1

Maria Serpas
HIST 300 GG
December 12, 2014

Realism and U.S Foreign Policy: Nicaragua in the 1980s

During the Cold War era, the United States foreign policy revolved around containing
the threat of the Soviet Unions influence in the western hemisphere. While the U.S. had already
been became increasingly more involved in Latin American affairs after the 1950s, staging coups
in various countries between the 1950s and the 1980s, Nicaragua would prove to be a much more
difficult case. Nicaragua is a classic example for a case study of the U.S. Cold War policies that
were founded upon the classical international relations theory of realism, including its issues
concerning morality, self-preservation, use of hard power to achieve its goals, and the worlds
system and international law.
The scholarship on U.S. foreign policy in Nicaragua reached its peak in the mid to late
1980s, however, after that period, major works ceased to be published. They were contemporary
works, and most books are listed under current events. All books focused on Nicaraguas
potential connections with the Soviet Unions and were mainly debates on that particular authors
stance of that contemporary issue and how it related to foreign policy. They touch on the political
side of the U.S.s foreign policy, but do not look into them through the International Affairs
perspectives and do not try to apply the International Relations theories to attempt to explain the
situation with Nicaragua, which is what this paper will do.
A brief historical background is necessary to begin to understand U.S. foreign policy in
Nicaragua. In 1979, the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN, or simply just Sandinistas)

overthrew the dynastic Somoza dictatorship that had ruled Nicaragua since the 1930s. From 1981
until 1989, counterrevolutionaries, or contras, began to attack the newly installed revolutionary
government. The contras were composed of various groups, all of different ideologies, and were
fully backed by U.S. aid and the CIA regardless. The U.S. and the governing Reagan
Administration viewed the Sandinista rule as a communist reign of terror and thought of its
existence as a threat to political stability in Central America and by extension as threat to the
U.S. for its alleged Marxist-Leninist leanings.1 The Sandinista government attempted to
acquiesce to American expectations and ideals through methods such as promising a mixed
economy, political freedom, and civil liberties for the Nicaraguan people, demonstrated by the
1984 elections which the Sandinistas won fairly according to a variety of impartial international
sources. Nicaragua took a noninterventionist and nonaligned foreign policy and wanted to be left
out of the U.S.-USSRs ideological rivalry. The U.S. did not back down, however, and continued
to fund the contras. In 1990, the Sandinistas finally lost the election to the U.S. backed party of
Violeta Chamorro, however they maintained a significant number of seats in the Nicaraguan
legislature and continue to hold political prominence to the present day.
The most salient characteristic of the realist theory is self-preservation and self-interest as
being the main goals of states. If anything, the U.S.s interventions in Central America are prime
examples of this characteristic. Its interests lied in keeping Soviet influences out of the Americas
so that they would be the regional hegemon and therefore maintain its sphere of influence, which
was already in decline, something the U.S. knew. The Santa Fe Committee of 1980 had already
assessed the decline of the American hegemony and it would become the basis of Reagans

1 Ronald Reagan, The Fear of Communism in Central America, Latin America and the
United States: A Documentary History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 306.

foreign policy when he took office in 1981. It indicated that U.S. intervention was justified only
if it was a direct extracontinental threat to the U.S. and not if it was to shape that country into a
predetermined mold that was simply just beneficial for the United States, and that the U.S.s
global power position rested on the sovereignty and security of Latin America.2 While this did
not appear to justify the actions in Nicaragua, the common fear of a communist threat was so
strong that Nicaragua was seen as a threat to the U.S. and therefore warranted some kind of
intervention.
Marlene Dixon and Ed McCaughan, in contrast, argue that the declining U.S. hegemony
weakened its ability to unilaterally impose its will and that it produced a government which
increasingly threatens world peace as it declines from the apex of imperialist power to unbridled
militarism.3 In other words, the U.S. had become desperate to keep the influence and dominion
it once had over the Latin American regions and it began to take more indirect and violent
approaches to impose its own interests than what is actually beneficial to the state involved.
Reagan used the fear of a communist takeover to promote intervention in hopes of restoring the
declining power and hegemony and thus began a series of covert interventions in Nicaragua,
which would be a test run for counterinsurgency techniques, in order to both preserve U.S. power
and interests.4 5

2 Committee of Santa Fe, Latin America and the United States: A Documentary
History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011, 298-299.

3 Marlene Dixon and Ed McCaughan, The Suez Syndrome: US Imperialism in

Decline in Nicaragua Under Siege, (San Francisco: Synthesis Publications, 1984), 11.

4 Kenneth Sharpe, U.S. Policy toward Central America in Crisis in Central America:
Regional Dynamics and U.S. Policy in the 1980s.(Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), 32.

The U.S.s classical policy of containment toward socialist and communist influences
further exemplifies its desires to act within its own interests seeking the goal of self-preservation.
The threat of a Soviet base in Nicaragua was something the U.S. needed to respond to as quickly
as possible. In 1980, the Committee of Santa Fe made it clear that the U.S., as an inactive state,
must seek to establish its natural position or it would be replaced by a competitor, in this case,
the USSR.6 To some, like CIA director William Casey, Nicaragua was ideologically already
under Soviet occupation, and that it was maintained by an external power, however the
government was not installed or occupied by external forces, but rather by Nicaraguans
themselves.7 The Sandinistas did not want any affiliation with any external power for that matter,
making these claims moot in the first place.
The realist theory asserts that states should not rely on morality to guide foreign policy.
The U.S. exercised this point in its covert dealings with the contras and the Reagan
administration clearly saw it as its moral duty to contain Soviet influence, mainly because it was
in its best interests to do so. In a televised speech in 1984, Ronald Reagan claims that we can
and must help Central America. Its in our national interest to do so, and morally, its the only
right thing to do, masking self-interest into a moral crusade.8 The Santa Fe Committee states

5 Peter Kornbluh, The Covert War, in Reagan versus the Sandinistas: The
Undeclared War on Nicaragua, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 21.
6 The Committee of Santa Fe, Latin America and the United States: A Documentary
History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 297.

7 Roy Gutman, Banana Diplomacy: The Making of American Policy in Nicaragua 19811987, (New York: Simon & Schuster Inc., 1988), 269.

8 Reagan, The Fear of Communism in Central America, 306.

that ethical realism provides the underlying moral support to the foreign policy principles of the
United States proving that morality for the United States is essentially self-serving.9 According
to Sung Ho Kim, the USs self-serving morality unilateral, self-imposed on constraints in
affirmation of the moral character of the U.S. as a society 10
The Reagan Administration also had a habit of manipulating language to make the U.S.s
covert activities seem moderate and reasonable and to disguise unilateral violence and therefore
keep American public opinion from opposing the aid the U.S. was giving to Nicaragua and
preserving its own interests.11 Reagan, as president, was often the face that the American public
saw and was the one informing the public of the affairs involving Nicaragua. Roy Gutman, a
journalist in Nicaragua, accuses Reagan of romanticizing the contras, calling them freedom
fighters, but instead it was just his administration throwing money at the contras, in hope that
they might destabilize the Sandinista government.12 In Reagans speeches, he often mentions the
issue of the communist threat that he wants to contain, telling the American public that America
must maintain [its] strength in order to deter and defend against aggression- to preserve freedom
and peace. [It] help [its] friends defend themselves however it must also do enough to protect

9 The Committee of Santa Fe, Saving the New World from Communism. Latin
America and the United States: A Documentary History. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2011), 297.
10 Sung Ho Kim, The Issue of International Law, Morality, and Prudence. In Reagan
versus the Sandinistas, 265.

11 Morris Morley and James Petras. The Reagan Administration and Nicaragua: How
Washington Constructs Its Case For Counterrevolution in Central America, (New York:
Institute for Media Analysis, Inc., 1987), 79.

12 Gutman, Banana Diplomacy, 272.

[its] security as well.13 The romanticized language brings up questions of morality because it
was meant to manipulate the public opinion, which it ignored for the most part anyway.
The Reagan administration not only ignored public opinion in favor of its military
adventurism, but it often tricked congress as well, exemplifying the realist belief that morality
should not guide foreign policy and that immoral deeds were necessary for the preservation of
the states interests.14 As far as public was concerned the covert funding of the contras was and
going against Congress were not necessary immoral deeds to preserve the state, but rather
immoral deeds that were reflections of its leaders.15 In 1981, the administration tricked Congress
by stating that the nineteen million in aid would b going to the contras so that they could interdict
the weapons going to the Salvadoran rebels.16 Until 1985, Reagan and his administration did not
admit that they were doing anything to undermine the Nicaraguan government, which was a
blatant lie, as the press contantly covered the event. In 1986, the administration was caught doing
other covert activities, such as arming Iranian rebels in exchange for hostages, and the scandal
became known as the Iran-Contra Affair and it wasnt until then that they admitted their
activities.
The many instances of sabotage also brought up the morality of the U.S. government. According
to Kornbluh, the U.S. hoped that the Nicaraguan government would become aggressive and

13 Reagan, The Fear of Communism in Central America, 305-306.

14 Dixon and McCaughan, The Suez Syndrome, 13.

15 Sharpe, U.S. Policy Toward Central America, 15.

16 Sharpe. U.S. Policy Toward Central America, 25.

repressive and thus claim collective defense, and justify its own actions meaning that they
hoped that Nicaragua would become the model of a repressive socialist regime that they sought
to fight against to prove a point.17 The Contadora peace negotiations were also not safe from
American manipulation. Nicaragua agreed to acquiesce to American demands, but the U.S.
began to call it one-sided and eventually blocked the Contadora group efforts because they were
producing the results the U.S. hoped for.18 Such manipulations were all seen as immoral and
further exemplify how the U.S.s code of ethics was self-serving, much like the realist theory
proposes a states morality should be.
Reagan himself said that our diplomatic objectives will not be attained by good will and noble
aspirations alone, and effectively, the U.S. used military influence to generate a favorable
outcome in the Contra wars. The U.S. did not use its own troops, however. Instead, it trained,
armed, and provided financial assistance to the contras to fight against the Sandinista military
themselves, thus preventing direct involvement and using Americans on the warfront. Funding
contras was costly, and when Congress cut off all aid to the Contras, the government turned to
allies such as El Salvador, Honduras, Israel, and South Korea, as well as private corporations and
individuals to support contras, at least until Congress overturned the decision. 19 The CIA was
active in funding and arming the contras, providing cash and military hardware, originally
through and Argentinian third party, however when relations between the two deteriorated, the

17 Kornbluh, The Covert War, 23

18 Goodfellow, The Diplomatic Front. In Reagan versus Sandinistas, 150.

19 Leogrande, Reagan versus the Sandinistas, 221.

CIA took direct control.20 Twenty-seven million dollars went directly to providing logistics
support in 1984, twenty million dollars went to providing aid for training and arming contras,
and after six years, 130 million had been spent in aid. However, by 1986, the contras had lost
their momentum and ceased to fight, making the Sandinista military successful in keeping the
contras at bay.21 They were successful, in a way. Fighting the many contra wars made it
expensive for military regimes to simply exist 22 The CIA was effective in passing on US
ideology to the Contras, however, showing how exercising hard power led to them also using
their ideological influence to keep the contras under their wing. For example, the armies of the
region began to internalize the U.S. conceptions of hemispheric security as their own and modern
ideology well-prepared armies that had their own military traditions would possess more
autonomy relative to the US.23
Economic intervention was also common as a side-effect of military funding. The U.S. and the
CIA attempted to destroy the Nicaraguan economy by targeting oil supplies, food stocks, and
pipelines to debilitate the Sandinista government. The attack on the port of Corinto was
especially destructive. 3.2 million gallons of gasoline, oil, and diesel fuel and hundreds of tons of
food and medicine were destroyed and the attack caused fires. An estimated $5-10 million were

20 Kornbluh, The Covert War, 25.

21 Kornbluh, The Covert War,34.

22 Debora Barry, Raul Vergara, and Jose Rodolfo Castro. Low Intensity Warfare: The
Counterinsrugency Strategy for Central America. Crisis in Central America. Boulder:
Westview Press. 1988. 77-97., 80.

23 Barry, Low Intensity Warfare, 85.

caused in destruction and a years supply of the yearly fuel consumption as well. 24 For this
reason, the militaristic aspects were also meant to have economic consequences, not on the U.S,
but on Nicaragua.
The realist theory is also based on one final premise: that the world order is anarchic and that
international organization and laws are ineffective. This explains the U.S.s ideologies behind
foreign intervention as well as explains how it was able to get away from being sanctioned,
despite its obvious covert activities and attempts to destabilize a democratically elected
government. Reagan states that El Salvadors instability, for example, is an attempt to
destabilize the region and eventually move chaos and anarchy toward the American border.25
Because of the perceived idea that Latin America is anarchic due to its instability, the US
attempts to be the worlds policeman to fill the void that the lack of a higher-up institution that
all countries respond to has created. The Committee of Santa Fe has stated that any U.S. power
base . . . cannot be allowed to crumble if the U.S. is to retain the adequate extra energy to be able
to play a balancing role elsewhere in the world. 26 The implication is that the U.S. is a balancing
factor in the anarchic world order and that in order to maintain that status, it must be actively
involved in world affairs and maintain the justice as it sees fit.
The belief that international law is ineffective unless it is a clearly defined treaty between two
states where the consequences of any violations are the responsibilities of the states to enforce, is
24 Nancy Stein, The CIA Takes Direct Charge: The Attack on Corinto, in Nicaragua under
Siege, 56-57

25 Reagan, The Fear of Communism in Central America, 305.

26 Committee of Santa Fe, Saving the New World from Communism. 297

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also a driving factor for the U.S. intervention in Nicaragua. The ICJ itself states that there is no
way they can be held accountable for be sanctioned for their actions under International law,
since international law is never enforced by any transnational organization. Aggressor states are
simply scolded for their actions. During Nicaragua vs United States in 1984, this would be the
case. Nicaragua, through the International Court of Justice charged the United States with
violating the principles of non-intervention and that the U.S. was guilty of indirect aggression.
However, the ruling was no more than a simple embarrassment for the U.S.27 The U.S. did
manage to evade the lawsuit, however. Nicaragua attempted to find them guilty of mining at the
ports and supporting the contras as violations of international law. The U.S., however, announced
the day before that it would notaccept the courts jurisdiction relating to U.S. disputes with any
nation in Central America for two years.28
U.S. foreign policy toward Central America in the cold war can be summed up by applying a
case study for Nicaragua with the basic aspects of the realist theory. It is the most definitive and
through its belief that self-preservation is the main goal of states, the U.S. defended itself against
criticism claiming that its meddling was selfish and destructive toward the world order. Its
actions toward Nicaragua, despite the dubious morality that accompanied it and its complete
disregard for international law, were seen as means to fulfill its goals, which was to protect U.S.
interests and to prevent another Cuba from happening to any other Latin American country.
Using its military power and influence to attempt to overthrow the Sandinista regime was also
characteristic of the U.S. using its hard power to affect an outcome that would result in its favor.

27Kim, The Issues of International Law, 265.

28 Gutman, Banana Diplomacy, 202.

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