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Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9

ERISTINGCOL vs COURT OF APPEALS - Jurisdiction

Doctrine: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.

Facts:

Eristingcol is an owner of a residential lot in Urdaneta Village (or village),


Makati City and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 208586. On the
other hand, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre were the former president and
chairman of the board of governors, construction committee chairman and
village manager of Urdaneta Village Association Inc. UVAI, respectively. UVAI
is an association of homeowners at Urdaneta Village.
Eristingcols action against UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre is founded on
the allegations that in compliance with the National Building Code and after
UVAIs approval of her building plans and acceptance of the construction
bond and architects fee, Eristingcol started constructing a house on her lot
with concrete canopy directly above the main door and highway; that for
alleged violation of its Construction Rules and Regulations (or CRR) on Set
Back Line vis-a-vis the canopy easement, UVAI imposed on her a penalty of
P400,000.00 and barred her workers and contractors from entering the
village and working on her property; that the CRR, particularly on Set Back
Line, is contrary to law; and that the penalty is unwarranted and excessive.
The RTC ratiocinated that UVAI, Limjoco, Tan and Vilvestre may not assail
its jurisdiction after they voluntarily entered their appearance, sought reliefs
therein, and embraced its authority by agreeing to sign an undertaking to
desist from prohibiting Eristingcols workers from entering the village. In so
ruling, it applied the doctrine enunciated in Tijam v. Sibonghanoy.
The CA issued the herein assailed Decision reversing the RTC Order
anddismissing Eristingcols complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

Issue:

Ruling:

Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcols
complaint.
Apparently, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of
nullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on more
than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative
of the nature of the action.
Scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that
the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves
into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes
into the proper interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically
its construction rules.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by


the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the
theories set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss.
Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the
whims of the defendant.
In stark contrast, the relationship between the parties in the instant case is
well-established. Given this admitted relationship, the privity of contract
between UVAI and Eristingcol is palpable, despite the latters deft phraseology
of its primary cause of action as a declaration of nullity of UVAIs Construction
Rules. In short, the crux of Eristingcols complaint is UVAIs supposed
arbitrary implementation of its construction rules against Eristingcol, a
member thereof.
In fine, based on the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint, it is the
HLURB, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over this case.

GABRIEL L. DUERO, vs. HON.COURT OF APPEALS, and BERNARDO A.


ERADEL
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: Lack of Jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by the
parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their express consent.
A party may assail the jurisdiction of the court over the action at any stage of the
proceedings and even on appeal.
FACTS: In 1988, private respondent Bemardo Eradel entered and occupied
petitioner's land covered by Tax Declaration located in Baras, San Miguel, Surigao del
Sur. The land had an assessed value of P5,240. Duero politely informed private
respondent that the land was his and requested the latter to vacate the land, private
respondent refused, but instead threatened him. Despite repeated demands, private
respondent refused to leave the land. Petitioner filed before the RTC a complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages and Attorney's Fees against
private respondent and two others. The counsel of the Ruenas asked for extension to
file their Answer and was given until July 18, 1995. Meanwhile, petitioner and the,
Ruenas executed a compromise agreement, which became the trial court's basis for a
partial judgment. The agreement stated that the Ruenas recognized and bound
themselves to respect the ownership and possession of Duero.
Petitioner presented his evidence ex parte. Judgment was rendered in his favor, and
respondent was ordered to peacefully vacate and turn over the land to petitioner.
Respondent filed a Motion for New Trial, alleging that he has been occupying the land
as a tenant of Artemio Laurente, Sr., since 1958. He explained that he turned over the
complaint and summons to Laurente in the honest belief that as landlord, the latter had
a better right to the land and was responsible to defend any adverse claim on it.
However, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9


Respondent filed before the RTC a Petition for Relief from Judgment, reiterating the
same allegation in his Motion for New Trial. Josephine, Ana Soledad and Virginia
Laurente, grandchildren of Artemio who were claiming ownership of the land, filed a
Motion for Intervention. The RTC denied the motion.
TC: The trial court issued an order denying the Petition for Relief from Judgment. In
a Motion for Reconsideration of said order, private respondent alleged
that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case, since the value of the land
was only P5,240 and therefore it was under the jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. RTC denied the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Execution, which the RTC granted. Respondent filed his
petition for certiorari before the CA.
CA: Respondent is not estopped from assailing the jurisdiction 'of the RTC, Branch 27
in Tandag, Surigao del Sur, when private respondent filed with said court his Motion
for Reconsideration And/Or Annulment of Judgment.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it held
that the municipal trial court had jurisdiction, and (2) that private respondent was not
estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the RTC after he had filed several motions
before it.
HELD/RATIO: (1) No. Under the circumstances, we could not fault the Court of
Appeals in overruling the RTC and in holding that private respondent was not estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the regional trial court. The fundamental rule is
that, the lack of jurisdiction of the court over an action cannot be waived by
the parties, or even cured by their silence, acquiescence or even by their
express consent. Further, a party may assail the jurisdiction of the court
over the action at any stage of the proceedings and even on appeal. The
appellate court did not err in saying that the RTC should have declared
itself barren of jurisdiction over the action. Even if private respondent actively
participated in the proceedings before said court, the doctrine of estoppel cannot
still be properly invoked against him because the question of lack of
jurisdiction may be raised at anytime and at any stage of the action.
Precedents tell us that as a general rule, the jurisdiction of a court is not a question of
acquiescence as a matter of fact, but an issue of conferment as a matter of law. Also,
neither waiver nor estoppel shall apply to confer jurisdiction upon a court, barring
highly meritorious and exceptional circumstances.
(2) No. Respondent is not estopped form questioning the jurisdiction of the
RTC. While participation in all stages of a case before the trial court, including
invocation of its authority in asking for affirmative relief, effectively bars a party by
estoppel from challenging the court's jurisdiction, estoppel has become an
equitable defense that is both substantive and remedial and its successful
invocation can bar a right and not merely its equitable enforcement. For

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties
before the said court,. believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But
by then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that
jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said
amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that
since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the
summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not
do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private
respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same
court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be
answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to
prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long,
continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land. But
his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a
Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he
moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised
for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that
private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already
on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied
his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two
motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of
private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for
entry of judgment and a writ of execution.

Gonzaga v CA (2002)
Corona, J.

DOCTRINE
Doctrine in Tijiam v Sibonghanoy still subsists. A partys active participation in all
stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to
grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same
courts jurisdiction.

FACTS
Petitioner spouses purchased lot 19 from respondent. To finance the purchase, the
spouses got a loan from SSS and made the property as the security. mistakenly, the

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9


spouses built their house on lot 18, instead of lot 19. Aware of such fact, the plaintiff
nonetheless continued to stay in the premises of Lot 18 on the proposal that he would
also buy the same. Plaintiff however failed to buy Lot 18 and likewise defaulted in the
payment of his loan with the SSS involving Lot 19. Consequently Lot 19 was foreclosed
and sold at public auction.
After foreclosure, the spouses asked respondent to swap lot 19 with lot 18. When
respondent refused, the spouses filed a petition for the reformation of the contract.

Trial court: The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
contract was clear. It reflected the true intention of parties: the spouses
intended to buy Lot 19 and not lot 18.

When Trial court issued a writ of execution, spouses filed an urgent


motion to recall writ of execution alleging that the court a quo had
no jurisdiction to try the case as it was vested in the Housing and
Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).

Party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways


and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by
deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches.

x xx

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x
[T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.

Spouses filed a new complaint with HLURB and a petition


to annul judgment of RTC before CA on the ground that RTC
does not have jurisdiction to try the case.

A partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial
court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative
relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same
courts jurisdiction.

CA: CA denied the petition on the ground of estoppel as ruled in tijam v


sibonghanoy.

Petitioners were the ones who instituted the petition for reformation of contract.
they vigorously asserted their cause of action.

Spouses filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of
the CA claiming that CA erred in dismissing the petition by applying the doctrine of
estoppel. Petitioners claim that SC in their recent decisions had already abandoned the
doctrine laid down in Tijiam v Sibonghanoy.

Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during
the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did
petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to
question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.

ISSUE
Whether petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC
HELD: Yes, the court has not abandoned tijam v sibonghanoy.
Tijiam v Sibonghanoy states:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed
to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.
This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction if not.

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9

ASIA'S EMERGING DRAGON CORPORATION vs. DOTC


G.R. No. 169914 April 18, 2008
TOPIC: JURISDICTION- Res Judicata
DOCTRINE:
The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment, are as
follows:
1.
the former judgment or order must be final;
2. it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was rendered after a
consideration of the evidence or stipulations submitted by the parties at the
trial of the case;
3. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and
4. there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, of
subject matter and of cause of action.
FACTS: This case tackled three SC decisions, namely:
-Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc.
-Republic v. Gingoyon
-Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation v. Department of Transportation and
Communications and Manila International Airport Authority (G.R. No. 169914)
These cases are about the awarding of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport
International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) Project to the Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO).
Banking on this SCs declaration in Agan that the award of the NAIA IPT
III Project to PIATCO is null and void, Asia's Emerging Dragon Corporation
(AEDC) filed before this Court the present Petition for Mandamus and Prohibition. At
the crux of the Petition of AEDC is its claim that, being the recognized and
unchallenged original proponent of the NAIA IPT III Project, it has the
exclusive, clear, and vested statutory right to the award thereof.
However, there having been two prior cases rendered by the SC (Agan & Gingoyon)
regarding the matter, a strong argument against the AEDC's Petition is that it is
already barred by res judicata.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case is barred by reason of res judicata, seeing that there
were prior rulings regarding the matter.
HELD: YES
RATIO:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

The elements of res judicata, in its concept as a bar by former judgment,


are as follows:
5. the former judgment or order must be final;
6. it must be a judgment or order on the merits, that is, it was
rendered after a consideration of the evidence or stipulations
submitted by the parties at the trial of the case;
7. it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and the parties; and
8. there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter and of cause of action.
All of the elements are present herein so as to bar the present
Petition.
First, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City, dismissing Civil Case No. 66213, was issued
on 30 April 1999. The Joint Motion to Dismiss, deemed a compromise
agreement, once approved by the court is immediately executory and not
appealable.47
Second, the Order of the RTC of Pasig City dismissing Civil Case No. 66213 pursuant
to the Joint Motion to Dismiss filed by the parties constitutes a judgment
on the merits.
The Joint Motion to Dismiss stated that the parties were willing to settle the case
amicably and, consequently, moved for the dismissal thereof. It also contained a
provision in which the parties the AEDC, on one hand, and the DOTC Secretary and
PBAC, on the other released and forever discharged each other from any and all
liabilities, whether criminal or civil, arising in connection with the case. It is
undisputable that the parties entered into a compromise agreement, defined as "a
contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid a litigation or
put an end to one already commenced.48" Essentially, it is a contract perfected by
mere consent, the latter being manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Once an
agreement is stamped with judicial approval, it becomes more than a mere contract
binding upon the parties; having the sanction of the court and entered as its
determination of the controversy, it has the force and effect of any other
judgment.49 Article 2037 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that a
compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res judicata.
Because of the compromise agreement among the parties, there was
accordingly a judicial settlement of the controversy, and the Order, of the
RTC of Pasig City was no less a judgment on the merits which may be annulled only
upon the ground of extrinsic fraud
Third, there is no question as to the jurisdiction of the RTC of Pasig City over the
subject matter and parties. The RTC can exercise original jurisdiction over
cases involving the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction.

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Lastly, there is, between Civil Case No. 66213 before the RTC of Pasig City and the
Petition now pending before this Court, an identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.
There is an identity of parties. In both petitions, the AEDC is the
petitioner. The respondents in Civil Case No. 66213 are the DOTC Secretary and the
PBAC Chairman and members. The respondents in the instant Petition are the DOTC,
the DOTC Secretary, and the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA).
There is an identity of subject matter because the two Petitions involve
none other than the award and implementation of the NAIA IPT III
Project.
There is an identity of cause of action because, in both Petitions, AEDC is
asserting the violation of its right to the award of the NAIA IPT III Project
as the original proponent in the absence of any other qualified bidders.
AGAN v PIATCO

in the next 10 years. This would be in addition to a fixed annual guaranteed payment to
the government. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponents compliance
with the minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the bid documents
and the IRR of the BOT (build operate and transfer) Law. The bid documents allowed
amendments to the draft concession agreement, but said that these should cover only
items that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponents proposal.
In August 1996, during the second pre-bid conference, the PBAC made several
clarifications, upon the request of Peoples Air Cargo & Warehousing Co. Inc
(PAIRCARGO),
which
wanted
to
challenge
the
AEDC
bid.
The PBAC said the list of revenue sources mentioned in the bid documents were
merely indicative. The project proponent may add other revenue sources, subject to
approval by the DOTC/MIAA. Also, only fees and charges denominated as public
utility fees would be subject to regulation, and these could still be revised, because the
PBAC has a pending query with the justice department. In September 1996, PBAC
issued a bid bulletin in which it said that since PAIRCARGO could not meet the
required minimum equity prescribed in the bid documents, it would accept instead an
audited financial statement of the financial capability of all member companies of the
consortium.

Jurisdiction: hierarchy of Courts


Doctrine: The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired cannot be obtained
in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify
availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this Courts primary
jurisdiction.
Facts:
In August 1989 the DOTC had a study conducted to determine whether or not
the present Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) can cope with traffic
development up to the year 2010. A draft final report was submitted to the DOTC in
December 1989. Four years later, in 1993, six Filipino-Chinese business leaders met
with then President Fidel Ramos to explore the possibility of investing in the
construction and operation of a new international airport terminal. The six later formed
the Asias Emerging Dragon Corp (AEDC) which submitted an unsolicited proposal for
the development of NAIA International Passenger Terminal III more than a year after
the first meeting with Ramos, in October 1994. In March 1995, the DOTC endorsed the
AEDC proposal to the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA). In
January 1996, NEDA passed Board Resolution No. 2 which approved the NAIA IPT III
project. In June 1996, the DOTC published an invitation for competitive bidding in two
daily newspapers, as required by law (sec 4-A of RA6957). The alternative bidders had
to submit three envelopes. The first contains the prequalification documents, the
second the technical proposal, and the third the financial proposal of the proponent.
The bidding was scheduled on September 20, 1996. The bid documents issued by the
Prequalification Bids and Awards Committee said the proponent must have adequate
capability to sustain the financing requirement for the engineering, design,
construction, operation, and maintenance phases of the project. The proponent must
have an equity that is at least 30% of the project cost, and be able to secure external
financing for the project. Government was also guaranteed a five percent share in the
gross revenue of the project for the first five years; 7.5% in the next 10 years, and 10%

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

In September 1996, PAIRCARGO submitted their competitive proposal to the


PBAC. The first envelope, containing the prequalification documents, was opened on
September 23, 1996, and PBAC prequalified the PAIRCARGO consortium the following
day. On September 26, AEDC filed with PBAC its reservations regarding PAIRCARGo,
noting the lack of corporate approvals and financial capability of PAIRCARGO. For
one, PAIRCARGO included in the computation of its financial capability the total net
worth of Security Bank, when the Banking Law limits to 15% the total investment that
a bank may make on one project. It also questioned the appointment of Lufthansa as
facility operator, because Philippine laws limit to Filipinos the operation of a public
utility.
The PBAC, however, said on October 2, 1996 that based on the documents submitted
and the prequalification criteria, PAIRCARGO was prequalified. The DOTC secretary
approved PBACs findings. The AEDC reiterated its objections two more times. On
October 16, the third envelope containing the financial proposals were opened, and
PAIRCARGO had offered to pay the government higher. Both PAIRCARGO and AEDC
offered to build the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for at least $350 million at no cost to
the government and to pay the government a 5% share in gross revenues for the first
five years of operation; a 7.5% share in gross revenues for the next 10 years of operation;
and a 10% share in gross revenues for the last 10 years of operation. In addition to this,
AEDC offered to pay the government P135 million as guaranteed payment for 27 years.
Paircargo Consortium offered a total of P17.75 billion for the same period. PBAC
informed AEDC it had accepted Paircagos price proposal, and given AEDC 30 working
days to match the bid. When AEDC failed to do so, the DOTC issued a notice on
December 11 1996 regarding AEDCs failure to match the proposal.
In February 1997, Paircargo Consortium incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co Inc (PIATCO). AEDC protested the alleged undue
preference given to PIATCO and reiterated its objections regarding the prequalification
of PIATCO. In April 1997, it filed before the Pasig RTC a petition for declaration of

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nullity of the proceedings, mandamus and injunction against the DOTC secretary, the
PBAC chair and its voting members, and the chair of the PBAC technical committee.
On April 17, the NEDA ICC conducted an ad referendum to facilitate the approval of the
BOT agreement between the DOTC and PIATCO. Because there were only four instead
of the required six signatures, the NEDA merely noted the agreement.
On July 9, 1997, the DOTC issued the notice of award for the project to
PIATCO. The Concession Agreement was signed on July 12, 1997, granting PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the NAIA Passenger Terminal III for 25 years, with
an option to renew for a period not exceeding 25 years. PIATCO was allowed to collect
fees, rentals and other charges in accordance with the rates or schedules in the 1997
Concession Agreement. At the end of the concession period, PIATCO will transfer the
airport
to
MIAA.
In November 1998, the government and PIATCO signed an Amended and Restated
Concession Agreement (ARCA). The ARCA amended provisions on the special
obligations of the government, the exclusivity of the franchise given to PIATCO, the
proceeds of the insurance, the taxes, duties and other charges that may be levied
PIATCO, and the provisions on the termination of the contract. Three more
supplements to the ARCA were signed afterwards: in August 1999, in September 2000,
and in June 2001.
The first redefined revenues, required government to construct an access road
connecting NAIA II and III, and added to the special obligations of government. The
second supplement required government to clear structures at the construction site and
to pay PIATCO for these. The third provided for PIATCOs obligations regarding the
construction of the surface road connecting Terminals II and III.
In September 2002, workers of the international airline service providers filed before
the Supreme Court a petition for prohibition enjoining the enforcement of the
agreements. They said the transfer to NAIA III could cost them their jobs, since under
the agreements, PIATCO is not required to honor MIAAs existing concession contracts
with various service providers for international airline airport services.
In October 2002, the service providers filed a motion for intervention and a
petition in intervention, joining the cause of the petitioning workers. Three
congressmen Salacnib Baterina, Clavel Martinez and Constantino Jaraula filed a
similar petition shortly after. In November 2002, several MIAA employees also filed a
petition questioning the legality of the agreements. In December 2002, another group
of congressmen Jacinto Paras, Rafael Nantes, Eduardo Zialcita, Willie Villarama,
Prospero Nograles, Prospero Pichay Jr., Harlin Cast Abayon and Benasing
Macarambon filed their comment in intervention defending the validity of the
agreements and praying for the dismissal of the petitions. On December 10, 2002, the
court heard the case on oral argument, the required the parties to file their respective
memoranda, and to explore the possibility of arbitration as provided in the challenged
contracts.
In their consolidated memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General and the
Office of the Government Corporate Counsel prayed that the petitions be given due
course and that the 1997 Concession Agreement, the ARCA and the supplements be
declared void for being contrary to the Constitution, the BOT Law and its implementing
rules and regulations. In March 2003, PIATCO commenced arbitration proceedings
before the International Chamber of Commerce, International Court of Arbitration.

Issue:
Held:

Whether or not there was violation of hierarchy of courts


No

Ratio:
Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review the instant cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is ill-equipped
to resolve. Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court
at the first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that
trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special civil
action for prohibition and hence, following the rule on hierarchy of courts, resort must
first be had before the trial courts.
After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court is
of the view that the crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions.
The facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well established and, hence,
need not be determined by a trial court.
The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming
jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Courts primary jurisdiction.
It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that
call for the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these
cases are oftranscendental importance as they involve the construction and operation
of the countrys premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted
for resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of
key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,
procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant
cases.

LIGA NG MGA BARANGAY V. ATIENZA


GR NO. 154599, JANUARY 21, 2004
DOCTRINES:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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Rule on Hierarchy of Courts: The concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to
be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained
freedom of choice of the court to which the application therefore will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. The hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals,
and also serves as the general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard of that judicial hierarchy most certainly
indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first lever
(inferior) courts should be filed with RTC, and those against the latter, with the CA. a
directs invocation of the SCs original jurisdiction to issue the writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is an established policy. It is policy necessary to prevent
inordinate demands upon the courts time and attention which are better devoted to
those matters within the exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further overcrowding of
the courts docket.

Requisites for filing a Writ of Certiorari: Writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur:
1.
2.
3.

It must be directed against a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or


quasi-judicial functions;
The tribunal, board, or officer must have acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and
There is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

Atienza. The Liga then filed a case of certiorari under rule 65 with the Supreme Court
averring that the Manila City Council acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisction when it enacted the said ordinance.
Issue: WON certiorari under rule 65 is the proper recourse.
Held: Please refer to the doctrines.
-

City Manila council was not acting in a quasi-judicial function when it enacted
the law, but under its legislative powers;
Not rule 65, but should be petition for declaratory relief in assailing
constitutionality or validity of a law;
Not with the SC, because jurisdiction is concurrent with RTC and CA
Must follow the hierarchy of courts

Serrana vs. Sandiganbayan


GR No. 162059
Topic: Jurisdiction
Doctrine: Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a
non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as
contemplated by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. It is well established that compensation is not an essential element of
public office. At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
Sandiganbayan: denied petitioners motion for lack of merit.

Forum Shopping; Exist if elements of Litis Pendentia are present: Forum


shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present or when a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. For litis pendentia to
exist, the following requisites must be present:
1.
2.
3.

Identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest
in both actions;
Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts;
Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the preceding case regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.

SC: petition is DENIED for lack of merit.


Facts:
Hannah Eunice D. Serrana was a senior student of the University of the PhilippinesCebu (UP). She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999
as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending
on December 31, 2000.
Petitioner received 15 million from President Estrada for the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall Annex. However such renovation failed to materialized. Hence, ombudsman filed
a charge of estafa to the sandiganbayan.
Issue:

Short Facts: The Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines. It was made by the Local Government Code. The LGU provided for election
of officers of the Liga. Sometime before the elections of LGU officers, the Manila City
Council enacted an ordinance inconsistent with the election law provided in the LGU
code and the Ligas constitution. This circular was later approved by the City Mayor,

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Can petitioner be charged of estafa in the Sandiganbayan? Can petitioner be considered


as public officer?
Ruling:

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9


Petitioner can be charged of estafa as provided in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. The
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in
relation to their office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one
of the offenses included in Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those
other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in relation to their
office.

As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vs
Desierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.

Since BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of a non-stock


corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is a public officer as contemplated
by P.D. No. 1606 the statute defining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. It is well
established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. At most, it is
merely incidental to the public office. Hence, Petitioner is a public officer by express
mandate of P.D.No. 1606 and jurisprudence.

AMBIL JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN


TOPIC: Jurisdiction
FACTS:
Atty. Loste, President of the Eastern Samar Chapter of the IBP, wrote a letter
to the office of the Ombudsman praying for an investigation into the alleged
transfer of the Mayor Adalim, an accused for murder, from the provincial jail
of Easter Samar to the residence of the petitioner.
NBI recommended the filing of criminal charges against the petitioner for
violation of Sec 3(e) of RA No. 3019 otherwise known as Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act
Petitioners contended that Adalims transfer was justified considering the
imminent threats upon his person and the danger posed by his detention at
the provincial jail.
According to petitioner, it was upon the advice of his lawyers that he be
directed the transfer of Adalim to his residence
Sandiganbayan, first division, found petitioner guilty of Anti-Graft and
Corruption. Petitioner have conspired to accord him unwarranted benefits in
the form of more comfortable quarters.
Petitioner said that the said rule does not apply to his case because the
provision contemplates only transactions of pecuniary nature. Since the law

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

punishes a public officer who extends unwarranted benefits to a private


person, petitioner avers that he cannot be held liable for extending a favor to
Mayor Adalim, a public officer. Further, he claims good faith in taking custody
of the mayor pursuant to his duty as a Provincial Jailer under
theAdministrative Code of 1917. Considering this, petitioner believes himself
entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise
of duty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 3(e) RA No. 3019, as amended, applies to petitioners case
before the Sandiganbayan?
RULING:
The Office of the Special Prosecutor said that it is enough to show that in
performer their functions, petitioners have accorded undue preference to
Adalim for liability to attach under the provision
the OSP maintains that Adalim is deemed a private party for purposes of
applying Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 because the unwarranted benefit
redounded, not to his person as a mayor, but to his person as a detention
prisoner accused of murder
petitioners were motivated by bad faith as evidenced by their refusal to turn
over Adalim despite instruction from Asst. Sec. Ingeniero
OSP also reiterates petitioners lack of authority to take custody of a detention
prisoner without a court order. Hence, it concludes that petitioners are not
entitled to the benefit of any justifying circumstance.
there is no question that petitioners are public officers discharging official
functions
and
that
jurisdiction
over
them
lay
with
the
Sandiganbayan. Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over public officers
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law is provided under Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 1606,[27] as amended by R.A. No. 8249.[28] The
pertinent portions of Section 4, P.D. No. 1606, as amended, read as follows:
o SEC. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as


amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the
accused are officials occupying the following
positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time
of the commission of the offense:
o (1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as
Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9


(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers and other provincial department
heads[;]
In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed
in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officers
mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be
vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as
the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided
in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is beyond
question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification] from the Provincial Government Department Head of the
HRMO shows that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary
Grade 22. Nonetheless, it is only when none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to salary grade 27 or higher shall exclusive
jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here, petitioner Apelado, Sr. was
charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over whose position the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried jointly
with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original
jurisdiction over them the Sandiganbayan.

were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP
Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were
invalid for being irregular and defective.

Issue:
1.
2.

Whether or not the forfeiture cases and the plunder case have separate causes
of action.
Whether SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her
children via substituted service of summons and by their voluntary
appearance.

Ruling:
1.
a.

Clarita Garcia vs. Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction


Doctrine: It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to
be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode
authorized by and proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires
jurisdiction over a person.
Facts:

Petitioner claims that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the
plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the
filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic
forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of
its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of
the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to
obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case
dispositions.

Prescinding from these premises, petitioner would ascribe grave abuse of


discretion on the SB 4th Division for not granting its separate motions to
dismiss the two forfeiture petitions and/or to consolidate them with the
plunder case on the foregoing ground.

In addition, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of
summons. The substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

b.

2.

a.

b.

Petitioners posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by


the plunder case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of
jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by the assumptions holding
it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As
correctly ruled by the SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 Resolution,
the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not arise from the
commission of a criminal offense, thus: Such liability is based on a
statute that safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully
acquired properties.
It bears stressing, as a second point, that a forfeiture case under RA
1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder
charged in Crim. Case No. 28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a
prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be established is the
commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of
ill-gotten wealth.
It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the
latter to be bound by its decision or orders. Valid service of
summons, by whatever mode authorized by and proper under the
Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a
person. In the instant case, it is undisputed that summons for
Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos
Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who
acknowledged receipt thereof by affixing his signature. It is also
undisputed that substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures
I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen.
Garcia at the PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted
services of summons were invalid for being irregular and defective.
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals, provides for the requirements to be:

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9

3.

i. (1) Impossibility of prompt personal service, i.e., the party


relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is
impossibility of prompt service within a reasonable time.
Reasonable time being "so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent
man to do, conveniently, what the contract or duty requires
that should be done, having a regard for the rights and
possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party." Moreover,
we indicated therein that the sheriff must show several
attempts for personal service of at least three (3) times on
at least two (2) different dates.
ii. (2) Specific details in the return, i.e., the sheriff must
describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service.
iii. (3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age
and discretion residing at defendants house or residence;
or on a competent person in charge of defendants office
orregular place of business.
c. From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted
service of summons was made on petitioner and her children, as the
service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not comply with the first
two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service
of summons. Moreover, the third requirement was also not strictly
complied with as the substituted service was made not at petitioners
house or residence but in the PNP Detention Center where Maj. Gen.
Garcia is detained, even if the latter is of suitable age and discretion.
Hence, no valid substituted service of summons was made.
A defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not
deemed to have appeared voluntarily before the court. What the rule on
voluntary appearancethe first sentence of the above-quoted rulemeans is
that the voluntary appearance of the defendant in court is without
qualification, in which case he is deemed to have waived his defense of lack of
jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons.

Remedial Law Review


PLATINUM TOURS AND TRAVEL, INCORPORATED, petitioner, vs. JOSE
M. PANLILIO, respondent.
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction. Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the
decision rendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the
person and the subject matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions
arising from the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

FACTS: Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president
Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC
bought from it..
RTC OF MAKATI: Rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and ordered
PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03
with legal interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit. A writ of execution was
issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary
Membership Certificate, in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and sold for
P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.
RTC: 1995 - private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene. Panlilio
claimed that Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her
shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and
that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5
million.Denied Panlilios motion for intervention.
RTC: 1996 - Declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the
conduct. Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of
preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares. In the meantime,
Panlilio again attempted to intervene, this time by incorporating in his complaint a
motion to consolidate the case. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the
motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who
was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued
an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting
for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Platinum, as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of Judge
Diokno but its motion was denied.
1997 - Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, the order
of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No.
94-1634.
1998 CA annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to
return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket
and decide it as a separate case.
Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA, praying
that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC
Branch of Makati.
CA: Motion for partial Reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62.
HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does
not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the
correctness of its decisions.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that
the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the

10

Remedial Law Review | Compiled Case Digests Jurisdiction to Rule 9


consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No. 94-1634, did not affect the
jurisdiction of the court which issued the said order.
Jurisdiction should be distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction
refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decision rendered therein.
Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the person and the subject
matter, as in the instant case, the decision on all questions arising from the
case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may
commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment
which does not affect its authority to decide the case, much less divest the
court of the jurisdiction over the case.

Respondent Eddy Ng Kok Wei, a Singaporean businessman, expressed in a letter


addressed to Petitioner Manila Bankers his intention to purchase a condominium unit
at Valle Verde Terraces. Respondent paid petitioner a reservation fee of P50,000 for
the purchase of a 46-square condominium unit. After over a month, respondent paid
90% of the purchase price.

Petitioner executed a contract to sell in favor of respondent. The contract expressly


states that the unit shall substantially be completed and delivered to respondent on 8
may 1990. 1% of the total amount shall be charged against petitioner in case of delay in
the delivery of the unit.

We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge
Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to
Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his own sala. Moreover, we find
the instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge
Diokno decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been
spared the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn
would have had one petition less in its docket.

The final turn over of the unit was pushed to a later date (21 May 1990). Respondent
returned to the Philippines a couple of times, and for those times he found his unit still
unlivable. Exasperated, respondent sent petitioner a letter demanding payment for
damages he sustained. Petitioner however ignored the demand. Respondent then filed
a complaint before RTC against respondent for specific performance and damages.

Manila Bankers Life Insurance Corporation v Eddy Ng Kok Wei (2003)

During pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and
eventually occupied it on 12 April 1991. Respondents cause of action has been limited
to claim for damages.

Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Re: Jurisdiction

Trial Court: Manila Bankers is liable for payment of damages due to the
delay in the performance of its obligation to Eddy.

DOCTRINE
complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer
against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified
the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and
can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.

CA: affirmed Trial Courts decision.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of
the condominium unit to respondent.

ISSUE
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over Manila Bankers case.

FACTS

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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HELD: Yes

Facts:

On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case,
Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:

Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from
defendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total amount
of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant
GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956,
March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and October 15, 1957.

SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
xxx

C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory


obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against
the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
x x x.

Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the
instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific
performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against
the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.

While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We
have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings
and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.

Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified
the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel
and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
GSIS vs Santiago
Doctrine: The CA is not a trier of facts. This doctrine has exceptions which were not
discussed in this case, merely cited. This is even more so when the CA affirms the
appreciation of factual evidence by the trial court.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

On March 6, 1980, defendant GSIS sold the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown


Development Corporation which sale was disapproved by the Office of the President
of the Philippines. The sold properties were returned to defendant GSIS.
On May 7, 1990, Antonio Vic Zulueta, represented by Eduardo M. Santiago, filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 71, a complaint for
reconveyance of real estate against the GSIS. Spouses Alfeo and Nenita Escasa, Manuel
III and Sylvia G. Urbano, and Marciana P. Gonzales and the heirs of Mamerto Gonzales
moved to be included as intervenors and filed their respective answers in
intervention. Subsequently, the petitioner, as defendant therein, filed its answer
alleging inter alia that the action was barred by the statute of limitations and/or laches
and that the complaint stated no cause of action. Subsequently, Zulueta was
substituted by Santiago as the plaintiff in the complaint a quo. Upon the death
of Santiago on March 6, 1996, he was substituted by his widow, Rosario Enriquez Vda.
de Santiago, as the plaintiff.
After due trial, the RTC rendered judgment against the petitioner
ordering it to reconvey to the respondent, Rosario Enriquez Vda. de
Santiago, in substitution of her deceased husband Eduardo, the seventyeight lots excluded from the foreclosure sale.
The petitioner elevated the case to the CA which rendered the assailed
decision affirming that of the RTC. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the herein appeal is DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Decision of December 17, 1997 of Branch 71 of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City is hereby AFFIRMED
In its petition, the petitioner maintains that it did not act in bad faith when it
erroneously included in its certificate of sale, and subsequently consolidated the titles
in its name over the seventy-eight lots (subject lots) that were excluded from the
foreclosure sale. There was no proof of bad faith nor could fraud or malice be
attributed to the petitioner when it erroneously caused the issuance of certificates of
title over the subject lots despite the fact that these were expressly excluded from the
foreclosure sale.
Issue: W/N issue of facts regarding bad faith can be tried in the CA.

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Held: No. but the decision of the SC still discussed it.
At the outset, it bears emphasis that the jurisdiction of this Court in a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended, is limited to
reviewing only errors of law. This Court is not a trier of facts. Case law has it that the
findings of the trial court especially when affirmed by the CA are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Although there are exceptions to the said rule, we find no reason to
deviate therefrom.[6] By assailing the findings of facts of the trial court as affirmed by
the CA, that it acted in bad faith, the petitioner thereby raised questions of facts in its
petition.
Nonetheless, even if we indulged the petition and delved into the factual issues,
we find the petition barren of merit.
That the petitioner acted in bad faith in consolidating ownership and causing the
issuance of titles in its name over the subject lots, notwithstanding that these were
expressly excluded from the foreclosure sale was the uniform ruling of the trial court
and appellate court. As declared by the CA:
The acts of defendant-appellant GSIS in concealing from the Zuluetas [the
respondents predecessors-in-interest] the existence of these lots, in failing to notify
or apprise the spouses Zulueta about the excluded lots from the time it consolidated
its titles on their foreclosed properties in 1975, in failing to inform them when it
entered into a contract of sale of the foreclosed properties to Yorkstown Development
Corporation in 1980 as well as when the said sale was revoked by then President
Ferdinand E. Marcos during the same year demonstrated a clear effort on its part to
defraud the spouses Zulueta and appropriate for itself the subject properties. Even if
titles over the lots had been issued in the name of the defendant-appellant, still it
could not legally claim ownership and absolute dominion over them because
indefeasibility of title under the Torrens system does not attach to titles secured by
fraud or misrepresentation. The fraud committed by defendant-appellant in the form
of concealment of the existence of said lots and failure to return the same to the real
owners after their exclusion from the foreclosure sale made defendant-appellant
holders in bad faith. It is well-settled that a holder in bad faith of a certificate of title
is not entitled to the protection of the law for the law cannot be used as a shield for
fraud.[7]
The Court agrees with the findings and conclusion of the trial court and the
CA. The petitioner is not an ordinary mortgagee. It is a government financial
institution and, like banks, is expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its
dealings, including those involving registered land.
KATON vs PALANCA
G.R. No. 151149. September 7, 2004
TOPIC: JURISDICTION
DOCTRINE: Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of
action clearly appear from the complaint filed with the trial court, the action may be

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for
review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends
useless litigations.
FACTS:

George Katon filed a request for the re-classification of a piece of real


property known as Sombrero Island which consists of approximately 18
hectares.

Gabriel Mandocdoc undertook the investigation, inspection and survey of


the area. During said survey, there were no actual occupants on the island
but there were some coconut trees claimed to have been planted by
petitioner and respondent Manuel Palanca, Jr. (alleged overseer of
petitioner) who went to the island from time to time to undertake
development work, like planting of additional coconut trees.

The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably
endorsed.

Petitioner contends that Sombrero Island had been classified from forest
land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his
request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then land
investigator of the District Land Office, favorably endorsed the request of
respondents.

A Survey Authority was issued authorizing Deputy Public Land Surveyor


Salvador to survey 10 hectares of Sombrero Island for the respondents.

Respondents filed a homestead patent application for a portion of the subject


island

Petitioner assails the validity of the homestead patents and original


certificates of title covering certain portions of Sombrero Island issued in
favor of respondents on the ground that the same were obtained through
fraud. Petitioner prays for the reconveyance of the whole island in his favor.

The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its
conversion from forest land to agricultural land.[6]

Respondents filed their Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses


and Counterclaim in due time. They also filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of the alleged defiance by petitioner of the trial courts Order to
amend his Complaint so he could thus effect a substitution by the legal heirs
of the deceased, Respondent Gapilango.
RTC- The Motion to Dismiss was granted.
Petitioners MR was denied by the trial court for being a third and prohibited
motion.
CA- Instead of limiting itself to the allegation of grave abuse of
discretion, the CA ruled on the merits. It held that while petitioner had caused
the reclassification of Sombrero Island from forest to agricultural land, he never
applied for a homestead patent under the Public Land Act. Hence, he never acquired
title to that land.

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The CA added that the annulment and cancellation of a homestead patent and the
reversion of the property to the State were matters between the latter and the
homestead grantee. Unless and until the government takes steps to annul the grant,
the homesteaders right thereto stands. Finally, granting arguendo that petitioner had
the exclusive right to apply for a patent to the land in question, he was already barred
by laches for having slept on his right for almost 23 years from the time Respondent
Palancas title had been issued.
CA acknowledged that it had erred when it ruled on the merits of the case. It
agreed with petitioner that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in perfunctorily
dismissing his Motion for Reconsideration, on the erroneous ground that it was a third
and prohibited motion when it was actually only his first motion.
Nonetheless, the Complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the
challenged Resolution of the CA Special Division of five members with two
justices dissenting pursuant to its residual prerogative under Section 1 of Rule 9 of
the Rules of Court.
ISSUE/S:
1. WON the CA is correct in resolving the Petition for Certiorari based on an
issue not raised (the merits of the case) in the Petition2. WON the CA is correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under
Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the
Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition
RATIO:
First issue: No.
This is not the first time that petitioner has taken issue with the propriety of the CAs
ruling on the merits. He raised it with the appellate court when he moved for
reconsideration. The CA even corrected itself in its resolution The CAs Resolution has
rendered petitioners issue moot. Hence, there is no need to discuss it further. Suffice
it to say that the appellate court indeed acted ultra jurisdictio in ruling on
the merits of the case when the only issue that could have been, and was in
fact, raised was the alleged grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial
court in denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. Settled is the
doctrine that the sole office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors
of jurisdiction. Such writ does not include a review of the evidence, more
so when no determination of the merits has yet been made by the trial
court, as in this case.
Second Issue: No.
Petitioner next submits that the CA erroneously invoked its residual
prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court when it motu
proprio dismissed the Petition for lack of jurisdiction and prescription. According to

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It
follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial
courts over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and
(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case
or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records
on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the
appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not
have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule
41. Undeniably, lsuch order of dismissal was not one for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.
What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of
the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same
rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it
dismissed the Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental grounds
directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction and for
prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Petition DENIED.
Pecson v Comelec
Residual Jurisdiction

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Doctrine: Decisions of the courts in electoral protest cases, should at least be given
similar worth and recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers.
(Disclaimer: mejo mahirap intindihin yung case, read at your own risk,
digest not credible)

Facts:
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in
the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007
elections. On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate,
garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecsons 12,531, or a margin of 61
votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon
thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the RTC.

On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons favor. The
RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanans 13,758
a vote margin of 1,139.

Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a
Notice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on November 27, 2008 an Order
noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing
the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed on November
28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials[2] (Rules) allows this remedy.

The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal via a Special
Order dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules,
the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.

Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ
of execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the
motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting the
records of the case.

Thereupon, Cunanan filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Application of


Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Status Quo Ante Order/Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) with Prayer for Immediate Raffle. He argued in his petition
that: (1) the RTC Decision did not clearly establish Pecsons victory or his (Cunanans)
defeat a requirement of Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules; among other reasons, the
number of votes the RTC tallied and tabulated exceeded the number of those who
actually voted and the votes cast for the position of Mayor, and (2) the RTC had
constructively relinquished its jurisdiction by the issuance of the Order dated
November 27, 2007 directing the transmittal of the records of the case.

The Second Division of the COMELEC issued on January 4, 2008 a 60-day


TRO directing: (1) the RTC to cease and desist from issuing or causing the issuance of
a writ of execution or implementing the Special Order; and (2) Cunanan to continue
performing the functions of Mayor of Magalang.

In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO,
Pecson argued that: (1) preliminary injunction cannot exist except as part or incident
of an independent action, being a mere ancillary remedy that exists only as an
incident of the main proceeding; (2) the petition for application of preliminary
injunction, as an original action, should be dismissed outright; and (3) Cunanan is
guilty of forum shopping, as he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order
simultaneously with the petition filed with the COMELEC.

The COMELECs Second Division denied Cunanans petition in a Resolution


dated March 6, 2008. It ruled that: (1) the resolution of the motion for execution
pending appeal is part of the residual jurisdiction of the RTC to settle pending
incidents; the motion was filed prior to the expiration of the period to appeal and
while the RTC was still in possession of the original record; and (2) there is good
reason to justify the execution of the Decision pending appeal, as Pecsons victory was
clearly and manifestly established.

Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an ExParte Motion. Despite Cunanans opposition, the RTC granted Pecsons motion.
Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions of Mayor of Magalang.

Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in reversing the decisions of thr trial court

Held: Yes

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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Ratio:
Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in
election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and
after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when
attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of
the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in
nullifying the RTCs Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of
jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at
wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law in
nullifying the Special Order.
ALDAY v. FGU INSURANCE
GR NO. 138822, JANUARY 23, 2001
DOCTRINES:
Test to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory:
Quintanilla v. CA, is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where the conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.
Non-payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal: In
Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is
a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not
been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner
has attempted to evade the payment of the proper fees for her permissive counterclaim.

Facts: Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC of
Makati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing
unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred
by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent for
respondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs
of suit.
Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the
payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and
contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

premium reserves amounting to P500,000.00. In addition, petitioner prayed for


attorneys fees, litigation expenses, moral damages and exemplary damages for the
allegedly unfounded action filed by respondent.
Respondent filed a Motion to Strike Out Answer With Compulsory Counterclaim And
To Declare Defendant In Default because petitioners answer was allegedly filed out of
time. However, the trial court denied the motion and similarly rejected respondents
motion for reconsideration. Respondent then filed a motion to dismiss petitioners
counterclaim, contending that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the same
because of the non-payment of docket fees by petitioner. In response, petitioner asked
the trial court to declare her counterclaim as exempt from payment of docket fees since
it is compulsory and that respondent be declared in default for having failed to answer
such counterclaim.
RTC: Granted respondents motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim and
consequently denied petitioners motion. The court found petitioners counterclaim to
be merely permissive in nature and held that petitioners failure to pay docket fees
prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the same. It also denied
petitioners MR.
CA: Sustained the trial court, finding petitioners own admissions, as
contained in her answer, show that her counterclaim is merely permissive.
Issue: WON petitioners counterclaim of petitioner is compulsory or permissive.
Held: Some are permissive, some are compulsory.
A compulsory counterclaim is one which, being cognizable by the regular courts of
justice, arises out of or is connected with the transaction or occurrence constituting the
subject matter of the opposing partys claim and does not require for its adjudication
the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction.
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals, this Court capsulized the criteria or tests that
may be used in determining whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive,
summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the
same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well
as defendants counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of Appeals, is the
compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical relationship
between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where conducting separate trials of the
respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial duplication of effort and time
by the parties and the court.

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Tested against the abovementioned standards, petitioners counterclaim for
commissions, bonuses, and accumulated premium reserves is merely
permissive. The evidence required to prove petitioners claims differs from that
needed to establish respondents demands for the recovery of cash accountabilities
from petitioner, such as cash advances and costs of premiums. The recovery of
respondents claims is not contingent or dependent upon establishing petitioners
counterclaim, such that conducting separate trials will not result in the substantial
duplication of the time and effort of the court and the parties. One would search the
records in vain for a logical connection between the parties claims. This conclusion is
further reinforced by petitioners own admissions since she declared in her answer that
respondents cause of action, unlike her own, was not based upon the Special Agents
Contract. However, petitioners claims for damages, allegedly suffered as
a result of the filing by respondent of its complaint, are compulsory.
There is no need for petitioner to pay docket fees for her compulsory
counterclaim. On the other hand, in order for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over
her permissive counterclaim, petitioner is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees.
The rule on the payment of filing fees has been laid down by the Court in the case of
Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Hon. Maximiano Asuncion:
1. It is not simply the filing of the complaint or appropriate initiatory pleading,
but the payment of the prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial court with
jurisdiction over the subject-matter or nature of the action. Where the filing
of the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by payment of the docket fee, the
court may allow payment of the fee within a reasonable time but in no case
beyond the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period.
2. The same rule applies to permissive counterclaims, third-party claims and
similar pleadings, which shall not be considered filed until and unless the
filing fee prescribed therefor is paid. The court may allow payment of said fee
within a reasonable time but also in no case beyond its applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for determination by the court, the additional
filing fee therefor shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the
responsibility of the Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce
said lien and assess and collect the additional fee.
The above mentioned ruling in Sun Insurance has been reiterated in the recent
case of Suson v. Court of Appeals. In Suson, the Court explained that although the
payment of the prescribed docket fees is a jurisdictional requirement, its
non-payment does not result in the automatic dismissal of the case

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is
nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of
the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after
respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to
pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to
declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket
fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer
her
counterclaim.
However,
the
trial
court
dismissed
petitioners
counterclaim. Pursuant to this Courts ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should
have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive
counterclaim.

Korea Technologies Co., Ltd. Vs. Hon. Albert A. Lerma, et al. ,


G.R. No. 143581. January 7, 2008
Topic: Rules 1-5
Doctrine: At the time PGSMC filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against
KOGIES, it was not liable to pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in
nature. We stress, however, that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as
amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in
compulsory counterclaim or cross-claims.
RTC: The RTC dismissed the petitioners motion to dismiss respondents
counterclaims
CA: The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court
SC: WHEREFORE, this petition is PARTLY GRANTED, in that:
(1) The May 30, 2000 CA Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 49249 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE;
(2) The September 21, 1998 and October 19, 1998 RTC Orders in Civil Case No.
98-117 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
(3) The parties are hereby ORDERED to submit themselves to the arbitration of
their dispute and differences arising from the subject Contract before the
KCAB; and
(4) PGSMC is hereby ALLOWED to dismantle and transfer the equipment and
machineries, if it had not done so, and ORDERED to preserve and maintain

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them until the finality of whatever arbitral award is given in the arbitration
proceedings.

FACTS: Petitioner KOGIES and respondent PGSMC executed a Contract whereby


KOGIES would set up an LPG Cylinder Manufacturing Plant for respondent.
Respondent unilaterally cancelled the contract on the ground that petitioner had
altered the quantity and lowered the quality of the machineries and equipment it
delivered. Petitioner opposed informing the latter that PGSMC could not unilaterally
rescind their contract nor dismantle and transfer the machineries and equipment on
mere imagined violations by petitioner. Petitioner then filed a Complaint for Specific
Performance against respondent before the RTC. Respondent filed its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim asserting that it had the full right to dismantle and transfer
the machineries and equipment because it had paid for them in full as stipulated in the
contract. KOGIES filed a motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims arguing that
when PGSMC filed the counterclaims, it should have paid docket fees and filed a
certificate of non-forum shopping, and that its failure to do so was a fatal defect. The
RTC dismissed the petitioners motion to dismiss respondents counterclaims as these
counterclaims fell within the requisites of compulsory counterclaims.
ISSUE: WON payment of docket fees and certificate of non-forum shopping were
required in the respondents Answer with counterclaim?
HELD: NO. The counterclaims of PGSMC were incorporated in its Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim in accordance with Section 8 of Rule 11, 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, the rule that was effective at the time the Answer with Counterclaim
was filed. Sec. 8 on existing counterclaim or cross-claim states, A compulsory
counterclaim or a cross-claim that a defending party has at the time he files his answer
shall be contained therein. As to the failure to submit a certificate of forum shopping,
PGSMCs Answer is not an initiatory pleading, which requires a certification against
forum shopping under Sec. 524 of Rule 7, 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. It is a
responsive pleading, hence, the courts a quo did not commit reversible error in denying
KOGIES motion to dismiss PGSMCs compulsory counterclaims. At the time PGSMC
filed its Answer incorporating its counterclaims against KOGIES, it was not liable to
pay filing fees for said counterclaims being compulsory in nature. We stress, however,
that effective August 16, 2004 under Sec. 7, Rule 141, as amended by A.M. No. 04-204-SC, docket fees are now required to be paid in compulsory counterclaim or crossclaims.

MERCADO vs CA
TOPIC: Payment of Docket Fees
FACTS:

ISSUE: Whether or not RTC never acquired jurisdiction because of non-payment of


docket fees by SMC?
RULING:
-

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Leonides Mercado had been distributing respondent (SMC)s beer products


in Quiapo, Manila
Mercado assigned 3 China Banking Corp. (CBC) certificates deposit
amounting to P5M to SMC and executed a continuing hold-out agreement
He also submitted 3 surety bonds from Eastern Assurance and Surety
Corporation (EASCO)
On Feb 10, 1992, SMC notified CBC that Mercado failed to pay for the items
he withdrew on credit. It asked the CBC to release the proceeds of the
assigned certificates of deposit.
On March 2, 1992, Mercado filed an action to annul the continuing hold-out
agreement and deed of assignment in the RTC of Manila claiming that the
continuing hold-out agreement allowed forfeiture without the benefit of
foreclosure.
On March 18, 1992, SMC filed its answer with counterclaim against Mercado
contending that Mercado delivered only 2 CBC certificates amounting to
P4.5Million
On April 23, 1992, SMC filed a third-party complaint against EASCO. It
sought to collect the proceeds of the surety bonds submitted by Mercado
Mercado filed an urgent manifestation and motion seeking the dismissal of
the complaint which the RTC denied.
CA affirmed the decision of RTC dismissing the complaint and ordered
Mercado and EASCO to jointly and severally pay SMC the amount of P7M
EASCO filed a petitioner for review on certiorari but eventually agreed to
settle its liability with SMC
Mercado passed away and was substituted by his heirs
Petitioner said that SMCs counterclaim was permissive in nature. SMC did
not pay docket fees, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the
counterclaim

When Mercado sought to annul he continuing hold-out agreement and deed


of assignment, he in effect sought to be freed from them
Aside from invoking the validity of the said agreements, SMC therefore
sought to collect the payment for the value of goods Mercado purchased on
credit.
Mercados complaint and SMCs counterclaim both touched the issues of
whether the continuing hold-out agreement and deed of assignment were
valid and whether Mercado has outstanding liabilities to SMC. The same
evidence would essentially support or refute Mercados claim and SMCs
counterclaim
SMCs counterclaim, being logically related to Mercados claim, was
compulsory in nature
The payment of docket fees was not necessary for the RTC to acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter

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PROTON PILIPINAS V. BANQUE NACIONAL DE PARIS Docket Fees


Doctrine: Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but, subsequently, the
judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if specified, has been left for
determination by the court, the additional filing fee shall constitute a lien on the
judgment. The exception to the rule is limited only to any damages that may arise after
the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible for the
claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof.
Facts:

Proton Pilipinas availed of credit facilities of Banque Nacional de Paris (BNP).


Protons resulting debt of $2M was guaranteed by Automotive Corporation
Philippines, Asea One Corp., and Autocorp Group.

BNP and Proton subsequently executed trust receipt agreements, where


Proton would receive passenger motor vehicles in trust for BNP, with the
option to sell them, subject to the condition that Proton would deliver the
proceeds of the sale to BNP, to be applied to the formers debt. Vehicles
remaining unsold would be returned to BNP. Proton allegedly failed to deliver.

BNP demanded from Protons corporate guarantors $1.5M, the total


outstanding obligation. The guarantors refused. BNP filed a complaint with
the Makati RTC praying for $1.5M plus accrued interest and other related
charges.

Respondent Proton filed a motion to dismiss, contending that 1) BNP failed to


pay the correct docket fees which is supposed to include interest, based on
Admin Circ. No. 11-94, and therefore the court could not have acquired
jurisdiction over the case, 2) the clerk of court failed to apply the correct
exchange rate, and that 3) since no demand letter was given, the complaint
was premature.

The court (Makati RTC) denied the petition, stating that the petitioner
properly paid the docket fees. It stated that Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal amount being
claimed in the pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. It
court further added that assuming the correct filing fees were not paid, the
rule is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the
prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is
cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the
meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.

Regarding the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange, the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Makati pegged it at P 43.00 to US$1. Absent any office
guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty bound to
follow, the rate he applied is presumptively correct.

With regard to the demand letter, the court said that the failure to make a
formal demand is not among the legal grounds for the dismissal of the case.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

CA ruled that, respondent Judge committed no grave abuse of discretion


amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to warrant certiorari and
mandamus.

Issues:
1) Whether BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees
2) Whether the Clerk of court applied the wrong exchange rate
3) Whether the amount of interest was not specified in the prayer, rendering the
complaint void.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner relied on a case decided in 1989 where Rule 141 was applied, the
interest and costs having been excluded in the computation of the aggregate
amount. However, the present case was filed in 1998, when such rule had
already been amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94.
The amended rule includes the interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and other costs in the computation of the aggregate
amount. In the complaint, respondent prayed for accrued
interestsubsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid. The complaint
having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondents claim includes the
interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing. Respondent not having
paid the fees for such, cannot claim the interest within such duration, unless
respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable
time and specify the precise amount of interest petitioners owe within the
period and pay the corresponding docket fee.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same
can only be determined after a final judgment has been handed down.
Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the corresponding docket fee.
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional fees which
shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to
interest accruing after the filing of the complaint.
2.

In the Clerk of Courts application of exchange rate, the presumption of


regularity is disputable, not conclusive. Petitioners have presented rebutting
evidence that the exchange rate when the case was filed was P43.21 to US$1,
not P43.00. Thus, the docket fees were insufficient. However, the trial court
did acquire jurisdiction. Respondent merely relied on the assessment made by
the Clerk of court. In such a case, where there exists no effort in defrauding
the government, respondent even demonstrating his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees as required, the court acquires
jurisdiction.

3.

Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee

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shall constitute a lien on the judgment. It shall be the responsibility of the
Clerk of Court or his duly authorized deputy to enforce said lien and assess
and collect the additional fee. The amount of any claim for damages, therefore,
arising on or before the filing of the complaint or any pleading should be
specified. While the determination of certain damages is left to the discretion
of the court, it is the duty of the parties claiming such damages to specify the
amount sought on the basis of which the court may make a proper
determination, and for the proper assessment of the appropriate docket fees.
The exception to the rule is limited only to any damages that may arise after
the filing of the complaint or similar pleading for then it will not be possible
for the claimant to specify nor speculate as to the amount thereof. Petition is
partially granted. The Clerk of Court is ordered to reassess and determine the
docket fees that should be paid by respondent within fifteen (15) days,
provided the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period has not yet
expired.
Remedial Law Review
RUBY SHELTER BUILDERS AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, petitioner vs. HON. PABLO C. FORMARAN, respondent.
TOPIC: RULE 1-5; FILING FEES
DOCTRINE: A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a
real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property
involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In
computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of
relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value
of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated
value of the same.
FACTS: Ruby Shelter Builders (RSB) obtained a P95M loan in from Tan and Obiedo,
secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over five parcels of land located in Naga City. RSB
failed to pay the loan despite being granted several extensions. It was agreed that RSB
should execute deeds of absolute sale over the five parcel of lands in lieu of payment
(i.e. dacion en pago).
Without payment having been made by RSB, Tan and Obiedo presented the Deeds of
Absolute Sale, as a result of which, they were able to secure TCTs over the five parcels
of land in their names.
RSB filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan and Obiedo for
declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages. RSBs causes of actions were: (a)
pactum commissorium; and (b) bad faith by Tan and Obediedo.
Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC, RSB paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket
and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court
initially considered the case as an action incapable of pecuniary estimation and
computed the docket and other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1),

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.


Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that the civil case
involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance
with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by
A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner did not
pay the appropriate docket fees for the civil case, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction
over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring
RSB to pay the correct and accurate docket fees and should RSB fail to do so, to deny
and dismiss the case.
RTC ordered RSB to pay additional filing fee and Tan was also ordered to pay docket
and filing fees on his counterclaim.
CA upheld RTC, saying that the objectives of RSB in filing the complaint were to
cancel the deeds of sale and ultimately, to recover possession of the same. It is
therefore a real action. Consequently, the additional docket fees that must be paid
cannot be assessed in accordance with Section 7(b). As a real action, Section 7(a) must
be applied in the assessment and payment of the proper docket fee.
RTC, instead of dismissing outright RSBs Complaint, granted RSB time to pay the
additional docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner
refused to pay the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had
already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court, as amended.
ISSUE: For the purposes of paying the correct amount of docket fees, whether or not
the annulment of deed of sale involving a real property is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
HELD: No. The Case is a real action.
After Tan and Obiedo had the Deeds of Absolute Sale presented to the Register of
Deeds, they were already issued TCTs over the real properties in question, in their
own names. No matter how fastidiously RSB attempts to conceal them, the allegations
and reliefs it sought in its Complaint appears to be ultimately a real action, involving
as they do the recovery by RSM of its title to and possession of the five parcels of land
from Tan and Obiedo.
While it is true that RSB does not directly seek the recovery of title or possession of
the property in question, his action for annulment of sale and his claim for damages
are closely intertwined with the issue of ownership of the building which, under the
law, is considered immovable property, the recovery of which is RSB's primary
objective. The prevalent doctrine is that an action for the annulment or rescission of a
sale of real property does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective
and nature of the case, which is to recover said real property. It is a real action.
Considering that the complaint is a real action, the Rule requires that "the assessed

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value of the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof shall be alleged
by the claimant and shall be the basis in computing the fees.

3.

A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action
would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved
therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing
the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the
assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real
properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of
the same.
St. Louis University, Inc. v Evangeline C. Cobarrubias (2010)

VA: When circulation and mediation again failed, parties submitted the issues
for Voluntary arbitration.
a. Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave
issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave
for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a fiveyear period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the
same five-year period.
b. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final.
The VA dismissed the complaint. CA decision is not yet final
because of the pending appeal with the SC.

4.

Brion, J.
Re: Rules 1-5; Docket fees

CA: Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material
portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with
the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition.
a.

Cobarrubas filed her MR, arguing that the ground cited is technical.
She attached to her motion copies of the material portions of the
record and the postal money order.

b.

CA reinstated the petition and found Cobarrubias substantially


complied with the rules by paying the appeal fee in full and attaching
the proper documents in her MR. SLU insisted that VA decision had
already attained finality for Cobarrubias failure to pay the docket
fees on time.

c.

CA brushed aside SLUs insistence on the finality of the VA decision


and annulled it. CA ordered SLU to pay all benefits due Cobarrubias
when she was placed on forced leave.

DOCTRINE
Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without
which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal
has been filed. There are, however, recognized exceptions to their strict
observance.

FACTS
Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the
union of faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the
following provision that: teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation,
who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be on forced
leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be
suspended.

SLU filed the present petition for review on certiorari.

1.

SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the appeal since
Cobarrubias failed to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period, and
rendered the VA decision final and executory. Even if Cobarrubias procedural
lapse is disregarded, SLU submits that Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA
should apply irrespective of the five-year effectivity of each CBA.

2.

Cobarrubias insists that the CA settled the appeal fee issue, in its July 30, 2008
resolution, when it found that she had substantially complied with the rules
by subsequently paying the docket fees in full. She submits that the CAs
interpretation of Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA is more in accord with
law and jurisprudence

Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating
points.
1.

Grievance Machinery: Respondent sought recourse from the CBAs


grievance machinery, but to no avail.

2.

NCMB: Respondent filed a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension
with NCMB.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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ISSUE
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating respondents petition despite her
failure to appeal (docket) fee within the reglementary period.

HELD

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellants fault;
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
importance of the issues involved; and
exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant
circumstances.

Yes. The CA erred in its ruling.

Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a
petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.

Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance
a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.

28. Relucio v Lopez


Facts

Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA
clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the
procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petitions
dismissal.

Case Background
On September 15, 1993, Angelina Lopez (Angelina) filed a petition for Appointment
for Sole
Administratrix of Conjugal Partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc. against Alberto
Lopez

Thus, payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period


is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential
requirement, without which, the decision appealed from would become final
and executory as if no appeal has been filed.

Here, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the
full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not perfected within the
reglementary period.

There are, however, recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such


as:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

most persuasive and weighty reasons;


to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to
comply with the prescribed procedure;
good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable
time from the time of the default;
the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
the merits of the case;
a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored
by the suspension of the rules;

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

(Alberto) and Imelda Relucio (Imelda), in the RTC of Makati, Branch 141, which alleged
that
Alberto, legally married to Angelina:

abandoned her and their four legitimate children


took full and exclusive control and administration of the conjugal partnership
spent and used the same for his sole gain and benefit to the total exclusion of
Angelina and their four children
after abandoning his family, maintained an illicit relationship and cohabited
with
Imelda since 1976

during their period of cohabitation since 1976, Alberto and Imelda have amassed a
fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations,
residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and
other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry; these properties, which are in the
names of Alberto and Imelda, singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been
acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money, property
and industry of Alberto with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from Imelda.
Alberto evaded his obligations as a father and husband and excluded Angelina and their
four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income
or fruits; he either did not place it in his name or concealed them from Angelina in the

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past 25 years that Alberto abandoned them, he has sold, disposed of, alienated,
transferred, assigned, cancelled, removed or stashed away properties, assets and
income belonging to the conjugal and either spent the proceeds for his sole benefit and
that of Imelda and their two illegitimate children, or permanently and fraudulently
placed them beyond the reach of the private-respondent and their four children. On
December 8, 1993, Imelda filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that
Angelina had no cause of action against her
RTC: Feb 10, 1994, order issued denying Imeldas Motion to Dismiss Imelda is
impleaded as a necessary or indispensable party because some of the subject properties
are registered in her name and Alberto, or solely in her name Imelda filed a Motion for
Reconsideration from the Feb 10, 1994 order, but was denied
Imelda filed with the CA a petition for certiorari assailing trial courts denial
of her motion to dismiss May 31, 1996, denied Imeldas petition for certiorari Imelda
filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but was denied
Issue:
1. Whether Angelinas petition for appointment established a cause of action against
Imelda
2. Whether Imeldas inclusion as party defendant is essential in the proceedings for a
complete

2. No, she is not essential; she is not a real party in interest, an indispensable
party, nor a
necessary party a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the
judgment of the suit. in this case, Imelda would be affected by any judgment
in the
proceeding if Imelda, is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. an
indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination
of an
action. in this case, the trial court can issue a judgment in favor of Angelina
and such
judgment will be valid and enforceable against Alberto but will not affect
Imelda in
any way. Imelda is not a necessary party; according to Sec. 8 Rule 3 of the
ROC, a necessary
party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In this case,
Angelina
could and would be able to have complete relief even without the participation
of
Imelda

adjudication of the controversy


DE CASTRO and DE CASTRO, vs. CA and ARTIGO
G.R. No. 115838. July 18, 2002

Held:
Substantial Issue:
No, no cause of action was established the elements of cause of action are: a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and an act or omission
on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. to determine
the sufficiency of cause of action, we must look at the allegation nowhere in
the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against the petitioner;
Angelinas causes of action are all against Alberto first cause of action:
appointment as sole administratix; the administration of property of marriage
is between them to the exclusion of all others second cause of action: an
accounting of the conjugal partnership; the
accounting is merely an incident of marriage alternative cause of action:
forfeiture of the property co-owned by Alberto and Imelda; what can only be
forfeited is Albertos share, assuming that there is a law that would permit that
another cause of action: support; support cannot be compelled from a
stranger.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

TOPIC: INDISPENSABLE PARTIES


DOCTRINE: The general rule is that all indispensible parties should be impleaded as
the joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot proceed without
their presence. However, there is no longer a need for all the co-owners to be impleaded
if one of the co-owners acts in behalf of the other co-owners.
FACTS: Private respondent Francisco Artigo sued petitioners Constante A. De Castro
and Corazon A. De Castro to collect the unpaid balance of his brokers commission
from the De Castros. The petitioner-appellants were co-owners of four lots. In a letter,
Artigo was authorized by appellants to act as real estate broker in the sale
of these properties for the amount of P23,000,000.00, five percent (5%) of
which will be given to the agent as commission. It was appellee who first found
Times Transit Corporation, represented by its president Mr. Rondaris, as prospective
buyer which desired to buy 2 lots only. Eventually, the sale was consummated. Appellee
received from appellants P48,893.76 as commission.
ARTIGOS CONTENTION: He felt short changed because according to him, his
total commission should be P352,500.00 which is 5% of the agreed price
of P7,050,000.00 paid by Times Transit Corporation and that it was he who
introduced the buyer to appellants and unceasingly facilitated the negotiation which

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ultimately led to the consummation of the sale. Hence, he sued below to collect the
balance.
DE CASTROS CONTENTION: Appellee is selfishly asking for more than what he
truly deserved as commission to the prejudice of other agents who were more
instrumental in the consummation of the sale. Although appellants concede that it
was appellee who first introduced Times Transit Corp. to them, appellee was not
designated by them as their exclusive real estate agent but that in fact there were
more or less 18 others whose collective efforts in the long run dwarfed those of
appellees, considering that the first negotiation for the sale where appellee took active
participation failed and it was these other agents who successfully brokered in the
second negotiation.
Moreover, The De Castros argue that Artigos complaint should have been
dismissed for failure to implead all the co-owners of the two lots. They
claim that Artigo always knew that the two lots were co-owned by Constante and
Corazon with their other siblings Jose and Carmela whom Constante merely
represented.
Further, they contend that failure to implead such
indispensable parties is fatal to the complaint since Artigo, as agent of all
the four co-owners, would be paid with funds co-owned by the four coowners.
CA- Affirmed In toto TCs decision.
It ruled that Constante authorized Artigo to act as agent in the sale of two lots. The
handwritten authorization letter signed by Constante clearly established a contract of
agency between Constante and Artigo. Thus, Artigo sought prospective buyers and
found Times Transit Corporation Artigo facilitated the negotiations which eventually
led to the sale of the two lots. Therefore, the Court of Appeals decided that Artigo is
entitled to the 5% commission on the purchase price as provided in the contract of
agency.
CA ruled that Artigos complaint is not dismissible for failure to
implead as indispensable parties the other co-owners of the two lots. The
Court of Appeals explained that it is not necessary to implead the other
co-owners since the action is exclusively based on a contract of agency
between Artigo and Constante.
ISSUE: WON the complaint merits dismissal for failure to implead other co-owners
as indispensable parties
HELD: No.
RATIO:
An indispensable party is one whose interest will be affected by the courts
action in the litigation, and without whom no final determination of the case can be
had. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory and courts cannot
proceed without their presence. Whenever it appears to the court in the course of
a proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court
to stop the trial and order the inclusion of such party. However, the rule on mandatory
joinder of indispensable parties is not applicable to the instant case.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

There is no dispute that Constante appointed Artigo in a handwritten note to sell


the properties of the De Castros for P23 million at a 5 percent commission.
Constante signed the note as owner and as representative of the
other co-owners. Under this note, a contract of agency was clearly
constituted between Constante and Artigo. Whether Constante appointed
Artigo as agent, in Constantes individual or representative capacity, or
both, the De Castros cannot seek the dismissal of the case for failure to
implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The De Castros
admit that the other co-owners are solidarily liable under the contract of
agency,http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2002/jul2002/115838.htm
_edn10 citing Article 1915 of the Civil Code.
The solidary liability of the four co-owners, however, militates against the De Castros
theory that the other co-owners should be impleaded as indispensable parties. A noted
commentator explained Article 1915 thus The rule in this article applies even when
the appointments were made by the principals in separate acts, provided that they are
for the same transaction. The solidarity arises from the common interest of
the principals, and not from the act of constituting the agency. By virtue of
this solidarity, the agent can recover from any principal the whole
compensation and indemnity owing to him by the others. The parties,
however, may, by express agreement, negate this solidary responsibility. The solidarity
does not disappear by the mere partition effected by the principals after the
accomplishment of the agency.
If the undertaking is one in which several are interested, but only some create
the agency, only the latter are solidarily liable, without prejudice to the effects
of negotiorum gestio with respect to the others. And if the power granted includes
various transactions some of which are common and others are not, only those
interested in each transaction shall be liable for it.
When the law expressly provides for solidarity of the obligation, as in the liability
of co-principals in a contract of agency, each obligor may be compelled to pay the entire
obligation.[12] The agent may recover the whole compensation from any one of the coprincipals, as in this case. Indeed, Article 1216 of the Civil Code provides that a creditor
may sue any of the solidary debtors.
Thus, the Court has ruled in Operators Incorporated vs. American Biscuit Co.,
Inc. that x x x solidarity does not make a solidary obligor an
indispensable party in a suit filed by the creditor. Article 1216 of the Civil Code
says that the creditor `may proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously.
LOTTE PHIL v Dela Cruz
Indispensible Parties

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Doctrine: The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court
with jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the
right to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a
suit or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
Facts:
Private respondent (petitioner herein) Lotte Phils., Inc. (Lotte) is a domestic
corporation. Petitioners (respondents herein) are among those who were
hired and assigned to the confectionery facility operated by private
respondent.
On December 14, 1995 and yearly thereafter until the year 2000 7J
Maintenance and Janitorial Services (7J) entered into a contract with
private respondent to provide manpower for needed maintenance, utility,
janitorial and other services to the latter. In compliance with the terms and
conditions of the service contract, and to accommodate the needs of private
respondent for personnel/workers to do and perform piece works,
petitioners, among others, were hired and assigned to private respondent as
repackers or sealers.
However, either in October, 1999 or on February 9, 2000, private respondent
dispensed with their services allegedly due to the expiration/termination of
the service contract by respondent with 7J. They were either told hwag muna
kayong pumasok at tatawagan na lang kung may gawa; or were asked to wait
pag magrereport sila sa trabaho. Unfortunately, petitioners were never
called back to work again.
Aggrieved, petitioners lodged a labor complaint against both private
respondent Lotte and 7J, for illegal dismissal, regularization, payment of
corresponding backwages and related employment benefits, 13th month pay,
service incentive leave, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees
based on total judgment award.
LA: 7J guilty of illegal dismissal
NLRC: Respondents file MR to declare Lotte as their employer, denied.
CA: Respondents file a petition for Certiorai, Lotte said it must be dismissed
for failure to implead 7J who is a party in interest. Reversed decision of the LA
and NLRC, Lotte is the employer of respondents. Denied petitioners MR
Issue: Wheter or not 7J is an indispensible party to the case and failure to
implead them warrants the dismissal of the case
Held: Yes

Ratio:
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit
or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because
it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents. The Court of
Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was
not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents.
Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.
Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No
final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion
is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order
to accord all parties with due process and fair play.

DELA CRUZ v. JOAQUIN


GR NO. 162788, JULY 28, 2005
DOCTRINES:1
Main doctrine: The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be
substituted as parties to a litigation. This requirement is necessitated by due process.
Thus, when the rights of the legal representatives of a decedent are actually recognized
and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with the Rules cannot

1 (*- incidental topics)

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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affect the validity of the promulgated decision. After all, due process had thereby been
satisfied.
Substitution of heirs; Not a matter of jurisdiction: Strictly speaking, the rule on
the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due
process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of representative of
heir is recognized and protected, non-compliance or belated formal compliance with
the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere failure to substitute
for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial courts decision. The
alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation of due process.
*Res judicata; Elements:
1.
2.
3.
4.

The former judgment or order must be final;


It must have been rendered on the merits of the controversy;
The court that rendered it must have had jurisdiction over the subject matter
and the parties; and
There must have been between the first and the second actions an identity
of parties, subject matter and cause of action.

Under Res Judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
of jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits
and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means
a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment. This principle bars
a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and a cause of action.
Public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given appoint
in time.
*Rule on Forum Shopping: Forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by a party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to
seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for
certiorari.
Forum shopping triffles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice, and congests court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation
of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt of court.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in another. We note, however, petitioners claim that the subject matter of the
present case has already been litigated and decided. Therefore, the applicable doctrine
is res judicata.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Facts: The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against
petitioners in the RTC. Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in
the amount of P9,000 payable after five (5) years. To secure the payment of the
obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was
for a parcel of land. The parties also executed another document entitled Kasunduan.
Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an
equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was merely an
accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property, a right that he failed to
exercise.
RTC: Declared that the parties had entered into a sale with right to
repurchase. It further held that Respondent had made a valid tender of
payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase. Hence,
petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his payment.
CA: Sustained the RTC decision and ordered a substitution by legal
representatives, in view of respondents death.
Petitioners now assert that the RTCs Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction when
respondent died during the pendency of the case and that there was no substitution of
heirs.
Issue: WON the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon respondents death.
Held: NO.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules
under Sec.16, Rule 3 require a substitution of the deceased. The rule on the substitution
of parties was crafted to protect every partys right to due process. The estate of the
deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the
successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied. A formal
substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear,
participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions
negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, non-compliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere
failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
courts decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation
of due process.
Case records show that respondents heirs voluntarily appeared and participated in the
case after the CA had ordered for legal representatives to appear and substitute for him.
As such, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the
heirs, to have substituted for the deceased respondent. As there was no violation of due

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process, the issue of substituAtion cannot be upheld as a ground to nullify the trial
courts Decision.
DOMINGO CARABEO, Petitioner, vs.
SPOUSES NORBERTO and SUSAN DINGCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 190823 April 4, 2011

Topic: Death or Separation of Party


Doctrine: Petitioners counsel of record had no personality to act on behalf of the
already deceased client who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a party
after his death.

RTC: The trial court ruled in favor of respondents


CA: Affirmed the decision the trial court.
SC: Petition is DENIED.

Facts: On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract
denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with
Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell
his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III,
Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for P38,000. Respondents tendered their initial
payment of P10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on
September 1990, and paid small amounts to petitioner, who still had to settle a family
squabble over said land. After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31,
2001,2 petitioner passed away. The records do not show that petitioners counsel informed
Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper
substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court.
Petitioners counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on March 20, 2001.

Issue: Whether or not the counsel had personality to act on behalf of the deceased
petitioner.

Ruling: The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in
filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioners counsel of record had no personality to act on
behalf of the already deceased client, who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a
party after his death. The trial courts decision had thereby become final and executory, no
appeal having been perfected.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

NAVARRO vs. ESCOBIDO


TOPIC: Real party
FACTS:
Respondent Karen T. Go filed 2 complaints before the RC for replevin
and/or sum of money with damages against Navarro
Karen Go prayed that the RTC issue writs of replevin for the seizure of 2
motor vehicles in Navarros possession
Navarro alleged as a special affirmative defense that the 2 complaints stated
no cause of action since Karen Go was not a party to the Lease Agreements
with Option to Purchase
o The lease agreement was between Kargo Enterprises, then
represented by its Manager, Glenn Go, and defendant Navarro
Acting on the presumption that Glenn Gos leasing business is a conjugal
property, the RTC held that Karen Go had sufficient interest in the his
leasing business to file the action against Navarro
RTC held that Karen Go should have included her husband, Glenn Go, in the
complaint based on Sec 4, Rule 3 of ROC. RTC ordered Karen Go to file a
motion for the inclusion of Glenn Go as co-plaintiff
Navarro filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that a
complaint which failed to state a cause of action could not be converted into
one with a cause of action by mere amendment or supplemental pleading.
Navarro alleges that even if the lease agreements were in the name of Kargo
enterprises, since it did not have the requisite juridical personality to sue, the
actual parties to the agreement are himself and Glenn Go. Since it was Karen
Go who filed the complaints and not Glenn Go, she was not a real party-ininterest and the complaints failed to state a cause of action
o In effect, the LC created a cause of action for Karen Go when there
was none at the time she filed the complaints and the inclusion of
Glenn Go as co-plaintiff drastically changed the theory of the
complaints, to his great prejudice
ISSUE:
whether or not Karen Go is a real party in this case?
RULING:
Karen Go is the real party-in-interest
The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that every action must be
prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-interest
Navarro admits that Karen Go is the registered owner of the business name
Kargo Enterprises
The name appears in the title of the complaint where the plaintiff was
identified as Karen Go, doing business under the name KARGO
ENTERPRISES
In the agreement it was indicated that

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GLENN O. GO, representing KARGO ENTERPRISES, as its
manager
The express terms of this Lease Agreement, Glenn Go did sign the agreement
only as the manager of Karen Go Enterprises and the latter is clearly the real
party to the lease agreements
Pursuant to Sec 1, Rule 3 of ROC, Kargo Enterprises cannot be a party to a
civil action, who then is the proper party to file an action?
As the registered owner of Kargo Enterprises, Karen Go is the party who will
directly benefit from or be injured by a judgment in this case
o

CHINA BANKING CORP VS OLIVER Indispensable Party

The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, stating that a
reading of the COMPLAINT which of course is hypothetically admitted, will
show that a valid judgment can be rendered against defendant.

The Court of Appeals promulgated the assailed decision, finding no


grave abuse of discretion committed by the trial judge in ruling that the Rules
of Court provided the manner of impleading parties to a case and in suggesting
that petitioner file an appropriate action to bring the mortgagor within the
courts jurisdiction. The appellate court said that Rule 6, Section 11 of the
Rules of Court allows petitioner to file a third-party complaint against the
mortgagor.

As to the judgment by default, the Court of Appeals said that an order denying
the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and may not be questioned through a
special civil action for certiorari. The defendant must proceed with the case
and raise the issues in his motion to dismiss when he appeals to a higher
court. In this case, petitioner Chinabank should have filed its answer when it
received the order denying the motion to dismiss. The special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals did not interrupt the period to file an
answer, there being no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction issued.

Doctrine: An indispensable party is a party in interest, without whom no final


determination can be had of an action.
Facts:

Petitioner Chinabank alleges that there are two owners duplicate copies of
TCT No. S-50195 involved in this case and two persons claiming to be the real
MERCEDES MARAVILLA OLIVER. One is the mortgagor, Oliver One. The
other is the respondent, Oliver Two. Respondents complaint before the trial
court was one for cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in petitioners
possession (Annex B).
Respondent, whom we shall call as Oliver Two, claimed that she was the
registered and lawful owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage;
that the owners duplicate copy of the title had always been in her possession;
and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank. She
prayed that: (1) the owners duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well
as the original title with the Registry of Deeds be cancelled; (2) the mortgage
be declared null and void; and (3) the Registry of Deeds be ordered to issue a
new and clean title in her name
According to petitioner, the issue is the genuineness of the titles, which is
intertwined with the issue of ownership. This being the case, said the
petitioner, the mortgagor Oliver One must necessarily be impleaded for she is
the registered owner. Petitioner argues that mortgagor Oliver One is in a
better position to defend her title. She stands to suffer if it is declared
fake. Further, petitioner claims that the validity and enforceability of the
mortgage entirely depends on the validity and authenticity of Annex B. The
mortgage cannot be declared a nullity without the trial court declaring Annex
B a nullity.
Hence, mortgagor Oliver Ones participation in the suit is indispensable,
according to petitioner. In brief, what petitioner Chinabank is saying is that it
was indispensable for respondent Oliver Two to implead mortgagor Oliver
One in the case before the trial court. Failing to do that, the complaint of
herein respondent Oliver Two should have been dismissed.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Issue:
1. Is the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes M. Oliver, herein
called Oliver One, an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 96219?
2. Should Section 7 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in this
case?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err when it sustained the trial courts declaration
that petitioner was in default?
Ruling:
1.

Petitioners contention is far from tenable. An indispensable party is a party


in interest, without whom no final determination can be had of an action. It is
true that mortgagor Oliver One is a party in interest, for she will be affected by
the outcome of the case. She stands to be benefited in case the mortgage is
declared valid, or injured in case her title is declared fake. However,
mortgagor Oliver Ones absence from the case does not hamper the trial court
in resolving the dispute between respondent Oliver Two and petitioner. A
perusal of Oliver Twos allegations in the complaint below shows that it was
for annulment of mortgage due to petitioners negligence in not determining
the actual ownership of the property, resulting in the mortgages annotation
on TCT No. S-50195 in the Registry of Deeds custody. To support said
allegations, respondent Oliver Two had to prove (1) that she is the real
Mercedes M. Oliver referred to in the TCT, and (2) that she is not the same
person using that name who entered into a deed of mortgage with the
petitioner. This, respondent Oliver Two can do in her complaint without

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necessarily impleading the mortgagor Oliver One. Hence, Oliver One is not
an indispensable party in the case filed by Oliver Two.
In Noceda vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 313 SCRA 504 (1999), we held that a
party is not indispensable to the suit if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is distinct and divisible from the interest of the other parties and will
not necessarily be prejudiced by a judgment which does complete justice to
the parties in court. In this case, Chinabank has interest in the loan which,
however, is distinct and divisible from the mortgagors interest, which
involves the land used as collateral for the loan.
2.

3.

As to the second issue, since mortgagor Oliver One is not an indispensable


party, Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires
compulsory joinder of indispensable parties in a case, does not apply. Instead,
it is Section 11, Rule 3, that applies. Non-joinder of parties is not a ground for
dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court, either on
its own initiative or on motion of the parties. Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed no error when it found no abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial court for denying Chinabanks motion to dismiss and, instead, suggested
that petitioner file an appropriate action against mortgagor Oliver One. A
person who is not a party to an action may be impleaded by the defendant
either on the basis of liability to himself or on the ground of direct liability to
the plaintiff.
Now, the third issue, did the Court of Appeals err when it sustained the trial
courts ruling that petitioner Chinabank was in default? As found by the Court
of Appeals, petitioner did not file its answer, although it received the March
13, 1997 order denying the motion to dismiss. Instead, petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Said petition,
however, does not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction is issued. No
such order or writ was issued in this case. Hence, Chinabank as defendant
below was properly declared in default by the trial court, after the 15-day
period to file its answer or other responsive pleading lapsed.

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW


PACIFIC CONSULTANTS INTERNATIONAL ASIA, INC. and JENS PETER
HENRICHSEN, Petitioners,
vs. KLAUS K. SCHONFELD, Respondent.
RULE 1-5
DOCTRINE: While the stipulation of the contract are considered valid and
enforceable, venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general
rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or
restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather
permissive. If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and


design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them.
FACTS: Respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a resident of New Westminster,
British Columbia, Canada. He had been a consultant in the field of environmental
engineering and water supply and sanitation. Pacicon Philippines, Inc. (PPI) is
engaged in the business of providing specialty and technical services both in and out
of the Philippines. It is a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan
(PCIJ). In 1997, PCIJ decided to engage in consultancy services for water and
sanitation in the Philippines. Respondent was employed by PCIJ, through
Henrichsen, as Sector Manager of PPI in its Water and Sanitation Department.
However, PCIJ assigned him as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary was
to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ.
On January 7, 1998, Henrichsen transmitted a letter of employment to respondent in
Canada, requesting him to accept the same and affix his conformity thereto.
The letter of employment contains among others a stipulation which states:

Any question of interpretation, understanding or fulfillment of the conditions of


employment, as well as any question arising between the Employee and the Company
which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and
which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties
through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London.
Respondent arrived in the Philippines and assumed his position as PPI Sector Manager.
He was accorded the status of a resident alien.
As required by Rule XIV (Employment of Aliens) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing
the Labor Code, PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit (Permit) for respondent
before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On May 5, 1999, respondent received a letter from Henrichsen informing him that his
employment had been terminated effective August 4, 1999 for the reason that PCIJ and
PPI had not been successful in the water and sanitation sector in the Philippines.
However, on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by electronic mail, requested respondent to
stay put in his job after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to report
on certain projects and discuss all the opportunities he had developed. Respondent
continued his work with PPI until the end of business hours on October 1, 1999.
Respondent filed with PPI several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave pay, air
fare from Manila to Canada, and cost of shipment of goods to Canada. PPI partially
settled some of his claims (US$5,635.99), but refused to pay the rest.
On December 5, 2000, respondent filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against
petitioners PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter. In his Complaint, respondent
alleged that he was illegally dismissed; PPI had not notified the DOLE of its decision to

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close one of its departments, which resulted in his dismissal; and they failed to notify
him that his employment was terminated after August 4, 1999. Respondent also
claimed for separation pay and other unpaid benefits. He alleged that the company
acted in bad faith and disregarded his rights.
Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the
Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) venue was
improperly laid. It averred that respondent was a Canadian citizen, a transient
expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a
foreign corporation with principal office in Tokyo, Japan. Since respondents cause of
action was based on his letter of employment executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January
7, 1998, under the principle of lex loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed
in Tokyo, Japan. Petitioners claimed that respondent did not offer any justification for
filing his complaint against PPI before the NLRC in the Philippines. Moreover, under
Section 12 of the General Conditions of Employment appended to the letter of
employment dated January 7, 1998, complainant and PCIJ had agreed that any
employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court of Arbitration.
Since even the Supreme Court had already ruled that such an agreement on venue is
valid, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision granting petitioners Motion to Dismiss. The
Labor Arbiter found, among others, that the January 7, 1998 contract of employment
between respondent and PCIJ was controlling; the Philippines was only the duty
station where Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions of
Employment. PCIJ remained respondents employer despite his having been sent to the
Philippines. Since the parties had agreed that any differences regarding employeremployee relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration
in London, this agreement is controlling.
On appeal, the NLRC agreed with the disquisitions of the Labor Arbiter and affirmed
the latters decision in toto.
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA. The CA found
the petition meritorious. Applying the four-fold test of determining an employeremployee relationship, the CA declared that respondent was an employee of PPI. On
the issue of venue, the appellate court declared that, even under the January 7, 1998
contract of employment, the parties were not precluded from bringing a case related
thereto in other venues. While there was, indeed, an agreement that issues between the
parties were to be resolved in the London Court of Arbitration, the venue is not
exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other
forum other than in the Philippines. It ordered the remand of the case to the Labor
Arbiter for disposition of the merits of the case.

complaint. Petitioners aver that since respondent is a Canadian citizen, the CA erred
in ignoring their claim that the principles of forum non conveniens and lex loci
contractus are applicable. They also point out that the principal office, officers and
staff of PCIJ are stationed in Tokyo, Japan; and the contract of employment of
respondent was executed in Tokyo, Japan.
The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in
the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively
in this court," "in no other court save ," "particularly," "nowhere else
but/except ," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.3 It
cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive
venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment
contract.
Petitioners insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens
must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a
repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following reasons:
First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.
Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals,this Court held that: x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x
All the foregoing requisites are present in this case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Labor Arbiter can take cognizance over the
case notwithstanding what was stated in the Employment Contract?
HELD: Yes. Petitioners assert that there no evidence that petitioner PPI is the
employer of respondent, the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over respondents

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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sufficiently established by documentary and testimonial evidence, as well as the
admissions of private respondents.

Benguet Exploration, Inc. v CA (2001)

1.

Petitioner argues that documents regarding the tonnage of the copper


concentrates have been properly identified and that the bill of lading, the
Certificate of Weight, and the Mates Receipt, all of which stated that
2,243.496 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were loaded on the ship,
create a prima facie presumption that such amount was indeed what was
loaded on the vessel.

2.

Petitioner asserts that the Draft Survey Report of OMIC was sufficient
evidence to prove that the cargo which arrived in Japan had a shortage of 355
wet metric tons.

Mendoza, J.
ISSUE

Re: Rule 6-9

1.
2.
** I really dont know which part of the case is relevant to the topic. The
case discussed issues on evidence and nothing on civpro.

Whether petitioner was able to prove the there was actually a shortage
Whether the establishment of the genuineness and due execution of the
documents results to prima facie presumption that the their contents are true.

HELD
FACTS

1.

Benguet Exploration exported cargo consisting of 2,243.496 wet tons of copper


concentrates (as provided in the bill of lading) to japan. It was loaded to respondent
Seawood Shippings vessel and was insured by Switzerland Insurance. However, when
the cargo was unloaded in Japan, the cargo was 355 metric tons short of the amount
state in the bill of lading. Petitioner Benguet made a formal demand for the value of the
alleged shortgage but both Seawood Shipping and Switzerland Insurance refuse the
demand.
Petitioner Benguet Exploration filed a complaint for damages against Seawood
Shipping Inc with RTC. Benguet filed another complaint for damages against
respondent Switzerland General Insurance, Co., LTD.
3rd

The two cases were consolidated. Switzerland Insurance filed a


party complaint
against Seawood Shipping, praying that the latter be ordered to indemnify it for
whatever might be adjudged against it in favor of petitioner.
Trial Court: Based on the evidence presented, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint as well as Switzerland Insurances third party complaint against Seawood
shipping.
CA: CA affirmed TCs decision.
Petitioner Benguet contends that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in ruling that it
failed to establish the loss or shortage of the subject cargo because such loss was

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

PROVING THE SHORTAGE


It is settled that only questions of law may be raised on appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45. Contrary to this rule, petitioner is raising questions of facts as
it seeks an evaluation of the evidence presented by the parties. However, we
find no basis for concluding that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
misappreciated the evidence in this case.

Petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that the weight of the copper
concentrates actually loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3 was
2,243.496 wet metric tons and that there was a shortage of 355 metric
tons when the cargo was discharged in Japan.

a.

Petitioners own witness, Rogelio Lumibao, admitted that he


was not present at the actual loading of the cargo at Poro
Point, his information being limited to what was contained in the bill of
lading. Neither was he present when the cargo was discharged
in Japan.

b. On the other hand, Ernesto Cayabyab, although he was present when the
Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mates Receipt, were
signed at the loading site, he admitted that he could not say for certain
that no spillage occurred during the loading of the cargo on the ship
because his attention was not on the cargo at all times.

It is evident that petitioners witnesses had no personal knowledge of the


actual weight of copper concentrates loaded on the vessel and discharged

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in Japan. The testimonies of these witnesses were thus hearsay. Hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value unless the proponent can show that
the evidence falls within the exceptions to the hearsay evidence rule.
2.

GENUINENESS AND DUE EXECUTION


Petitioner contends that the genuineness and due execution of the documents
presented, i.e., Bill of Lading, Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight,
Mates Receipt, were properly established by the testimony of its witness,
Ernesto Cayabyab, and that as a result, there is a prima facie presumption that
their contents are true.

Mandawe Galleon vs Isidro


Doctrine: The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory in initiatory
pleadings. The subsequent compliance with the requirement does not excuse a partys
failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where the Court
excused non-compliance with the requirement to submit a certificate of non-forum
shopping, it found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict
application of the Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable
Facts:

This contention has no merit. When the law makes use of the phrase
genuineness and due execution of the instrument it means nothing more
than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different
import on its face from the one executed.

Respondents, alleging that they were employees of petitioners, filed a case


for illegal dismissal and non-payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, thirteenth (13th)
month pay, and service incentive leave pay against petitioners, Manuel Jose Oyson III
and Simonette C. Abao before the Regional Arbitration Branch VII, Cebu City of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Petitioners are engaged in making
rattan furniture in Mandaue City.

Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other
matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was
to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot
preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not
contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.

Respondents averred that they started working at Gamallo Sons, Inc. in 1977
and 1978. In 1980, the firm name was changed to Gamallosons Traders, Inc. and
eventually it became Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. The employees suspected that the
adoption and substitution of many firm names was intended to subvert the labor
standard benefits, status, terms, and conditions of employment.

a.

b.

In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity
of these documents. Respondent Switzerland Insurance presented Export
Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioners own witness, Rogelio Lumibao,
prepared, in which it was stated that the copper concentrates to be transported
to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric
tons, 10 percent more or less.
On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance
had referred petitioners claim, prepared a report which showed that a total of
2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point.

Considering the discrepancies in the various documents showing the


actual amount of copper concentrates transported to Poro Point and
loaded in the vessel, there is no evidence of the exact amount of copper
concentrates shipped. Thus, whatever presumption of regularity in the
transactions might have risen from the genuineness and due execution of
the Bill of Lading, Certificate of Weight, Certificate of Loading, and Mates
Receipt was successfully rebutted by the evidence presented by respondent
Switzerland Insurance which showed disparities in the actual weight of the cargo
transported to Poro Point and loaded on the vessel. This fact is compounded by the
admissions made by Lumibao and Cayabyab that they had no personal knowledge of
the actual amount of copper concentrates loaded on the vessel.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

They claimed that, in order to ensure their availability for possible twentyfour (24) hour service, respondents were extended loans to build their houses in
petitioners compound. Thus, they were on call any time, day or night.
On July 22, 1978, respondents were notified that the company adopted a
policy of voluntary retrenchment, offering employees separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay for every year of service. However, respondents did not avail of the said
plan. They asserted that, on March 5, 2001, they were dismissed from employment
without just cause and without due process.
On the other hand, petitioners averred that respondents were not their
employees but were independent contractors who received various orders from many
other furniture manufacturers, and that respondents constructed their houses and
workplaces in the compound owned by another corporation, the Galleon Agro Realty
Development Corporation.
On April 3, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision,[3] finding respondents illegally dismissed from employment.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC. However, they failed to attach a
certification of non-forum shopping to their notice of appeal, as required by Section 4,
Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Thus, on December 4, 2003, the NLRC
issued a resolution[5] dismissing petitioners appeal for being fatally defective, and the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed in toto with finality. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a resolution[6] dated
May 27, 2004.

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Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE NLRC DENYING
PETITIONERS APPEAL ON MERE TECHNICALITY DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF
MERITORIOUS CASE OF THE PETITIONERS.

to November 14, 2003. In a memorandum, Ramon C. Nghuatco, Director III of TSS,


submitted to the Commission Secretary his comments/recommendation on Paler's
application saying that it granted the Leave Applications for 09 June 2003 - 30
July 2003,

Held: Administrative Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994, issued by the
Supreme Court requires that every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the CA must
be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping. Later, Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 was issued and made effective on April 1, 1994. It expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in court and in quasi-judicial agencies. The Court
adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section
5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, to curb the malpractice of
forum shopping, the rule ordains that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of
court and be a cause for the summary dismissal of the petition, without prejudice to the
taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.[12]

Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003,
Paler left for the United States on June 8, 2003, without verifying
whether his application for leave (for August 1 - November 14, 2003) was
approved or denied.

The filing of a certificate of non-forum shopping is mandatory in initiatory


pleadings. The subsequent compliance with the requirement does not excuse a partys
failure to comply therewith in the first instance. In those cases where the Court excused
non-compliance with the requirement to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping, it
found special circumstances or compelling reasons which made the strict application
of the Circular clearly unjustified or inequitable. In this case, however, the petitioners
offered no valid justification for their failure to comply with the Circular.
Finally, it bears stressing that while it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities and that rules of procedure shall not be strictly enforced at the cost of
substantial justice, it does not mean that the Rules of Court may be ignored at will and
at random to the prejudice of the orderly presentation and assessment of the issues and
their just resolution. It must be emphasized that procedural rules should not be
belittled or dismissed simply because their non-observance might have resulted in
prejudice to a party's substantial rights. Like all rules, they are required to be followed,
except only for the most persuasive of reasons.
COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, represented herein by its Secretary
HON. ARTURO L. TIU vs.CELSO M. PALER
G.R. No. 172623 | March 3, 2010
TOPIC: Rule 6-9 Pleadings and Default: Verification and Certification of Forum
Shopping
DOCTRINE: The certification of non-forum shopping must be executed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case, it is the
Commission Secretary not the COA Chairman who signed the certification absent of
any vested authority to do so or to act on the Chairmans behalf. Therefore, the case is
dismissible.
FACTS: Respondent Celso M. Paler was a Supervising Legislative Staff Officer II (SG24) with the Technical Support Service (TSS) of the Commission on Appointments.
He submitted a request for vacation leave for 74 working days - from August 1, 2003

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that
he was being dropped from the roll of employees effective said date, due to his
continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with Section 63, Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 14. Paler moved for
reconsideration but this was denied, on the ground that it was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's
decision. MR denied.
CA- affirmed with modification the CSC decision ruling that since Paler had already
reached the compulsory age of retirement and was no longer entitled to
reinstatement. MR denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tiu, the Commission Secretary, has the authority to file
the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
behalf of the Commission Chairman.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a
government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There
was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative,
lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition
could sign the verification. With regard, however, to the certification of nonforum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case,
Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the
Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file
the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such
authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler's allegation
of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.

FUN FACT! Atty. Arturo Tiu is Archies dad.

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OAMINAL v CASTILLO
Default
Doctrine: Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy

Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against respondents with the RTC.
The summons together with the complaint was served upon the secretary of
respondent. Respondents filed their Urgent Motion to Declare Service of
Summons Improper and Legally Defective alleging that the Sheriffs Return
has failed to comply on substituted service of summons but said motion was
not heard due to the Judges absence. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion
to Declare [Respondents] in Default and to Render Judgment because no
answer [was] filed by [the latter]. The respondents filed Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with. The judge denied
[respondents] Motion to Dismiss, and admitted [their] Answer. However six
months after admitting their answer, the judge ruled that [respondents]
Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with
Counterclaim was filed outside the period to file answer, hence he (1) denied
the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared
[respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to present evidence exparte within ten days from receipt of order, in which, the case will be
dismissed.

CA: The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them.

Issue: Whether or not respondents were validly declared in default

A review of the assailed Decision reveals that the alleged lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court over the defendants therein was the reason why the CA nullified
the formers default judgment and dismissed the case without prejudice.
However, we have ruled earlier that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction
over them. Given this fact, the CA erred in dismissing the case; as a
consequence, it failed to rule on the propriety of the Order and the judgment
of default. To avoid circuitousness and further delay, the Court deems it
necessary to now rule on this issue.

As much as possible, suits should be decided on the merits and not on


technicalities. For this reason, courts have repeatedly been admonished
against default orders and judgments that lay more emphasis on procedural
niceties at the expense of substantial justice. Not being based upon the merits
of the controversy, such issuances may indeed amount to a considerable
injustice resulting in serious consequences on the part of the defendant. Thus,
it is necessary to examine carefully the grounds upon which these orders and
judgments are sought to be set aside.
Respondents herein were declared in default by the trial court on May 22,
2001, purportedly because of their delay in filing an answer. Its unexpected
volte face came six months after it had ruled to admit their Answer on
November 16, 2000, as follows:

That with respect to the Motion to Admit Answer, this Court is not in favor of
terminating this case on the basis of technicality for failure to answer on time,
hence, as ruled in the case of Nantz v. Jugo and Cruz, 43 O.G. No. 11, p. 4620,
it was held:
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when
they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or
unforeseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and
have not deprived the court ot its authority. Conceived in the best traditions
of practical and moral justice and common sense, the Rules of Court frown
upon hairsplitting technicalities that do not square with their liberal tendency
and with the ends of justice unless something in the nature of the factors just
stated intervene. x x x
WHEREFORE, x x x in the interest of justice, the Answer of the [respondents]
is hereby admitted.

Held: No

Ratio:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Indiana Aerospace University v. Commission on Higher Education held that


no practical purpose was served in declaring the defendants in default when
their Answer had already been filed -- albeit after the 15-day period, but before
they were declared as such. Applying that ruling to the present case, we find
that respondents were, therefore, imprudently declared in default.

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Note: as to the issue of jurisdiction;


Assuming arguendo that the service of summons was defective, such flaw was
cured and respondents are deemed to have submitted themselves to the
jurisdiction of the trial court when they filed an Omnibus Motion to Admit the
Motion to Dismiss and Answer with Counterclaim, an Answer with
Counterclaim, a Motion to Inhibit, and a Motion for Reconsideration and Plea
to Reset Pre-trial. The filing of Motions seeking affirmative relief -- to admit
answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default
judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration -- are
considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court. Having
invoked the trial courts jurisdiction to secure affirmative relief, respondents
cannot -- after failing to obtain the relief prayed for -- repudiate the very same
authority they have invoked.

ASIAN CONSTRUCTION v. CA
GR NO. 160242, MAY 17, 2005
DOCTRINES:
Third-part claim; Prerequisite: A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that
some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be
one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of
a third-party defendant is proper f he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant
or both for all part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendants liability arises out of another transaction.
Impleading a third party defendant; grounds: The defendant may implead
another as third-party defendant:

complaint alleged the following: ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida
mobile floodlighting systems from MEC during the period of March 13 to July 15, 1998
but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor in the total amount of
P4,313,935.00; from July 14 to August 25, 1998, various equipments from MEC were,
likewise, leased by ACDC for the latters power plant in Mauban, Quezon, and that there
was still a balance of P456,666.67; and ACDC also purchased and took custody of
various equipment parts from MEC for the agreed price of P237,336.20 which, despite
demands, ACDC failed to pay.
ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third-party complaint against
Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel).
In its answer, ACDC admitted its
indebtedness to MEC in the amount of P5M but alleged the special and affirmative
defenses. It admitted that it is indebted to MEC the amount of P5M but asserted that it
will not be so were it not for Becthel, that it too leased the subject property but failed to
pay.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint against Becthel on
the ground that the defendant had already admitted its principal obligation to MEC in
the amount ofP5,071,335.86; the transaction between it and ACDC, on the one hand,
and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other, were independent
transactions. Furthermore, the allowance of the third-party complaint would result in
undue delays in the disposition of the case. MEC then filed a motion for summary
judgment, alleging therein that there was no genuine issue as to the obligation of ACDC
to MEC.
RTC: Denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint and
granting the motion of MEC, which the trial court considered as a motion for
a judgment on the pleadings.
CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the assailed decision. The appellate
court sustained the disallowance of the third-party complaint of ACDC against
Becthel on the ground that the transaction between the said parties did not
arise out of the same transaction on which MECs claim was based.

On an allegation of liability of the latter to the defendant for contribution,


indemnity, subrogation or any other relief;
On the ground of direct liability of the third-party defendant to the plaintiff;
or
The liability of the third-party defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant.

Issues: WON a third-party complaint is proper and WON judgment on the pleadings
is proper.

There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint
and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the
third-party.

Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.) party complaint
is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.

1.
2.
3.

Facts: On March 13, 2001, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a Complaint
for a sum of money with damages against the Asian Construction and Development
Corporation (ACDC) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Held: NO and NO
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides:

Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may
render judgment on the pleadings, as follows:

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Section 1. Judgment on the pleadings. Where an answer fails to tender an issue, or,
otherwise, admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading, the court
may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. However, in actions
for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage or for legal separation, the material
facts alleged in the complaint shall always be proved.

transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner
as third-party plaintiff for the construction of the latters project in Mauban, Quezon,
where the equipment leased from the respondent was used by the petitioner. The
controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between
the petitioner and Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely distinct from each other.

The purpose of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court is to permit a


defendant to assert an independent claim against a third-party which he, otherwise,
would assert in another action, thus preventing multiplicity of suits. All the rights of
the parties concerned would then be adjudicated in one proceeding. This is a rule of
procedure and does not create a substantial right. Neither does it abridge, enlarge, or
nullify the substantial rights of any litigant. This right to file a third-party
complaint against a third-party rests in the discretion of the trial
court. The third-party complaint is actually independent of, separate and
distinct from the plaintiffs complaint, such that were it not for the rule, it would
have to be filed separately from the original complaint.

BANCO DE ORO-EPCI, INC. vs. JOHN TANSIPEK

In Capayas v. Court of First Instance, the Court made out the following tests:
(1) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is
based; or whether the third-party claim, although arising out of another or different
contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim;
(2) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although
the third-party defendants liability arises out of another transaction; and
(3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defenses which the thirdparty plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs claim.
The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be
recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show
possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party
complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint
must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show
that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant.
It bears stressing that common liability is the very essence for
contribution. Contribution is a payment made by each, or by any of several having
a common liability of his share in the damage suffered or in the money necessarily paid
by one of the parties in behalf of the other or others. The rule on common liability is
fundamental in the action for contribution. The test to determine whether the
claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint is, whether it arises out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or the third-party plaintiffs
claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected
with the plaintiffs claim.
In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the
petitioner as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

G.R. No. 181235. July 22, 2009


Topic: Pleadings and Default

Doctrine: It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent


Tansipek in this case is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main
case, whether or not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and
regardless of the result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal
should be based on the Decisions being contrary to law or the evidence already
presented, and not on the alleged invalidity of the default order.

RTC: RTC denied PCIBs Motion to Dismiss.


CA: Motion for Reconsideration was denied for having been filed out of time.
SC: Decision of the CA is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
FACTS: The Complaint alleges that J. O. Construction Inc., (JOCI) entered into a
contract with Duty Free Philippines, Inc. as actual construction went on, progress
billings were made. Payments were received by JOCI directly or through herein
respondent John Tansipek, its authorized collector. Payments received by respondent
Tansipek were initially remitted to JOCI. However, payment through PNB Check in the
amount of P4,050,136.51 was not turned over to JOCI but instead, Tansipek deposited
the same to his account in PCIB. PCIB allowed the said deposit, despite the fact that the
check was crossed for the deposit to payees account only, and despite the alleged lack
of authority of Tansipek to endorse said check. PCIB refused to pay JOCI the full
amount of the check despite demands made by the latter. PCIB filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint. The RTC denied PCIBs Motion to Dismiss. PCIB filed a Motion
to Admit Amended Third-Party Complaint. Upon Motion, respondent Tansipek was
granted time to file his Answer to the Third-Party Complaint. He was, however,
declared in default for failure to do so. The Motion to Reconsider the Default Order was
denied. Upon being declared in default, respondent Tansipek filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Default Order. Upon denial thereof, Tansipek filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which was dismissed for failure to attach the

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assailed Orders. Respondent Tansipeks Motion for Reconsideration with the Court of
Appeals was denied for having been filed out of time.

ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the
correct remedy
HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was
erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion
to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3
(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different
from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must
show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious
defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect,
and
(2)
of
meritorious
defenses
must
concur.
It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent Tansipek in this
case is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or
not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the
result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on
the Decisions being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the
alleged invalidity of the default order.

REPUBLIC VS. SANDIGABAYAN MISSING CASE

Issue:

Doctrine: Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy,
an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli
(an accomplished or consummated act), only the prayer for provisional remedy should
be denied.
Facts:

Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against
the Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera
praying for the following reliefs: issuance of a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of
petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held;
declaration of nullity of the mortgage constituted over petitioners property
covered by TCT No. T-11292 in favor of respondent; and award of damages.
RTC denied due course and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Injunction but was eventually denied.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in not enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
subject of this case.

Ruling:

CANELAND SUGAR CORPORATION vs ALON Cause of Action

Petitioner contends that the RTCs act of authorizing the foreclosure of its
property amounts to a prejudgment of the case since it amounts to a ruling
that respondent has a valid mortgage in its favor. Petitioner also argues,
among others, that Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 385 is not applicable
inasmuch as at the time of the lease to Sunnix, Inc., the management and
control of its operations has already been virtually taken over by respondent.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that: P.D. No. 385 prohibits the
issuance of an injunctive order against government financial institutions; the
CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion; the RTC Order merely dealt
with the propriety of the injunctive order and not the validity of the mortgage;
and the issue of the propriety of the injunctive order has been rendered moot
and academic by the foreclosure sale conducted and the issuance of a
certificate of sale by the sheriff.

In the instant case, aside from the principal action for damages, private
respondent sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale in order to prevent an
alleged irreparable injury to private respondent. It is settled that these
injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be
enjoined had become fait accompli (an accomplished or consummated act),
only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied. However, the trial
court should still proceed with the determination of the issue of the validity of
the mortgage, not to mention the issue of the nullity of the foreclosure sale as
well as petitioners prayer for damages so that an adjudication of the rights of
the parties can be had.

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW


LIGAYA, CHARITO, PARALUMAN And EFREN, all surnamed BIGLANGAWA Petitioners,
vs. PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY Respondent.
RULE 10-14

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DOCTRINE 1: Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure amended the
former rule in such manner that the phrase "or that the cause of action or defense is
substantially altered" was stricken-off and not retained in the new rules. The clear
import of such amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense." This
should only be true, however when despite a substantial change or alteration in the
cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the higher
interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the laudable
objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding."
DOCTRINE 2: Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a
suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment Founded upon
public policy and necessity. While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a
notice of lis pendens, such power, meanwhile, is exercised under express provisions
of law- Sec. 14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens
may be canceled on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of
molesting the title of the adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary
to protect the title of the party who caused it to be recorded
FACTS: Petitioners, with their mother, Encarnacion Biglang-Awa, filed a Complaint
for declaration of nullity of deeds, cancellation of titles, reconveyance and recovery
with damages against Roberth B. Tolentino (Tolentino), Philippine Trust Co.
(respondent) and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In the complaint, they that
they are the legitimate owners of eight parcels of land, all located along Quirino
Highway, Novaliches Quezon Cit, averring that in 1977, without the knowledge and
consent of Encarnacion and through fraudulent manipulations, misrepresentations
and the use of falsified documents, Tolentino succeeded in having four of the eight
subject parcels of land, which are in the name of Encarnacion, encumbered by way of
mortgage to secure a loan made by Tolentino with respondent; that on separate
occasions in 1998 and 2000, and using similar fraudulent manipulations,
misrepresentations and use of falsified documents, Tolentino was able to secure in his
name new Torrens titles over all the eight subject parcels of land. Subsequently,
petitioners caused the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on all the titles registered
in the name of Tolentino.
Tolentino filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that Ligaya of lack capacity to sue
in behalf of the other plaintiff, and that she has no cause of action considering that she
has sold her property to Tolentino.
Encarnacion filed a Notice of Dismissal claiming that the subject complaint was filed
without her permission and/or conformity; that the four parcels of land, titled under
her name, and which formed part of the subject matter of the said complaint, were
solely her own; and that she freely and satisfactorily sold them to Tolentino.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim praying that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action against it, and for failure
of Encarnacion to verify and certify the complaint against it.
RTC: Plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas vda. De Biglang-Awa only and all the defendants
are concerned, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Let her name be deleted from the
caption of the complaint.
Thereafter, Tolentino filed a Motion for Issuance of a Certificate of Finality of the
Court's Order of February 2, 2001.
On February 19, 2001, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit
Attached Amended Complaint. Petitioners contend that they, together with
Encarnacion and Liwayway are co-owners, pro-indiviso, of the subject parcels of land;
that through manipulations and misrepresentations, Tolentino, Encarnacion and
Liwayway were able to secure a partition of and titles over the disputed properties.
RTC - The dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the commencement
of any appropriate action that may be initiated by the proper party plaintiffs against
the proper defendant or defendants.
On May 2, 2001, Tolentino, filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens
with respect to the four parcels of land covered.
On May 3, 2001, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 16,
2001 RTC Resolution and an Opposition to Tolentino's Motion for Cancellation of
Notice of Lis Pendens..
On August 14, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and Tolentinos Motion for cancellation of notice of Lis Pendens.
On December 21, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order on the ground that the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens is "simply not accessible".
Unsatisfied by the August 14, 2001 and December 21, 2001 Orders of the RTC,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the RTC is guilty
of grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for cancellation of the notices
of lis pendens.
On March 26, 2002, petitioners also filed a petition for certiorarip raised in the said
petition is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
Tolentino's motion to dismiss and denied petitioner's motion for leave to admit
amended complaint. However, the case was dismissed by the CA .

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ISSUE: (1) Whether the RTC should have allowed petitioners to amend their
complaint against herein respondent, and (2) Whether it is proper to cancel the notice
of lis pendens annotated at the back of the Torrens titles issued in the name of
Encarnacion.
HELD:
(1) No. In the present case, prior to petitioners' filing of their Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint and to Admit Attached Amended Complaint, respondent already
filed its Answer with Counterclaim. Hence, since respondent had already filed its
answer, it follows that petitioners may no longer amend their complaint against the
former as a matter of right. They may do so only upon leave of court, as provided
under Section 3, Rule 10 of the same Rules, which they did by filing their Motion for
Leave to Amend Complaint. Section 3, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure amended the former rule in such manner that the phrase "or
that the cause of action or defense is substantially altered" was strickenoff and not retained in the new rules. The clear import of such
amendment in Section 3, Rule 10 is that under the new rules, "the
amendment may (now) substantially alter the cause of action or defense."
This should only be true, however when despite a substantial change or alteration in
the cause of action or defense, the amendments sought to be made shall serve the
higher interests of substantial justice, and prevent delay and equally promote the
laudable objective of the rules which is to secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive
disposition of every action and proceeding."
On the basis of the foregoing ruling, the denial of petitioners' Motion for Leave to
Amend Complaint on the ground that the amendment "drastically altered the causes
of action of the parties plaintiffs and parties defendants between and among
themselves" is erroneous. Nonetheless, the Court finds that the RTC correctly denied
petitioners' Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint, although for a different reason.
The RTC already dismissed the Complaint filed by petitioners for lack of jurisdiction
over the action because petitioners failed to pay the appropriate docket fees.
Petitioners did not appeal this ruling of the RTC. In any case, such order of dismissal
had already become final and executory pending resolution of the present petition. On
this basis, the Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint is rendered moot.
(2) Yes. Petitioners had categorically declared in their original Complaint that the
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632 were previously owned
exclusively by Encarnacion. On this basis, the RTC correctly ruled that petitioners
have no cause of action against respondent.
Lis pendens, which literally means pending suit, refers to the jurisdiction,
power or control which a court acquires over property involved in a suit,
pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment Founded
upon public policy and necessity, lis pendens is intended to keep the

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over said property.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the
entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by
successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court
will promulgate subsequently.
While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power,
meanwhile, is exercised under express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled
on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
In the instant case, it is established that petitioners have no interest over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to 198632. Hence, the annotation of
notices of lis pendens on the abovementioned titles is not necessary to protect
petitioners individual titles over the other properties involved in their complaint.
Furthermore, as the complaint of petitioners was already dismissed without
prejudice, and since petitioners had not filed any other case involving the subject
properties, there is no longer any pending suit to speak of. Hence, the CA did not
commit any error when it ordered the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens
annotated at the back of TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632.
Asean Pacific Planners v City of Urdaneta (2008)
Quisumbing, J.
Re: Amendments to pleadings

DOCTRINE
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby.

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Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial Order dated April 1, 2002
already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid. Thus, what is needed is
presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence of the city for
or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible. Note also that
under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be made
to cause them to conform to the evidence.

Respondent Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed a complaint for annulment of
contract with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining
order against respondents City of Urdaneta, Capalad doing business under the name
JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) and Asean Pacific
Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDG).

1.

Del Castillo alleged that the Urdaneta City mayor entered into 5 contracts for
the construction and management of a 4-storey twin cinema commercial
center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting
to P250Million, funded by a loan from PNB. For a minimal work, the
contractor was allegedly paid P95Million.

2.

According to Del Castillo, all 5 contracts are void because the object of the
contract is a piece of land belonging to public domain and which remains
devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, the
contracts are void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.

In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid.

2.
3.
4.

1.
2.
3.
4.

withdraw Urdaneta City's Answer;


drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined as plaintiff;
admit Urdaneta City's complaint; and
conduct a new pre-trial.

Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate
legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in
representation of its interests.

FACTS

1.

After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta
City and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to:

Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer, joined
in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then
Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that
the complaint states no cause of action.
For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an
Answer5 with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground
that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa
became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as
taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention adopting the allegations of Del
Castillo.

RTC: In an order dated 11 September 2002, RTC admitted entry of appearance of


Lazaro Law firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the city prosecutor. It
granted the prayer to drop the city as defendants and admitted its
complaint for consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the
defendants to answer the citys complaint.

In another order dated 14 February 2004, RTC dropped Capalad as


defendant, and his complaint was admitted and consolidated with
the complaints of del Castillo and Urdaneta City. RTC directed APP
and APPCDC to answer Capalads complaint.

CA: APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before CA. CA dismissed the
petition because:
1.
2.
3.

defective verification and certification of non-forum shopping,


failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of the RTC's assailed
orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and
lack of written explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was
not personal.

ISSUE
Whether Trial court erred in allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to
switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective answers and admitting
their complaints.

HELD
The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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Petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to reverse admissions in its Answer
that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief, that the execution of the contracts
was in good faith.

of Averdi, then transferred his rights to Eduardo Lopingco, herein private respondent,
subject to the terms and conditions specified in their Memorandum of
Agreement 2 and the Addendum thereto, 3 both concluded in February 1983.

We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.

On June 21, 1984, Lopingco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
against the petitioner and the Philippine Veterans Bank for revocation of the said
board resolution and the rescission of his contract with the petitioner. Copies of the
complaint, together with the corresponding summons, were served on the defendants.

Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial
Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid.
Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence
of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible.
Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be
made to cause them to conform to the evidence.

In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given
leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not
necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's
testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.

As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as
defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no
authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that
Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the
other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty.
Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.

De Dios vs CA
Doctrine: The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are alleged in an
amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in court that another
summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint
Facts:
By its Board Resolution No. 939B-82, adopted on December 28, 1982, the Philippine
Veterans Bank conveyed a parcel of land under a conditional sale to Averdi Marketing
and Development Corporation. 1 Petitioner Artie Vergel de Dios, as general manager

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

On July 13, 1984, at 9:15 o'clock in the morning, Lopingco filed an amended
complaint and at the same time served a copy thereof on the petitioner by registered
mail. On August 10, 1984, the petitioner filed through counsel an omnibus motion
asking that he be furnished a copy of the amended complaint. This was opposed by
the private respondent, who said that the copy sought had already been sent directly
to the petitioner by registered mail "because at the time said copy was mailed, there
was as yet no appearance of counsel for said defendant."
On September 12, 1984, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for the
private respondent moved for a declaration of default against the petitioner for failure
to file his answer within the reglementary period. The trial court deferred resolution
of the motion pending receipt of proof that the petitioner had indeed received the
copy of the amended complaint sent to him by registered mail.
On December 6, 1984, upon presentation of a certification from the Makati Central
Post Office that the petitioner had received a copy of the amended complaint on July
17, 1984, he w
On June 5, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial alleging error on the part
of the trial court for declaring him in default although he had not yet been served with
a copy of the amended complaint and his omnibus motion had not yet been resolved.
Assuming that such service was not necessary, he contented that he was nonetheless
not negligent for failing to file his answer within the extended reglementary period.
On August 30, 1985, the petitioner filed an appeal with the respondent
court, alleging that the trial court erred in declaring him in default
without first ruling on his Omnibus Motion and in denying his motion for
new trial. The appellate tribunal affirmed the questioned order.
The petitioner submits that inasmuch as the amended complaint completely replaced
the original complaint, the latter was stricken from the record and considered nonexistent. So was the summons that accompanied it. As the amended complaint was a
completely new pleading, a new summons should have been issued requiring the
defendants to answer the same, conformably to Rule 14, Sec. 1, of the Rules of Court.
For failing to do this and thereafter declaring him in default, the trial court denied
him the right to be heard in violation of due process.
Issue: W/N a new summons must be made for the amended complaint.

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Held: No..
In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments to
the complaint, the court must ascertain if the defendant shall be required to answer
for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the
original complaint. 7 An amendment will not be considered as stating a new cause of
action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show substantially the same
wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are alleged refer to the same
matter but are more fully and differently stated, or where averments which were
implied are made in express terms, and the subject of the controversy or the liability
sought to be enforced remains the same. 8
A reading of the amended complaint in the case at bar shows that it merely
supplemented an incomplete allegation regarding the subject property. The purpose
of the amendment was merely to include the additional information that the subject
property "was and is still under litigation and the contract was entered into without
the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent judicial authority."
It is clear from a comparison of the allegations appearing in the original complaint
and in the amended complaint that the cause of action of the private respondent had
not been changed. The amended complaint also asked for the rescission of the
Memorandum of Agreement and the Addendum and the return of the sum of P
725,000.00 which had been given by Lopingco to the petitioner as down payment on
the subject property. Plainly, what was sought to be enforced against the petitioner
both in the original complaint and in the amended complaint was his obligation to
refund the said sum to the private respondent. The amended complaint did not
change the cause of action but simply advanced the above-quoted additional
information.
We hold therefore that no new summons on the amended complaint was necessary.
REMINGTON INDUSTRIAL SALES CORP. vs. CA and BRITISH STEEL
(ASIA), LTD.
GR. No. 133657. May 29, 2002
TOPIC: Rules 10-14: Amendments
DOCTRINE: The fact that the other defendants have filed their answers to the
complaint does not bar petitioners right to amend the complaint as against
respondent. Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff
may still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the
other defendants.
FACTS:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from
breach of contract. Impleaded as principal defendant therein was Industrial
Steel. (ISL), with Ferro Trading (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as
alternative defendants.
ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against
them. RTC denied. ISL then filed its answer to the complaint. On the other
hand, British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by
incorporating therein additional factual allegations constitutive of
its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend
the complaint as a matter of right because respondent has not yet
filed a responsive pleading thereto.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that it had
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said Amended
Complaint before the trial court. Hence, petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the special civil action be suspended.
TC- ruled on petitioners Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
CA- grants the writ of certiorari and orders the respondent judge to dismiss
without prejudice the Complaint against petitioner British Steel (Asia) Ltd.
MR Denied.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action, despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective
complaint under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. NO.
Stated simply: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer
has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher
court? YES
RATIO: Section 2, Rule 10 ROC explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as
a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior
to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule
10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not
allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because
any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense
in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by
changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event,
the defendant has not presented any defense that can be alteredor affected by the
amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant
still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations against him by

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properly setting up his defense in the answer. Considerable leeway is thus given to the
plaintiff to amend his complaint once, as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an
answer by the defendant.
The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint
before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss
or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude otherwise, the
right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be rendered nugatory and
ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to foreclose this remedial right is to
challenge the adequacy of the complaint before he files an answer. Moreover,
amendment of pleadings is favored and should be liberally allowed in the furtherance
of justice in order to determine every case as far as possible on its merits without regard
to technicalities. This principle is generally recognized to speed up trial and save party
litigants from incurring unnecessary expense, so that a full hearing on the merits of
every case may be had and multiplicity of suits avoided.
In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its
assailed judgment will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the
same set of facts and to which the defendants would likely raise the same
or, at least, related defenses. Plainly stated, we find no practical
advantage in ordering the dismissal of the complaint against respondent
and for petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can still clearly
amend the complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the
complaint would not prejudice respondents or delay the action, as this
would, in fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint
does not bar petitioners right to amend the complaint as against respondent. Indeed,
where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may
still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims
asserted solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims
asserted against the other defendants.[22]
Furthermore, we do not agree with respondents claim that it will be prejudiced
by the admission of the Amended Complaint because it had spent time, money and
effort to file its petition before the appellate court. We cannot see how the result could
be any different for respondent, if petitioner merely re-filed the complaint instead of
being allowed to amend it. As adverted to earlier, amendment would even work to
respondents advantage since it will undoubtedly speed up the proceedings before the
trial court. Consequently, the amendment should be allowed in the case at bar as a
matter
of
right
in
accordance
with
the
rules.

Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and
Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle,
Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine
bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose
between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at
S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an
action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is
of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield,
Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint
may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola
Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was also her
counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her
husband.
Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband as
the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of
summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D.
Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server
left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For
this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private
respondents motion.
RTC: denied the MR of respondents.
CA: declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by
Alfredo hence this petition.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with
summons

VALMONTE v CA
Summons

Held: No

Doctrine: Service of summons if action in rem and action in personam

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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Ratio:
There was no valid service of summons on Lourdes.

The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property
and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must
be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.

In the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.


Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes. This mode of service,
like the first two, must be made outside the Philippines, such as through the Philippine
Embassy in the foreign country where the defendant resides. The service of summons
on petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte was not made upon the order of the court as
required by Rule 14, 17 and certainly was not a mode deemed sufficient by the court
which in fact refused to consider the service to be valid and on that basis declare
petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte in default for her failure to file an answer.

Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19,
such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the
plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.

Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such
leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.

MILLENNIUM INDUSTRIAL v. TAN


GR NO. 131724, FEBRUARY 28, 2000
DOCTRINES:
Service of summons; Service to Corporations: Summons is the means by which
the defendant in a case is notified of the existence of an action against him and, thereby,

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is
a corporation, Rule 14 and 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The
rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with
the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by him.
Doctrine of substantial compliance; Requisites: In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. CA,
this Court enumerated the requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance, to wit:
a)
b)
c)

There must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e.,
transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the
person served;
The person served must sign a receipt of the Sheriffs return; and
There must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the
person on whom the summons was actually served. Most important for it is
through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on the service of summons is
attained.

Facts: Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation executed a Deed of Real Estate


Mortgage over its real property in favor of respondent Jackson Tan. The mortgage was
executed to secure payment of petitioners indebtedness to respondent.
Respondent filed against petitioner a complaint for foreclosure of mortgage in the RTC.
Summons and a copy of the complaint were served upon petitioner through a certain
Lynverd Cinches, described in the sheriffs return, as a Draftsman, a person of
sufficient age and (discretion) working therein, he is the highest ranking officer or
Officer-in-Charge of defendants Corporation, to receive processes of the Court.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that there was no
valid service of summons upon it, as a result of which the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction over it. Petitioner invoked Rule 14, 13 of the 1964 Rules of Court and
contended that service on Lynverd Cinches, as alleged in the sheriffs return, was
invalid as he is not one of the authorized persons on whom summons may be served
and that, in fact, he was not even its employee.
RTC: Denied petitioners Motion to Dismiss. MR also denied.
CA: Petition for Certiarari dismissed. The appellate court ruled that
although petitioner denied Lynverd Cinches' authority to receive summons for
it, its actual receipt of the summons could be inferred from its filing of a
motion to dismiss, hence, the purpose for issuing summons had been
substantially achieved. Moreover, it was held, by including the affirmative
defense that it had already paid its obligation and praying for other reliefs in
its Motion to Dismiss, petitioner voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court.

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Issue: Whether or not summons upon the draftsman was valid.
Held: NO.
Petitioner contends that the enumeration in Rule 14, 13 is exclusive and that service
of summons upon one who is not enumerated therein is invalid. This is the general rule.
However, it is settled that substantial compliance by serving summons on persons
other than those mentioned in the above rule may be justified.
In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled. With
respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioners filing of a motion to
dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the summons and the
complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this or that Lynverd Cinches actually
turned over the summons to any of the officers of the corporation. In contrast, in our
cases applying the substantial compliance rule, there was direct evidence, such as the
admission of the corporations officers, of receipt of summons by the corporation
through the person upon whom it was actually served. The question is whether it is
allowable to merely infer actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the
person on whom summons was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to
be substantial compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the
person served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of
summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or means other
than the person actually served, the service of summons becomes meaningless. This is
particularly true in the present case where there is a serious doubt if Lynverd Cinches,
the person on whom service of summons was effected, is in fact an employee of the
corporation. Except for the Sheriffs return, there is nothing to show that Lynverd
Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the corporation.
Also, receipt by petitioner of the summons and complaint cannot be
inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Respondent
casts doubt on petitioners claim that it came to know about the summons and the
complaint against it only after it learned that there was a pending foreclosure of its
mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this claim. Petitioner was in default in
the payment of its loan. It had received demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had
reason to believe that a foreclosure suit would be filed against it. The appellate court
was, therefore, in error in giving weight to respondents claim.
E.B. Villarosa and Partner Co., Ltd. vs. Benito,
G.R. No. 136426 August 6, 1999

Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language.

RTC: Defendants Motion for Reconsideration was denied


SC: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
public respondent trial court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.

Facts: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City
and with branch offices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at
Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction
of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any
dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. Private
respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with
its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there
were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint,
were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the stated address at
Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was
duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager
Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced
by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its
employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons
named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made.
plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. plaintiff filed a Motion
to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's
Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new
Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on
persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in
that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate
secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Topic: Service of Summons

Doctrine: The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is


"restricted, limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction
expressio unios est exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
Held: No. The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted,
limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est

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exclusio alterius and argues that if the Rules of Court Revision Committee intended to
liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily done so by clear and
concise language. Under the new Rules, service of summons upon an agent of the
corporation is no longer authorized. The designation of persons or officers who are
authorized to accept summons for a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited
and more clearly specified in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
The rule now states "general manager" instead of only "manager"; "corporate secretary"
instead of "secretary"; and "treasurer" instead of "cashier." The phrase "agent, or any
of its directors" is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.

RAMOS vs RAMOS
TOPIC: Entitlement to Summons
Well-settled is the rule that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. The
only exceptions to this rule are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc
pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
FACTS:
Petitioners are children of late Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr, who was the coowner of a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. It was co-owned by him, his sister
Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and Antonio
By virtue of a SPA executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter
Adoracion Mendoza had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days
Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the
sale, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for
interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims
RTC upheld the sale of the share of Narcisa only. It ruled that Adoracion had
no authority to sell the shares of other co-owners because the SPA had been
executed in favor only of her mother, Narcisa
the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. It held that while there was no Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless valid,
because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters sub-agent.
There was thus no need to execute another special power of attorney in her
favor as sub-agent
CA decision was not appealed. On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the
CA a motion to set aside the decision since they had not been served a copy
of either the Complaint or the summons. Neither had they been impleaded as
parties to the case in the RTC
they argued that the CA Decision should be set aside because it adversely
affected their respective shares in the property without due process
In denying the Motion of petitioners, the CA cited the grounds raised in
respondents Opposition: (a) the Motion was not allowed as a remedy under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the Decision sought to be set aside had
long become final and executory; (c) the movants did not have any legal
standing; and (d) the Motion was purely dilatory and without merit

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners Motion and allowing its
Decision dated September 25, 1995 to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing
petitioners property in favor of respondents, hence without due process of law?
RULING:
that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable
A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
in the land
The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors, (2)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and (3) void judgments
To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the
action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of
summons differ depending on the nature of the action
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader
to determine the ownership of the real property in question. Specifically, it
forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among
themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought
to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the
personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action,
because it affected title to or possession of real property
petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented
merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no
standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate,
because the latter was represented by an executor or administrator
o there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case,
inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been
made parties.
Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court
were still in effect. Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3, an
executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended
The present rule requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose
benefit the action is brought.
Under the former Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue
or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case, it was the estate of
petitioners father Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan

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Quiming and Associates, that was included as defendant and served


summons
As it was, there was no need to include petitioners as defendants. Not being
parties, they were not entitled to be served summons.
Petitioner Florencio D. Chanliongco, on the other hand, was impleaded in the
Complaint, but not served summons. However, the service of summons upon
the estate of his deceased father was sufficient, as the estate appeared for and
on behalf of all the beneficiaries and the heirs of Paulino Chanliongco,
including Florencio
the counsel of petitioners, Atty. Felino V. Quiming Jr., is a partner of the law
firm that represented the estate of the deceased father. Hence, it can
reasonably be expected that the service upon the law firm was sufficient
notice to all the beneficiaries of the estate

RICHARD TEH vs CA Service of Summons


Doctrine: Rule 16, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that after
hearing the motion, a judge may dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order
the amendment of the pleading.
Facts:

On August 20, 1998, respondent EIM International Sales, Inc. filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment against Wood
Based Panels, Inc., Sinrimco. Inc., Manfred Luig and petitioner. Petitioner
was impleaded in the case because he was the President of both Wood Based
Panels, Inc. and Sinrimco, Inc.

Subsequently, summons were served upon the two corporations and


Luig (defendants). The sheriff failed to serve the summons intended for the
petitioner because the former could not locate the petitioners address as
indicated in the complaint. Said address was obtained by the respondent from
the General Information Sheets filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission by the two corporations

The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person because he had not
been served with summons. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the
pre-trial and the resetting thereof on November 19, 1999. It, likewise, ordered
the respondent to submit a reply or opposition to petitioners motion to
dismiss within five days from October 19, 1999

The next day, October 20, 1999, the respondent filed a Comment explaining
that summons had not been served on the petitioner because, according to the
sheriff, the petitioners address indicated in the complaint, 138 Maria Clara
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, could not be located.

The trial court issued an Omnibus Order dated November 17, 1999 denying
petitioners motion to dismiss and directing that an alias summons be issued
against the petitioner to be served upon him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila. The respondent thereafter filed a manifestation and motion,

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

informing the court that the address of the petitioner as indicated in the
complaint was erroneous, and that summons should instead be served upon
him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, which was
his correct address.
On December 14, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the trial courts omnibus order. He contended therein that the case should be
dismissed in view of the trial courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over his
person and the respondents failure to prosecute the case, considering that
more than a year had passed since the complaint was instituted and yet
summons had not yet been served on him. The respondent opposed the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The trial court issued an Order dated January 25, 2000 denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing resolution, but said motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals

Issue:
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the
latter denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance
of an alias summons to be served.
Ruling:

When the appellate court studied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
and found that the contention therein was correct, it proceeded to look into
the merits of the petition. However, it found that the same should be
dismissed for lack of merit because it found that the trial courts order assailed
by the petitioner therein was an order denying a motion to dismiss. Based on
the factual circumstances of the case, the appellate court ruled that the order
sought to be reversed was an interlocutory order which is beyond the scope of
a petition for certiorari, and that the trial court did not commit abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and ordered the issuance of an
alias summons to the latter.
The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias
summons to be served upon him. Although the respondent should have
resorted to other means to determine the correct address of the petitioner
when it was informed by the sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the
petitioner, the respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure because the
petitioners address as indicated by Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco,
Inc. on their respective General Information Sheets, was incorrect.
Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under Rule 16,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the motion, a judge may
dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the

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pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its finding
that the issues alleged by the respondent in its complaint could not be resolved
fully in the absence of the petitioner. In its desire to resolve completely the
issues brought before it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by ordering the issuance of alias
summons on the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within its
discretion. The Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in dismissing the
petition for certiorari filed before it.

Remedial Law Review


PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner vs. PNOC EXPLORATION
CORPORATION, respondent.
RULE 10-14 AMENDMENTS TO SUMMONS

CA: Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even
sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal
interest and cost of suit.
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely,
lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the
trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the
September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and
equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of
service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not
respondents messenger.

DOCTRINE: In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner,


or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court
may order. It applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem

ISSUES: (1) Whether there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper
service of summons. (2) Whether the rule on service by publication under Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam. (3)
Whether the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared
by the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.

FACTS: Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation, filed a complaint for a sum of


money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to
be collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.

HELD:

Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter
cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by
publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted
the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondents employee to the
effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known
address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of
summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte.
TC: Granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer
of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply
with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution
with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because
the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

(1) No. Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant
is designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that
there is jurisdiction over his person.
(2) No. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because
it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been
changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies
in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that the
complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for
recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.
(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that

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the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail
is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

Remedial Law Review


PEDRO T. SANTOS, JR., petitioner vs. PNOC EXPLORATION
CORPORATION, respondent.
RULE 10-14 AMENDMENTS TO SUMMONS
DOCTRINE: In any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner,
or the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by
diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in
a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court
may order. It applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi in rem
FACTS: Respondent PNOC Exploration Corporation, filed a complaint for a sum of
money against petitioner Pedro Santos Jr. in the RTC of Pasig. The amount sought to
be collected was the petitioners unpaid balance of the car loan advanced to him by
respondent when he was still a member of its board of directors.
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter
cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by
publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted
the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondents employee to the
effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known
address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of
summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte.
TC: Granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer
of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply
with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution
with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because
the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
CA: Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even
sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal
interest and cost of suit.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely,
lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the
trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the
September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and
equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of
service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not
respondents messenger.

ISSUES: (1) Whether there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper
service of summons. (2) Whether the rule on service by publication under Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam. (3)
Whether the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared
by the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant
is designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that
there is jurisdiction over his person.
(2) No. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because
it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been
changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies
in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that the
complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for
recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.
(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that
the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail
is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.

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Jose vs Boyon
Facts:
On July 2, 1998, [petitioners] Patrick and Rafaela Jose lodged a complaint for
specific performance against [respondents] Helen and Romeo Boyon to compel them
to facilitate the transfer of ownership of a parcel of land subject of
a controverted sale. The action was lodged before the Regional Trial Court
of Muntinlupa which is presided by herein public respondent Judge
N.C. Perello. On July 21, 1998, respondent judge, through the acting Branch Clerk of
Court of Branch 276 of the RTC of Muntinlupa City, issued summons to the
[respondents]. As per return of the summons, substituted service was resorted to by
the process server allegedly because efforts to serve the summons personally to the
[respondents] failed. On December 9, 1998, [petitioners] filed before the trial court
an Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by
Publication. On December 28, 1998, public respondent issued an Order granting the
Ex-parte Motion for Leave of Court to Effect Summons by Publication. On July 30,
1999, the respondent judge, sans a written motion, issued an Order declaring herein
[respondents] in default for failure to file their respective answers. As a consequence
of the declaration of default, [petitioners] were allowed to submit their evidence exparte. Ultimately, on December 7, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed
resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
x x x Therefore, Spouses Helen and Romeo Boyon are directed to execute the
necessary document with the effect of withdrawing the Affidavit of Loss they filed and
annotated with the Register of Deeds of Makati City so that title to the parcel of land
subject of the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of the Plaintiffs be transferred in their
names. Thereafter the Register of Deeds of Makati City or Muntinlupa City may
cancel Transfer of Certificate of Title No. 149635 of the Defendants and issue another
to Plaintiff under the deed of sale, clean and free of any reported encumbrance.
Defendants are also directed to pay Plaintiffs actual expenses in the amount
of P20,000 and attorneys fees of P20,000 including costs of this suit.
On January 5, 2000, [respondent] Helen Boyon, who was then residing in the United
States of America, was surprised to learn from her sister Elizabeth Boyon, of the
resolution issued by the respondent court. On January 18, 2000, [respondents] filed
an Ad Cautelam motion questioning, among others, the validity of the service of
summons effected by the court a quo. On March 17, 2000, the public respondent
issued an Order denying the said motion on the basis of the defaulted [respondents]
supposed loss of standing in court. On March 29, 2000, the [respondents] once again
raised the issue of jurisdiction of the trial court via a motion for
reconsideration. On June 22, 2000, however, an Order was issued by the public
respondent denying the said motion. The [petitioners] moved for the execution of
the controverted judgment which the respondent judge ultimately granted.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution
and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the
sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons,
because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to
locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by
personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally
infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an
action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void,
since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Issue: W/N the service of summons were valid
W/N there was a defective personal service of summons
W/N service of summons by publication was improper.
Held: 1. Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by
publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective and
invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an
Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and
of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail
to the formers last known address.
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action
is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by
personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses
to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons
is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the
process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a)
indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is
in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.[7] It is likewise

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required that the pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of
service or in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with
all the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of summons
ineffective.
2. In the instant case, it appears that the process server hastily and capriciously
resorted to substituted service of summons without actually exerting any genuine
effort to locate respondents. A review of the records[9] reveals that the only effort he
exerted was to go to No. 32 Ariza Drive, Camella Homes, Alabang on July 22, 1998, to
try to serve the summons personally on respondents. While the Return of Summons
states that efforts to do so were ineffectual and unavailing because Helen Boyon was
in the United States and Romeo Boyon was in Bicol, it did not mention exactly what
efforts -- if any -- were undertaken to find respondents. Furthermore, it did not
specify where or from whom the process server obtained the information on their
whereabouts.
3. It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an action
against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the latter, an
individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that individuals interest
in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.[15]
In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for
specific performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved
a piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since they did
not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has consistently declared
that an action for specific performance is an action in personam

DOLE PHILIPPINES vs HON. REINATO QUILALA


G.R. No. 168723 July 9, 2008
DOCTRINES:
Filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for additional
time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default
with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Service of summons on a domestic corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to
the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Service must therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
FACTS:

Private respondent All Season Farm Corp. sought the recovery of a sum of
money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. and
several of its officers.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

According to Dole, an alias summons was served upon it through a certain


Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant employed by Dole Pacific General Services,
Ltd., which is an entity separate from Dole.
Dole filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (a) the
RTC lacked jurisdiction over the person of Dole due to improper service of
summons; (b) the complaint failed to state a cause of action; (c) All Season
was not the real party in interest; and (d) the officers of Dole cannot be
sued in their personal capacities for alleged acts performed in their
official capacities as corporate officers of Dole.
RTC-denied said motion. Partial MR was also denied.
Thereafter, Dole filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the
alias summons was not properly served.
CA- denied petition. It reasoned that Doles president had known of the
service of the alias summons although he did not personally receive and sign
it. It also held that in todays corporate setup, documents addressed to
corporate officers are received in their behalf by their staff. MR Denied.

Contentions:
Petitioner contends that for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over a domestic
corporation,
summons
must
be
served
only
on
the
corporate
officers enumerated in Section 11 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner maintains that the alias summons was not validly served on it
since the alias summons was served on Marifa Dela Cruz, an employee of Dole Pacific
General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate and distinct from petitioner. It
further avers that even if she were an employee of the petitioner, she is not one of the
officers enumerated under Section 11, Rule 14. Thus, the RTC, without proper service
of summons, lacks jurisdiction over petitioner as defendant below.
Private respondent All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias summons
through its president. According to private respondent, there was full compliance with
Section 11, Rule 14, when Marifa Dela Cruz received the summons upon instruction of
petitioners president as indicated in the Officers Return. More so, petitioner had
admitted that it received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals committed an error of law when it allowed
substituted service on a private corporation when it held that Dole was validly served
with summons in spite of the fact that summons was not served on its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel
thereby ignoring the rule on service of summons on private domestic corporations.
Simply stated: Whether there was a valid service of summons on petitioner for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the corporation.
HELD: NO. But the court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner when the latter
sought affirmative reliefs.

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RATIO: Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic
corporation is restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule
in statutory construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must
therefore be made on the president, managing partner, general manager,
corporate secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
In this case, it appears that Marifa Dela Cruz, a legal assistant, received the alias
summons. Contrary to private respondents claim that it was received upon instruction
of the president of the corporation as indicated in the Officers Return, such fact does
not appear in the receiving copy of the alias summons which Marifa Dela Cruz
signed. There was no evidence that she was authorized to receive court
processes in behalf of the president. Considering that the service of
summons was made on a legal assistant, not employed by herein petitioner
and who is not one of the designated persons under Section 11, Rule 14, the
trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over petitioner.
However, under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary
appearance in the action is equivalent to service of summons. As held
previously by this Court, the filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such
as, to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration
of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for
reconsideration, are considered voluntary submission to the jurisdiction
of the court.
Note that petitioner filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time. It was not a conditional appearance entered to question the
regularity of the service of summons, but an appearance submitting to the
jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the receipt of the alias summons
and praying for additional time to file responsive pleading. Consequently,
petitioner having acknowledged the receipt of the summons and also having invoked
the jurisdiction of the RTC to secure affirmative relief in its motion for additional time,
petitioner effectively submitted voluntarily to the jurisdiction of the RTC. It
is estopped now from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.The RTC
therefore properly took cognizance of the case against Dole Philippines,
Inc., and we agree that the trial and the appellate courts committed no error of law
when Doles contentions were overruled.
MANOTOC v CA

Doctrine: In order for jurisdiction to be vested upon the courts, a valid substitute
service of summons is required

Facts:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and
on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc for
Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano
seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the
United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case
entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case
No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by
military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command,
direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant
Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.

Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons on July 6,
1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or
AlexandraHomes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.

On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon
(Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit
mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared
her in default through an Order dated October 13, 1993.

On October 19, 1993, petitioner, by special appearance of counsel, filed a Motion to


Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over her person due to an
invalid substituted service of summons. The grounds to support the motion were: (1)
the address of defendant indicated in the Complaint (Alexandra Homes) was not her
dwelling, residence, or regular place of business as provided in Section 8, Rule 14 of the
Rules of Court; (2) the party (de la Cruz), who was found in the unit, was neither a
representative, employee, nor a resident of the place; (3) the procedure prescribed by
the Rules on personal and substituted service of summons was ignored; (4) defendant
was a resident of Singapore; and (5) whatever judgment rendered in this case would be
ineffective and futile.

During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc presented Carlos
Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra
Homesonly two times. He also identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which
stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the
Certification was issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also
presented her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued
by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore.
She claimed that the person referred to in plaintiffs Exhibits A to EEEE as Mrs.
Manotoc may not even be her, but the mother of Tommy Manotoc, and granting that
she was the one referred to in said exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs.

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Manotoc. Hence, the infrequent number of times she allegedly entered Alexandra
Homes did not at all establish plaintiffs position that she was a resident of said place.
On the other hand, Agapita Trajano, for plaintiffs estate, presented Robert Swift, lead
counsel for plaintiffs in the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos Human Rights Litigation, who
testified that he participated in the deposition taking of Ferdinand R. Marcos, Jr.; and
he confirmed that Mr. Marcos, Jr. testified that petitioners residence was at the
Alexandra Apartment, Greenhills. In addition, the entries in the logbook of Alexandra
Homes from August 4, 1992 to August 2, 1993, listing the name of petitioner Manotoc
and the Sheriffs Return, were adduced in evidence.

Requirements for Substituted Service:


(1)

Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service

(2)

Specific Details in the Return

(3)

A Person of Suitable Age and Discretion

(4)

A Competent Person in Charge

In the case at bar, there was an invalid substitute service.


Let us examine the full text of the Sheriffs Return, which reads:

On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the
strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was
AlexandraHomes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on
the documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the
presumption that the sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular performance
of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.

On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotocs plea for reconsideration for
lack of merit.

Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of
Appeals (CA) on January 20, 1995, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the
annulment of the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge Aurelio C.
Trampe.

THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons with complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above
entitled case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC
located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room
104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic]Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the day but
to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence
or premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was
resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said
summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of
the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone
Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with the
said defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said
processes but he refused to sign (emphases supplied).

WHEREFORE, said summons is hereby returned to this Honorable Court of origin,


duly served for its record and information.
CA: dismissed the petition for certiorari and prohibition. Also rejected petitioners
passport as proof of her residency in Singapore. Also denied MR
Pasig, Metro-Manila July 15, 1993.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a n invalid substitute of service in the case at bar

Held:
Yes

Ratio:

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence of


material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner Manotoc in
person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those efforts proved
inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has become impossible or
unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of on many occasions several
attempts were made to serve the summons x x x personally, at reasonable hours
during the day, and to no avail for the reason that the said defendant is usually out of
her place and/or residence or premises. Wanting in detailed information, the Return
deviates from the rulingin Domagas v. Jensen and other related casesthat the
pertinent facts and circumstances on the efforts exerted to serve the summons

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personally must be narrated in the Return. It cannot be determined how many times,
on what specific dates, and at what hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the
fact that the substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by
a Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the Return
or Certificate of Service.

Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not
been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons,
exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of
the Complaint only states that respondents were informed, and so [they] allege about
the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more
direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or
house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for
personal service to have been pursued persistently.

Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are
two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age
and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant.
Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as
to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs
general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out
by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra
Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society would
unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation
that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to
have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la
Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not
have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners right
to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted
service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.

It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized
by the rules.

DOCTRINES:
Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be
acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of
summons.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons of the defendants voluntary appearance in court: When the
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no
valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is null and void.
Personal service preferred over substituted service: Personal service of
summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons
cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.

Facts: Constatino A. Pascual filed a complaint for Specific Performance before the
RTC. In the Return Service, the Process Server reported that he failed to deliver the
summons to the defendant. According to the report, the defendant, Dr. Lourdes
Pascual, was not at her home and only her maid was there who refused to receive the
summons. His effort to effect the service is backed up by a certification of the Barangay
in the area.
The following day, the Process Server went back at the defendants place, but again she
is not home. Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC. Subsequently, the
Process Server returned with the report that a substituted service was effected. For
failure of defendant to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default to which Dr. Lourdes Pascual filed an opposition claiming that
she was not able to receive any summons and a copy of the complaint hence the RTC
cannot exercise jurisdiction over her person.
RTC: Declared Dr. Lourdes Pascual in Default. MR Denied. She then filed a
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default with the argument of non-service of
Summons. RTC denied and on the same day issued a Certificate of Finality
and Entry of Judgment.
CA: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 overturned RTC
and ruled in her favor.
Petitioner herein, Constantino Pascual, through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 comes now to the SC.
Issue: WON the service of summons is valid.

PASCUAL v. PASCUAL
GR NO. 171916, DECEMBER 4, 2009

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Held: NO.

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In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, the
service may be done by personal or substituted. A plain reading of Rule 14, Sections 6
and 7 indicates that Personal Service should and always be the first option, only when
the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server
resort to substituted service.
The Court gave a discussion as to the nature of the requisites of substituted service in
Manotoc v. Court of Appeals. We can break down this section into the following
requirements to effect a valid substituted service:
1)

2)

Impossibility of Prompt Personal Service


a. The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show
that defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility
of prompt service.
Specific Details in the Return
a. The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and
circumstances surrounding the attempted personal service. The
efforts made to find the defendant and the reasons behind the
failure must be clearly narrated in detail in the Return.

3)

A Person Suitable of Age and Discretion


a. If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or
residence, it should be left with a person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein.

4)

A Competent Person in Charge


a. Such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the
obligation of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the
prejudicial effects arising from inaction on the summons.

These details must be contained in the return.


Petitioner contends that there was a valid substituted service of summons as shown in
three officers return. However, this Court stresses that the Process Server must show
that the defendant cannot be served promptly, or that there was an impossibility of
service. The Return of Summons in this case does not show or indicate the actual
exertion or any steps by the officer to serve the summons. In the absence of even the
barest compliance with the procedure for substituted service of summons outlined in
the Rules, the principle of Presumption of Regularity cannot apply. CA affirmed in
toto.

Heirs of Vinzons v. CA
315 SCRA 541

Topic: Rules 15-19 Motions to Intervention


Doctrine: Referral to the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat should be made prior to the
filing of the ejectment case under PD 1508. Legal action for ejectment is barred when
there is non-recourse to barangay court.

MTC: ordered respondent to vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals
RTC: affirmed decision in toto
CA: reversed the RTC and MTC
SC: Decision of CA affirmed.

FACTS: Petitioners Heirs of Vinzons are co-owners of a parcel of land of which


respondent Mena Edoria, as lessee, is occupying a portion. Respondent built thereon a
residential house worth P40,000.00. He started paying a monthly rent of P4.00 which
by1986 had reached P13.00.In 1986, an ejectment suit was filed by petitioners several
others also occupying the same lot owned by them, on the ground, among others, of
non-payment of rentals. After trial, however, the case was dismissed on the finding that
respondent was not in arrears but was even advance in his rental payments. Both
petitioner and respondent appealed from said decision to the Regional Trial Court. In
1988, while the aforementioned case pending appeal before the RTC petitioner filed
another ejectment suit against respondent and thirty-nine (39) others alleging that said
defendants refused to enter into an agreement with them as tenants-lessees and refused
to pay the increased rent of P1.00 per square meter per month. Respondent resisted the
claim alleging, among others, lack of cause of action and pendency of the earlier
ejectment case. The trial court rendered its decision dismissing the case against
respondent in view of the pendency of a civil case on appeal. This decision was again
elevated to the RTC.

While the second civil was pending appeal in the RTC, petitioners again filed the instant
suit for ejectment on the following grounds:
a)
b)
c)

In his answer, respondent sought dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:
a)
b)
c)

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

expiration of lease contract as of 1984;


refusal to sign written renewal of contract of lease; and
non-payment of rent for one (1) year and ten (10) months.

it did not pass through barangay conciliation;


no prior demand was made or if there was such a demand, it was made more
than one year prior to the filing of the case;
there was no cause of action as it was in violation of PD 20 and BP Blg. 25;

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d)
e)

the case is barred by prior judgment; and


there is still pending appeal a similar case between the parties.

After trial, the MTC rendered its decision, ordering respondent to vacate the premises
and pay the accrued rentals. On appeal to the RTC, the said decision was affirmed in
toto. The CA, however, reversed the two (2) earlier decisions by dismissing the
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, failure to comply with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law (PD 1508); and lack of evidence of prior demand to vacate before
instituting the complaint.

Issue: Whether submission of the case to the Barangay court is a necessity?

Held: SC ruled that the MTC had improperly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment
suit.
First, this case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed within
one year from the date of last demand with the MTC, otherwise it is an accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC. The rule is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be
filed should be counted from the last letter of demand to vacate. Accion publiciana is
the plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year.
Second, the challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for failure of the
plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process under PD
1508,preliminary to judicial recourse. The CA had found that "there is no clear showing
that it was brought before the Barangay Lupon or Pangkat of Barangay where the
parties reside and the property subject of the case is situated, as there is no barangay
certification to file action attached to the complaint.
Third, petitioners rely heavily on the general rule that findings of trial courts
deserve to be respected and affirmed by appellate courts.
Almost as well recognized, as the general rule is the exception that the factual
findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of Appeals if by the
evidence on record or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.
Considering that the trial courts and the Court of Appeals arrived at different
factual findings, we have reviewed the evidence on record and have found as aforesaid,
the improper assumption by the MTC of the case due to non-recourse to barangay
conciliation and the lapse of the one-year period for bringing the case for unlawful
detainer. Having arrived at the above conclusion, the Court finds no need to discuss the
other issues, specifically, those bearing on the application of the principles of litis
pendentia and/or res judicata. Decision of CA affirmed.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

LEDESMA vs CA
FACTS:
Petioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building in Malate, Manila.
Two units of said apartment were leased
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated
December 10, 1984, and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a month-to-month
basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of
monthly rental payments, was violated by private respondent and that as of
October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both units
in the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent to, and
received by, private respondent
Petitioner referred the matter to Barangay for conciliation when the private
respondents failed to honor the demand letter.
Petitioner was assisted by her son Raymond, not a lawyer, because of her
recurring psychogical and emotional ailment as evidenced of her receipts
and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist.
Private respondent refused to vacate the premises, petitioner filed a case for
ejectment proceed in MTC Branch 10, Manila which ordered respondent to
vacate the premises and to pay the rentals and the attorneys fees in the
amount of P2,500
RTC of Manila affirmed the MTCs decision except for the award of
attorneys fees which reduced it to P1000
Private Respondent filed a petition for review in CA which reversed the
ruling of the LC due to lack of cause of action
Section 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 states:
o Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . .
o Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. In all proceedings
provided for herein, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors
and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are
not lawyers.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not private respondent did not comply with Sec. 6 and 9 of PD
1508 in the lower court?
b. Whether or not Private Respondent had waived his right to question the lack
of cause of action

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c.

Whether or not private respondent was not served summons?

RULING:
a. The court does not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the
Court of Appeals
When private respondent stated that he was never summoned or
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating
that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person
for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement
Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he
was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman;
that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in
paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action
was improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby
resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of
P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in
substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or
objections in the court below.
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before
the barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological
ailments. But for the entire year of 1988, there is no indication at all
that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The
only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner.
There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the
Lupon Chairman's office.
b. Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented
by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.
To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal
confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of
the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute
resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory
language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory
construction dictating that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius",
the express exceptions made regarding minors and incompetents
must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned.
c. Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred
her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila

Uy v. Contreras237 SCRA 167 - prior referral to the lupon


Doctrine: While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of
1991, the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its provisions on
prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Facts:

Petitioner Felicidad Uy subleased from respondent Susanna Atayde the other


half of the second floor of a building. She operated therein a beauty parlor.
The sublease contract expired; However, the petitioner was not able to remove
all her personal properties. An argument arose between the petitioner and
Atayde when the former sought to withdraw from the premises her remaining
properties. The argument degenerated into a scuffle between the petitioner,
on the one hand, and Atayde and several of Ataydes employees, including
private respondent Winnie Javier.
Respondent had themselves medically examined for the alleged injuries
inflicted on them by the petitioner. Respondents filed a complaint with the
Barangay. The confrontation of the parties was scheduled by the Barangay,
only petitioner appeared. The Barangay then reset the confrontation. The
office of provincial prosecutor filed two information for slight physical injuries
against the petitioner with MTC. Respondent MTC Judge ordered the
petitioner to submit her counter-affidavit and those of her witnesses.
Petitioner submitted and specifically alleged the prematurity of filing of the
case for failure to undergo conciliation proceedings. Petitioner filed a motion
to dismiss. Respondent Judge Contreras denied the motion. Same as
the MR. Petition filed a special civil action for certiorari in the SC.

Issue:
Whether respondent Judge Contreras abused his discretion and whether prior referral
to the lupon is a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court.
Ruling:

While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991,
the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its
provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
In Peregrina vs. Panis, this Court stated:
o Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo
vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes
the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is
analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of
earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members,
lacking which the case can be dismissed.
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so
in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:
o In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional

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requirement, non-compliance with which would deprive a court of


its jurisdiction either over the subject matter or over the person of
the defendant. Where, however, the fact of non-compliance with and
non-observance of such procedure has been seasonably raised as an
issue before the court first taking cognizance of the complaint,
dismissal of the action is proper.
This Court emphasizes the vital role which the revised katarungang
pambarangay law plays in the delivery of justice at the barangay level, in
promoting peace, stability, and progress therein, and in effectively preventing
or reducing expensive and wearisome litigation. Parties to disputes cognizable
by the lupon should, with sincerity, exhaust the remedies provided by that law,
government prosecutors should exercise due diligence in ascertaining
compliance with it, and trial courts should not hesitate to impose the
appropriate sanctions for non-compliance thereof.
The respondent judge thus acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to
dismiss Criminal Cases. Respondent judges total unawareness of the Local
Government Code of 1991, more specifically on the provisions on
the Katarungang pambarangay, is distressing. He should have taken judicial
notice thereof, ever mindful that under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court, courts are mandatorily required to take judicial notice of "the official
acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the Philippines."
We have ruled that a judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules. He should have applied
the revised katarungang pambarangay law under the Local Government
Code of 1991. Had he done so, this petition would not have reached us and
taken valuable attention and time which could have been devoted to more
important cases.

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW


SPOUSES FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, JR. AND AMPARO O. DE GUZMAN,
PETITIONERS, VS. CESAR OCHOA AND SYLVIA A. OCHOA,
REPRESENTED BY ARACELI S. AZORES, AS THEIR ATTORNEY-INFACT, RESPONDENTS.
TOPIC: OMNIBUS MOTION; MOTION TO DISMISS
DOCTRINE: An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general
rule is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil
action for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and
not errors of judgment. Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only
be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after
trial.
An omnibus motion is a motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A
motion to dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the
complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus motion,

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion
because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived."
FACTS: On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa,
through respondent Araceli Azores, acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment of contract
of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages. The action, docketed as
Civil Case No. 68896 was raffled to Branch 160, presided by the respondent RTC
Judge. On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 68896, filed
a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the complaint did not state a cause
of action. The petitioners' motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the private
respondents.
RTC - Respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and at the same
time set Civil Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference.
Petitioners filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the certification against
forum shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the principal parties
(plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the
complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible.
The private respondents opposed the second motion to dismiss.
RTC - RTC Judge issued her first assailed order, denying the second motion to
dismiss. Petition filed their motion for reconsideration, but the respondent RTC
Judge denied the motion through her second assailed order.
Petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA via a petition for certiorari
contending that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it
was fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia
Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-fact of
Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers
delegated to Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in court.
CA - Denied the petition for lack' of merit. Agreed with the RTC that following the
omnibus motion rule, the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners were
deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the second motion to dismiss does not violate the Omnibus
Motion Rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court because the issue raised in
the second motion was a question of jurisdiction. (2) Whether the RTC should have
dismissed the complaint motu proprio.
HELD: (1) No. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule
is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action

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for certiorari which is a remedy designed to correct errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. Therefore, an order denying a motion to dismiss may only be
reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The
ordinary procedure to be followed, only in exceptional cases where the denial of the
motion to dismiss is tainted with grave abuse of discretion that the Court allows the
extraordinary remedy of certiorari. By "grave abuse of discretion," we mean such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment that is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction.
In this case, the petitioners failed to convincingly substantiate its charge of
arbitrariness on the part of Judge Fabros.
Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court defines an omnibus motion as a
motion attacking a pleading, judgment or proceeding. A motion to
dismiss is an omnibus motion because it attacks a pleading, that is, the
complaint. For this reason, a motion to dismiss, like any other omnibus
motion, must raise and include all objections available at the time of the
filing of the motion because under Section 8, "all objections not so
included shall be deemed waived." As inferred from the provision, only the
following defenses under Section 1, Rule 9, are excepted from its application: [a] lack
of jurisdiction over the subject matter; [b] litis pendentia; [c] res judicata; and [d] the
action is barred by the statute of limitations or prescription.
In the case at bench, the petitioners raised the ground of defective
verification and certification of forum shopping only when they filed their
second motion to dismiss, despite the fact that this ground was existent
and available to them at the time of the filing of their first motion to
dismiss. Absent any justifiable reason to explain this fatal omission, the
ground of defective verification and certification of forum shopping was
deemed waived and could no longer be questioned by the petitioners in
their second motion to dismiss.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the requirement regarding verification of
a pleading is formal, not jurisdictional. Such requirement is simply a condition
affecting the form of the pleading, and non-compliance with which does not
necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. Similarly, the rule requiring the
submission of such certification of non-forum shopping, although obligatory, is not
jurisdictional. The certification requirement is rooted in the principle that a partylitigant shall not be allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different fora, as this
practice is detrimental to an orderly judicial procedure.
(2) No. Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court is clear that failure to comply with the
requirements on the rule against forum shopping shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case "upon motion and after hearing."

Re: Rules 15-19; Pre-Trial

DOCTRINE
Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the
parties.

FACTS
Accused raped a 6 year old child (Mayia). Because of the extent of the damage on her
genitals, the child undertook an IV sedation operation to repair her lacerations.

"On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang,
Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on
her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez
approached her. Appellant introduced himself as "Johnny" and immediately
afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. Still in shock, Mayia
fell down. At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them.

Appellant then proceeded to lower his black denim pants while


simultaneously removing Mayias panty. He then inserted his penis inside
Mayias vagina. Mayia felt excruciating pain in her private parts (sic) but
was not able to repel her aggressor whose strength and weight totally
engulfed her. Her only recourse was to cry while her young body was being
ravished.

After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away.
Notwithstanding that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress now
covered with her own blood, Mayia managed to stand up and seek help. She
ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters away
from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard her
dog barking. Looking at the direction of the noise, she saw a confused Mayia
approaching her with blood dripping from her private parts and thighs.
When Giron asked Mayia what happened, the latter shouted "ni-rape ako,
ni-rape ako". Giron then summoned her husband and other companions to
look for Mayias attacker but was unable to find him. Giron then proceeded
to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca, Mayias parents, to inform them of
what happened.

People v Perez (2003)

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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When her parents asked Mayia if she knew her assailant, the latter answered
the name "Johnny." The couple brought their daughter to the President
Ramon Magsaysay Memorial Hospital for medical examination. In the
police station, accused was positively identifies by Mayia as the perpetrator.

The trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime Statutory
Rape. Accused was sentenced to suffer death penalty. Thus this automatic review.

HELD
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration.

At the pre-trial, the parties mutually worked out a satisfactory


disposition of the criminal case. Appellant, assisted by counsel, signed a PreTrial Agreement which, as incorporated in the Pre-Trial Order, stated that:
"x x x.
3. The victim in this case, Mayia P. Ponseca was born on 23 May 1990 as
evidenced by her birth certificate;

Appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.
Appellant maintains that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for
failure of the prosecution to prove Mayias age by independent evidence.
Appellant points out that while Mayias birth certificate was duly marked
during the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial.
Appellant asserts that Mayias minority must not only be specifically alleged in the
Information but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt during the
trial.1awphi1.

During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayias birth certificate as
Exhibit "A". The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence which included Exhibit
"A", a certified true copy of Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted
Exhibit "A" without any objection from the defense.

ISSUE

The purpose of pre-trial is to consider the following:

Whether the age of Mayia was not proven because although the birth certificate was
duly marked during pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during trial.

x x x." (Emphasis supplied)

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.

plea bargaining;
stipulation of facts;
marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes lawful defenses; and
such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and
civil aspects of the case.

Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the


parties.

Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on
December 15, 1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident
occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was "8
years old last May 23." Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as
shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on
January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has
indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped
her.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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Saguid vs CA
Doctrine: Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure of
the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial. The remedy is to file a motion for reconsideration showing FAME.
Fraud, accident, mistake and excusable negligence for failure to appear at pre-trial.
Facts:
Seventeen-year old Gina S. Rey was married,[2] but separated de facto from her
husband, when she met petitioner Jacinto Saguid in Marinduque, sometime in July
1987.[3] After a brief courtship, the two decided to cohabit as husband and wife in a
house built on a lot owned by Jacintos father.[4] Their cohabitation was not blessed
with any children. Jacinto made a living as the patron of their fishing vessel Saguid
Brothers.[5] Gina, on the other hand, worked as a fish dealer, but decided to work as
an entertainer in Japan from 1992 to 1994 when her relationship with Jacintos
relatives turned sour. Her periodic absence, however, did not ebb away the conflict
with petitioners relatives. In 1996, the couple decided to separate and end up their 9year cohabitation.[6]
On January 9, 1997, private respondent filed a complaint for Partition and Recovery
of Personal Property with Receivership against the petitioner with the Regional Trial
Court of Boac, Marinduque.
In his answer[12] to the complaint, petitioner claimed that the expenses for the
construction of their house were defrayed solely from his income as a captain of their
fishing vessel. He averred that private respondents meager income as fish dealer
rendered her unable to contribute in the construction of said house. Besides, selling
fish was a mere pastime to her; as such, she was contented with the small quantity of
fish allotted to her from his fishing trips. Petitioner further contended that Gina did
not work continuously in Japan from 1992 to 1994, but only for a 6-month duration
each year. When their house was repaired and improved sometime in 1995-1996,
private respondent did not share in the expenses because her earnings as entertainer
were spent on the daily needs and business of her parents. From his income in the
fishing business, he claimed to have saved a total of P130,000.00, P75,000.00 of
which was placed in a joint account deposit with private respondent. This savings,
according to petitioner was spent in purchasing the disputed personal properties.
On May 21, 1997, the trial court declared the petitioner as in default for failure to file a
pre-trial brief as required by Supreme Court Circular No. 1-89.[13]
On May 26, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[14] of the May 21, 1997
order, which was denied on June 2, 1997, and private respondent was allowed to
present evidence ex parte.[15] Petitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but
the same was also denied on October 8, 1997.
On July 15, 1998, a decision[16] was rendered in favor of private respondent
Issue: whether or not the trial court erred in allowing private respondent to present
evidence ex parte;

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

Held: No.Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure
of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall
render judgment on the basis thereof.[20] The remedy of the defendant is to file a
motion for reconsideration[21] showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.[22] The motion need not really stress the
fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which
contains his defenses is already on record.[23]
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however,
sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex
parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by
counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion
for extension to file answer,[24] the required answer stating therein the special and
affirmative defenses,[25] and several other motions.[26] If it were true that petitioner did
not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial
brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to
file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt
of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure
to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their nonobservance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they
should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[27]
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a
persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the
Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented
by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due
process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation
of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.[28]
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic
the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for
failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied
retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required
under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the
said circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure
to appear at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered
as in default
LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276,
Muntinlupa City, THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D. VILLARIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 153828. October 24, 2003

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Topic: RULES 15-19- INTERVENTION
DOCTRINE: To allow intervention, it must be shown that:
a. The movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or
otherwise qualified, and
b. Consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or
whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is not
more important than the second
FACTS:

A complaint was filed by petitioner before the HLURB against PR Builders,


Inc. and its managers, Enrico Baluyot and Pablito Villarin, private
respondents husband.

HLURB rendered a decision rescinding the contract to sell between petitioner


and PR Builders, and ordering PR Builders to refund petitioner as well as to
pay damages.

HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its managers, and
referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for
enforcement.

Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in
the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine
Villarin.

Private respondent filed before the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from
proceeding with the public auction.

Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the
execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent and her
husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in
the HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer
for the separate liability of her husband.

Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order and set
the case for raffle and conference.

A conference was then conducted, after which public respondent judge issued
the assailed resolution granting private respondents petition for prohibition
and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.

More than a month after public respondent judge issued the resolution,
petitioner filed a motion for intervention.

RTC: Public respondent judge denied the motion ruling that this case has
long been decided, hence the intervention is too late. There is no case for them
to intervene.

Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for certiorari,

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has the right to intervene


HELD: NO
RATIO: Petitioner insists that, in a petition for prohibition, it is essential that the party
who is interested in sustaining the act or acts sought to be prohibited or enjoined be
impleaded as private respondent. Thus, as the judgment creditor in the HLURB case,
petitioner claims that he was an indispensable party in the petition for prohibition and
should have been allowed to intervene in the said case. He was not allowed to do so.
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 2 Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any
other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist
from further proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the
judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents
relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46. (2a)
Petitioners claim that he had the right to intervene is without
basis. Nothing in the said provision requires the inclusion of a private
party as respondent in petitions for prohibition.
On the other hand, to allow intervention, it must be shown that
a. The movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation or
otherwise qualified, and
b. Consideration must be given as to whether the adjudication of
the rights of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced,
or whether the intervenors rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not. Both requirements must concur as the first is
not more important than the second.[5]
In the case at bar, it cannot be said that petitioners right as a judgment creditor
was adversely affected by the lifting of the levy on the subject real property. Records
reveal that there are other pieces of property exclusively owned by the defendants in
the HLURB case that can be levied upon.
Moreover, even granting for the sake of argument that petitioner indeed had the
right to intervene, he must exercise said right in accordance with the rules and within
the period prescribed therefor.

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As provided in the Rules of Court, the motion for intervention may be filed
at any time before rendition of judgment by the trial court.[6] Petitioner
filed his motion only on April 25, 2002, way beyond the period set forth in
the rules. The court resolution granting private respondents petition for prohibition
and lifting the levy on the subject property was issued on March 22, 2002. By April 6,
2002, after the lapse of 15 days, the said resolution had already become final and
executory.
Besides, the mere fact that petitioner failed to move for the
reconsideration of the trial courts resolution is sufficient cause for the
outright dismissal of the instant petition. Certiorari as a special civil action will
not lie unless a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent court to
allow it an opportunity to correct its errors, if any.
PINLAC v CA
Doctrine: publication must be done in a newspaper of general circulation
Facts:
Petitioners herein are World War II veterans, their dependents and successors-ininterest. Together, they filed a class suit primarily for Quieting of Title before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, where it was docketed as Civil Case
No. Q-35672. In particular, petitioners claimed that the real property, which has an
aggregate area of 502 hectares, were part of forest lands belonging to the government;
that they and their predecessors-in-interest have occupied said property continuously,
adversely, and exclusively for more than thirty (30) years; and that they have
accordingly filed applications for land titling in their respective names with the
appropriate government agency.
While petitioners claim that the land in dispute was part of the public domain, they
named as respondents several persons and corporations who are titled owners of
subdivided parcels of land within the subject property. One of those so impleaded as
a party-respondent was the Vil-Ma Maloles Subdivision (hereinafter, Vil-Ma). The
individual lot owners of the said subdivision, however, were not specifically named.
Since personal service of summons could not be effected on Vil-Ma and some of the
other named respondents, petitioners moved for leave of court to serve summons by
publication which was granted. Accordingly, the summons was published in the
Metropolitan Newsweek, a periodical edited and published in the City of Caloocan
and Malolos, Bulacan.
Some of the named respondents filed their respective responsive pleadings, while the
others, including Vil-Ma, failed to answer, and were thus declared in default.
Consequently, petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte against the
defaulted respondents.
Lower court: Granted petition as against defaulted respondents

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

CA: ruled that defaulted parties are actually indispensible parties and that should
have been served with summons. Granted preliminary injunction as against the
petitioners.

Issue: Whether or not defaulted parties were validly served with summons.

Held: No

Ratio:
We also agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision
is null and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the latter were not
duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. The summons and
the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited and published in
Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the
publication in said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan Newsweek, to be invalid
because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of general circulation in
Quezon City where the subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree
No. 1079, Section 1.
Petitioners, however, contend that the service of summons by publication was legal
and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of Court.
The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders of the trial court dated
May 5, 1993 and September 29, 1983.
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval
of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan Newsweek is
not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules strictly require that
publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such time as the court may order. The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not
specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the
absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the
strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled
with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by publication
ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that
the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal
defect in the service of summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory
requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by
publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service
other than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules,
the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private respondents are
concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was filed on November 2,

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1983, Vilma Maloles Subdivision no longer existed as a juridical entity. Vilma Maloles
Subdivision, a partnership, was dissolved more than six (6) years earlier, as evidenced
by a Certificate of Dissolution issued by the SEC dated January 26, 1976.
Consequently, it could no longer be sued having lost its juridical personality.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. SISON


GR NO. 185954, FEBRUARY 16 2010
DOCTRINE:
Intervention: It is fundamental that the allowance or disallowance of a Motion to
Intervene is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The permissive tenor of the
rules shows the intention to give to the court the full measure of discretion in permitting
or disallowing the intervention. Simply, intervention is a procedure by which third
persons, not originally parties to the suit but claiming an interest in the subject matter,
come into the case in order to protect their right or interpose their claim. Its main
purpose is to settle in one action and by a single judgment all conflicting claims of, or
the whole controversy among, the persons involved.
To warrant intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must
concur:
1. The movant has a legal interest in the matter in litigation; and
2. Intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of being properly
decided in a separate proceeding.
The interest, which entitles one to intervene, must involve the matter in litigation and
of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.

Facts: On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by
Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a lettercomplaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor
Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar, including
respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them
amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13,
2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit
(COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million
went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were
expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that
purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T.
De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded
provincial officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The latter were then
required to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the
complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained
in the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his
function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the
requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds
are available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification
issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in
the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding.
Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached
in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected
nor directly implicated in the complaint.
Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that
he had not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by
the Province of Samar.
Ombudsman: Rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from
service.
CA: Petition for review under rule 43 Reversed and set aside decision of the
Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman then filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA
in its assailed resolution of December 18, 2008.
Issue: WON the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.
Held: NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is not the proper party to intervene. The SC further
stated that:
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene
in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be
mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.

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It is an established doctrine that judges should detach themselves from cases
where their decisions are appealed to a higher court for review. The raison d'etre for
such a doctrine is the fact that judges are not active combatants in such proceeding and
must leave the opposing parties to contend their individual positions and the appellate
court to decide the issues without the judges' active participation. When judges actively
participate in the appeal of their judgment, they, in a way, cease to be judicial and have
become adversarial instead.
In Pleyto v. Philippine National Police Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (PNP-CIDG), the Court applied this doctrine when it held that the CA erred in
granting the Motion to Intervene filed by the Office of the Ombudsman, to wit:
The court or the quasi-judicial agency must be detached and impartial,
not only when hearing and resolving the case before it, but even when its judgment is
brought on appeal before a higher court. The judge of a court or the officer of a quasijudicial agency must keep in mind that he is an adjudicator who must settle the
controversies between parties in accordance with the evidence and applicable laws,
regulations and/or jurisprudence. His judgment should already clearly and
completely state his findings of fact and law.
There must be no more need for him to justify further his judgment when it is appealed
before appellate courts. When the court judge or the quasi-judicial officer intervenes as
a party in the appealed case, he inevitably forsakes his detachment and impartiality,
and his interest in the case becomes personal since his objective now is no longer only
to settle the controversy between the original parties (which he had already
accomplished by rendering his judgment), but more significantly, to refute the
appellant's assignment of errors, defend his judgment, and prevent it from being
overturned on appeal.
AONUEVO vs. JALANDONI
G.R. No. 178221
Topic: Intervention
Doctrine: The descendants of Isabel have no share in the Estate of Rodolfo directly
denying the petitioners legal rights to intervene in the intestate proceedings.

RTC: (acting as intestate court) permitted the petitioners and their siblings to
intervene in the proceedings
CA: granted the petition for certiorari and nullified the orders of the intestate court.

Procedural History
On 2 July 2004, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental issued an
order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the intestate proceedings
of Rodolfo. The respondent sought for reconsideration but was denied by the same
court in an order dated 26 January 2006. On 31 May 2007, by reason of a petition for
certiorari, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decisions issued by the lower
court. Via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this
case was brought before the Supreme Court.
Facts: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate on 20 December 1966. His brother,
Bernardino, filed at the Court of First Instance a petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration for Rodolfos property. The petitioners filed a manifestation before the
court introducing themselves as the children of Sylvia, the daughter of Isabel and John.
Isabel who, at the time of Rodolfos death, was legally married to the deceased and is
therefore entitled to a share in the latters property. In the same manifestation, they
prayed that they be allowed to intervene in their mothers behalf in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased. To support their cause, the marriage certificate between
Isabel and Rodolfo, the petitioners proof of births and the birth certificate of their
mother, Sylvia, were appended in their manifestation. Bernardino opposed their
intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were
married and that she was a legitimate child. As a result, Isabels marriage to Rodolfo
was null and void. Petitioners argue, however, that such statement in the birth
certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage between Isabel and John
and that it was only done to save the family from condemnation.
Issues: Whether or not the fact of marriage cannot be proven by evidence other than
the marriage certificate; and Whether or not the petitioners have legal right to intervene
in the proceedings.
Held: No. The court ruled that while a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. In this case the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the
competent evidence of the previous marriage between her mother Isabel and father
John. It contains entries that her parents were married and that she is their
legitimate child. The court further ruled, that such entries, pursuant to existing laws,
are accorded prima facie weight and presumed true. Sylvias birth certificate speaks of
a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John. The birth certificate shall be regarded
as equivalent evidence to prove the existence of marriage in the absence of a marriage
certificate. Therefore, Isabels marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at the time of the
marriage, Isabel was still married to John. As a result, the descendants of Isabel have
no share in the Estate of Rodolfo directly denying the petitioners legal rights to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.

SC: the instant appeal is DENIED


The instant appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED.

Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu

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