diversitatibus
entiisof 1332, deals with the ontological statusof relations.The other,
determinations
de diversitate
ad speciem
of 1333, is a more
Defensiones
generis
direct defense of Buridan's original conclusions in De diversitate
generis
ad speciem
and discusses the way genus and species are related to each
other.Althoughwe do not know whetherthese repliesprovokedany reaction of the opponents,it is certainthat in 1334 Buridan honored the
request to writeone final treatiseabout the disputed topics; this is De
1
relationibus.

1 Abouttheseworks:
BerndMichael,
Buridan:
Studien
seinen
zu seinem
Leben,
Johannes
Werken
undzurRezeption
Theorien
seiner
imEuropa
desspten
Mittelalters
, Berlin1985,II, 425Burdan
ontheOntological
A First
Status
Relations.
Presentation
54;J.M.M.H.Thijssen,
ofCausal
dedependentiis,
diversitatibus
etconvenientiis
in:Albert
Zimmermann
"Questio
ofthePolemic
andAndreas
undNatur
imMittelalter
, Berlin1991,234-55,esp.236Speer(eds.),Mensch
7. De diversitate
ad speciem
is notknownto havesurvived
in anymanuscript.
Of
generis
theotherworks
no complete
havebeenpublished
editions
ofDe
yet.A partialedition
inThijssen1991,238-51.The edition
etconvenientiis
of
, diversitatibus
dependentiis
appeared
De relationibus
wasannounced
Relation
alsVergleich.
DieRelationstheorie
byRolfSchnberger,
desJohannes
Burdan
imKontext
seines
Denkens
undderScholastik
, Leiden1994,372,n. 6.
Buridan's
deuniversali
as De differentia
universalis
adindividuum
Quaestiones
, alsoknown
, which
isanother
ofhisearly'polemical'
wasedited
Iohannes
(Duae
works,
Buridanus,
byS. Szyller,
deuniversali
' in:Przeglad
, 3 (1987),135-78.
quaestiones
Tomistyczny
Koninklijke
BrillNY Leiden,2004
- www.brill.nl
Alsoavailable
online

Vivarium
42, 1

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DIRK-JAN

It has been suggestedthat Buridan's so-called 'polemical' worksoriginated in the context of formal academic disputations.2Our treatise
shows some characteristicsin structure,styleand terminologythat support this suggestion.Especially the structureof the author's determinatio
at the end, and the formula-likedeclarationof sinwith its recapitulatio
cere intentionsmay be mentionedhere.3Buridan's opponentsin De deare two anonymousmastersof artsat
etconvenientiis
, diversitatibus
pendentiis
the universityof Paris. One of them belongs to the Picard nation and
is referredto as Picardus
, the otherbelongs to the English nation and is
called Anglicus
Althougha formaldisputationwas an affairof the magistiratherthan of students,Buridan does referto his studentsand his
teachingpracticeseveraltimes.5The treatisealso containsan interesting
remarkabout Buridan'sapproach to authorities.6
The theme of the disputationis the ontological status of relation.7
The questionsat stake are whethercausal relationsadd anythingto the
essence of the effectof a cause, whetherthe agreementor difference
between two thingsis anythingadded to theiressence,and whetherrelations of relationsare possible. The structureof the disputationis as
that
follows.Buridan begins by repeating three statementsconclusiones
he had already put forwardat an earlieroccasion, probablyin the lost
' dansles
2 Michael1985(op.cit.,
La 'disputatio
above,n. 1),I, 245-6;Olga Weijers,
Turnhout
25-49.
aumoyen
desarts
Facults
2002,
,
ge
3 "Etprotestor
illudquod
etsustinere
sedsolumaddiscere
quodnihilmaliintendo,
Et supplico
verum
etaliaquae ad haecsequuntur.
mihividetur
quodsitfasunicuique
in
nihiltarnen
inspeculativis,
metaminconvenientiae
alteriomnem
nostrum
imponere
autinfide."
moribus
(p. 123,11-15).
4 Michaelconjectured
de Feno(thelatinized
wasAegidius
thatthePicardmaster
see
doubtsaboutthissuggestion:
nameofGillesvanderHoye),butThijssen
expressed
1991{op.cit.,
Michael1985(op.cit.,
above,n. 1),237.
above,n. 1), II, 443;Thijssen
5 Forexample:
meisinlegendo"
coramscholaribus
"declaravi
(p. 142,5-6);"etbeani
sciunt"
(p. 131,33).
6 Seeintherecapitulation
Lindicit[sc.Picardus]
quodforte
(p. 144,19-24):"Tertio
sibiacquiesco,
Ethuicresponsioni
sibicredere.
necoportet
illiusopinionis,
fuit
colniensis
siveLincolniensis,
fundare
superaliquamauctoritatem,
quia nolomein hac opinione
etetiamipsifuerunt
faciliter
siveAristotelis,
siveAverrois,
exponuntur,
quiaauctoritates
eosexponere
Tamenplusvellem
homines.
quamnegare."
probabiliter
7 OtherplaceswhereBuridandiscusses
thesametopicare:IohannesBuridanus,
Mnchen
ed.Johannes
inPraedicamenta,
1983,69-106(qq. 10-14);
Schneider,
Quaestiones
In Praedicamenta
Summulae:
Iohannes
1994,46-61(
, ed. E.P. Bos,Nijmegen
Buridanus,
BadiusAsParisiis:
Iod.
Aristotelis
In
Iohannes
,
Buridanus, Metaphysicen quaestiones
3.4);
etdiversitates
convenientiae
1518,y qq. 5-9(ff.29rb-32vb),
censius,
esp.y 6: "Utrum
veldiversis"
additaerebusconvenientibus
sintressivedispositiones
ad invicem
rerum
sintdispositiones
rerumad invicem
siveeffectuationes
causalitates
and V,8: "Utrum
causisetcausatis".
additaeillisrebus,

13:55:50 PM

DE DEPENDENTIIS
TREATISE
JOHNBURIDAN'S

11 1

ad speciem
treatiseDe diversitate
, and that apparentlyset offthe opgeneris
He
also
criticism.
providesa briefargumentationfortheseconponents5
clusions.Then the opponentstake the stage.Firstcomes the anonymous
Picard master who puts forwardfivestatementswith arguments,then
the anonymous English master carries in two more objections. After
a shortformula-likedeclarationof sincereintentionsBuridan proceeds
He summarizesthe opponents' arguments
withhis solution(determinatici).
The explanation of these five
and respondswith fivemore conclusiones.
statementsis the core of the treatise.Finally,Buridan summarizesthe
entirediscussion.
Buridan's views regardingthe ontologicalstatusof relationare summarized in the threeconclusionsthat are given at the beginningof the
treatise.First,the dependence of an effectupon its cause does not add
anythingto the essence of the effect.Second, iftwo beingsagree in their
essence, then this agreement does not add anythingto their essence.
Third, iftwo beings are in a relationof dependence, agreementor differenceto each other,thenthisrelationdoes not existextramentally.
Both opponents involvedin the disputationdefend realistpositions.
Their purpose is to attackthefirstand second conclusionput forwardby
Buridan. The Picard mastertriesto show thatthe essence of an absolute
to explain its dependence upon somethingelse.
being is not sufficient
He argues thatifthiswere the case, i.e., ifthingscould be in a relation
to other thingsjust by being themselves,then we could not distinguish
cause and effect.Therefore,somethingmust be added to the essence
of the effectin order forit to be the effectof a cause. Only if we are
to explain
dealing withrelativebeings theirrelativeessence is sufficient
theirdependence and no furtheraddition is required.In neithercase is
anythingadded to the cause, because the cause never depends on the
effect,but alwaysthe otherway round.
In a similarvein the Picard mastertriesto show that if two absolute
beings agree or differin nature,then theiragreementor differenceis
somethingreal that is added to each essence. In the case of two agreerelativebeings, theirrelativenature already sufficesto
ing or differing
explain theiragreementor difference.
The English master also attacks Buridan's conclusions. He tries to
show thata dependencycan be destroyedwhile the dependentbeing itselfremainsin existence.Therefore,dependencyand a dependentbeing
are reallydistinctfromeach other.Also, the English masterdenies that
a relationcan relate to anotherrelation,because thiswould lead to an
infiniteregress.

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112

DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

In his response Buridan argues that relationscan be foundedon relations.We could thinkof the posteriority
of Socrates' fatherhoodwith
an
reason whyrelationcould
to
Socrates
as
There
is
no
example.
respect
or terminus
not serve as one of the terms,eitherfiindamentum
, of another
relation.For example, let us say that a relationa (e.g., Socrates' fatherhood) is posteriorwith respectto its foundationb (e.g., Socrates). This
which itselfis a relation,is foundedupon relation<z,forifit
posteriority,
were foundedupon , then b would be posteriorto a (whichis absurd).
Therefore,relationcan be foundedupon relation.Any objectionthatreare not two reallydistinctrelationsmustfail,
lation a and itsposteriority
because relationa is a relationfounded in b with respectto something
is a relation
reallydistinct(e.g., Socrates' son), whereas the posteriority
withrespectto b. Because both relationsdifferin theirterminus
, theyare
not the same relation. Having establishedthat there can be relations
of relations,Buridan argues thatdependency,agreementand difference
can be foundedon dependency,agreementand difference.
Also, if any
of the latterrelationswere real (which Buridan denies!),8then any of
the formerrelationsfoundedupon it would also be real, i.e., not merely
existingrationally.
Buridan also triesto show thatthe effectof a cause depends upon the
cause by its verynature.His strategyhere is to lead the opponentsinto
contradictionor into an infiniteregress.Suppose that an effecta needs
somethingelse than itselfto depend on its cause b. Then how does this
additionalfactor(let us call it c) come into being? The answer is that it
must have been caused. But does c depend on its cause by itselfor by
cause b? If the latterwere true,then the cause b would firstcause the
dependence of a beforecausing a itself,which leads to a contradiction.
If the formerwere true,then an infiniteregresswould result.Therefore,
a depends on b by itself,not by c.
In an effortto strengthenthisconclusionBuridan discussesat length
the counterarguments
put forwardby the Picard master and identifies
six weak spots (<defectus
) in the English master'stheory.The finalsection
of the treatiseis a recapitulationof the entirediscussion,in which the
threeparticipantsall take the stage once more.
8 Buridanus,
"Etegocredoistam
inPraedicamenta
, q. 10,ed. Bos,7152"55:
Quaestiones
Ideo ponoconclusionem
essefalsam.
talem,scilicet
quodnon
oppositam
opinionem
terminos
abab
res
aliae
relativos
terminos
illis,
quae
significante
per
significante
per
relativi
nectermini
solutos,
supponunt
proaliisrebusab illis,proquibussupponunt
absolti."
termini

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TREATISE
DE DEPENDENTIIS
JOHNBURIDAN'S

113

Manuscripts
survivesin two codices: Klosterneuburg,StiftsBuridan'sDe dependentiis
bibliothekcod. 291, ff.163ra-172ra (siglumK); and Praha, Sttn knihovna cod. VIII Ell (Truhl 1536), ff.239r-249v (siglum P).9 The
Klosterneuburgmanuscriptwas writtenin the 14thcentury,the Prague
10
manuscriptin or around 1419. ManuscriptP was not copied directly
from because K has an omission due to homoeoteleutonthat is not
presentin P.11In additionto our treatise,both codices also contain Burdeterminations
de diversitate
ad speciem
but no other
idan's Defensiones
generis
textsthatare relatedto the debate. I have checked in particularforthe
presence of any treatisesthat the opponents may have writtenin reply,
but did not findany.12
Finallya fewwordsabout the criticaledition.I have recordedall variant readingsin the criticalapparatus withexceptionof variantswithout
differencein meaning, such as ille/iste
etc. The reader will
, ergo/igitur
notice that,when both witnessesare at variance, the older manuscript
does not always have the betterreading.Therefore,I have decided to
9 Bothcodicesaredescribed
inMichael1985(<
., above,n. 1),427-8.See
briefly
op.cit
codicum
Latinorum
alsoJoseph
Publica
Truhlr,
Catalogus
manuscriptorum
quiinC.R.Bibliotheca
I willrefer
universitatis
asservantur
tothe
, Praha1914,I, 567.In thisarticle
atque
Pragensis
foliation
rather
thanbythe15thcentury
folionumbers
Praguemanuscript
byitsmodern
In Thijssen1991(op.cit.,
whicharepartly
call
above,n. 1),235 an incorrect
preserved.
number
forthePraguecodex.
(VII E 11)isgiven
10Michael1985(op.cit.
cod.VIII E 11,f.
above,n. 1),II, 427;Praha,Sttn
knihovna,
inthesamehandas ourtreatise
ofBuridan's
deuniversali
238v(explicit
Quaestiones
, written
andimmediately
Iohannis
Buridani
de
it):"Expliciunt
magisti
preceding
quaestiones
universali
finitae
annoDominimccccxix
antefestum
nesciocuiusetcetera."
11Thishomoeoteleuton,
foundon f. 17lrbK (p. 146,8 oftheedition),
alsoproves
inThijssen1991(op.cit.,
thatthesuggestion
be theautoabove,n. 1),237thatK might
cannolonger
be upheld.
graph,
12Buridan's
inbothK (onlyqu. 1)andP,
deuniversali
Quaestiones
, preserved
polemical
arenotdirecdy
related
toDe dependentiis
etconvenientiis
, diversitatibus
, although
theycontainreferences
tothelatter
treatise
deuniversali
Quaestiones
, ed. Szyller,
16223,
(Buridanus,
and 17528"29).
The untitled
andanonymous
treatise
known
as De natura
numeri
16918"19,
etunitatum,
attributed
to Buridanandpreserved
in K (if.205vb-215vb),
is notrelated
P contains
either.
sevenanonymous
thatdo
Finally,
manuscript
quaestiones
metaphysical
notseemtoberelated
tothedebate,
treat
similar
Theirtidesare:
although
they
subjects.
universalia
sintmaxime
difficilia
sintpriora
(1) Utrum
(f.283v);(2) Utrumuniversalia
secundum
intellectum
(f.283v);(3)Utrum
speciessitmagisprincipium
quamgenusvel
e contra
eius(f.285r);(5) (Utrum)
(f.284v);(4)Utrum
genussitparsspecieietsittotum
a singulari
inspeciebus
universale
sitseparabile
sitpriuset
(f.285v);(6)Utrum
semper
sicutvidetur
dicerePhilosophus
posterius
(f.286r);(7)Utrum
speciessitnobilior
genere
(f.286v).

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114

DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

adopt variantreadingsfromboth K and P in the text.Conjectureshave

been reduced to a minimum.I have adjusted the orthographyof the
text to the spellingof classical Latin (but with u/v distinction)and applied punctuationaccordingto modern standards.Sources thatare cited
in the texthave been identifiedas much as possible. Referencesto Aristotleand Averroesin the sources apparatus are to Aristoteles
Latinusand
the editioIuntina
referencesto Grosseteste'scommentaryon
, respectively;
are to the Rossi edition.13Because thisis the oldest
the Posterior
Analytics
textwrittenby Buridan that is known to have survived,the quotations
fromBuridan'searlierworkscould not be identified.
Nijmegen
RadboudUniversity
Nijmegen
ofPhilosophy
Department

13Robertus
libros
Commentarius
inPosteriorum
, ed.Pietro
Rossi,
Grosseteste,
Analyticorum
Firenze1981.

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DE DEPENDENTIIS
TREATISE
JOHNBURIDAN'S

115

Edition
IOHANNISBURIDANI
ET GONVENIENTIIS
DE DEPENDENTIIS,DIVERSITATIBUS
Ad defensionemveritatisquam quidam impugnarenitunturde dependentiiseffectuumex suis causis et de convenientiiset diversitatibusre5 rum ad invicem,volo nunc reiterareconclusionesquas de hoc alias satis
vel nimis succinctedeclaravi. Quarum prima est quod dependentia effectusex sua causa nihiladdit in effectudependenteultraeius essentiam.
Secunda est quod convenientiaevel diversitatesessentialesseu quidditativae,cuiusmodisuntconvenientiaevel diversitatesaliquorum secundum
10 speciem aut secundum genus, nihil addunt in rebus sie convenientibus
vel diversispraeter suas essentias.Tertia conclusio est quod huiusmodi
dependentiaevel convenientiaevel diversitatesprout sunt relationesdinon suntpraeteranimam.
stinetaea fundamentis,
conclusionum
)
(Probatio
15 (1) Primam conclusionemprobavi alias inducendo in diversisgeneribus
causarum. In causa efficientesic. Effectusdependet ab agente in hoc
quod produciturab eo. Et si dependet se ipso non per dependentiam
realem sibi additam,habeo propositum.Si autem hoc sitper dependentiam realem superadditam,tunc ilia dependentia iterumdependet ab
20 aliquo agente a quo producitur,cum ipsa habeat esse post non-esse.Et si
dependet se ipsa et non per dependentiamaliam realem superadditam,
pari rationepoteramusstarein primo,quia nulla ratiovideturcogere de
uno quae non cogat de alio. Si vero ipsa dependet per aliam dependentiam additam et realem,quaeram iterumde illa ut prius,et procedam in
in essentialiterordinatis,quod reputoinconveniens.
25 infinitum
Et eodem modo processi de causa finaliet suo effectu,quod non repeto.
Sed repeto de causa materiali,ut per hoc appareat quod saepe dubitatumfuit,scilicetutruminhaerentiaaccidentissitde essentiaaccidentis.
30 Dixi ergo quod forma dependet a materia per hoc quod ipsa inhaeret materiae,aut per hoc quod materia subiciturei, quod idem est. Si 163rbK
autem hoc sit per dependentiamrealem sibi additam, tune illa depen8 est]om.K 30-31 inhaeret]
K 32 autem]om.K
inhaereat

13:55:50 PM

I 16

DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

dentia eritaccidens reale et in subiectoreali,et sie dependebititerumab

ilio subiecto,cum ei inhaereatvel cum illud subiectumsibi subiciatur.Si
autem sic dependeat non per aliam dependentiamsibi realiteradditam,
tuncpari rationestandumerat in primo. Si vero per aliam, procedam in
5
infinitum.
Similiterrepetode causa formali,nam materiadependet a formaper
hoc quod informaturea, sive sit forma substantialissive accidentalis.
Si autem hoc est per dependentiamrealem additam, ilia dependentia
eritaccidens informansmateriam,et sic materia iterumdependebitab
illa, et procedaturultraut prius. Iterum hanc conclusionemconfirmavi10
auctoritateLincolniensissecundo Posteriorum
, ubi dicit quod dependentia uniuscuiusqueentisex primo principionihilmultiplicatin re dependente. Quod si verum sit, non apparebit ratio cogens quin hoc possit
dici de aliis causis et suis effectibus.
(2) Secundam conclusionemprobavi primo quia res causatae habent 15
suas essentialesconvenientiasvel diversitatessecundumquod dependent
ex causis eisdem vel diversis.Causae enim eaedem vel convenientessunt
natae causare effectusconvenientes,et diversae diversos.Cum ergo illae dependentiaenihilmultiplicantin re,videturrationabilequod etiam
nec illae convenientiaevel diversitatesaliquid multiplicant,
quia si in de- 20
dicere
aliter
de convenulla
ratio
hoc
concessum
fuerit,
coget
pendentiis
nientiisvel diversitatibus.
Secundo probavihanc conclusionemsic. Si a et b suntformaesimpli- illa dices diversaeessentialiterper diversitatemrealitersuperadditam
vel 25
versitasvoceturc- , tunc oportetquod c et a sintdiversaessentialiter
per aliam diversitatemrealiteradditam, et tunc procedam in infinitum;
vel non per aliam diversitatemsed se ipsis,et tunc pari rationestandum
239vP erat in primo. Similiterest de convenientiis:nam Socrates convenitPla163vaK toni specie, et si hoc est per convenientiamsibi realiteradditam, tunc
cum illa convenientiacapiam aliam convenientiameiusdem speciei. Et 30
tunc illae convenientiaeconveniuntspecie vel per aliam convenientiam
vel non per
sibi iterumrealiteradditam,et tunc procedam in infinitum;
aliam sed se ipsis,et tunc eodem modo standumerat prius.
sunt maiores et minoresconIterum,dicebam quod in intelligentiis
venientiaeet diversitatesearum ad invicem.Cum tarnennihil sit in eis 35
Posteriora
InAnalitica
I I Robertus
2, 1,29i83"84
Grosseteste,
forma
add.K 11-12 depen1 etinsubiecto
reali]om.K 2 illud]eiusK 7 sive2]
P
1
K
6
rationis
add.
dependet
dependent]
dentia]

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117

ultra suas essentias,sicut supponebam ex duodecimo Metaphysicae

, nec
hoc intendonunc declarare,quia nimisessetextrapropositum.
(3) Tertiam conclusionem breviterprobavi, quia convenientiae,deproutsuntrelationeset distinctaea fundamenpendentiaeet diversitates
5 tis,vel suntrealiterpraeteranimam in illisfundamentis,et tunc addunt
ultraeorum essentias,quod est remotum;vel non suntpraeteranimam,
et sic habeturhaec tertiaconclusio.
, sc.Picardi)
('Conclusiones
opponentis
Duas primas istarumtrimconclusionumduo venerabilesmagistini10 tunturdestruere,tam arguendo contra eas quam solvendo earum rationes. Quidam enim multumsubtiliteret ordinatead destruendumdictas
conclusionesponitquinqu conclusiones.
(1) Prima est quod dependentia causati formaliterabsolti ex sua
causa multiplicaiveram formamrealem superadditamentitatiilliuscau15 sati formaliterrespectiviex sua causa.
(2) Secunda conclusio est quod dependentia causati formaliterrespectiviex sua causa nihilreale multiplicatsuper essentiamilliuscausati.
(3) Tertia conclusio est quod dependentia causati ex sua causa nihil
multiplicatin causa, sive causa fueritformaliterabsoluta sive respectiva,
20 et sive etiam effectusfueritformaliterabsolutusvel respectivus.
(4) Quarta conclusio est quod identitteset diversitatesessentiales
pluriumrerumformaliterabsolutarummultiplicantveras formasreales
in utroque extremorum.
(5) Quinta conclusio est quod identitteset diversitatesessentiales
25 pluriumrerumformaliterrespectivarumnihil multiplicantin rebus eisdem aut diversis.
adprimam
conclusionem
(Rationes
Picardi)
Ad primam conclusionemarguitprimo sic. Si dependentia causati formaliterabsoltiex sua causa nihilreale multiplicaretin causato, tunc in
30 causato ut sic nihil esset nisi formaliterabsolutum,cum illud causatum 163vbK
ponatur esse formaliterabsolutum. Sed si in causato nihil sit nisi for1 Cf.Aristoteles,
12,6, 107lb20-21
Metaphysica
10 earum]eorum
J 15 formaliter
... causa]om.K 16 formaliter]
om.K 26 aut]
velK 31 si]om.K

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DEKKER
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maliterabsolutum,tunc causatum non habet habitudinemad causam.

Ista consequentiapatet,quia habitudo non est ens formaliter
absolutum,
immo formaliter
respectivum.Et si causatum non habet habitudinemad
causam, tunccausatumnon dependebita causa. Ista consequentiapatet,
quia dependentia est quaedam habitudo,et si dependentiafueritrealis, 5
tunc habitudo eritrealis,et si fueritper intellectum,tunc erithabitudo
per intellectum.Sed si causatum non dependet ex causa, tunc causatum non est causatum. Ista consequentia patet, quia pro alio causatum
non dicituresse causatum nisiquia dependet ex causa. Sed hoc ultimum
10
consequens implicaicontradictionem;ergo et cetera.
Secundo arguitursic. Si dependentia causati formaliterabsolti niad
hil reale multiplicaretin causato, tunc causatum non plus referretur
causam quam causa ad causatum; consequens est falsum,ergo et antecedens. Falsitas consequentispatet quinto Metaphysicae
capitulo de ad
interilla quae suntde primo 15
aliquid, ubi Philosophusdans differentiam
vel secundo modo relativorumet illa quae suntde tertiodicitsic: "secundum numerumquidem igituret potentiamdicta ad aliquid omnia sunt
ad aliquid, eo quod ipsum quod quid est alteriusdicituripsum quod est,
sed non eo quod aliud ad aliud; mensurabilevero et scibileet intelligibile
240rP eo quod aliud ad ipsum dicitur,ad aliquid dicuntur.Nam intelligibile20
significai,quia ipsius est intellectus."Et super hoc dicit Commentator
quod relatioest duobus modis,scilicetrelatioin substantiautriusquerelativi,aut relatio in substantiaalteriustertiiet in altera propterillud.
ad inviPatet ergo quod relativatertiimodi non aequaliter referuntur
in
eius 25
substantia
existentem
relationem
mensurabile
cem. Immo,
per
ad mensurabileper rerefertur
ad mensuram,sed mensuranon refertur
lationemexistentemin substantiaeius; modo certumest quod relationes
causae ad causatum et e contra sunt de isto tertiomodo, quia effectus
in suo esse mensuratura causa. Sed consequentia est plana, quia nulli
dubium est quin causa referaturad suum causatum relationehabente 30
esse formaleab anima et esse fundamentalein re extra.
Ad hoc iste confirmtdietam rationemostendendo quod causatum
164raK
referturreali relationead causam et causa non referturreali relatione
ad invicem
ad causatum, quia si causa et causatum mutuo referrentur
InMetaphysica
14 Aristoteles,
5, 15,fol.
5, 15,1021a26-31 21 Averroes,
Metaphysica
129vG
... aliquid]om.K 17
add.K 3 si] sicKP 16-18 secundum
2 est]formaliter
om.KP 23
dicitP 20 eo ... intelligibile]
numerum
quidem]om.KP 18 dicitur]
K
om.
K
altero
33
non]
altera]

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119

relationereali, tunc sicut causatum constituiturper causam, ita causa

constitueretur
per causatum; quod est falsum,quia tunc idem respectu
eiusdem et eodem modo esset causa et causatum; quod implicai contradictionem.Sed consequentia tenetpro tanto quia causa et causatum
5 suntin tertiomodo relativorum.In quo modo illud quod refertur
ad alterumrelationereali fundatain ipso, constituitur
alterum.
Et
istam
per
rationem innuit Commentator quinto Metaphysicae
capitulo de ad aliquid, ubi exponens tertiummodum relativorumdicitsie: "Et intellectus
non referturad intelligentem,
sed ad intellectum,quoniam si ita esset,
10 tunc intellectusconstitueretur
per intelligentem;sed videturesse e converso. Ex quo consequereturquod illud quod constituiturper aliquid
constitutillud,scilicetquia contingitut causa constitueretur
per causatum. Et sic idem esset in respectueiusdem causa et causatum insimul."
Et hanc rationemsecundumexpositionemCommentatorisinnuitPhilo15 sophus in hac littera:"Non est autem intellectusad illud cuius est intellectus;bis enim idem dictumutique erit." Patet ergo quod causatum
refertur
reali relationead causam, quia constituitur
per illam. Sed causa
non refertur
reali relationead causatum,quia tunc e contraconstituereturper ipsum.
Tertio arguit sic. Quandocumque de aliquibus circumscriptoomni
20
realiter.
opere intellectusverificaripossunt contradictoria,illa differunt
sta patet per primmprincipium.Sed sic est de causato formaliterabsoluto et de eius dependentia ex causa, quia dato quod numquam intelligeremus,adhuc causatum formaliterabsolutumnon esset habitudo
25 ad aliud, quia impossibileest quod eadem natura, et hoc in causatis et
finitissitformaliterabsoluta et formaliterad aliud. Sed dato etiam quod
nihilintelligeremus,
tarnende potentiaessethabitudo ad aliud, quia ipsa
est illud quo causatum dependet ex causa et habet formaliterhabitudinem ad causam, dato quod non intelligamusquia nisi praeterintellec30 tum causatum dependeretex causa et per talem dependentiamhaberet
habitudinemad causam, tunc praeter intellectumcausatum non esset 164rb/T
causatum,sicutpriusarguebatur.

7 Averroes,
In Metaphysica
5, 15,fol.129vH 14-15 Aristoteles,
5, 15,
Metaphysica
1021a31-33
10 esse]om.KP 18 reali]iter.
K 25 eadem]eodemP 26-27 Sed ... aliud]om.P

13:55:50 PM

120

DEKKER
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conclusionem
ad secundam
Picardi)
(Rationes
Primo
Deinde iste arguit ad suam conclusionem secundam tripliciter.
sic. Natura non facit de duobus quod potest facere uno, quia ageret
otiose; sed causatum formaliterrespectivumpotest actu dependere ex
sua causa sine aliquo superaddito,cum ipsum sitformaliteret essentiali-5
terad aliud se habens siveprincipiumformalead aliud se habendi.
Secundo sic. Illud in quo non potest fundarirelatio realis, non dependet ex causa per dependentiamrealiteradditam; sed in causato formaliterrespectivonon potestfundarirelatiorealis,quoniam omne illud
quod fundatdependentiamest necessario independens,quia aliternon 10
Ergo quod fundatrelationemad termiplus fundaretquam fundaretur.
240vP num dependentemoportetipsum esse independenstali dependentia,et
per consequens oportetipsum esse absolutumper privationemrespectus
ad terminm.Sed causatum formaliterrespectivumnon est sic absolu15
tum; ergo non potestfundarealiquam relationemrealem.
Tertio arguitper rationemmeam, scilicetquia procedereturin infinitum in essentialiterordinatis.
conclusionem
Picardi
ad tertiam
}
(.Rationes
Deinde arguitad suam tertiamconclusionemsic. In ilio nihil multiplicai dependentia causati ex causa, quod ut sic non est ad aliquid, quia 20
Sed causa ut
sed solum quia alterumad ipsum refertur.
ipsum referatur,
sed solum quia alterumad
causa non est ad aliquid quia ipsa referatur,
ut patet ex supra allegatiscapitulo de ad aliquid quinto
ipsam refertur,
Metaphysicae.
Item. Secundo quia sequereturquod in prima intelligentiaesset ac- 25
cidens superadditumsuae naturae,cum ipsa sitprima et maxime causa
aliorum.Consequens tarnenest absurdumsecundumomes.
conclusionem
ad quartam
Picardi)
(.Rationes
Deinde arguitsic ad quartam conclusionemquaestionis sicut arguebat
ad primam,quia si identitteset diversitatesnon essentrelationesreales 30
a suis fundamentisformaliterabsolutis,tunc in rebus eisdem
diffrentes
24 Aristoteles,
5, 15,1020a26-31
Metaphysica
P
7 Secundo]SecundaK 22 quia2]om.P 26 cumipsa]iter.

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JOHNBURIDAN'S

12 1

non esset ut sic nisi formaliterabsolutum;et tune non haberenthabitudinem ad invicem,cum habitudo ad aliud non sit quid formaliterabsolutum,et tune non essenteaedem, quia contradictionemimplicai quod
unum sitidem alteriet non habeat aliquam habitudinemad ipsum.Ergo
5 res eaedem non erunteaedem; quod est falsum.
164vaK
Secundo arguitquia praeterintellectumpossuntverificancontradictoria de re formaliterabsoluta et de sua identitte,quia res formaliter
absoluta non est habitudo ad aliud, sed identitasipsius ad aliam rem est
formaliterhabitudo ad aliud, quia contradictionemimplicai quod res sit
10 eadem alteriet non habeat habitudinemad ipsam. Et hoc non est nisi
per identitatem.Ergo identitasdifferpraeterintellectuma re absoluta
quae dicitureadem.
Tertio arguitsic. Ponamus quod Socrates vixeritper decernannos et
Plato generaturhodie, manifestumest tunc quod intellectunon intelli15 gente Socrates habet nunc identitatemspecificamcum Platone, et heri
non habebat. Et ita in Socrate est de novo generatahuiusmodiidentitas.
Et tarnennihilde esse Socratisest de novo generatum,quia duravitper
decernannos, ut positumest. Ergo talisidentitasest aliquid reale praeter
essentiamSocratis.
ad quinterni
20 (Rationes
conclusionem
Picardi)
Deinde arguitsic ad quintamconclusionemsicutfecitad secundam,nec
plus, nec minus;ideo non repeto.Sic ergo patet quo modo iste subtiliter
arguitcontraconclusionesmeas.
alterius
se.Anglici
('Conclusiones
}
opponentis,
25 Sed adhuc quidam alter sic arguitcontra meam primam conclusionem.
Primo accipit quod potentia materiae pro respectuest alia ab essentia
materiae secundum Commentatoremprimo Physicorum
, tunc quia corin
adventu
formae
et
non
tunc
materia,
rumpitur
quia est de genere
relationiset non materia.
30
Secundo accipit quod potentiamateriae praedicta est praeteroperationem intellectus,quia sive intellectusintelligatsive non, ipsa tamen
corrumpiturin adventuformae,quod non esset si essetab anima.
InPhysica
27 Averroes,
1,7,fol.41rE-F
3 eaedem]eodemP 14 quod]inadd.KP 18 estaliquidreale]om.K 21 sic]om.K

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Tunc eodem modo arguitde Socrate dependentein sua generationea

spermateet a virtutehominisexistentein spermateet ab influentiacaeli
influxain eo. Nam ista dependentia corrumpiturSocrate permanente,
ergo non est sibi eadem. Consequentia patet de se. Probaturantecedens,
quia corruptospermatevel virtuteexistentein eo corrumpiturilla de- 5
pendentia,quoniam a re quae non est nihildependet. Sed constatquod
ad corruptionemhuius spermatisnon corrumpiturSocrates.
Etiam. Socrates est de praedicamentosubstantiae,et dependentiaest
164vbK de praedicamentorelationis,quia dependens diciturad aliud dependens
241rP et non diciturdependens nisi per dependentiam.Nec potest dici quod 10
ilia dependentia sit solum per animam, quia praeter omnem operationem animae effectusdependet a suis causis, et hoc est per dependentiam. Etiam si ilia dependentia non esset realiterdistinctaab effectu
dependente,tunc ratio Commentatorisde potentiamateriae nihilvaleret,quia dicereturquod materianon estpotens ad recipiendumformam 15
per potentiamformaliterquae sit ad aliquid, nisi per intellectum;quod
est inconveniensdicere, quia hoc dicere est ponere omnem relationem
esse ab anima, quod est- ut iste dicit- contra Commentatoremprimo
et contraPhilosophumquintoMetaphysicae
, qui distinguitinter
Physicorum
relationemrealem et relationemrationis,et ponit muitosmodos relatio- 20
num realium;ergo et cetera.
Secundo istearguitcontraprimamconclusionemmeam et secundam
per dicta mea in quibusdam aliis conclusionibus.Nam una conclusio
mea est quod convenientiaessentialiseffectuumest secundum dependentiam eorum ex eisdem causis in univocis,vel secundum dependen- 25
tiam unius ab altero ut in analogis. Et hoc in sequenti determinatione
magis declarabitur.
Tunc contra primam conclusionem meam arguit sic. Homo et asinus non ut dependentessunt diversivel saltemnon conveniunt,ergo ut
dependentesadhuc ab eadem causa sunt diversivel saltem non conve- 30
niunt.Quod est contrame. Et patet consequentia,quia dependentiailla
nihiladdit in re, ergo reduplicatavel non reduplicatanon mutatveritatem. Similiterdiceturquod homo et asinus accepti non ut conveniunt,
sunt diversi,ergo accepti ut conveniuntsunt diversi,cum convenientia
35
nihiladdat in re. Sed hoc consequens est falsum,ergo et cetera.

InPhysica
18 Averroes,
5, 15
1,7,fol.41rE-F 19 Aristoteles,
Metaphysica
K 34 sunt2]
om.P | cum]om.P
13 si]quasiP: quiasiK 28 arguit
sic]sicarguitur

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123

intentione
Buridani)
{De sincera
Ista igitursunt quae alii dubitaveruntcontra conclusiones quas posui
prius. Quibus repetitisprocedam iterumsic. Primo repetam responsiones quibus istivolueruntevadere radones quibus conclusionesmeas pro5 baveram. Et huiusmodievasiones tollam,ut radones meae in vigoresuo
non solum remaneant apud provectos,sed etiam apud iunioreslucide
appareant remanere.Postea removeboradones illorumquas iam reperii. 165raK
Et ad differentiam
ponendam interillos duos doctoresqui in praesenti
mihi
contrariantur,
ego vocabo unum Picardum et alterum
proposito
10 Anglicum,quia Parisiusnomine communi unus est de natione Picardorum et alter de natione Anglicorum.Et protestorquod nihil mali intendo,sed solum addiscere et sustinereillud quod mihivideturverumet
alia quae ad haec sequuntur.Et supplico quod sitfas unicuique nostrum
imponerealteriomnem metam inconvenientiaein speculativis,nihilta15 men in moribusaut in fide.
rationum
( Recapitulatio
opponentium)
Anglicus ergo ad primam rationem meam de dependentiisrespondet
quod effectusabsolutusdependet ab agente per dependentiamsibi realiteradditam. Sed illa dependentiase ipsa dependet ab agente,et non per
20 aliam dependentiam realitersibi additam. Et eodem modo respondet
Picardus.
Sed quando dicitur:"Non est aliqua ratio cogens quod unum illorum
in dependendo ab agente magis requiratdependentiamsibi realiteradditam quam alterum",ad hoc dicit Anglicus quod immo, quia regula
25 est, ut dicit, quod quando aliquid inest aliquibus accidentaliteret denominative,oportetquod insit alicui formaliteret quidditative.Modo
omnia absoluta dependent accidentaliteret denominativeper dependentiam,ideo oportetquod dependentiase ipsa dependeat formaliteret
quidditative.
30
Item ad idem. Iste alibi assignat aliam rationem,quia scilicet absolutumbene potest fundarerelationemrealem, sed relatio non potest
fundarerelationemproptertria:primo quia essetprocessusin infinitum,
secundo quia relatio esset relativa,tertioquia tunc essent plures modi

14-15 tamen]
etnonP 17 meam]mecum
I

22 aliqua]aliaKP

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124

'S*?

DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

relationumdistinguendipenes fundamentaquam tria,cuius oppositum

istedicitesse notumex quintoMetaphysicae.
Picardus autem aliam rationem assignat in hoc, scilicetquod absolutum dependet per additum,et relativumnon. Hoc enim est, ut dicit,
quia natura in formaliterabsoluto debuit et potuit facere talem addi- 5
tum, sed hoc natura non potuit neque debuit in formaliterrespectivo.
Natura quidem in absoluto debuit,quia non potuitaliquod ens formaliterabsolutumfacerehabere habitudinemad alterumper se ipsum. Et
ipsa potuit,quia ens formaliterabsolutumest tantae virtutisquod in eo
potest fundarirelatio realis superaddita. Sed in respectivonatura non 10
debuit, quia potuit causatum formaliterrespectivumfacere dependere
per se ipsum. Nec etiam potuit,quia ens formaliterrespectivumnon est
tantae virtutisquod in eo possitfundarirelatiorealissuperaddita.
Et sicutdictumest de dependentiaeffectusex causa agente,ita ipsi respondentde dependentiaex finevel ex materiavel ex forma,nisi quod 15
Picardus de dependentiamateriaea formadicitquod materiadependet
a formaper dependentiamadditam. Et cum dicitur:"Illa dependentia
informatmateriamet ita materia dependet ab ea", ipse concedit quod
aliquo modo dependet ab ea, sed dicit quod hoc est sine aliquo addito.
Et cum dicitur:"pari ratione standumerat in primo", dicit quod non, 20
quia in primo natura debuit et potuit, sed non in secundo. In primo
quidem natura debuit,quia oportetut materia dependeat ex sua causa
per se dante sibi esse substantiale;et hoc non potest esse per se ipsam.
Etiam naturapotuit,quia tam materia quam formasuntentia absoluta,
ita quod unum potuitfundaretalem relationemet aliud terminare.Sed 25
in secundo natura non debuit, quia illa dependentia non dat materiae
aliquod esse substantiale,sed esse accidentale solum. Et ideo natura non
debuitesse sollicitade dependentiamateriaeex tali causa. Etiam natura
non potuit,quia illa dependentiaest ens formaliterrespectivum,et ideo
non potestterminaretalem relationem.Nam omne illud quod termint 30
dependentiam alteriusoportet ipsum esse independens independentia
opposita dependentiae illius cuius dependentiam termint:nam aliter
Et ad istam intentionemdicit
non plus terminareiquam terminaretur.
Commentatorquarto Physicorum
quod nisi locus quiesceret,frustraloca35
tum moveturad ipsum.
InPhysica
2 Aristoteles,
4,4,f.140rA
5, 15,1020b26-3234 Averroes,
Metaphysica
dicitP 19 sed... addito]om.K 20 dicitur]
sicA' 17 dicitur]
1 tria]om.P 14 sicut]
K 23 hoc]om.K 33 Et]om.K
natura
dicitP 22 materia]

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125

Quia rationemmeam de qua nunc locutum est credo esse demon- 165vaK
strativamsi modo debito sustineatur,et non est a demonstrationerecedendum occasione responsionumcavillosarum,quia sic fortescientia
posset in ignorantiamvertivel in deceptionem,ideo declarandum est
5 quo modo deficiuntrationesnunc statimrecitatae.
Et est advertendumprimo quod ambo priusdietimaistriin hoc concordantmecum, quod in relationibusrealibussubordinatisnon contingit
in infinitum
procedere. Secundo concordantmecum quod dependentia
habens causam dependet ex illa causa, et edam quod convenientiaalilo qua convenitsecundum speciem alteri convenientiaecum qua est eiusdem speciei,et est diversaspecificeab aliqua alia relationecum qua non
est eiusdem speciei; et similiterde diversitate.Tertio concordant mecum in hoc quod super dependentiameffectusex sua causa non potest
fundarirelatio realis. Et eodem modo concordant quantum ad hoc de
15 convenientiaet diversitate,
sicutapparebitpost.
Sed mihi discordant,quia dicunt effectumabsolutum non posse a
causa dependere nisi per dependentiam realitersibi additam, nec altericonvenirevel esse diversumnisi per convenientiamvel diversitatem
realiteradditam. Secundo discordantmihi, quia dicuntrelationemnon
20 posse fundarealiam relationem.Et per ista duo voluntrationemmeam
annullare.
('Conclusiones
Buridani)
responsoriae
Volo ergo contra ista declarare quinqu conclusiones.Prima est quod 242rP
relatio potest fundarisuper relationemita quod alia et alia formaliter
25 sive essentialitereritrelatiofundanset relatiofundata.
Secunda est specialiterdescendendo ad propositumquod essendo dicto modo relationemfundantemaliam a relatione fundata,tamen dependentia potest fundarisuper dependentiam et super convenientiam
et super diversitatem,et similiterconvenientiapotestfundarisuper de30 pendentiamet convenientiamet diversitatem,et similiterdiversitassuper dependentiamet convenientiamet diversitatem.Et loquor hic accipiendo dependentiam,convenientiamet diversitatemprout sunt essentialiterrespectussive relationes.

5 rationes]
K 9-10 aliqua]aliaK 27 fundantem]
P 31
fundante
responsiones
K | Etloquor]om.K
convenientiam]
consequentiam

13:55:50 PM

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DEKKER
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Tertia conclusio erit quod si dependentiae vel convenientiaevel di165vbK versitatesquae sunt relationesfundataesuper res absolutas,sunt reales,
tunc etiam convenientiaevel diversitatesvel dependentiae, quae sunt
relationesfundataesuper praedictas dependentias,convenientiasvel di5
versitates,eruntreales.
hamodo
res
erit
causatum
absolutum
conclusio
quo
quod
Quarta
bens causam potestesse absoluta, dependet se ipso essentialitera causa
circumscriptoomni eius accidente,sive absoluto sive respectivo.
Quinta conclusio erit quod dependentiae,convenientiaevel diversitates,quae sunt relationesfundatae super res absolutas,non sunt in re 10
praeteranimam.
(Probatio
primaeconclusionis)
Primam conclusionem probo sic. Quaecumque relatio fundata super
aliquod absolutum est posteriornaturaliterilio fundamentoabsoluto,
sta, credo, concediturab omnibus. Sed illa posterioritas,qua illa re- 15
lati, puta paternitas,est posteriorsuo fondamento,est quaedam relatio. Ista est necessaria specialiterapud illos qui dicunt dependentiam
effectusa causa esse relationem,quia non minus illa posterioritasdicit habitudinemad fundamentumquam illa dependentia ad causam,
vel etiam quam diversitasSocratis ad illud cui est diversus.Sed ista 20
posterioritasnecessario fundatursuper illam relationem,puta paternitatem,in habitudinead fundamentumipsius paternitatis.Hoc apparet
ex terminis,quia aliternon diceremusquod paternitasest posteriorfundamento suo. Etiam ficticiumesset quod illa posterioritasesset relatio
sine fundamento.Et absurdum esset quod fundareturtamquam super 25
immediatumfundamentumsuper fundamentumpaternitatis,cum illud
fundamentumnon dicaturesse posterius,sed prius.Nec fundatursuper
animam, capiendo fundamentumprout hic loquimurde eo, scilicetpro
ad aliud. Hoc patet,quia
eo quod relationefundatasuperipsumrefertur
dicendo "Paternitasest posteriorsuo fundamento"non referimusani- 30
sed solum ipsam paternimam ad illud fundamentumtali posterioritate,
tatem;ergo paternitas,quae est relatio,fundatposterioritatem,
quae est
alia relatio.Et sic relatiouna potestalteramrelationemfundare.
licetsit
Sed mihivideturquod Picardus diceretquod illa posterioritas,
est
Ideo
a
alia
relatio
non
est
tarnen
alia, 35
relatio,
probo quod
paternitate.
K
inv.
K 28 loquimur]
21 illamrelationem]
loquuntur

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127

quia relationesquae sunt ad diversos terminossunt diversae necessario. Nam omnes concesseruntusque nunc quod relationesdistinguuntur166raK
ad distinctionemterminorum,quod est quia esse relationisest ad suum
terminm.Sed constatquod paternitaset illa posterioritasad diversos
5 terminosdicuntur,quia paternitasad filiumdiciturseu ad ilium qui est
filius,sed illa posterioritastamquam ad propriumterminmdiciturad
patrem seu ad ilium qui est pater.Quod patet ex vi verborum,quia dicimus quod paternitasest posteriorsuo fundamento,scilicetilio qui est
pater.
Isti duo magistifortefugiendodicerent,sicut iam videtur Anglicus
dixisse,ut post videbitur,quod intentioeorum est quod relatiorealisnon
fundatursuper relationemaliam, sed relatiorationisbene. Ideo dicereturquod illa posterioritasest relatiorationis.Sed licetsic dicendo concedatur haec prima conclusio mea, tarnenadhuc volo ostenderequod ilia
15 posterioritasnecessario concedenda est ab eis relatio realis et distincta
a paternitate.Hoc enim probo per radones eorum, quibus arguebant 242vP
quod dependentia causati absolti ex causa est relatio realis distinctaa
causato.
Primo per primam rationemPicardi sic. Si posterioritaspaternitatis
20 ad eius fundamentumnon adderei aliquid reale in paternitate,sequereturquod in paternitatenullus esset respectusnisi ad filium.Ista paab albedine sicut respectivumab
tet,quia paternitasprout distinguitur
absoluto, nullam habitudinemdicit nisi ad filium.Ipsa enim non dicit
formaliter
habitudinemad suum subiectumtamquam ad terminmplus
25 quam accidens absolutum,cum impossibilesit relationemeandem dici
formaliter
ad diversosterminos,ut dictumfuitet magis diceturpost. Sed
si in paternitatenihil sit formaliterrespectivumnisi ad filium,tunc paternitasnon habebithabitudinemad suum subiectumvel fundamentum.
Et per consequens non eritnaturaliterposterioreo, quia posterioritasest
30 quaedam habitudo. Sed istud consequens non minus est falsumquam
quod causatum non dependeat a causa, et hoc dato quod anima non
intelligeret.
Item. Per secundam rationemipsius arguitursic. Quandocumque de
aliquibus circumscriptoomni opere intellectusverificaripossuntcontra35 dictoria,ilia sunt diversa realiter.Sed sic est de paternitateet de eius
posterioritatead suum subiectum,quia dato quod non intelligeremus,166rbif
10

1 suntdiversae]
iter.
K 16 enim]estK | quibus]quiK 17 excausa]om.P 21
resP 34 intellectus]
P | possunt]
esset]eritK 32 intelligeret]
intelligit
intelligimus
P
prout

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DEKKER
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tarnenpaternitasesset formaliterhabitudo ad filium;sed posterioritas

qua ipsa est posteriorfundamentonon est habitudo formaliterad fi- nisi dicas
lium, sed ad fundamentumpaternitatis
quod eadem relatio
est formaliterad diversosterminos,quod non est concedendumnec iste
concedit,quia in tertiarationesuae quartae conclusionisipse contradi- 5
cit quod si Socrates vixeritper decern annos et hodie generaturPlato,
necesse est quod in Socrate sitde novo generataidentitasquae est idem
specie Platoni. Probatio,quia est idem ei et priusnon erat. Modo ex hoc
non posset concludi talisgenerationovae identitatisin Socrate,si eadem
dici ad diversosterminos,quia diceremquod ad 10
relatiopossetformaliter
esse Socratem eundem Platoni sufficitidentitasquam praehabebat ad
Iohannem, vel alia relatioquaecumque in eo praeexistens.
Item. Per rationemAnglici arguitursic. Paternitasest posteriornaturalitersuo fundamentodato quod non intelligeremus;et non est posteriornisi per posterioritatem;ergo posterioritasest praeter animam 15
relatiofundatasuperpaternitatem,sicutipse arguebatquod effectusdependei ab agente dato quod anima non intelligeretet non dependet
nisiper dependentiam.Ergo dependentiaest relatiorealisfundatasuper
causatum.
Et sciendum quod, sicut argutumest de paternitateet de posterio- 20
ritateeius ad suum fundamentum,ita posset argui de omni relatione
Et sicut de poquam istiponerentesse realem, et de sua posterioritate.
inhaerentia
ita
de
eius
sterioritate
est,
argui potest
paternitatisargutum
ad suum subiectumaut de eius dependentiaex aliis causis,et universaliterde omni habitudinehabente originemex natura rei secundumquam 25
nos possemuspaternitatemcomparare ad quodcumque aliud.
Dico ergo colligendo ea quae iam in hac prima conclusioneprobata
sunt, quod primo probatum est quod super relationempotest fundari
relatio. Secundo quod relatio fundansest alia a relatio fundata.Tertio
166vaK quod per rationesillorumnon solum concluditurquod relatiofundans 30
est realis, sed etiam quod relatio fundataest realis. Et quia ipsi dicunt
hoc esse falsum,ideo sequiturquod suae rationesnon erantdemonstrativae,sed sophisticae.
contra
conclusionem)
(Solutiorationum
primam
1 esset]estK 2 ipsa]ipseK 3 nisi]nonP 4 quod]quia P 8 Modo]ideo
K
P 23 arguipotest]
inv.
K 10 dici]om.P 20 de2]om.P 22 ponerent]
poneret
27 hac]hancK

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129

Tunc volo solvereradones eorum quibus nisi suntprobare quod relatio

non fundatrelationem.Prima rado Anglici erat quod esset processusin
infinitum.Sed ponendo has relationesab anima ego sibi concedo, quia
anima non potest in infinitumreflecterese super se et suam operatio5 nem.
Alia ratio sua erat quia sequereturquod relatioessetrelativa.Sed hoc 243rP
non reputo inconveniensin entibus animae, nam scientia est scita et
intellecta.
intelligentia
Alia ratio sua erat quia tunc essentplures modi relationumquam illi
10 tres quos posuit Aristotelesquinto Metaphysicae.
Dico quod non, quia
dependentiaex causa debet ad tertiummodum reduci semper,sed convenientiadebet reduci ad illas relationesquas Aristotelesdicebat sumi
secundumunum, cuiusmodisuntidem, aequale et simile.Et e converso
diversitasdebet reduci ad relationessumptas secundum multa. Et hoc
15 est valde darum.
Ratio vero Picardi prima fuittalis. Capiendo earn generaliter,natura
non facitpluribusquod potest facere uno; sed ens formaliterrespectivum potestreferriad aliud sine aliquo superaddito,cum ipsum sit formaliteret essentialiterad aliud se habens; ergo natura ad referendum
20 ipsum nihilfacitin eo superadditum.Dicendum est concedendo maiorem. Sed ad minorem dicendum est quod ens formaliterrespectivum
refertur
se ipso sine addito ad suum propriumterminm,sed dico quod
ad quodcumque aliud ab ilio proprioterminoipsum non magis se ipso
refertur
quam accidens quodcumque absolutum.Et voco propriumter25 minum entis formaliterrespectivigeneraliterillum a quo respectivum
ab absoluto. Et voco propriumterminmalicuius entisfordistinguitur
maliterrespectiviin speciali illum a quo unaquaeque relatio ab omni
alia relationedistinguitur.
Verbi gratia,in generalidico quod relationon
ab
accidente
absoluto
distinguitur
per habere subiectumvel causam ef30 ficientemvel finalem,quia haec omnia habet accidens absolutum; sed
ab absoluto per habere se ad terminmad quem de essendistinguitur
tiali significatoet conceptu dicit habitudinem.Verbi gratia, similitudo
de suo significatoet conceptu essentialinon dicit habitudinemad suam 166vbK
causam efficientem,
nec ad suum finem,nec ad suum subiectum;sed
10 Aristoteles,
5, 15, 1020b26-32 12 Aristoteles,
7, 6b20-27;
Metaphysica
Categoriae
, 15,1021a9-10
Metaphysical
1 quibus]quiK 4 non]om.P 6 quiasequeretur]
om.K 8 intelligentia]
intellectio
K 9 quia]quodK | quam]quodK 26 proprium
inv.K 28 alia]
terminm]
alteraK

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dicit solum habitudinemsubiectisui sive sui fundamentiad illud quod

est ei simile.Similiterexemplificoin speciali. Si sex suntduplum ad tria
et triplmad duo, dico quod istarumrelationumterminipropriinon
Sed
sunt suum subiectum,scilicetsex, quia per hoc non distinguuntur.
sui terminipropriisunt dimidium et subtriplumsive duo et tria, nam 5
per ista duplum et triplmfundata in senario vel super senarium diDico ergo quod si dependentia,quae est relatiocausati ad
stinguuntur.
causam, sic ad propriumterminmreferaturad suum subiectumvel
fundamentum,sicutcum dicimusipsam esse posterioremnaturalitersuo
fundamento,illa non magis referturad illud subiectumse ipsa quam 10
accidens absolutum ad suum subiectum,quia ipsa, ut est relatio,non
magis est essentialiteret formaliterad suum subiectumquam accidens
absolutum,sed solum,ut est relatio,ipsa est essentialiteret formaliterad
propriumterminm,scilicetad causam. Et sic potestdici de paternitate
15
et omnibusaliis relationibusquas istidicuntesse reales.
Secunda ratio istiusfuitquia fundansrelationemdependentemdebet
esse independens,aliternon plus fundaretquam fundaretur;sed relatio
non est independens;ergo non potestfundarerelationem.Dicendum est
ad maiorem quod fundansrelationemdebet esse independensad illum
terminmad quem dependet relatio fundata tamquam ad terminm 20
propriumet formalem.Sed possibile est quod dependeat ad alium terminm. Verbi grada, paternitas,ut visum fuit,fundatposterioritatem;
illa autem posterioritasdependet ad prius ut ad terminmproprium;
ideo paternitasnon dependet ad priusut ad terminmproprium,sed ad
25
filium.
Tertia ratio istiusfuitquia procedereturin infinitum.Sed ad hoc iam
responsumfuit.
Adhuc est alia ratio istius,scilicetquia super relationemnatura non
debuit fundare,nec potuit,aliam relationem.Primo dicit quod non de94.Q,
jp
Potu^ facererelationemreferriper se ipsam. Sed ad hoc iam 30
167raK ^11^'
dictumest quod verum est ad terminmsuum proprium,sed non plus
potuitrespectivumquam absolutumfacerereferrise ipso ad aliud quam
ad suum terminmproprium.
Item. Dicit quod natura non potuit relationemfundaresuper relationem,quia ens formaliterrespectivumnon est tantae virtutisquod in 35
eo possit fundarirelatio realis. Sed ad hoc dicendum est quod ad fundandum relationemnon requiriturquod fundamentumhabeat aliquam
P 23 utad terminm]
P 8 sic]sicutKP 21 possibile]
6 fundata]
fundato
probabile
K
iter.

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TREATISE
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JOHNBURIDAN'S

13 1

virtutem,nisi aliquis velitomnem entitatemvocare virtutem.Sed in intellectuestvirtusqua potestsive absolutumsive respectivumconferread

aliud, et sic formarevel efficererelationemsuper illud tamquam super
fundamentum.Immo potestdici quod quia relatioest minimaevel nul5 lius virtutis,
ideo non potestintellectuiresisterequin intellectuscomparet
earn alteriquam suo terminoproprio,et per consequens quin possitsuper eam fundarerelationem.
Item. Si fundamentumdebeat habere aliquam virtutemad hoc quod
possit fundarerelationem,quod non credo, tunc dicendum esset quod
10 relatio virtutemtalem habet, cum probatum sit quod de facto relatio
fundatursuperrelationem.Et ut sic ad unum dicere,non suntnisiverba
in dicendo quod hoc habet virtutemet hoc non, nisi ad hoc adducatur
ratio efficaxquare sic est in hoc et non sic in ilio.
Iterum. Ut expediar de hoc quod iste dixit quod relatio non potest
15 terminarerelationem,quia omne quod termintdependentiamalterius
oportetquod sitindependensindependentiaopposita dependentiaeillius
- nam aliter non
cuius dependentiam termint
plus terminareiquam
terminaretur ad hoc brevitersufficeret
dicere sicut de fundaredictum
fuit.Sed tarnencausa solacii et propter addiscere debet dari talis di20 stinctiode terminorelationis.Relatio duplicem habet terminm,scilicet formalemet materialemsive fundamentalem.Terminusformalisest
relatio alia correspondensilli et sibi opposita relative,terminusfundamentalisvel materialisest fundamentumrelationisquae est terminus
formalis.Verbi gratia,paternitatisterminusformalisest filiatio,et eius 167rbK
25 terminusmaterialisest fundamentumfiliationis.Et sic duae relationes
quae ad invicem opponunturrelativeterminantse invicem formaliter,
et ad invicemdicunturformaliter.Ideo dictum est in libro Praedicamentorum
quod omnia relativa,si convenienterassignenturad illud ad quod
dicuntur,oportet quod dicantur ad convertentiam.Sed materialister30 minus paternitatisest illud super quod fundaturfiliatio.Et tunc relatio
et illud ad quod diciturnon dicunturad convertentiam,propternon
bonam, id est non formalemassignationemtermini.Et hoc totumdclarai pulchre Aristotelesin Praedicamentis
et beani sciunt,ideo transeo.
Et sicutdixi de dici ad convertentiam,
ita debet dici de esse simulnatu35 raliter.
27-28 Aristoteles,
7,6b28
Categoriae
6-7 superearn]iter.
K 13 sic]sicutK
K 34 de esse]ad esseK
determinai

22 relatioalia] ino.K

32-33 declarat]

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Dico ergo quod terminusformaliscuiuslibetrelationisest essentialiter relatio,et sic est dependens formaliterad aliud. Sed hoc non est ad
illud ad quod dependet relatioquam termint.Et sic terminus,licet sit
formaliterdependens,tarnennon dependet illa dependentia quam teret requiritur5
mint,sed est talisdependentiaindependens.Et hoc sufficit
ad esse terminmformalemalicuius relationis.Verbi gratia,paternitas
dependet ad filiationemet filiatioad paternitatem,etiam paternitasterideo non dependet dependentiafiliatiomint dependentiamfiliationis,
nis. Et sie etiam filiatiotermintpaternitatem,ideo dependentia quae
est paternitasnon dependet. Et si dicaturibi: "ergo est circulus",et ego 10
244rP concedo si velis extremaoppositionisvocare circulum,aliternon. Et si
dicas: "Numquam terminabiturdependentia si terminaturad dependens", dico quod numquam terminabitursic quod ipsa non sit amplius
Nam paternitassic terdependentia,sed terminabiturquantum sufficit.
minaturad filiationemquod non diciturad aliquid ultra formaliter,
et 15
sic etiam filiatioterminaturad paternitatemquod non diciturformaliter
ad aliquid ultra,sicutunus punctussic termintlineam quod ipsa ex illa
parte non proceditultra,et alterpunctussic quod non proceditultraex
167vaK altera parte. Sed de terminomaterialidico quod ipse est independens
tam dependentia relationisquam fundat,quam dependentia relationis 20
oppositae. Ideo optimepotestet fundarerelationemet terminarematerialiter,licetsitvere dependens ad aliud aliqua vera dependentia.
secundae
(Probatio
conclusionis)
Deinde probo secundam conclusionem,quae erat descendendo ad propositum. Et probo primo quod super diversitatemfundaturdependen- 25
tia, quoniam si Socrates est diversusa Brunello diversitatespecificasibi
realiteraddita, sicut isti dicunt, oportet quod illa diversitassit in Socrate tamquam in subiecto. Ergo dependet a Socrate, et hoc non est
nisi per dependentiam,sicutipsi arguunt.Tunc ergo vel ista dependentia fundatursuper Socratem tamquam super fundamentumproprium 30
et immediatum,aut super diversitatemSocratis ad Brunellum.Si super
habeo propositum.Si super Socratem,hoc est impossibile,
diversitatem,
quia tunc Socrates dependerei illa dependentia, quod non est verum:
immo diversitasest qua illa dependentia dependet a Socrate. Nec poK 10 ibi]illiK
1 relationis]
K 2 aliud]illudK 6 relationis]
locutionis
rationis
K 29 dependentiam]
15 aliquid]aliud* 17 aliquid]aliudK 22 vera]naturali
P
dependentia

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133

testdici quod ilia diversitaset illa dependentia sinteadem relatio,cum

sintad diversosterminoset diversorum.Nam diversitasest Socratis ad
ad Socratem. Et eodem modo
Brunellum,et dependentiaest diversitatis
probaturquod de potentiafundatursuper convenientiamspecificamSo5 cratisad Platonem,quia ilia convenientiadependet a Socrate.
Similiterprobo quod dependentia fundatur super dependentiam,
quia forma dependet a materia ita quod super formamfundaturdependentia a materia. Sed illam dependentiam necesse est dependere
a forma.Relatio enim dependet necessario a suo proprio fundamento.
10 Modo illa dependentiaquae est a formanon habet pro immediatofundamento formam,quia forma non dependet a forma,nec materiam,
quia materia non dependet a forma sicut a fundamento.Ergo restt
quod non fundaturnisi super dependentiamformae a materia. Et hoc
etiam patet ex vi verborum,quia tali dependentia, scilicetrelationisa
15 fundamento,dicimus dependentiam formae a materia dependere a
forma.
Nec potest aliquis dicere quod eadem relatio sit dependentia qua
formadependeta materiaet dependentiaqua illa dependentiadependet 167vbK
a forma.Sunt enim alteriuset alterius,et etiam ad alterum.Una enim
20 est formaead materiam,et alia est dependere ad formam.
Ita etiam probo quod convenientiafundatursuper dependentiam,
quia dependentia Socratis a suo generanteconvenitspecie cum dependentia Platonis a suo generante.Ergo convenientiafundatursuper dependentiamrespectualterius.Nec potest dici quod convenientiailla et
25 illa dependentia sint eadem relatio, quia sunt aliorum et ad alia. Est
enim dependentia Socratis ad suum generans et convenientiaest illius
dependentiaead aliam dependentiam.Et sic etiam potestprobari quod 244vP
vel superconvenientiam.Simiconvenientiafundatursuperdiversitatem
litereodem modo potestprobariquod diversitassuperquodlibet illorum
30 triumpotestfundari.Et sic patet illa secunda conclusio.

P 8 est]om.K 10 Modo]
1 sint]suntP 2 est]om.K 3 diversitatis]
diversitas
P 14 verborum]
materia
IdeoK 11 formam,
qua P | materiam]
quia]formae
K 15 dependentiam]
P 19 ad] alterum
et K 24 alterius]
illorum
dependentia
P | aliam]illamK 28 super]
add.P 27 dependentiae]
dependentia
dependentiae
P
om.K 29 diversitas]
diversis

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DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

tertiae
(.Probatio
conclusionis)
Deinde probo tertiamconclusionem.Et accipio pro exemplo convenientiam fundatamsuper dependentiam:verbi gratia, Socrates dependei a
suo generanteet Plato dependet a suo generante.Et sic una dependentia fundatursuper Socratem et alia super Platonem.Iterumdependentia 5
Socratis convenitspecie cum dependentia Platonis.Et sic super dependentiam Socratis fundaturconvenientia,sicut in alia conclusione videbatur.Probo ergo quod si dependentia fundata super Socratem est relatio realis,quod etiam convenientiafundatasuper illam dependentiam
est relatiorealis,quia quandocumque aliqua duo habent easdem causas 10
si unum est reale, alterumest reale. Hoc est
realitatisvel non-realitatis,
notum per se. Sed illa convenientiaet illa dependentia habent easdem
causas realitatisvel non-realitatis.
Ergo et cetera. Probatio minoris,quia
omnes rationes quibus isti magistivolunt demonstraredependentiam
Socratisesse realem,non minuscontradicuntde illa convenientiaquam 15
de illa dependentia. Nam posito quod dependentia Socratis et dependentia Platonissuntreales secundumistos,ego arguam sic per rationem
Picardi primam. Si convenientiadependentiae Socratis ad dependentiam Platonisnihiladderet realiterin illa dependentia,sequereturquod
168raK in illa dependentia nihil esset ut sic quod esset formaliteret essentia- 20
literrespectusad dependentiamPlatonis. Ista consequentia patet, quia
licet dependentia Socratis a suo generantesit essentialiteret formaliter
respectusad aliud, scilicetad generans,tamen ipsa non est essentialiter
et formaliterrespectusad dependentiamPlatonis,tum quia eadem relatio non est essentialiteret formaliterad duos terminos,tum quia etiam 25
corruptoPlatone et eius dependentianon corrumpiturdependentiaSocratis.Et tamen impossibileest relationemmanere sine ilio ad quod ipsa
dicituressentialiteret formaliter.
Sic ergo clara est illa consequentia.Sed
si in dependentia Socratis nihil sit essentialiteret formaliterrespectivum ad dependentiamPlatonis,tunc dependentia Socratisnon habebit 30
habitudinemad dependentiamPlatonis;ergo dependentia Socratisnon
conveniretspecie cum dependentiaPlatonis,quia convenientiaunius ad
alterum est habitudo ipsius ad illud, ut iste concedit. Sed illud consequens est impossibile,cum illae dependentiaesinteiusdem speciei. Ergo
35
et cetera.

om.P 10 easdem]
eademP 25-27 tum
8 est]aliaadd.K 9-10 quodetiam... realis]
P
om.P 27 manere]
remanere
... Socratis]

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135

Item. Secundum prius dicta, si Socrates convenientiareali convenit

Platoni, illa convenientiadependet a Socrate, et sic super earn fundaturdependentia.Tunc arguo quod ilia dependentiaest relatiorealisper
secundam radonem Picardi sic. Si dependentiailliusconvenientiaea So5 crate non diceretaliquid reale additumilli convenientiae,sequiturquod
illa convenientiaquae est effectusSocratis,non plus referretur
ad Socratem qui est causa eius quam e contra,et sic causatum non plus referreturad causam quam causa ad causatum,quod istereputaipro inconvenienti.Et patet consequentia,quia non est dubium quin per relationem
10 habentem esse suum formaleab anima potest Socrates referriad illam
convenientiamsicutcausa ad causatum; et tunc sicutipse procedebat tu
procedas ultra,scilicetquod non plus illa convenientiaconstitueretur
per
Socratem quam e contra.
Item. Revertorad convenientiamfundatamsuper dependentiam si15 cut in prima rationeaccepl. Et tunc arguo per tertiamrationemPicardi
sic. Quandocumque de aliquibus circumscriptoomni opere intellectus168rbiT
realiter.Sed sic est de depossuntverificancontradictoria,illa differunt
pendentia Socratis a sua causa et de convenientiaillius dependentiae
ad dependentiam Platonis,quia dependentia Socratis est formaliteret
20 essentialiterad generansut ad terminm,et non ad dependentiamPlatonis; sed convenientiaest essentialiteret formaliterad dependentiam
245rP
Platonis,ut ad terminm,et non ad generans;ergo et cetera.
Item per rationemAnglici arguo sic. Corrupto Platone corrumpitur
convenientiaSocratis ad Platonem, quia Socrates, qui est homo, non
25 convenitcum ilio quod non est. Sed non corrumpiturdependentia Socratisa sua causa. Ergo illa convenientiaest aliud ab illa dependentia.
Nec potest dici quod illa convenientiasit ab anima, si illae dependentiae fueruntpraeteranimam, quia praeteromnem operationemanimae
illae dependentiae sunteiusdem speciei. Et sic conveniuntspecie et non
30 nisi per convenientiam.Etiam, si tu diceres quod illa dependentia non
convenitformaliterper convenientiamquae sit ad aliquid, scilicet ad
aliam dependentiam,nisi per animam, tunc ego similiterpossem dicere
quod materia non est potens ad recipiendumformamper potentiam
formaliter
quae sitad aliquid, nisiper intellectum.Et procede ultrasicut
35 ipse procedebat. Patet ergo quod omnes causae quas isti assignaverunt
ad probandum quod convenientiae,diversitateset dependentiae fundatae super absoluta sunt relationesreales, concluduntaequaliter de fun5 diceret]
P 8 causaad] causatP
differret

11 causaad] causatP

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datis super respectiva.Et sic probata est minor rationisprincipalisad

hanc conclusionemtertiam,scilicetquod eaedem sunt causae realitatis
vel non-realitatisin convenientiis,diversitatibus
et dependentiisfundatis
super absoluta et fundatissuper respectiva.
Et adhuc confirmatur
ilia minor,quia nulla videturratioefficaxquod 5
relatio
sit
nisi
realis,
aliqua
quod suum naturaleet propriumfundamentm est reale et similitersuus terminus.Si ergo illa sit causa sufficiens,
statim sequitur,ex quo dependentia Socratis et dependentia Platonis
sunt reales,quod convenientiaspecificaunius ad alteramsit relatiorea168vaK lis. Nec valet dicere quod absolutumpotestfundarerelationemrealemet 10
respectivumnon, quia hoc esset sine rationeponere illud quod quaerimus et de quo disputamus.Nec valentmotiva quibus hoc dictumposset
habere apparentiam,sicutiam declaravi prius in prima conclusione.Et
ut sic ad unum dicere,pura fictioest dicere sic de uno duorumet non sic
de alio, ubi nullae rationesplus probant de uno quam de alio, et quod 15
si rationesfacientesdubitare solvunturde uno, ipsae solvuntureodem
modo de alio. Modo sic est hic, ut apparuitper te et plenius apparebit.
(.Probatio
quartaeconclusioni)
Tunc probo quartam conclusionem,scilicetquod causatum absolutum
modo quo res habens causam potestdici absoluta, dependet se ipso es- 20
sentialitera causa circumscriptoomni eius accidente,sive absoluto sive
respectivo.Et arguo sic. Socrates praeter animam dependet ab agente
aut non nisi per resuo. Aut ergo dependet ab ilio se ipso essentialiter,
lationem sibi additam. Istam divisionemomnes concedunt. Sed huius
divisionissecundum membrumest impossibile;ergo primumest neces- 25
secundimembri,quia si Socratespraeter
sarium.Probo impossibilitatem
animam dependet ab agente et non nisi per dependentiamsibi realiter
additam, tune illa dependentia,cum habeat esse post non-esse,dependet iterumpraeter animam ab agente a quo produciturin esse. Aut
ergo se ipsa essentialiterdependet ab ilio agente, aut per aliam depen- 30
dentiam iterumsibi realiteradditam. Secundum non est possibile,quia
Nec primumest possibile,quia sequiturquod
245vP procedereturin infinitum.
dependentia Socratis,quae est relatiofundatain eo, dependeretab ilio
agente prius naturaliteret immediatiusquam Socrates. Consequens est
falsum,ergo et antecedens.Probo falsitatemconsequentis,quia oportet 35
in
K 6 quod]quiaK 7 similiter]
om.K 32 possibile]
inv.
2 conclusionem
tertiam]
K
possibilitate

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137

concedere quod ilia dependentia est accidens existensin Socrate tamquam in subiecto,et per consequens ipsa est posteriornaturaliterSocrate. Modo si ipsa est posteriornaturaliterSocrate, oportetquod ipsa
posteriusnaturaliterproducaturin esse ab agente quam Socrates. Cum
5 ergo nec Socrates,nec illa dependentiadependeant ab ilio agente nisi in
hoc quod producunturin esse ab eo, sequiturquod illa dependentianon 168vbK
dependet prius naturaliterab ilio agente quam Socrates, immo, posterius naturaliteret mediante Socrate, sicut effectusper accidens alicuius
agentisdependet ab ilio agente medianteeffectuper se.
10 Tunc probo consequentiam,quia illud quod se ipso essentialiterest
aliquid, est illud aliquid prius naturaliteret immediatiusquam illud
sed solum per alterum.
quod non est illud aliquid se ipso essentialiter,
Si ergo dependentiailia est se ipsa dependens essentialiterab agente,et
Socrates non nisi per illam dependentiam,patet quod illa consequentia
15 erat necessaria.
Et confirmoarguendo in modo loquendi quorundam sic. Certum est
quod Socrates est prior naturaliterquacumque dependentia quae est
accidens ipsius. Tunc ergo in ilio signo pro quo Socrates est prior naturaliterilla accidentalidependentia,vel ipse dependet ab agente a quo
20 producitur,vel non. Si sic, ergo se ipso essentialiteret non per dependentiamadditam. Si non, ergo pro ilio signo non dependet ab ilio a quo
producitur;quod implicat contradictionem,quia pro alio Socrates ab
agente suo dependere non diciturnisi quia ab eo in esse producitur.
contra
conclusione
(Solutiorationum
quartam
m)
25 Tunc respondeo ad rationes aliorum contra istam conclusionem. Ad
cuius evidentiamest sciendum quod sicut causa aliqua potest esse per
se vel per accidens alicuius effectus,
ut domificatorest causa per se domus et musicusest causa domus per accidens, ita aliquid potestdependere ab alterodupliciter:uno modo per se et essentialiter,
alio modo per
30 accidens. Iterumper se dupliciter,quia uno modo aliquid dependet ad
alterumessentialitertamquam ad terminmcum quo est simulnatura,
et diciturad convertentiam:verbi gratia, paternitasad filiationem.Et
tale est essentialiterrelatiovel de genere vel de praedicamentorespectivo.Alio modo aliquid dependet essentialiterad alterumtamquam ad
3 Modo]IdeoK 11 aliquid1]
aliudP | aliquid2]
aliudP 12 aliquid]aliudP
19 ab agente]
om.K 25 istam]
istaK 28 domusperaccidens]
domus
peraccidens
K 33 velde2]seuK

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illud per quod est,tamquam per illud quod est causa eius et prius naturalitereo. Et sic quodeumque ens praeterDeum dependet essentialiter
ad aliud vel ab alio, quia prima substantiacausata a Deo non solum
169raK est a Deo vel propterDeum secundum sua accidentia, si habeat aliqua accidentia,sed etiam secundum suam essentiam.Et tale dependens 5
non oportetquod sit essentialiterrelatio sive de praedicamentorespectivo,quia iam dictum est quod a tali dependentia nihil absolvitur,sive
secundum suam substantiam,sive secundum sua accidentia,nisi Deus.
Sed dico quod aliquid dependet accidentaliterad alterumper hoc quod
aliquid sibi additumvel attributumdependet. Et hoc est dupliciter:aut 10
quia immediatefundatillud quod essentialiterest ad alterum,aut quia
Verbi gratiade primo: haec albedo ad illam
246rP illifondamentoconiungitur.
aliam albedinem dependet, quia similitudofondata super eam dependet. Sed verbi gratia de secundo: nix dependet ad cygnumdependentia
similitudinis,
quia coniungituralbedini super quam fondatursimilitudo 15
essentialiter
dependet. Et iste modus est magis per accidens quam
quae
Et
adhuc
prior.
possentdari alii modi magis per accidens,sed non curo.
Sed scias quod in his essentialiterse ipsisdependentibusnihilest aliud
in re praeter animam dependens quam dependentia qua dependet essicut non est aliud in re praeter animam ens et entitasquae 20
sentialiter,
est ens, nec esse rei et essentiaqua res est,sicutnunc suppono et alias, si
possum, declarabo. Nec mirerisquia loquendo specialiterde dependentia qua res essentialiterdependet ex causa, sive res illa sit absoluta sive
respectiva,vel loquendo de causalitatequa res essentialiterest causa, licet sit absoluta, ego puto quod dependens et dependentia,et causa et 25
causalitas sunt nomina transcendentia,quae rebus cuiuslibetpraedicamenti possunt applicari, et quae praeter animam nihil multiplicantin
rebus quibus applicantur.Dimitto tarnennunc loqui amplius de huiusnisi quod adhuc dico quod sicutnon
modi nominibustranscendentibus,
differt
entitaset res quae diciturens, vel unitas et res quae dicituruna, 30
nisi per nostrummodum intelligendi,ita non differtin praedictisde169rbK pendentiaet res quae diciturdependens,nisi per nostrummodum intelligendi. Quo modo autem per modum intelligendidistinguanturpraeEt alias, si potuero per Dei gradicta, debet videri quarto Metaphysicae.
35
tiam,declarabo.
34 Aristoteles,
4, 2
Metaphysica
K | etiam]etP 9 ad] perK 11 fundat]
a materia
2 ens]om.K 5 accidentia]
K 32 modum]
om.K 33 distinguantur]
K 24 essentialiter
fundet
distinguatur
est]inv.
P

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139

Tunc dico ad primam radonem Picardi, quae videtur esse contra

istam quartam conclusionem,et contra quintam, quam nunc suppono
et postea probabo. Quando dicitur:"Si dependentia causati formaliter
absoltiex sua causa nihilreale multiplicareiin causato, tunc in causato
5 nihil esset nisi formaliterabsolutum", dico quod verum est prout abcontra dependens ad terminmcum quo est simul
solutumdistinguitur
natura et diciturad convenientiam.Sed bene est ibi dependens a causa,
quia dixi illud causatum esse dependens essentialitera causa. Et quando
dicitur:"ergo causatum non habet habitudinemad causam", concedo
10 loquendo de habitudinequae est de praedicamentorelationis.Sed si tu
velisvocare habitudinemillam dependentiamqua tale causatum dependet essentialitera causa, quae non est aliud quam sua essentiapraeter
nostrummodum intelligendi,tunc dico quod causatum illud habet habitudinemad causam. Et isto modo breviterpatet quod causatum est
15 causatum et se habet ad causam sicut dependens ab ea se ipso, et non
per habitudinemvel dependentiamquae sit de praedicamento relationis, sed quae est ipsamet substantiacausati. Tamen anima secundum
exigentiamnaturarumintellectarumpotest causam et causatum ad invicem conferre,et sic formaresuper eas relationesmutuas, quae vere
20 dicunturad convertentiamet sunt simul natura, quia intellectusconferendonon potest intelligerehoc esse causatum ab ilio quin intelligat
illud esse causam huius et e contra.
Ad secundam rationem eius, quando dicitur: "tunc causatum non
ad causam quam causa ad causatum", dico quod causaplus referretur
ad causam relationedistinctaab ipso quam causa
25 tum non plus refertur
ad causatum. Sed dico quod causatum magis dependet a causa quam 246vP
e contra, loquendo de omni dependentia, quia licet ipsum dicatur ad
causam per relationemfundatamsuper ipsum et e converso,tamen cum
hoc causatum dependetse ipso essentialitera causa, cum habeat esse ab
30 ea, et non e converso.Et de isto esse aliquid seu de isto dependentivel 169vaK
relativo,aut quo modo vis nominare,quo quidem esse effectusest essentialisa causa et quod quidem esse non est aliud quam essentiacausati,
debet intelligiquod unum constituitur
per alterum,et non e converso.
de
necessitate
rei
est
effectusest quod sua substanSimiliter,quia
quae
35 tia sit ab alio, ideo non potestperfecteintelliginisi per illud a quo est
ex parte sua posset intelligiperfectesine alio. Licet ergo anima formet
1 Tunc]om.P 11 illam]illaK 17 sed]Si P | substantia]
om.P 19 formare]
om.K 21 esse]estK 23 quandodicitur]
om.K 24 plus]om.P 24-25 causatum]
om.K 34-35 substantia]
causaK

13:55:50 PM

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DEKKER
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super causam et causatum relationesad invicem,tarnenrelatiofondata

super causatum dicituresse in substantiaeius non subiective,sed fundamentaler, et in anima subiective.Et relatio fondata super causam
non dicituresse in substantiaeius, propterhoc quod effectusper necessitatemsuae substantiaeest fondativustalis relationis,et non causa, vel 5
propterhoc quod intellectusnon potestperfecteintelligeresubstantiam
effectussine collatione eius ad causam. Non sic autem est de causa. Et
hoc in idem redit.Et secundum hanc veram sententiamdebent intelligi
verba Aristoteliset Commentatoris.
Ad tertiamrationem istius dicendum est quod de causato absoluto 10
et de dependentia quae est relatio fondata per animam super ipsum,
verificantur
contradictoria,sed non praeter animam, cum talis dependentia sit ab anima. Sed dico quod de ilio causato et de essentialidecontradictoriapraeteranimam.
pendentia eius a causa non verificantur
Et quando dicitur:"Illud causatum non est formaliterhabitudo cum sit 15
absolutum",dico quod ipsum non est habitudo vel dependentiaad terminm cum quo sit simul natura et dicatur ad convertentiam.Et ita
dico quod ilia essentialisdependentia non est talis habitudo, sed dico
quod illud causatum absolutumesse essentialiterdependentiaa causa a
Et si tu velis vocare illam 20
qua ipsum est illud quod est substantialiter.
essentialemdependentiam habitudinemessentialem,tunc dicam quod
causatum absolutumest essentialitertalis habitudo,sicutvisumfuit.
Ad primamrationemAnglicidicendumest quod in ea suntsex defectus. Primo deficitquia dicit quod omnem relationemesse ab anima est
contraAristotelemet Commentatorem.Dico enim quod numquam Ari- 25
stoteleset Commentatorhoc negaverunt.Et dico ut dem aliis materiam
ut mihi alias visum fuit,ad probandum
studendi,quod ratio difficilior,
169vbK quod aliqua est relatio realis,est quia similitudoet dissimilitudoapparent sensui exteriori,ergo proveniuntintellectui.Sed forteposset dici
quod sensus est virtusanimae cognoscitivaequae ita potestconferreet 30
per consequens relationesformareinterea quae per se sentit,sicut intellectusinterea quae intelligit.Sed de hoc non me determinoquoad
nunc.
Secundo deficitdicendo quod dicere potentiammateriae et dependentiasa causis et diversitateset convenientiasesse ab anima, est dicere 35
omnem relationemesse ab anima. Hoc autem est falsum,sicut dicere
quod homo et equus habent pedes non est dicere quod omne animal
habet pedes.
28 realis]quaeadd. P 29 forte]
quodadd.KP 32 de]ad P

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TREATISE
DE DEPENDENTIIS
JOHNBURIDAN'S

14 1

Tertiodeficitquando vultprobare quod dependentiacausad ab agente est diversa a causato. Primo enim arguit sic: quia dependentia Socratisa suo generantecorrumpiturcorruptogenerante,et tarnenSocrates non corrumpitur.Dicendum est quod si capitur dependentia prout
5 est a causa, non sicut ad terminmcum quo sit simul natura, tunc
vel Socrates secundum suam substantiamdependet ab ilio agente, et
sic dico quod illa dependentianon corrumpitursubstantiaSocratismanente, nam quod inest alicui secundum se semper inest sibi ipso manente; vel Socrates dependet ab agente non secundum suam substan10 tiam, sed solum secundum suum fieri,et tunc dicam quod ilia dependentia non est eadem Socrati secundum suam substantiam,sed secundum suum fieri.
Item. Quando ipse addit quod Socrates est de praedicamento sub- 247rP
stantiaeet dependentiaest de praedicamentorelationis,hoc solutumfuit
15 per distinctionemde dependentia.
Quarto deficitquia concesso secundum ipsum quod potentia materiae ad formamgenerandam sit praeter animam, ipse non potestprobare illud quod intendit,scilicetquod dependentia Socratis a suo generantecorrumpaturcorruptoilio generante,dum tarnenSocrates ma20 neat, quia potentia materiae est ad terminmqui non est sed erit in
futuro.Ergo ad relationemesse realem non requiriturexistentiatermini,
sed sufficit
quod eritde futuro.Modo ita potero dicere quod dependentia Socratis ab agente est realis quia suus terminusfuit.Hoc enim sufficit.Nec oportetquod existt,quia non est ratio quare futurummagis
25 sufficiatquam praeteritum.Nam ita bene posuit Aristotelesquinto Merelationessecundum tempuspraeteritumsicutsecundum fututaphysicae
rum.
Quinto deficitquia non percipitdistinctionemquae communissime 170ra/T
soletfieride potentiamateriae,scilicetquod illa potentiapotestsumipro
30 subiectopotente,et sic est idem quod materia,et sic materia est se ipsa
potens non aliquo alio; vel potestsumi pro respectuad formamfundato
supermateriam,et sic non est de essentiamateriae.Sic ergo dicam quod
dependentiapotestsumi pro subiecto dependente,et sic est idem quod
essentiailliusrei dependentis,licetilla res sitde praedicamentoabsoluto.
35 Et sic illa res absoluta se ipsa dependet et non aliquo alio; vel potest
25 Aristoteles
,Metaphysical,
15,1021a21-23
3-4 tamen... corrumpitur]
P 4 est]om.K
causamSocratis
noncorrumpere
K 25 ita]om.K 32 essentia]
esseP 35 et2]om.P
capitur]
capiatur

13:55:50 PM

'

142

DEKKER
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sumi pro respectuet cetera,et sic non est de essentiailliusrei,sed est ab

anima, ut probabiturpost.
Sexto deficitdicendo quod potentia materiae pro respectusit praeter animam, nam contrariumhuius alias declaravi coram scholaribus
meis in legendo. Sed nunc transeode hoc, quia est alia specialisdifficul-5
tas, nisi quod ad satisfaciendummodicum istimagistroostendo sibi quo
modo illa potentiacorrumpiturin adventuformae,licet sitab anima.
Et dico primo quod potentia materiae pro respectuad formamformaliterper animam super materiamper collationemad formamfuturam ut futuraest- et dico "ut futuraest" saltem contingenter.
Et dico 10
quod conceptusanimae vel ea quae formatasuntab anima mediantibus
conceptibuseius, tunc dicunturvera, quando in re est debita correspondentia; sed quando non est, tunc dicunturfalsa. Tunc ergo, quia ens
uno modo diciturde vero et non-ensde falso,ut patet sextoMetaphysicae^
ideo talia quando vertunturde vero in falsum,dicunturcorrumpi,cum 15
corruptiosit de ente in non-ens.Et ideo solemus dicere quod sententia
vel opinio est corruptaquando est falsa. Modo constatquod sic vertunturentia animae de vero in falsumquando in re debita correspondentia
vertiturin indebitamsecundum praedicta. Ergo sic corrumpidicuntur.
170rbi Sed constatquod si forma futurain materia fiatei praesens, tunc po- 20
tenda quae est respectusfundatussuper materiamper collationemad
formamfuturamut futura,non habebit iam debitam correspondentiam
in re quam priushabebat. Ideo sic corrumpidiciturin adventuformae.
Ad aliam rationemistiuspatet ex dictissi quis bene considerei.Nam
247vP vel ipse loquitur de dependentiis,convenientiiset diversitatibusessen- 25
tialibus hominis et asini, et sic nihil sunt aliud quam homo et asinus,
et ideo dicere homo et asinus ut non dependentesnon est aliud dicere
quam homo et asinus ut non-homoet non-asinus,quod nihilest dicere.
Dico ergo quod tales convenientiae,diversitatesvel dependentiae non
possunt a talibus circumscribi.Vel ipse loquitur de dependentiis,con- 30
venientiiset diversitatibus
prout sunt relationesanimae fundataesuper
hominem et asinum, et distinetaeab eis, et sic concedo quod homo et
asinus ut non dependent ab eisdem causis, id est, ut non intelliguntur
dependere ab eisdem causis, vel saltem ut non venimusin conceptum
eorum per easdem causas a quibus dependent aut per accidentia pro- 35
venientiain eis ex illiseisdem causis, sic nullo modo conveniunt,id est,
14 Aristoteles,
6, 2, 1026a34-35
Metaphysica
K
17 Modo]IdeoK 18 quando... debita]iter.

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143

non intelliguntur
convenire.Sed tunc non sequitur"ergo ut dependent
non conveniunt",quia talis dependentia bene addit aliquid non in horninet asino, sed in intellectu.Sic etiam dico quod dicendo homo et
asinus ut non conveniunt,si loquamur de convenientiaessentiali,nihil
5 est aliud dicere quam homo et asinus ut non-homoet non-asinus.Si tarnencapiatur convenientiaet diversitaspro relationibusanimae, sic est
aliud et aliud ipsos esse convenienteset diversos,quia intelligimuseos
esse convenienteset esse diversossecundum quod in eorum notitiasper
alia et alia devenimus,ut declaravialias.
10 (Probatio
)
quintaeconclusionis
Deinde probo quintam conclusionem,quam usque nunc aliqualitersupposui, scilicet quod dependentiae, convenientiaevel diversitates,quae
sunt relationesfundataesuper res absolutas,non suntin re praeterani- 170vaK
mam. Arguo sic. Si dependentiae,convenientiaevel diversitatesfunda15 tae super absoluta essentpraeteranimam, sequiturquod convenientiae,
diversitateset dependentiae fundatae super huiusmodi praedictas dependentias,convenientiasvel diversitatesessent praeter animam. Consequens est falsum;ergo et antecedens.Falsitasconsequentispatet,quia
aliterprocedereturin infinitum,
quod est inconveniens.Et illi hoc con20 cedunt,quia per tertiamconclusionem,quam nunc ante probavi.
Item. Natura non facitpluribusquod potestfacereuno: istamconcedunt isti magistiet alii philosophi. Sed natura potest facere quod ens
absolutum se ipso dependet essentialitera causa, ut probatum est in
quarta conclusioneimmediatepraecedente.Ergo naturapropterdepen25 dere illud absolutuma causa non facitin ilio absoluto aliam dependentiam sibi realiteradditam, sed dico quod intellectusnecessario format
illam dependentiamrelativamsi perfectedebeat causatum intelligere,
ut
priusdictumfuit.
(.Recapitulatio
)
30 Sic ergo patentevidenterpraedictae quinqu conclusiones.Et patet quo
modo illa ratio quam alias feci de processu in infinitum
in dependentiis
erat necessaria et omnino impossibilisad solvendum,quoniam omnia
dicta nunc fundatafueruntsuper illam rationem.Et apparet quo modo
21 uno]uniK

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DEKKER
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evasiones aliorumfueruntsolutae- vel quandoque narrativesolum sine

probatione,cum tarneneis probatio incumbat quia non est ponenda
in natura pluralitassine ratione cogente,ut dixi alias; et in hoc omnes
philosophiconcordant.
Deinde. Quia conclusionemquam per rationempraedictam proba- 5
veram confirmaviauctoritateLincolniensissecundo Posteriorum
dicentis
248rP quod dependentia a prima causa nihilmultiplicaiin re dependente,rePrimo quod nihiladdit absolutum,sed bene
spondetPicardus tripliciter.
addit aliquid relativum.Sed hoc non valet,quia illam auctoritatemdicit
ad ostendendumquod quaestio "si est" non ponit in numerummodo 10
170vbK quo reputaturponere in numerumubi relatioattribuitur
absoluto; esset
enim quaestio "quia est".
Secundo dicitquod illa auctoritassic intelligitur
quod dependentianihil in re dependentemultiplicat,sed bene multiplicaiin re absoluta. Sed
hoc nihil est, quia per illam propositionemvolebat ostendereuniversa- 15
litervel saltem specialiterin substantiis,quod esse dictum de eis nihil
multiplicat.
Tertio dicit quod forteLincolniensisfuitillius opinionis,nec oportet
sibi credere.Et huic responsionisibi acquiesco, quia nolo me in hac opinione fundaresuper aliquam auctoritatem,sive Lincolniensis,sive Aver- 20
rois,sive Aristotelis,quia auctoritatesfaciliterexponuntur,et etiam ipsi
fuerunthomines. Tarnen plus vellem probabilitereos exponere quam
negare.
Item. Dicit Anglicusad hanc rationemvel auctoritatemquod ilia propositi non debet reputaride mente Lincolniensis,quia cum illam pro- 25
positionem dedisset ad solvendum quandam dubitationem,statimsubiunxit aliam solutionem,innuens per hoc quod prima non erat de
mente sua. Et ego bene scio quod subiunxitaliam solutionem;tamen
aeque assertiveposuit primam sicut secundam, et magis explicavitprimam quam secundam. Et cum hoc illae duae solutionesnon discordant: 30
ideo tantumlicet negare unam sicutaliam. Ergo dicat istequod Lincolniensisfuitilliusopinioniset regratiaborsibi.
Ex dictisitaque syllogizareoportetbrevissimede convenientiiset diversitatibussicut syllogizatumfuitde dependentiis.Nam quinqu conclusionesquas immediateprobavi non plus possuntapplicari dependen- 35
Posteriora
6 Robertus
2, 1,29183'84
Grosseteste,
InAnalytica
2 cumtamen]inv.P
etnonP
28 tamen]

P 20 aliquam]aliamK: illamP
13 intelligitur]
intelligunt

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145

tiis quam convenientiiset diversitatibus.Et hoc est clarissimuminspicientipraedictain prima conclusione,in secunda et in tertiaet in quinta.
De quarta vero non est magnum dubium, quia Socrates et Plato prius
naturaliterconveniuntspecie quam duae relationes.Etiam Socrates et
5 Brunellusprius naturalitersuntdiversispecie quam illae diversitateseorum quae sunt relationesfundatae super eos. Immo forteillae diversitates non differunt
specie, ergo impossibileest dicere quod illae con- 17IraK
venientiaese ipsis conveniantvel illae diversitatesse ipsis sint diversae
quin multofortiushic dicaturde substantiisse ipsis.SimiliterSocrates et
10 Plato suntprioresuniversaliter
convenientiisipsorumad invicem.Si illae
convenientiaesintrelationesadditae, ergo in ilio priori,cum Socrates et
Plato sinteiusdem speciei,oportetquod se ipsis,non convenientiaaddita
conveniant.Et formesistasradones sicutformataefuerintde dependentiis,et omnia alia factasicuttibivisumfueritexpedire.
15 Item. Nullus potest dicere quod Deus sit diversusab aliquo nisi se
ipso. Tamen omnes rationesquae adducunturad probandum quod Socratesnon est diversusa Platone vel Brunellose ipso, possuntretorqueri.
Consimilitersuper diversitatemDei ad alia. Ergo nihil concluduntomnes. Sed dicit Picardus ad hoc quod non oportetprimam causam esse
20 diversamab aliis per aliquid sibi additum,propterinfinitatem
et illimitationemsuae perfectionis;hoc est tamen necessariumin aliis. Sed hoc
dictum est sine probatione et contra ipsum, quia omnes rationessuae
tenduntad metam contradictionis.Deus vero proptersuam infinitatem
vel illimitationemnon compatiturcontradictoriasimul, nec ea facere
25 potest.
Buridani
)
(Responsiones
Nunc volo ostenderequo modo isti debiliterresponderuntad rationes 248vP
meas quas alias feceramad probandum istas convenientiasvel diversitates nihil addere in rebus convenientibusvel diversissuper earum essen30 tias. Prima ratio summatimerat quod dependentia nihil multiplicatin
re dependente;sed res conveniuntsecundumquod dependentex eisdem
causis, et sunt diversae secundum quod dependent ex diversiscausis;
ergo convenientiaeet diversitatesnihilmultiplicant.
Primo istinegant dependentiasnihil multiplicare;sed probatumfuit,
35 ideo male negant. Secundo Picardus dicit quod si dependentiae nihil
2 et1]om.K 9 multo]
multaP
17 seipso]om.K

11 sint]suntP

| inilio]nulloP

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14 tibi]ubiP

146

DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

17lrbK multiplicant,tune non sequiturquod convenientiaeet diversitatesnihil

multiplicant.Sed dico quod licet non sequaturvirtuteformaesyllogisticae nunc datae, tarnensequiturquia concedentiquod dependentianon
multiplicai,nulla apparebit ratio cogens quod convenientiaevel diversinisicoacti. 5
tatesmultiplicent.Sed non debemusponere multiplicationem
et
cetera.
Ergo
Ad aliam rationemmeam, quando diciturquod si a et b suntdiversa,
vel se ipsis sunt diversa,vel per diversitatemadditam, dicunt quod per
diversitatemadditam. Et quando dicitur:"Illa voceturc, tunc c et a sunt
diversa", dicunt quod verum est se ipsis, sicut dicebant de dependen- 10
tiis,quia sicutdicebat Anglicus,regula est quando aliquid inestaliquibus
accidentaliteret denominative,quod insitalicui formaliteret quidditative. Sed ista regula nulla est. Nam albedo inest homini accidentaliter
et denominative,et tamen nulli inestformaliteret quidditative,nisi dicatur quod ipsa sibi ipsi inest quidditativepropterhoc quod albedo est 15
essentialiteralbedo, et hoc improprieest loqui valde. Et iterumad removendumillam responsionemet evasiones, ego arguebam replicando
convenientiamsuper diversitatemet e contrasic. Capio duas convenientias eiusdem speciei, et capio aliam rem quae non est eiusdem speciei
et illa res vocetur, tunc 20
cum alia convenientianec cum alia diversitate,
dico quod illae convenientiaesunt diversae ab ipso b plus quam inter
se. Et non sunt diversae se ipsis,quia convenientianon est essentialiter
diversitas.Ergo suntdiversaeper diversitatemadditam. Tunc capio cum
ista diversitatealiam diversitatemeiusdem speciei. Istae tunc magis conveniuntinterse quam cum , sed non se ipsis, cum diversitasnon sit 25
formaliterconvenientia;ergo per convenientiamiterumadditam. Et sic
procedam in infinitum.
Sed contra istam replicationemmeam dicit Picardus quod ego mihi
contradico,quoniam si duae paternitatesconveniuntspecie et differunt
numero,quaeriturutrumidem in quo conveniuntsit illud idem in quo 30
vel aliud. Si idem, ergo cum convenientiaet diversitasnon
differunt,
diffranta rebus eisdem vel diversis,sequitur quod illud idem realiter
17lva K quod est convenientiasit illud idem quod est diversitas.Quod tamen
ego negaviproutistemihi imponit.Si sitaliud, ergo convenientiavel diversitasillorumpaternitatumdifferab eis, quod ego negavi,ut istedicit. 35
Deinde ipse respondetad illam replicationemdicens quod duae conveK
om.K | per1]propter
P 8 velseipsissuntdiversa]
convenienties
1 convenientiae]
P 33 illud]
K 17 evasiones]
consimiles
K 16 improprie
est]inv.
I per2]propter
K
differunt
om.K 35 differ]

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147

ab aliquo tertioquam interse, et duae diversitanientiaeplus differunt

tes plus conveniuntinterse quam cum tertio.Et hoc non est per aliquid
superadditum,quia huiusmodiconvenientiaevel diversitatessunt entia
formaliter
respectiva.Et cum diciturquod hoc est impossibile,quia con5 venientianon est essentialiterdiversitas,nec diversitasconvenientia,dicit
quod verumest secundum eundem gradum convenientiaevel diversit-249rP
tis, sed secundum alium et alium gradum nullum est inconveniens.Et
ita est in proposito.Unde illud idem realiterquod est convenientiaspecificaest diversitasnumeralis.Similiterquod est convenientiageneralis
10 est diversitasspecifica.
Sed ego nescio quo modo talia possintdici, nam ponendo sicut ipse
ponit,quod convenientiaspecificaSocratis ad Platonem est relatiorealis, et similiterdiversitasnumeralisipsius ad Platonem est relatiorealis,
licet concedereturquod haec convenientiaet haec diversitassinteadem
15 relatio,tarnende isto nihil arguebam. Sed dicebam quod haec convenientia est diversa specie ab ipso , et dicebam quod illa convenientia
non est essentialiterilla diversitasqua diciturdiversa ab ipso b. Ponamus quod b sit albedo vel paternitas,nam ut prius dictumfuit,eadem
relatio non est formaliterad diversosterminosnec diversorumfunda20 mentorm.Modo illa convenientiaest Socratis ad Platonem,illa autem
diversitasnon est Socratis ad Platonem, sed est illius convenientiaead
albedinem vel paternitatem.Et illi convenientiaeSocratis ad Platonem
correspondeirelatioquae est convenientiaPiatonisad Socratem. Sed diversitatiilliusconvenientiaead albedinem correspondeirelatioquae est
25 diversitasalbedinis ad illam convenientiam.Modo relationesnon sunt
eaedem quando correlationessibi oppositae sunt diversae.Etiam remanente Socrate et Platone remanetconvenientiaSocratis ad Platonem,si 17IvbK
sit relatiorealis. Et tamen diversitasqua illa convenientiaest diversa ab
albedine corrumpiturcorrupta albedine, quia amplius non est diversa
30 ab ea loquendo proprie.Et sicut dico de diversitatequa illa convenientia est diversaab ipso b, ita dicendum est de convenientiaqua diversitas
convenitalteridiversitati.Et hoc est facilevidereconsiderantipraedicta,
ideo transeo.
Item. Non bene credo quod relatiodiversitatisnumeralisSocratis ad
35 Platonem sit eadem cum relationeconvenientiaespecificaeSocratis ad
Platonem,quia Socrates et Plato possunt cognosci esse diversinumero,

1 ab aliquo]absoluto
P 15 dicebam]
dico* 25 illam]illaK
P 28 Et]om.K
convenientia

| convenientiam]

13:55:50 PM

148

DEKKER
DIRK-JAN

quando tarnennon sciunturconvenirespecie: ut si ita de longe videantur

quod ignoremusutrumsinthominesvel equi vel arbores.Etiam convenientia sive identitasspecificasumitursecundum unum, ut dicitAristotelesquinto Metaphysicae
capitulo de ad aliquid. Et ex opposito diversitas
sumitursecundummulta.Modo non est idem esse multanumeroet esse 5
unum specie. Socrates enim est unus specie et non est multa numero.
numero et non conveniuntspecie;
Item, Socrates et Brunellusdifferunt
est
idem
convenientia
non
ergo
specificaet diversitasnumeralis.SimiliterSocrateset Plato conveniuntin genere,et tamen non differunt
specie;
10
ergo non est idem convenientiageneraliset diversitasspecifica.
Sic ergo multipliciter
deficiuntdicta istius.Tunc respondeo ad rationem suam in qua dicitme mihicontradicere.Quando arguitur:"Si duae
numero,quaeriturutrumsit
paternitatesconveniuntspecie et differunt
dico quod illae paternitaidem in quo conveniuntet in quo differunt?"
essentialisive 15
tes eodem et secundum idem sui conveniuntet differunt
249vP fundamentaliconvenientiavel diversitate.Sic enim non est aliud convenientia quam diversitas,quia idem est et secundum idem sui quod potest fundarerespectumconvenientiaeet respectumdiversitatis.Tamen
172raK convenientiaspecifica,prout est relatiofundatasuper illas paternitates,
non est idem quod diversitasnumeralis,quae est relatiofundatasuper 20
easdem paternitates.Nam intellectusalio et alio modo intelligendoillas
paternitatesfundatsuper eas aliam et aliam relationem,scilicetconvenientiam et diversitatem.Et ista non contradicunt,sed prius probata
suntesse necessaria.De illisautem modis intelligendidiversisnon pertinet ad quaestionem istam,sed ad quaestionem de diversitatespeciei ad 25
individuum.
Anglicus autem aliter respondei ad illam rationem meam, dicens
quod si relatiofundatursuper relationem,ilia est relatiorationis,et non
realis,et ideo duae diversitatesconveniuntnon per convenientiamquae
in sua speci- 30
est relatiorealis,sed conveniuntrealiteret fundamentaliter
vero et extrinseceper relationemrationis.Sed
fica quidditate,formaliter
nunc ego regratioristi reverendomagistro,qui mihi concedit quod ad
exaliqua differrespecie realitervel convenirespecie realitersufficiunt
convenientia
vel
diversitate
cum
tra animam suae specificaequidditates
3-4 Aristoteles,
5, 15,1021a 11-12
Metaphysica
K 3 secundum]
1 quando]quodKP 2 ignoremus]
quodK 7 conignoramus
in add.P 12 dicit]dicesK
iterK | differunt]
in add.P 9 conveniunt]
veniunt]
K 31 vero]
P 28 fundatur]
fundetur
verum
15 eodem]eedemKP 18 respectum]
K 33 aliqua]om.P
om.K I relationem]
relationis

13:55:50 PM

TREATISE
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149

quae suntrelationesrationis.Ergo cum in re non sitponenda pluralitas

sine necessitate,ego non ponam in Socrate et Brunello aliquas relationes reales. Ipsi enim sunt diversispecie et convenientesgenere realiter
et fundamentaliter
per suas specificaset generales quidditates,sed for5 maliteret extrinseceper relationesrationis.Non enim est alia ratio in
absolutiset in respectivisquantum ad hoc, ut superiusvidebatur.
Et haec ad praesenssufficiant
de ista quaestione.

1 cum]om.P 2 aliquas]aliasKP 5 relationes]

K 6 in]om.K 7 de
relationis
istaquaestione]
ad istamquaestionem
K | Et ... quaestione]
add.Explicit
quaestio
de dependentiis
etconvenientiis
etdiversitatibus
determinata
Iohannem
permagistrm

Buridan
annoDomini1332 K

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