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Doctrine: It is a settled rule that jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint. Jurisdiction is not affected by the pleas or the theories
set up by the defendant in an answer or a motion to dismiss. Otherwise, jurisdiction
would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of the defendant.
Facts:
Issue:
Ruling:
Whether it is the RTC or the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board
(HLURB) which has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Eristingcols
complaint.
Apparently, Eristingcols complaint, designated as one for declaration of
nullity, falls within the regular courts jurisdiction. However, we have, on more
than one occasion, held that the caption of the complaint is not determinative
of the nature of the action.
Scrutiny of the allegations contained in Eristingcols complaint reveals that
the nature of the question subject of this controversy only superficially delves
into the validity of UVAIs Construction Rules. The complaint actually goes
into the proper interpretation and application of UVAIs by-laws, specifically
its construction rules.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
estoppel to apply, the action giving rise thereto must be unequivocal and intentional
because, if misapplied, estoppel may become a tool of injustice.
Petitioner who filed the complaint against private respondent and two other parties
before the said court,. believing that the RTC had jurisdiction over his complaint. But
by then, Republic Act 7691 amending BP 129 had become effective, such that
jurisdiction already belongs not to the RTC but to the MTC pursuant to said
amendment. Private respondent, an unschooled farmer, in the mistaken belief that
since he was merely a tenant of the late Artemio Laurente Sr., his landlord, gave the
summons to a Hipolito Laurente, one of the surviving heirs of Artemio Sr., who did not
do anything about the summons. For failure to answer the complaint, private
respondent was declared in default. He then filed a Motion for New Trial in the same
court and explained that he defaulted because of his belief that the suit ought to be
answered by his landlord. In that motion he stated that he had by then the evidence to
prove that he had a better right than petitioner over the land because of his long,
continuous and uninterrupted possession as bona-fide tenant-lessee of the land. But
his motion was denied. He tried an alternative recourse. He filed before the RTC a
Motion for Relief from Judgment. Again, the same court denied his motion, hence he
moved for reconsideration of the denial. In his Motion for Reconsideration, he raised
for the first time the RTC's lack of jurisdiction. This motion was again denied. Note that
private respondent raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction, not when the case was already
on appeal, but when the case, was still before the RTC that ruled him in default, denied
his motion for new trial as well as for relief from judgment, and denied likewise his two
motions for reconsideration. After the RTC still refused to reconsider the denial of
private respondent's motion for relief from judgment, it went on to issue the order for
entry of judgment and a writ of execution.
Gonzaga v CA (2002)
Corona, J.
DOCTRINE
Doctrine in Tijiam v Sibonghanoy still subsists. A partys active participation in all
stages of the case before the trial court, which includes invoking the courts authority to
grant affirmative relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same
courts jurisdiction.
FACTS
Petitioner spouses purchased lot 19 from respondent. To finance the purchase, the
spouses got a loan from SSS and made the property as the security. mistakenly, the
Trial court: The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The
contract was clear. It reflected the true intention of parties: the spouses
intended to buy Lot 19 and not lot 18.
x xx
It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to
secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing
to obtain such relief, repudiate, or question that same jurisdiction x x x x
[T]he question whether the court had jurisdiction either of the subject matter
of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the
party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such
a practice can not be tolerated obviously for reasons of public policy.
A partys active participation in all stages of the case before the trial
court, which includes invoking the courts authority to grant affirmative
relief, effectively estops such party from later challenging that same
courts jurisdiction.
Petitioners were the ones who instituted the petition for reformation of contract.
they vigorously asserted their cause of action.
Spouses filed a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision of
the CA claiming that CA erred in dismissing the petition by applying the doctrine of
estoppel. Petitioners claim that SC in their recent decisions had already abandoned the
doctrine laid down in Tijiam v Sibonghanoy.
Not even once did petitioners ever raise the issue of the courts jurisdiction during
the entire proceedings which lasted for two years. It was only after the trial court
rendered its decision and issued a writ of execution against them in 1998 did
petitioners first raise the issue of jurisdiction and it was only because said
decision was unfavorable to them. Petitioners thus effectively waived their right to
question the courts jurisdiction over the case they themselves filed.
ISSUE
Whether petitioners are estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of RTC
HELD: Yes, the court has not abandoned tijam v sibonghanoy.
Tijiam v Sibonghanoy states:
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Petitioners should bear the consequence of their act. They cannot be allowed
to profit from their omission to the damage and prejudice of the private respondent.
This Court frowns upon the undesirable practice of a party submitting his case for
decision and then accepting the judgment but only if favorable, and attacking it for lack
of jurisdiction if not.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
in the next 10 years. This would be in addition to a fixed annual guaranteed payment to
the government. The basis for the prequalification shall be the proponents compliance
with the minimum technical and financial requirements provided in the bid documents
and the IRR of the BOT (build operate and transfer) Law. The bid documents allowed
amendments to the draft concession agreement, but said that these should cover only
items that would not materially affect the preparation of the proponents proposal.
In August 1996, during the second pre-bid conference, the PBAC made several
clarifications, upon the request of Peoples Air Cargo & Warehousing Co. Inc
(PAIRCARGO),
which
wanted
to
challenge
the
AEDC
bid.
The PBAC said the list of revenue sources mentioned in the bid documents were
merely indicative. The project proponent may add other revenue sources, subject to
approval by the DOTC/MIAA. Also, only fees and charges denominated as public
utility fees would be subject to regulation, and these could still be revised, because the
PBAC has a pending query with the justice department. In September 1996, PBAC
issued a bid bulletin in which it said that since PAIRCARGO could not meet the
required minimum equity prescribed in the bid documents, it would accept instead an
audited financial statement of the financial capability of all member companies of the
consortium.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Issue:
Held:
Ratio:
Respondent PIATCO further alleges that this Court is without jurisdiction to
review the instant cases as factual issues are involved which this Court is ill-equipped
to resolve. Moreover, PIATCO alleges that submission of this controversy to this Court
at the first instance is a violation of the rule on hierarchy of courts. They contend that
trial courts have concurrent jurisdiction with this Court with respect to a special civil
action for prohibition and hence, following the rule on hierarchy of courts, resort must
first be had before the trial courts.
After a thorough study and careful evaluation of the issues involved, this Court is
of the view that the crux of the instant controversy involves significant legal questions.
The facts necessary to resolve these legal questions are well established and, hence,
need not be determined by a trial court.
The rule on hierarchy of courts will not also prevent this Court from assuming
jurisdiction over the cases at bar. The said rule may be relaxed when the redress desired
cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of this
Courts primary jurisdiction.
It is easy to discern that exceptional circumstances exist in the cases at bar that
call for the relaxation of the rule. Both petitioners and respondents agree that these
cases are oftranscendental importance as they involve the construction and operation
of the countrys premier international airport. Moreover, the crucial issues submitted
for resolution are of first impression and they entail the proper legal interpretation of
key provisions of the Constitution, the BOT Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations. Thus, considering the nature of the controversy before the Court,
procedural bars may be lowered to give way for the speedy disposition of the instant
cases.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Requisites for filing a Writ of Certiorari: Writ of certiorari to issue, the following
requisites must concur:
1.
2.
3.
Atienza. The Liga then filed a case of certiorari under rule 65 with the Supreme Court
averring that the Manila City Council acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisction when it enacted the said ordinance.
Issue: WON certiorari under rule 65 is the proper recourse.
Held: Please refer to the doctrines.
-
City Manila council was not acting in a quasi-judicial function when it enacted
the law, but under its legislative powers;
Not rule 65, but should be petition for declaratory relief in assailing
constitutionality or validity of a law;
Not with the SC, because jurisdiction is concurrent with RTC and CA
Must follow the hierarchy of courts
Identity of parties, or at least such parties as are representing the same interest
in both actions;
Identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being founded on
the same facts;
Identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such
that any judgment that may be rendered in the preceding case regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other case.
Short Facts: The Liga is the national organization of all the barangays in the
Philippines. It was made by the Local Government Code. The LGU provided for election
of officers of the Liga. Sometime before the elections of LGU officers, the Manila City
Council enacted an ordinance inconsistent with the election law provided in the LGU
code and the Ligas constitution. This circular was later approved by the City Mayor,
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
As to the issue of whether or not petitioner is a public officer. It was held in Laurel vs
Desierto, that public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by
law, by which for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the PNP
Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were
invalid for being irregular and defective.
Issue:
1.
2.
Whether or not the forfeiture cases and the plunder case have separate causes
of action.
Whether SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her person and that of her
children via substituted service of summons and by their voluntary
appearance.
Ruling:
1.
a.
Petitioner claims that the SB 4th Division has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter of Forfeitures I and II as both cases are now covered or included in the
plunder case against the Garcias. Or as petitioner puts it a bit differently, the
filing of the main plunder case (Crim. Case No. 28107), with its automatic
forfeiture mechanism in the event of conviction, ousted the SB 4th Division of
its jurisdiction over the subject matter of the forfeiture cases. The inclusion of
the forfeiture cases with the plunder case is necessary, so petitioner claims, to
obviate possible double jeopardy entanglements and colliding case
dispositions.
In addition, petitioner argues that the SB did not acquire jurisdiction over her
person and that of her children due to a defective substituted service of
summons. The substituted service of summons for both Forfeitures I and II
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
b.
2.
a.
b.
3.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
FACTS: Platinum Tours and Travel Inc. (Platinum) filed a complaint for a sum of
money with damages against Pan Asiatic Travel Corporation (PATC) and its president
Nelida G. Galvez. Platinum sought to collect payment for the airline tickets which PATC
bought from it..
RTC OF MAKATI: Rendered a judgment by default in favor of Platinum and ordered
PATC and Nelida G. Galvez to solidarily pay Platinum actual damages of P 359,621.03
with legal interest, P 50,000 attorneys fees and cost of suit. A writ of execution was
issued on motion of Platinum. Pursuant to the writ, Manila Polo Club Proprietary
Membership Certificate, in the name of Nelida G. Galvez was levied upon and sold for
P479,888.48 to a certain Ma. Rosario Khoo.
RTC: 1995 - private respondent Jose M. Panlilio filed a motion to intervene. Panlilio
claimed that Galvez had executed in his favor a chattel mortgage over her
shares of stock in the Manila Polo Club to secure her P1 million loan and
that Galvez had already delivered to him the stock certificates valued at P5
million.Denied Panlilios motion for intervention.
RTC: 1996 - Declared the execution sale null and void due to irregularities in the
conduct. Panlilio filed against Galvez a collection case with application for a writ of
preliminary attachment of the disputed Manila Polo Club shares. In the meantime,
Panlilio again attempted to intervene, this time by incorporating in his complaint a
motion to consolidate the case. Judge Salvador Tensuan of Branch 146 granted the
motion for consolidation on condition that Judge Roberto Diokno of Branch 62, who
was trying Civil Case No. 94-1634, would not object thereto. Judge Diokno later issued
an order, dated July 23, 1996, allowing the consolidation of the two cases and setting
for hearing Panlilios application for a writ of preliminary attachment. Platinum, as
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 94-1634, moved to reconsider the July 23, 1996 order of Judge
Diokno but its motion was denied.
1997 - Platinum filed a petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals assailing, the order
of Judge Diokno allowing the consolidation of Civil Case No. 96-365 and Civil Case No.
94-1634.
1998 CA annulled the assailed order but left it to Judge Diokno to decide whether to
return Civil Case No. 96-365 to Judge Tensuan in Branch 146, or to keep it in his docket
and decide it as a separate case.
Platinum filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the decision of the CA, praying
that Civil Case No. 96-365 be returned to Branch 146 or re-raffled to another RTC
Branch of Makati.
CA: Motion for partial Reconsideration was denied.
ISSUE: Whether Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case No. 96-365 falls
within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62.
HELD: Yes. Jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine a particular case, it does
not depend upon the regularity of the exercise by the court of that power or on the
correctness of its decisions.
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that Panlilios collection case docketed as Civil Case
No. 96-365 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC of Makati, Branch 62. The fact that
the Court of Appeals subsequently annulled Judge Dioknos order granting the
10
We find no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals when it left to Judge
Diokno of Branch 62 the discretion on whether to return Civil Case No. 96-365 to
Branch 146 or to decide the same as a separate case in his own sala. Moreover, we find
the instant petition premature and speculative. Had Platinum waited until Judge
Diokno decided on what to do with Civil Case No. 96-365, the parties would have been
spared the trouble and the expense of seeking recourse from this Court, which in turn
would have had one petition less in its docket.
The final turn over of the unit was pushed to a later date (21 May 1990). Respondent
returned to the Philippines a couple of times, and for those times he found his unit still
unlivable. Exasperated, respondent sent petitioner a letter demanding payment for
damages he sustained. Petitioner however ignored the demand. Respondent then filed
a complaint before RTC against respondent for specific performance and damages.
During pendency of the case, respondent finally accepted the condominium unit and
eventually occupied it on 12 April 1991. Respondents cause of action has been limited
to claim for damages.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J.
Re: Jurisdiction
Trial Court: Manila Bankers is liable for payment of damages due to the
delay in the performance of its obligation to Eddy.
DOCTRINE
complaints for specific performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer
against the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified
the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel and
can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the instant case; and that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming
the trial courts finding that petitioner incurred unreasonable delay in the delivery of
the condominium unit to respondent.
ISSUE
Whether RTC has jurisdiction over Manila Bankers case.
FACTS
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
11
Facts:
On petitioners contention that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the instant case,
Section 1 (c) of Presidential Decree No. 1344, as amended, provides:
Deceased spouses Jose C. Zulueta and Soledad Ramos obtained various loans from
defendant GSIS for (the) period September, 1956 to October, 1957 in the total amount
of P3,117,000.00 secured by real estate mortgages over parcels of land covered by
TCT Nos. 26105, 37177 and 50365. The Zuluetas failed to pay their loans to defendant
GSIS and the latter foreclosed the real estate mortgages dated September 25, 1956,
March 6, 1957, April 4, 1957 and October 15, 1957.
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade
and business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree
No. 957, the National Housing Authority [now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB)] shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide cases of the following nature:
xxx
Pursuant to the above provisions, it is the HLURB which has jurisdiction over the
instant case. We have consistently held that complaints for specific
performance with damages by a lot or condominium unit buyer against
the owner or developer falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
HLURB.
While it may be true that the trial court is without jurisdiction over the case, petitioners
active participation in the proceedings estopped it from assailing such lack of it. We
have held that it is an undesirable practice of a party participating in the proceedings
and submitting its case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable,
and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.
Here, petitioner failed to raise the question of jurisdiction before the trial
court and the Appellate Court. In effect, petitioner confirmed and ratified
the trial courts jurisdiction over this case. Certainly, it is now in estoppel
and can no longer question the trial courts jurisdiction.
GSIS vs Santiago
Doctrine: The CA is not a trier of facts. This doctrine has exceptions which were not
discussed in this case, merely cited. This is even more so when the CA affirms the
appreciation of factual evidence by the trial court.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
12
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
dismissed motu proprio by the Court of Appeals, even if the case has been elevated for
review on different grounds. Verily, the dismissal of such cases appropriately ends
useless litigations.
FACTS:
The application for conversion of the whole Sombrero Island was favorably
endorsed.
Petitioner contends that Sombrero Island had been classified from forest
land to agricultural land and certified available for disposition upon his
request and at his instance. However, Mr. Lucio Valera, then land
investigator of the District Land Office, favorably endorsed the request of
respondents.
The petitioner claims that he has the exclusive right to file an application for
homestead patent over the whole island since it was he who requested for its
conversion from forest land to agricultural land.[6]
13
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
him, residual prerogative refers to the power that the trial court, in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It
follows that such powers are not possessed by an appellate court.
Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives
under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial
courts over cases appealed to the CA.
Under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived, except when
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) litis pendentia, (3) res judicata and
(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record. In the four
excepted instances, the court shall motu proprio dismiss the claim or action.
The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in
which the court is normally deemed to have lost jurisdiction over the case
or the subject matter involved in the appeal. This stage is reached upon the
perfection of the appeals by the parties or upon the approval of the records
on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records
on appeal. In either instance, the trial court still retains its so-called residual
jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises, permit appeals of
indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the
appeal.
The CAs motu proprio dismissal of petitioners Complaint could not
have been based, therefore, on residual jurisdiction under Rule
41. Undeniably, lsuch order of dismissal was not one for the protection and
preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the disposition of the case on appeal.
What the CA referred to as residual prerogatives were the general residual powers of
the courts to dismiss an action motu proprio upon the grounds mentioned in Section 1
of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court and under authority of Section 2 of Rule 1 of the same
rules.
To be sure, the CA had the excepted instances in mind when it
dismissed the Complaint motu proprio on more fundamental grounds
directly bearing on the lower courts lack of jurisdiction and for
prescription of the action. Indeed, when a court has no jurisdiction over
the subject matter, the only power it has is to dismiss the action.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought.
Petition DENIED.
Pecson v Comelec
Residual Jurisdiction
14
Facts:
Pecson and Cunanan were candidates for the mayoralty position in
the Municipality of Magalang, Province of Pampanga in the May 2007
elections. On May 17, 2007, Cunanan was proclaimed the winning candidate,
garnering a total of 12,592 votes as against Pecsons 12,531, or a margin of 61
votes. Cunanan took his oath and assumed the position of Mayor of Magalang. Soon
thereafter, Pecson filed an election protest, docketed as EPE No. 07-51, with the RTC.
On November 23, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision in Pecsons favor. The
RTC ruled that Pecson received a total of 14,897 votes as against Cunanans 13,758
a vote margin of 1,139.
Cunanan received a copy of the Decision on November 26, 2007 and filed a
Notice of Appeal the day after. The RTC issued on November 27, 2008 an Order
noting the filing of the notice of appeal and the payment of appeal fee and directing
the transmittal of the records of the case to the Electoral Contests Adjudication
Department (ECAD) of the COMELEC. Pecson, on the other hand, filed on November
28, 2007 an Urgent Motion for Immediate Execution Pending Appeal, claiming that
Section 11, Rule 14 of the Rules of Procedure in Election Contests before the Courts
Involving Elective Municipal and Barangay Officials[2] (Rules) allows this remedy.
The RTC granted Pecsons motion for execution pending appeal via a Special
Order dated December 3, 2007 (Special Order) but suspended, pursuant to the Rules,
the actual issuance of the writ of execution for twenty (20) days.
Expectedly, Cunanan moved to reconsider the Order, arguing that the RTC
gravely abused its discretion: (1) in ruling that there were good reasons to issue a writ
of execution pending appeal; and (2) in entertaining and subsequently granting the
motion for execution pending appeal despite the issuance of an order transmitting the
records of the case.
In his Answer and/or Opposition, with Prayer for Immediate Lifting of TRO,
Pecson argued that: (1) preliminary injunction cannot exist except as part or incident
of an independent action, being a mere ancillary remedy that exists only as an
incident of the main proceeding; (2) the petition for application of preliminary
injunction, as an original action, should be dismissed outright; and (3) Cunanan is
guilty of forum shopping, as he filed a motion for reconsideration of the Special Order
simultaneously with the petition filed with the COMELEC.
Pecson thus asked for the issuance of a writ of execution via an ExParte Motion. Despite Cunanans opposition, the RTC granted Pecsons motion.
Pecson thereafter assumed the duties and functions of Mayor of Magalang.
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC erred in reversing the decisions of thr trial court
Held: Yes
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
15
Ratio:
Also, we reiterate here our consistent ruling that decisions of the courts in
election protest cases, resulting as they do from a judicial evaluation of the ballots and
after full-blown adversarial proceedings, should at least be given similar worth and
recognition as decisions of the board of canvassers. This is especially true when
attended by other equally weighty circumstances of the case, such as the shortness of
the term of the contested elective office, of the case.
In light of all these considerations, we conclude that the COMELEC erred in
nullifying the RTCs Special Order in a manner sufficiently gross to affect its exercise of
jurisdiction. Specifically, it committed grave abuse of discretion when it looked at
wrong considerations and when it acted outside of the contemplation of the law in
nullifying the Special Order.
ALDAY v. FGU INSURANCE
GR NO. 138822, JANUARY 23, 2001
DOCTRINES:
Test to determine whether a counterclaim is permissive or compulsory:
Quintanilla v. CA, is the compelling test of compulsoriness which requires a logical
relationship between the claim and counterclaim, that is, where the conducting
separate trials of the respective claims of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the parties and the court.
Non-payment of docket fees does not result in automatic dismissal: In
Suson, the Court explained that although the payment of the prescribed docket fees is
a jurisdictional requirement, its non-payment does not result in the automatic
dismissal of the case provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period. Coming now to the case at bar, it has not
been alleged by respondent and there is nothing in the records to show that petitioner
has attempted to evade the payment of the proper fees for her permissive counterclaim.
Facts: Respondent FGU Insurance Corporation filed a complaint with the RTC of
Makati alleging that petitioner Evangeline K. Alday owed it P114,650.76, representing
unliquidated cash advances, unremitted costs of premiums and other charges incurred
by petitioner in the course of her work as an insurance agent for
respondent. Respondent also prayed for exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs
of suit.
Petitioner filed her answer and by way of counterclaim, asserted her right for the
payment of P104,893.45, representing direct commissions, profit commissions and
contingent bonuses earned from 1 July 1986 to 7 December 1986, and for accumulated
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
16
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
provided the docket fees are paid within the applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
Coming now to the case at bar, it has not been alleged by respondent and there is
nothing in the records to show that petitioner has attempted to evade the payment of
the proper docket fees for her permissive counterclaim. As a matter of fact, after
respondent filed its motion to dismiss petitioners counterclaim based on her failure to
pay docket fees, petitioner immediately filed a motion with the trial court, asking it to
declare her counterclaim as compulsory in nature and therefore exempt from docket
fees and, in addition, to declare that respondent was in default for its failure to answer
her
counterclaim.
However,
the
trial
court
dismissed
petitioners
counterclaim. Pursuant to this Courts ruling in Sun Insurance, the trial court should
have instead given petitioner a reasonable time, but in no case beyond the applicable
prescriptive or reglementary period, to pay the filing fees for her permissive
counterclaim.
17
MERCADO vs CA
TOPIC: Payment of Docket Fees
FACTS:
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
18
The court (Makati RTC) denied the petition, stating that the petitioner
properly paid the docket fees. It stated that Section 7(a) of Rule 141 of the
Rules of Court excludes interest accruing from the principal amount being
claimed in the pleading in the computation of the prescribed filing fees. It
court further added that assuming the correct filing fees were not paid, the
rule is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the
prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is
cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the
meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action.
Regarding the correct dollar-peso rate of exchange, the Office of the Clerk of
Court of the RTC of Makati pegged it at P 43.00 to US$1. Absent any office
guide of the rate of exchange which said court functionary was duty bound to
follow, the rate he applied is presumptively correct.
With regard to the demand letter, the court said that the failure to make a
formal demand is not among the legal grounds for the dismissal of the case.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Issues:
1) Whether BNP failed to pay the correct docket fees
2) Whether the Clerk of court applied the wrong exchange rate
3) Whether the amount of interest was not specified in the prayer, rendering the
complaint void.
Ruling:
1. Petitioner relied on a case decided in 1989 where Rule 141 was applied, the
interest and costs having been excluded in the computation of the aggregate
amount. However, the present case was filed in 1998, when such rule had
already been amended by Administrative Circular No. 11-94.
The amended rule includes the interest, damages of whatever kind, attorneys
fees, litigation expenses, and other costs in the computation of the aggregate
amount. In the complaint, respondent prayed for accrued
interestsubsequent to August 15, 1998 until fully paid. The complaint
having been filed on September 7, 1998, respondents claim includes the
interest from August 16, 1998 until such date of filing. Respondent not having
paid the fees for such, cannot claim the interest within such duration, unless
respondent is allowed by motion to amend its complaint within a reasonable
time and specify the precise amount of interest petitioners owe within the
period and pay the corresponding docket fee.
With respect to the interest accruing after the filing of the complaint, the same
can only be determined after a final judgment has been handed down.
Respondent cannot thus be made to pay the corresponding docket fee.
Pursuant, however, to Section 2, Rule 141, as amended by Administrative
Circular No. 11-94, respondent should be made to pay additional fees which
shall constitute a lien in the event the trial court adjudges that it is entitled to
interest accruing after the filing of the complaint.
2.
3.
Where the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of the
appropriate pleading and payment of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified, has been left for determination by the court, the additional filing fee
19
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
20
3.
A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action
would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property involved
therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing
the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the
assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real
properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of
the same.
St. Louis University, Inc. v Evangeline C. Cobarrubias (2010)
VA: When circulation and mediation again failed, parties submitted the issues
for Voluntary arbitration.
a. Respondent argued that the CA already resolved the forced leave
issue in a prior case between the parties, ruling that the forced leave
for teachers who fail their evaluation for three (3) times within a fiveyear period should be coterminous with the CBA in force during the
same five-year period.
b. Petitioner argued that said CA decision is not yet final.
The VA dismissed the complaint. CA decision is not yet final
because of the pending appeal with the SC.
4.
Brion, J.
Re: Rules 1-5; Docket fees
CA: Respondent filed with the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court but failed to pay the filing fees and to attach the material
portion of the records. Motion for reconsideration was filed, complying with
the procedural lapses, and CA reinstated the petition.
a.
Cobarrubas filed her MR, arguing that the ground cited is technical.
She attached to her motion copies of the material portions of the
record and the postal money order.
b.
c.
DOCTRINE
Payment in full of docket fees within the prescribed period is not only
mandatory, but also jurisdictional. It is an essential requirement, without
which, the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal
has been filed. There are, however, recognized exceptions to their strict
observance.
FACTS
Respondent is an associate professor of the petitioner and an active member of the
union of faculty and employees. The Collective Bargaining Agreements contained the
following provision that: teaching employees in college who fail the yearly evaluation,
who are retained for three (3) cumulative years in five (5) years, shall be on forced
leave for one (1) regular semester during which period all benefits due them shall be
suspended.
1.
SLU argues that the CA should not have reinstated the appeal since
Cobarrubias failed to pay the docket fees within the prescribed period, and
rendered the VA decision final and executory. Even if Cobarrubias procedural
lapse is disregarded, SLU submits that Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA
should apply irrespective of the five-year effectivity of each CBA.
2.
Cobarrubias insists that the CA settled the appeal fee issue, in its July 30, 2008
resolution, when it found that she had substantially complied with the rules
by subsequently paying the docket fees in full. She submits that the CAs
interpretation of Section 7.7(a) of the 2006-2011 CBA is more in accord with
law and jurisprudence
Petitioner placed respondent on forced leave for failing to achieve the required rating
points.
1.
2.
NCMB: Respondent filed a case for illegal forced leave or illegal suspension
with NCMB.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
21
HELD
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory;
the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby;
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without the appellants fault;
peculiar, legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case;
in the name of substantial justice and fair play;
importance of the issues involved; and
exercise of sound discretion by the judge, guided by all the attendant
circumstances.
Appeal is not a natural right but a mere statutory privilege, thus, appeal must be made
strictly in accordance with the provision set by law. Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
provides that appeals from the judgment of the VA shall be taken to the CA, by filing a
petition for review within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice of judgment.
Thus, there should be an effort, on the part of the party invoking liberality, to advance
a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
Furthermore, upon the filing of the petition, the petitioner shall pay to the CA
clerk of court the docketing and other lawful fees; non-compliance with the
procedural requirements shall be a sufficient ground for the petitions
dismissal.
Case Background
On September 15, 1993, Angelina Lopez (Angelina) filed a petition for Appointment
for Sole
Administratrix of Conjugal Partnership of Properties, Forfeiture, etc. against Alberto
Lopez
Here, the docket fees were paid late, and without payment of the
full docket fees, Cobarrubias appeal was not perfected within the
reglementary period.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
(Alberto) and Imelda Relucio (Imelda), in the RTC of Makati, Branch 141, which alleged
that
Alberto, legally married to Angelina:
during their period of cohabitation since 1976, Alberto and Imelda have amassed a
fortune consisting mainly of stockholdings in Lopez-owned or controlled corporations,
residential, agricultural, commercial lots, houses, apartments and buildings, cars and
other motor vehicles, bank accounts and jewelry; these properties, which are in the
names of Alberto and Imelda, singly or jointly or their dummies and proxies, have been
acquired principally if not solely through the actual contribution of money, property
and industry of Alberto with minimal, if not nil, actual contribution from Imelda.
Alberto evaded his obligations as a father and husband and excluded Angelina and their
four children from sharing or benefiting from the conjugal properties and the income
or fruits; he either did not place it in his name or concealed them from Angelina in the
22
2. No, she is not essential; she is not a real party in interest, an indispensable
party, nor a
necessary party a real party in interest is one who stands to be benefited or
injured by the
judgment of the suit. in this case, Imelda would be affected by any judgment
in the
proceeding if Imelda, is not a real party in interest, she cannot be an
indispensable party. an
indispensable party is one without whom there can be no final determination
of an
action. in this case, the trial court can issue a judgment in favor of Angelina
and such
judgment will be valid and enforceable against Alberto but will not affect
Imelda in
any way. Imelda is not a necessary party; according to Sec. 8 Rule 3 of the
ROC, a necessary
party is one who is not indispensable but who ought to be joined as a party if
complete relief is to be accorded as to those already parties, or for a complete
determination or settlement of the claim subject of the action. In this case,
Angelina
could and would be able to have complete relief even without the participation
of
Imelda
Held:
Substantial Issue:
No, no cause of action was established the elements of cause of action are: a
right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever means and under whatever law it
arises or is created; an obligation on the part of the named defendant to
respect or not to violate such right; and an act or omission
on the part of such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff or
constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff for
which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages. to determine
the sufficiency of cause of action, we must look at the allegation nowhere in
the allegations does it appear that relief is sought against the petitioner;
Angelinas causes of action are all against Alberto first cause of action:
appointment as sole administratix; the administration of property of marriage
is between them to the exclusion of all others second cause of action: an
accounting of the conjugal partnership; the
accounting is merely an incident of marriage alternative cause of action:
forfeiture of the property co-owned by Alberto and Imelda; what can only be
forfeited is Albertos share, assuming that there is a law that would permit that
another cause of action: support; support cannot be compelled from a
stranger.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
23
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
24
Ratio:
An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action, and who shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory.
The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with
jurisdiction, which is the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right
to act in a case. Thus, without the presence of indispensable parties to a suit
or proceeding, judgment of a court cannot attain real finality. The absence of
an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
In the case at bar, 7J is an indispensable party. It is a party in interest because
it will be affected by the outcome of the case. The Labor Arbiter and the NLRC
found 7J to be solely liable as the employer of respondents. The Court of
Appeals however rendered Lotte jointly and severally liable with 7J who was
not impleaded by holding that the former is the real employer of respondents.
Plainly, its decision directly affected 7J.
In Domingo v. Scheer, we held that the non-joinder of indispensable parties is
not a ground for the dismissal of an action and the remedy is to implead the
non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be added by order of the
court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action
and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner refuses to implead an
indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the
complaint/petition for the petitioner/plaintiffs failure to comply therefor.
Although 7J was a co-party in the case before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC,
respondents failed to include it in their petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals. Hence, the Court of Appeals did not acquire jurisdiction over 7J. No
final ruling on this matter can be had without impleading 7J, whose inclusion
is necessary for the effective and complete resolution of the case and in order
to accord all parties with due process and fair play.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
25
Under Res Judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent
of jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all later suits
and on all points and matters determined in the previous suit. The term literally means
a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon, or settled by judgment. This principle bars
a subsequent suit involving the same parties, subject matter, and a cause of action.
Public policy requires that controversies must be settled with finality at a given appoint
in time.
*Rule on Forum Shopping: Forum shopping is the institution of two or more
actions or proceedings involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, on the supposition that one or the other court would
make a favorable disposition. Forum shopping may be resorted to by a party against
whom an adverse judgment or order has been issued in one forum, in an attempt to
seek a favorable opinion in another, other than by an appeal or a special civil action for
certiorari.
Forum shopping triffles with the courts, abuses their processes, degrades the
administration of justice, and congests court dockets. Willful and deliberate violation
of the rule against it is a ground for the summary dismissal of the case; it may also
constitute direct contempt of court.
The test for determining the existence of forum shopping is whether the elements of
litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case amounts to res
judicata in another. We note, however, petitioners claim that the subject matter of the
present case has already been litigated and decided. Therefore, the applicable doctrine
is res judicata.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Facts: The case originated from a Complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership, the cancellation of title, and damages, filed by Pedro Joaquin against
petitioners in the RTC. Respondent alleged that he had obtained a loan from them in
the amount of P9,000 payable after five (5) years. To secure the payment of the
obligation, he supposedly executed a Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners. The Deed was
for a parcel of land. The parties also executed another document entitled Kasunduan.
Respondent claimed that the Kasunduan showed the Deed of Sale to be actually an
equitable mortgage. Spouses De la Cruz contended that this document was merely an
accommodation to allow the repurchase of the property, a right that he failed to
exercise.
RTC: Declared that the parties had entered into a sale with right to
repurchase. It further held that Respondent had made a valid tender of
payment on two separate occasions to exercise his right of repurchase. Hence,
petitioners were required to reconvey the property upon his payment.
CA: Sustained the RTC decision and ordered a substitution by legal
representatives, in view of respondents death.
Petitioners now assert that the RTCs Decision was invalid for lack of jurisdiction when
respondent died during the pendency of the case and that there was no substitution of
heirs.
Issue: WON the trial court lost jurisdiction over the case upon respondents death.
Held: NO.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules
under Sec.16, Rule 3 require a substitution of the deceased. The rule on the substitution
of parties was crafted to protect every partys right to due process. The estate of the
deceased party will continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly
appointed legal representative. Moreover, no adjudication can be made against the
successor of the deceased if the fundamental right to a day in court is denied. A formal
substitution by heirs is not necessary when they themselves voluntarily appear,
participate in the case, and present evidence in defense of the deceased. These actions
negate any claim that the right to due process was violated.
Strictly speaking, the rule on the substitution by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction,
but of due process. Thus, when due process is not violated, as when the right of the
representative or heir is recognized and protected, non-compliance or belated formal
compliance with the Rules cannot affect the validity of a promulgated decision. Mere
failure to substitute for a deceased plaintiff is not a sufficient ground to nullify a trial
courts decision. The alleging party must prove that there was an undeniable violation
of due process.
Case records show that respondents heirs voluntarily appeared and participated in the
case after the CA had ordered for legal representatives to appear and substitute for him.
As such, the Motion for Substitution may be deemed to have been granted; and the
heirs, to have substituted for the deceased respondent. As there was no violation of due
26
Facts: On July 10, 1990, Domingo Carabeo (petitioner) entered into a contract
denominated as "Kasunduan sa Bilihan ng Karapatan sa Lupa"1 (kasunduan) with
Spouses Norberto and Susan Dingco (respondents) whereby petitioner agreed to sell
his rights over a 648 square meter parcel of unregistered land situated in Purok III,
Tugatog, Orani, Bataan to respondents for P38,000. Respondents tendered their initial
payment of P10,000 upon signing of the contract, the remaining balance to be paid on
September 1990, and paid small amounts to petitioner, who still had to settle a family
squabble over said land. After the case was submitted for decision or on January 31,
2001,2 petitioner passed away. The records do not show that petitioners counsel informed
Branch 1 of the Bataan RTC, where the complaint was lodged, of his death and that proper
substitution was effected in accordance with Section 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court.
Petitioners counsel filed a Notice of Appeal on March 20, 2001.
Issue: Whether or not the counsel had personality to act on behalf of the deceased
petitioner.
Ruling: The death of a client immediately divests the counsel of authority. Thus, in
filing a Notice of Appeal, petitioners counsel of record had no personality to act on
behalf of the already deceased client, who, it bears reiteration, had not been substituted as a
party after his death. The trial courts decision had thereby become final and executory, no
appeal having been perfected.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
27
The RTC issued an order denying the motion to dismiss, stating that a
reading of the COMPLAINT which of course is hypothetically admitted, will
show that a valid judgment can be rendered against defendant.
As to the judgment by default, the Court of Appeals said that an order denying
the motion to dismiss is interlocutory and may not be questioned through a
special civil action for certiorari. The defendant must proceed with the case
and raise the issues in his motion to dismiss when he appeals to a higher
court. In this case, petitioner Chinabank should have filed its answer when it
received the order denying the motion to dismiss. The special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals did not interrupt the period to file an
answer, there being no temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary
injunction issued.
Petitioner Chinabank alleges that there are two owners duplicate copies of
TCT No. S-50195 involved in this case and two persons claiming to be the real
MERCEDES MARAVILLA OLIVER. One is the mortgagor, Oliver One. The
other is the respondent, Oliver Two. Respondents complaint before the trial
court was one for cancellation of the transfer certificate of title in petitioners
possession (Annex B).
Respondent, whom we shall call as Oliver Two, claimed that she was the
registered and lawful owner of the land subject of the real estate mortgage;
that the owners duplicate copy of the title had always been in her possession;
and that she did not apply for a loan or surrender her title to Chinabank. She
prayed that: (1) the owners duplicate copy surrendered to Chinabank as well
as the original title with the Registry of Deeds be cancelled; (2) the mortgage
be declared null and void; and (3) the Registry of Deeds be ordered to issue a
new and clean title in her name
According to petitioner, the issue is the genuineness of the titles, which is
intertwined with the issue of ownership. This being the case, said the
petitioner, the mortgagor Oliver One must necessarily be impleaded for she is
the registered owner. Petitioner argues that mortgagor Oliver One is in a
better position to defend her title. She stands to suffer if it is declared
fake. Further, petitioner claims that the validity and enforceability of the
mortgage entirely depends on the validity and authenticity of Annex B. The
mortgage cannot be declared a nullity without the trial court declaring Annex
B a nullity.
Hence, mortgagor Oliver Ones participation in the suit is indispensable,
according to petitioner. In brief, what petitioner Chinabank is saying is that it
was indispensable for respondent Oliver Two to implead mortgagor Oliver
One in the case before the trial court. Failing to do that, the complaint of
herein respondent Oliver Two should have been dismissed.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Issue:
1. Is the mortgagor who goes by the name of Mercedes M. Oliver, herein
called Oliver One, an indispensable party in Civil Case No. 96219?
2. Should Section 7 Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure apply in this
case?
3. Did the Court of Appeals err when it sustained the trial courts declaration
that petitioner was in default?
Ruling:
1.
28
3.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
29
complaint. Petitioners aver that since respondent is a Canadian citizen, the CA erred
in ignoring their claim that the principles of forum non conveniens and lex loci
contractus are applicable. They also point out that the principal office, officers and
staff of PCIJ are stationed in Tokyo, Japan; and the contract of employment of
respondent was executed in Tokyo, Japan.
The settled rule on stipulations regarding venue, as held by this Court in
the vintage case of Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, is that
while they are considered valid and enforceable, venue stipulations in a
contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general rule set forth in Rule 4 of
the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words. They should be considered merely as an agreement or additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive.
If the intention of the parties were to restrict venue, there must be accompanying
language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions
between them be litigated only at the place named by them.
In the instant case, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "exclusively
in this court," "in no other court save ," "particularly," "nowhere else
but/except ," or words of equal import were stated in the contract.3 It
cannot be said that the court of arbitration in London is an exclusive
venue to bring forth any complaint arising out of the employment
contract.
Petitioners insistence on the application of the principle of forum non conveniens
must be rejected. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a
repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle for the following reasons:
First. The Labor Code of the Philippines does not include forum non
conveniens as a ground for the dismissal of the complaint.
Second. The propriety of dismissing a case based on this principle requires a
factual determination; hence, it is properly considered as defense.
Third. In Bank of America, NT&SA, Bank of America International, Ltd. v.
Court of Appeals,this Court held that: x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following
requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties
may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to
make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the
Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x
All the foregoing requisites are present in this case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Philippine Labor Arbiter can take cognizance over the
case notwithstanding what was stated in the Employment Contract?
HELD: Yes. Petitioners assert that there no evidence that petitioner PPI is the
employer of respondent, the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over respondents
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
30
1.
2.
Petitioner asserts that the Draft Survey Report of OMIC was sufficient
evidence to prove that the cargo which arrived in Japan had a shortage of 355
wet metric tons.
Mendoza, J.
ISSUE
1.
2.
** I really dont know which part of the case is relevant to the topic. The
case discussed issues on evidence and nothing on civpro.
Whether petitioner was able to prove the there was actually a shortage
Whether the establishment of the genuineness and due execution of the
documents results to prima facie presumption that the their contents are true.
HELD
FACTS
1.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Petitioner failed to present evidence to prove that the weight of the copper
concentrates actually loaded on the ship Sangkulirang No. 3 was
2,243.496 wet metric tons and that there was a shortage of 355 metric
tons when the cargo was discharged in Japan.
a.
b. On the other hand, Ernesto Cayabyab, although he was present when the
Certificate of Loading, Certificate of Weight, and the Mates Receipt, were
signed at the loading site, he admitted that he could not say for certain
that no spillage occurred during the loading of the cargo on the ship
because his attention was not on the cargo at all times.
31
This contention has no merit. When the law makes use of the phrase
genuineness and due execution of the instrument it means nothing more
than that the instrument is not spurious, counterfeit, or of different
import on its face from the one executed.
Execution can only refer to the actual making and delivery, but it cannot involve other
matters without enlarging its meaning beyond reason. The only object of the rule was
to enable a plaintiff to make out a prima facie, not a conclusive case, and it cannot
preclude a defendant from introducing any defense on the merits which does not
contradict the execution of the instrument introduced in evidence.
Respondents averred that they started working at Gamallo Sons, Inc. in 1977
and 1978. In 1980, the firm name was changed to Gamallosons Traders, Inc. and
eventually it became Mandaue Galleon Trade, Inc. The employees suspected that the
adoption and substitution of many firm names was intended to subvert the labor
standard benefits, status, terms, and conditions of employment.
a.
b.
In this case, respondents presented evidence which casts doubt on the veracity
of these documents. Respondent Switzerland Insurance presented Export
Declaration No. 1131/85 which petitioners own witness, Rogelio Lumibao,
prepared, in which it was stated that the copper concentrates to be transported
to Japan had a gross weight of only 2,050 wet metric tons or 1,845 dry metric
tons, 10 percent more or less.
On the other hand, Certified Adjusters, Inc., to which Switzerland Insurance
had referred petitioners claim, prepared a report which showed that a total of
2,451.630 wet metric tons of copper concentrates were delivered at Poro Point.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
They claimed that, in order to ensure their availability for possible twentyfour (24) hour service, respondents were extended loans to build their houses in
petitioners compound. Thus, they were on call any time, day or night.
On July 22, 1978, respondents were notified that the company adopted a
policy of voluntary retrenchment, offering employees separation pay equivalent to one
(1) month pay for every year of service. However, respondents did not avail of the said
plan. They asserted that, on March 5, 2001, they were dismissed from employment
without just cause and without due process.
On the other hand, petitioners averred that respondents were not their
employees but were independent contractors who received various orders from many
other furniture manufacturers, and that respondents constructed their houses and
workplaces in the compound owned by another corporation, the Galleon Agro Realty
Development Corporation.
On April 3, 2002, the Labor Arbiter rendered a
decision,[3] finding respondents illegally dismissed from employment.
Petitioners filed an appeal before the NLRC. However, they failed to attach a
certification of non-forum shopping to their notice of appeal, as required by Section 4,
Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure. Thus, on December 4, 2003, the NLRC
issued a resolution[5] dismissing petitioners appeal for being fatally defective, and the
decision of the Labor Arbiter was affirmed in toto with finality. Petitioners filed a
motion for reconsideration. However, the same was denied in a resolution[6] dated
May 27, 2004.
32
Held: Administrative Circular No. 28-91, dated February 8, 1994, issued by the
Supreme Court requires that every petition filed with the Supreme Court or the CA must
be accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping. Later, Administrative Circular
No. 04-94 was issued and made effective on April 1, 1994. It expanded the certification
requirement to include cases filed in court and in quasi-judicial agencies. The Court
adopted paragraphs (1) and (2) of Administrative Circular No. 04-94 to become Section
5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Significantly, to curb the malpractice of
forum shopping, the rule ordains that a violation thereof would constitute contempt of
court and be a cause for the summary dismissal of the petition, without prejudice to the
taking of appropriate action against the counsel of the party concerned.[12]
Since he already had an approved leave from June 9 to July 30, 2003,
Paler left for the United States on June 8, 2003, without verifying
whether his application for leave (for August 1 - November 14, 2003) was
approved or denied.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
In a letter dated September 16, 2003, the Commission Chairman informed Paler that
he was being dropped from the roll of employees effective said date, due to his
continuous 30-day absence without leave and in accordance with Section 63, Civil
Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 14. Paler moved for
reconsideration but this was denied, on the ground that it was filed beyond the
15-day reglementary period.
On appeal, the CSC reversed and set aside the Commission Chairman's
decision. MR denied.
CA- affirmed with modification the CSC decision ruling that since Paler had already
reached the compulsory age of retirement and was no longer entitled to
reinstatement. MR denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Tiu, the Commission Secretary, has the authority to file
the petition and sign the verification and certification of non-forum shopping in
behalf of the Commission Chairman.
HELD: No.
RATIO: The petitioner in this case is the Commission on Appointments, a
government entity created by the Constitution, and headed by its Chairman. There
was no need for the Chairman himself to sign the verification. Its representative,
lawyer or any person who personally knew the truth of the facts alleged in the petition
could sign the verification. With regard, however, to the certification of nonforum shopping, the established rule is that it must be executed by the
plaintiff or any of the principal parties and not by counsel. In this case,
Atty. Tiu failed to show that he was specifically authorized by the
Chairman to sign the certification of non-forum shopping, much less file
the petition in his behalf. There is nothing on record to prove such
authority. Atty. Tiu did not even bother to controvert Paler's allegation
of his lack of authority. This renders the petition dismissible.
33
OAMINAL v CASTILLO
Default
Doctrine: Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be
overlooked when they do not involve public policy
Facts:
Petitioner filed a complaint for collection against respondents with the RTC.
The summons together with the complaint was served upon the secretary of
respondent. Respondents filed their Urgent Motion to Declare Service of
Summons Improper and Legally Defective alleging that the Sheriffs Return
has failed to comply on substituted service of summons but said motion was
not heard due to the Judges absence. Petitioner then filed an Omnibus Motion
to Declare [Respondents] in Default and to Render Judgment because no
answer [was] filed by [the latter]. The respondents filed Omnibus Motion Ad
Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with. The judge denied
[respondents] Motion to Dismiss, and admitted [their] Answer. However six
months after admitting their answer, the judge ruled that [respondents]
Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer with
Counterclaim was filed outside the period to file answer, hence he (1) denied
the Motion to Admit Motion to Dismiss and Answer; (2) declared
[respondents] in default; and (3) ordered [petitioner] to present evidence exparte within ten days from receipt of order, in which, the case will be
dismissed.
CA: The CA ruled that the trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over
respondents, because the summons had been improperly served on them.
A review of the assailed Decision reveals that the alleged lack of jurisdiction of
the trial court over the defendants therein was the reason why the CA nullified
the formers default judgment and dismissed the case without prejudice.
However, we have ruled earlier that the lower court had acquired jurisdiction
over them. Given this fact, the CA erred in dismissing the case; as a
consequence, it failed to rule on the propriety of the Order and the judgment
of default. To avoid circuitousness and further delay, the Court deems it
necessary to now rule on this issue.
That with respect to the Motion to Admit Answer, this Court is not in favor of
terminating this case on the basis of technicality for failure to answer on time,
hence, as ruled in the case of Nantz v. Jugo and Cruz, 43 O.G. No. 11, p. 4620,
it was held:
Lapses in the literal observance of a rule of procedure will be overlooked when
they do not involve public policy, when they arose from an honest mistake or
unforeseen accident, when they have not prejudiced the adverse party and
have not deprived the court ot its authority. Conceived in the best traditions
of practical and moral justice and common sense, the Rules of Court frown
upon hairsplitting technicalities that do not square with their liberal tendency
and with the ends of justice unless something in the nature of the factors just
stated intervene. x x x
WHEREFORE, x x x in the interest of justice, the Answer of the [respondents]
is hereby admitted.
Held: No
Ratio:
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
34
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION v. CA
GR NO. 160242, MAY 17, 2005
DOCTRINES:
Third-part claim; Prerequisite: A prerequisite to the exercise of such right is that
some substantive basis for a third-party claim be found to exist, whether the basis be
one of indemnity, subrogation, contribution or other substantive right. The bringing of
a third-party defendant is proper f he would be liable to the plaintiff or to the defendant
or both for all part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although the
third-party defendants liability arises out of another transaction.
Impleading a third party defendant; grounds: The defendant may implead
another as third-party defendant:
complaint alleged the following: ACDC leased Caterpillar generator sets and Amida
mobile floodlighting systems from MEC during the period of March 13 to July 15, 1998
but failed, despite demands, to pay the rentals therefor in the total amount of
P4,313,935.00; from July 14 to August 25, 1998, various equipments from MEC were,
likewise, leased by ACDC for the latters power plant in Mauban, Quezon, and that there
was still a balance of P456,666.67; and ACDC also purchased and took custody of
various equipment parts from MEC for the agreed price of P237,336.20 which, despite
demands, ACDC failed to pay.
ACDC filed a motion to file and admit answer with third-party complaint against
Becthel Overseas Corporation (Becthel).
In its answer, ACDC admitted its
indebtedness to MEC in the amount of P5M but alleged the special and affirmative
defenses. It admitted that it is indebted to MEC the amount of P5M but asserted that it
will not be so were it not for Becthel, that it too leased the subject property but failed to
pay.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC to file a third-party complaint against Becthel on
the ground that the defendant had already admitted its principal obligation to MEC in
the amount ofP5,071,335.86; the transaction between it and ACDC, on the one hand,
and between ACDC and Becthel, on the other, were independent
transactions. Furthermore, the allowance of the third-party complaint would result in
undue delays in the disposition of the case. MEC then filed a motion for summary
judgment, alleging therein that there was no genuine issue as to the obligation of ACDC
to MEC.
RTC: Denied the motion of ACDC for leave to file a third-party complaint and
granting the motion of MEC, which the trial court considered as a motion for
a judgment on the pleadings.
CA: Dismissed the appeal and affirmed the assailed decision. The appellate
court sustained the disallowance of the third-party complaint of ACDC against
Becthel on the ground that the transaction between the said parties did not
arise out of the same transaction on which MECs claim was based.
Issues: WON a third-party complaint is proper and WON judgment on the pleadings
is proper.
There must be a causal connection between the claim of the plaintiff in his complaint
and a claim for contribution, indemnity or other relief of the defendant against the
third-party.
Sec. 11. Third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint. A third (fourth, etc.) party complaint
is a claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third (fourth, etc.) party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponents claim.
1.
2.
3.
Facts: On March 13, 2001, Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC) filed a Complaint
for a sum of money with damages against the Asian Construction and Development
Corporation (ACDC) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Held: NO and NO
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court provides:
Furthermore, Section 1, Rule 34 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court may
render judgment on the pleadings, as follows:
35
transactions are different and separate from those between Becthel and the petitioner
as third-party plaintiff for the construction of the latters project in Mauban, Quezon,
where the equipment leased from the respondent was used by the petitioner. The
controversy between the respondent and the petitioner, on one hand, and that between
the petitioner and Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely distinct from each other.
In Capayas v. Court of First Instance, the Court made out the following tests:
(1) whether it arises out of the same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is
based; or whether the third-party claim, although arising out of another or different
contract or transaction, is connected with the plaintiffs claim;
(2) whether the third-party defendant would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against the original defendant, although
the third-party defendants liability arises out of another transaction; and
(3) whether the third-party defendant may assert any defenses which the thirdparty plaintiff has or may have to the plaintiffs claim.
The third-party complaint does not have to show with certainty that there will be
recovery against the third-party defendant, and it is sufficient that pleadings show
possibility of recovery. In determining the sufficiency of the third-party
complaint, the allegations in the original complaint and the third-party complaint
must be examined. A third-party complaint must allege facts which prima facie show
that the defendant is entitled to contribution, indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant.
It bears stressing that common liability is the very essence for
contribution. Contribution is a payment made by each, or by any of several having
a common liability of his share in the damage suffered or in the money necessarily paid
by one of the parties in behalf of the other or others. The rule on common liability is
fundamental in the action for contribution. The test to determine whether the
claim for indemnity in a third-party complaint is, whether it arises out of the
same transaction on which the plaintiffs claim is based, or the third-party plaintiffs
claim, although arising out of another or different contract or transaction, is connected
with the plaintiffs claim.
In this case, the claims of the respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC, against the
petitioner as defendant therein, arose out of the contracts of lease and sale; such
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
36
ISSUE: Whether or not the motion for reconsideration of the default order was the
correct remedy
HELD: NO. Respondent Tansipeks remedy against the Order of Default was
erroneous from the very beginning. Respondent Tansipek should have filed a Motion
to Lift Order of Default, and not a Motion for Reconsideration pursuant to Section 3
(b), Rule 9 of the Rules of Court. A Motion to Lift Order of Default is different
from an ordinary motion in that the Motion should be verified; and must
show fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and meritorious
defenses. The allegations of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable
neglect,
and
(2)
of
meritorious
defenses
must
concur.
It is important to note that a party declared in default respondent Tansipek in this
case is not barred from appealing from the judgment on the main case, whether or
not he had previously filed a Motion to Set Aside Order of Default, and regardless of the
result of the latter and the appeals therefrom. However, the appeal should be based on
the Decisions being contrary to law or the evidence already presented, and not on the
alleged invalidity of the default order.
Issue:
Doctrine: Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a provisional remedy,
an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be enjoined had become fait accompli
(an accomplished or consummated act), only the prayer for provisional remedy should
be denied.
Facts:
Caneland Sugar Corporation (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) a complaint for damages, injunction, and nullity of mortgage against
the Land Bank of the Philippines (respondent) and Sheriff Eric B. de Vera
praying for the following reliefs: issuance of a temporary restraining order
enjoining respondent and the Sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale of
petitioners property; declaration of nullity of any foreclosure sale to be held;
declaration of nullity of the mortgage constituted over petitioners property
covered by TCT No. T-11292 in favor of respondent; and award of damages.
RTC denied due course and dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
Petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari
and Prohibition with Injunction but was eventually denied.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in not enjoining the extrajudicial foreclosure of the properties
subject of this case.
Ruling:
Petitioner contends that the RTCs act of authorizing the foreclosure of its
property amounts to a prejudgment of the case since it amounts to a ruling
that respondent has a valid mortgage in its favor. Petitioner also argues,
among others, that Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 385 is not applicable
inasmuch as at the time of the lease to Sunnix, Inc., the management and
control of its operations has already been virtually taken over by respondent.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that: P.D. No. 385 prohibits the
issuance of an injunctive order against government financial institutions; the
CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion; the RTC Order merely dealt
with the propriety of the injunctive order and not the validity of the mortgage;
and the issue of the propriety of the injunctive order has been rendered moot
and academic by the foreclosure sale conducted and the issuance of a
certificate of sale by the sheriff.
In the instant case, aside from the principal action for damages, private
respondent sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin the foreclosure sale in order to prevent an
alleged irreparable injury to private respondent. It is settled that these
injunctive reliefs are preservative remedies for the protection of substantive
rights and interests. Injunction is not a cause of action in itself but merely a
provisional remedy, an adjunct to a main suit. When the act sought to be
enjoined had become fait accompli (an accomplished or consummated act),
only the prayer for provisional remedy should be denied. However, the trial
court should still proceed with the determination of the issue of the validity of
the mortgage, not to mention the issue of the nullity of the foreclosure sale as
well as petitioners prayer for damages so that an adjudication of the rights of
the parties can be had.
37
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Respondent filed its Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim praying that the
complaint be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action against it, and for failure
of Encarnacion to verify and certify the complaint against it.
RTC: Plaintiff Encarnacion Cleofas vda. De Biglang-Awa only and all the defendants
are concerned, is DISMISSED with prejudice. Let her name be deleted from the
caption of the complaint.
Thereafter, Tolentino filed a Motion for Issuance of a Certificate of Finality of the
Court's Order of February 2, 2001.
On February 19, 2001, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Subsequently, petitioners filed a Motion for Leave to Amend Complaint and to Admit
Attached Amended Complaint. Petitioners contend that they, together with
Encarnacion and Liwayway are co-owners, pro-indiviso, of the subject parcels of land;
that through manipulations and misrepresentations, Tolentino, Encarnacion and
Liwayway were able to secure a partition of and titles over the disputed properties.
RTC - The dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the commencement
of any appropriate action that may be initiated by the proper party plaintiffs against
the proper defendant or defendants.
On May 2, 2001, Tolentino, filed a Motion for Cancellation of Notice of Lis Pendens
with respect to the four parcels of land covered.
On May 3, 2001, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the April 16,
2001 RTC Resolution and an Opposition to Tolentino's Motion for Cancellation of
Notice of Lis Pendens..
On August 14, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration and Tolentinos Motion for cancellation of notice of Lis Pendens.
On December 21, 2001, the RTC issued an Order denying respondent's Motion for
Reconsideration of the RTC Order on the ground that the cancellation of the notice of
lis pendens is "simply not accessible".
Unsatisfied by the August 14, 2001 and December 21, 2001 Orders of the RTC,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that the RTC is guilty
of grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion for cancellation of the notices
of lis pendens.
On March 26, 2002, petitioners also filed a petition for certiorarip raised in the said
petition is whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted
Tolentino's motion to dismiss and denied petitioner's motion for leave to admit
amended complaint. However, the case was dismissed by the CA .
38
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
properties in litigation within the power of the court until the litigation is
terminated, and to prevent the defeat of the judgment or decree by
subsequent alienation. Its notice is an announcement to the whole world that a
particular property is in litigation and serves as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk or that he gambles on the result of
the litigation over said property.
The filing of a notice of lis pendens has a two-fold effect: (1) to keep the
subject matter of the litigation within the power of the court until the
entry of the final judgment to prevent the defeat of the final judgment by
successive alienations; and (2) to bind a purchaser, bona fide or not, of
the land subject of the litigation to the judgment or decree that the court
will promulgate subsequently.
While the trial court has inherent power to cancel a notice of lis pendens, such power,
meanwhile, is exercised under express provisions of law. As provided for by Sec. 14,
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a notice of lis pendens may be canceled
on two grounds: (1) if the annotation was for the purpose of molesting the title of the
adverse party, or (2) when the annotation is not necessary to protect the title of the
party who caused it to be recorded.
In the instant case, it is established that petitioners have no interest over the
properties covered by TCT Nos. N-198629 to 198632. Hence, the annotation of
notices of lis pendens on the abovementioned titles is not necessary to protect
petitioners individual titles over the other properties involved in their complaint.
Furthermore, as the complaint of petitioners was already dismissed without
prejudice, and since petitioners had not filed any other case involving the subject
properties, there is no longer any pending suit to speak of. Hence, the CA did not
commit any error when it ordered the cancellation of the notices of lis pendens
annotated at the back of TCT Nos. N-198629 to N-198632.
Asean Pacific Planners v City of Urdaneta (2008)
Quisumbing, J.
Re: Amendments to pleadings
DOCTRINE
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby.
39
Respondent Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, filed a complaint for annulment of
contract with prayer for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining
order against respondents City of Urdaneta, Capalad doing business under the name
JJEFWA Builders, and petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) and Asean Pacific
Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDG).
1.
Del Castillo alleged that the Urdaneta City mayor entered into 5 contracts for
the construction and management of a 4-storey twin cinema commercial
center and hotel involving a massive expenditure of public funds amounting
to P250Million, funded by a loan from PNB. For a minimal work, the
contractor was allegedly paid P95Million.
2.
According to Del Castillo, all 5 contracts are void because the object of the
contract is a piece of land belonging to public domain and which remains
devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary school. Additionally, the
contracts are void because they were all awarded solely to the Goco family.
In their Answer, APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are valid.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that inadequate
legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in
representation of its interests.
FACTS
1.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel for Urdaneta
City and filed an Omnibus Motion with prayer to:
Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the city's Answer, joined
in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then
Mayor Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod.
Mayor Perez also stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that
the complaint states no cause of action.
For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an
Answer5 with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground
that Del Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa
became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as
taxpayers, a Complaint-in-Intervention adopting the allegations of Del
Castillo.
CA: APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before CA. CA dismissed the
petition because:
1.
2.
3.
ISSUE
Whether Trial court erred in allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to
switch sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective answers and admitting
their complaints.
HELD
The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
40
of Averdi, then transferred his rights to Eduardo Lopingco, herein private respondent,
subject to the terms and conditions specified in their Memorandum of
Agreement 2 and the Addendum thereto, 3 both concluded in February 1983.
On June 21, 1984, Lopingco filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint
against the petitioner and the Philippine Veterans Bank for revocation of the said
board resolution and the rescission of his contract with the petitioner. Copies of the
complaint, together with the corresponding summons, were served on the defendants.
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence is objected
to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the pleadings, the
court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with liberality if the
presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial
Order dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are valid.
Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties' evidence on the issue. Any evidence
of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and admissible.
Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings may be
made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta City's judicial admissions, the trial court is still given
leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not
necessarily prevail over documentary evidence, e.g., the contracts assailed. A party's
testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.
As regards the RTC's order admitting Capalad's complaint and dropping him as
defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no
authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that
Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the
other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty.
Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
De Dios vs CA
Doctrine: The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are alleged in an
amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in court that another
summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint
Facts:
By its Board Resolution No. 939B-82, adopted on December 28, 1982, the Philippine
Veterans Bank conveyed a parcel of land under a conditional sale to Averdi Marketing
and Development Corporation. 1 Petitioner Artie Vergel de Dios, as general manager
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
On July 13, 1984, at 9:15 o'clock in the morning, Lopingco filed an amended
complaint and at the same time served a copy thereof on the petitioner by registered
mail. On August 10, 1984, the petitioner filed through counsel an omnibus motion
asking that he be furnished a copy of the amended complaint. This was opposed by
the private respondent, who said that the copy sought had already been sent directly
to the petitioner by registered mail "because at the time said copy was mailed, there
was as yet no appearance of counsel for said defendant."
On September 12, 1984, at the hearing on the motion to dismiss, counsel for the
private respondent moved for a declaration of default against the petitioner for failure
to file his answer within the reglementary period. The trial court deferred resolution
of the motion pending receipt of proof that the petitioner had indeed received the
copy of the amended complaint sent to him by registered mail.
On December 6, 1984, upon presentation of a certification from the Makati Central
Post Office that the petitioner had received a copy of the amended complaint on July
17, 1984, he w
On June 5, 1985, the petitioner filed a motion for new trial alleging error on the part
of the trial court for declaring him in default although he had not yet been served with
a copy of the amended complaint and his omnibus motion had not yet been resolved.
Assuming that such service was not necessary, he contented that he was nonetheless
not negligent for failing to file his answer within the extended reglementary period.
On August 30, 1985, the petitioner filed an appeal with the respondent
court, alleging that the trial court erred in declaring him in default
without first ruling on his Omnibus Motion and in denying his motion for
new trial. The appellate tribunal affirmed the questioned order.
The petitioner submits that inasmuch as the amended complaint completely replaced
the original complaint, the latter was stricken from the record and considered nonexistent. So was the summons that accompanied it. As the amended complaint was a
completely new pleading, a new summons should have been issued requiring the
defendants to answer the same, conformably to Rule 14, Sec. 1, of the Rules of Court.
For failing to do this and thereafter declaring him in default, the trial court denied
him the right to be heard in violation of due process.
Issue: W/N a new summons must be made for the amended complaint.
41
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money and damages arising from
breach of contract. Impleaded as principal defendant therein was Industrial
Steel. (ISL), with Ferro Trading (Ferro) and respondent British Steel as
alternative defendants.
ISL and respondent British Steel separately moved for the dismissal of the
complaint on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action against
them. RTC denied. ISL then filed its answer to the complaint. On the other
hand, British Steel filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA.
Meanwhile, petitioner sought to amend its complaint by
incorporating therein additional factual allegations constitutive of
its cause of action against respondent. Pursuant to Section 2, Rule
10 of the Rules of Court, petitioner maintained that it can amend
the complaint as a matter of right because respondent has not yet
filed a responsive pleading thereto.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Manifestation and Motion stating that it had
filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint together with said Amended
Complaint before the trial court. Hence, petitioner prayed that the
proceedings in the special civil action be suspended.
TC- ruled on petitioners Motion to Admit Amended Complaint
CA- grants the writ of certiorari and orders the respondent judge to dismiss
without prejudice the Complaint against petitioner British Steel (Asia) Ltd.
MR Denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting the extraordinary writ of
certiorari, correctly ordered the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a cause of
action, despite the fact that petitioner exercised its right to amend the defective
complaint under Section 2, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court. NO.
Stated simply: Can a complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer
has been filed, even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher
court? YES
RATIO: Section 2, Rule 10 ROC explicitly states that a pleading may be amended as
a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served. This only means that prior
to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the
complaint whether a new cause of action or change in theory is
introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent Section 3 of Rule
10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the complaint is not
allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served, because
any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense
in the answer.
Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by
changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an event,
the defendant has not presented any defense that can be alteredor affected by the
amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 10. The defendant
still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the allegations against him by
42
Facts:
Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a foreign resident. Petitioners Lourdes and
Alfredo are husband and wife both residents of 90222 Carkeek Drive South Seattle,
Washington, U.S.A. Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, who is a member of the Philippine
bar, however, practices his profession in the Philippines, commuting for this purpose
between his residence in the state of Washington and Manila, where he holds office at
S-304 Gedisco Centre, 1564 A. Mabini, Ermita, Manila.
Private respondent Rosita Dimalanta, who is the sister of petitioner filed an
action for partition against former and her husband. She alleged that, the plaintiff is
of legal age, a widow and is at present a resident of 14823 Conway Road, Chesterfield,
Missouri, U.S.A., while the defendants are spouses but, for purposes of this complaint
may be served with summons at Gedisco Center, Unit 304, 1564 A. Mabini St., Ermita,
Manila where defendant Alfredo D. Valmonte as defendant Lourdes Arreola
Valmontes spouse holds office and where he can be found.He husband was also her
counsel, who has a law office in the Philippines. The summons were served on her
husband.
Petitioner in a letter, referred private respondents counsel to her husband as
the party to whom all communications intended for her should be sent. Service of
summons was then made upon petitioner Alfredo at his office in Manila. Alfredo D.
Valmonte accepted his summons, but not the one for Lourdes, on the ground that he
was not authorized to accept the process on her behalf. Accordingly the process server
left without leaving a copy of the summons and complaint for petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte.
Petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte thereafter filed his Answer with
Counterclaim. Petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte, however, did not file her Answer. For
this reason private respondent moved to declare her in default. Petitioner Alfredo D.
Valmonte entered a special appearance in behalf of his wife and opposed the private
respondents motion.
RTC: denied the MR of respondents.
CA: declared petitioner Lourdes in default. Said decision was received by
Alfredo hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte was validly served with
summons
VALMONTE v CA
Summons
Held: No
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
43
The action herein is in the nature of an action quasi in rem. Such an action
is essentially for the purpose of affecting the defendants interest in a specific property
and not to render a judgment against him. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a
nonresident who is not found in the Philippines, service of summons on her must be in
accordance with Rule 14, 17. Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must
be made either (1) by personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in such places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a
copy of the summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the
last known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.
Secondly, the service in the attempted manner on petitioner was not made
upon prior leave of the trial court as required also in Rule 14, 17. As provided in 19,
such leave must be applied for by motion in writing, supported by affidavit of the
plaintiff or some person on his behalf and setting forth the grounds for the application.
Finally, and most importantly, because there was no order granting such
leave, petitioner Lourdes was not given ample time to file her Answer which,
according to the rules, shall be not less than sixty (60) days after notice.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
the court is conferred jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is
a corporation, Rule 14 and 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the
corporations president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The
rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so integrated with
the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by him.
Doctrine of substantial compliance; Requisites: In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. CA,
this Court enumerated the requisites for the application of the doctrine of substantial
compliance, to wit:
a)
b)
c)
There must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e.,
transferring possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the
person served;
The person served must sign a receipt of the Sheriffs return; and
There must be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the
person on whom the summons was actually served. Most important for it is
through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on the service of summons is
attained.
44
Committee intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, it could have easily
done so by clear and concise language.
Facts: Petitioner is a limited partnership with principal office address at Davao City
and with branch offices at Paraaque, MM and Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioner and private respondent executed a Deed of Sale with Development
Agreement wherein the former agreed to develop certain parcels of land located at
Cagayan de Oro belonging to the latter into a housing subdivision for the construction
of low cost housing units. They further agreed that in case of litigation regarding any
dispute arising therefrom, the venue shall be in the proper courts of Makati. Private
respondent, as plaintiff, filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against
petitioner, as defendant, before the RTC Makati for failure of the latter to comply with
its contractual obligation in that, other than a few unfinished low cost houses, there
were no substantial developments therein. Summons, together with the complaint,
were served upon the defendant, through its Branch Manager at the stated address at
Cagayan de Oro City but the Sheriff's Return of Service stated that the summons was
duly served "upon defendant E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. thru its Branch Manager
Engr. at their new office Villa Gonzalo, Nazareth, Cagayan de Oro City, and evidenced
by the signature on the face of the original copy of the summons. Defendant prayed for
the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of improper service of summons and for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. It contends that the RTC did not
acquire jurisdiction over its person since the summons was improperly served upon its
employee in its branch office at Cagayan de Oro City who is not one of those persons
named in Section 11, Rule 14 RoC upon whom service of summons may be made.
plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. plaintiff filed a Motion
to Declare Defendant in Default. the trial court issued an Order denying defendant's
Motion to Dismiss as well as plaintiffs Motion to Declare Defendant in Default.
defendant, filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that Sec.11, Rule 14 of the new
Rules did not liberalize but, on the contrary, restricted the service of summons on
persons enumerated therein; and that the new provision is very specific and clear in
that the word "manager" was changed to "general manager", "secretary" to "corporate
secretary", and excluding therefrom agent and director. Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Issue: Whether or not the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the person of petitioner
upon service of summons on its Branch Manager.
Held: No. The enumeration of persons to whom summons may be served is "restricted,
limited and exclusive" following the rule on statutory construction expressio unios est
45
RAMOS vs RAMOS
TOPIC: Entitlement to Summons
Well-settled is the rule that a final judgment is immutable and unalterable. The
only exceptions to this rule are (1) the correction of clerical errors, (2) the so-called nunc
pro tuncentries which cause no prejudice to any party, and (3) void judgments.
FACTS:
Petitioners are children of late Paulino V. Chanliongco Jr, who was the coowner of a parcel of land in Tondo, Manila. It was co-owned by him, his sister
Narcisa, and his brothers Mario and Antonio
By virtue of a SPA executed by the co-owners in favor of Narcisa, her daughter
Adoracion Mendoza had sold the lot to herein respondents on different days
Because of conflict among the heirs of the co-owners as to the validity of the
sale, respondents filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) a Complaint for
interpleader to resolve the various ownership claims
RTC upheld the sale of the share of Narcisa only. It ruled that Adoracion had
no authority to sell the shares of other co-owners because the SPA had been
executed in favor only of her mother, Narcisa
the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. It held that while there was no Special
Power of Attorney in favor of Adoracion, the sale was nonetheless valid,
because she had been authorized by her mother to be the latters sub-agent.
There was thus no need to execute another special power of attorney in her
favor as sub-agent
CA decision was not appealed. On April 10, 1999, petitioners filed with the
CA a motion to set aside the decision since they had not been served a copy
of either the Complaint or the summons. Neither had they been impleaded as
parties to the case in the RTC
they argued that the CA Decision should be set aside because it adversely
affected their respective shares in the property without due process
In denying the Motion of petitioners, the CA cited the grounds raised in
respondents Opposition: (a) the Motion was not allowed as a remedy under
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (b) the Decision sought to be set aside had
long become final and executory; (c) the movants did not have any legal
standing; and (d) the Motion was purely dilatory and without merit
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying petitioners Motion and allowing its
Decision dated September 25, 1995 to take its course, inspite of its knowledge that the
lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of petitioners and passing
petitioners property in favor of respondents, hence without due process of law?
RULING:
that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable
A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the
modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and
whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
in the land
The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors, (2)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and (3) void judgments
To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the
action is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of
summons differ depending on the nature of the action
An action in personam is lodged against a person based on personal
liability; an action in rem is directed against the thing itself instead of the
person while an action quasi in rem names a person as defendant, but its
object is to subject that persons interest in a property to a corresponding
lien or obligation
The Complaint filed by respondents with the RTC called for an interpleader
to determine the ownership of the real property in question. Specifically, it
forced persons claiming an interest in the land to settle the dispute among
themselves as to which of them owned the property. Essentially, it sought
to resolve the ownership of the land and was not directed against the
personal liability of any particular person. It was therefore a real action,
because it affected title to or possession of real property
petitioners were not the registered owners of the land, but represented
merely an inchoate interest thereto as heirs of Paulino. They had no
standing in court with respect to actions over a property of the estate,
because the latter was represented by an executor or administrator
o there was no need to implead them as defendants in the case,
inasmuch as the estates of the deceased co-owners had already been
made parties.
Furthermore, at the time the Complaint was filed, the 1964 Rules of Court
were still in effect. Under the old Rules, specifically Section 3 of Rule 3, an
executor or administrator may sue or be sued without joining the party for
whose benefit the action is prosecuted or defended
The present rule requires the joinder of the beneficiary or the party for whose
benefit the action is brought.
Under the former Rules, an executor or administrator is allowed to either sue
or be sued alone in that capacity. In the present case, it was the estate of
petitioners father Paulino Chanliongco, as represented by Sebrio Tan
46
On August 20, 1998, respondent EIM International Sales, Inc. filed in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City a Complaint for collection of sum of
money with prayer for issuance of preliminary attachment against Wood
Based Panels, Inc., Sinrimco. Inc., Manfred Luig and petitioner. Petitioner
was impleaded in the case because he was the President of both Wood Based
Panels, Inc. and Sinrimco, Inc.
The petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the ground that the
trial court had not acquired jurisdiction over his person because he had not
been served with summons. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the
pre-trial and the resetting thereof on November 19, 1999. It, likewise, ordered
the respondent to submit a reply or opposition to petitioners motion to
dismiss within five days from October 19, 1999
The next day, October 20, 1999, the respondent filed a Comment explaining
that summons had not been served on the petitioner because, according to the
sheriff, the petitioners address indicated in the complaint, 138 Maria Clara
Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila, could not be located.
The trial court issued an Omnibus Order dated November 17, 1999 denying
petitioners motion to dismiss and directing that an alias summons be issued
against the petitioner to be served upon him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta.
Mesa, Manila. The respondent thereafter filed a manifestation and motion,
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
informing the court that the address of the petitioner as indicated in the
complaint was erroneous, and that summons should instead be served upon
him at 138 Maria Clara Street, Sta. Mesa Heights, Quezon City, which was
his correct address.
On December 14, 1999, the petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the trial courts omnibus order. He contended therein that the case should be
dismissed in view of the trial courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over his
person and the respondents failure to prosecute the case, considering that
more than a year had passed since the complaint was instituted and yet
summons had not yet been served on him. The respondent opposed the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The trial court issued an Order dated January 25, 2000 denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the foregoing resolution, but said motion was denied by the
Court of Appeals
Issue:
Whether or not there was abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court when the
latter denied the petitioners motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance
of an alias summons to be served.
Ruling:
When the appellate court studied the petitioners motion for reconsideration
and found that the contention therein was correct, it proceeded to look into
the merits of the petition. However, it found that the same should be
dismissed for lack of merit because it found that the trial courts order assailed
by the petitioner therein was an order denying a motion to dismiss. Based on
the factual circumstances of the case, the appellate court ruled that the order
sought to be reversed was an interlocutory order which is beyond the scope of
a petition for certiorari, and that the trial court did not commit abuse of
discretion when it denied the motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner and ordered the issuance of an
alias summons to the latter.
The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias
summons to be served upon him. Although the respondent should have
resorted to other means to determine the correct address of the petitioner
when it was informed by the sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the
petitioner, the respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure because the
petitioners address as indicated by Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco,
Inc. on their respective General Information Sheets, was incorrect.
Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under Rule 16,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the motion, a judge may
dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the
47
CA: Petitioner appeals to the CA via a petition for certiorari but failed and even
sustained the trial courts decision and ordered the former to pay the amount plus legal
interest and cost of suit.
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely,
lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the
trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the
September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and
equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of
service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not
respondents messenger.
ISSUES: (1) Whether there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper
service of summons. (2) Whether the rule on service by publication under Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam. (3)
Whether the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared
by the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.
HELD:
Personal service of summons were made to petitioner but failed because the latter
cannot be located in his last known address despite earnest efforts to do so.
Subsequently, on respondents motion, the trial court allowed service of summons by
publication. Respondent caused the publication of the summons in Remate, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. Thereafter, respondent submitted
the affidavit of publication and the affidavit of service of respondents employee to the
effect that he sent a copy of the summons by registered mail to petitioners last known
address.
Petitioner still failed to answer within the prescribed period despite the publication of
summons. Hence, respondent filed a motion for the reception of its evidence ex parte.
TC: Granted said motion and proceeded with the ex parte presentation and formal offer
of its evidence.
Petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and to Admit Attached
Answer, alleging that the affidavit of service submitted by respondent failed to comply
with Section 19, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court as it was not executed by the clerk of court.
Trial court denied the said motion and held that the rules did not require such execution
with the clerk of court. It also denied the motion to admit petitioners answer because
the same was filed way beyond the reglementary period.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
(1) No. Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant
is designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that
there is jurisdiction over his person.
(2) No. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because
it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been
changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies
in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that the
complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for
recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.
(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that
48
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Petitioner essentially reiterates the grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals, namely,
lack of jurisdiction over his person due to improper service of summons, failure of the
trial court to furnish him with copies of its orders and processes including the
September 11, 2003 order and preference for technicality rather than justice and
equity. In particular, he claims that the rule on service by publication under Section
14, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in
personam like a complaint for a sum of money. He also contends that the affidavit of
service of a copy of the summons should have been prepared by the clerk of court, not
respondents messenger.
ISSUES: (1) Whether there is lack of jurisdiction over the petitioner due to improper
service of summons. (2) Whether the rule on service by publication under Section 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court applies only to actions in rem, not actions in personam. (3)
Whether the affidavit of service of the copy of the summons should have been prepared
by the clerk of court and not respondents messenger.
HELD:
(1) No. Section 14, Rule 14 provides that in any action where the defendant
is designated as an unknown owner or the like or when his whereabouts
are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may,
by leave of court, be effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation and in such places and for such times as the court may
order. Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of court to
effect the service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation. Thus, petitioner was proper served with summons by publication and that
there is jurisdiction over his person.
(2) No. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant under the old rule because
it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule was applicable but this has been
changed, it now applies to any action. The present rule expressly states that it applies
in any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or
the like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry. Hence, the petitioners contention that the
complaint filed against him is not covered by the said rule because the action for
recovery of sum of money is an action in personam is not applicable anymore.
(3) The service of summons by publication is complemented by service of summons by
registered mail to defendants last known address. This complementary service is
evidenced by an affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for
publication in the post office, postage for prepaid, directed to the defendant by
registered mail to his last known address. The rules, however, do not require that
the affidavit of complementary service be executed by the clerk of court.
While the trial court ordinarily does the mailing of copies of its orders and
processes, the duty to make the complementary service by registered mail
is imposed on the party who resorts to service by publication.
49
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
The CA held that the trial court had no authority to issue the questioned Resolution
and Orders. According to the appellate court, the RTC never acquired jurisdiction
over respondents because of the invalid service of summons upon them. First, the
sheriff failed to comply with the requirements of substituted service of summons,
because he did not specify in the Return of Summons the prior efforts he had made to
locate them and the impossibility of promptly serving the summons upon them by
personal service. Second, the subsequent summons by publication was equally
infirm, because the Complaint was a suit for specific performance and therefore an
action in personam. Consequently, the Resolution and the Orders were null and void,
since the RTC had never acquired jurisdiction over respondents.
Issue: W/N the service of summons were valid
W/N there was a defective personal service of summons
W/N service of summons by publication was improper.
Held: 1. Respondents conclude that even granting that the service of summons by
publication was permissible under the circumstances, it would still be defective and
invalid because of the failure of petitioners to observe the requirements of law, like an
Affidavit attesting that the latter deposited in the post office a copy of the summons and
of the order of publication, paid the postage, and sent the documents by registered mail
to the formers last known address.
We agree with respondents. In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant by the service of summons. Where the action
is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines, such service may be done by
personal or substituted service, following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court, which read:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses
to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be
served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be
effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some
person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the
copies at defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person
in charge thereof.
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of summons
is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made promptly can the
process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of service of summons must (a)
indicate the impossibility of service of summons within a reasonable time; (b) specify
the efforts exerted to locate the defendant; and (c) state that the summons was served
upon a person of sufficient age and discretion who is residing in the address, or who is
in charge of the office or regular place of business, of the defendant.[7] It is likewise
50
Private respondent All Season Farm Corp. sought the recovery of a sum of
money, accounting and damages from petitioner Dole Philippines, Inc. and
several of its officers.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Contentions:
Petitioner contends that for the court to validly acquire jurisdiction over a domestic
corporation,
summons
must
be
served
only
on
the
corporate
officers enumerated in Section 11 Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. Petitioner maintains that the alias summons was not validly served on it
since the alias summons was served on Marifa Dela Cruz, an employee of Dole Pacific
General Services, Ltd., which is an entity separate and distinct from petitioner. It
further avers that even if she were an employee of the petitioner, she is not one of the
officers enumerated under Section 11, Rule 14. Thus, the RTC, without proper service
of summons, lacks jurisdiction over petitioner as defendant below.
Private respondent All Season, for its part, contends that the trial court had
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner, since petitioner received the alias summons
through its president. According to private respondent, there was full compliance with
Section 11, Rule 14, when Marifa Dela Cruz received the summons upon instruction of
petitioners president as indicated in the Officers Return. More so, petitioner had
admitted that it received the alias summons in its Entry of Appearance with Motion for
Time filed.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court of appeals committed an error of law when it allowed
substituted service on a private corporation when it held that Dole was validly served
with summons in spite of the fact that summons was not served on its president,
managing partner, general manager, corporate secretary, treasurer or in-house counsel
thereby ignoring the rule on service of summons on private domestic corporations.
Simply stated: Whether there was a valid service of summons on petitioner for
the trial court to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the corporation.
HELD: NO. But the court acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner when the latter
sought affirmative reliefs.
51
Doctrine: In order for jurisdiction to be vested upon the courts, a valid substitute
service of summons is required
Facts:
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Petitioner is the defendant in Civil Case No. 63337 entitled Agapita Trajano, pro se, and
on behalf of the Estate of Archimedes Trajano v. Imelda Imee R. Marcos-Manotoc for
Filing, Recognition and/or Enforcement of Foreign Judgment. Respondent Trajano
seeks the enforcement of a foreign courts judgment rendered on May 1, 1991 by the
United States District Court of Honolulu, Hawaii, United States of America, in a case
entitled Agapita Trajano, et al. v. Imee Marcos-Manotoc a.k.a. Imee Marcos, Civil Case
No. 86-0207 for wrongful death of deceased Archimedes Trajano committed by
military intelligence officials of the Philippines allegedly under the command,
direction, authority, supervision, tolerance, sufferance and/or influence of defendant
Manotoc, pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39 of the then Revised Rules of Court.
Based on paragraph two of the Complaint, the trial court issued a Summons on July 6,
1993 addressed to petitioner at Alexandra Condominium Corporation or
AlexandraHomes, E2 Room 104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City.
On July 15, 1993, the Summons and a copy of the Complaint were allegedly served upon
(Mr.) Macky de la Cruz, an alleged caretaker of petitioner at the condominium unit
mentioned earlier. When petitioner failed to file her Answer, the trial court declared
her in default through an Order dated October 13, 1993.
During the hearing on the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner Manotoc presented Carlos
Gonzales, who testified that he saw defendant Manotoc as a visitor in Alexandra
Homesonly two times. He also identified the Certification of Renato A. de Leon, which
stated that Unit E-2104 was owned by Queens Park Realty, Inc.; and at the time the
Certification was issued, the unit was not being leased by anyone. Petitioner also
presented her Philippine passport and the Disembarkation/Embarkation Card issued
by the Immigration Service of Singapore to show that she was a resident of Singapore.
She claimed that the person referred to in plaintiffs Exhibits A to EEEE as Mrs.
Manotoc may not even be her, but the mother of Tommy Manotoc, and granting that
she was the one referred to in said exhibits, only 27 out of 109 entries referred to Mrs.
52
(2)
(3)
(4)
On October 11, 1994, the trial court rejected Manotocs Motion to Dismiss on the
strength of its findings that her residence, for purposes of the Complaint, was
AlexandraHomes, Unit E-2104, No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro Manila, based on
the documentary evidence of respondent Trajano. The trial court relied on the
presumption that the sheriffs substituted service was made in the regular performance
of official duty, and such presumption stood in the absence of proof to the contrary.
On December 21, 1994, the trial court discarded Manotocs plea for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
Undaunted, Manotoc filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition before the Court of
Appeals (CA) on January 20, 1995, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 36214 seeking the
annulment of the October 11, 1994 and December 21, 1994 Orders of Judge Aurelio C.
Trampe.
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on many occasions several attempts were made to serve the
summons with complaint and annexes issued by this Honorable Court in the above
entitled case, personally upon the defendant IMELDA IMEE MARCOS-MANOTOC
located at Alexandra Condominium Corpration [sic] or Alexandra Homes E-2 Room
104 No. 29 Merlaco [sic]Ave., Pasig, Metro-Manila at reasonable hours of the day but
to no avail for the reason that said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence
or premises. That on the 15th day of July, 1993, substituted service of summons was
resorted to in accordance with the Rules of Court in the Philippines leaving copy of said
summons with complaint and annexes thru [sic] (Mr) Macky de la Cruz, caretaker of
the said defendant, according to (Ms) Lyn Jacinto, Receptionist and Telephone
Operator of the said building, a person of suitable age and discretion, living with the
said defendant at the given address who acknowledged the receipt thereof of said
processes but he refused to sign (emphases supplied).
Held:
Yes
Ratio:
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
53
Besides, apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not
been shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons,
exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second paragraph of
the Complaint only states that respondents were informed, and so [they] allege about
the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting to substituted service, a
plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to locate the defendant through more
direct means. More so, in the case in hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or
house is doubtful or has not been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for
personal service to have been pursued persistently.
Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a serious
nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with a person of
suitable age and discretion residing in defendants house or residence. Thus, there are
two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient must be a person of suitable age
and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in the house or residence of defendant.
Both requirements were not met. In this case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as
to residence, age, and discretion of Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs
general assertion that de la Cruz is the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out
by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto, alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra
Homes. It is doubtful if Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the
condominium unit considering that a married woman of her stature in society would
unlikely hire a male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation
that Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary to
have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de la
Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that he did not
have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner. To protect petitioners right
to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case against her, the substituted
service of summons must be shown to clearly comply with the rules.
It has been stated and restated that substituted service of summons must faithfully and
strictly comply with the prescribed requirements and in the circumstances authorized
by the rules.
DOCTRINES:
Due process dictates that jurisdiction over the person of a defendant can only be
acquired by the courts after a strict compliance with the rules on the proper service of
summons.
Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons of the defendants voluntary appearance in court: When the
defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no
valid service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is null and void.
Personal service preferred over substituted service: Personal service of
summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said summons
cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to substituted
service.
Facts: Constatino A. Pascual filed a complaint for Specific Performance before the
RTC. In the Return Service, the Process Server reported that he failed to deliver the
summons to the defendant. According to the report, the defendant, Dr. Lourdes
Pascual, was not at her home and only her maid was there who refused to receive the
summons. His effort to effect the service is backed up by a certification of the Barangay
in the area.
The following day, the Process Server went back at the defendants place, but again she
is not home. Thereafter, an alias summons was issued by the RTC. Subsequently, the
Process Server returned with the report that a substituted service was effected. For
failure of defendant to file a responsive pleading, petitioner, filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant in Default to which Dr. Lourdes Pascual filed an opposition claiming that
she was not able to receive any summons and a copy of the complaint hence the RTC
cannot exercise jurisdiction over her person.
RTC: Declared Dr. Lourdes Pascual in Default. MR Denied. She then filed a
Motion to Set Aside Order of Default with the argument of non-service of
Summons. RTC denied and on the same day issued a Certificate of Finality
and Entry of Judgment.
CA: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 overturned RTC
and ruled in her favor.
Petitioner herein, Constantino Pascual, through a Petition for Review on Certiorari
under Rule 45 comes now to the SC.
Issue: WON the service of summons is valid.
PASCUAL v. PASCUAL
GR NO. 171916, DECEMBER 4, 2009
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Held: NO.
54
2)
3)
4)
Heirs of Vinzons v. CA
315 SCRA 541
MTC: ordered respondent to vacate the premises and pay the accrued rentals
RTC: affirmed decision in toto
CA: reversed the RTC and MTC
SC: Decision of CA affirmed.
While the second civil was pending appeal in the RTC, petitioners again filed the instant
suit for ejectment on the following grounds:
a)
b)
c)
In his answer, respondent sought dismissal of the complaint on the following grounds:
a)
b)
c)
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
55
After trial, the MTC rendered its decision, ordering respondent to vacate the premises
and pay the accrued rentals. On appeal to the RTC, the said decision was affirmed in
toto. The CA, however, reversed the two (2) earlier decisions by dismissing the
complaint on the ground of litis pendentia, failure to comply with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law (PD 1508); and lack of evidence of prior demand to vacate before
instituting the complaint.
Held: SC ruled that the MTC had improperly assumed jurisdiction over the ejectment
suit.
First, this case being one of unlawful detainer, it must have been filed within
one year from the date of last demand with the MTC, otherwise it is an accion publiciana
cognizable by the RTC. The rule is that the one-year period provided for in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Rules of Court within which a complaint for unlawful detainer can be
filed should be counted from the last letter of demand to vacate. Accion publiciana is
the plenary action to recover the right of possession when dispossession has lasted for
more than one year.
Second, the challenged decision correctly dismissed the case for failure of the
plaintiffs, the petitioners herein, to avail of the barangay conciliation process under PD
1508,preliminary to judicial recourse. The CA had found that "there is no clear showing
that it was brought before the Barangay Lupon or Pangkat of Barangay where the
parties reside and the property subject of the case is situated, as there is no barangay
certification to file action attached to the complaint.
Third, petitioners rely heavily on the general rule that findings of trial courts
deserve to be respected and affirmed by appellate courts.
Almost as well recognized, as the general rule is the exception that the factual
findings of the trial court may nonetheless be reversed by the Court of Appeals if by the
evidence on record or the lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.
Considering that the trial courts and the Court of Appeals arrived at different
factual findings, we have reviewed the evidence on record and have found as aforesaid,
the improper assumption by the MTC of the case due to non-recourse to barangay
conciliation and the lapse of the one-year period for bringing the case for unlawful
detainer. Having arrived at the above conclusion, the Court finds no need to discuss the
other issues, specifically, those bearing on the application of the principles of litis
pendentia and/or res judicata. Decision of CA affirmed.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
LEDESMA vs CA
FACTS:
Petioner is the owner-lessor of an apartment building in Malate, Manila.
Two units of said apartment were leased
Said lease was originally covered by written contracts of lease both dated
December 10, 1984, and except for the rates and duration, the terms and
conditions of said contracts were impliedly renewed on a month-to-month
basis pursuant to Article 1670 of the Civil Code
One of the terms and conditions of the said Contract of Lease, that of
monthly rental payments, was violated by private respondent and that as of
October 31, 1988, said private respondent has incurred arrears for both units
in the total sum of P14,039.00 for which letters of demand were sent to, and
received by, private respondent
Petitioner referred the matter to Barangay for conciliation when the private
respondents failed to honor the demand letter.
Petitioner was assisted by her son Raymond, not a lawyer, because of her
recurring psychogical and emotional ailment as evidenced of her receipts
and prescriptions issued by her psychiatrist.
Private respondent refused to vacate the premises, petitioner filed a case for
ejectment proceed in MTC Branch 10, Manila which ordered respondent to
vacate the premises and to pay the rentals and the attorneys fees in the
amount of P2,500
RTC of Manila affirmed the MTCs decision except for the award of
attorneys fees which reduced it to P1000
Private Respondent filed a petition for review in CA which reversed the
ruling of the LC due to lack of cause of action
Section 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 states:
o Sec. 6. Conciliation pre-condition to filing of complaint. No
complaint, petition, action or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office
for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the parties
before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or
the Pangkat Secretary, attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman,
or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . .
o Sec. 9. Appearance of parties in person. In all proceedings
provided for herein, the parties must appear in person without the
assistance of counsel/representative, with the exception of minors
and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are
not lawyers.
ISSUE:
a. Whether or not private respondent did not comply with Sec. 6 and 9 of PD
1508 in the lower court?
b. Whether or not Private Respondent had waived his right to question the lack
of cause of action
56
RULING:
a. The court does not agree with petitioner that the issue of non-compliance
with Sections 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 was raised only for the first time in the
Court of Appeals
When private respondent stated that he was never summoned or
subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman, he, in effect, was stating
that since he was never summoned, he could not appear in person
for the needed confrontation of the parties before the Lupon
Chairman for conciliation and/or amicable settlement
Private respondent's allegation in paragraph 4 of his Answer that he
was never summoned or subpoenaed by the Barangay Chairman;
that plaintiff has no cause of action against him as alleged in
paragraph 7 of the Answer; and that the certification to file action
was improperly issued in view of the foregoing allegations thereby
resulting in non-compliance with the mandatory requirements of
P.D. No. 1508, as stated in paragraph 8 of the Answer are in
substantial compliance with the raising of said issues and/or
objections in the court below.
Petitioner tries to show that her failure to personally appear before
the barangay Chairman was because of her recurring psychological
ailments. But for the entire year of 1988, there is no indication at all
that petitioner went to see her psychiatrist for consultation. The
only conclusion is that 1988 was a lucid interval for petitioner.
There was, therefore, no excuse then for her non-appearance at the
Lupon Chairman's office.
b. Petitioner, not having shown that she is incompetent, cannot be represented
by counsel or even by attorney-in-fact who is next of kin.
To ensure compliance with the requirement of personal
confrontation between the parties, and thereby, the effectiveness of
the barangay conciliation proceedings as a mode of dispute
resolution, the above-quoted provision is couched in mandatory
language. Moreover, pursuant to the familiar maxim in statutory
construction dictating that "expressio unius est exclusio alterius",
the express exceptions made regarding minors and incompetents
must be construed as exclusive of all others not mentioned.
c. Petitioner's non-compliance with Secs. 6 and 9 of P.D. 1508 legally barred
her from pursuing the ejectment case in the MTC of Manila
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Facts:
Issue:
Whether respondent Judge Contreras abused his discretion and whether prior referral
to the lupon is a pre-condition to the filing of an action in court.
Ruling:
While P.D. No. 1508 has been repealed by the Local Government Code of 1991,
the jurisprudence built thereon regarding prior referral to the lupon as a precondition to the filing of an action in court remains applicable because its
provisions on prior referral were substantially reproduced in the Code.
In Peregrina vs. Panis, this Court stated:
o Thus, Morata vs. Go, 125 SCRA 444 (1983), and Vda. de Borromeo
vs. Pogoy, 126 SCRA 217 (1983) have held that P.D. No. 1508 makes
the conciliation process at the Barangay level a condition precedent
for the filing of a complaint in Court. Non-compliance with that
condition precedent could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
the ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity. The condition is
analogous to exhaustion of administrative remedies, or the lack of
earnest efforts to compromise suits between family members,
lacking which the case can be dismissed.
Such non-compliance is not, however, jurisdictional. This Court said so
in Garces vs. Court of Appeals:
o In fine, we have held in the past that prior recourse to the conciliation
procedure required under P.D. 1508 is not a jurisdictional
57
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
must raise and include all objections available at the time of the filing of the motion
because under Section 8, "all objections not so included shall be deemed waived."
FACTS: On March 25, 2002, respondent spouses Cesar Ochoa and Sylvia Ochoa,
through respondent Araceli Azores, acting as attorney-in-fact, commenced in the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an action seeking the annulment of contract
of mortgage, foreclosure sale, certificate of sale and damages. The action, docketed as
Civil Case No. 68896 was raffled to Branch 160, presided by the respondent RTC
Judge. On May 22, 2002, the petitioners, as defendants in Civil Case No. 68896, filed
a motion to dismiss, alleging the sole ground that the complaint did not state a cause
of action. The petitioners' motion to dismiss was formally opposed by the private
respondents.
RTC - Respondent RTC Judge denied petitioners' motion to dismiss and at the same
time set Civil Case No. 68896 for pre-trial conference.
Petitioners filed a second motion to dismiss, alleging that the certification against
forum shopping attached to the complaint was not executed by the principal parties
(plaintiffs) in violation of Sec. 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, rendering the
complaint fatally defective and thus dismissible.
The private respondents opposed the second motion to dismiss.
RTC - RTC Judge issued her first assailed order, denying the second motion to
dismiss. Petition filed their motion for reconsideration, but the respondent RTC
Judge denied the motion through her second assailed order.
Petitioners elevated the order of denial to the CA via a petition for certiorari
contending that the RTC should have dismissed the complaint motu proprio since it
was fatally defective. They pointed out that the Verification and Certification of NonForum Shopping attached to the complaint was not signed by Cesar Ochoa or Sylvia
Ochoa but by Araceli S. Azores (Azores), who was acting as the attorney-in-fact of
Cesar Ochoa only. They invited the attention of the RTC to the fact that the powers
delegated to Azores did not include the authority to institute an action in court.
CA - Denied the petition for lack' of merit. Agreed with the RTC that following the
omnibus motion rule, the defects of the complaint pointed out by the petitioners were
deemed waived when they failed to raise it in their first motion to dismiss.
ISSUE: (1) Whether the second motion to dismiss does not violate the Omnibus
Motion Rule under Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court because the issue raised in
the second motion was a question of jurisdiction. (2) Whether the RTC should have
dismissed the complaint motu proprio.
HELD: (1) No. An order denying a motion to dismiss is an interlocutory order which
neither terminates the case nor finally disposes of it, as it leaves something to be done
by the court before the case is finally decided on the merits. As such, the general rule
is that the denial of a motion to dismiss cannot be questioned in a special civil action
58
DOCTRINE
Facts stipulated and evidence admitted during pre-trial bind the
parties.
FACTS
Accused raped a 6 year old child (Mayia). Because of the extent of the damage on her
genitals, the child undertook an IV sedation operation to repair her lacerations.
"On January 17, 1997, about noontime, in Sitio Baco, Barangay Macarang,
Palauig, Zambales, six-year old Mayia Ponseca was walking along Sulok on
her way to her house in Sitio Camiling when appellant Jesus Sebunga Perez
approached her. Appellant introduced himself as "Johnny" and immediately
afterwards, strangled her neck and boxed her abdomen. Still in shock, Mayia
fell down. At that point, a dog arrived and barked at them.
After satisfying his beastly desires, appellant raised his pants and ran away.
Notwithstanding that her vagina was bleeding profusely and her dress now
covered with her own blood, Mayia managed to stand up and seek help. She
ran to the house of Virginia Giron, which was only fifty (50) meters away
from the scene of the crime. In fact, Giron was outside when she heard her
dog barking. Looking at the direction of the noise, she saw a confused Mayia
approaching her with blood dripping from her private parts and thighs.
When Giron asked Mayia what happened, the latter shouted "ni-rape ako,
ni-rape ako". Giron then summoned her husband and other companions to
look for Mayias attacker but was unable to find him. Giron then proceeded
to Hermie Ponseca and Osias Ponseca, Mayias parents, to inform them of
what happened.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
59
The trial court found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime Statutory
Rape. Accused was sentenced to suffer death penalty. Thus this automatic review.
HELD
Appellants argument deserves scant consideration.
Appellant contends that even assuming that the guilt of appellant has been proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the trial court erred in imposing the death penalty.
Appellant maintains that the death penalty cannot be imposed on him for
failure of the prosecution to prove Mayias age by independent evidence.
Appellant points out that while Mayias birth certificate was duly marked
during the pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during the trial.
Appellant asserts that Mayias minority must not only be specifically alleged in the
Information but must also be established beyond reasonable doubt during the
trial.1awphi1.
During the pre-trial, the prosecution marked in evidence Mayias birth certificate as
Exhibit "A". The prosecution submitted its Offer of Evidence which included Exhibit
"A", a certified true copy of Mayias birth certificate. The trial court admitted
Exhibit "A" without any objection from the defense.
ISSUE
Whether the age of Mayia was not proven because although the birth certificate was
duly marked during pre-trial, it was not presented and identified during trial.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
plea bargaining;
stipulation of facts;
marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
interposes lawful defenses; and
such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and
civil aspects of the case.
Moreover, Mayia herself testified in open court as to her age. During the trial on
December 15, 1998, which was about twenty-three (23) months after the rape incident
occurred on January 17, 1997, Mayia testified on cross-examination that she was "8
years old last May 23." Thus, by deduction, since Mayia was born on May 23, 1990 as
shown in her birth certificate, she was about six (6) years and seven (7) months old on
January 17, 1997, the day the crime took place. We rule that the prosecution has
indisputably proven that Mayia was below seven years old at the time appellant raped
her.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
60
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
Held: No.Under Section 6, Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the failure
of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief shall have the same effect as failure to appear at
the pre-trial, i.e., the plaintiff may present his evidence ex parte and the court shall
render judgment on the basis thereof.[20] The remedy of the defendant is to file a
motion for reconsideration[21] showing that his failure to file a pre-trial brief was due to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect.[22] The motion need not really stress the
fact that the defendant has a valid and meritorious defense because his answer which
contains his defenses is already on record.[23]
In the case at bar, petitioner insists that his failure to file a pre-trial brief is
justified because he was not represented by counsel. This justification is not, however,
sufficient to set aside the order directing private respondent to present evidence ex
parte, inasmuch as the petitioner chose at his own risk not to be represented by
counsel. Even without the assistance of a lawyer, petitioner was able to file a motion
for extension to file answer,[24] the required answer stating therein the special and
affirmative defenses,[25] and several other motions.[26] If it were true that petitioner did
not understand the import of the April 23, 1997 order directing him to file a pre-trial
brief, he could have inquired from the court or filed a motion for extension of time to
file the brief. Instead, he waited until May 26, 1997, or 14 days from his alleged receipt
of the April 23, 1997 order before he filed a motion asking the court to excuse his failure
to file a brief. Pre-trial rules are not to be belittled or dismissed because their nonobservance may result in prejudice to a partys substantive rights. Like all rules, they
should be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when they may be
relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the degree of his
thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed.[27]
In the instant case, the fact that petitioner was not assisted by a lawyer is not a
persuasive reason to relax the application of the rules. There is nothing in the
Constitution which mandates that a party in a non-criminal proceeding be represented
by counsel and that the absence of such representation amounts to a denial of due
process. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal
profession is not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation
of its members the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated.[28]
However, the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the effectivity of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, specifically, Section 6, Rule 18 thereof, rendered moot and academic
the issue of whether or not the plaintiff may be allowed to present evidence ex parte for
failure of the defendant to file a pre-trial brief. While the rules may indeed be applied
retroactively, the same is not called for in the case at bar. Even before the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure took effect on July 1, 1997, the filing of a pre-trial brief was required
under Circular No. 1-89 which became effective on February 1, 1989. Pursuant to the
said circular, [f]ailure to file pre-trial briefs may be given the same effect as the failure
to appear at the pre-trial, that is, the party may be declared non-suited or considered
as in default
LINCOLN L. YAO, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE NORMA C. PERELLO, in
her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 276,
Muntinlupa City, THE EX-OFICIO SHERIFF, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
MUNTINLUPA CITY and BERNADINE D. VILLARIN, respondents.
G.R. No. 153828. October 24, 2003
61
HLURB issued a writ of execution against PR Builders and its managers, and
referred the writ to the office of the Clerk of Court of Muntinlupa for
enforcement.
Pursuant to the writ, the deputy sheriff levied on a parcel of land registered in
the names of spouses Pablito Villarin and private respondent, Bernadine
Villarin.
Private respondent filed before the RTC of Paraaque City, a petition for
prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, seeking to enjoin Sheriff Melvin T. Bagabaldo from
proceeding with the public auction.
Private respondent alleged that she co-owned the property subject of the
execution sale; that the property regime between private respondent and her
husband was complete separation of property, and that she was not a party in
the HLURB case, hence, the subject property could not be levied on to answer
for the separate liability of her husband.
Judge Norma C. Perrello issued a 72-hour temporary restraining order and set
the case for raffle and conference.
A conference was then conducted, after which public respondent judge issued
the assailed resolution granting private respondents petition for prohibition
and declaring the subject property exempt from execution. Hence, the
scheduled auction sale did not materialize.
More than a month after public respondent judge issued the resolution,
petitioner filed a motion for intervention.
RTC: Public respondent judge denied the motion ruling that this case has
long been decided, hence the intervention is too late. There is no case for them
to intervene.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
62
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
CA: ruled that defaulted parties are actually indispensible parties and that should
have been served with summons. Granted preliminary injunction as against the
petitioners.
Issue: Whether or not defaulted parties were validly served with summons.
Held: No
Ratio:
We also agree with the Court of Appeals conclusion that the Partial Decision
is null and void insofar as private respondents are concerned since the latter were not
duly served summons or notified of the proceedings against them. The summons and
the Partial Decision were published in a local newspaper edited and published in
Caloocan City and Malolos, Bulacan. However, the Court of Appeals found the
publication in said newspaper, namely the Metropolitan Newsweek, to be invalid
because the said periodical is not considered a newspaper of general circulation in
Quezon City where the subject property is located, as required by Presidential Decree
No. 1079, Section 1.
Petitioners, however, contend that the service of summons by publication was legal
and in accordance with the requirements of Rule 14, Section 14 of the Rules of Court.
The service by publication was done pursuant to the orders of the trial court dated
May 5, 1993 and September 29, 1983.
While the service of summons by publication may have been done with the approval
of the trial court, it does not cure the fatal defect that the Metropolitan Newsweek is
not a newspaper of general circulation in Quezon City. The Rules strictly require that
publication must be in a newspaper of general circulation and in such places and for
such time as the court may order. The court orders relied upon by petitioners did not
specify the place and the length of time that the summons was to be published. In the
absence of such specification, publication in just any periodical does not satisfy the
strict requirements of the rules. The incomplete directive of the court a quo coupled
with the defective publication of the summons rendered the service by publication
ineffective. The modes of service of summons should be strictly followed in order that
the court may acquire jurisdiction over the respondents, and failure to strictly comply
with the requirements of the rules regarding the order of its publication is a fatal
defect in the service of summons. It cannot be overemphasized that the statutory
requirements of service of summons, whether personally, by substituted service, or by
publication, must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully, and any mode of service
other than that prescribed by the statute is considered ineffective.
Be that as it may, even granting that the publication strictly complied with the rules,
the service of summons would still be ineffective insofar as private respondents are
concerned. At the time the complaint for Quieting of Title was filed on November 2,
63
Facts: On October 11, 2004, the Isog Han Samar Movement, represented by
Fr. Noel Labendia of the Diocese of Calbayog, Catbalogan, Samar, filed a lettercomplaint addressed to then Ombudsman, Hon. Simeon Marcelo, accusing Governor
Milagrosa T. Tan and other local public officials of the Province of Samar, including
respondent Maximo D. Sison, of highly anomalous transactions entered into by them
amounting to several millions of pesos. Sison was the Provincial Budget Officer.
The letter-complaint stemmed from the audit investigation dated August 13,
2004 conducted by the Legal and Adjudication Office (LAO), Commission on Audit
(COA), which found, among others, that various purchases totaling PhP 29.34 million
went without proper bidding procedures and documentations; that calamity funds were
expended without a State of Calamity having been declared by the President; and that
purchases for rice, medicines, electric fans, and cement were substantially overpriced.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
On January 24, 2005, the Office of the Ombudsman, through Director Jose T.
De Jesus, Jr., found basis to proceed with the administrative case against the impleaded
provincial officials of Samar, docketed as OMB-C-A-05-0051-B. The latter were then
required to file their counter-affidavits and countervailing evidence against the
complaint.
In his counter-affidavit, Sison vehemently denied the accusations contained
in the letter-complaint and claimed his innocence on the charges. He asserted that his
function is limited to the issuance of a certification that an appropriation for the
requisition exists, that the corresponding amount has been obligated, and that funds
are available. He did not, in any way, vouch for the truthfulness of the certification
issued by the requesting parties. In addition, he averred that he never participated in
the alleged irregularities as shown in the minutes and attendance sheet of the bidding.
Further, he alleged that not one of the documentary evidences so far attached
in the letter-complaint bore his signature and that he was neither factually connected
nor directly implicated in the complaint.
Sison submitted his Position Paper to the Office of the Ombudsman and reiterated that
he had not participated in the alleged anomalous purchases and use of public funds by
the Province of Samar.
Ombudsman: Rendered a Decision, finding Sison and several other local
officials of the Province of Samar guilty of grave misconduct, dishonesty, and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and dismissing him from
service.
CA: Petition for review under rule 43 Reversed and set aside decision of the
Ombudsman.
The Office of the Ombudsman then filed an Omnibus Motion for Intervention and to
Admit Attached Motion for Reconsideration, which was subsequently denied by the CA
in its assailed resolution of December 18, 2008.
Issue: WON the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed to intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decision rendered by the CA.
Held: NO.
The Supreme Court ruled that it is not the proper party to intervene. The SC further
stated that:
Clearly, the Office of the Ombudsman is not an appropriate party to intervene
in the instant case. It must remain partial and detached. More importantly, it must be
mindful of its role as an adjudicator, not an advocate.
64
RTC: (acting as intestate court) permitted the petitioners and their siblings to
intervene in the proceedings
CA: granted the petition for certiorari and nullified the orders of the intestate court.
Procedural History
On 2 July 2004, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 40, of Negros Occidental issued an
order allowing the petitioners and their siblings to take part in the intestate proceedings
of Rodolfo. The respondent sought for reconsideration but was denied by the same
court in an order dated 26 January 2006. On 31 May 2007, by reason of a petition for
certiorari, the Court of Appeals nullified and set aside the decisions issued by the lower
court. Via a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, this
case was brought before the Supreme Court.
Facts: Rodolfo Jalandoni died intestate on 20 December 1966. His brother,
Bernardino, filed at the Court of First Instance a petition for Issuance of Letters of
Administration for Rodolfos property. The petitioners filed a manifestation before the
court introducing themselves as the children of Sylvia, the daughter of Isabel and John.
Isabel who, at the time of Rodolfos death, was legally married to the deceased and is
therefore entitled to a share in the latters property. In the same manifestation, they
prayed that they be allowed to intervene in their mothers behalf in the intestate
proceedings of the deceased. To support their cause, the marriage certificate between
Isabel and Rodolfo, the petitioners proof of births and the birth certificate of their
mother, Sylvia, were appended in their manifestation. Bernardino opposed their
intervention because the birth certificate of Sylvia states that Isabel and John were
married and that she was a legitimate child. As a result, Isabels marriage to Rodolfo
was null and void. Petitioners argue, however, that such statement in the birth
certificate was not enough evidence to prove a valid marriage between Isabel and John
and that it was only done to save the family from condemnation.
Issues: Whether or not the fact of marriage cannot be proven by evidence other than
the marriage certificate; and Whether or not the petitioners have legal right to intervene
in the proceedings.
Held: No. The court ruled that while a marriage certificate is considered the primary
evidence of a marital union, it is not regarded as the sole and exclusive evidence of
marriage. The fact of marriage may be proven by relevant evidence other than the
marriage certificate. In this case the birth certificate of Sylvia precisely serves as the
competent evidence of the previous marriage between her mother Isabel and father
John. It contains entries that her parents were married and that she is their
legitimate child. The court further ruled, that such entries, pursuant to existing laws,
are accorded prima facie weight and presumed true. Sylvias birth certificate speaks of
a subsisting marriage between Isabel and John. The birth certificate shall be regarded
as equivalent evidence to prove the existence of marriage in the absence of a marriage
certificate. Therefore, Isabels marriage to Rodolfo is void seeing that at the time of the
marriage, Isabel was still married to John. As a result, the descendants of Isabel have
no share in the Estate of Rodolfo directly denying the petitioners legal rights to
intervene in the intestate proceedings.
Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
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Aceron. Alegado. De Guzman E., De Guzman M., Galang, Kintanar, Segundo, Uy, Yu
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