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15:41:51 PM

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iii
'u
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)123-154

Signification and Truth

of Semantics
at the Crossroads

Epistemologa
Ontology in Augustine's

Early Philosophical

and

Writings*

LaurentCesalli& Nadja Germann

i.Br.
Seminan
Freiburg
Philosophisches
Abstract
in Augustines
of truthand signification
Thisarticleis abouttheconception
early
of
the
shift
In
the
first,
Augusgradual
part,
semantic-linguistic
philosophical
writings.
develthatAugustine
Itreveals
istreated
theAcademics
towards
tines position
closely.
to
is
suited
of
Stoic
elements
a
notion
of
which,
epistemology,
by
integrating
ops
sign
In thesecoftrueknowledge
function
asa transmitter
expressions.
through
linguistic
s
andAugustine
ofsignified
structure
ondpart,boththeontological
(sensible)
things
areexamined.
truths
ofmathematical
to theapparent
solution
Againhis
tautologies
incontrast
thenatural
thistime,however,
outtobethekeystone;
notionofsignturns
bothparts
In
their
of
totheconventional
complementarity,
expressions.
sign linguistic
the
overcomes
with
and
showhowAugustine
skepticism
intensely
(partially)
struggles
ofsignandsignification.
hisconception
ofthesensible
worldthrough
Keywords
of
andproportions,
numbers
ofsigns,
semantics,
theory
skepticism,
theory
Augustine,
of
truth,
theory judgment
Introduction
the"shoreof thebeatavita can be reachedonlyby
Accordingto Augustine,
This idea has a numberof
of philosophy".1
"harbour
the
passingthrough
*) Wewould
readers
for
andseveral
toKlausJacobi
ourgratitude
liketoexpress
anonymous
for
andtoFriederike
onearlier
drafts
ofthispaper,
andcomments
critical
Schmiga,
suggestions
are
ofthetext.
Ourspecial
redaction
withthefinal
assistance
hervaluable
however,
thanks,
thetext.
shetooktocorrect
forthetrouble
K.Meredith
towards
directed
Ziebart,
l) SeeAurelius
De beata
vita
, I, 1 [CCSL29,65.1sq.].
Augustinus,
DOI:10.1
Brill
2008
163/156853408X297679
Koninklijke
NV,
Leiden,

15:41:58 PM

124

L. Cesalliy
N Germann
46 (2008)123-154
/Vivarium

implications,the most importantof which consistsin the

far-reaching
identification
of the path to happinesswiththe acquisitionof knowledge.
Furthermore,
justas thismetaphor
speaksofonlya singleharbourand a single
shore,we mustconcludethatthereis onlya singleapplicablemethod,namely
theone truth.
and a singlegoalin thesearchforwisdom,namely,
philosophy,
However,if man can attainhappinessonlythroughfinding(and attaining)
theone truth,thentheintriguing
questionarisesofwhatexactlythattruthis.
The presentstudyfocuseson justthisquestion.Thisfocus,however,
is determinedbycertainpeculiarities
from
the
fact
that
as
truth,
expressed
resulting
s metaphor,
can be attainedonlythrough
byAugustine
knowledge.
threestandardobservations
of all,
mustbe made:first
Here,thefollowing
of thingsor mattersof fact
knowledgeis notableforbeingat the interface
the
and
mental
acts
(of
(objects),
cognitive
knowingsubjects)thatreferto
thoseobjects.Secondly,thesementalactshavespecificcontentsthatmustbe
in sentencesin orderto be communicated
to othersubjects.Thisis
expressed
if one wishesto determinethe truthor falsity
of the
also required,thirdly,
in
thus
the
of
truth
its
epistemic
acquired.Consequently question
knowledge
involvesat leasttwospheres:on theone hand,thelindimensionnecessarily
betweenlinguisticsigns,
sphere,includingthe relationship
guistic-semantic
theirsignification
and truth;and on theotherhand,theontologicalsphere,
theconnectionbetweenobjects,theirontologicalconstitution
and
embracing
are reflected
in thetwofolddivisionof our article.
truth.Theseperspectives
While thefirstpartaddressesthequestionof therelationship
betweensign,
thesecondsection
and truthin itslinguistic-semantic
dimension,
signification
the
side
of
the
matter
to
the
fore.2
brings ontological
discussestheproblemofknowledge
and truthfrombothofthese
Augustine
as is perhapswell-known.
However,as we shalltryto showwith
perspectives,
whichtogether
conourstudy,theseperspectives
twocomplements
represent
of
As
is
from
his
s
stitute
notion
truth.
evident
earlyphiloAugustinecomplex
thisnotionis basedin extra-mental
sophicalwritings,
thingsand presupposes
sensoryperceptionas thestarting
pointfortheprocessof cognition.Nevertruthwhichcan be knownwithcertainty
and is
theless,it is an intelligible
furthermore
communicable.
The keynotionwe willelucidatein thisconnectionis Augustinesconceptof signification
, whichnot onlybridgesthegap

2)Thissubdivision
toourrespective
in thecomposition
ofthis
corresponds
responsibilities
Thefirst
ofitsmain
isthework
while
thesecond
to
ofLaurent
Cesalli,
body
paper.
part
belongs
NadjaGermann.

15:41:58 PM

46 (2008)123-154
N. Germann
/Vivarium
L. Cesalliy

125

aboutthose
and knowledge
betweenthesemioticleveloflinguistic
expressions
with
theintelliontic
the
connects
also
but
which
to
refers,
language
things
which
is based
of
,
gibleside of things.This double function signification
betweensignadata and signanatudistinction
s fundamental
uponAugustine
talia*willbe broughtto lightand studiedin greaterdetail.On thisbasiswe
shall argue thatAugustine,with respectto the acquisitionof knowledge
is
of knowledge,
as wellas to thecommunicability
throughsenseperception
farlessskepticalthanis usuallyassumed.3
of his
In orderto developthishithertounderacknowledged
peculiarity
to
relevant
the
on theearliestof
concentrate
writings
thoughtwe will,firstly,
Contraacadmicos
ourdiscussion,
, whichappearsto leadto a skeptical
namely,
of knowledge.For according
dead-endwithrespectto thesheerattainability
man
can
to thistext,theonlytruths
obtain,apartfromintrospective
recogni, secondly,written
tion, are logical-mathematical
tautologies.De dialctica
afterContraacadmicos
, willreveala solutionto theproblemofhowto
shortly
the mostrecentof our texts,
communicateknowledge.De musica
, thirdly,
thecertaincognitionof intelligible
evenprovidesan explanationconcerning
itimpartsan at leastparto extra-mental
inherent
truths
Furthermore,
reality.
a further
tialescapefromConttaacadmicosapparentdead-end,by offering
truths.
mathematical
of
meansfortheinterpretion
PointofView
1. Froma Linguistic-Semantic
withan
We wouldliketo openthe"linguistic-semantic"
partofourdiscussion
is
of
central
that
one
anachronistic
however,
observation;
importancefor
and truth.When computer
betweensignification
graspingthe relationship
are askedwhetheror not we will soon be able to workwithmanscientists
made machinescapable of developingtheirown languages,the standard
answeris the following:in orderto build computerscapableof developing
be understood.
theirownlanguages,thenatureofhumanlanguagemustfirst
of
human
the
nature
have
understood
will
we
However,
languageonce
only
between
difference
the
of
we areableto givea scientific
qualitative
description
3)Thatis,onphilosophical
tohave
seems
theskepsis
Foritisclearthatevenwhere
grounds.
leaves
the
means
thehopeofcertain
annihilated
alone,
always
Augustine
byhuman
knowledge
Contra
Th.
see
certain
of
dooropenforanother
Fhrer,
Augustin
knowledge,
type
(theological)
undKommentar
2 und3,Einleitung
Bcher
velDeAcademicis,
York,
Acadmicos
(Berlin-New
1997),31sqq.

15:41:58 PM

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L. Cesalli,
N. Germann
/Vivarium
46 (2008)123-154

Thissomewhatsibylline
answerto
and genuineknowledge.4
mereinformation
dimension.
a primafacietechnicalquestionhas an obviouslyanthropological
thisanswerappearsas a
of thehistorianof philosophy,
Fromtheperspective
in thefirstbook
of
man
Aristotle
to
the
definition
allusion
givenby
possible
: Whatdifferentiates
humanbeingsfromothersocially-organized
ofhisPolitics
bees- andherewe mightaddandfromcomputers
animalssuchas,forexample,
In brief,and etymologically
the
is theabilityto developlanguage.5
expressed:
humanbeingis a "logical"animal.However,whatmoderncomputerscientistsexpressin theirownlanguageis byno meansa newidea.
historical
In the followingwe will considerone concreteand confirmed
mere
information
and
this
between
to
difference
genuine
attempt analyze very
of rhetoric,
professor
knowledge.This attemptwas made by recently-retired
sometimebetweenthesummerof386 and EastersEve ofthefolAugustine,
oftwosources:
inthevicinity
ofMilan.We willmakeuseprimarily
year
lowing
De
dialecticalWe
acadmicos
and
his
treatise
s
Contra
Augustineearlydialogue
wishto answerthequestion:"whatelementsof a conceptionof truthcan be
oflinguistic
as wellas in histheory
foundinAugustinescritiqueofskepticism
and
signification?"7
signs
willbe divided
thelinguistic-semantic
partofourinvestigation
Accordingly,
s positionregarding
considerAugustine
intotwosections.We willfirst
skeptias itisexpressed
andthenshifttohissemantictheory
cismin Contraacadmicos
in De dialctica
.
Dead-End
1.1. A Philosophical
Faithfulto his mainsource,CicerosLibriacademic
i, Augustinediscussesthe
centralskepticalthesesoftheso-calledmiddleand newAcademy.8
According
4)See,forexample,
AModern
andStuart
Peter
,
Russell,
Artificial
Intelligence:
Approach
Norwig,
Intheframe
ofthispaper,
2nded.(Upper
Saddle
River,
NJ,2003),chap.1.2.8("linguistics").
factual
asfollows:
a simple
information
andknowledge
between
thedifference
weunderstand
tothelevel
ofvision")
intheouter
world
isaffecting
mysense
belongs
perception
("something
would
bedistinguished
while
ofmere
information,
byan"epistemic
upgrade"
knowledge
genuine
a tree").
I seeis,forexample,
("what
5)Aristotle,
Politics
, I,2, 1253a7-10.
6)TheContra
thefollowing
editions:
Aurelius
willbequoted
from
andDedialctica
acadmicos
Contra
acadmicos
, ed.W.M.Green
1970),3-61[=CCSL29];Aurelius
(Turnhout,
Augustinus,
B.D. Jackson
ed.J.Pinborg,
transi.
Dedialctica,
1975).
(Dordrecht-Boston,
Augustinus,
7)ForAugustines
tofaith,
seeEckard
and
of
Knig,
conceptionphilosophy itsrelationship
Denken
indenFrhschriften
undphilosophisches
Christlicher
Glaube
Philosophus.
Augustinus
1970),22-26and131-136.
(Mnchen,
Augustins
8)Fortherelationship
with
oftheAcademics,
seeFhrer,
theskepticism
ofAugustine
Augustin

15:41:58 PM

46 (2008)123-154
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N. Germann
L. Cesalli,

127

theskeptics positioncan be summedup as follows:sincenothto Augustine,

withcertainty
be
known
can
judged with
by our senses,nor anything
ing
which
to
baseassent.9
on
have
no
we
our
reason,
adequategrounds
by
certainty
thatis, cognitionof truth,is
Thisamountsto sayingthatcertainknowledge,
is nothingotherthantherefutation
s intention
unachievable.
Now,Augustine
is thatknowledge
In fact,hismainthesisin Contraacadmicos
ofskepticism.10
the
forrejecting
The
reason
be
can
therefore
is possibleand truth
cognized.11
s own
positionis linked,on theone hand,toAugustine
skeptics philosophical
incomto
the
on
the
other
for
truth
motivated
hand,
and,
intellectually
quest
ofskepticism
and faith,as faithseemsindeedto presupposeassent.
patibility
for
themerequestfortruthis insufficient
However,accordingto Augustine,
humanhappiness,whichwillonlybe achievedonce truthhas actuallybeen
found.12
debatewhich
reflects
thehistorical
acadmicos
Thescenario
depictedin Contra
suchas Archesiofthemiddleand newAcademy,
tookplacebetweenmembers
such as Zeno and Chrysippus.13
laus and Carneades,and Stoicphilosophers,
oftheso-calledStoiccriterion
Whatwasat stakein thatdebatewas thevalidity
inAugustines
ownwords,is as follows:
oftruth.
Thiscriterion,

insein
aswellasKurt
Contra
Acadmicos
Flasch,
31-33,
(cit.n.3 above),
Einfiihrung
Augustin.
Denken
1994),36and55sq.
(Darmstadt,
9)Augustine,
Contra
II,5,11.
acadmicos,
10)Notethat
onthe
isambiguous:
themiddle
andnewAcademics
towards
position
Augustine's
in
their
because
itdiscourages
human
toskepticism
heishostile
onehand,
beings
legitimate
theAcademics
hadanesoteric,
believes
ontheother
hand,
genuine
Augustine
questfortruth;
a veilof
authentic
behind
infact
tried
tohidetheir
andthat
Platonic
doctrine
philosophy
they
Contra
acadmicos,
II, 10,24andIII,17,38).
(seeAugustine,
skepticism
n) Augustine,
Contra
acadmicos,
II,9,23.
12)Augustine,
Contra
acadmicos,
I,9,24-25.
13)SeeAugustine's
inContra
onthetopic
considerations
ownhistorical
acadmicos,
II,4, 10-6,
in opposition
be known
stands
thattruth
cannot
as thethesis
oftheAcademics
15.Just
with
hisphilosophical
oftheStoics
toAugustine's
soisthematerialism
(neoview,
incompatible
access
to ancient
Greek
main
One
should
add
here
that
orientation.
Platonic)
Augustine's
aneclectic
himself
ofCicero
wasprovided
andHellenistic
(106-43),
bythewritings
philosophy
ThatAugustine
haddirect
forbothStoicsandAcademics.
sympathy
philosopher
showing
ofhis
in theobvious
Stoiccharacter
is evidenced
ofStoicphilosophy,
however,
knowledge
of
his
mention
Contra
and
De dialctica
Cresconium,
I,
19,
below,
24)
9-15)
(
(see
having
p.
in Pinborg,
De dialctica
readsomelibriStoicorum
(cit.n. 5 above).
(seetheintroduction
TheStoicTradition
onAugustine,
seeM. Colish,
ofStoicphilosophy
Fortheinfluence
from
2 vols,(Leiden,
Middle
totheEarly
1985)vol.I, 329sq.andvol.II, 142-238,
Ages,
Antiquity
esp.181-198.

15:41:58 PM

128

L. Cesalliy
N. Germann
/Vivarium
46 (2008)123-154

Asfortheir
that
truth
couldnotbeperceived,
tookthisfrom
the
opinion
they
apparendy
famous
definition
oftheStoic,
couldbeperceived
that
wasso
Zeno,whosaidthattruth
on themindfrom
thesource
ofitsorigin,
thatitcouldnotoriginate
from
impressed
whence
itdidnotoriginate.
Thiscanbestated
more
and
in
the
briefly plainly following
canbeperceived
that
cannot
bepresent
inwhat
isnottrue.14
way:truth
bythose
signs
- in the technical
That which"is impressedon the mind"is a presentation
oftheStoics,a phantasia,Now,a phantasiawhichexistsin sucha
vocabulary
that
it
can ariseonlyfromtheobjectit represents
and no other,is one
way
whichcan serveas theadequateobjectofourassent.Sucha phantasiais then
- a comprehensive
calleda phantasiakataleptike
For thatreapresentation.15
fromtheopeninglinesofthe
son,italso qualifiesas "true".As can be inferred
textjust quoted,the Academicsdevelopedtheirown skepticalpositionin
reactionto theStoiccriterion
oftruth.Therecannotbe sucha thingas a phantasiakataleptike
oursensesnorourreasonare
, saytheAcademics,sinceneither
able to distinguish
betweena comprehensive
and a non-comprehensive
presentation.
Augustinenow mountsa twofoldcritiqueoftheAcademics,partlydeconstructive
and partlyconstructive.16
Firstof all, on thenegativeside,he purto
show
the
of
the
ports
inconsistency Academics critiqueoftheStoiccriterion
oftruth,as formulated
byZeno; second,he intendsto showin a positiveway
where
certainknowledge
, thatis, in whichdomainofhumanunderstanding,
can be attained.
In hisdeconstructive
criticism
oftheAcademics,
pointstowards
Augustine
a dilemmafromwhichno skepticalphilosopher
mayescapewithoutdamage:
eitherZenos Criterionis valid- in whichcase howeverskepticism
is abandoned- or it is not,in whichcase something
can be known,eventhoughit

14)Aurelius
theAcademics,
transi.
(NewYork,
1951),76-77
J.J.O'Meara
Augustinus,
Against
Christian
text:
Contra
acadmicos
Writers,
[=Ancient
,II,5,11 [CCSL29,24.10-16].
12];Latin
SeealsoContra
acadmicos
'DasKriterium
derWahrheit
inAugustins
,III,9,18andTherese
Fuhrer,
Christianae
46 (1992),257-275,
Contra
Acadmicos"',
Vigiliae
esp.258-262.
15)Onthenotion
ofphantasia
Phantasia
,seeF.H.Sandbach,
,inProblems
kataleptike
Kataleptike
inStoicism
A.Long(London,
themain
sources
ofthat
,ed.Alexis
9-21;for
1971),
doxographical
- Diogenes
notion
Laertius
andOpinions
Eminent
46
and
{TheLives
,
VII,
54),
of
Philosophers
- see
Cicero(Acadmica
theProfessors
, II, 77-78),Sextus
, VII,247-252)
Empiricus
(Against
Alexis
A.Long,
andDavidN.Sedley,
The
Hellenistic
2 vols.(Cambridge,
vol.II,
1987,
Philosophers,
243-254
(section
40)).
16)Fora detailed
ofthat
seeFuhrer,
Contra
Acadmicos
(cit.n.8 above),
analysis
critique
Augustin
and303-307.
144-158

15:41:58 PM

46 (2008)123-154
N. Germann
/Vivarium
L. Cesalliy

129

withthefalse.17
And we mightadd heretheclassical
maysharecharacteristics
that
no
withoutassentto
positioncan be refuted
againstskepticism,
argument
is a
thetruth.As a consequence,everyargumentagainstthe Stoic criterion
one.
self-refuting
s critiqueis forourpurposesmoreinterThe constructive
partofAugustine
of theskepticsappearsalreadysomewhat
esting.In it,Augustinescriticism
theskeptics positionbeing,in fact,partially
accepted.The crucomplicated,
to whatextentAugustineis readyto go
cial pointis of courseto determine
oftheskepticsand atwhichpointhe is compelledto
alongwiththeargument
s
leaveit behind.The answerto thatquestionis symptomatic
of Augustine
it
overall.
could
be
said
that
this
position
Simplyput,
position
philosophical
a fundamental
mistrust
of thesenses.In fact,in Contraacadmicos
expresses
withregardto thesenses:theycanappearsto be a skepticalthinker
Augustine
theconstructive
not provideus withcertainknowledge.18
Therefore,
partof
hiscritiqueofskepticism
mustentailtheopeningup ofan epistemic
spacefor
certainknowledge
whichis notgroundedin senseperception.
Butwherecan
such knowledgebe obtained?Augustinedistinguishes
two realmsin which
is thesubjeccertainknowledge,
whichis to saytruth,is obtainable.The first
domain
that
one
and
knows
with
that
tive,introspective
i.e.,
lives,
certainty
he lives;or thatone perceivessomething(withor withoutcertainty),
and
thatone is perceiving
knowswithcertainty
The
other
domain
is
something.19
'
- propositions
thatoflogicaland mathematical
oftheform ornotp
truths
as wellas arithmetical
be false,says
equationssuchas '2 + 3 = 5' can impossibly
Augustine.20
In summary,
s criticism
ofskepticism
in Contraacadmicos
leads
Augustine
to a conceptionof truthas somethingthatcannotbe knownthroughthe
senses,but onlythroughreason.21
AlthougharguingagainsttheAcademics,
does
not
take
on
tel
oftruth;rather,
he disAugustine
queltheStoiccriterion
so
to
its
field
of
from
the
sensible
to
the
intellectual
places,
speak,
application
17)Augustine,
Contra
acadmicos,
III,9,21.
18)Theepistemological
a corporalibus
adincorporaba
isa leitmotiv
ofAugustine's
program
philoSeeforexemple
Contra
acadmicos
, III, 11, 26,aswellasAugussophical
writings.
Augustine,
De diversis
sensibus
Veritas
tine,
Ixxxiii,
), where
q. 9 (Utrum
corporeis
quaestionibus
percipi
possit
theanswer
tothat
isclearly
question
negative.
19)SeeAugustine,
Contra
acadmicos,
III,9, 19.
20)SeeAugustine,
Contra
acadmicos
, III,11,24andIII,13,29.
21)Hereonecannot
- himself
ofAnselm
ofCanterbury
a careful
reader
of
helpbutthink
- andhisdefinition
oftruth
assolamente
ofCanterbury,
De
(seeAnselm
Augustine
perceptibilis
veritate
, 11).

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realm.Thatmoveis notwithoutconsequence:forthetwotypesoftruthwhich
thepurelysubjectiveand thelogical-mathematical,
Augustineacknowledges,
non-communiThe former
is essentially
pay a highpricefortheircertainty.
cableand thelatteris whatwe in moderntermswouldcall emptyand tautological.22Betweendesperatelyprivateand seeminglytautologicaltruths,
however,therelies an entiredomain of human activityand knowledgeto
which,it would seem,truthmustremainforeign:thedomainof language.
entities,
appearhereto be excluded
Spokenwords,thosesensibly-perceptible
This seemsto be the ineluctableconsequenceof
as potentialtruth-bearers.
as it unfoldsin Contraacadmicos
s critiqueof skepticism
, a pessiAugustine
misticconclusionwhichleavesthereaderofthattextwiththeunsettling
questionofwhyone shouldcontinueto discuss,write,readorteach- asAugustine
ofcertainknowledgeto logical-mathematiobviouslydid.23The confinement
truthsleadsto thequestionof theepistemicvalueof lincal or introspective
can linguisticsignsbe the vehicleof trueknowledge?
guisticexpressions:
in De dialcticaoffers
bothan answerto
of
s
Augustine theory signification
thatquestionand an elegantsolutionto theproblem.24
22)Forthesakeofclarity,
thisstudy.
wefallbackon thismodern
terminology
throughout
truths
as
mathemacial
arises
whether
thequestion
theterminological
however,
ascpect,
Beyond
the
wemean
whith
towhat
inContra
acadmicos
them
understands
today
correspond
Augustine
ofmathinthefact
that
therecognition
ofthischoice
Weseethejustification
word
'tautology'.
as
a
isnotpresented
inContra
acadmicos
ascognizable
truths
ematical
byAugustinewayoutof
itdoesnot
can
be
attained
human
of
truth
that
it
is
a
kind
subjects,
by
skepticism:
although
- justastautologies
itwould
remain
unclear
donot.Otherwise,
their
increase
why
knowledge
didnotreach
inContra
acadmicos
hestill
onseveral
occasions
insists
,that
anycertain
Augustine
acadmicos
, II,23and30aswellasIII,5 and43).
(seeContra
knowledge
23)Fortheimportance
to
ascompared
oflanguage
inAugustines
ofcommunication
conception
MediTwoModels
ofOccidental
andAugustine.
Aristotle
seeIrne
Rosier-Catach,
Aristotle's,
2 vols.(NewDehli,
andSignification
inSigns
evalSemantics',
, ed.H.S.Gill,andG. Manetti,
vol.II,41-62,
1999-2000),
esp.41-42.
24)Itisa well-known
value
oflinoftheepistemic
onthequestion
that
fact
position
Augustine's
for
in
he
denies
in
In
time:
the
De
over
X,
389,
34),
(written
e.g.
magistro
changed
signs
guistic
tolanwith
asa skeptic
usanything
andappears
toteach
ofwords
thecapacity
respect
example
in396),where
thenotion
inDedoctrina
Christiana
willbenuanced
Thisposition
(written
guage.
trinitate
In
the
De
for
a
more
finds
oflinguistic
,
II,
31,
48).
(see
appreciation example
positive
sign
De
trinitate
word
nullius
inner
of
the
the
XV,
10,
,
19)
{verbum
(mental)
linguae,
finally,theory
- 'linguistic'
here
ofthe"linguistic"
notion
a fully
dematerialized
shows
only
meaning
having
sign
form
ofmental
wasanearly
of
the
inner
word
that
asweacknowledgeAugustine's
insofar
theory
d'Ockham
DePlaton
Guillaume
intrieur.
Lediscours
seeClaude
onthis
Panaccio,
aspect,
language;
howfarifatall
istodetermine
inthepresent
19.Ourpoint
however,
(Paris,
1999),108-1
study,
totheskeptical
analternative
inDe dialctica
offers
andsignification
ofsigns
theory
Augustine's
inContra
acadmicos.
which
headopts
attitude
towards
sensibly-transmitted
knowledge

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46 (2008)123-154
L. Cesalli,
N. Germann

131

as a WayOut
1.2. Linguistic
Signification
Dialecticholdsa predominant
position,forAugustine,
amongstthelanguagedisciIt is nota descriptive,
but rathera reflexive
relatedor trivialsciences.25
to
in
value
of
reason
come
for
the
nature
and
of
the
it,
pline
highestorder;
relatedto spokenlanguage,but it is not
light.Dialecticis indeedessentially
"that
which
a
science:
sounds",saysAugustinein De diaprimarilyphonetic
lctica
, 5, "is not the concernof dialectics".26
However,withoutthatwhich
sounds,withoutthewords,therecould be no dialectics,at leastnot in the
of the
sensein whichthatdisciplineis presented
byAugustinein his treatise
samename:thedialcticais thescientiabenedisputando1
and thereis no dismeansfor
putewithoutwords.Thus thatwhichsoundsis an indispensable
thetwonotionsofsignum
andsignificatio
Therefore,
everydialectical
cognition.
in
a
role
treatise.
are
the
two
central
elements,
They
respecplay
Augustines
fromthat
tivelya materialvehicleand a relation,whichallowthetransition
to thatwhichdoes notsoundand is essenwhichsounds,and is notessential,
tialto dialectics.
Let us beginwithsignificatio
. Whatlevelsand entitiesareinvolved,accordin
to
the
semantic
famous
analysisoflanguage?The following
ing Augustine,
passagegivesa detailedanswerto thatquestion:
Nowthat
which
themind,
nottheears,
from
theword
andwhich
isheldwithin
perceives
themind
itself
iscalled
a dicibile.
Whena word
isspoken
notforitsownsakebutforthe
itiscalled
sakeofsignifying
a dictio.
Thething
itself
which
isneither
a word
else,
something
inthemind,
northeconception
ofa word
whether
ornotithasa word
itcanbe
bywhich
iscalled
buta resintheproper
sense
ofthename.
these
four
Therefore,
signified,
nothing
aretobekept
distinct:
theverbum
andtheres.2*
, thedicibile
, thedictio
25)SeeAurelius
Deordine
89-137
, ed.W.M.Green
(Turnhout,
1970),
[=CCSL29];
Augustinus,
ibid.,
II, 13,38.
26)Augustine,
Dedialctica,
5 [ed.Pinborg,
88.18].
27)SeeAugustine,
Dedialctica
, 1,1.
28)Augustine,
Dedialctica,
Latin
text
For
5 [transi.
89-91];
[ed.Pinborg,
88.5-90.9].
Jackson,
a detailed
onthedistinction
between
dictio
andres,
seeHansRuef,
verbum,
dicibile,
commentary
ber
Semiotik
undSprache.
"DedialczuAugustins
Augustin
Sprachtheoretische
Analysen
Schrifi
"
tica
M.
Ancient
Rist,
(Bern,
1981),82-115;
John
Augustine. Thought
Baptized
(Cambridge,
DieSpur
desZeichens.
DasZeichen
undseine
inder
Funktion
23-40;
Meier-Oeser,
1994),
Stephan
desMittelalters
undder
Neuzeit
York,
(Berlin-New
1997),7-13;KlausKahnPhilosophie
frhen
derZeichen?
ber
ert,
(Amsterdam,
1999),9-11and35-45;Ch.
Entmachtung
Augustin
Sprache
of
The
toAugustine,
ed.NorKirwan,
Philosophy
Augustines
Language', Cambridge
Companion
manKretzmann
andEleonore
G. Manetti,
Leteorie
del
2001),186-204;
Stump
(Cambridge,
nell'antichit
classica
(Milano,
1987),226-229.
segno

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N. Germann
/Vivarium

as its
in thematerial,spokenword(verbum),
The mindperceivessomething
from
itself
is
different
A
with
a
verbum
content.
coupled
significate
intelligible
which
in
dicibile
thencalleda dictio.Thatwhichis perceived thedictiois the
,
fromthe extraand mustbe distinguished
is onlyintellectually
perceptible
mentalobject,namelythe res. Such intellectual
perceptionof an intelligible
contentin or froma materialobjectsuch as a wordis nothingotherthan
thatsoundspresentsthemindwithsomeWheneversomething
significano.
that
then
to
be
soundingthingis at thesametimea signum
cognized,
thing
a sign:
tothemindsomething
indicates
sensed
andwhich
which
is itself
A signis something
thesignitself.29
beyond
The spokenwordas signis theobjectof a twofoldperceptionwithrespeccontents:on the one hand, the soundingword itselfis the
tivelydifferent
content,or
object of sense perception;on the otherhand, the intelligible
intellectual
of
the
is
the
it
dicibile
, transmitted
perceptionof the
by
object
.
animus
or
mind,
in Contraacadmicos
discussionofskepticism
presJustas theAugustinin
- namely,insistenceon the possibilityof human
ents a Stoic component
- so too mustAugustinin
dialecticsbe considthetruth
beingsdiscovering
thetriadsemaiof
whether
The
eredin thelightofitsStoicsources.30 question
29)Augustine,
text
Dedialctica,
5 [transi.
86.10].lheconcep[ed.Pinborg,
87];Latin
Jackson,
- a viewthat
a standard
was
not
seems
natural
asa sign
tionoftheverbum
position
today
very
arerather
andStoictraditions,
InthePeripatetic
inthephilosophy
ofantiquity.
{semeia)
signs
assigns
tospeak
ofwords
isnotthefirst
orpremises,
andifAugustine
(Plato,
indices,
symptoms,
asopposed
datum
asa signum
theword
himdidaswell),
before
Aristotle
andtheStoics
(verbum),
itis
ontheonehand,
defined
inAugustine
a newly
naturale
tosignum
,acquires
placeandvalue:
in
doctrina
Christiana
De
will
be
which
of
into
a
fully
developed
theorysigns
integrated general
value
ofthe
theepistemic
aslinguistic
theverbum
hand,
(II,1,1-3);ontheother
signconserves
On that
ofthesign(indication,
traditional,
premise).
symptom,
conception
pre-Augustinian
1-34andthepartofthe
DieSpurdesZeichens
seeMeier-Oeser,
(cit.n.28 above),
question,
- DerLehrer
De
in
Aurelius
Schulthess
Peter
,
written
Introduction
Augustinus,magistro
by
oflinFuhrer
annot.
anded.byTherese
2002),26-41.Ontheconception
introd.,
(Paderborn,
du
auxthories
introduction
seeC. Chiesa,
before
Smiosis-signes-symboles:
Augustine,
guistic
signs
Phro
onSigns',
'St.Augustine
etAvistte
dePlaton
1991),aswellasR.A.Markus,
(Berne,
signe
la
et
2.1(1957),60-83,esp.60-65,andJ.Ppin,
nesis
1976),
(Villanova,
Augustin dialectique
esp.77-86.
30)Besides
andSchulthess
Ruef
ofMeier-Oeser
thestudies
(cit.n.28above)
(cit.n.28above),
Stoic
seeB.Mates,
mentioned
1953),11-26.
above,
(cit.n.28above)
(Berkeley,
Logic

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46 (2008)123-154

133

semainoumenon
and tynchanon
noriy
,31in whichthesecondtermis thefamous
in
lekton
stands
the
ofthedistinction
madebyAugustine
between
,
background
verbum
(or dictio
), dicibileand reshas beendiscussedat lengthin Augustinin
studies.32
However,whatseemsto havegone unnoticedin previousresearch,
is the similarity
betweenthe Augustinindefinition
of sign and the Stoic
notionofa presentation
orphantasiaPHereis one ofthemaindoxographical
sourcesforthatnotion:

31)Sextus
theLogicians
thelektor
, II, 11.Astheconcerned
reveals,
Empiricus,
Against
passage
thedicibile
andtheir
medieval
enuntiabile
anddictum
tothose
kinds
of
correspondents
belong
entities
thatassume
theroleofspecific,
semantic
correlates
oflinguistic
non-material,
expresonthispoint,
seeL. Cesalli,
Leralisme
etontologie
desproposisions;
propositionnel.
Smantique
tions
chez
DunsScot
Richard
etJean
, Gauthier
Jean
Paris,
2007),34-36.
Burley,
Brinkley
Wyclif(
32)Seeforexample
Meier-Oeser
12sq.),whohimself,
likeRuef(cit.n.28
(cit.n.28 above,
108sq.),doesnotseeintheStoiclekton
theequivalent
ofthedicibile
above,
Colish
,while
(cit.,
n. 13above,
vol.I, 329sq.),Manetti
thetranslator
ofDe
(cit.n.28above,
227)andJackson,
dialctica
ofthecontrary,
seeB.D.Jackson,
'TheTheory
ofSigns
inSt.Augustines
,areconvinced
De doctrina
Revue
desEtudes
15(1969),9-49,esp.47 sq.Themain
christiana'
Augustiniennes
theaffinity
between
lekta
anddicibilia
area) that
dicibilia
aremental
entities
arguments
against
whereas
lekta
arenot,sincetheStoics
conceived
ofthought
asbeing
are
material;
b)thatlekta
that
which
issignified,
while
toAugustine,
that
which
are
according
linguistic
expressions
signify
resandnotdicibilia'
dicibilia
entail
thepossibility
ofbeing
saidandthus
must
beprior
to
c)that
actual
verbal
whereas
lekta
areconsequences
ofverbal
Onthat
see
expressions
expressions.
point,
G.Nuchelmans,
Theories
Ancient
andMedieval
oftheProposition.
Concepts
oftheBearer
ofTruth
andFalsity
to
assert
the
of
(Amsterdam-London,
1973),116sq. Farfrom
wanting
identity
lekton
anddicibile
fortheclaim
that
thetwoentities
haveremarkable
, wewishtoargue
characincommon:
teristics
bothrepresent
that
which
isneither
a linguistic
d)they
e)
signnora thing;
both
are
linked
mental
themind
thedicibile
they
essentially with
activity:
perceives
(Augustine);
themind
andcontains
thelekton
Asforthearguments
contra
adduced
above
(Stoics).
grasps
observations
canbemade:1.Thedicibile
isnota thought
butrather
that
(a-c),thefollowing
which
wegrasp
a mental
act- anintelligible
content
which,
, must
through
justlikethelekton
beimmaterial.
2.Thatlekta
aresignified
canbeunderstood
asthefact
that
aretheimmedithey
atecorrelate
ofspoken
words
as
dicibilia
but
that
does
not
meanthat
ourlinguistic
are),
(just
donotultimately
wesay'Dioniswalking,
wedefinitely
intend
(when
expressions
signify
things
tosaysomething
about
a human
andnotabout
a lekton
oflekton
indeed
). 3. Thenotion
being
entails
anactual
useoflinguistic
himself
notes
but,asMeier-Oeser
(cit.n.28above,
expressions,
ofinternal
ormental
offers
ananswer
12,n.58),theStoicnotion
tothat
speech
objection.
33)Although
- Jackson
thecommentators
ofAugustine's
De dialctica
Ruef
(cit.n.32 above),
Meier-Oeser
Schulthess
(cit.n.28above),
Kahnert
(cit.n.28above),
(cit.n.31above),
(citn.
Kirwan
30above),
Markus
Rist(cit.
(cit.n.30above),
(cit.n.31above),
(cit.n.31above),
Ppin
- stress
n.30above)
andColish
theStoic
ofAugustines
(cit.n.13above)
semantics,
background
nonehaspointed
outthat
definition
ofsign
inDedialctica
shows
similarities
Augustines
striking

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46 (2008)123-154

inthepsyche,
Apresentation
isa happening
that
occurs
both
andthat
which
displaying
itself
what
hasoccurred
it.Forexample,
when
vision
we
lookuponsomething
caused
white,
by
isanaffect;
ofthis
affect
wecansaythat
inthepsyche
theactofseeing
andbecause
through
isa white
that
itimplies
there
mine].34
[italics
object
The similarity
appearsevenmoreclearlyifwe comparetheabove-quotedpasof thedefinition
sagefromAetiuswiththeother,moredetailedformulation
christian#.
ofsignthatAugustinegivesin De doctrina
cometomind,
besides
the
which
ofitself
makes
someother
Fora signisa thing
thing
that
itpresents
tothesenses.35
impression
betweendefinientes
Do we have here a mere similarity
, the Augustinin
orarethedefinienda
ofa presentation,
ofsignandtheStoicdefinition
definition
We wishto suggestthatthereis morethana terminologithemselves
similar?
of objects.The Stoic
but certainly
cal resemblance,
nothinglikean identity
as
the
.36So the
sort
of
is
not
the
same
signum
thing
Augustinin
phantasia
motivahave
been
the
to
be
raised
as
to
what
could
has
philosophical
question
intohis definition
of signan elementof the
tionforAugustineto integrate
astowhat
thiscouldmean
thequestion
. Asa consequence,
with
theStoicnotion
ofphantasia
in
the
literature.
Schulhas
not
been
addressed
of
truth
s
for
conception
philosophical
Augustine
between
theStoicinferential
thedifference
forexample
thess
32-38)stresses
(cit.n.28 above,
notion
ofsign
ofaninference)
andtheAugustinin
istheantecedent
ofsign(a semeion
notion
the
Henotes
however
anditssignificate.
a linguistic
asa relation
between
(p.38),that
expression
inDe
inAugustine's
definitions
ispresent
notion
oftheinferential
given
sign"
"epistemic-logical
a type
ofphantasia
Christiana.
Ruef
andDe doctrina
dialctica
108)mentions
(cit.n.28above,
on
while
which
is
an
5
the
,
chapter
impression)
commenting
expressible
(namely phantasia
logike
tothedicibile
andnot
tosuggest
a Stoiccorrespondent
ofDedialctica
, buthedoessoinorder
ofsign.
inconnection
with
definition
Augustine's
34)Aetius,
Phantasia
Sandbach,
10];greek
(cit.n. 17above),
Piatita,
IV,12[transi.
Katalptik
vol.
4
I.
von
vols.
ed.
veterum
text'Stoicorum
2,21
Armin,
,
1903-1924),
(Teubner,
fragmenta
(n.54)].
35)Aurelius
Dedoctrina
Christiana
,ed.andtransi,
(Oxford,
1995),
byR.P.H.Green
Augustinus,
CCSL
ed.J.Martin
1-167
57.Latintext:
[=
32];ibid.II, 1,1 [CCSL32,
1962),
(Turnhout,
32.5-7].
36)Asa matter
viaa spetothesenses
canbepresented
that
a signum
isa corporeal
offact,
thing
which
a corporeal
isrepresented
that
isprecisely
while
a phantasia
(thecorcies,
thing
through
which
the
that
is
be
the
to
the
would
element
,
corporeal
thing
phantaston
signum
responding
between
a phantasia
andthatof
arecausalrelations
there
thephantasia
causes
). Furthermore,
andthat
a signum
arenosuchrelations
between
there
isa phantasia
a phantasia
which
, while
isnatural.
andrepresentation
isconventional
which
a signum
language
signifies:

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46 (2008)123-154

135

- thiselement
Stoicdefinition
ofphantasia
ofthetwo
beingthecombination
momentsofreflexivity
and transitivity
ofsomething
(sf-ostentatio)
(ostentado
was to
else). In short,we believethatAugustinesreasonforthisintegration
- in
ensuretheepistemicvalueofwords- thatis of linguistic,
sensiblesigns
orderto tempertheratherskepticaloutcomeof the Contraacadmicos?1
But
whyand howcan thenotionofphantasiahelpto achievethisgoal?
As to the firstquestion,the centralroleplayedby thephantasiain Stoic
offers
a plausibleanswer.It is thepivotalnotionin theexplanaepistemology
tionof knowledgeand itsfoundationin senseperception.38
Aboveall, as we
haveseen(p. 5 sq.), theStoiccriterion
oftruthis nothingotherthana peculiar
kindof presentation,
theso calledcomprehensive
orphantasia
presentation
In
.
kataleptike linkinghisconceptionofthesignto theStoicnotionofpresen- they
to providelinguistic
tation,Augustine
areat
displayshisintention
signs
- withan essentialepistemicvalue.
stakein theDe dialctica
- a briefcomAs to thesecondquestion- howis thisgoal to be achieved?
parisonis requiredbetweentheroleplayedbythespeciesofa signin Augustines analysisofsignification
and theroleplayedbythephantasiaofa thing
in theStoics analysisofsenseperception.When I seea tree,forexample,my
mindis affected
(orphantasia)suchthatI knowthatthere
bya presentation
is, in the externalworld,a materialobjectwhichhas caused mypresentation,namelythe treeI am now seeing:perceptionis a sense-basedcausal
inferencethat informsme about the actual presenceof an object in the
externalworld.When I understand
thespokenword'arbor- thatis, when
thiswordsuccessfully
functions
as a signforme- mymindis affected
bya
4
of
the
word
arbor
such
I
that
know
that
this
word
refers
to
a
kindof
species
naturalthing,namelya plant composedof a trunk,branchesand leaves:
is a sense-basedepistemicinferencethatdoes not informme
signification
about the presenceof anythingin the externalworld beyondthe sound
"arbor"itself,39
but rathergives me access to a kind of mentalcontent

throughwhichI know to what kind of thingsthe word arbor refers.In

treesin the externalworldare the reswe speak
Augustininterminology:
37)Seeabove,
p.7 sq.
38)Seeforexample
The
andOpinions
Laertius,
,VII,49.
Diogenes
Lifes
ofEminent
Philosophers
39)There
isofcourse
thecaseofmaterial
vs.use),where
thesounding
(mention
supposition
word
isatthesametime
andsignificate
ofverbum
anddictio
inDe
(seethedifference
signifier
isa rather
case.Thecrucial
dialecticay
isthat
onecanusesuccessfully
5),butthis
particular
point
thesign'arbor
without
there
while
itisimpossible
normal
condiaround,
(under
anytree
being
toseea tree,
when
there
isnotree
Inshort,
around.
isnotrepresenting.
tions)
signifying

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46 (2008)123-154

aboutwhenwe correctly
use thesignumarbor and theyarealso thethings
we see,whenwe see trees.Whereasthatwhichthesignumarbor showsto
mymindbeyonditselfis not a treein theexternalworld,but thedicibileI
4
can graspfromtheword arbor: "Now thatwhichthe mind,not theears,
perceivesin the word and whichis held withinthe mind itselfis called a
'
dicibile saysAugustinein De dialectical
To sum up: Augustinereachesthegoal of ensuringtheepistemicvalueof
ofsenseperceplinguistic
signsbytakingthebasicStoicexplanation-pattern
tion(self-ostentatio
/ostentatio
ofsomething
else)and makingitworkon two
different
levels.Whatwe gainthrough
is notinforontologically
signification
mationabouttheexistence
ofthematerial
causeofa presentation
we have,but
ratherknowledgeofsomeabstractor formalcriteria
the
bywhichto identify
we
are
about:
is
the
to
obtain
way
things
speaking
signification
intelligible
fromAugusverysignificantly
knowledgefroma sensibleobject.Thisdiffers
tinescontinually
reaffirmed
thevalueofsenseperception
pessimism
regarding
forcognitionof truth:if truthis to be knowable,thenthe contentof that
thelevelofsenseperception.
what
Thisis precisely
knowledgemusttranscend
thesignumas definedin De dialctica
and De doctrina
Christiana
is designedto
do. In termsoftheexamplegivenabove(seeinga tree/usingsuccessfully
the
in theexternal
word'arbor)theconclusion"thereis something
worldcausing
I presently
have"is mereinformation,
theimpression
whilethecontent"that
is a plantcomposedout of a trunk,
whichis causingmyactualimpression
branchesand leaves"is genuineknowledge(see p. 3 sq. above).
Thatis whytherealso can be linguistic
truth-bearers,
namely,
propositions,
is
and
whyargumentation possible,
whydialectics,thedisciplinadisciplinaIf all of theaboveis true,thenAugustine
s definition
of
rum,is meaningful.
a
as
well
as
his
of
can
be
seen
as
consepositive
conception signification
sign
in Contraacadmicos
ofskepticism
. At theend of this
quenceofhis criticism
Cicero-inspired
dialogue,thecognitionoftruthis confinedto thetwosterile
the twofold
realmsof subjectiveintrospection
and tautology,
nevertheless

40)Augustin,
In
De dialctica
, 5 [transi.
89-91];Latintext[ed.Pinborg,
88.5-90.9].
Jackson,
thedicibile
canbeseenasanearly
form
oftheverbum
nullius
ofverbum
cordis
that
sense,
linguae
withFreges
Sinndescribed
as
ofthelater
De trinitat
alsosomesimilarities
e,XVandpresents
ofthesignificate),
see
"eine
ArtdesGegebenseins
desBezeichneten"
(awayof"being-givenness"
undphilosophische
Kritik
100
G. Frege,
'berSinnundBedeutung',
Zeitschrift
frPhilosophie
(1892),25-50,
esp.26.

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L. Cesalli,
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137

natureof the linguisticsign- whichon the one hand is perceptible

by the
- now
content
themindwithan intelligible
sensesand on theotherpresents
a third,intermediate
domainin which
ofdelineating
opensup thepossibility
thedomainoflinguistic
truthcan be cognized,namely,
expressions.
Results
1.3. Interim
ofthegeneralskepdead-end
. DespiteAugustine
s rejection
(1) A philosophical
thediscussionof the
ticalclaimthatnothingcan be knownwithcertainty,
leads to a conclusionthatis itself
Academics'doctrinein Contraacadmicos
partially
skeptical:iftruthcan be known,thennot throughthesenses.The
of thisphilosophicalconclusionbecomesapparentifwe
'dead-end'character
observethe examplesprovidedof the sortof truthswhichare knowable
introspective,
privatetruthson the one hand,and analyticalor tautological
- providedone is notcontentto reducephilosophy
truths
on theother
either
to solipsismor mereformalism.
as a way out of skepticism.
(2) Thesignification
of linguistic
expressions
what
a
does
when
it
as a sign,
functions
correctly
sign ,
Signification,
linguistic
as definedbyAugustinein De dialctica
, makespossiblea semanticconception of truthforlinguisticexpressions.
Accordingto Augustine,a signis a
- se ipsumsensuiostendit
- and that
that
can
be
the
senses
perceivedby
thing
nevertheless
transmits
an intellectual
. In
knowledge aliquidanimoostendit
otherwords,thesignificatio
bridgesthegap betweenwhatis perceivedbythe
sensesand whatis perceived
Thisis achieved
bythemind,i.e.,theintelligible.
of
the
elements
from
the
Stoic
definition
of
by
integration
phantasiaintothe
definition
ofsign,thusproviding
valuein spite
linguistic
signswithepistemic
oftheirmaterial,
sensibleside:thesignificatio
makesa signum
.
outofa verbum
scientists
would
makes
Contemporary
computer
say: significatio
genuine
knowledgeout ofmereinformation.
Thewayoutofskepticism
offered
(3) Theneedforontological
by
foundation.
thesignification
oflinguistic
is
not
to
set
the
sufficient,
however,
expressions
semanticconceptionoftruthuponan entirely
stablefoundation.
Augustinin
describedas knowledgeof truth,thefactthat
For,in orderto be legitimately
as
sensible
ofthethingsto
signs
objectsprovideus withintelligible
knowledge
whichtheyconventionally
stillrequiresthefulfillment
ofa further
conrefer,
the
dition.That is, the ressignified
in
must
themselves
by
participate
signa
truth.Onlywithan examination
oftheontologicaltruthofsignifiable
objects
and theirperceivability
will the linguistic-semantic
of
the
relation
aspect
betweensignification
and truthreceivean entirely
stablefoundation.

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2. Why Thingsare SemanticallyTrue

advancestheopinionthatwhatexists,is true:"for
In hisSoliloquies
, Augustine
thatseemsto me to be truewhichis".41His reasonfindsnothingobjectionable
thatis,to res,overall,ontictruth.It is
in thisview,and thusascribesto reality,
thistruthof realitythatfoundsthe truthof linguistic
expressions,
precisely
as discussed
referto things(res).42
sincelinguisticexpressions
Furthermore,
aresigns(signa)and as sucharepartof a triadic
above,linguistic
expressions
From
and the thingsignified.
theirinterpreter
relationbetweenthemselves,
on
the
one
between
thisit followsthatone mustdistinguish
sharply
signs
thereare
hand and thingson theother.43
However,accordingto Augustine,
Butifthisis thecase,one must
also thingswhichareat thesametimesigns.44
and thus possessbeyondtheirontic
concludethattheyhave signification
one. So thereis thegeneralquestion
a
semantic
dimensiona further,
namely
to
in
which
stand
the
relation
of
truth,and themoreparticular
questhings
as wellas how,and
tionofwhatthingsthatareat thesametimesignssignify,
In short,then,it is thisconnectionbetweenthings,
withwhattruth-value.
willbe pursuedin thispartofthestudy.
that
and
truth
signification
one quickly
on reality,
In occupyingoneselfwithAugustinesreflections
to numa notablecharacteristic,
encounters
namelythecentralroleattributed
on
the
remarks
ber.In thefirstplace arehiswell-known
meaningof
general
numberforthe existenceof the sensibleworld,as forexamplein De libero
arbitrioII, 16, 42: "They[sc. the skyand the earthetc.,NG] have forms

41)Aurelius
libri
duo, ed.W.Hrmann
1986),3-98[=CSEL
(Wien,
Soliloquiorum
Augustinus,
Latin
text
[CSEL89,56.14sq.].
II,5,8 [mytranslation];
89];ibid.,
42)Cf.De dialctica
forthe
reisignum";
estuniuscuiusque
, 5 [ed.Pinborg,
86.7]:"Verbum
in
cf.
addition
in
the
truth
of
a
the
truth
of
of
foundation
reality,
Augusproposition
(objective)
videtur
utcognitori
estquoditasehabet
, II, 5,8 [CSEL89,55.18]:"Verum
tine,
Soliloquia
(...)"
43)Cf.De dialctica
animo
sealiquid
estquod(...) praeter
, 5 [ed.Pinborg,
86.8]:"Signum
vellatet"
velintelligitur
86.7
which
"sentitur
while
theresisthat
ostendit",
[ibid. sq.].
44)Cf.Augustine,
uelrerum
"Omnis
doctrina
Christiana
Dedoctrina
, I,2,2 [CCSL32,7.1-14]:
nuncresappelaui,
autem
sedrespersignadiscuntur.
estuelsignorm,
quaenonad
Proprie
cetera
estlignum
sicuti
(...).
adhibentur,
lapispecusatquehuiusmodi
aliquid
significandum
derebus
omnis
resedamsignum
II, 1,1 [ibid.,
est";ibid.,
32.1-3]:
"Quoniam
(...) nonautem
siquid
nonetiam
nisiquodsunt,
nequisineisadtenderet,
commonens
cumscriberem,
praemisi
Die SpurdesRichens
se significant
aliudpraeter
(cit.n. 28 above),
(...)". Cf.Meier-Oeser,
23-26and29.

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139

Taketheseaway,and nothingwillbe left",45

or in
becausetheyhavenumbers.
De musicaW, 17, 57: "Butifyoutakethese[sc.thenumbers,
NG] awayfrom
the earth,it will be nothing".46
Especiallyin the latterwriting,however,
expressions.
Augustinegoes clearlybeyondthesegeneraland also traditional
Therehe develops,with respectto things,a complextheoryof signsand
whichconsistsof two complementary
knowledge,
parts:on the partof the
a
model
of
and
and on thepartofthe
perception knowledge,
knowingsubject
of
an
as
well
as
semantic
ofthestrucobject knowledge ontological
grounding
The basisis in bothcasesthesameprinciple:number.
tureofreality.47
In viewof bothof thesecharacteristics
and the above-mentioned
central
of
of
this
the
our
will
be
as
follows.
The
invesstudy, procedure
question
part
will
with
an
examination
of
s
of
number
tigation begin
Augustineconception
and musicon thebasisofDe ordineand De musica
. Followingthis,thefocus
willturn,first
to hisnumerological
modelofperception
and knowledge,
and
secondto his ontologicalas wellas semanticfoundingof realityon thebasis
ofnumber.Lastly,
somemaincharacteristics
oftheconnection
betweenthings,
will
and
truth
be
set
out.
signification
2.1. Augustine's
Conception
ofNumberand Music
In thesecondbook of De ordine
, Augustinediscussesin detailthemeaning
and roleofnumberin therealmofthescientific
Therehe outlines
disciplines.
in an idealwaythedevelopment
of thesevenliberalarts,and describestheir
45)Aurelius
TheProblem
anded.M. Pontifex
, transi,
(NewYork,
Augustinus,
ofFreeChoice
Aurelius
De libero
arbitrio
, ed.W.M.Green
1955),123.Latintext:
(Turnhout,
Augustinus,
II, 16,42 [CCSL29,265.25sq.].
1970),211-321[=CCSL29];ibid.,
46)Aurelius
Demusica
liber
ed.andtransi.
Martin
V7,
(Stockholm,
2002);
Jacobsson
Augustinus,
text:
Aurelius
De musica.
Bcher
i undvi.Vom
ibid.,
VI,17,57,[ibid.,
113].Latin
Augustinus,
sthetischen
Urteil
zurmetaphysischen
ed.Frank
Hentschel
Erkenntnis,
2002),172.52.
(Hamburg,
Forfurther
aswellasliterature
cf.C. Horn,
derZahlen,
Revue
examples
Augustins
Philosophie
desEtudes
40
389.
389-415,
(1994),
Augustiniennes
esp.
47)ForDemusica
cf.A.Keller,
Aurelius
unddieMusik.
zu "Demusica"
Augustinus
Untersuchungen
imKontext
seines
inAugustinus,
De
1993);F.Hentschel,
Schrifitums
(Wrzburg,
'Einleitung',
musica.
Bcher
i undvi.(cit.n.46 above),
thephilosophical
relevance
of
p.vii-xxviii.
Though
- mainly
this
text
haslongbeenrecognized
andthough
ithasformed
theobject
ofseveral
studies
- itsimplications
from
anaesthetic
withrespect
toAugustines
ofsigns
and
perspective
theory
aregenerally
Hentschel
s "Einleitung"
where
heemphacf.,forexample,
signification
neglected,
sizestheepistemological
aswellas theological
ofourtext,
butdoesnotdrawa
implications
connection
toAugustine
s concept
ofsignification.
EveninKeller
s thorough
this
is
study
aspect
absent.

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"
functions.While he identifies
the task of the Triviumas recte
respective
thatof the Quadrivium48
as "beatecontemplar
i".49The
docere' he identifies
subjectofthelatteris things(res),and itsgoalconsistsin leadingone fromthe
beautyofsensiblethings,throughtheirformand measure,to theunderlying
number:
Thence
she[sc.reason,
intotherealm
ofthevisible
heaven
and,surveying
NG]advanced
thatnothing
other
andearth,
sensed
thanbeauty
waspleasing
toher,andwithin
that
andwithin
thoseforms,
andwithin
thosemeasures,
numbers
forms,
measures,
beauty,
[..J.50
thecoreof thetrivialarts,mathematics
(number),is
Justas logicrepresents
thatofthequadrivial.51
Whatthisconceptionimpliesfortheroleofnumber,
is thatit is to be graspedas themeansforlayingbarethefixedand universal
structure
of the universe,beyondthe characteristics
or conventionsof the
worldof appearance.Of significance
forthetopicof thisstudyis theactual
in theQuadrivium,namely,beauty.This a
objectregarded"mathematically"
as
detail
insofar
s conceptof beautyimpliesan agreenoteworthy
Augustine
mentwithmathematical
laws.52
Thischaracteristic
nevertheless
provesto be a
48)Augustine
inBoethius,
which
wasbrought
time
doesnotusethisterm,
De
upforthefirst
arithmetic
theterm
itself
onp. 11.64].
a>I, 1,64-130[CCSL94A,11-14;
49)Augustine
a threefold
functional
division
ofthose
"inwhich
fields
therationabile
develops
inparagraph
characterized
as"actsrelating
tosomegoal",
35.lhe first,
maybebest
appears"
asethics,
notbelonging
tothesciences
onwhich
described
intends
tofocus
inthe
Augustine
theother
whereas
twoarethe"theoretical"
cf.Augustine,
De ordine,
sciences,
II, 12,
following,
Theidentification
of"recte
with
docere"
theTrivium
and"beate
contem35 [CCSL29,127.1-6].
with
the
as
here
becomes
clear
the
of
Quadrivium
plar
suggested
against background
paraas a fielddealing
is introduced
withtheimposition
ofverbal
35-42.TheTrivium
graphs
cf.ibid.[ibid.,
andthetranslation
ofsignifications,
Thetransition
tothe
127.12-15].
expression
ispresented
asthedesire
ofratio
tocontemplate
thedivine
arts,
however,
beatitudes,
quadrivial
cf.ibid.,
129.1sq.].
II, 14,39 [ibid.,
50)Augustine,
Deordine
Latin
text
, II, 15,42 [my
translation];
[CCSL29,130.1-4].
51)Noone- soAugustine
- should
hisconviction
toa point
strive
fortheknowledge
sharpens
inthese
ofthesoulintheTrivium
contained
i.e.theself-knowledge
andtheknowledge
of
arts,
intheQuadrivium,
thisdouble
Godastheorigin
ofallthings
without
science
ofdialectics
and
cf.Augustine,
Deordine,
this
distincmathematics,
II,18,47[CCSL29,132.2-133.6].
Notably,
tionconcerning
thetwoapproaches
toknowledge
tothetwofold
task
ofphilosophy,
corresponds
cf.ibid.[ibid.,
"Cuius[sc.philosophiae
est,una
133.12-14]:
NG]duplex
disciplinae,
quaestio
deanima,
altera
dedeo.Prima
utnosmet
utoriginem
nostram".
efficit,
altera,
ipsosnouerimus,
52)Cf.,forthis,
Aurelius
unddieMusik
275sq.,whoalso
Keller,
(cit.n.47 above),
Augustinus
theconnection
andnumber;
forAugustine's
notion
ofbeauty,
cf.
stresses
between
beauty

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141

betweenthings,
necessaryconditionforhis conceptionof the relationship
as
will
now
be
and
demonstrated
signification truth,
throughtheexampleof
De musica
.
Music, as one of the quadrivialarts,concernsall acousticphenomena.
thestatusof thisobject:It is
Augustinepermitsno doubtto ariseregarding
notsubjectto thelimitations
and particularities
ofarbitrary
as is,
appearances
forinstance,language,butfollowsuniversally-valid
laws.Withrespectto the
oftheobjectofhisinvestigation,
at theendofthefirst
universality
Augustine,
that
the
and
laws
of
music
book, emphasizes
regularities
applyto motion
In thisway,he givesone to understandthatthe rules
(motus
) in general.53
in musicapplyto everything
uncovered
and corruption,
subjectto generation
thusto realityin general.54
Withregardto thenotionof res, thisconcepthas
consequences.'Res',accordingto this,meanseverything
far-reaching
appropriateas objectoftheQuadrivium,thatis,all natural'entitiescreatedbythe
is correct,
we mayfurther
conclude
One, or God.55And,ifthisinterpretation
thatall natural'things,
be theydiscrete
or continuous,
or
spatially temporally
structure
of motion.56
With respect
moved,are drivenby themathematical

A. Schmitt,
'ZahlundSchnheit
inAugustins
De musica
, vi',Wrzburger
Jahrbcher
fiirdie
NeueFolge16 (1990),221-237,
hereinparticular
W.Beier224-237;
Altertumswissenschaft.
numerosa.
ZuAugustins
desSchnen
undWeisheit
38
waltes,
, Wissenschaft
Aequalitas
Begriff
(1975),140-157.
53)Cf.,forexample,
Demusica
"Cumigitur
ad
, I, 13,28 [ed.Hentschel,
64.27-31]:
Augustine,
scientia
estbenemodulandi,
nonpossit
huius,
ipsamrationem
disciplinae
siquidem
negari
omnes
motus
(...)".
pertinere
54)Thisinterpretation
is further
corroborated
remarks
inDe ordine
where
his
byAugustines
even
than
the
one
here.
that
the
concept
appears farther-reaching
developed Byemphasizing
detected
arevalidnotonlyforarithmetic,
andmusic,
butastronomy
as
regularities
geometry,
well(thefourth
ofthequadrivial
healsoincludes
thesupra-lunar
motions
oftheheavenly
arts),
bodies.
alltheother
those
oftheplanets
arethe"most
and
motions,
constant",
"fixed",
Beyond
"ultimate".
Nonetheless
are
controlled
thesameforce,
dimensio
and
they
byexactly
namely
numerus
, cf.De ordine
, II, 15,42 [CCSL29,130.9-14].
55)Cf.,inthis
definition
ofresinDedialctica
86.7sq.],
connection,
, 5 [ed.Pinborg,
Augustines
toabove,
referred
"Resestquidquid
velsentitur,
velintelligitur,
p.16,n.43;therelevant
passage:
vellatet".
Iftheinterpretation
hereiscorrect,
the"latent"
cannot
beGod,as
presented
things
in
a
medieval
in
his
n.
"Sciuntur
125
notes,
V,
2):
suggested
quoted
byPinborg
gloss
p. (Chapter
sentiuntur
enimcorporalia,
latet
[sic,NG;onemight
instead]
expect
spiritalia,
intelliguntur
vero
materia".
ipsedeusetinformis
56)With
thischaracterization,
werefer
tothefamous
definition
ofthequadrivial
establisharts,
local
movement
and
local
rest
as
the
multitudo,
,
see,
ing
magnitudo
respective
subject-matters,
forthis,
Dearithmetica,
Boethius,
I, 1,4 [CCSL94A,10.39-1
1.43].

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to the underlying
mathematical
we alreadyhave seen that
laws,moreover,
is
convinced
of
their
and
Augustine
rationality reliability:
Butthat
oneandtwoshould
notbethree,
andthat
twoshould
notbetwice
asmuch
asone,
noneofthedeadwasable,noneoftheliving
isable,nofuture
manwillbeabletobring
about.57
Theselawsofmathematics,
aresubjectto no change,
accordingto Augustine,
but remaineverstableand are intelligible.58
With thesecharacteristics,
i.e.
and rationality,
to the
however,
stability
theypartakeofa feature
prerequisite
Withrespectto thequestionpursued
acquisitionofknowledgeand certainty.
it
is
crucial
to
notice
here,
that,accordingto our author,thesemathematical
laws inhereto natural'things.For thismeansthatthereis in the sensible,
- can
extra-mental
worldan intelligible
which- whenperceptible
structure
provideone with certainknowledge.Hence, the questionsarise,first,of
whether
s conceptofperception
and knowledgecontainsan explaAugustine
nationforhow man can extracttheselaws fromsense-data,and, second,
whetherthisknowledgeconsistsofmorethana tautological,
emptytruth.
2.2. Augustines
ModelofPerception
and Knowledge
In ordernow to shiftto Augustine
s modelofperception
and knowledge,
we
mustfirstrecallhis conceptionof thosekindsof objectswhichare able to
transmit
As demonstrated
in thefirst
knowledge.
partofthisstudy,
Augustine
is convincedthatitis possibleformanto attainknowledge.
to him,
According
57)Augustine,
De musica
text
138.58,VI,12,35 [transi.
77];Latin
[ed.Hentschel,
Jacobsson,
'ZahlundSchnheit'
Schmitt,
62]. Cf.,in thisconnection,
(cit.n. 52 above),224 sq.,
whodiscusses
notion
ofnumber
andemphasizes
itsbothrational
anddynamic
Augustine's
character.
58)Forthemathematical
lawsandproportions,
cf.Augustine,
Demusica
,1,11,19[ed.Hentschel,
utquasnobis
certas
monstraverint
48.34sq.]:"() numros,
I, 12,
(. . .)";ibid.,
fixasque
leges
"Recte
istos
tres
numerus
eiquippe
tribui23 [ibid.,
56.123-126]:
igitur
quaternarius
sequitur,
turistaproportione
collatio.
eoiamassuesce
valeat,
Quaequantum
quodiliaunitas
cognoscere,
in
rebus
ordinatis
hac
una
effici
for
similar
such
as
thevisofthe
notions,
(...)
(...)";
potest
numbers
andthelexoriusaequalitatis,
cf.Augustine,
Demusica,
1,11,18[ibid.,
46.8]:"Namque
istavisnumero
inest
"Unde(...), nisiaequalitatis
VI, 10,27 [ibid.,
(...)"; ibid.,
124.49-54]:
iure
dominanti
"Cur(...), nisi(...) aequalitatis
( . . .)";ibid.[ibid.,
126.61-64]:
lege( . . .)".With
to
character
of
the
stable
and
self-identical
cf.
der
number,
Horn,
respect
Augustins
Philosophie
Zahlen(cit.n.46above),
toDelibero
389,396sq.(referring,
here,
arbitrio,
II,7,15- II,8,20).
thisaspect,
cf.alsoDe ordine,
aswellas Contra
II, 19,50 [CCSL29,134.24-27],
Regarding
acadmicos
n.20).
III,11,24,andIII,13,29(seeabove,
p.7 with

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L. Cesalli,
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143

boththeobjectsofknowledgeand thesignificata
oflinguistic
are
expressions
res.59
This meansthatmotionis generally
suitedto functionas an objectof
In
since
it
is
a
order
to
explainhow men can cognize
knowledge,
thing.
as
the
mathematical
structure
of motion,
and
number
motion,
ultimately
in De musicabetweendifferent
typesof numbers,
Augustinedifferentiates
with
numeri
at
the
level
of
the
physicalworld,and probeginning
corporales
iudiciales
at
the
level
of
the
to
numeri
human
intellect.
Thosekindsof
ceeding
in theprocess
next
to
the
numeri
are
of
numbers
which,
,
importance
corporales
of perception,Augustinecalls numerioccursores^
numerirecordabiles
and
numeri
sensuales
, all ofwhichbelongto thehumansoul.60
in thisconnectionarenumerioccursores
Of essentialsignificance
, sincethey
standat theinterface
of sensiblephenomenaon thepartof theextra-mental
on thepartoftheperceiving
worldand sensory
perception
subject.Augustine
devotesa greatdeal of space in De musicato explaininghow thesenumbers
function.As analysisof the passagein questionshows,the purposeof his
is to pointout thefactthatsenseperception
extensive
is an active,
explication
mentalprocess,and thatthismentalactnecessarily
containsa "quasi-rational"
Thisreveals,however,
thatAugustineconceivesof bothreality
component.61
59)EveninDe magistro
maintains
hismost
the
, where
Augustine
pessimistic
position
regarding
of
for
he
does
not
the
expressions
deny possibility
significance
linguistic
transmitting
knowledge,
ofcognition
assuch,
De magistro
cf.,forexample,
, ed.K.-D.Daur(Turnhout,
1970),157-203
"Etidmaxime
tibinitor
X,34sq.[CCSL29,193.153-194.171]:
[=CCSL29];ibid.,
persuadere
discere
cumremipsam
uerbis
alienis
didici,
(...), nosnihil
(...), pereasigna,
(...). Nonenim,
sedoculis
meis(. . .)";cf.,inthisconnection,
DieSpuries
Zeichens
credidi,
Meier-Oeser,
(cit.
n.28above),
with
tothequotation
inquestion,
13-20,
ibid.,17-19.
regard
60)There
isyetonelastspecies
ofnumbers,
numeri
inthehierarchy
between
progressons,
falling
numeri
recordabiles
andnumeri
sensuales.
toAugustine,
form
thebasisforthe
they
According
ofsonus
On numeri
andtheir
cf.Augustine,
De
function,
(ormotus).
production
progressons
musica
Forfurther
discussion
andliterature
with
to
,VI,3,4 [ed.Hentschel,
74.2-76.25].
regard
thesixdifferent
ofnumbers,
cf.Keller,
Aurelius
unddieMusik
(cit.n. 47
species
Augustinus
257-262;
Hentschel,
above),
(cit.n.47above),
'Einleitung'
p.xix-xxvi.
61)Perception,
toAugustine's
means
thebehaviour
ofthesoultowards
according
explanation,
Ifthese
received
stimuli.
stimuli
aremathematically
harmoniproportionate,
they
correspond
toitsownmathematically
ruled
thenumeri
Inthiscase,thesoulperoccursores.
numbers,
cally
ceives
with
with
otherwise
thesoul's
"reaction"
areinboth
pleasure,
pain.Theratio
underlying
casestherational
lawsofmathematics,
which
iswhy
itsactivity
ischaracterized
as"quasi-rational"intheabove
ForAugustine's
cf.especially
De musica
, VI,5,9
interpretation.
explanation,
cf.ibid.,VI, 5, 10,[ibid.,
sive
[ed.Hentschel,
88.31-90.77];
90.58-62]:
"(...) hasactiones,
faciles
sivedifficiles
nonearnlatere,
ethoc
convenientiam,
inconvenientiam,
propter
propter
totum
dicitur".
'ZahlundSchnheit'
est,quodsentire
Cf.,inthisconnection,
Schmitt,
(cit.
n.52above),
theactive
roleofthesoulinthispart
ofthepercep225sq.,whoalsoemphasizes
tion-process.

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and humanperception
structured:
(and finally:
knowledge)as isomorphically
the
laws
of
mathematics
at
this
Hence, already
{numerus).
by
very
pointwe
can assumethatthisisomorphism
providesthe meansby whichAugustine
willexplainthecognizability
ofextra-mental
things.
Thisinterpretation
findsadditionalconfirmation
in a further
characteristic,
in
sensuales
. The roleofthistypeofnumber
arising connectionto thenumeri
is, accordingto Augustine,to judge whetheror not a perceivedmotionis
i.e. structured
lawsdescribedin
proportionate,
accordingto themathematical
thefirst
bookofDe musica
:
... a fifth
kind[sc.ofnumbers,
inthenatural
exists
of
NG]. . .,a kindwhich
judgement
when
wearedelighted
ofrhythms
oroffended
when
a mistake
perception,
bytheequality
ismade
inthem.
ForI donotdespise
that
oursense
would
nothave
beenable
your
opinion
toperform
this
without
somerhythms
init.62
hidden
having
are a measurewhichthesoul
Accordingto thispassage,thenumerisensuales
nature.
Sense
meansto comparethe
possessesby
perception,
consequently,
motionof an extra-mental
with
this
measure.
Whereaspleasureis the
thing
effect
ofan accordperceivedbythesoul betweenthenumerological
structure
of an extra-mental
and
its
inborn
results
from
dismeasure,
thing
rejection
The
natural
consists
in
agreement.
judgement,
correspondingly,
precisely this
act of uncoveringthe relationshipbetweenthe "external"and respective
62)De musica
text[ed.Hentschel,
seealsoibid.
,VI,4, 5 [transi.
17];Latin
76.3-8];
Jacobsson,
velabhorrendo
naturali
iureferre
78.14sq.]:"(.) velannuendo
senten[ibid.,
quasiquodam
naturale
illudiudicium
tiam";
ibid.,
VI,7,18[ibid.,
104.32]:
"(.) nectarnen
(. . .)".Augustine
alludes
tothis
offormulation
inbookI,cf.,forexamkind
(and,consequently,
already
concept)
10
28.18
"Natura
id
fieri
omnibus
dedit
sensum
5,
I,
audiendi,
[ibid.,
ple,
sq.]:
puto,
quae
quo
istaiudicantur".
thisbackground,
reason
for
to these
Against
Augustine's
initially
referring
numeri
sensuales
asnumeri
iudiciales
which
helater
reserved
for
intellectual
(a term
strictly
judge- Horn,Augustins
intherealm
ofrational
becomes
clear.
der
ment,
knowledge)
Philosophie
thenumeri
Zahlen(cit.n.46 above),
sensuales
with
thesensus
a concept
to
401,links
interior
in
which
often
refers
his
in
with
the
connection
Augustine
philosophical
particularly
writings,
"innate"
ofanimals
toproduce
orhoneycapacity
beautifully-ordered
things,
e.g.,nids(birds)
combs
cf.De ordine
cf.alsoAugustines
that
, II, 19,49 [CCSL29,134.6-9];
(bees),
emphasize
theiudicium
naturale
is"nonratione
sednatura"
, I,2,3;ed.Hentschel,
{Demusica
72.37).Thus
heclearly
connects
these
"innate"
numbers
with
therationes
seminales
ofDediversis
quaestionibus
- An
Ixxxiii
therational,
with
divine
order
oftheuniverse.
, q. 46 (Deideis
), andconsequently
identification
ofthenumeri
sensuales
with
thesensus
interior
ismoreover
bySchmitt,
suggested
'ZahlundSchnheit'
underlines
the"quasi
rationale
Akte
231,whosimilarly
(cit.n.52above),
intheprocess
derSeele"
ofperception,
and233.Cf.alsoDelibero
arbitrio
ibid.,
227-230,
, II,3,
8,25-11,
4, 13,51[CCSL29,240.38-246.10].

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145

"internal"numbers.As thisjudgementis basedon number,it is also "quasirational"althoughthenumerisensuales

themselves
arestillassignedto theact
ofperception
and notto actualintellectual
knowledge.
The measurein reference
to whichmenjudge "naturally",
Augustineusucalls
dimensio
or
mensura
.
this
dimensio
or
mensura
also necessarily
ally
Again
this
time
on
the
side
of
the
of
To disimpliesrationality,
object perception.63
cernagreement
withmensura
meansto uncoverthebeautyof thisobject.By
however,
'beauty',
Augustineunderstands
nothingotherthanthe numeroto
structure
inherent
a
which
obeysthe lexaequalitatisand is
logical
thing
whichis to say,mathematical.
Thusarisesmans
rational,
consequently
strictly
naturalgift,his iudiciumnaturale
, the bridgebetweensensorily-perceptible
thingsand intellectual
knowledge.64
Theseobservations
render
visiblea decisivecharacteristic
ofAugustine
s comthatman,in orderto be able to perceiveat
plextheory,
namelyhisconviction
all, mustpossessan "innate"or "natural"abilityfora "quasi-rational"
judgement.This"quasi-rational"
formstheindispensable
conditionofthe
judgement
to differentiate
fromdisproportionate
motions,andhence
ability
proportionate
to detectthenumerological
structure
inherent
to things.65
modelof
Augustines
and
thus
an
to
numerological
perception knowledge represents attempt provide
a theory
to explicate
hisaforementioned
conviction
thatperception,
it
although
relieson thesenses,is nevertheless
a rationally-founded
act.
Let us pursueAugustinesepistemological
modela litdefurther
still.Since
contains
a
moment
of
on
the
level
of
perception
judgmentalready
sensory
perof motions,66
ception,namelya naturaljudgement'of theproportionedness
63)Forexample,
De musica
istosrationabiles
, I, 11,18 [ed.Hentschel,
46.1-3]:"() omnes
id estquiad sesehabent
numerorum
motus,
dimensionem";
ibid.,I, 11,19 [ibid.,
aliquam
adcertum
modum
rationem,
"() illam
46.27-29]:
quae(...) revocat
formamque
praescribit
641
Fortheconnection
between
number
andrationality,
cf.thequotations
andreferences
beauty,
n.
with
52.
above,
17-19,
p.
65)According
tothis,
hemoreover
thetransistion
from
sensible
toknowledge
of
places
things
their
structure
ona thoroughly
rational
basis.Fora similar
cf.Schmitt,
'Zahlund
conclusion,
Schnheit'
that
duetoAugustine's
ofnumeri
233;Schmitt
(cit.n.52above),
emphasizes
concept
iudiciales
numbers
which
will
later
call
numeri
sensuales
there
is
no
absolute
(those
),
Augustine
therealm
ofrationality
andthatofthesenses,
"daja derSinnselbst
schon
eine
gapbetween
rationale
insichenthlt".
still
isprerational,
itaccords
toratio
Komponente
perception
Though
Tothiswemaynowaddthatalsobetween
therealm
ofsensory
andreality
(ibid.).
perception
there
isnoabsolute
virtue
of
their
gapby
isomorphy.
66)Thisexpression
willhenceforth
beusedinthesense
ofaccordance
with
thelawsofmathematics'.
himself
sometimes
falls
backonthenotion
ofproportio
inthisconnection.
Augustine

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numeri
iudiciales
to be functions
of
proveon thelevelofintellectual
knowledge
thepreceding
naturaljudgements.
aboutjudgements:
Theyarejudgements
ButI formypartbelieve
that
whenthisverse,
which
weputforth,
issung,
Deuscreator
omnium
itwith
these
andevaluate
itwith
some
and
,we[. . .]enjoy
others,
judicial
rhythms
that
wepassanother,
more
sentence
with
those
more
hidden
onthis
certain,
rhythms
pleawhich
thesentence
ofthose
sure,
is,sotospeak,
judicial
rhythms.67
or not
Accordingto this,thetaskofthenumeriiudicialesis to decidewhether
thenaturaljudgementpassedon a thingis adequateor not,whichis to say
whetherthe observedproportionedness
is ^//-proportioned.68
Althoughat
thispointit stillremainsunclearwhatexactlyAugustinehas in mind,we can
establishthathe linkstheperception
ofthingsand naturaljudgementregardwithyeta further
structure
measure,one which(at
ing theirmathematical
leastmetaphysically)
precedesnaturaljudgement.
Withrespectto thesubjectofknowledge,
namelythehumansoul,Augus- fromthesensorypertineis now able to explaintheprocessof knowledge
ceptionof reality,
throughthe "quasi-rational"
agreementor disagreement
withtheperceivedstructures
inherentto reality,
up to a rationaljudgement
this
structure
and
the
natural
regarding
judgement.Howeverto whatextent
theobjectofknowledge
itself and thusreality
and itsallegedly
mathematical
- is ontologically
structure
secured,remainsto be seen; as does thelocus of
thatmeasureaccordingto whichthisstructure
is judgedto be well-proportioned.In thisconnection,thequestionmustalso be dealtwithof whether
thisstructure
possessesanyfurther
signification.
Foundation
and theSignification
2.3. TheOntological
ofReality
ofItsStructure
The clearestreference
to thatmeasurewhichunderlies
ofthesecjudgements
- the numeriiudiciales
- occursin De musicaVI, 11, 29, where
ond order
67)Augustine,
Demusica
text
,VI,9,23[transi.
57];Latin
[ed.Hentschel,
116.15-21];
Jacobsson,
"... etaliudest
- 120.54]:
seealsoibid.,
118.48
recte
ansecus
utrum
VI,9,24 [ibid.,
aestimare,
istadelectent,
quodfitratiocinando".
68)Obviously,
thissecond
order
reflects
thedefinition
ofmusic
judgement
presented
byAugustineinbookI ("Musica
estscientia
bene
Demusica
6.10;my
modulandi",
, I,2,2;ed.Hentschel,
itscharacterization
as "bene";
foraninterpretation
ofthemeaning
ofthis
emphasis),
namely
cf.thefollowing
section.
theepitet
cf.alsoKeller,
bene,
"well-proportionedness",
Regarding
Aurelius
unddieMusik
253;cf.,incontrast,
Hentschel,
(cit.n.47above),
Augustinus
'Einleitung
xiii
Our
which
tends
more
(cit.n.47 above),
p. sq.
interpretation,willbepresented
shortly,
towards
Keller
s view.

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147

the divineorderas the last instancein reference

to
Augustinecharacterizes
whichtheadequacyofproportions
be
determined:
may
Butwhat
issuperior
inwhich
that
thehighest,
eternal
unshakeable,
except
unchangeable,
where
there
isnotime,
because
there
is nochange,
andfrom
which
the
exists,
equality
times
arecreated
andsetinorder
inimitation
andmodified
ofeternity,
while
thecelestial
rotation
returns
tothesameplaceandrecalls
thecelestial
bodies
tothesameplaceand
the
and
months
and
and
lustra
and
the
other
orbits
ofthestars
years
through days
obeys
thelawsofequality
andunity
andorder?69
The principleofall thingsand theirstructures
formsthesumma
consequently
with God.70This has far-reaching
conse, which is identifiable
aequalitas
for
our
it
be
concluded
from
this
that
the
existence
First,
quences
topic.
may
of thingsand theirstructures
is ontologically
foundedin thesummaaequalitas7l Beyondthisit becomesevidentthatthecompositionofthesestructures
is actuallya mathematical
one: everything
thatexistsfollowsthelegesaequalitatisetunitatis.Henceitcan,in principle,
be recognized
bythelikewisemathhuman ratio in its proportionality.72
While the
ematically-structured
69)Augustine,
Demusica
text
,VI,11,29 [transi.
67];Latin
[ed.Hentschel,
128.8-15].
Jacobsson,
Fora detailed
oftheroleofordo
inDe musica
cf.Keller,
Aurelius
unddie
analysis
Augustinus
Musik
and241-246.
227-235
(cit.n.47above),
70)Inaddition
tothequotation
inthetext,
Demusica
cf.,for
,VI,8,20[ed.Hentschel,
example,
certe
decet
credere
auctorem
omnis
108.15sq.]:"() deum,
convenientiae
quem
atqueconandibid.,VI, 12,36 [ibid.,140.82-88]:
"D. Nihilmihiomnino
estde istorum
cordiae",
securius.
M.Undeergocredendum
estanimae
estetincomtribui,
aequalitate
quodaeternum
nisiabunoaeterno
etincommutabili
deo?(...) Illud(...) manifestum
esteum(...)
mutabile,
seseintus
addeummovet,
utverum
incommutabile
.
Cf.
also
De
contra
(.
.)".
intelligat
genesi
ed.J.-P.
ManichaeoSy
1841),col.173-220[= PL 34];ibid.,I, 16,26 [PL34,
Migne(Paris,
nisiubisumma
etsummus
etsum186.1-3]:
"() Necaliuminvenies,
mensura,
numerus,
musordoest,idestDeum(...)".
71)Thatthelexaequalitatis
forms
theprinciple
towhich
wascreated
according
everything
by
De
musica
56
God,is confirmed
,
VI,
17,
Hentschel,
[ed.
168.11-170.19]:
by
"Quamobrem
fateri
abunoprincipio
illiacsimilem
divitiis
bonitatis
(...) debet
quisqus
peraequalem
speciem
eius(...) omnia
facta
esseatquecondita
inquantumcumque
sunt".
sunt,
quaecumque
72)Foranexplicit
foundation
ofthenumbers
with
which
thesoulmeasures
allitsother
numeri
andmotions,
the
numeri
cf.
De
musica
34-36
,
,
VI,
12,
[ed.
namely
spiritualesAugustine,
autem
memoria
nonsolum
carnales
motus
dequibus
Hentschel,
134.1-140.90]:
animi,
"Excipit
iamdiximus,
sedetiam
dequibus
breviter
dicam.
(...). Aequalitatem
[se.crsupra
spirituales,
tametmanentem,
nisialicubi
notaesset;
NG]illam
animus,
(...) nusquam
profecto
appeteret
estanimae
estet
(...). Ubiergocenses?
(...) Undeergocredendum
tribui,
quodaeternum
nisiabunoaeterno
etincommutabili
deo?".
incommutabile,

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connectionbetweenthe foregoing
model of knowledgeand the now ontoin
can
this
thequestionregarding
reality
waybe established,
logically-founded
the
inherent
to
remains
thesignification
of
structures
things
open.
In thisrespect,
a centralroleis playedbya notionwhichrecursfrequently
s writings
and whichformsa well-known
sub-classof
throughout
Augustine
In De musica
the
most
referhissignanaturalisnamely,vestigia.70
>
important
of
encesto thisnotionarefoundat theend ofbook one and at thebeginning
of numbook six. In bothcasesAugustinevoicestheopinionthat"vestiges
to objectsof perception,
eitherto our sensesor immediately
bers",inherent
The background
of
or "unchangeable
truth".74
lead one towardsthe"interior"
thisdescription
formstheprogrampursuedbyAugustinein thisbook: He
ones.75If one
wishesto proceedfrom"physicalnumbers"to "immaterial"
with
his
of
and model
intention
into
connection
this
conception reality
brings
conclusionsmaybe drawn.Thosemathematical
thefollowing
ofknowledge,
- discreteand conwhichmenareable to recognizein all motions
structures
- are precisely
the vestigia
inherentin things.
tinuous,spatialand temporal
Since thesevestigesconcern"physicalnumbers",theysignify
corresponding
"immaterial
numbers".

73)Forthevestigia
Christiana
naturalia
assigna
, II, 1,2 [CCSL32,
, cf.,aboveall,De doctrina
alia
sunt
alia
data.
Naturalia
sunt,
naturalia,
32.12-33.18]:
quaesineuoluntate
"Signorm
igitur
estfumus
ex
se
sicuti
se
aliud
ullo
faciunt,
praeteraliquid
cognosci
atque appetitu
significant
animantis
adhocgenus
transeuntis
( . . .)".For
(...). Sedetuestigium
pertinet
ignem.
significans
De signis
theimpact
ofthisdistinction
Bacon,
, e.g.I, 3, ed.K.M.
cf.,forexample,
Roger
ordinata
suntnaturalia,
autem
1978),82:"Signorm
(NewYork,
quaedam
quaedam
Fredeborg
ex
essentia
sua
et
non
ex
intentione
autem
Naturalia
abanima
adsignificandum.
dicuntur,
quia
animae
rationem
recipiunt".
signi
74)Cf.De musica
cum(...) musica
, I, 8, 28 [ed.Hentschel,
(...)
64.34-39]:
"Quamobrem
adipsa
utcommodius
eadem
nonne
prius
persequi,
oportet
vestigia
quaedam
posuerit,
vestigia
"Satis
diu(...) investigiis
ibid.,VI, 1, 1 [ibid.,
66.1-11]:
(...) ducamur?";
(...) penetralia
a sensibus
carnis
sumus.
numerorum
(...) quibusdam
(...) putavimus
(...) morati
gradibus
amore
adhaerescerent
veritatis
NG]".In
[sc.homines,
(...) incommutabilis
(...) duceratione
Delibero
arbitrio
cf.Deordine
furthermore,
, II,16,
addition,
, II,15,43 [CCSL29,130.17-21];
163
42, [CCSL29,265.15-17].
75)Forthispurpose,
68.1sq.]:"Quamobrem
cf.De musica
,VI,2,2 [ed.Hentschel,
(...), uta
reference
tonumbers,
direct
transeamus
adincorporea
ibid.,
VI,12,34
(...)"; with
corporeis
certam
et
numeris
nonreperiebamus
illam,
134.4-9]:
[ibid.,
quaminsensibilibus
"Aequalitatem
et
tarnen
adumbratam
sed
manentem,
nusquam
profecto
praetereuntem
agnoscebamus,
locorum
ettemporum,
alicubi
noninspatiis
notaesset;
hocautem
nisialicubi
animus,
appeteret
seeibid.,
foradditional
evidence
etistapraetereunt";
136.27
namillatument,
VI,12,35 [ibid.,
VI,12,36 [ibid.,
140.75-79].
sq.];ibid.,

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46 (2008)123-154

149

What does this mean forthe seekerof knowledge?He makes,as just

withthehelpofhisnumeri
sensuales
described,
, the"quasi-rational"
judgement
thatthethingswhichhe perceivesare proportionate.
He thencontinues,by
meansofthenumeri
iudiciales
whichleads
, withtheactual,rational
judgement
himto therecognition
thattheyarewell-proportioned,
whichis tosaythatone
and thesamelawis thebasisofall proportions:
thelexaequalitatis.
Insightinto
thelexaeqtialitatis
thathe haveknowledge
of its
necessarily
implies,however,
fundamental
the
summa
or
unitas
J6
The
inherent
principle,
vestiges
aequalitas
in thingstherefore
revealthe determining
principleof theirmathematical
whichis at oncetheontologicalfoundation
ofreality.77
structure,
At thispointthequestionarisesof therelationship
betweentheonticand
thesemanticdimensions
ofa thing.The vestigesofnumbersarticulate
themto
on
the
level
of
the
ontic
of
selves,according Augustine,
composition things:
or sensiblenumbers,in short,thebeautyand hence
theyformthe"physical"
the mathematical
structure
of things.Theirsignification
refersaccordingly
their
"immaterial"
numbers
the
realmof the lex
through
corresponding
aequalitatis to the principleon whichtheyare based, thatis the summa
- i.e. itsessentialmathematThusthecomposition
ofa thing
aequalitasitself.
- performs
ical structure
a taskanalogousto thesemanticfunction
of a sign.
In viewoftheAugustinin
of
it
could
be
here
conception signs,
objectedthat
thesameepistemological
problemnow ariseson the "semanticlevel"of the
which
we
know
s reflections
on language;for
alreadyfromAugustine
things
him
to
be
of
knowlmay capable providing
althoughlinguistic
signsaccording
In short,thecertainty
edge,theyareyetsubjectto theproblemofambiguity.
oftheknowledgetheyprovideis questionable.78
76)Fortherelevant
inthisconnection,
cf.above,
n.69.Fora short
quotation
p.25with
survey
ofthepath"vonderErkenntnis
zurewigen
cf.Hentschel,
Gleichheit",
Rhythmen
krperlicher
leaves
theontological
outof
who,however,
(cit.n.47 above),
'Einleitung'
p. xix-xxvi,
aspect
consideration.
77)Inthis
cf.theprecisely
inverse
ofcoming
intobeing
connection,
process
through
cosmologicalnumbers
inDe musica
asdescribed
"stacerte
, VI,17,58 [ed.Hentschel,
172.67-174.79]:
sensus
ministerio
numeramus
omnia,
numros,
(...), locales
(...) nisipraecedentiquaecarnalis
busintimis
etinsilentio
inmotu,
necaccipere
illospossunt
nec
numeris,
temporalibus
quisunt
habere.
Illositidem
intervallis
etmodificai
Vitalis
motus
serviens
temporum
agiles
praecedit
domino
rerum
nontemporalia
habens
intervalla
numerorum
sedtemomnium,
suorum,
digesta
etintellectuals
numeri
beatarum
animarum
poraministrante
potentia,
supra
quamrationales
dei( . . .) usqueadterrena
etinferna
iuratransmittunt".
Theproatquesanctarum,
ipsam
legem
cessofknowledge
thus
tobethenoetic
reditus
ofthiscosmologica!
emanation.
proves
78)Forfurther
details
inthisregard,
cf.partI ofthisstudy.

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/Vivarium
L. Cesalli,

of natAn answerto thisobjectionis providedbythecentralcharacteristic

relation
to therealmofsignadata, thereis a determinate
uralsigns':in contrast
thesignsin quesbetweenthe naturalsign and itssignification^
Regarding
is precisely
theiressentheirsignificatum
tionhere,whichareall naturalthings,
the naturalsign,
and- insofaras theircarrier,
tia, or essentialconstitution,
- is eo ipsoontologically
the ontoDue to thispeculiarity,
founded.80
exists
coincide.
logicaltruthofthethingand thesemantictruthofthe"sign-thing"
describedhereapply
However,itshouldbe keptin mindthattheconnections
createdbyGod.81Artificiallythatis to thereality
to naturalthings,
exclusively
, fall,
producedthingssuch as song or dance in the fieldof the ars musica
of
data
into
the
to
this
, in
necessarily
signa
conception,
category
according
sideis notperseor naturallylinkedto theonticwhichthesemiotic-semantic
betweenthenatural
ontological.Finally,ifone regardsthesign-relationship
and theprincipleto whichtheyrefer,
namelythesummaaequal"sign-things"
itasor unitas, thisrelationprovesto be twofold:in one direction,leading
awayfromunityand towardsthosethingsbroughtforthout of
ontologically
in theotherdirection,
it throughthelexaequalitatis',
pointingsemanticallywhichorderedthem,
numerorum
via
the
vis
from
away
things,
epistemically
and
towardstheunitywhichis theirfoundational
principle thatwhichmakes
In
conclusion
to thispartofthepresof
the
truth.
certain
knowledge
possible
shallnow be
fromour examination
ent study,a fewspecialpointsresulting
highlighted.
Results
2.4. Interim
. As has been
and truth
(1) On thefunctionofnumberin therelationofthings
of
shownon the basis of De musica, numbercorrespondsto the structure
and
in
forth
createdreality.It is boththeformative
reality,
power bringing
79)Fora comparative
DieSpurdes
cf.Meier-Oeser,
dataandsigna
ofsigna
naturalia,
analysis
whoholds,
Meier-Oeser
Zeichens
ibid.,
26,"dadiealsnatrli23-26;against
(cit.n.28above),
Natur
Zeichen
ihrer
bereits
Sachenicht
chesZeichen
ist",one
eigenen
aufgrund
fungierende
- precisely
their
consideration
here
under
the'things'
that
itis- atleastregarding
couldobject
assign.
that
functions
nature'
very
80)Fortheontological
- Cf.,incontrast,
therelation
cf.p. 25 withn.69 above.
foundation,
seeabove,
which
is
or
the
data
and
between
p. 12with
arbitrary
contingent,
thing
signified
signa
of
such
as
the
naturalia
other
kinds
of
to
n.36.Furthermore,
vestigeananimal
signa
contrary
animal
iscontingent
whose
occurrence
by),boththeoccurpassed
having
(upontherespective
isnecessary.
inquestion
here
ofthevestiges
rence
andsignification
81)Cf.ouranalysis
andDeordine
inDe musica
oftherespective
above,
p. 19.
passages

15:41:58 PM

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/Vivarium
, N. Germann

151

strucwhichleads humanreason,by meansof its corresponding

the ra/0
In
of
the
his
use
of
to
certain
truth.
ture,
unparalleled
Pythagoknowledge
whatis, seen
reanand Platonicnumber-theory,
Augustinethusformulates
of knowlas a whole,a detailed"mathematical"
theoryof theisomorphism
and
reality.82
edge
(2) On thestatusof things.In thisconnectionit should be stressedthat
Augustine,despitehis generaldepreciationof the physical,sensibleworld,
leavesno doubtthatthingsarethestarting
pointin theknowledge-process.83
are
a
means
towards
our
actualepistemic
they only
Admittedly,
goal,thetruth.
of vestigia
and areas suchfitforuse,84and
Nevertheless
theyarethecarriers
therefore
recommended
to all who striveforjoy in the presenceof eternal
truth.85
If theinterpretation
in reference
tothings.
(3) On themeaningof'significare'
hereis correct,
all createdor "natural"thingspossesssignification.
presented
are
"natural
whose
immanent
mathematical
structure
orbeautyis
They
signs",
The
a vestigeoftheirfoundational
force
of
this
"trace"
is the
principle. driving
lexaequalitatis
connectedto the"One" byvirtueofthe
, whichis inseparably
of
which
number
thesignificatum
ofall
conception
groundsit. Consequently
naturalthingsis notonlyundoubtedly
butalsoone and thesame,that
certain,
Truth.
is,theone,ontological

82)Foranevaluation
ofAugustine's
useofPythagorean
number
cf.theclosely-related
theory,
assessment
ofHentschel,
derZahlund
(cit.n.47 above),
'Einleitung'
p. ix:"DieBedeutung
zahlhafter
Strukturen
frdenPythagoreismus
istbekannt,
aberinkeinem
anderen
Werk
wird
derWegvonzahlhaften
Strukturen
dessinnlich
Wahrnehmbaren
bishinzurErkenntnis
des
Gttlichen
sofolgerichtig
undbiszumZielbeschritten
wieinDe musica
.
83)Keller
arrives
ata similar
Aurelius
unddieMusik
279:
result,
(cit.n.A7above),
Augustinus
"Erkenntnis
meint
vonSinnesempfindung
inGanggebrachte
[. . .] eineimZusammenhang
derdenkenden
Seele[. . .]".With
tothispeculiarity,
wemust
that
respect
Besinnung
emphasize
in
De
musica
does
not
fall
back
on
the
of
Contra
acadmicos
but
rather
,
,
Augustine,
skepticism
continues
thetendency
inDedialctica
cf.section
1.2.ofthispaper.
; forthis,
present
84)Augustine
- thewell-known
himself
here
ofuti
ofhisfrui,
cf.Demusica
,
speaks
complement
"Sedqualis
tibihomo
illosnumros,
VI,14,45 [ed.Hentschel,
videtur,
154.40-50]:
quiomne
decorpore
tantum
refert,
(...) adsalutem
(...) nonadsuperfluam
quisunt
corporis
omnesque
velperniciosam
sedadnecessariam
velimprobationem
utitur
curiositatem,
( . . .)?";
probationem
"Hisetenim,
in
tabula
ibid.,
VI,14,46 [ibid.,
sunt,
156.73-75]:
quoniam
temporales
tamquam
carebimus".
fructibus,
(...) beneutendo
85)Cf.,forexample,
De musica
,VI,15,49 [ed.Hentschel,
160.12-15]:
"() quanto
ergotunc
inunum
deum
etperspicuam
intenti
utdictum
adfaciem'
veritatem,
est,'facie
numero,
magis
nullainquietudine
sentiemus
etgaudebimus?".
quibus
corpora,
agimus

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46 (2008)123-154
L. Cesalli,
N. Germann

. Insofaras
can be semantically
(4) On thequestionofwhether
wrong,
things
these
are
and
or
"natural"
is
about
created
only
thingsin the
things
speech
inaccurately,
providedone
quadrivialsenseoftheword , theycannotsignify
deceivesmen,which
does not assumea geniusmalignas,who intentionally
of thingshas as a
did not. Howeverthischaracteristic
Augustinecertainly
will
be
their
that
not
always true,but also that
meaning
consequence, only
as theyare":"quaecumquesunt,in
"are,whattheyare,insofar
theynecessarily
sunt".86
quantumcumque
3. Conclusion
s conLet us returnto our starting
point,namely,thequestionofAugustine
The
his
notion
of
the
role
and
of
of
truth
key
playedby
signification.
ception
is
betweenlanguage,perceptionand reality,
close connectionhe establishes
in
what
of
our
in theresultsof thetwo parts
reflected
inquiry.Accordingly,
followswe willrecallour mainresultsin orderto emphasizetheircorrespondenceand complementarity.
so called,"linguistic-semantic"
As we hope to haveshownin thefirst,
part
of our study,Augustinedefendsdifferent
positionsin the Contraacadmicos
restricts
. The critiqueof skepticismin Contraacadmicos
and De dialctica
to
the
to
of
truth
to
sense,
namely
sphereof
thingsimperceptible
knowledge
realm
oflinthe
entire
truths.
Thus
puresubjectiveand logico-mathematical
trueknowledge.In De dialcguisticsignsappearsincapableof transmitting
this
rather
shifts
from
ticahowever,
negativepositionto a positive
Augustine
thegapbetweenthesensible
ofsignas a linkbridging
one: bothhisdefinition
and his epistemicconceptionof signification
and intelligible,
open a new
avenueforcognitionofthetruthvia linguistic
expressions.
Althoughlinguistic
theactualoftrueknowledge,
as transmitters
areable to function
expressions
of
a
further
the
fulfillment
of
this
ization
condition,
yet
requires
possibility
areontothatthosethingsto whichtheyareconventionally
referring
namely,
true.
logically
De musicaprovidesa solutionboth to thisproblemand to the seeming
truthsas discussedon thebasisof Contraacadmidead-endofmathematical
on musicthatAugustinedevelopsan elaboratecosmocos. It is in thistreatise
structure
anditsconstitutive
which
model
ontologically
groundsreality
logical
charthe
same
structure
As
God.
in one ultimateprinciple,
precisely
namely,
86)De musica
170.18sq.],asquoted
above,
,VI,17,56[ed.Hentschel,
p.25,n.71.

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46 (2008)123-154

153

thismodelensures
theprocessofhumanperception
and knowledge,
acterizes
of reality,
or moreprecisely
still:of itsstructure.
thecognizability
However,
in the"ontological"
due toAugustine
s peculiarnotionofres,ourinvestigation
an additionalaspectto the
partofthestudywentyeta littlefurther,
bringing
fore:As someres, namelynatural'things,accordingto him,arealso signs,we
was. It turnedout thatthose
raisedthe questionof whattheirsignification
the
structure,
byvirtueoftheirinherent
"sign-things"
signify,
numero-logical
one Truth,whichis at thesametimethefoundingprincipleof reality.
Morethe
over,and in contrastto the semanticlevel of linguisticexpressions,
of"sign-things"
is essentially
inherent
to thoseres.Consequently
signification
itunambiguously
refers
to itssignificatum
, leavingno roomfordeceptionand
thusforskepticism.
With respectto the relationof signification
and truth,theseresultshave
severalconsequences:as thestudyofAugustine
s earlyphilosophical
writings
has shown,onlythecombinationof thesemanticwiththeontologicalview
ofhisnotionoftruth:theveryexistence
promisesan adequateunderstanding
of humanscienceis submittedto thethreeconditionsof therebeing(1) an
structure
ofobjectivereality(thetruthofthings),and (2) theposintelligible
of
thatintelligible
structure
with
sibility cognizingand (3) communicating
satisfactory
accuracy(thetruthofsigns).Whatwe havehereis a symmetrical
is describedin termsof linguisticand
model,withinwhichepistemology
the
model
involvesa linguistic-semantic
side and
metaphysical
components:
an ontologicalone, theaccuracyof humanknowledgebeingfoundedon the
betweenwordsas signsofthings,and thingsas signsof
isomorphism
existing
theirontologicaltruth.
s philosophicalconceptionof truthinvolvesa theory
Moreover,
Augustine
of intentional
objectsof a peculiarkind:generally
speaking,mentalacts of
and understanding
can be directedtowardsextra-mental
perceiving
things.
Whenthisis thecase,thecontents
ofthosementalactsareintentional
objects.
The peculiarity
of theintentional
objectsinvolvedin Augustinesepistemology,however(see forexamplethe dicibilein De dialcticaand the numeri
in De music),is thefactthattheycan eo ipsoqualifyas truein virtue
iudiciales
oftheontologicaltruthofthethingstowardswhichtheyaredirected.In that
sense,thoseintentional
objectscan be describedas "alethic".Consequently,
the ontologicaltruthof thingsis the conditionof therebeinga linguisticsemantictruth.87
At thecoreof theseboth realmsof truthis the notionof
87)Fortheroleplayed
inmedieval
andmodern
theories
ofintentionality,
see
byAugustine
D. Perler,
Theorien
derIntentionalitt
imMittelalter
where
the
a.M.,2002),403-405,
(Frankfurt

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)123-154

items( verbay
which,in bothfields,connectssensoryperceivable
signification
with
contents
that
are
either
ornaturally
linked
res)
intelligible
conventionally
withtheseitems.
due to
Finallyand as we haveseen,Augustinefocuseson thingsprimarily
theirusefulness'
in leadingtheseekerof truthfromthesensoryworldto its
truth{resas signa).However,althoughAugustines
foundational,
intelligible
owninterest
is directedtowardsthecognitionofintelligible
objects,hismodel
of perception
and knowledgenecessarily
sense
as the
presupposes
perception
of
the
of
For
the
seeker
of
point
starting
process cognition.
knowledge,in
orderat all to detectthestructure
inherent
to things,
mustin a first
stagefocus
on extra-mental
besides
the
semantic
dimension
of
thisposiHence,
reality.
tion(theverystructure
ofworldlythingsis a vestigium),
Augustinesconcentrationon the metaphysical
structureof thingsmay have influencedhis
in theirreflections
successors
on theconstitution
ofthingsas thingsand in an
in
interest
the
nature
as
a
increasing
physicalentity.88

author
shows
howFranz
refers
Brentano
toAristotle,
Thomas
andAugustine
asprevious
Aquinas
thinkers
whodefended
the"mental
ofobjects;
in-existence"
fortheroleofthenotion
ofintentio
inAugustine's
of
ocular
vision
mental
M.
and
see
'"Quamvidendo
theory
language, Sirridge,
intus
inDeTrinitate
dicimus":
andSaying
inLanguage
andCognition
XV',Medieval
,
Seeing
Analyses
ed.S.Ebbesen,
andR.Friedman
andL.Cesalli,
and
317-330
1999),
Tntentionality
(Copenhagen,
Influence
onBurley
andWyclifs
Vivarium
Semantics',
,
Truth-Making:
Augustines
Propositional
Vol.45,No.2.(2007),
283-297.
88)Cf.for
theso-called
ofnature"
inthe12th
Thisconcept
hasbeen
example
"discovery
century.
coined
Lathologie
audouzime
sicle
ithas
(Paris,
1957),
byM.-D.Chenu,
esp.21-30.Recently,
a renewed
scientific
cf.A. Speer,
Die entdeckte
Natur.
zu
interest,
provoked
Untersuchungen
einer
scientia
naturalis
im
12.
the
Meanwhile,
(Leiden,
1995).
Jahrhundert
Begrndungsversuchen
hasbeenraised
thescientific
interest
inthethings
asthings
whether
canbetraced
back
question
inthehistory
toearlier
ofphilosophy,
cf.N. Germann,
De temporum
ratione.
Quaperiods
drivium
undGotteserkenntnis
amBeispiel
Abbos
von
undHermanns
vonReichenau
(LeidenFleury
C. Burnett,
before
Translations
from
Arabic
Boston,
2006),esp.304-309;
'Physics Physics.
Early
inMss.British
ofTexts
Nature
additional
GalbaE IV',
22719andCotton
Library
Concerning
Medioevo
27(2002),53-109.

15:41:58 PM

-IG
l0
()'v
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46(2008)155-174

ber das Verhltnis

und individueller

materieller

Gegenstnde

allgemeiner
und mathematischer
Thomas

nach

von Aquin

AndrejKrause
Universitt
Seminar
furPhilosophie,
Halle-Wittenberg
Abstract
ofabstraction.
Thisarticle
examines
oneaspectofThomasAquinas'understanding
It
toAquinas,
showsinwhichway,according
universal
material
and
individual
objects
material
objectsarethestarting
pointformathematical
objects.It comestotheconmathematical
clusionthatforAquinastherearenotonlyuniversal
objects(circle,
mathematical
that
Universal
mathecircle,
line),butalsoindividual
(this
line).
objects
matical
are
of
universal
material
and
mathematiindividual
objects
objects properties
calobjectsareproperties
ofindividual
material
One typeofabstractio
objects.
formae
leadsfrom
material
to
universal
mathematical
a secondtype
individual
objects
objects,
fromuniversal
material
mathematical
anda thirdtype
objectsto universal
objects,
fromindividual
material
to
individual
mathematical
the
objects
objects.Therefore,
abstractio
is
of
concept
formae ambiguous.
Keywords
individual
material
universal
material
individual
mathematical
objects,
objects,
objects,
abstractio
universal
mathematical
objects,
formae
1teiltThomasvon
In seinerSchrift:
De Trinitate
SuperBoetium
Aquindie theoretischePhilosophiein Naturphilosophie,
Mathematikund Metaphysik
ein.
!) DieseSchrift
wirdimfolgenden
mit"InDe Trin."
undnachSancti
Thomae
de
abgekrzt
De
inOpera
Boetium
Trinitate
Omnia
tomus
L (Roma-Paris,
,
, EditioLeonina,
Aquino,
Super
wobeiinKlammern
dieSeitenzahl
dieser
Eine
wird.
1992)zitiert,
jeweils
Ausgabe
angegeben
ltere
kritische
istSancti
Thomae
deAquino,
librum
Boethii
De Trinitate
,
Ausgabe
Expositio
super
ed.Bruno
Decker
derDatierung,
derMotivation
undderStruktur
(Leiden,
1955).ZurFrage
dieser
Schrift
C. Hall,TheTrinity.
AnAnalysis
vgl.Douglas
ofSt.Thomas
Expositio
ofthe
Aquinas'
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
DOI:10.1
163/156853407X246090
NV,
Leiden,

15:42:04 PM

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Die Gegenstnde
dieserWissenschaften
sollenjeweilsdurchdreiTtigkeiten
desVerstandes
erfatwerden,durchdie abstractio
universalis
a particularsdie
abstractio
formaeund die separatio.Die thomasische
Einteilungder theoretischenPhilosophieund die damitverbundene
Abstraktionslehre
ist ein oft
behandeltesThema.2Der vorliegende
Aufsatzsoll einenbesonderenAspekt
dieserLehreuntersuchen,
dervon derbisherigen
Literatur
zu Thomasnicht
diskutiert
wurde.Er will verdeutlichen,
inwiefern
die Unterscheidung
von
und
individuellen
materiellen
die
fr
die
Naturallgemeinen
Gegenstnden,
vonallgemeinen
undindiviist,zu einerUnterscheidung
philosophierelevant
duellenmathematischen
fuhren
kann.Diese Fragewurdebisher
Gegenstnden
auch nichtvon den Arbeiten,
die spezielldie mathematische
Abstraktion
des
Thomasbehandeln,errtert.3
Der Aufsatzbestehtaus dreiTeilen.Im erstenerfolgen
einigewenigetermiohnedie die spterenAusfhrungen
nichtvernologischeVorbemerkungen,
standenwerdenknnen.Im zweitenTeil wirddie frdie Naturphilosophie
De Trinitate
Schriften
desThomas
York-Kln,
(Leiden-New
1992),38-47.Andere
ofBoethius
vonAquin
werden
wiefolgt
zitiert:
Sth= Summa
inOpera
Omnia
, Editio
Leonina,
theologiae,
tomus
IV-XII(Roma,
De enteetess.= De ente
etessentia
Omnia
1888F.),
, in Opera
, Editio
XLIII(Roma,
tomus
Leonina,
1976).
2)Vgl.etwaL.-B.Geiger,
Abstraction
et sparation
S. Thomas',
Revue
dessciences
d'aprs
etthologiques
31 (1947),3-40(dazukritisch:
'Washeit
J.A.Aertsen,
philosophiques
MetaphysikbeiThomas
vonAquin?',
Miscellanea
Mediaevalia
22/1(1994),217-239),
Armand
Maurer,
St.Thomas
The
Division
andMethods
VandVIofhisCommenQuestions
Aquinas.
oftheSciences.
onthe
De Trinitate
L.Oeing-Hanhoff,
'Wesen
und
XVIII-XXX,
(Toronto,
1963),
tary
ofBoethius
Formen
derAbstraktion
nachThomas
vonAquin,Philosophisches
71 (1963),14-37,
Jahrbuch
undMethode
dertheoretischen
nachThomas
von
Neumann,
Siegfried
Gegenstand
Wissenschaften
derExpositio
librum
Boethii
De
Trinitate
v.
a.
(Mnster,
97-119,
1965),
Aquin
aufgrund
super
F.Wippel,
Themes
in Thomas
D. C, 1984),69-104,
John
Metaphysical
Aquinas
(Washington,
F.VanSteenberghen,
'Lastructure
delaphilosophie
selon
S.Thomas
Revue
thorique
d'Aquin',
deLouvain
C. Lafleur,
83(1985),536-558,
ettripartition
'Abstraction,
philosophique
sparation
delaphilosophie
lments
del'arrire-fond
farabien
etartien
deThomas
thortique.
Quelques
Boetium
De trinitate,
deThologie
etPhilosophie
5,article
3',Recherches
d'Aquin,
Super
question
mdivales
Walter
67(2000),248-271,
beiThomas
von
EineEinfuhrung
Patt,
Metaphysik
Aquin.
(London,
2004),19-47.
3)Vgl.J.F.Whittaker,
"The
Position
ofMathematics
intheHierarchy
ofSpeculative
Science',
TheThomist
E. Winance,
3 (1941),467-506,
'Notesurl'abstraction
selonsaint
mathmatique
Revue
deLouvain
T.C.Anderson,
53(1955),482-510,
Thomas',
Matphilosophique
'Intelligibel
terandtheObjects
ofMathematics
inAquinas',
TheNewScholasticism
43 (1969),555-576,
'Aristotle
andAquinas
ontheFreedom
oftheMathematician',
TheThomist
ders.,
36 (1972),
A. Maurer,
'Thomists
andThomas
on theFoundation
ofMathematics',
231-255,
Aquinas
Review
47 (1993),43-61.
ofMetaphysics

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157

zwischenallgemeinenund individuellen
materielrelevante
Unterscheidung
Im
Teil
wird
zu den
len Gegenstnden
dritten
warum
untersucht,
expliziert.
mathematischen
Gegenstndennach Thomas sowohl allgemeineals auch
individuelle
Gegenstnde
gehrenmssenund in welcherWeisedie im zweitenTeildesAufsatzes
von allgemeinen
und individargelegte
Unterscheidung
duellenmateriellen
fr
die
von
Gegenstnden
Unterscheidung allgemeinen
mathematischen
undindividuellen
Gegenstnden
wichtigist.In diesemZusamwird
sich
unter
anderem
da derBegriff
derabstractio
herausstellen,
menhang
ist.
formaemehrdeutig
I. Terminologische
Vorbemerkungen4
Thomasunterscheidet
theoretische
und praktische
Philosophie.Die theoretischePhilosophiesoll sich andersals die praktischePhilosophieDingen
sie sollsich
zuwenden,die nichtdurchdieTtigkeitdes Menschenentstehen,
also beispielsweise
wederfurdie menschlichen
noch
fiirdie
Handlungen
durchdie knstlerischen
Werke
interessieren.
Ttigkeiten
hervorgebrachten
Innerhalbder Gruppe der Dinge, die von der theoretischen
Philosophie
betrachtet
derGruppederDinge,die nichtdurchdie
werden,also innerhalb
werdendreiGruppenunterschieden,
die
Ttigkeitdes Menschenentstehen,
in
derEinteilung
dertheoretischen
MathemaPhilosophie Naturphilosophie,
tikund Metaphysik
sollen.Die GliederdieserGruppenhngen
entsprechen
starkvon der Materieab. Thomasnenntzwarauch eine
jeweilsverschieden
vonderBewegung,
erbercksichtigt
dieseAbhngigkeit
bei der
Abhngigkeit
der
theoretischen
so
da
sie
eigentlichen
Einteilung
Philosophiejedochnicht,
hiervernachlssigt
werdenkann.Die GliederdererstenGruppesollenvonder
MateriegemdemSeinundgemdemBegriff
esseetintellectum)
(secundum
die
zweiten
Glieder
der
dem
Sein,nichtabergem
abhngen,
Gruppegem
demBegriff,
unddie Gliederderdritten
GruppewedergemdemSeinnoch
Hierbeisolleinbeliebiges
x genaudanndemBegriff
nach
gemdemBegriff.
von derMaterieabhngen,wennin derDefinitionvon x ausgesagt
wird,da
x materiell
nachvonderMaterieabhnist,undgenaudannnichtdemBegriff
in
gen,wennnicht der Definitionvon x ausgesagtwird,da x materiellist,
wobei letzteres
nichtohne weiteresimpliziert,
da in der Definitionvon x
x
da
nicht
materiell
ist.
So
wird,
ausgesagt
folgtdaraus,da etwa in der
Definitiondes Menschennichtausgesagtwird,da der Menschkahlkpfig
4)Vgl.zumFolgenden
InDeTrin.
art.(137f.).
q. 5 a. 1corp.

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A.Krause

ist.
wird,da ernichtkahlkpfig
ist,nicht,da in dieserDefinitionausgesagt
werden.
In Definitionensollen geradewesentliche
ausgesagt
Eigenschaften
Wenn also die Definitiondes Menschennicht aussagt,da der Mensch
ist.Der
da ernichtwesentlich
ist,so istdamitgemeint,
kahlkpfig
kahlkpfig
sein.Entsprechend
Menschknnteaberimmernochzuflligkahlkpfig
gilt
dann: Wenn die Definitionvon x nichtaussagt,da x materiellist,so ist
ist.x knntejedoch immer
materiell
damitgemeint,da x nichtwesentlich
die Abhngigkeit
sein. Fernerscheintes angemessen,
noch zuflligmateriell
da
von der Materiegem dem Sein (secundumesse)so zu interpretieren,
wenn
Materie
der
von
Sein
dem
daraus,
etwasgenaudann gem
abhngt,
da es existiert,
GegendieseInterpretation
folgt,da auch Materieexistiert.
knntesich ein Einwand erheben:Wre es nichtmglich,da es etwas
gibt,das nichtohne Materiesein kann, ohne da dieses etwasvon der
nichtmaterieller
Materieabhngt,etwawennein bestimmter
Gegenstand
so da
einenmateriellen
a- notwendigerweise
Gegenstand b verursacht,
Wre a dann abervon b
wenn b existiert?
nur dann existiert,
a tatschlich
b verurabhngigDiese Fragelt sichbejahen:Wenn a notwendigerweise
sacht,dannista von b abhngig,da a dannnichtohneb seinkann.Fernerist
demAutorkeineuerungdes Thomasbekannt,in derein BeispielangegeSomitlassensichfolgende
Einwandentspricht.
benwird,das demgenannten
auseinanderhalten:
Definitionen
Definition1: x istgenaudannGliedderGruppe1, wenngilt:
auch Materie.
dann existiert
(1) Wennx existiert,
(2) Die Definitionvon x sagtaus, da x materiellist.
Definition2: x istgenaudannGlied derGruppe2, wenngilt:
auch Materie.
dann existiert
(1) Wennx existiert,
(2) Die Definitionvon x sagtnichtaus, da x materiellist.
Definition3: x istgenaudannGliedderGruppe3, wenngilt:
Materieexistiert.
(1) Es ist nichtso, da dann,wennx existiert,
(2) Die Definitionvon x sagtnichtaus, da x materiellist.
da manes mitDingenzu tunhat,die nichtdurch
UnterderVoraussetzung,
soll sich mit den Dingen der ersten
die Ttigkeitdes Menschenentstehen,
die auch Physikgenanntwird,mitden
Gruppegeradedie Naturphilosophie,
und mitden Dingenderletzten
Mathematik
die
zweiten
der
Gruppe
Dingen
uniistdie abstractio
Der
befassen.
die
Naturphilosophie
Gruppe Metaphysik

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159

versalis
a particular
die abstractio
i, derMathematik
formaeund derMetaphy"
'
sik die separatiozugeordnet.Der Terminus abstractioselbstwurdevon
Boethiusals bersetzung
des griechischen
in die lateiWortes"aphairesis"
nischephilosophische
wobei "aphairesis"
erstmalsvon
Spracheeingefhrt,
in einemtechnischen
Aristoteles
Sinn gebrauchtwurde.5Inwiefern
nun die
in
sich
der
Tradition
des
Aristoteles
befindende
dertheogenannte,
Einteilung
retischenPhilosophiein Naturphilosophie,
Mathematikund Metaphysik
heutenochbefriedigen
Thomasselbstknpft
kann,sei einmaldahingestellt.6
mitseinerAbstraktionstheorie
an Aristoteles
wobei
er
die Probleme,
die er
an,
unterdemTitelderAbstraktion
zunchst
vonAverroes
bernimmt.7
behandelt,

II. Allgemeineund individuellematerielleGegenstnde

Nach Definition1 istx also genaudann GegenstandderNaturphilosophie,
wenngilt,dawennx existiert,
auchMaterieexistiert,
undwenndieDefinition
von x aussagt,da x materiell
ist.Ein solcherGegenstandsoll beispielsweise
derMenschsein.Zunchsteinmalfolgtaus seinerExistenzdie Existenzvon
Materie,dennohneMateriegbeeskeineMenschen.Ferner
sagtdieDefinition
des Menschenaus,da derMenschmateriell
ist,dennsie sagtaus,da erein
Sinnenwesen
abersindmateriell.
Die Naturphilosophie
ist,Sinnenwesen
ist,
wie jedes Einteilungsglied
der theoretischen
eine
Wissenschaft,
Philosophie,
scientia.
Wissenschaften
sollenallgemeine
unddas knAussagenformulieren
nensie nurdanntun,wennsie sichmitallgemeinen
befassen.8
DemDingen
nach ist nichtder individuelle
Mensch,der MenschA oder der MenschB,
derNaturphilosophie,
sondernderallgemeine
Mensch,derinA und
Gegenstand
B gewissermaen
enthalten
mu:
ist,so da man Definition1 modifizieren
5)Vgl.P.Aubenque,
'Abstraktion
Wrterbuch
derPhilosophie
I', inHistorisches
, ed.Joachim
Bd.1/A-C(Basel-Stuttgart,
u.Josef
deVries,
derScholastik
Ritter,
1971),42-44,
Grundbegriffe
desAbstraktionsproblems
imMittelalter
(Darmstadt,
1983),1.ZurGeschichte
vgl.L. OeingAbstraktion
Wrterbuch
derPhilosophie
Bd.1/
Hanhoff,
III',inHistorisches
, ed.Joachim
Ritter,
A-C(Basel-Stuttgart,
derAbstraktionslehre
desThomas
stellt
vorallem
die
47-59.Neben
1971),
desAlbertus
mitderUnterscheidung
vonvierAbstraktionsgraden
einenHhepunkt
Magnus
dieser
dar.Vgl.Ulrich
Die Erkenntnislehre
desAlbertus
Dhnert,
Problemgeschichte
Magnus
andenStufen
der'abstractio
'St.Albert
andtheTheory
of
1934),R.Z. Lauer,
gemessen
(Leipzig,
Thomist
17(1954),69-83.
Abstraction',^
6)VanSteenberghen,
'Lastructure
delaphilosophie
hatdiesbezglich
thorique',
beispielsweise
erhebliche
Zweifel.
7)Vgl.Oeing-Hanhoff,
'Abstraktion
III',51.
8)Vgl.InDeTrin.
q. 5 a. 2 ad4 (144).

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Definition
1': x istgenaudannGegenstand
derNaturphilosophie,
wenngilt:
x
Wenn
dann
existiert
auch
Materie.
existiert,
(1)
(2) Die Definitionvon x sagtaus, da x materiellist.
(3) x istein allgemeiner
Gegenstand.
Aus (2) folgt:,
da x materiell
ist,wenngleich
(2), wie gesagt,nichtdamitidentischist,da x materiell
ist.Jedenfalls
istjederGegenstandderNaturphilosomateriell.
Inwiefern
aber
knnen
materielle
phie
Gegenstnde
allgemeinsein?
ThomashltzweierleiMaterienauseinander,
materia
und materia
particularis
universalis
.9
, jene nennterauch materiasignata
, dieseauch materiacommunis
AusGrndenderEinheitlichkeit
seienimfolgenden
dieTermini"individuelle
Materie"frmateria
und "allgemeine
Materie"furmateriauniverparticularis
salisverwendet.
Die materia
ist
das
dermaterielsignata
Individuationsprinzip
len Gegenstnde,10
so da sich etwader MenschA und der MenschB, die
individuellen
ja materielleGegenstndesind,aufgrundihrerverschiedenen
Materieunterscheiden.
Die individuelle
Materiedes MenschenA istdessen
Materie,etwadie Knochenvon A. Entsprechendes
ganz bestimmte
giltfr
B. Zwar unterscheiden
sich die beidenindividuellen
Materienvoneinander,
nursollendie individuelle
MaterievonA, die individuelle
Materievon B und
die jeweiligenindividuellen
Materiender anderenMenschenetwasgemeinsam haben,eine bestimmte
etwavon
allgemeineMaterie,die sichallerdings
der allgemeinen
Materieder Steineoder der Pferdeunterscheiden
soll. Der
individuelle
Menschistmateriell
der
individuellen
er
Materie, hatbeigem
bestimmte
Knochen.Der allgemeineMenschistmateriell
spielsweise
gem
derallgemeinen
sondernallgemeineKnoMaterie,er hatkeinebestimmten,
chen.Wendetsichdie Naturphilosophie
einemindividuellen
Menschenzu,so
will sie etwasvon dessenallgemeiner
aber
auch etwasvon dessen
Materie,
Formwissen.Im Fall des Menschensoll die Zusammensetzung
allgemeiner
aus Materieund Formgeradedie Zusammensetzung
aus Leib und Seelesein.
So wiederindividuelle
Menschzusammengesetzt
istaus individueller
Materie
undindividueller
Formbzw.individuellem
Leib und individueller
Seele,so ist
derallgemeineMenschzusammengesetzt
aus allgemeiner
Materieund allgemeinerFormbzw.allgemeinem
Leib und allgemeiner
Seele.Die Naturphilointeressiert
sich
nach
Thomas
nur
fur
die
sophie
allgemeineMaterie(beim
Menschen:furden allgemeinenLeib) und furdie allgemeineForm (beim
9)Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.(143),ad2 (I43f.),
SthI q. 85a. 1ad2.
q. 5 a. 2 corp.
10)Vgl.InDeTrin.
q. 5 a. 2 ad1 (143).

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161

Menschen:frdie allgemeineSeele) einesindividuellen

materiellen
Gegenstandes.Sie soll,indemsievon den individuellen
absieht,das
Bestimmungen
Dieses "HerausAllgemeineaus dem Individuellen
gleichsamherausziehen.
ziehen"nenntThomasabstractio
a particulari.u
universalis
Die abstractio
universalis
a particulari
istderwichtigste
Fall derabstractio
totius
, bei deres um
das Verhltnis
von Ganzes und Teil geht.Bei der abstractio
totiuswirddas
Ganze ohne die Teile oder ein Teil (oder mehrereTeile) ohne das Ganze
betrachtet.
Zu dieserabstractio
universalis
a particulari
gehrtdie abstractio
ihr
als
man
bei
das
als
das
Ganze
insofern,
{totum)
Allgemeine
logische
auffassen
kann,das aus den Besonderen,aus den Teilen,"herausgezogen"
wird.12
Das Ergebnisdieses"Herausziehens"
ist ein Gegenstand,
der sowohl
als
auch
materiell
zwar
er
und
ist
materiell
der
ist,
allgemein
gem allgemeinen
Materie.Die Naturphilosophie
sieht
Materie,nichtgemderindividuellen
vonderindividuellen
Materieab.13Damitsiehtsieauchvonderindividuellen
Formab, denndieseergibtsichgewissermaen
aus derindividuellen
Materie,
da letztere,
und nichtdie individuelleForm,das Individuationsprinzip
der
materiellen
ist.
Gegenstnde
Die GrenzenderAllgemeinheit
derallgemeinen
materiellen
Gegenstnde
sollendurchihreDefinitionenbestimmtwerden.Wenn beispielsweise
der
Mensch
eine
Materie
und
eine
Form
hat,so
allgemeine
allgemeine
allgemeine
hat er doch keinebeliebige
Materieund keinebeliebige
Form,da er sichetwa
von dem allgemeinen
Steinoder dem allgemeinenPferdunterscheidet.
Die
des
Menschen
ist
durch
den
bzw.
die
DefiAllgemeinheit allgemeinen
Begriff
nitiondes Menscheneingeschrnkt.
Der Menschistein vernunftbegabtes
Sinnenwesen.
Zwar mu man die Definitionsbestandteile
und
"vernunftbegabt"
"Sinnenwesen"
von den Teilen "Leib" und "Seele" unterscheiden,
da etwa
"Sinnenwesen"
die Gattungangibtund "vernunftbegabt"
denArtunterschied,
aberweder"Leib" noch "Seele"die Gattungoder den Artunterschied
angeund eristvernunftbegabt,
erist
ben;so istderMenschzwarein Sinnenwesen
kein
Leib
er
ist
und
auch
keine
Seele.14
Dennoch
soll
die
Definition
des
jedoch
Menschendie Grenzender Allgemeinheit
der menschlichen
Materieund
Formangeben.
n) Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.(143),a.3 corp.
art.(149).Einegeschichtsphilosophische
q. 5 a.2 corp.
zuInDeTrin.
sichinLafleur,
ettripartition
.
'Abstraction,
Untersuchung
q. 5.a.3.findet
sparation
12)Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.(149).Vgl.auchPatt,
beiThomas
von
28.
Aauin,
q. 5 a.3 corp.
Metaphysik
13)Vgl.In De Trin.
intellectus
communiter
abstrait
[sic]a materia
q. 5 a. 2 ad2 (144):"unde
. .,nonautem
a materia
communi
inscientia
naturali
."
signata.
14)Vgl.De enteetess.c.II (372).

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univerdie durchdie abstractio

materiellen
Die allgemeinen
Gegenstnde,
indivineben
den
keine
sollen
erkannt
salisa particulari
werden,
Gegenstnde
sein.
enthalten
ihnen
in
sondern
duellenmateriellen
gleichsam
Gegenstnden,
Positionals gemigter
blicherweisewird diese universalientheoretische
Realismusbezeichnet.Die thomasischenallgemeinenmateriellenGegenstndesind keineIdeen im SinnePiatons,weil sie wegenihrerallgemeinen
sind.Thomaslehntin In De Trin.die AnnahmederIdeen
Materiemateriell
er Menschist,keineplatoPiatonsab.15Somitistauch derMensch,insofern
materieller
nischeIdee, sondernein allgemeiner
Gegenstand,der in jedem
von
derMateriegetrennt.16
Er
ist
nicht
ist.
einzelnenMenschen"enthalten"
Nach Thomasgibtes also allgemeinematerielle
(z. B. den allgeGegenstnde
meinenMenschen)und individuellematerielleGegenstnde(z. B. diesen
MenschenA). Die allgemeinenmateriellen
Gegenstndewerdendurchdie
Sie exiabernichtgeschaffen.
zwarerkannt,
a particulari
universalis
abstractio
nichtneben,sonderngleichsam,
stierenauch ohnedieseabstractio
, allerdings
Natrlichwirft
materiellen
wie gesagt,in den individuellen
Gegenstnden.
wo
denn
etwa
PositionwichtigeFragenauf,
dieseontologische
die,
genausich
wenn es sich bei ihnen
die allgemeinenmateriellen
Gegenstndebefinden,
IdeenPiatonshandelnsoll?An welchemOrtbefindet
nichtum die abstrakten
er jeweilsgenauan den
derallgemeineMensch?Existiert
sichbeispielsweise
Wenn
Menschenexistieren?
an denen die individuellen
Raum-Zeit-Stellen,
nein,wo dann?Wennja, wiekannes sein,da einundderselbeGegenstand
rumlich
voneinander
an mehreren,
Mensch- sichgleichzeitig
derallgemeine
insofern
da
dies
man
knnte
Vielleicht
Ortenbefindet?
sagen,
getrennten
so da sichein
Menschgleichsamaufteilt,
mglichist,als sichderallgemeine
an einemvon x verTeil von ihmam Ort x und ein andererTeil gleichzeitig
nichtim SinneThoDiese Antwortwrefreilich
schiedenenOrt y befindet?
ist, da sich der allgemeineMensch
mas, der vielmehrder Auffassung
an x undybefinden
sowohlanx alsauchanybefindet,
vorausgesetzt
vollstndig
Menschen.WaredannderallgemeineMenschan x und der
sichindividuelle
Wrdensie
ein und derselbeGegenstand?
Menschan y tatschlich
allgemeine
ihrerrumlichenKoordinaten(zu einem
sich nichtzumindesthinsichtlich
Ferner:Hrt der allgemeineMensch
gegebenenZeitpunkt)unterscheiden?
Menschenmehrgibt?Diese
wenn es keineindividuellen
auf zu existieren,
15)Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.(I42f.).
q. 5 a. 2 corp.
16)InDe Trin.
materiam
insuiratione
includunt
art.(143): ..singularia
signaq. 5 a. 2 corp.
InDe Trin.
communem..r
materiam
uero
uniuersalia
tam,
q. 5 a. 3 corp.art.(149):"...inci
Funote
auch
13.
a sensibilibus
. . uniuersalia
utponerent.
inerrorem
derunt
separata..Vgl.

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163

Fragemtebejahtwerden,wennderallgemeineMenschnur"in"den individuellenMenschenexistiert.
Andererseits
drfte
es dannheutebeispielsweise
keinallgemeines
Mammutgeben,weil es kein individuelles
Mammutmehr
gibt.Wie wrenachThomasin diesemFallheutenocheinewissenschaftliche,
alsoallgemeine
MteernichtdochannehAussageberMammutsmglich?
da
die
materiellen
zumindestinsofern
ideell
men,
allgemeinen
Gegenstnde
im SinnePiatonssind,als sie unabhngigvon ihrenwirklichen
Exemplaren
existieren
knnen?Knntensie dannabernochmateriell
sein?
Wie dem auch sei,Thomasist derAuffassung,
da es sowohlallgemeine
als auch individuelle
materielle
werGegenstndegibt.Jetztsoll untersucht
seien sie individuelloder
den, in welcherWeise aus diesenGegenstnden,
sichdie mathematischen
seinerAnsichtnach"herausallgemein,
Gegenstnde
ziehen"lassen.

III. Allgemeineund individuellemathematische

Gegenstnde
Auch die Mathematiksoll sich als Disziplinder theoretischen
Philosophie
ausschlielich
mitsolchenDingenbefassen,
die nichtdurchdieTtigkeitdes
Menschenentstehen,
ihreGegenstndesollen nichtdurchden Menschen
erschaffen
werden.17
Darin stimmtThomasmitderklassischen
Mathematik
nicht
berein,nach der die mathematischen
Gegenstnde
gedanklichkonnicht
erfundenbzw. erschaffen,
sondernentdecktwerden.Diese
struiert,
Positionistalt,siefindetsichbereitsin PiatonsEuthydemos
, wo vondenMeRechnernund Sternkundigen
da
sie "ihreFiguren
knstlern,
wird,
gesagt
und Zahlenreihen
nichtmachen,sonderndiesesindschon,undsie findensie
nurauf,wie sie sind."18
AuchAristoteles
istaufdem GebietderMathematik
Realist.19
Maurerbetont,da die realistische
von derMathematik
Auffassung
im gesamten13. Jahrhundert
insbesondere
auch bei Alberwurde,
akzeptiert
tus Magnus,RobertusKilwardbyund im allgemeinenbei den Magistern
17)ZurStellung
derMathematik
imthomasischen
dertheoretischen
System
Philosophie
vgl.
"The
Position
ofMathematics',
u.Patt,
beiThomas
von
Whittaker,
43-47.
Metaphysik
Aquin,
18)Piaton,
Smtliche
Werke
10vol.(Frank,290b,c,inPiaton
,ed.Karlheinz
Hlser,
Euthydemos
furt
amMain-Leipzig,
vol.3,323.
1991),
19)Vgl.J.Annas,
'DieGegenstnde
derMathematik
beiAristoteles,
inMathematics
andMetain
ed.Andreas
Graeser
Annas
Aristotle,
dort
1987),131-147.
physics
(Bern-Stuttgart,
bespricht
insbesondere
auchdenAbstraktionsbegrifF
desAristoteles.
Zumontologischen
Status
dermathematischen
beiAristoteles
Aristotle
andMathematics.
J.Cleary,
Objekte
vgl.auchJohn
Aporetic
Method
inCosmology
andMetaphysics
York-Kln,
(Leiden-New
1995),268-344.

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der Knstein Paris.20

Wir werdenallerdingssehen,da nach Thomaseine
besondereVerstandesttigkeit,
die abstractio
, dazu erforderlich
ist,um
forrnae
die mathematischen
zu erfassen,
diese
Gegenstnde
wenngleich
Gegenstnde
nichtdurchdieseTtigkeitkonstruiert
werden.21
Nach derin denVorbemerkungen
Definition
2 istx genaudann
genannten
wenngilt:
GegenstandderMathematik,
dann existiert
auch Materie.
(1) Wennx existiert,
(2) Die Definitionvon x sagtnichtaus, da x materiellist.
Die Bedingung(2) ist,wieeingangserwhnt,
nichtohneweiteres
damitgleichzusetzen,da die Definitionvon x aussagt,da x nichtmateriell
ist,aus ihr
alleinfolgtinsbesondere
da
mathematische
nichtmateriell
nicht,
Gegenstnde
sind.Thomasist gleichwohlderAnsicht,da diese Gegenstndein derTat
nichtmateriell
Formensein.Zwarsprichtergelesind,sie sollenquantitative
da
die
mathematischen
davon,
gentlich
Gegenstndemateriellgemder
materiaintelligibilis
nur
sind, handeltes sichbei dieserMaterieumeineMaterieimbertragenen
Sinn:Ein mathematischer
istmateriell
Gegenstand
gem
dermateria
wenn
er
als
"Stoff"
oder
"Mittel"innerhalb
dann,
intelligibilis
gerade
einesmathematischen
Beweisesverwendet
wird.22
Diese abgeleitete,
imGrunde
"
von materia soll an dieserStelle
quivoke,bestenfalls
analogeVerwendung
nichtweiterinteressieren.
Somitergibtsichfolgendemodifizierte
Definition:
Definition2': x istgenaudannGegenstandderMathematik,
wenngilt:
dann existiert
auch Materie.
(1) Wennx existiert,
(2) x istnichtmateriell.
20)Vgl.Maurer,
'Thomists
andThomas
60.
Aquinas',
21)Anderson,
Matter
andtheObjects
ofMathematics',
diethomasische
'Intelligibel
vergleicht
derMathematik
mitderaristotelischen.
Erstellt
sowohl
Gemeinsamkeiten
alsauch
Philosophie
Unterschiede
heraus
undbemerkt
indiesem
danach
vieler
KomZusammenhang,
Auffassung
mentatoren
diemathematischen
nachThomas
eineArtZwischenstatus
htten:
Gegenstnde
w.. . they
areneither
ofreason
norrealbeings,
butshare
features
ofboth"
purely
beings
(vgl.559,
Funote
dierealistische
Position
desThomas
13).DieseInterpretation
der
gibt
jedoch
bezglich
mathematischen
miverstndlich
dennnachThomas
haben
diemathemawieder,
Gegenstnde
tischen
keinen
wieauchimmer
eines
Produkts
desmenschlichen
Gegenstnde
gearteten
Aspekt
Geistes.
Ebenso
istAndersons
da
nach
Thomas
die
mathematischen
Behauptung,
Gegenstnde
to physical
zumindest
Quantitten
physikalischen
korrespondieren
(correspond
quantities),
andAquinas',
sindQuantitten
mathematisch
und
255).FrThomas
unprzise
(vgl.Aristotle
diesen
sollen
keine
mathematischen
sondern
diemathematischen
Gegenstnde
korresponieren>
sollen
dieseQuantitten
sein.
Gegenstnde
22)Vgl.InDeTrin.
q. 5 a. 3 ad4 (150).

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165

Die mathematischen
und in arithmeGegenstndewerdenin geometrische
tischeunterteilt,
wobei der ursprngliche
der
Geometrieder
Gegenstand
der
die Einheitist.23ThoPunkt, ursprngliche
GegenstandderArithmetik
mas kenntdie Arithmetik
aus Boethius'De institutione
arithmetica
und die
Geometrie
ausEuklidsElementa
Betrachten
wir
die
geometriae.1A
(abgeleiteten)
Linie,Flchebzw.Figurund Krper.Nach Defigeometrischen
Gegenstnde
nitionT existieren
dieseGegenstnde
nurdann,wennMaterieexistiert,
ohne
da sie selbstmateriell
sind.Wie hatmandas zu verstehen?
Nach Thomasist
einesmatejedermathematische
GegenstandeinAkzidenz,eineEigenschaft,
riellenGegenstandes,
der dann derjeweiligeTrgerdieserEigenschaft
ist.25
Insofern
die mathematischen
im
und
die
Gegenstnde allgemeinen
genannten
im besonderen
materieller
geometrischen
Gegenstnde
Eigenschaften
Gegenstndesind,existieren
sie nurdann,wennMaterieexistiert.
Auchwenndie
mathematischen
Gegenstndenichtmateriellsind,so impliziertdoch ihre
Existenzdie Existenzvon Materie,weilihreExistenzdie Existenzmaterieller
und die Existenzmaterieller
die ExiTrgerimpliziert
Trgertrivialerweise
stenzvon Materieimpliziert.
Obwohl die mathematischen
Gegenstndean
die Existenzmaterieller
Trgergebundensind, geht die Materialittihrer
der
Trgernichtauf sie ber.Insbesonderefolgtaus der Nichtmaterialitt
mathematischen
da
sie
keine
materiellen
Teile materieller
Gegenstnde,
sind.
Gegenstnde
Die Gegenstnde
derNaturphilosophie
werdenvermgeihrerjeweilsverschiedenenArtzugehrigkeit,
ihrerjeweilsverschiedenen
Definitionunterschieden.
Die individuellen
a usw.- sind
Gegenstnde derMenschA,dasPferd
als individuelleGegenstndefurdie Naturphilosophie
nichtvon Interesse.
LtsichEntsprechendes
in BezugaufdieMathematik
sagen?SinddieGegenstnde der Mathematikalso allgemeineGegenstnde?Der Mathematiker
sollzwarebensowie derNaturphilosoph
eineAbstraktion
nursoll
vollziehen,
es bei der mathematischen
Abstraktion
um das "Herausziehen"
bestimmter
Formengehen,so da diese Abstraktion
abstractio
der
, Abstraktion
formae
Formgenanntwird.26
Die Form,die durchdie abstractio
formaeabstrahiert,

23)Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.Vgl.auch
art.,
q. 5 a. 3 ad6 (151),SthI q. 1 a. 2 corp.
q. 3 a. 5 corp.
'Notesurl'abstraction
488.
Winance,
mathmatique',
24)Vgl.Maurer,
"Ihomists
andThomas
59.
Aquinas',
25)Vgl.InDeTrin.
enim
materia
sensibilis
ad,lineam
sicut
q. 5 a. 3 ad2 (150):"non
comparatur
setmas
sicut
subiectum
inquoesse
etsimiliter
estdesuperficie
etcorpore
."
habet;
pars,
26)Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.(149).
q. 5 a. 3 corp.

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/Vivarium
A.Krause

"
Formzusam, wird,ist nichtdie Form,die als individuelle
herausgezogen"
materiellen
Materieeinenindividuellen
men miteinerindividuellen
Gegenstandbildet(etwadie Form- die Seele- des MenschenA), sie istauch nicht
die als allgemeineFormzusammen
die Formeinesmateriellen
Gegenstandes,
bilmateriellen
Materieeinenallgemeinen
miteinerallgemeinen
Gegenstand
det (etwadie Form- die Seele- des Menschenals Menschen),sondernsie ist
die
undzwarentweder
Formdiesesmateriellen
die quantitative
Gegenstandes,
Mathematik
soll
demnach
die
Form.
Die
arithmetische
oder
die
geometrische
erfasFormeinesmateriellen
oderarithmetische
Gegenstandes
geometrische
eine
Zahl
aus
Kreis
einer
Mnze27
oder
sie
einen
aus
sen,etwadann,wenn
Sollendiese Formennun aber
"herauszieht".
Kollektion28
einerbestimmten
sollen
also
die
durchdie abstractio
oder
individuell
sein,
formae
allgemein
die Gegenstndeder Mathematik,
erfatenGegenstnde,
allgemeinsein,so
der
a particulari
erfaten
universalis
wie die durchdie abstractio
Gegenstnde
Da
die
sein?
sollen
sie
individuell
oder
sind,
Naturphilosophie
allgemein
als
solche
eine
und
eine Disziplindertheoretischen
Mathematik
Philosophie
sein soll, wirdsie sich letztlichum allgemeineAussagen,um
Wissenschaft
AussagenberallgemeineGegenstndebemhenmssen.Insofernwerden
von der
Arten29,
Gegenstnde,mathematische
allgemeinemathematische
Thomas
auch
individuelle
es
nach
erfat.
abstractio
Allerdingsgibt
formae
wiretwaseineReaktionauf einen
mathematische
Gegenstnde.Betrachten
vonderMaterieabsieht.
EinwandgegenseineAnnahme,da die Mathematik
Der Einwandlautetwie folgt:
betrachtet
dieGeraden,
Art.AberderMathematiker
AlleGeraden
sindvonderselben
betrachten.
nicht
unddasQuadrat
knnte
erdasDreieck
ersiezhlt,
andernfalls
indem
undderArt
siesichderZahlnachunterscheiden
insofern
erdieLinien,
Alsobetrachtet
diederArtnach
fur
dieDinge,
desUnterscheidens
dasPrinzip
Aber
nachbereinstimmen.
betrachtet.30
vomMathematiker
dieMaterie
. . . Alsowird
istdieMaterie
bereinstimmen,
27)Vgl.SthI q. 40a. 3 corp.
art.
28)Vel.SthIq. 11a. 3 ad2.
29)Vgl.InDeTrin.
SthI q. 7 a. 4 ad2,q. 85a. 1ad2.
q. 5 a. 3 ad3 (150),
"Omnes
30)InDe Trin.
eiusdem
Setmathematicus
recte
sunt
linee
a.
3
3
5
(145):
speciei.
q.
arg.
consietquadratum;
numerando
lineas
rectas
considrt
eas,aliasnonconsideraret
ergo
triangulum
hisque
Setprincipium
numero
etconueniunt
secundum
drt
lineas
differendi
specie.
quoddifferunt
Eineetwas
a mathematico
materia
consideratur
. . Ergo
estmateria.
conueniunt
secundum
speciem
Trinitt.
Eine
ber
die
von
in
Thomas
findet
sich
deutsche
andere
Auslegung
Aquin,
bersetzung
von
De trinitate
Inlibrum
Boethii
desBoethius.
dergleichnamigen
bersetzung
exposition
Schrift
HansLentz
1988),206.
(Stuttgart,

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167

Es wirdalso so argumentiert:
Alle Geradensindvon derselbenArt.
Der Mathematiker
zhltdieseGeraden.
Also betrachtet
derMathematiker
GegenstndeinnerhalbeinerArt.
Man kannnurdann GegenstndeinnerhalbeinerArtbetrachten,
wenn
man nichtvon derMaterieabsieht,die diese Gegenstndeindividuiert.
nichtvon der Materieab.
(5) Also siehtderMathematiker
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Bei diesemArgument
sei einmalvorausgesetzt,
da die Aussage(1) wahrist.
Das ist insofernnichtabwegig,als man individuelleGeradenzu einerArt
zusammenfassen
kann, indem man Geradenals bestimmtePunktmengen
die
definiert, gewissenAxiomengengen.(2) wird vom Einwand damit
da manandernfalls
Dreieckeund Quadratenichtunterscheiden
begrndet,
knnte.Dies leuchtetein,da bei derDefinitionvon n-Eckendie Anzahlder
Seitenzumindestimplizitrelevantist.Aus (1) und (2) folgt(3), aus (3) und
Thomaskritisiert
an dieser
(4) folgt(5). SomitwrederEinwandberechtigt.
(2) oder (3), die implizieren,
berlegungnun nichtetwadie Behauptungen
da es individuellemathematische
Gegenstndegibt,sonderndie Behaup31
Der
erste
Grund
frdie Unterscheidung
dessen,was
tung(4).
eigentliche,
zurselbenArtgehrt,sei nichtdie Materie,sonderndie verschiedene
Lageim
Raum. Die Ursachefurdie zahlenmige
Verschiedenheit
ist,so Thomasan
andererStelle,die rumliche
Verschiedenheit.32
Diese Aussagenstehennuraufden erstenBlickimWiderspruch
zurseiner
wonachdie materia
dermateriellen
Ansicht,
signatadas Individuationsprinzip
, so wirdjetztdeutlich,soll gerade
Gegenstndeist,denndie materiasignata,
ihrer
rumlichen
individuieren
knnen.Da es sichbei den
wegen
Verteilung
mathematischen
Gegenstndenum nichtmaterielle
Gegenstndehandelt,
knnensie, so darfman Thomasinterpretieren,
direktaufgrundihrerverschiedenen
rumlichen
ohneUmwegberdie materia
,
Lage,gleichsam
signata
individuiert
werden.DaherkannderMathematiker
von derMaterieabsehen
undindividuelle
Geradenaufgrund
ihrerverschiedenen
Lageim Raumunterscheiden.33
zu
den
mathematischen
sehrwohl
Folglichgehren
Gegenstnden
31)Vgl.InDeTrin.
q. 5 a. 3 ad3 (150).
32)Vgl.InDe Trin.
lociconsideretur
secundum
suam
q. 4 a. 4 corp.art.(132):"setsidiuersitas
sicplanum
estquoddiuersitas
beiestcausadiuersitatis
secundum
numerum.n
causam,
33)Vgl.auchInDeTrin.
art.(129):"Inmathematicis
enim
non
ratio
q.4 a.3 corp.
potest
assignari
diuersitatis
harum
duarum
linearum
nisi
situm"
propter

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74

individuelle
die sichdannaufgrund
ihrerLage im RaumunterGegenstnde,
scheidenlassen.Wenn man mitThomasannimmt,da individuelle
mathematischeGegenstndeEigenschaften
individueller
materieller
Gegenstnde
da sich verschiedene
sind,und wenn man fernervoraussetzt,
individuelle
materielle
nicht
an
derselben
Raumstelle
befinden
Gegenstnde
gleichzeitig
auch dies tutThomas 34,dannkannmanmitihmderAuffassung
sein,da
sich verschiedene
individuellemathematische
zu
einem
Gegenstnde
gegebenen Zeitpunktan verschiedenen
Raumstellenbefinden.Wenn beispielsweisezweiMnzenzu einemZeitpunkt
verschiedene
Raumstellen
einnehmen,
dann nehmenauch die beidenKreise,die Eigenschaften
dieserMnzensein
Raumstellen
ein. Zwarsindmathesollen,zu diesemZeitpunktverschiedene
matischeGegenstndenachDefinition2' nichtmateriell,
sie knnenjedoch
insofern
im Raum sein,als sich ihremateriellen
Trgerim Raum befinden.
Getrenntvon ihrenTrgernsind die mathematischen
Gegenstndefreilich
- berhauptnicht
insofernunrumlich,
als es sie- getrennt
gibt.35Folglich
sind sie keine Formenim Sinne Piatons.Sie knnennur "an" materiellen
siegetrennt
von ihnenbetrachtet
werden
existieren,
Gegenstnden
wenngleich
knnen.36
Die beidenKreisehabenalso insofern
eine verschiedene
Lage im
als
sie
eines
sich
im
Raum
befindenden
Raum,
materiellen
jeweilsEigenschaft
sind.
Gegenstandes
Haltenwirfest,da es sowohlallgemeineals auch individuelle
mathematischeGegenstnde
beide
werden
durch
die
abstractio
gibt,
formaeerfat.In
welcherBeziehung,
in welcherReihenfolge
hinsichtlich
derErkenntnis
stehen
dieseGegenstndeim Prozederabstractio
formaeiEs lassensichprinzipiell
dreimglicheFlleauseinanderhalten:
Die abstractio
formaeerfat
mathematischen
(a) zunchstdie individuellen
Gegenstndeund aus diesen
die allgemeinen
mathematischen
Gegenstnde
oder
(b) zunchstdie allgemeinenmathematischen
Gegenstndeund aus diesen
die individuellen
mathematischen
Gegenstnde
oder
34)Vgl.InDeTrin.
art.(128f.),
a. 4 corp.
art.(132).
q. 4 a. 3 corp.
35)Vgl.InDe Trin.
inerrorem
utponerent
mathemaq. 5 a. 3 corp.art.(149):".. . inciderunt
tica.. . a sensibilibus
nonsubsistunt
separata..SthI q. 5 a. 3 ad4: ". . . mathematica
separata
secundum
esse.
. ."
36)Vgl.Maurer,
'Thomists
andThomas
hatklargesehen,
59.Thomas
daauchbei
Aquinas',
Aristoteles
dieabstrahierten
zwar
abernicht
alsgetrennt
betrachtet
werGegenstnde
getrennt,
den.Vgl.Aubenque,
Abstraktion
P,43.

15:42:04 PM

46 (2008)155-174
A.Krause
/Vivarium

169

(c) sowohl die individuellenals auch die allgemeinenmathematischen

aus
gewissermaen
gleichzeitig
Gegenstndeunabhngigvoneinander,
den gegebenenmateriellen
Gegenstnden.
Kreises.Es knnte
Ein Beispiel:Eine Mnzehabedie Formeinesbestimmten
Kreisund aus diesein,da die abstractio
formaezunchstden individuellen
Kreiserfat,
es knnteaberauch sein,da sie zunchst
semden allgemeinen
Kreiserfat,
und es
Kreisund aus diesemden individuellen
den allgemeinen
Kreis
knnteschlielichsein,da sie beideKreise,sowohlden individuellen
voneinander
aus der
derMnze als auch den allgemeinen
Kreis,unabhngig
Da es sich
Mnze erfat.WelcherderdreiFlleistnachThomaszutreffend?
bei derMathematikum eineWissenschaft
handelt,wirdes ihrletztlichum
mathegehen,so da die allgemeinen
Aussagenberallgemeine
Gegenstnde
Ziel
der
abstractio
sind.
Auermatischen
das
formae
Gegenstnde eigentliche
mathematischen
demsollendie mathematischen
Arten,d. h. die allgemeinen
materiellen
sonnicht
nur
aus
den
individuellen
Gegenstnden,
Gegenstnde,
materiellen
abstrahiert
dernauchaus den allgemeinen
werden,
Gegenstnden
sondernauch von der allgemeinen
indemnichtnurvon der individuellen,
"
.. a
Materieabgesehenwird: Speciesautemmathematicae
possuntabstrahi.
Demnachgilt
materiasensibilinonsolumindividulused etiamcommuni"01
zweierlei:
mathematischen
werdenaus individuSatz 1: Die allgemeinen
Gegenstnde
abstrahiert.
ellenmateriellen
Gegenstnden
mathematischen
werdenaus allgemeinen
Satz 2: Die allgemeinen
Gegenstnde
materiellen
abstrahiert.
Gegenstnden
der Frage,in welcherBezieWegenSatz 1 istklar,da Thomashinsichtlich
die
individuellen
und
mathematischen
allgemeinen
Gegenstnde
hung
im Prozederabstractio
denneineAbstrakformaestehen,Fall (a) favorisiert,
tionallgemeiner
mathematischer
materiellen
Gegenstndeaus individuellen
ist
nur
ber
individuelle
mathematische
Gegenstnden
Gegenstnde
mglich,
so da diese Abstraktion
aus zwei Teilprozessenbesteht,einem ersten,in
dem aus individuellen
materiellen
individuellemathematische
Gegenstnden
werden,und einemzweiten,in demaus diesen
Gegenstnde
"herausgezogen"
37)SthI q. 85a. 1 ad2. Vgl.Neumann,
undMethode,
111:"Diemathematischen
Gegenstand
knnen
sowohl
vondersingulren
wieallgemeinen
Sinnesmaterie
abstrahiert
Gegenstnde
. . ."Vgl.auchWinance,
werden
'Notesurl'abstraction
491.
mathmatique',

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)155-174

individuellen
mathematischen
mathematische
Gegenstnden
allgemeine
Gegenstnde"herausgezogen"
werden.
dieseszweitenTeilprozesses
lt sich fragen,ob Thomasdem
Angesichts
von
Lorenzen38
zustimmen
wrde,gem dem bei der
Abstraktionsbegriff
Abstraktion
im Grundenichtsanderesgeschieht,
als da in neuerWeisevon
altenGegenstnden
erschaffen
wird,jedochkeineneuenGegenstnde
geredet
werden,wobei dieses"neueReden"dadurcherfolgen
soll,da man sichauf
beschrnktund Aussageformen,
die
sogenannteinvarianteAussageformen
nichtinvariant
als
zurckweist.
DemnachliegteinAbstraktisind, unzulssig
onsprozegenau dann vor,wenn man lediglichbezglicheinergewhlten
invariante
HierbeiisteineAusquivalenzrelation
Aussageformen
akzeptiert.
.
dann
invariant
einer
A(. .) genau
sageform
bezglich
gegebenen
quivalenzrelationR, wennfralle x, y aus der BeziehungxRy folgt,da die Aussage
A(x) genau dann gilt,wenn die AussageA(y) gilt. Bei der Abstraktion
beschrnkt
mansichalso aufdiejenigen
sichnicht
Aussagen,derenGltigkeit
wenn
man
die
relevante
Konstante
durcheinezu ihrgemR quivandert,
lente Konstanteersetzt.Ein Beispielaus der Schulmathematik:
Betrachtet
werdendie Menge derpositivengemeinenBrcheund die Mengederpositivenrationalen
Zahlen.Gehtmanvon dererstenaufdie zweiteMengeber,
wirdinsofern
eineAbstraktion
im SinneLorenzensvollzogen,als man dann
nurAussagenzult,derenGltigkeit
sichbei Ersetzung
einesBruchesdurch
einendazu quivalentenBruchnichtndert,man beschrnkt
sich also auf
einer
invariante
Die
bestimmte,
bezglich
quivalenzrelation
Aussageformen.
wrein diesemFall die Relation,die Brchegenaudann
quivalenzrelation
alsquivalentansieht,wennderenZhlerundNennerberkreuz
multipliziert
das gleicheProduktergeben.
KnnteThomasdiesemAbstraktionsverstndnis
furden zweitenTeilproze
derobengeschilderten
Abstraktion
mathematischer
allgemeiner
Gegenstnde
- der Abstraktion
aus individuellenmateriellenGegenstnden
allgemeiner
mathematischer
mathematischen
Gegenstndeaus individuellen
Gegenstnden- zustimmen?
Dazu mteereinequivalenzrelation
angeben,durchdie
die individuellen
mathematischen
zu MengenjeweilsuntereinGegenstnde
anderquivalenter
individueller
mathematischer
Gegenstndezusammengefat werden.Von der Verschiedenheit
der individuellenmathematischen
Gegenstndein diesenMengenmteabgesehenwerden.Die Menge aller
Geradenknnteeine solcheMengesein,die MengeallerKreiseeine andere.
38)Vgl. zum Folgenden
Paul Lorenzen,
Lehrbuch
derkonstruktiven
Wissenschaftstheorie
(Mannheim-Wien-Zrich,
1987),161-169.

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46 (2008)155-174

171

Die Abstraktion
wrdedadurchgeschehen,da man nur solcheAussageformenzult,die bezglichderquivalenzrelation
invariant
sind,also nur
solcheAussagen,derenGltigkeit
sichbei derErsetzungdes Ausdrucks,
der
fiireinebestimmte
einzelneGeradesteht,durcheinenAusdruck,
derfreine
anderebestimmteeinzelneGerade steht,ebensowenigndert,wie bei der
einzelnenKreissteht,
Ersetzungdes Ausdrucks,der fiireinen bestimmten
durcheinenAusdruck,der fureinen anderenbestimmten
einzelnenKreis
steht.Man tutnurso,alsob manberneueGegenstnde,
berdie allgemeine
Geradeoder berden allgemeinenKreis,redet,obwohlman nurin neuer
Weiseberdie altenGegenstnde,
also berdie einzelnenGeradenund Kreise
redet.VerbotensindsolcheStzewie "Die Geradea hatkeinenAnfangsund
keinenEndpunkt",solangedamitetwasanderesgesagtwirdals mitdem Satz
"Die Geradeb hat keinenAnfangs-und keinenEndpunkt".Werdendiese
beidenStzeals tautologisch
da sie ein und denselbenSachverhalt
angesehen,
den
da
Geraden
keinenAnfangs-und keinenEndSachverhalt,
aussagen,
sind
sie
punkthaben,
zugelassen.
Bei einerderartigen
Abstraktionsverfahrens
Anwendungdes geschilderten
wrefreilich
zu
durch
welche
klren,
einiges
beispielsweise,
quivalenzrelation genau die individuellenmathematischen
Gegenstndein bestimmte
werden.Sehr
Mengen,etwain die Mengeder Geraden,Kreiseusw.sortiert
wahrscheinlich
wrdeThomasdas Lorenzensche
Verstndnis
vonAbstraktion
abernichtakzeptieren.
Zwarvertritt
auch er die Auffassung,
da durchdie
Abstraktion
keineneuen Gegenstndegeschaffen
nur
werden,
folgtdas fr
ihndaraus,da sie schonin derextramentalen
Weltsind,so da mansie nur
entdeckenmu, whrendes diese neuen Gegenstndenach Lorenzennur
scheinbar
gibt,wirwrdennurso reden,als ob es sie gibt.Nach Thomaswerden wederdie individuellen
noch die allgemeinenmathematischen
Gegenstndekonstruiert,
vielmehrsind sie schonda und es kommtdaraufan, sie
zu erfassen.
Auerdemsoll es die Mathematikals
vermgederAbstraktion
Teil dertheoretischen
mit
Philosophie Dingenzu tunhaben,die nichtdurch
dieTtigkeit
desMenschenentstehen,
dieseDinge knnenfolglich
keineProduktedermenschlichen
Redeweisesein.
Nach Satz2 werdendie allgemeinen
mathematischen
aus den
Gegenstnde
materiellen
abstrahiert.
Da
das
dieser
allgemeinen
Gegenstnden
Endergebnis
Abstraktion
wiederumdie in Satz 1 genanntenallgemeinen
mathematischen
der allgemeinenmathematischen
Gegenstndesind,liefertdie Abstraktion
aus
den
individuellen
materiellen
berdie indiviGegenstnde
Gegenstnden
duellenmathematischen
dasselbe
Gegenstnde
Ergebniswie die Abstraktion
derallgemeinen
mathematischen
ausdenallgemeinen
materiellen
Gegenstnde

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wobeibei derletztenAbstraktion
wird,da die
Gegenstnden,
angenommen
materiellen
aus
den
individuellen
materiellen
allgemeinen
Gegenstnde
universalis
a particularierfatwerden.
Gegenstndendurchdie abstractio
Diese Zusammenhnge
lassensichveranschaulichen:
individueller
materieller
materieller
Gegenstand individueller
Gegenstand
(MnzeA)
(MnzeA)
1
individueller
mathematischer
derMnzeA)
Gegenstand(Kreisform

I
materieller
allgemeiner
Gegenstand
Mnze)
(allgemeine

i
mathematischer
allgemeiner
Gegenstand(allgemeineKreisform)

i
mathematischer
allgemeiner
Kreisform)
Gegenstand(allgemeine

Sowohl der linksals auch der rechtsdargestellte

Ablaufliefertallgemeine
mathematische
Nun
sich
aber
aus der Verschiedenheit
Gegenstnde.
ergibt
dieserAblufe,da der Begriff
der abstractio
ist,denn
formaemehrdeutig
das Abstrahieren
mathematischer
aus individuellen
allgemeiner
Gegenstnde
materiellen
berindividuellemathematische
Gegenstnden
Gegenstndeist
etwasanderesals das Abstrahieren
mathematischer
allgemeiner
Gegenstnde
aus allgemeinen
materiellen
dieser
Gegenstnden,
mgensichdie Ergebnisse
auchnichtunterscheiden.
Die Mehrdeutigkeit
desBegriffs
Abstraktionsvorgnge
derabstractio
resultiert
weiter
da
durch
die
abstractio
daraus,
formae
formae
nichtnurdie allgemeinen
mathematischen
Gegenstndegewonnenwerden,
sondernauch die individuellen
mathematischen
und zwaraus
Gegenstnde,
den individuellen
materiellen
denn es ist offensichtlich,
da
Gegenstnden,
etwader individuelleKreisnuraus einemindividuellen
materiellen
Gegenstandabstrahiert
werdenkann.Thomassprichtzwarauch davon,da man
sichmehrere
individuelle
mathematische
innerhalb
einermatheGegenstnde
matischenArtvorstellen( ymaginari
) knne.39Dieses Vorstellenist jedoch
nicht das Abstrahieren
dieser Gegenstndeaus individuellenmateriellen
sondern
der rumlichen
Gegenstnden,
Ergebnisdes Bercksichtigens
Lage
dermathematischen
Gegenstnde.
Es ergebensichalso dreiverschiedene
Typenderabstractio
formae:
39)Vgl.InDeTrin.
q. 5 a. 3 ad3 (150).

15:42:04 PM

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/Vivarium
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173

mathematischer
aus individu(I) dieAbstraktion
allgemeiner
Gegenstnde
ellenmateriellen
Gegenstnden
mathematischer
aus allgemei(II) die Abstraktion
allgemeiner
Gegenstnde
nen materiellen
Gegenstnden
individueller
mathematischer
(III) die Abstraktion
Gegenstndeaus individuellenmateriellen
Gegenstnden.
Hierbeiist(III) einTeilprozevon (I).
- seien sie individuell
Thomaszufolgesind mathematische
Gegenstnde
- Eigenschaften
oder allgemein
materieller
Gegenstnde,und zwarsind,so
knnenwir sagen,individuellemathematische
GegenstndeEigenschaften
individueller
materieller
und
Gegenstnde allgemeinemathematische
GegenstndeEigenschaften
materieller
allgemeiner
Gegenstnde.Wie ein individuellerKreis eine Eigenschaft
eines individuellenmateriellen
kreisrunden
ist
so
der
Kreis
eine
des
ist,
Gegenstandes
allgemeine
Eigenschaft allgemeinen
materiellen
kreisrunden
Da allgemeine
materielle
Gegenstandes.
Gegenstnde
vonderabstractio
universalis
a particulari
erfatwerden,mtederallgemeine
materielle
kreisrunde
betrachtet
werGegenstandvon derNaturphilosophie
den. Ob ThomaswohldieseKonsequenzgezogenhtte?
WendenwirunsnocheinmalderDefinition2' zu. Nach dieserDefinition
istXgenaudannGegenstand
derMathematik,
wenngilt:(1) Wennx existiert,
dannexistiert
auchMaterie,und (2) x istnichtmateriell.
Sowohldie allgemeinen als auch die individuellen
mathematischen
Gegenstndeerfllendiese
denn
wenn
ein
individueller
mathematischer
Definition,
existiert,
Gegenstand
existiert
aucheinindividueller
materieller
vondemderindividuGegenstand,
elle mathematische
ist,und wennein allgemeiGegenstandeine Eigenschaft
ner mathematischer
dann
existiertein allgemeiner
Gegenstandexistiert,
materieller
von dem derallgemeinemathematische
Gegenstand,
Gegenstand
eine Eigenschaft
ist.Auerdemsindwederdie individuellen
noch die allgemeinenmathematischen
Gegenstndemateriell.Aber sollteThomas nicht
auch derAnsichtsein,da man die von derMateriegetrennten
Substanzen,
etwadie Engel,zhlenkann?Sollteerdannnichtzulassen,da ZahlenEigenschaften
vonGegenstnden
seinknnen,die nichtmateriell
sind?Und knnte
man nichtauch dann Engel zhlen,wenn es nur Engel gbe?Generellist
die Annahme,da mathematische
materieller
GegenstndeEigenschaften
Zahlenproblematisch.
In dermodersind,schonfrnatrliche
Gegenstnde
nenMengenlehre
werdendieseZahlenalsbesondereMengenaufgefat,
wobei
dies in verschiedener
Weise geschehenkann. Wenn Zahlen Mengen sind,
dann sindsie zwarkeinemateriellen
wreForderung
Gegenstnde;insofern

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46 (2008)155-174

denn
(2) der Definition2' erfllt.Aber Forderung(1) wre nichterfllt,
natrliche
Zahlenlassensichauch so definieren,
da man lediglichdie leere
Menge und eine "Nachfolgevorschrift"
bentigt,um Mengenzu definieren,
die dannjeweilsmiteinernatrlichen
Zahl identifiziert
werden.So kannman
die Zahlen 0, 1, 2, 3, . . . etwaals 0, {0}, {{0}}, {{{0}}}, . . . oderals 0, {0},
wie es Zermelobzw.von Neu{0, {0}}, {0, {0}, {0, {0}}}, . . . definieren,
manngetanhaben.40Fregebeispielsweise
hat die natrliche
Zahl n mitder
aller
n
die
Elemente
so da, wenn
enthlt,
identifiziert,41
Menge
Mengen,
Zahlenals Eigenschaften
betrachtet
werdensollten,sie als Eigenschaften
von
also als Eigenschaften
von Gegenstnden,
die
wren,42
Mengenaufzufassen
nichtmateriell
sind.Diese so definierten
Zahlenwrendemnachkeinemathematischen
furThomas.Die Frage,ob es vielleicht
andere,nicht
Gegenstnde
aberdennochfurdie moderneMathematik
brauchbare
mengentheoretische,
Definitionsversuche
furdienatrlichen
Zahlengibt,diegeeignet
seinknnten,
der thomasischen
Position,da mathematische
GegenstndeEigenschaften
materieller
istein
Gegenstndesind,einenakzeptablenSinn abzugewinnen,
ThemafureinenanderenAufsatz.

40)Vgl.Heinz-Dieter
indieMengenlehre
Ebbinghaus,
Einfiihrung
(Mannheim-Leipzig-WienZrich,
1994),77.
41)Vgl.Gottlob
DieGrundlagen
derArithmetik.
Einebgisch
mathematische
Frege,
Untersuchung
ber
denBegriff
derZahl,ed.Joachim
Schulte
100.
2005),
(Stuttgart,
42)Quineversucht
indiesem
Sinnefiirdieintuitive
Anschaulichkeit
vonFreges
zu
Fassung
VanOrman
undGegenstand
453.
1993),
Quine,Word
argumentieren.
Vgl.Willard
(Stuttgart,

15:42:04 PM

VIVA
RI UM
www.brill.nl/viv

)
BR1LL

Vivarium
46 (2008)175-191

Insolubilia
Secundum

and the Fallacy

Quid et Simpliciter

CatarinaDutilhNovaes
University
ofAmsterdam
StephenRead
UK
University
ofStAndrews,
Abstract
ThomasBradwardine
makesmuchofthefactthathissolution
totheinsolubles
is in
accordance
withAristotle's
of
the
in
the
Liar
as
that
of
secunfallacy
diagnosis
paradox
dumquidetsimpliciter.
PaulSpade,however,
claimsthatthisinvocation
ofAristotle
by
Bradwardine
is purely
in
order
to
confer
on his
"honorary"
speciousrespectability
andgiveita spurious
ofauthority.
Ouranswer
toSpadefollows
Bradanalysis
weight
wardine
s response
totheproblem
ofrevenge:
of
itself
that
itis
anyproposition
saying
falsesaysmorethandoesBradwardine
s proposition
of
it
that
it
is
and
so
false,
saying
follows
fromthatotherproposition
in
of
of
what
it
and
not
only respect part
says,
.
simpliciter
Keywords
insolubilia'
Bradwardine,
fallacy,
Spade
1. Introduction
It iswidelyrecognized
thatthehistorical
ofLiarparadoxesin the
development
laterMiddleAges,thenknownas Insolubili
relatedto thefala, is intimately
secundum
et
It
is
as
not
clear
lacy
yet
quid simpliciter}
entirely howexactlythe
firstformulations
of insolubilia(or logicalparadoxes)came about (the first
such formulations
are fromthe end of the 12th century),as the possible
L.M.De Rijk,
Modernorum
P.V.Spade,
'Theorigins
ofthemedieval
(Assen,
1962-67);
Logica
Insolubilia-literaturt
Studies
inSpade,
33 (1973),292-309,
and
, Franciscan
Lies,
repr.
Language
intheLateMiddle
inSophisms
andLiars',
in
(London,
1988);C. Martin,
Logic
Ages
'Obligations
Medieval
andGrammar,
ed.S. Read(Dordrecht,
1993).
Logic
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
DOI:10.1163/004275408X31
NV,
Leiden,
1258

15:42:16 PM

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C. Dutilh
Novaes
46 (2008)175-191
, S. Read/Vivarium

ancientsourcessimplydo notseemto offer

enoughmaterialfora full-fledged
realization
oftheirdeeplyparadoxicalnature.Christopher
Martin2
hasargued
thatone ofthemainfactors
in thedevelopment
oftheinsolubilia
convincingly
in
the
Middle
was
the
of
the
medievalkind
genre
Ages
development
typically
oforaldisputation
knownas obligationes.
Indeed,fora successful
performance
in suchdisputations,
itwasessentialto be ableto identify
paradoxical
proposithecasus, was oftenintendedto gentions,as thesetupforsuchdisputations,
erate preciselythis kind of self-referential
statement,and as grantinga
defeat
for
the
the
Nevertheless,
paradoxicalpropositionspelled
respondent.
seemsto be one of thebestcandidatesas
fallacysecundum
quid etsimpliciter
themainancientsourceofinspiration
fortheinsolubilialiterature.
However,Paul VincentSpade has claimedin severalplaces that,while
thehistoricalconnectionis patent,the conceptualconnectionbetweenthis
fallacyand insolubiliais in factrathermeagre.3He saysthattheusesof this
ofinsolubilia
is conceptually
fallacymadebyseveralauthorsin theirtreatment
far
from
what
in
Aristotle
had
intended
his
own
text;such uses, he
very
adds, are at best adaptationsof the originalconceptsdefiningthe fallacy
secundum
. Moreover,
he considerslaterinvocations
of this
quid etsimpliciter
in
treatments
of
in
in
insolubilia
Bradwardine
s
in
solution
,
fallacy
particular
the 14thcentury,
as purely"honorary";4
it was solelyout of respectforthe
- indeed,a fallacyad verecundiam
- thatBradwardine
tradition
invokedthis
in
connection
with
insolubilia
not
on
and
the
basis
of
real
fallacy
conceptual
kinship.
In thispaper,we considerand rejectSpades assessment,
withparticular
to
Bradwardine.
We
will
that
s
in factfits
Bradwardine
solution
respect
argue
into
the
structure
the
secundum
neatly
conceptual
underlying fallacy
quid et
.
s
criticism
stem
from
too
narrow
an
of
may
Spade
simpliciter
understanding
thisfallacy.
we viewthisfallacyas a remarkably
flexible
By contrast,
conceptual framework,
to
a
of
and
but
situations,
variety phenomena
applicable
withoutlosingitscoherence.
2)Martin,
andLiars'.
'Obligations
3)Spade,
'Theorigins
ofthemedieval
Medieval
Liar
: A CataInsolubilia-iiterature;
Spade,The
the
ImoiubWiz-Literature
in
The
'Insolubilia',
(Toronto,
1975);
Spade,
logue
of
Cambridge
History
Medieval
A.Kenny
eds.N. Kretzmann,
andJ.Pinborg
1982),
ofLater
Philosophy,
(Cambridge,
inthemedieval
'Fiveearly
theories
Insolubilia-itetaxur
25 (1987),
, Vivarium
246-52);
Spade,
Insolubles
ofPhilosophy
24-46;Spade,
(Stanford
2005).K.Simmons,
Encyclopedia
Universality
andthe
Liar(Cambridge,
dismissal
ofsecundum
1993)5.2.2,alsorejects
Spade's
quidetsimplicwith
iter
toPseudo-Sherwood's
andOckham's
treatments
ofinsolubles.
respect
4)Spade,
n.46,repeated
'Fiveearly
inSpade,
Insolubles
theories',
2.1.

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177

2. lhe Fallacysecundumquid et simpliciter

is perhapsbestseenas a largeumbrella
secundum
The fallacy
quidetsimpliciter
ofphenomenacan be placed.Thebasicideais that
underwhicha widevariety
attributes
onlyin a
maybelongto a thingin an absolutesense,or bycontrast
a termmaybe predicatedofa thingabsocertainrespector aspect;similarly,
arises
A
in
a
certain
or
respect. fallacysecundum
quid etsimpliciter
lutely, only
taken
as
in
sense
is
a
used
in
"an
an
when,
particular
argument, expression
is
not
a
Such passage
alwaysunwarranted,
thoughit wereused absolutely".5
to tryto identify
but in manycasesit is, and thisis whyit is important
patrelatedto thefactthattermscan applyabsoternsof sophisticalrefutations
lutelyor only in certainrespectsto things.Aristotleclassifiedthe fallacy
as a fallacyextradictionem
secundum
, thatis,a fallacythatis
quid etsimpliciter
usesoflanguage.However,on manyoccasions,it
notdependenton particular
of thiskindis indeed
seemsthatwhatis at therootof a fallaciousargument
in
address
texts
factexplicitly
A
few
medieval
use of language.
theparticular
afterall,6and
thisfallacy
theissueas towhether
maynotbe a fallacyindictione
concludethat it is not, but this indicatesthat the doubt concerningthe
was notuncommon.
ofthisfallacy
classification
sevIn his Sophistical
, Aristotle
proceedsas usualbyproviding
Refutations
ofthisfallacy,
eralexamplesofoccurrences
else,the
and,morethananything
ofexamplessubstanexamplesarethecoreofhisdiscussion.The widevariety
accountflexible
is
a
and
that
this
indeed
tiatestheclaim
umbrella,
fallacy
large
ing fora wide varietyof phenomena.Let us take a look at some of these
ElenchisI67al):
De Sophisticis
The first
comesfromch. 5 (Aristotle,
examples.
then
what
isnotis.7
ofanopinion,
Ifwhat
isnotistheobject
arenot
Theproblemhere,Aristotle
says,is that'to be X" and 'to be simpliciter
while
not
to
be
the
of
In
it
is
thesame. thiscase,
really
object opinion
possible
5)Aristotle,
inDavidRoss
W.A. Pickard-Cambridge,
Elenchis
De Sophisticis
I66b39,transi.
Works
vol.
I.
The
Aristotle,
(Oxford,
1928).
(ed.),
of
6)Dialctica
ofSherwood,
IntroducModernorum
Monacensis
), p.593;William
(DeRijk,
Logica
Libro
in Logicam
tiones
1995),p. 200;SimonofFaversham,
Quaestiones
super
(Hamburg,
DunsScotus,
etal.(Toronto,
, ed.S. Ebbesen
1984)p. 157;John
[sic]Elenchorum
Quaestiones
etal.(St.BonaveninOpera
Elenchorum
Lihrum
Aristotelis,
II,eds.R.Andrews
Philosophica
super
NY- Washington
ture,
DC,2004).
7)Aristoteles
Boethii:
"Siquodnonest
VI 1-3,ed.B. Dod (Leiden,
Latinus
1975)translatio
est,quoniam
quodnonestest."
p. 11.
opinabile

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forexample),forto be theobjectofopinionis to be secun(a chimera,

existing
In thisfallaciousargument,
dumquid, whileto be is to be simpliciter,
then,
adds
is
Aristotle
inferred.
from"tobeX" (secundum
quid), "tobe" {simpliciter)
i.e.
that this confusionarises"becauseof the closenessof the expression,
from'to be'" (l67a4-6),8and thisis an
because"'tobe X* is butlittledifferent
.
closeto a fallacyin dictione
exampleofa casethatseemsdangerously
in thatit exposesthe mereoThe nextexampleis particularly
significant
is:
The
the
facet
of
fallacy. example "Supposean Indianto be blackall
logical
with
white
but
over,
respectto histeeth;thenhe is bothwhiteand notwhite"
(l67a8-9).9 The sameexampleis said to applyto an Ethiopian(latera recuron thisfallacy).The ideais thata black
rentexamplein themedievalliterature
man is whitesecundumquid, i.e. withrespectto a particularpartof him,
moregenerally,
beingblacksimpliciter,
namelyhis teeth,whilenevertheless
of
thatapplyonlyto partsofan objectmaybe said to be attributes
attributes
in
the
to
with
theobjectsecundum
(i.e.
question),
specificpart
respect
quid
.
to the objectsimpliciter
of the wholewould be attributed
whileattributes
of
these
characteristic
that
a
Buridansays
Indeed,in the14thcentury,
general
is relatedto whatis predisecundum
is
"what
is
that
quid
predicated
concepts
thatthe
thusimplying
is to itswhole",10
as a part-in-mode
catedsimpliciter
is
crucial.
of
these
concepts
reading
mereological
But forour presentpurposes,thetwo mostimportant
examplesgivenby
come in theextendeddiscussionin ch. 25 (180al 1-181^1) and are
Aristotle
trueand falseat
and ofthemanwho sayssomething
thoseoftheoath-breaker
fortheforsources
to
be
thesametime.Theseareindeedthought
verylikely
swearsto breakan
mulationof the firstmedievalLiars.11The oath-breaker
oath,and thenbreaksan(other?)oath.A problemwiththispassageis thatit
seemsto allowfortwodistinctreadings:one accordingto whichtheoathin
theverysameoath,and theotheraccordthatofbreaking
questionis precisely
this
ing to whichthefirstoath is thathe willbreakan oath,not specifically
and
adds
this
second
defends
other
oath
but
oath,
reading,
(Spade
any
very
8)Aristoteles
esse
diffrant
etparum
sintdictione
eo quodprxima
autem
"Videtur
Latinus:
etnonessequidetnonesse."
quidetesse,
p.11.
9)Aristoteles
albusergoetnonalbus
albusestdentibus;
cumsitniger,
"UtsitIndus,
Latinus:
11.
est."
p.
10)J.Buridan,
G. Klima(NewHaven,
deDialctica
Summulae
CT,2001),pp.554-5:
, transi.
velsimilestvelvere
secundum
estquoddictum
manifestum
"Unde
simpliciter
quidaddictum
totum."
sicut
itudinarie
(ed.Hubien).
parsinmodoadsuum
n) Cf.Spade,
.
InsolubiliaAiteiztxxie
ofthemedieval
"The
origins

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179

Underthesecondreading,
thatthisis howmostmedievaisreadthepassage).12
thisexampleis notexactlyanalogousto thetypicalLiarsentencein thatthere
to oath 1 itself,
as thereis withtheLiar:oath 1 does notrefer
is no circularity
butto anyotheroath.However,it is notimplausiblethatat leastsomemedieval authorsreadthispassageunderthe firstreading,namelythatthe oath
madeis: 'I promiseto breakthisveryoath'.
forourpurposesis thatfromthisAristoIn thispassage,whatis important
tleconcludesthatbykeepingone oath (oath 1) but not keepingotheroaths
(oath2 forexample,underthenon-self-referential
reading),themanis notan
secundum
he
is
an
r,
oath-keeper
quid withrespectto
oath-keeper
simplicite
he
would
have
to keepall hisoaths.
oath1, butto be an oath-keeper
simplicits
not
become
obedient
mandoes
a disobedient
merely
by
{simpliciter)
Similarly,
beingobedientonce,eventhoughhe maybe saidto havebeenobedientsecundumquid (180a35-2). This suggestsa quantificational
readingof secundum
to
would
statements
and
(affirmative)
correspond
simpliciter
simpliciter.
quid
secundum
statements
while(affirmative)
universal
quid would
quantification,
this
While
existential
to
natural,
very
readingdoes
quantification.
correspond
distinction
not applyto all the caseswherethe secundumquid / simpliciter
that
cases
of
attributes
in
ch.
Aristotle
25
holds;later
applyto somepresents
, butnotto eachofitsinstancessecundum
quid (180b13-14):
thingsimpliciter
frombeingnot
a thing,thoughgood absolutely,
"Thereis nothingto prevent
and
or
to
a
to
a
man,
man, beinggood
yetnotgood
particular
particular
good
nowor here."13
afterthe oath-keeper
example,Aristotleasks whether"the
Immediately
sameman can at thesametimesaywhatis bothfalseand true"(180b2-3).14
answerto thisproblem,sayingthat"it is not
He does not givea definitive
easyto see in whichof the two connectionsthe word absolutelyis to be
- withtrueor withfalse."15
rendered
(180b3-4) (We shallsee laterthatBradwardinedoes havean answerto thisproblem.)But Aristotleadds thatit is
thoughtrue
possibleforsomething(a proposition)to be falseabsolutely,
but
not true
in some particular
i.e.
for
it
to
be
true
secundum
respect,
quid
12)Cf.Spade,
Insolubles
1.3.
,3)Aristoteles
aut
"Nichil
estbonum
huicnonessebonm,
Latinus:
quodsimpliciter
prohibet
velnoninhocbonum."
huicquidem
bonum
sednonnunc
50.
p.
14)Aristoteles
eundem
simul
etverum
Latinus:
"Similis
autem
ratio
etdeeoquodestmentiri
esse."
p.50.
15)Aristoteles
Latinus:
"Sedquianonestfacile
utromodoquisassignet
simpliciter
inspicere,
essevelmentiri,
difficile
videtur."
verum
50.
p.

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46 (2008)175-191
NovaeSy

. It is a tellingfactthatno mentionis madeoftheconverse,

thatis,
simpliciter
thatsomething
can be truesimpliciter
whilebeingfalsesecundum
quid, andwe
shallsee laterthatBradwardine
willindeedtreatthelattercase as impossible
and theformer
as possible(agreeingthuswithAristotle
on theformer).
The
idea hereseemsto be thefollowing:
takethetricky
statements
oftenmadeby
politicians.While in mostcases thereis some truthto whattheysay,such
statements
areoverallfalse,i.e. falsesimpliciter
, whilenevertheless
beingtrue
in somerespects,
i.e. secundum
quid.
3. Insolubilia-SolutionsBased on secundumquid
a rangeoftextsdealingwithinsolubilia
in thepre-Bradwardine
Spadeaddresses
He saysthathislistis notmeantto be exhaustive,
butit is certainly
period.16
of
the
insolubilia
literature
of
this
His
list contains
representative
period.
fifteen
of
which
twelve
connectionwiththe
items,
presenta director indirect
. Manyof thesetextsareliteralcomments
fallacysecundum
quid etsimpliciter
on theSophistici
Elenchi
. In
, othersarecollectionsofquestionson theElenchi
otherwords,theinsolubilia
literature
ofthisperiodis overwhelmingly
evenif
notunanimously
markedbyitsconnectionwiththefallacysecundum
quid et
simpliciter.
What seemsto makeSpade questiontheconceptualkinshipbetweenthis
and solutionsto insolubilia
is thefactthat"manyofourauthorsusethis
fallacy
had in mind."17
He adds that"the
fallacyin waysquiteunlikewhatAristotle
secundum
et
thus
became
a
kind
of
authoritative
framefallacy
quid simpliciter
workthatwasimposedsomewhatartificially
on quitediverseattempts
to solve
theparadox."18
to supportthisaccusaSpadedoesnotreallygiveus arguments
tionof artificiality;
he is apparently
convincedthatthedissimilarity
between
theoriginalconceptualframework
of thefallacysecundum
et
quid simpliciter
and itsusesin theinsolubilia
literature
is in factself-evident.
whatneedsto be done to questionSpades claimis to showthat
Therefore,
thereis no suchdissimilarity,
or in anycase notin a fundamental
way.Medieval uses of thefallacyframework
in particular,
and of Aristotelian
logicin
are
indeed
characterized
of concomigeneral,
by thisintriguing
relationship
tantsimilarity
and dissimilarity:
whileessentially
inspiredbytheoriginalAris16)Spade,
'Fiveearly
theories'.
17)Spade,
'Fiveearly
theories',
p.32.
18)Spade,
'Fiveearly
theories',
p.33.

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18 1

wentbeyondtheseideas and
totelianideas,themedievalauthorsinvariably
to theoriginal
Whether
or
not
own
twist.
theyremainfaithful
gavethemtheir
that
is byand largea matterofthedegreeofsimilarity
framework
Aristotelian
one requiresin orderto passthejudgmentoffaithfulness.
ourclaimthat,whilecertainly
Now,in orderto substantiate
goingbeyond
theoriginalusesof thefallacysecundum
, thereis neverthequid etsimpliciter
betweenthisfallacyand themedieval
lessconsiderable
conceptualsimilarity
insolubilia
usesofit,we shallexaminethreedifferent
waysin whichthefallacy
Thevery
in
to
treat
Liarsentences.
was
order
et
used
secundum
quid simpliciter
usesof thesamefallacyforthispurposeindicates
factthattherearedifferent
as we haveargued,and notthateachof
thatit is indeeda flexible
framework,
fromAristotles
a departure
themis necessarily
originalideas.
In fact,in thepassagescommentedupon in theprevioussection,Aristotle
theories.
morethanfull-fledged
is rather
sketchy,
puttingforward
suggestions
while
false
be
secundum
true
He suggests
thata proposition
may
simplicquid
themedievalauthorswillthen
iterbutdoesnotdevelopthispointanyfurther;
and theywillalso investigate
whyand with
applythisidea to Liarsentences,
.
false
is
true
secundum
but
what
a
Liar
sentence
to
simpliciter
respect
quid
Different
answersto thesequestionsare thenproposed,and one cannotsay
seemednotto
had in mind",as Aristotle
thattheyare"unlikewhatAristotle
or in any
havethatmuchin mindwithrespectto thisparticular
suggestion,
fromthetextalone.
casenothingthatcan be gathered
wayto applythisfallacyto theproblem,given
Perhapsthemostintuitive
withLiarsentencesis thattheyseemto be trueand
thatwhatis problematic
is to considerthepossibility
falseat thesametime(whichis counterintuitive),
secundum
of attributions
of truthand falsity
combinations
of different
quid
considersfourpossibiliSimonofFaversham
to a proposition.
and simpliciter
it maybe
and falsesimpliciter,
ties:theLiarsentencemaybe truesimpliciter
be
secundum
false
secundum
it
true
truesecundum
and
quidand
quid' may
quid
the
and
.
He
dismisses
or
false
secundum
true
falsesimpliciter,
simpliciter
quid
to be truesimpliciter
and falsesimfirst
two:it is impossiblefora proposition
if
secundum
and
false
secundum
and
it
were
true
quid
quid, itwouldbe
pliciter,
an ambiguousproposition(multiplex),whichit is not. He does not really
on why
but givescompellingarguments
argueagainstthefourthpossibility,
'
. It
thethirdis thecase: dicofalsumis truesecundum
quid and falsesimpliciter
becauseit signifies
otherthanthingsare;19but it is true
is falsesimpliciter
19)Simon
. . . quamsit
Libro
Elenchorum
ofFaversham,
,p. 167:"aliud
Quaestiones
significai
super
inre".

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secundum
quid becausewhoeversaysthathe saysthingsareas he saystheyare
falseandindeed
andtheLiarsentencesaysthatitsayssomething
speakstruly,20
false.
itsayssomething
to solveinsolubilia
Anotheruse of thefallacysecundum
quid etsimpliciter
and concernedtheuse of
oftheoriginalframework
was in facta modification
with respectto supposition.
the conceptssecundumquid and simpliciter
'
whichconsistedin
knownas restriction
thiswas thestrategy
Broadlyspeaking,
in
term
case
self-reference:
forexamof
a
of
the
restricting supposition given
L
in
for
virtueof
'false
could
not
in
L
'This
sentence
is
:
false,
supposit
ple,
cast
not
all
defenders
of
restrictio
Bradwardine21
beinga partofL. As notedby
itin termsofsecundum
(Burleydid not),butsomedid,such
quidetsimpliciter
in F: 'egodico
as Ockham22and Lambertof Lagny.23
Accordingto thelatter,
F
onl
secundum
for
(thewhole) y
quid',now,iffalsum
falsum' falsumsupposits
quid, sinceit saysof
suppositsforF secundum
quid, thenF is truesecundum
itselfthatit is false,and indeedit is false(sincefalsumsuppositsforF secundumquid). However,Lambertinvokestheprincipleaccordingto whichthe
partcannotsuppositforthewholeto claimthatfalsumcannotsuppositfor
thatdoes notobtain,namelythatit
F simpliciter,
therefore,
.Fsayssomething
. The restrictio
itis falsesimpliciter
is false,and therefore
approach,castin terms
24or not,was indeed
et
of secundum
verypopularforquite
quid simpliciter
addressedagainstit byBradsometime,in anycase untilthesharpcriticism
wardine.
but Scotus
Favershams,
Finally,Scotus'solutionin somesensesresembles
actus
the
between
distinction
a theoretical
introduces
namely
sophistication,
and actusexercitusa distinction
widelyused in contextsother
significatus

20)Simon
sicut
Libro
ofFaversham,
Elenchorum,
Quaestiones
p. 167:"quidicitsedicere
super
verum
dicit."
dicit,
21)T. Bradwardine,
Texts
andTranslations,
Insolubilia
Leuven,
, ed.S. Read(DallasMedieval
des
inM.-L.Roure,
'La problmatique
textis found
butunreliable
2008),2.2.(Anearlier
de
del'dition
destraits
duXIV',suivie
insolubles
au XIIIesicleetau dbut
propositions
du
d'histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
Archives
W.Burleigh
etTh.Bradwardine',
W.Shyreswood,
205-326.)
Moyen
Age37 [1970],
22)SeeSimmons,
andtheLiar
, p.90.
Universality
23)Lambert
IlMentitore
e ilMedioevo
from
hisLogica
Extracts
ofAuxerre.
, inL. Pozzi,
(Parma,
Lambert
of
Lamberts
edition
a
but
unreliable
1
There
is
also
12-115.
1987),
Logica'.
complete
pp.
Lorica
ofAuxerre,
, ed.F.Alessio
(Florence,
1971).
24)Indeed,
inquite
with
fits
ofsecundum
themereological
nicely
interpretation
quidetsimpliciter
- seeSimmons,
andtheLiar
ofsupposition
theideaofrestriction
, 5.2.2.
Universality

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183

- to accountforthequid withrespect
as well25
literature
thantheinsolubilia
.
to whicha Liarsentenceis truesecundum
quid, whilebeingfalsesimpliciter
ofScotus'solutionis to showthatthesecundum
The interest
quidetsimpliciter
canbe combinedwithotherconcepts,in particular
framework
conceptsdetersimand/or/not
secundum
is
said
in
which
quid
something
miningtheaspects
to Scotus,in thecaseof !egodicofalsum'theactussignificatus
According
pliciter.
in thiscasetheactofsayinga falsehood,
iswhatis signified
bytheproposition,
is whatis accomplished
whiletheactusexercitus
bythespeaker(itsperformaand indeedhe says
Thespeakersaysthathe saysa falsehood,
tivedimension).26
thisproposia trueactusexercitus.17
thushe performs
a falsehood,
Therefore,
butitis false
actus
exercitus
to
the
with
i.e.
tionis truesecundum
,
,
respect
quid
is false.28
it
that
what
of
the
it
is
a
is,
false',
, because
signifies
sign
simpliciter
matter.Spade
of Scotus solutionis stilla controversial
The interpretation
for
distinction
et
of
the
secundum
the
quid simpliciter
downplays importance
as
distinction
/
actus
exercitus
actus
the
and
Scotus,29 interprets
significatus
more
it
But
seems
on self-reference".30
to somekindofrestriction
"committed
naturalto view the idea thatmorethan one act is involvedin assertinga
propositionalongthelinesof Aristotles(dis)obedientman: ifhe obeysone
quid in thesamewaythat
specificcommand,he is merelyobedientsecundum
is trueonlysecundum
to a trueactusexercitus
thatcorresponds
a proposition
/
similar
to theactusexercitus
a
distinction
when
Moreover,
mentioning
quid.
it among
classifies
Bradwardine
in his treatise,31
distinction
actussignificatus
25)SeeG. Nuchelmans,
inMedieval
SemanActus
Exercitus/
Actus
'TheDistinction
Significatus
ed.N. Kretzmann
inMedieval
inMeaning
andInference
1988);I.
(Dordrecht,
tics',
Philosophy,
danslessophismes
etactus
actus
exercitus
entre
'Ladistinction
Rosier,
grammaticaux
significatus
andGrammar
inMedieval
in
textes
,
duMs.BNlat.16618etautres
Logic
Sophisms
apparents',
auXIIIesicle
etlasmantique
comme
acte.Surlagrammaire
Laparole
ed.Read;andI. Rosier,
1994),chap.5.
(Paris,
26)Onecouldillustrate
If
contradictions.
ofother
with
thisdistinction
performative
examples
to
is
the
actus
else
someone
and
asks'Isthere
someone
'No',
there?',
replies
significatus
anybody
somethere
isindeed
istoindicate
that
exercitus
buttheactus
there
isn't
there,
anybody
saythat
- again
actus
exercitus.
buta true
a false
actus
there
body
significatus
27)"Etquidam
circa
actum
dicendi
secundum
quid,quiavereexercet
ponunt
quodestverus
Librum
Elenchorum
53
falsam."
orationem
514,
Aristotelis,
14-15).
Scotus,
Quaestiones
q. (p.
super
28)"Quodautem
falsa
dicitur
sitfalsitas
quiaestsignum
patet
perhocquodoratio
simpliciter,
Scofalsi."
etestsignum
cumnihil
Sedhaecesthuiusmodi
falsi.
dixerit,
prius
'egodicofalsum',
Elenchorum
Librum
Aristotelis,
tus,Quaestiones
q. 53(p.514,8-10).
super
29)Hementions
text
inInsolubles
inthemain
ina footnote
rather
than
itonly
2.3.
30)Spade,
Insolubles
2.3.
31)Hedistinguishes
Insolubilia
: Bradwardine,
dicere
exercitum
from
dicere
5.8.
conceptum

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46 (2008)175-191
Novaes,

thedistinguent
es,i.e., thosethattryto solvetheLiarparadoxbysayingthatit
should be distinguished,
thatit is proneto morethanone reading.Bradwardinereproaches
thedistinguentes
fornotsolvingtheinsolubleaccordingto
thefallacy
secundum
et
quid simpliciter
(eighthandlastopinionin Bradwardine
Insolubilia
ch.
It
is
had Scotusin
)
(
5).
unlikely,
though,thatBradwardine
mindin thispassage,as his description
does notfitin wellwithScotus text;
Scotushimselfrecognizesthatusingthe actusexercitus
vs. actussignificatus
distinction
withrespectto Liarsentencesis nota theoryofhisown creation,
- sinceScotus
so Bradwardine
to otherusesofthedistinction
maybe referring
obviouslyintendshis solutionto be relatedto the fallacysecundum
quid et
.
simpliciter
In sum,thefactthattheseauthorsall use theconceptssecundum
quid et
and yet presentquite different
accountsof insolublesdoes not
simpliciter
to theoriginalsecundum
mean,we takeit,thattheirsolutionsarenotfaithful
framework.
are
all
variations
of
Aristotle's
They
quid
originalidea thatsome
be
true
secundum
while
false
.
propositions
may
quid
simpliciter
4. Bradwardineand theLiar
Thomas Bradwardine
was a RegentMasterin Artsat Oxfordin the early
1320s.It wasat thistimethathe composedhislogicalmasterpiece,
De Insolu"
bilibus
Insolubiliamagisti
Thome
, as testified
bytheMadridms.: Expliciunt
de Bradwardyn
de angliaregentis
OxoniiP2 Afterfivechapterssurveying
and
other
current
of
the
that
insolubles,primarily of
dismissing
eight
diagnoses
therestringentes
terminorum
no
of
(that termcan standforitselfor anything
whichit is part),Bradwardine
his own,apparently
novel,diagnosis,
presents
setout lucidlyin a proofofhisThesis2 {secundaconclusio
on the
), established
basisoftwodefinitions
and sixpostulates:
Ifsomeproposition
itself
nottobetrue
oritself
tobefalse,
itsignifies
itself
tobe
signifies
true
andisfalse.33

32)Madrid,
Bib.Nov.Univ.
MS 105f.37rb;
'Ockham
andsome
MertoCent.,
J.A.Weisheipl,
Medieval
Studies
30(1968),163-213,
theMSas"now
lost".
nians',
p. 190describes
Fortunately,
itisstill
tobefound
intheHistorical
oftheComplutense
inCalleNoviciado
Library
University
inMadrid.
33)Bradwardine,
Insolubilia
senonesseveram
velseesse
6.4:"sialiquapropositio
significet
seesseveram
etestfalsa."
falsam,
ipsasignificai

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Novaes,

185

it conin detailand at length.We can summarise

is articulated
His argument
as
follows:
cisely
SupposeA saysofitselfthatit is nottrueor thatit is false(and so nottrue,
thatas Q, and supmore:abbreviate
byPostulate1: Bivalence).It maysignify
is one signifying
1
true
Definition
Then
true.
A
is
not
("A
proposition
by
pose
its trueor
either
that
it
not
as
are
signifies, is,
onlyas thingsare"),things
not-Q.So if^4is nottruetheneithernot-QorA is true,in otherwords,if^4is
thatA is nottrueand Q is
nottrueand Q thenA is true.But byhypothesis,
folwhatever
So byPostulate2 ("Everyproposition
whatA signifies.
signifies
A
So
is
true.
thatA itself
A signifies
lowsfromwhatit signifies"),
(at
signifies
least)thatA is trueand thatv4is nottrue.Butthatconjunctionis impossible,
mustfailto obtain.Hence,byDefinition1 again,A
A signifies
so something
Bivalence
is nottrue,and so by
(Postulate1),A is false.
a numberof stepsin theargumenthere,whereBradWeve runtogether
wardineadducesPostulates
3-6, Definition2 and Thesis1. We'vealso applied
of Postulate2, whichplaysan
a strongdose of charityto theinterpretation
essentialrolein theproof.Whatwe actuallyreadin themss.is:
orabsolutely
offact
asa matter
ormeans
every<respectively>
signifies
Every
proposition
or
of
fact
a
matter
from
it
as
which
follows
absolutely.34
thing
theproofofThesis2,
has to rewrite
and accordingly
Spadetakesthisliterally,35
and othersneeda
makesareredundant
claimingthatsomestepsBradwardine
fromit" (the
follows
a [proposition]
new principle,that"whatever
signifies
Princi'Bradwardine
the
Bradwardine
'Converse
Principle',CBP), matching
followsfromit."Spade
ordenoteswhatever
signifies
ple',BP: "A [proposition]
ButevenBP leadsto
for
Bradwardine.36
a
is
disaster
that
CBP
to
show
on
goes
the
about
standard
the
consider
For
Z, whichsaysof
Liar,
reasoning
paradox.
itselfthatit is nottrue:
sobyreductio
,
areasitsaysthey
Thenthings
L istrue.
are,soL isnottrue;
First,
suppose
L isnottrue.
as
areindeed
then
L isnottrue
that
(aswehavejustproved),
But,secondly,
things
given
L
is
true.
Contradiction.
so
L saysthey
are,
34)Bradwardine,
utnuncvelsimsivednott
Insolubilia
6.3:"Quelibet
propositio
significai
vel
istam
ut
nunc
ad
omne
simpliciter."
pliciter' quodsequitur
35)Spade,Insolubilia
ofsignification
s theory
andBradwardine
, p. 120.
'Insolubilia
36)Spade,
ofsignification
s theory
andBradwardine
, pp.128ff.

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is to block the second move here.By

Bradwardinesdecisivecontribution
Definition1, it is notenoughforL to be truethatL notbe true.Thingsmust
as L saystheyare,and byThesis2, L also saysthatL is true.Buton
be wholly
mustprovethatif^4
oftheproofofThesis2,37Bradwardine
Spades rewriting
is nottruethenA is true,to applyBP (and concludeiztA saysthatA is true).
Butthatlastconditionalis all thatis neededforthesecondlegofthestandard
thatL is not
leg (acceptedbyBradwardine)
proof- havingshownin thefirst
L is true.
thatconsequently
true,to landin paradoxbyinferring
2
Whatwe needto do, then,is see howBradwardine
actuallyusesPostulate
'if
A
is
is
not
it
in his proof.The conditionalto whichhe applies (see above)
whatever
elseA mightsay,whichwe
trueand Q thenA is true. Q abbreviates
areaboutto discoverincludesA s beingtrue.So all we haveis thejejuneconto
ditional:'ifA is not trueand A is true(etc.),thenA is true'.Thatsuffices
the
concludethatA saysofitselfthatit is true;butit is notenoughto retrieve
s solutionworks
secondlegoftheproofofparadox.Thatis whyBradwardine
as Spade claimsit does.
and does notcollapsein theusualcontradiction,
BP.
What
it
uses is the morecautious
Bradwardines
proofdoes not use
whateverfollowsfromwhatit signifies.
signifies
principle:everyproposition
ofThesis2 in manyvariantsin later
the
demonstration
Bradwardine
repeats
is
the
time
this
and
principlehe uses.Sadly,he was uncharacchapters, every
ofPostulate2, butcharity
laxin hisstatement
(is therean interpreteristically
to hisactualproof(s)
tationwhichdoesnotlandhimin paradox?)andattention
but
effective
more
cautious
him
the
to
of
attribution
principle.
support
5. Bradwardine'sTheoryof Consequence
followsfroma
It speaksof"whatever
closerexamination.
Postulate2 warrants
thatwhat
mean?
It
claims
What
this
'
does
vel
ut
nunc
simpliciter
proposition
This
is an
that
in
factalreadysignifiedby
does so followis
proposition.
is closedunderconseextremely
strongclosurecondition,thatsignification
theclaimthatmuch
makes
nunc
ut
In
fact,
consequences
including
quence.
true
of
the
use
allows
nunc
ut
For
merelycontingently
consequence
stronger.
Then
from
ass
is
an
that
running.
only
Suppose,e.g.,
enthymematic
premises.
'Everyman is running'we can infer'Everyman is an ass' ut nunc, bya syllogismin Barbara.The premiseis possibleand theconclusionimpossible.Yet

4Insolubilia
37)Spade,
ofsignification
andBradwardines
, p. 122.
theory

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Novaes,

187

Aristotle
notedthattheimpossiblenevervalidlyfollowsfromthepossible
thatis what possible'means.38
of thenotionof ut nuncconsequencecomesfroma treatise
Thiscriticism
The
attributed
to Bradwardine.
on consequence(' Textusconsequentiarum)
adduces,but is unmovedby,all thearguments
editor,Niels Green-Pedersen,
thattheworkis byBradshouldruleout thepossibility
which,put together,
wardine.The treatiseis a sustainedcritiqueof Ockhams SummaLogicae
,
s associationwithBurleys school,givessomeplauwhichgivenBradwardine
to himin one ofthetwomss.in whichitsurvives.
to itsattribution
(It
sibility
is anonymousin theother.)But in thecourseof thatattackon Ockham,its
"
dismissesutnuncconsequenceas mistaken:Nihilestconseauthorrepeatedly
9
utnunc
in Bradwardine
s treatise
on insolubles,
quentiautnuncP In contrast,
Bradwardine
s
is
central
and
proof
pervasive.Consider,e.g.,
consequence
of Thesis1 (primaconclusio
) in ch. 6, whichhe will adduce timeand time
again:
affirmation
or
hasmany
ordenotes
whose
extreme
Every
proposition
supposita
signifies
andifonly
denial
forsomeofthem,
one,forit.40
'
'A is 2?, he says,wheretheterm has manysupTake sucha proposition,
posita:
toallitssupposita,
areequivalent
asa
A andoneofthese',
Thenthetwoterms,
pointing
ofthat
ofthem
addsdenial
orexclusion
oranything
matter
offact
andneither
(utnunc),
'A is and'Oneofthese
areequivalent:
andsothese
twopropositions
kindtotheother,
anaffirmation
for
oneofthesupposita
ofA,andhence
isffsignifies
isB>;and'Oneofthese
asa matter
of
A and'this
A orthat,
sotoodoes(AisB. Again,
andsoon areequivalent
A orthat
areequivalent
asa matter
offact:
"This
andsoon,
fact.
Hencethese
propositions
isB' and'AisB' 41
38)An.Pr.I,32al9-20.
39)N.J.Green-Pedersen,
onOckhams
Doctrine
ofconsequences:
anedition
,
'Bradwardine(P)
42 (1982),85-150,p.938.
Grec
etLatin
Cahiers
del'Institut
duMoyen-Age
40)Bradwardine,
multa
habet
Insolubilia
cuiusextremum
6.4:"Quelibet
supposita
propositio
et
si
sive
dnott
affimationem
vel
unicum
istorum,
proisto."
negationem
proaliquo
significai
41)Bradwardine,
Insolubilia
istiduotermini
convertuntur
utnunc:
a etaliquod
6.5.1:"Tunc
illorum
omnibus
suissuppositis,
etneutrum
additnegationem
necexclusionem
demonstratis
a estb etaliquod
nechuiusmodi
isteduepropositiones
convertuntur:
istorum
alium,
super
ergo
est
affirmatio
etin
estb,etperistam:
istorum
b,
a,
aliquod
significatur proaliquo
suppositoergo
ista:a estb.Adidem
istitermini
convertuntur
utnunc:
a ethoca velilludetsicdesingulis.
Ergo
etistepropositiones
convertuntur
hoca velillud,
etsicdesingulis
estb,eta estb."
utnunc:

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, S. Read/Vivarium

And similarproofsrunthroughsucceedingchapters.
in thetwo
betweenthedoctrines
notesthisincompatibility
Green-Pedersen
ut
nunc
central
how
works,thoughwe thinkhe failsto appreciate
consequence
thattheirsupposedcommon
. He suggests,therefore,
is to the Insolubilia
on consequenceis an
authorchangedhismind.42
Perhaps,he says,thetreatise
endorse
to
came
later
Bradwardine
and
consequenceutnunc. This
earlywork
fortheInsolubiliais an earlyworktoo.Weisheipl,notingthe
is a non-starter,
"
as regentis
of Bradwardine
Oxonie' mentionedabove,
Madrid description
extendsit to 1326. But Ockthisperiodto 1321-4.Dolnikowski43
attributes
hams SummaLogicaewaswritten
Consequentiarum
onlyin 1323,so theTextus
and it
can be no earlierthanthat.The twoworksare almostsimultaneous,
Bradwardine.
is
thatthe Textus
seemsveryunlikely
Consequentiarumby
ofutnuncconanswersthecriticism
In fact,in theInsolubiliaBradwardine
:
Consequentiarum
sequencefromthe Textus
thatonlyan asswere
be madea captious
willbychance
There
supposing
objection,
a manisanass,and
therefore
a manissitting,
bevalid:
would
inference
this
. . . then
seated,
hence
soistheconclusion.44
ispossible,
thepremise
he says:
Butthisis readilyanswered,
theconcluoffact
asa matter
because
offact,
asa matter
isvalid
inference
this
that
Itistrue
A manis
offact:
asa matter
areequivalent
Forthese
inthepremise.
sionisunderstood
for
so
on
and
or
that
andA manisthissitter
sitting'.45
things
sitting
ruleappliesonlyto absoluteconsequence{conseIn fact,he says,Aristotle's
shows.
as thiscounterexample
et
quentiabona simpliciter),

42)Green-Pedersen,
ofconsequences',
Doctrine
onOckhams
Bradwardine(?)
p.88.
43)E.W.Dolnikowski,
inFourteenthVision
Time
anda
a View
Bradwardine:
Thomas
ofEternity
of
4.
1995),
(Leiden,
p.
Thought
Century
44)Bradwardine,
forte
instabit
conclusioni
"Huicautem
cavillator,
Insolubilia
6.5.3-4:
suppoestbona:homoestsedens,
asinus
nensquodtantum
sedeat,
ergo
(.. .) tuncistaconsequentia
etconsequens."
estpossibile,
antecedens
estasinus,
homo
ergo
45)Bradwardine,
estbonautnunc,
estquodistaconsequentia
Insolubilia
quia
ad6.5.4:"verum
estsedens
homo
utnunc:
convertuntur
Istaenim
inantecedente.
utnunc
intelligitur
consequens
sedentibus."
velilludetsicdesingulis
esthocsedens
ethomo

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Novaes,
6. Secundum

189

Vindicated

Bradwardine
laysgreatstorebytheclaimthathis theoryis trulyAristotelian.
Not onlydoes he dismissothertheories(namely,twoof fourversionsof the
, thatthepartcannotstandforthewhole,and that
theoryof therestringentes
of thedistinguent
in act fromitscompletion)
theutterance
es,distinguishing
fornot assigninga fallacysecundum
et
to theinsolubles.He
quid simpliciter
claims
that
he
is
out
Aristotle's
true
repeatedly
spelling
diagnosis.Thiscomes
in ch. 7, in an extendedtreatment
out mostforcefully
of the problemof
revenge.
The term'revenge'
was coinedbyR. Martin46
to describethepuzzlingsituationwherea theorist
wantsto describethe Liar sentence(forexample)as
ornottrue,orwhatever,
whenthesentenceitselfappears
false,ormeaningless,
to sayjustthat,thatit is false,meaningless
orwhatever.
Ifthetheorist
is right
so to describetheLiar,and is speakingtruly,
does
it
not
follow
that
the
why
Liarsentenceitselfis true,and notfalse,meaningless
orwhatever?
Thisis thesituationBradwardine
setsup in ch. 7. SupposeSocratesutters
this:
only
A: Socrates
a falsehood.
utters
- thatA is falsefolBradwardine
wantsto saythatSocratesuttersa falsehood
lowsfromThesis2, giventhatA signifies
that
it is false.But ifthe
(ut nunc)
diagnosisis truewhenBradwardine
saysit,whywas it nottruewhenSocrates
said it?Afterall, theirtwoutterances
wereexactlythesame- samewordsin
thesameorder.
The answeris centralto Bradwardines
solution:whatSocratessaysis selfbutwhatBradwardine
comesto
referential,
saysis not. Finally,Bradwardine
theeleventhobjection:
Theeleventh
isthis:from
theresponse
itfollows
thatthefollowing
objection
justgiven,
inference
isvalid:Socrates
utters
thisfalsehood,
'Socrates
utters
a falsehood',
so
namely,
Socrates
utters
a falsehood.
Hencethere
is herenofallacy
secundum
r,
quidetsimplicite
toAristotle's
Elench.
onthesolution
ofthefallacy
secundum
2,inthechapter
contrary
Soph.
itisshown
insolubles
areparalogisms
secundum
,where
quidetsimpliciter
byhimthat
quid
etsimpliciter.
insuchinferences
then
there
would
notbeaninsoluble
because
it
Moreover,
isnota difficult
isthedefinition
ofinsoluble.47
yetthat
paralogism,
46)R.L.Martin,
Recent
onTruth
andtheLiarParadox
(Oxford,
1984),p.4.
Essays
47)Bradwardine,
Insolubilia
sic:existaresponsione
istam
conse7.11:"Undcimo
sequitur
essebonam:
Sortes
dicithocfalsum
dicitfalsum,
dicit
quentiam
quodestSortes
ergoSortes

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C. Dutilh
Novaes,

morethandoes the
Bradwardine's
replyto thisobjectionis thatA signifies
it fallsunder
A
is
For
since
is
false.
self-referential,
that
equiformjudgment
himself
Socrates
true.
it
is
that
Indeed,suppose
Thesis2 and so also signifies
reasonsas follows,in hismind:he apprehends
justtwopropositions:
isapprehended
B: Thisfalsehood
bySocrates
(intelligitur)
to thisproposition:
referring
isapprehended
C: A falsehood
bySocrates
If Socratesis temptedto inferC fromB, he will have committeda fallacy
thatC is
ForB entailsonlypartof C: C signifies
secundum
quid etsimpliciter.
B
but
bothtrueand false(and apprehended
onlythatC
signifies
bySocrates),
is falseand apprehended
quid but not
by Socrates.So B entailsC secundum
We nowseetheanswertoAristode's
puzzle(1803-4) in 2 above.
simpliciter.
B
in
so faras it saysthatit is true
from
follows
so
C
is
B is truewhileC false,
butnotin so faras itsaysthatit is false.
discussionin ch. 11 of "merelyapparent
Finally,considerBradwardine's
to
insolubles".Theymightappear be insolubles,but theirsolutiondoes not
so theyare notrealinsolubles.
turnon a fallacysecundum
quid etsimpliciter,
to,and argue:
Forexample,supposenothingis referred
to
isreferred
Nothing
Sothisisnotreferred
to,
but
to Socrates.Clearly,thepremisewas truewhenitwas uttered,48
referring
was complete.So theconclusioncan never
once theinference
it was falsified
conclusionis an
the
even
be true,
premisecan be. Bradwardine's
though
some
Buridan
to
yearslater:
insightwhichhas beenwidelyattributed
2
Aristotelem
secundum
falsum.
quodestcontra
quidetsimpliciter,
Ergoibinonestfallacia
eum
ubi
et
secundum
fallacie
solutione
de
per
apparet
simpliciter,
Elenchorum,
quid
capitulo
consetuncintalibus
Preterea
secundum
sintparalogismi
quidetsimpliciter.
quodinsolubilia
diffinitione
est
de
tarnen
difficilis
est
ibi
non
insolubile
nonesset
quod
paralogismi
quia
quentiis
insolubilis."
48)Bradwardine,
estfalsa,
Insolubilia
consequens
11.6:"Dicendum
quia,quando
quodminor
verum
fuerit
licet
inconsequente,
falsificatur
illius
est,antecedens
prodemonstrate
consequentie
anteprolationem
consequentis."

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191

towhether
itcanor
orimpossible
a proposition
isnotsaidtobepossible
Because
according
canbeorcannot
beasissignified
ofwhether
cannot
betrue,
butonaccount
byit.49
things
7. Conclusion
Thus,as Bradwardine
says,an insolubleis "a difficult
paralogismsecundum
some
act on itselfwitha
from
the
reflection
of
et
resulting
quid simpliciter
A fallacysecundum
occurswhen
determination".50
privative
quid etsimpliciter
a fallaciousinference
is madefroma premiseto a conclusionwherea property
is wronglyattributedto somethingsimpliciter
whereas,fromthe premise
ofthisproperty
to thethingcan be
alone,onlythesecundum
quid attribution
in
To solvetheinsolubleswhatwe needto do is blockthereasoning
inferred.
what is in effectthe problemof
the secondleg of the standardargument,
havingshownthatthepuzzlecaseis false,we mustshowwhyitdoes
revenge:
not followfromthat,thatit is true.The answeris thatit is truein part,but
.
onlyin part,and partialtruthis nottruthsimpliciter
mustobtain- things
it signifies
For a propositionto be true,everything
as itsaystheyare.Truthis a limitorpeakofsuccess;anyfalling
mustbe wholly
A proposition
is trueifthingsareonlyas it saystheyare;
offfromit is failure.
ifthingsarenotso in anyrespect,
it is false.Thisis why,accordingto Aristotle's undevelopedhunch,it is possiblefora propositionto be truesecundum
(butnottheotherwayround);thishappenswhen
quidwhilefalsesimpliciter
at leastone ofthethingsit saysobtains,butnotall ofthem,whichmakesita
propositiontruesecundumquid (withrespectto the particularthingthat
A Liarsentenceis precisely
a proposition
ofthis
obtains),butfalsesimpliciter.
kind,and thecause of itsparadoxicalnatureis thefallaciousmovefromits
it is onlyits truthsecundum
to its truthsimpliciter,
falsity
quid thatcan be
that
it
is
false
.
thus
Hence,Spades claimthat
derived,
simpliciter
confirming
withrespectto insolubilia
arepurelyhonorary
seems
invocations
ofthisfallacy
fundamentally
ungrounded.

49)Bradwardine,
Insolubilia
nondicitur
velimpossibilis
11.6:"quiapropositio
possibilis
quia
essevelsicimpossibile
estessesicut
velnonpotest
essevera,
sedquiasicpotest
potest
significatur
Cf.Buridan,
Summulae
deDialctica
, tr.9 (.Sophismata
Conclusion,
), ch.8,'Third
peristam."
954-5.
pp.
50)Bradwardine,
estdifficilis
Insolubilia
secundum
2.1: "insolubile
paralogismus
quidetsimexreflexione
alicuius
actus
secumdeterminatione
pliciter
supra
privativa
proveniens."

15:42:16 PM

VIVA
RI UM
www.brill.nl/viv

:4'
brill

lhe

Vivarium
46 (2008)192-221

Theory of materia prima in Marsilio

Platonic Theology*

Ficino's

JamesG. Snyder
TheCUNYGraduate
Center
Department
ofPhilosophy,
Abstract
Thispaperis an examination
ofthetheory
ofmateria
century
primaofthefifteenth
Platonist
Marsilio
Ficino.It limits
itsdiscussion
ofFicino's
to theontological
theory
andepistemic
status
ofprimematter
inhisPlatonic
Ficinoholdsa "robust"
Theology.
of
matter
that
makes
two
fundamental
assertions:
First,
theory prime
primematter
exists
of
and
it
at
least
in
Ficino's
form,
second,
is,
independent
principle,
intelligible.
in
of
matter
is
this
with
framed
a
discussion
of
the
theory prime
paper
divergence
overthenature
ofprimematter.
philosophers
amongScholastic
Keywords
Marsilio
Platonism
Ficino,matter,
primematter,
I
in hisphilosophical
thePlatonicTheology
(1482), the
Frequently
masterpiece,
RenaissancePlatonistMarsilioFicino (1433-99) speculatesabout the existenceof an utterly
formless
and passivemateriaprimathatfunctions
as the
of
all
material
"indifferent
Ficino
asserts
that
receptacle"
things.Although
matter
is
devoid
of
all
and
his
denial
that
the
human
prime
quality, despite
mindcanhaveanydirectand privileged
ofit,he doesnot,forthese
knowledge
reasons,concludethatprimematteris nothing,or some fictiveabstraction
thathas no realityapartfromthehumanmind,as Aristotle
had likelymainFicinoheld in the PlatonicTheology
tained.1To the contrary,
whatmaybe
*' I wishtothank
Catherine
Wilson
andEmily
Michael
forcomments
ondrafts
ofthispaper.
inMiamiatthe2007annual
Anearlier
version
ofthispaper
waspresented
conference
ofthe
Renaissance
ofAmerica.
Society
l) Aristotle,
7.3,1028b-1029a28.
Metaphysics,
Brill
2008
Koninklijke
NV,
Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/
156853408X255909

15:42:44 PM

46 (2008)192-221
I Vivarium
J.G.Snyder

193

calleda "robust"theoryof primematter.On the robustview,primematter

in a modeofexistencethatbelongsuniquelyto thosethingsthat
participates
fromnothing,and it existsin sucha waythatit
arecreatedby God directly
formsof all
possessesin a confusedand tumultuousstatethe rudimentary
materialthings.The existenceof primematter,accordingto Ficino,is not
offorms,
ofanything
else,suchas theactuality
dependentupon theexistence
had previously
as some philosophers
or on form-matter
argued.
composites,
The robustnessof primematteralso has epistemological
implicationsfor
infinite
that
the
confusionof
Ficino
Ficino.In thePlatonicTheology
,
suggests
if
mindwill
in
even
the
human
intelligible,
primematteris,at least principle,
orwithclarity
and distinctness.
neverknowit directly,
of thebasicontologicaland epistemicstatus
Thispaperis an examination
. The conceptoccupiesa promiofprimematterin Ficinos PlatonicTheology
nentand variedpositionin the largerargumentof the PlatonicTheology,
servingat one and thesame timeas a premisein Ficinosargumentforthe
of the
of the materialism
of the soul, as partof his refutation
immortality
"
"
the
impiiduo Epicurusand Lucretius(amongothers),and as partof groundworkforhis vitalisticnaturalphilosophy.In this paper Ficinos theoryis
theoriesof primematterthatwere
framedwitha discussionof thedivergent
in thethirteenth
heldbyDominicanand FranciscanScholasticphilosophers
The divergence
concernedtheontologicaland episand fourteenth
centuries.
ThomasAquinas,who belongedto theDominitemicstatusofprimematter.
can order,arguedthatprimematterdoes not existwithoutform,and is
suchas
on itsown.SeveralFranciscan
philosophers,
completely
unintelligible
a greater
JohnDuns ScotusandWilliamofOckham,attributed
degreeofrealFicinos
to
matter
than
did.2
theoryin thisway
ity prime
Aquinas
Framing
servestwo purposes:First,it opens up a way of approachingthe theoryof
thegeneraltheoretical
, and to determine
primematterin thePlatonicTheology
s existence
the
commitments
on primematter
and intelligibility.
Approaching
in
this
is
because
his
and
of
matter
theory,
helpful
theory prime
way especially
in hisphilosophy,
haveremainedmostly
thegeneralfunction
thatitperforms
use ofthe
unnoticedand unexamined.3
Also,althoughFicinomakesfrequent
2)SeeThomas
Lectura
Deprincipiis
Chs.I andII.AlsoseeJohn
DunsScotus,
naturae,
Aquinas,
2. 12;andOpusOxoniense
alsoa Franciscan,
forthe
, lib.II,d. 12,q. 1. Bonaventure,
argued
also
ofprime
matter.
SeeInII. Sent
however,
.,d. 12,art.1,q. 1,2 and3. Bonaventure,
reality
helda doctrine
ofseeds
which
Scotus
andOckham
denied.
3)While
Ficino
sviews
ofprime
andcorporeal
matter
haveremained
forthemost
unexampart
tworecent
articles
havetouched
onaspects
ofit.SeeHiroshi
ofSeeds
and
ined,
Hirai,
"Concepts

15:42:44 PM

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46 (2008)192-221
/Vivarium
/. G.Snyder

, he nowherestraightforconceptof primematterin the PlatonicTheology

of his theory
reveals
features
Ficino
of
it.
his
view
defends
Instead,
wardly
the
contexts
across
in
and variousphilosophical
eighteenbooksof
elliptically
whereFicino standson the
the PlatonicTheology.
Second,by determining
to MedievalSchohis
of
status
and
matter,
relationship
ontological epistemic
lasticismis complicated,if not clarified.Ficino scholarshave traditionally
arguedthatThomasAquinasexercisedthe mostpowerfulinfluenceon the
andithasbeenarguedandassumed
ofFicinos philosophy,
Scholasticelements
Thomistic.4
thatFicinos theoryofprimematteris fundamentally
Recognizing
the
beliefthatFicinowas a
theories
undermines
of Scholastic
the plurality
of
Whilea discussionofScholastictheories
Thomistwhenitcomesto matter.
on the
does not exhaustFicinos philosophicalinheritance
mattercertainly
it in thiswayis a convenient
issue,approaching
pointof entryto examining
elements
on primematter.
commitments
Ficinos generaltheoretical
Certainly
Ficino argues
of the Neoplatonictraditionof Plotinusare also significant.
he departs
withPlotinusthatprimematteris completely
however,
impassible;
to
and
entitative
a
robust
in
fromPlotinus attributing
reality primematter.
oftheunderlying
An examination
conceptofprimematterthatis at playin
Platonistin factpartedways
revealsthattheFlorentine
thePlatonicTheology
of
withThomasAquinas when it came to the existenceand intelligibility
those
in
with
primematter.In theend,Ficinos theorysharesmore common
an entitative
and theologianswho attributed
realityto prime
philosophers
thatFicinogivesfor
To thisend,thispaperexaminesthearguments
matter.
that
in thePlatonicTheology
s existence
, and thetwodistinctions
primematter
to graspingthebasics
thework,whicharerelevant
Ficinomarksthroughout
betweentheabsoluteand particular
of his theory:First,Ficinodistinguishes
where
modesofexistence;
and,second,betweenprimeand corporealmatter,
the
the
latter
in the absolutemode of existenceand
theformerparticipates
HisPhilosophy.
Ficino:
HisTheology,
inMarsilio
; His
ofMarsilio
intheWork
Nature
Ficino,"
with
M. Davies(Leiden,
V.Rees,
and,inthesamevol2002),257-284;
, eds.M.Allen,
Legacy
in
ofMatter
Mirrors:
TheConcept
Divine
GazesandBloody
"Narcissus,
Kodera,
ume,Sergius
corand
Ficinos
of
with
deals
Neither
285-306.
however,
article,
Ficino,"
theoryprime
directly
matter.
poreal
4)Seetheintroduction
in
andThomism
Platonism
isSacred:
TheSecular
B. Collins,
toArdis
inItalian
"Thomism
Platonic
Ficinos
Marsilio
1974);PaulOskarKristeller,
(Nijhoff,
Theology
inMedieval
NC,1974),29-94;Kristeller,
(Durham,
Learning
ofRenaissance
Aspects
Thought,"
andLetters
inStudies
inRenaissance
39;
Ficino
andHisCircle,"
"Marsilio
1956),
(Roma,
Thought
ofMarsilio
translations
totherecent
introduction
Hankins'
andJames
andMichael
J.B.Aliens
Platonic
Ficinos
2001),xi.
(Cambridge,
Theology

15:42:44 PM

I Vivarium
46 (2008)192-221
J.G.Snyder

195

particular.
Finally,the paper concludeswithan explanationof the general
functionthatmattertheoryperforms
in Ficinos PlatonicTheology
, and with
on
the
and
motivations
thatground
speculations
philosophical
theological
Ficinos robusttheoryofprimematter.
II
The Aristotelian
analysisof materialthingsinto theirform,matterand privationwas the dominantframework
forconceptualizing
materialthingsby
Scholasticnaturalphilosophers,
and it was notfullyreplaceduntilthedevelIt
opmentof modernmechanistic
philosophiesin theseventeenth
century.5
was also theframework
thatMarsilioFicinomostlyinherited
fromtheScholasticsand thathe employedin his PlatonicTheology
.6 On thisanalysisof
materialthings,theformof a substanceis theprincipleof organization,
the
matterthesubjectin whichtheforminheres,and theprivationis theform
thatthethinglacks.The matterofa giventhingis relative
to theleveloforganizationthatis underconsideration,
since a piece of bronze,whichis not
withoutitsown formand matter,
servesat thesametimeas thematterof a
The mostfundamental
statue,whichisyetanotherleveloforganization.7
matter,thatis,thematterthatis thoughtto be beneathall levelsoforganization,
has traditionally
beencalled"primematter"byphilosophers
in boththePlatonicand Aristotelian
traditions.8
Prime
matter
servesas the
philosophical
5)Onalternative
theories
ofmatter
intheMedieval
seeAtomism
anditsPlaceinMedieval
period,
ed.
Robert
Aurelien
,
(Leiden,
2007).
Philosophy
6)Foranaccount
ofFicino
s basicontology,
seeMichael
s Theory
"Ficino
oftheFive
J.B.Allen,
Substances
andtheNeoplatonists'
Parmenides"
andRenaissance
Studies
12:1
Journal
ofMedieval
toFicino
s Scholastic
seeFicino
s "Incipit
1982).Fordocuments
(Spring,
pertaining
background,
Tractatus
and"Tractatus
Marsilii"
inPaulOskar
Kristellers
"Marsilio
Ficino
Physicus"
Physicus
andHisCircle,"
inStudies
inRenaissance
and
Letters
Vol.
I
60-64
and
,
(Roma,
1956),
Thought
ofFicino
74-76.Fora discussion
s Scholastic
seeJames
Plato
andtheItalian
education,
Hankins,
Renaissance
PaulOskar
,Vol.I (Leiden,
Marsilio
Ficino
andHisWork
1996),271-276;
Kristeller,
Five
Hundred
Years
Florence
andItsUniversity
(Firenze,
1987),6-7;andJonathan
Davies,
After
theEarly
Renaissance
(Leiden,
1998),21-22.
During
7)SeeBookI ofAristotle's
fora general
account
ofhisviews
onform,
matter
andprivaPhysics
tion.
AtPhysics
Aristotle
howmatter
isrelative
tothelevel
, II.2,194b9,
oforganization
explains
that
isunder
consideration.
8)SeeRichard
s Matter,
andMotion:
Theories
inAntiquity
andTheir
Sorabji
(LonSpace
Sequel
oftheory
ofprime
matter
don,1988)fora discussion
heldbythecommentators
onAristotle;
alsoseerelevant
sections
ofVolumes
2 (Physics)
and3 (Metaphysics),
ofRichard
s The
Sorabji

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)192-221
J.G.Snyder

ultimate
and itwasthoughtto be conserved
in theprocess
subjectofall forms,
ofsubstantial
such
as
when
one
element
is
and
change,
corrupted a newone
is generated.
While therewas generalagreementamong Scholasticphilosophersthat
materialsubstances
haveas theirprinciples
formand privation,
there
matter,
was no generalconsensusabouttheprecisenatureofprimematteritself.The
Thomistictheorywas not theonlytheoryof primematter.Thereexistedin
thethirteenth
and fourteenth
centuries
a plurality
oftheories
ofprimematter
thatwereheld by variousScholasticphilosophersfromdiversetheological
ordersand traditions.
The different
theoriesmadedivergent
claimsaboutthe
s existence
and thedegreeto whichit is intelligible,
ifat all. The
primematter
on
the
of
that
one
attributed
to prime
disagreement
depended
degree reality
matter:Is mattera thinand spectralentitythatis dependentupon thereality
ofotherthingsforitsownqualifiedand partialexistence,
or is it morerobust
in its nature,such thatit mayexiston its own, and mayeven be known?
ThomasAquinas held somethingalong the lines of the firstposition.He
catearguedthatprimematteris a qualifiedentitythatexistsas a theoretical
in
the
of
material
and
as
of
actual
form-matter
gory
metaphysics
things,
part
he arguedthatprimematteris completely
composites.Further,
unintelligible
on itsown.On theotherhand,philosophers
who belongedto theFranciscan
- such as Saint Bonaventure,
tradition
JohnDuns Scotus and Williamof
Ockham- generally
attributed
a greater
to primematter
than
degreeofreality
ThomasAquinasdid.
assertions
aboutprimematter.9
First,
Aquinasmadetwodistinctive
Aquinas
heldthatprimematterexistsonlypotentially
on itsown,withoutform,but
existsas an actuality
onlyon accountofbeingpartofa form-matter
composite.10He viewedprimematteras possessinga partialor incompleteexistence

200-600
AD (London,
from
2004)forselections
Philosophy
oftheCommentators
Neoplatonic
andthecommentators,
onprime
matter.
philosophers,
9)Aquinas
makes
four
basicassertions
about
inDeprincipiis
matter
naturae
,and
actually
prime
inother
discussions
ofmatter.
Inaddition
tothetwoassertions
examined
also
above,
Aquinas
for
the
of
matter.
Matter
is
one
undifferentiated.
matSecond,
unity
argues
through
being
prime
terwascreated
from
Prime
matter
isnotgenerated
orcorrupted
inthe
byGoddirectly
nothing.
course
ofnatural
butisconserved.
Fora general
discussion
ofThomas
viewof
change,
Aquinas'
seeJohn
F.Wippel,
TheMetaphysical
From
Finite
to
matter,
Thought
ofThomas
Aquinas:
Being
Uncreated
and
Robert
Thomas
on
Human
295-375;
Passnau,
2000),
Being
(Washington,
Aquinas
APhilosophical
Nature:
la, 75-89(Cambridge,
2002),40-45.
ofSumma
Study
theologiae
10)Sententia
,VII.2.1289-1292.
super
Metaphysicam

15:42:44 PM

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46 (2008)192-221
J.G.Snyder

197

of
ofmaterialthings,thatis,on theexistence
thatis parasiticon theactuality
that
to
its
Prime
matter
has
no
act
actualform-matter
pertains
composites.
ownessence,and in virtueofwhichitwouldcontinueto existin theabsence
naturae
ofsomething
thatdoes,namely,form.In De principiis
, Aquinasconofitself,
that"matter
existsincompletely
cluded,therefore,
needingsomething
In SummacontraGentiles
thesoul
morein orderto exist."11
, whilecontrasting
withprimematter,
Aquinasstatesthat"primematterdoes not remainin act
afterthe formsdeparture,
exceptin relationto the act of anotherform,"
whereasthehumansoul does.12When a formis corrupted,
then,theprime
matterthatwas once its substratedoes not continueto existin actuality,
replacesthe earlier
accordingto Aquinas,unlessanotherformimmediately
one. The qualifiedexistencethatprimematterenjoyson thisviewalso has
Second,Aquinasassertedthatprime
implications.
epistemological
significant
matteris onlyknownindirectly
byan analogydrawnwithsomeformmatter
holds
that
any knowledgeof primematteris in itself
composite.Aquinas
inconceivable.
Whatever
accordperfectly
knowledgeone has of something,
a
its
which
that
to
comes
from
definition
of
form,
implied
prime
ing Aquinas,
"cant be knownordefinedas such,butonly[known]
matter,
strictly
speaking,
by an analogy"with the matterthat belongsto the ordinaryobjectsof
For instance,one reasonsthatjust as bronzeservesas the
our experience.13
matterofa statue,so primematterservesas thematterforall levelsoforganization.Concludinghis discussionof primematterin the earlychaptersof

n) Thomas
inSelected
OnthePrinciples
anded.
, trans,
Aquinas,
ofNature,
Writings
Philosophical
68.
McDermott
(Oxford,
1993),
Timothy
12)Thomas
Summa
Gentiles
F.Anderson
contra
, Vol.2, trans.
Dame,
(Notre
James
Aquinas,
1956),264.
13)Thomas
isfollowing
OnthePrinciples
Aristotle's
71.HereAquinas
Aquinas,
posiofNature,
tionontheepistemic
status
ofthesubstrate
foratPhysics
Aristotle
1.7191a8-13.
writes,
argued
"Theunderlying
nature
canbeknown
Forasthebronze
istothestatue,
thewoodto
byanalogy.
thebed,orthematter
andtheformless
before
form
toanything
which
hasform,
sois
receiving
theunderlying
tosubstance,
i.e.the'this'
orexistent."
nature
R.P.HarAristotle,
, trans.
Physics
inTheComplete
dieandR.K.Gaye,
Works
Vol.I,
Press,
(Princeton
1984),
University
ofAristotle
Thomas
on
Thomas'
onI
326.In TheMetaphysical
,
Commentary
Thought
of
Aquinas
relying
Sentences
F.Wippel
that
I,q. 15,a.3,John
(d.36,q.2,a.3) andSumma
theologiae
prime
argues
matter
canalsobeknown
ofdivine
ideaforprime
matter"
that
isnotdistinct
from
bya "kind
thedivine
ideaofthecomposite.
Prime
matter
is known
inthiswayinsofar
as itis realized
with
theappropriate
form.
Asfarashuman
areconcerned,
mathowever,
together
beings
prime
tercanonly
beknown
andnotinitself.
F.Wippel,
The
John
byananalogy,
Metaphysical
Thought
325-327.
ofThomas
Aquinas,

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J.G.Snyder

De principiis
naturae
thencan
, Aquinassaysthat"[nothingactuallyexistent
be called primematter."14
PrimematterexistsforAquinas,therefore,
in a
or
thin
which
is to saythatit is something
thatfunctions
sense,
as
qualified
theultimatematerialsubstrate
ofall things,butwhichdoes notsubsiston its
own. Further,
in spiteof our best efforts
to bringit undersome rational
matter
must
forever
remain
in obscurity,
both to the finite
account,prime
humanintellect,
and perhaps,byimplication,
evento themindofGod.
The Thomistictheoryof primematterwas controversial
in thethirteenth
and fourteenth
centuries.15
Franciscan
and
philosophers theologians
generally
thanAquinasdid.
arguedthatprimematterpossessesa morerobustexistence
all itsownthatis notdependenton
Theyclaimedthatprimematteris a reality
the actualityof the form-matter
and theyalso
compositesforits existence,
its
ultimate
Based
on
what
was understood
as
arguedagainst
unintelligibility.
thedubioustheological
and philosophical
oftheThomistic
view,
implications
suchas JohnDuns Scotusand Williamof Ockhamassigneda
philosophers
to primematter,
greater
degreeofentitative
reality
thereby
viewingmatterin
morerobustterms.16
TheThomistic
threatened
view,itwasgenerally
thought,
Gods omnipotence,
sinceit impliedthatGod was impotentto createprime
matter
withoutform.ItwasalsothoughtthattheThomistic
threatened
theory
Gods omniscience,
sinceit impliedthatGod could notknowprimematter.
BeforeAquinas,SaintBonaventure
ofprime
arguedthatthepurereceptivity
mattercan be consideredin itselfthroughprivation,
thatis,bystripping
it of
all formit is knownto be an "intelligible
darkness"(tenebraintelligibilis
).17
Bonaventure
statesthatprimematter"is able to be consideredby the soul
Scotusarguesthat
accordingto itsown essenceand as whollyunformed."18
matter
in
exists
and
not
as
the
that
prime
actuality,
just
pure potentiality

14)Thomas
OnthePrinciples
71.
Aquinas,
ofNature,
15)Intheseventeenth
for
that
creation
exnihilo
isuninMilton,
instance,
John
century,
argues
SeeChapter
VIIofTheChristian
Doctrine
Milton
forhisown"robust"
,where
telligible.
argues
viewofmatter
that
shares
somefeatures
incommon
with
Ficino
s view.
In TheChristian
DocMilton
that
matter
isintrinsically
trine,
tocregenerally
argues
goodandwasatonetime
prior
ation
anactual
substance
that
wasconfused
andformless.
16)SeeAllan
"TheOckhmisit
inTheConcept
inGreek
andMedieval
Wolter,
Critique,"
ofMatter
McMullin
F.Wippel,
, ed.Ernn
The
MetaDame,1965),124-1
46;andJohn
(Notre
Philosophy
, 312-313.
physical
Thought
ofThomas
Aquinas
17)Bonaventure,
Commentarius
inII librum
Sententiarum
, d.3,p.I,a. I,q. 2.AlsoseeChristoM.Cullen,
Bonaventure
(NewYork,
2006),45-46.
pher
18)Quoted
inChristopher
M.Cullen,
Bonaventure
, 46.

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J.G.Snyder

199

residesin actualform-matter
Also,inasmuchas primematteris
composites.19
an actuality,
ScotusarguedthatGod can havean idea of it. The Dominican
view,it was also arguedby Ockham,was also philosophically
flawed,since
therewas,in theend,no entity
thatis actuallyserving
as thesubstrate
ofmaterialformsat all.20It was therefore
that
there
has
to
be
thought
actually somethat
is
called
its
over
thing
"primematter,"
retaining identity time,and which
functions
as thesubstrate
ofall materialthings.
MarsilioFicinoaddresses
boththeontologicalandepistemic
statusofprime
matterin thePlatonicTheology.
It is arguedin thesectionsthatfollowthat
Ficinos theorystandsin starkoppositionto theThomistictheoryas outlined
above. Ficinomakescertainbasic assertionsabout primemattersexistence
ofform,and he suggests
thatitis in principle
in itself,
independent
intelligible
evenifthehumanmindcan come to knowit onlybyan analogywithordiof
narymaterialthings,and by a comparisonof the levelsof thehierarchy
in
At
least
these
two
Ficino
from
therefore,
being.
respects,
diverges
Aquinas
in hismostbasicunderstanding
ofmatter,
and insteadalignshimself
withthe
traditionof philosophers
and theologiansthatassertedthe realityof prime
matteris philosophically
and theologically
superior.This traditionincludes
notonlytheFranciscanScholasticphilosophers,
butalso Plato,Plotinus,the
Hermes
and
pseudo-Egyptian
sage
Trismegistus, Augustine,
amongothers.
Ill
Scholarshavetraditionally
noteda strongThomisticpresencein theScholastic
elementsof MarsilioFicinos philosophyand theology,
especiallyin his PlatonicTheology
as
to
on Platos dialogues,among
, opposed his commentaries
otherworks,whichreflect
the Neoplatonismof Plotinusand Proclusmore

19)John
DunsScotus,
inMetaphysicam
II,dist.12,quest1; Quaestiones
7,q.5;see
OpusOxon.
2 ofRichard
K. Cross,
ThePhysics
TheScientific
Context
especially
Chapter
ofDunsScotus:
ofa
Vision
which
contains
a clear
ofScotus'
forthe
(Oxford,
1998),
Theological
exposition
arguments
existence
ofmatter,
anditsnature;
aswellasPeter
"Scotus
onMetaphysics,"
inTheCamKing,
toDunsScotus
Williams
, ed.Timothy
(NewYork,
2002),15-68.
bridge
Companion
20)William
ofOckham,
Summula
naturalis
inlibros
1.1-15;
philosophiae
Espositio
Physicorum
Aristotelis
Brevis
summa
libri
"TheOckhamist
, 1.15.1-18.7;
Cri, 1.3.Allan
Wolter,
Physicorum
Andr
ThePhysics
128-31.
William
Ockham
114Goddu,
95-107,
(Leiden,
tique,"
1986),
of
of
s Philosophy
ofNature,"
inTheCambridge
118;and"Ockham
toOckham
, ed.Paul
Companion
Vincent
1999),147-149.
Spade(NewYork,

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J.G.Snyder

It haswrongly
beenasserted
prominently.21
byArdisB. Collinsthatthetheory
ofprimematterthatFicinoheldin thePlatonicTheology
is largely
Thomistic.
Otherinterpreters,
such as Paul Oskar Kristeller,
have assumedthatFicino
helda versionofAquinas'theoryofmatter.In general,detecting
a Thomistic
flavorto aspectsof thisworkis certainly
not withouta strongjustification.
One neednotlookdeeplyin orderto findThomasAquinasin thepagesofthe
PlatonicTheology
, sinceFicinodeclaresthatAquinasis the "thesplendorof
inthefinalbook.Elsewhere
Christian
hespeaksofhimaffectionately
Theology"
as "ourThomasAquinas."22
ThomasAquinashasalso beena significant
partof
Ficinos biography,
at leastsincetheearlysixteenth
TheSummacontra
century.
Gentiles
is thoughtto havehad a roleto playin resolving
a spiritual
crisisthat
afflicted
Ficino in the 1450s. Ficinos earlysixteenth-century
biographer,
GiovanniCorsi,describesa periodin Ficinoslifein whichhe was afflicted
withmelancholy
in
becausehad "strayed
too farfromtheChristianthinkers"
his pursuitof ancientpagan philosophy.23
Ficinowas givena copy of the
in orderto
SummacontraGentiles
ofFlorence,Antoninus,
bytheArchbishop
modelfortheharmonization
of pagan
givetheyoungPlatonista successful
philosophyand Christiandoctrine.Aquinas has been widelyviewedas an
antidoteto Ficinosperceived
paganismand heresy.24

21)There
inthetwentieth
ofMarsilio
Ficinos
weretwodominant
interpretations
philosophy
there
wasthesystematic
ofPaulOskarKristeller,
was
First,
and,there
century.
interpretation
Yates
andMichael
themore
creative
theinterpretation
ofFrances
J.B.Allenthatemphasized
elements
ofFicino
s thought.
TheHermetic
istoday
thedominant
andHermetic
interpretation
in"Paul
B.
Allen
these
two
to
Ficinos
Michael
discusses
interpretation. J.
approaches
philosophy
E Tenebris
Ficino:
Revocaverunt
Reconsidered
Oskar
Kristeller
andMarsilio
,"inKristeller
(New
Celenza
hasargued
thatKristeller
washostile
totheHermetic
York,
2006),1-18.Christopher
itinferior
to"true"
SeeChristopher
"Paul
andconsidered
Celenza,
philosophy.
interpretation
alsoinKristeller
Oskar
Kristeller
andtheHermetic
74.
Tradition,"
Reconsidered,
71-80,
especially
inthe
G. Snyder's
doctoral
"Matter
andMethod
AlsoseeChapter
OneofJames
dissertation,
ofMarsilio
Platonic
Center,
Ficino,"
2008),fora discussion
(TheCUNYGraduate
Theology
when
itcomes
ofthese
twointerpretations,
toMarsilio
Ficinos
oftheshortcomings
especially
ofnature.
philosophy
22)Marsilio
Michael
textedited
Platonic
Ficino,
, Vol.6,trans.
J.B. Allen,
byJames
Theology
"Marsilio
Ficino
Hankins
with
William
Bowen
Mass,2002),138-139.
Kristeller,
(Cambridge,
inRenaissance
andLetters,
Studies
andHisCircle,"
39,n.15.
Thought
23)"TheLifeofMarsilio
inThe
Letters
Ficino
Ficino,"
,Vol.3 (London,
1985),140.
ofMarsilio
24)Zanobi
thatFicino
often
toldhimthisstory
anacquaintance
ofFicino,
claimed
Acciaiuoli,
OnFicino
s "spiritual
andCorsi
s andAcciaiuoli
s descriptions
ofit,
about
St.Antoninus.
crisis,"
Renaissance
PlatointheItalian
seeespecially
Hankins,
, Vol.I (Leiden,
1990),279-280,
James

15:42:44 PM

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I Vivarium
J.G.Snyder

201

Paul Oskar Kristeller

arguedthatAquinas exercisedthe most powerful
In thefirst
ofhisphilosophy.25
on thedevelopment
Scholasticinfluence
chapa
offers
terof his seminalstudy,ThePhilosophy
ofMarsilioFicino, Kristeller
theThomisticthebriefexpositionofFicinos theoryofmatterthatresembles
Kristeller
explainsthatformoccupiesnearlythe
oryin severalsalientrespects.
that"matter
is,
wholerealmofbeingon itsownforFicino,and consequently
and
Further
it."26
from
so to speak,practically
Aquinas
aligning
expelled
Kristeller
Ficinoon thequestionofmattersexistence,
explainsthat"[m]atter
ofitsown. It merelyhas,in respectto eachobject,theequal
has no existence
is nextto nothingand
ofbeingand ofnotbeing.Matter,therefore,
possibility
does not
standsmidwaybetweenBeingand Nothing."27
AlthoughKristeller
nonsome
in
mind
have
he
does
in
this
mentionAquinasdirectly
context,
inherversionof theThomistictheorythathe believesFicino
controversial
Kristeller
In a laterarticletitled"Thomismand ItalianThought,"
ited.28
argues
his
heart
of
the
to
thatwhen one "penetrate
[Ficino
s]
[s]
philosophy"
very
withThomasAquinas,one discovers,
in searchof resemblances
accordingto
"Ficinoobviouslyknewhim
thatamongScholasticphilosophers,
Kristeller,

in
diMarsilio
"Perlabiografia
Ficino,"
SeealsoP.O. Kristeller,
andVol.II,454-459.
reprinted
Vol.I, 191-211.
andLetters,
inRenaissance
Studies
Thought
25)Michael
as "alate
forFicino
a "feel"
thatKristeller
noted
developed
J.B. Allenhasaptly
Renaisas
an
and
Franciscan
a
tilt
towards
with
scholastic
early
positions
theological
philosopher
alone.
in
Platonic
the
immersion
his
near-total
result
of
as
a
sance
Theology While
Neoplatonist"
thesameisnottrue
Franciscan
held
some
Ficino
that
Kristeller
positions,
theological
thought
Thomas
that
Kristeller
Inthisrespect,
ofnature.
forhismetaphysics
Aquinas
argued
generally
"PaulOskar
SeeMichael
onFicino.
influence
Scholastic
wasthemostimportant
J.B. Allen,
Reconsidered
inKristeller
andMarsilio
Kristeller
, 9.
Ficino,"
26)PaulOskar
Conant
Ficino
Marsilio
ThePhilosophy
, trans.
(NewYork,
Kristeller,
Virginia
of
1943).39.
27)PaulOskar
Ficino
The
, 39.
Kristeller,
ofMarsilio
Phibsophy
28)Itisperhaps
ofany
wasreally
ofmatter
thequestion
that
Kristeller
didnotthink
that
likely
lies
elsewhere
s
of
Ficino
that
the
core
Kristellers
since
to
concern
Ficino,
philosophy
argues
deep
Ernst
Cas"Ficino
s PlaceinIntellectual
Ina 1945article,
innatural
than
History,"
philosophy.
ofnature,
Aphilosophy
ofNature.
noindependent
"wefind
inFicino
that
comments
sirer
study
- byCardano,
oftheRenaissance
onewaslater
inthesenseinwhich
bythinkers
developed
- wasunknown
tonote
iscorrect
While
Cassirer
toFicino."
Bruno
Giordano
Patrizzi,
Telesio,
inthePlatonic
ofmatter
, itisnotthecase
isnoindependent
thatthere
Theology
investigation
iswhatCassirer
which
ofinthiswork,
worth
isnota natural
thatthere
speaking
philosophy
from
the
ascent
in
the
souls
as
a
saw
natural
Ficino
step
philosophynecessary
generally
implies.
s PlaceinIntellectual
"Ficino
E. Cassirer,
realms.
totheimmaterial
material
Journal
History," of
theHistory
ofIdeas6(4)(1945),489.

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J.G.Snyder

ArdisB. Collinspossiblymakesthemost
[Aquinas]betterthantheothers."29
ambitiouscase forFicinos Thomismin his book TheSecularis Sacred:Platonism
and Thomism
in MarsilioFicimsPlatonicTheology.
,30To makehiscase,
Collinsin theappendixjuxtaposespassagesfromeachtextin orderto demonstrate"thatimportant
sectionsof Ficinos workarecompletely
dominatedby
influence."31
with
to
Ficinos
Specifically
respect
theoryof matter,
Aquinas'
ofprimematter"wouldcontradict
CollinsarguesthatforFicinotheexistence
itsnature."32
whenit comesto thewayin
Collins*book has been influential
whichscholarsviewFicinos philosophical
debtto ThomasAquinas.33
It is undeniablethatThomismdid have a deep and lastingimpacton
elements
ofFicinos philosophy
andtheology.
as Kristeller
However,
significant
a
Scholastic
inheritance
is
matter.
Because
Ficinos
complicated
recognized,
in
FicinoacceptedcertainThomisticphilosophical
and
doctrines,
spiteofthe
factthatFicinoperhapsknewAquinasbest,itdoesnotfollowfromthis,given
That
Ficinos generaleclecticism,thathe acceptedhis theoryof matter.34
to
smooth
over
subtle
it
is
all
too
differences
said,
easy
yetsignificant
among
Scholasticphilosophers,
and attribute
most,ifnotall, Scholasticelementsof

29)PaulOskarKris
Three
Medieval
teller,
ofRenaissance
Learning:
Essays
byPaulOskar
Aspects
andHisCircle,"
inStudies
in
"Marsilio
Ficino
Kristeller
, 74.Alsosee,PaulOskarKristeller
In
this
Kristeller
also
notes
seven
references
to
Renaissance
and
Letters
39.
article,
,
John
Thought
Ficino
s Opera
omnia.
DunsScotus
throughout
30)Michael
thatthere
are"extensive
from
theSumma
hasalsoargued
J.B. Allen
borrowings"
Marsilio
inMarsilio
Ficino
s Commentary
onPlato's
Philebus.
Michael
contra
Gentiles
J.B.Allen,
andRenaissance
Texts
andStudies,
Ficino:
The
Philebus
1975),23-24.
(Medieval
Commentary
31)Ardis
inMarsilio
Platonic
TheSecular
isSacred:
Platonism
andThomism
Ficinos
B. Collins,
,x.
Theology
32)Ardis
isSacred
B.Collins,
The
Secular
,45.
33)Intheintroduction
ofthePlatonic
totherecent
translations
J.B.Allen,
byMichael
Theology
the
translation.
In
the
to
therecent
aswellasinthetextual
notes
that
introduction
accompany
Collins
views
onFiciofthePlatonic
andHankins,
translation
,Allen
echoing
Theology
English
bears
theinfluence
ofthesecond
bookon
nos Thomistic
assert
that
thePlatonic
debt,
Theology
state
that"[occasionally
Ficino
tookpassages
contra
Gentiles
creation
oftheSumma
, and,they
in
and
he
was
interested
sections
almost
verbatim
from
Thomas'
clearly
aligning
argumentation,
astheultimate
scholastic
ofthesaint
whowasalready
ofhiswork
with
that
authority."
emerging
Marsilio
Platonic
Vol.1,xi.
Ficino,
Theology,
34)Kristeller
indealing
a general
caution
with
Ficinos
Scholastic
heritage
judiciously
suggested
he
we
tocall
Renaissance
when
writes
that
"lest
aretempted
inhisEight
the
Italian
Philosophers
of
Thomas
that
hecametosidewith
Scotus
him[Ficino]
a Thomist,
weshould
remember
against
ofwhether
is
thequestion
thewillortheintellect
issues
ononeofthecrucial
them,
dividing
Italian
Renaissance
PaulOskar
39-40.
Kristeller,
1964),
(Stanford,
ofthe
superior."
Eight
Philosophers

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J.G.Snyder

203

Ficinosthoughtto ThomasAquinas.The pre-eminent

positionthatis today
attributed
to ThomasAquinasamongMedievalphilosophers
is in facta postand
even
a
Medieval,
post-Renaissance
development.35
Aquinasmay
Although
havebeenemerging
as thepre-eminent
Scholasticauthority
in fifteenth
centuryFlorence,Ficinodoes nothesitateto divergefromAquinason significant
and theological
in fact,in latefifteenth
matters;
philosophical
century
Italy,it
has been arguedthatScotistmetaphysics
was viewedas philosophicaland
whenit
theologically
superiorto Thomisticmetaphysics,
especially,
ironically,
cameto demonstrating
theimmortality
ofthesoul.36Whiletheattribution
of
a Scholasticdoctrinefoundin FicinosPlatonicTheology
to Aquinasmayin
therearespecialcases,suchas withhistheory
ofprime
manycasesbe justified,
whereit is not. It will be arguedbelow,thatFicinoclearlydoes not
matter,
acceptAquinas'theoryof primematter,and opts insteadfora theorythat
attributes
a greater
to primematter.BothKristeller
and Coldegreeofreality
linserroneously
assumethatFicinoendorsedsomeversionof theThomistic
does thisimplicitly
theoryof matter;Kristeller
byarguingthatFicinohelda
version
of
the
Thomistic
whereas
Collinsis explicitin hisassergeneric
theory,
tionthatFicinofollowThomason primematter.
IV
The previoussectionnotwithstanding,
Ficinocan sounda lot likeAquinasin
thePlatonicTheology
whenhe discussesmatter.Ficinocan appearat timesto
endorsebothof theassertions
aboutprimematteroutlinedabove.He claims

35)Inhisrecent
introduction
toMedieval
Marenbon
writes
that
John
philosophy,
Aquinas'
"unique
andhisofficial
doctrinal
reflect
status,
Marenprominence,
post-Medieval
John
developments."
AnHistorical
andPhilosophical
bon,Medieval
Introduction
Philosophy:
2007),245.
(Roudedge,
36)SeeJohn
andtheMissing
Monfasani,
Ockhamists:
"Aristotelians,
Platonists,
Philosophical
inPre-Reformation
Renaissance
Monfasani
has
Liberty
46(2)(1993),247-276.
Italy,"
Quarterly
that
Franciscan
Scotists
were
inItaly
attheendofthefifteenth
andthebeginargued
prominent
"viamoderna
ofthesixteenth
centuries.
Scotist
theso-called
as
ning
,"wasviewed
metaphysics,
toThomistic
theso-called
"viaantiqua
itcametoissues
,"when
superior
metaphysics,
pertaining
tothecreation
oftheuniverse,
aswellasinitscapacity
torefute
theAverroistic
doctrine
ofthe
oftheintellect.
Scotist
waseven
seenasproviding
a support
oftheimmortalunity
metaphysics
himself
remained
thepossibility
of
ityofthesoul,evenifDunsScotus
agnostic
concerning
ofthesouls immortality.
Renaissance
Scotists
on
the
that
a
anydemonstration
argued, contrary,
demonstration
ofimmortality
isindeed
TheBishop
ofPadua,
Pietro
whowrote
Barozzi,
possible.
anedict
theAverroistic
in1489,wasa supporter
ofScotist
against
position
metaphysicians.

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J.G.Snyder

ofall material
as thesubstrate
thatone and thesameprimematterfunctions
and
is
matter
that
and,
ungenerated uncorrupted, at a glance,
prime
things,
existand thatit is completely
eventhatprimematterdoes notindependently
Ficinoexplainsearly
s existence,
on itsown.Concerningmatter
unintelligible
that"whatis last,thatis, corporeal
in thefirstbook of thePlatonicTheology
else
It can neveract on anything
has to be actedupon byeverything.
matter,
its
action."37
of
fornothingexistsbelowitwhichcouldbe thesubject
ofitself,
- as
neitherexistsofitself
Later,againin Book I, Ficinoexplainsthat"matter
- nordoesitexistbecauseofthequaliand doesnotactofitself
itis imperfect
becauseof someformthatprecedes
it
exists
Rather
tiesthatit itselfprecedes.
a qualifiedexistence
In bothofthesepassages,Ficinoappearsto attribute
it."38
likeAquinasdid. In thefirstpassage,he deniesthatmattercan do
to matter,
as theobjectofits
sincenothingexistsbeneathitthatcouldfunction
anything,
on
its
doesnotexist
own,butexists
action;in thesecondhe claimsthatmatter
ofform.Ficino
in somelessersensethatis dependenton thepreviousexistence
also claimsin severalplacesthatthingsare knownexclusively
throughtheir
is
matter
unknowable.39
formless
that
whichwouldseemto imply
form,
prime
betweenAquinasand Ficino
doctrinal
of
an
overall
assertion
agreement
Any
is largely
s ontologicaland epistemic
status,however,
on thequestionofmatter
is
not
it
those
as
such
In
above,
apparentthat
given
misguided. quotations
he
does speak
when
and
Ficinois evenspeakingabout primematterat all,
he tendsto divergewidelyfromAquinasin his
aboutprimematter,
directly
ofit.In thefirst
mostbasicunderstanding
passage,Ficinois actuallyspeaking
materia
matter
aboutthenatureofcorporeal
), whichmustbe dis(;
corporealis
prima);and the secondpassagecan
tinguishedfromprimematter(materia
thatFicinomarksbetweenwhat
a
distinction
in
of
be
understood
light
only
thatbelongto things.It is
of
existence
modes
the
two
to
be
takes
he
separate
to primemata greater
degreeofexistence
arguedbelowthatFicinoattributes
terthanAquinaswaseverwillingto,and he arguesthattheinfinite
receptivity
to God. Both of theseclaimsplace Ficinoin
of primematteris intelligible
to primemata greater
who haveattributed
ofphilosophers
a tradition
reality
the
even
ter.This becomesevidentevenwhenone notesthat
languageand

37)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.1, 23.
Ficino,
Theology
38)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.1,41.
Ficino,
Theology
39)Forinstance,
most
about
thatwelearn
inBookX,Chapter
V,Ficino
clearly
objects
explains
theconditions
from
inisolation
rational
their
about
wethink
when
andmost
principles
reliably
Platonic
Marsilio
,Vol.3, 159.
ofmatter."
Ficino,
Theology

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J.G; Snyder

205

- suchas
thatFicinousesto describematterin thePlatonicTheology
imagery
- is in itselfan indicationofsortsthat
the"womb"and "seedbed"ofbecoming
thereis a different
conceptofmatteroperatingin FicinothaninAquinas.For
whichis
Ficino
saysthatnature"isartmoldingmatterfromwithin,"
example,
in
in
the
bosom
of
matter
is
a
form
"hidden
because
way
anygiven
possible
a
more
robust
exisSuch
attributes
it
is
to
before
brought light."40
language
It willbe arguedbelowthatanyperceivedresemblance
tenceto primematter.
that
fromignoring
severalkeydistinctions
betweenAquinasand Ficinoresults
matter
and
its
existence.
Ficinomakesin thePlatonicTheology
regarding
uses theconceptof primematterin theearly
AlthoughFicinofrequently
- especiallyin Book I wherehe arguesforthe
booksof thePlatonicTheology
- he givesarguments
forits
foror habitin nature
ofan incorporeal
necessity
aremade in thecourseof
existencein Book V, ChapterIV. Thesearguments
In thischapterFicinofurnishes
ofsoulovermatter.
arguingforthegovernance
fortheexistence
ofprimematter.
at leastthreearguments
(1)

Naturamarsimitatur

beneathall of
thatpersists
First,Ficinoarguesthattheremustexista substrate
theaccidentaland substantial
changesthatoccurin naturebasedon an analart.
between
art
and
nature.Ficinostatesthatnatureimitates
that
he
finds
ogy
Human craftsmen,
Ficinoreasons,do not havethepowerto createanything
bitofmatterthat
fromscratch;rather,
theytakesomepreexisting
completely
is at hand,and imprintin it a formthatthematteritselfdoes not possess.41

40)Marsilio
aresimilarities
between
Marsilio
Ficino
Platonic
Ficino,
, Vol.2,57.There
Theology
tohave
Bruno
when
itcomes
tonatural
Therobustness
ofmatter
andGiordano
appears
change.
sview
ofnatural
Arobust
matter
holds
the
hadsignificant
forFicino
implications
change.
prime
as
ofallthings,
to
Ficino.
Bruno
also
describes
natural
formless
seeds
according
change coming
indrawing
Seeespecially
the
"from
within"
andhegoesfurther
outthese
matter,
implications.
De lacausa
etuno.
Second
ofBruno's
,principio
Dialogue
41)Marsilio
Platonic
s discussion
ofthedifference
Ficino,
, Vol.2, 19.AlsoseeFicino
Theology
XIofthePlatonic
. There
Ficino
between
natural
causes
andGodinBookII,Chapter
Theology
matter
of
as
essences
of
minds
and
that
"God
alone
creates
the
bodies
and
many
explains
prime
rational
without
anintermediary
ora substrate."
Platonic
soulsaspossible
,Vol.1,167.
Theology
A natural
orpower
ina
ontheother
toFicino,
"isa sort
ofform
limited
cause,
hand,
according
allitsforce
certain
oneparticular
whatever
itdoeswith
anddoing
result,
waytoproducing
doing
itofnecessity."
Platonic
make
a particular
from
the
, Vol.1,165.Natural
Theology
thing
agents
materials
that
areathand,
toFicino,
andproduces
itsdiverse
effects
from
a combinaaccording
tionofitsownlimited
andthedisposition
ofthematter
that
itispresent
on.
power,
working

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J.G.Snyder

Natureoperatesin muchthesameway,accordingto Ficino,withtheexceptionthatthematterthatit initially

clotheswithformis completely
formless.
Naturedoes notpossessthecreativecausalityto bringtheverymaterialsubstrateof all thingsintoexistencefromnothing.Instead,it has thepowerto
thatitfashions
workwitha formless
and pre-existing
substrate
intoa particuforms.In this
larthisorthatwiththeguidanceofthemodelsoftheintelligible
respect,Ficinos argumentresemblesPlatos storyabout the creationof the
The Demiurgedoesnotcreatethe
universe
bytheDemiurgein the Timaeus.*2
it
notcreatetheconfusedmatter
of
the
forms
and
does
themselves,
archetypes
of becomingin whichsensiblethingsbecome.The Demiand thereceptacle
thatarepresentat handin the
instead
makes
use of theserawmaterials
urge
In similarfashion,accordingto Ficino,nature
construction
of theuniverse.43
fromscratch.Natureworks,likePlatos Demiurge,
does not createanything
on what is alreadygiven,in thiscase, primematter.When the substantial
changeof one elementintoanotheroccurs,naturedoes not createthenew
that
fromnothing,butfroma pre-existing
materialsubstrate
elemententirely
is conservedthroughout
thecourseofall changes.Fromtheseconsiderations,
thecraftsman
of theworld,has subject
Ficinoconcludesthat"natureherself,
allforms."44
thatis lackingallforms,
butis equallyreadyto receive
to ita matter
(2)

Fromactuspurustopurapotentia

in Ficinos
thatiswidespread
Thesecondargument
dependson an assumption
- such
levels
of
to
which
the
sundryontological
reality
thought,according
and haras matter,
body,quality,rationalsoul,etc.- standin a proportional
withone another.45
Each genus,accordingto Ficino,has
monicrelationship
thatexhibitorderand proportion;
twoextremes
and a seriesofintermediaries
withGod standingon one end,
in fact,all of realityforFicinois a hierarchy
In
on
the
other.
this
matter
and formless
chapterFicinomakeshiscase
prime
42)Plato,
Timaeus
, 28c-30c.
43)OfTimaeus
Plato's
seeFrancis
Cornford,
28c-30c,
(London,
1937),37.Seealso,
Cosmology
ofthe
Ficinos
ofPlato's
Timaeus
anditsMyth
"Marsilio
Michael
J.B. Allen,
Interpretation
in
Honor
Paul
Oskar
Kristeller
in
Studies
of
(Binghampton,
festivum:
Demiurge,"Supplementum
NY,1984),399-401.
44)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.2, 19.
Ficino,
Theology
45)Ficino
inontology
isevident
inhisconsidthat
there
ismeasure
andproportion
s assumption
There
Ficino
forms
in
the
first
book
of
the
Platonic
of
eration
ofthevarious
Theology.
grades
of
that
exist
at
of
forms
of
at
least
three
different
for
the
existence
polar
opposites
grades
argues
thishypostasis.

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207

ofprimematterveryquickly,almostin passing.He explains

fortheexistence
that"[j]ustas God at thehighestlevelofthingsis pureact,"so theremust"be
whichneedseveryat thelowestlevelwhichis purepotentiality,
something
thing,andwhichin itselfis withoutformyetcapableoftakingon all forms."46
on one pole
The basicidea is thatwhenone findsthatthereexistssomething
withineachindividualhypostaofbeing(or,forthatmatter,
ofthehierarchy
else,thatis thenegationofthe
sis),thenone shouldexpectto findsomething
on the otherend of the ontologicalspectrum.When it comes to the
first,
of
s existence,
then,Ficinoreasonsthattheexistence
questionofprimematter
in
is
a
state
of
of
that
the
existence
purepotentialsomething
pureactimplies
on theotherhand,pure
ity.Whilepureacthas nothingin it thatis potential,
- eventhoughit existsin a mannerthatwillbe
or primematter
potentiality,
in a statepoisedto
and is therefore
has
below
nothingofactuality,
explained
receivetheformsofall things.47
(3)

TheReciprocal
oftheElements
Interchange

oftheelementsin thischapFicinoturnsto thereciprocal

Finally,
interchange
s existence.
Ficinoclaimsthatbyexaminterto makehiscaseforprimematter
changethatoccurswhenone elementbecomesanotherone
ingthesubstantial
hancmateriarn).
Ficino
can catcha glimpseof "thishiddenmatter"{latentem
A
case
correct
underof
the
elements
as
a
turnsto thesubstantial
study.
change
changeof somebit of earthintosomevolumeof
standingof thesubstantial
ofa formless
and impassibleprime
water,Ficinoargues,impliestheexistence
Ficinoexamines
all
such
transformations.
matter
thatis conserved
throughout
of
substantial
of two alternatives
the possibility
explanations
change:first,
eitherthe formof earthremains,in some attenuatedfashion,in the newly
formed
volumeofwater,or,second,whentheformofearthrecedes,itis comalternative
cannotbe thecase,
pletelyreplacedbytheformofwater.The first
accordingto Ficino,sincetheformofearth,whichis dry,possessesa quality,
it cannot
to theformofwater,wetness.Therefore,
whichis contrary
dryness,
be truethattheformofearthremainsat all in thenewlyformed
water;on the
theearthmustbe completely
eliminated
and replacedbytheformof
contrary,
46)Marsilio
III ofthePlatonic
Platonic
Vol.2, 19.Alsosee,BookX,Chapter
Ficino,
Theology,
ifpure
willpureactbefound,
cannowhere
There
Ficino
states
that
"nowhere
potency
Theology.
exist."
isarguing
that
thefact
ofpure
. . . Therefore
matter
must
Ficino
befound
potency,
simple
notexist
were
itnotthecasethat
where
theemanation
ofthelight
ofGods creation
would
ends,
Thevery
ofpurepotency
onpureact.
existence
depends
pureactexisted.
47)Fora similar
SeeChapter
16and17ofBookI ofThomas
Summa
contra
Gentiles.
view,
Aquinas'

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J.G.Snyder

is essentially
water.The materialsubstrate
wipedclean,so to speak,andwhere
exists
the
formofwater.When theformof
of
earth
once
was
now
theform
Ficinoexplains,theformofearth"vanishes
intothechaos"
waterapproaches,
whichcontainsall thosepossibleformsthatare not at thepresentmoment
The
actual,and otherformsthatarepossibleandyetwillneverbe actualized.48
sincethere
formofwater,however,
cannotexistwithouta materialsubstrate,
would be no foundationin whichtheformcould takehold.Thus,sincethe
and because"nonewsubstrate
formofwatercannotexistwithouta substrate,
in
the
the
course
of
substantial
itself"
change,thenitmustbe thecase
presents
thatthesameprimematter"whichwas thesubstancefortheformof earth
Evenifone formis immediately
nowreceives
theformofwater."49
replacedby
thesubstantial
that
Ficino
thinks
another,
byconsidering
changeofelements,
or primematter,
ofa materialsubstrate,
thenecessary
existence
one discovers
thatstandsbeneathand supportsall formsequally.50
But whydoes Ficino insistthat"no new substratepresentsitself"along
in thiscase,water?Whycan itnot
withtheappearanceofeachnewsubstance,
Ficinomaintains
is createdwitheach newsubstance?
be thata newsubstrate
witheach substantial
thatthecreationof a new materialsubstrate
changeis
can
infer
from
the
first
one
for
two
reasons:
First,
argument,
unacceptable
would ascribeto nature
outlinedabove,thatthecreationof a new substrate
thepowerto createsomethingfromnothing,whichis wrong,accordingto
If naturein factimitatesart,
Ficino.Naturedoes not havecreativecausality.
from
does
not
create
thennature
something
nothing,as artdoes not, but
thatarepre-existing.
makesuseofmaterials
Second,wereitthecasethatprime
withtheformofearth,thenthenaturalchangeofone
matter
was annihilated
thingintoanotherwouldbe directedtowardsevil,accordingto Ficino.Somemustremainwhenone thingchangesintoanother.Ficino
thing,therefore,
behindthesecondpointin thefollowing
the
passage:
explains reasoning
and
that
small
ofwater
tonothing
first
reduced
iswhether
it[nature]
Ourquestion
portion
If
the
it
reduced
water
it
some
of
the
water.
or
whether
then
air,
entirely
preserved
produced
evil.
Yetthat
intention
bedirected
towards
nature
s intention
would
then
tonothing,
always
which
Andexistence
since
itisgoverned
aimsatthegood,
itself,
byGodshighest
goodness.
48)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.2, 19.
Ficino,
Theology
49)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.2, 19-21.
Ficino,
Theology
50)Thisargument
Ina notetothetext
ofthe
thePythagorean
isattributed
toTimaeus
byFicino.
of
to
Plato's
Ficino
is
here
that
Allen
and
Hankins
Platonic
50D-51B
,
referring
explain
Theology
Timaeus.

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J.G.Snyder

209

isthepeculiar
ofeternal
from
atsomepoint
God,wouldbestolen
gift
bycauses
things
toGod.51
subsequent
In thispassageFicinochangesthe examplefromthe substantialchangeof
earthintowaterto waterchangingintoair.Ifitwerethecase,he reasons,that
thewaterwerefirst
reducedto nothing,thennaturewouldtendtowardsevil,
sinceit would be robbingthingsof theveryexistencethatis Gods alone to
thenaturaldesireof all things,includingnatureherself,
give.Furthermore,
to
according Ficino,"is directedtowardsthegood,thatis, towardslife,existenceand so on, and nottheiropposites."52
Evenprimematter,
whichis itself
is describedby Ficino as being"desirousof the good, namelyof
formless,
form. . . becauseitis opento receiving
thegood,and becauseitis necessary
for
a good world."53
Werenatureto reducesomethingto nothing,accordingto
thenaturalappetitethatstrives
Ficino,it would preventit frommanifesting
forlife,existenceand thefulfillment
of finalends. Ficinocontinues:"Since
to God do not possessabsoluteexistence,
but onlyqualified
thingsinferior
existence suchor suchexistence , theydo not havethepowerto abolish
existencecompletely,
but onlya particular
mode of existence
. . ." Moreover,
Ficinoexplainsthat"Naturalagentscannotmakesomething
out of nothing.
Forto makesomething
out ofsomething
is easierthanto makeitout
existing
In additionto thenaturalappetitethataimsat thegood,Ficino
ofnothing."54
in
this
argues
passagethatnaturalagentsdo notpossessthecausalpotencyto
createsomething
fromnothing,muchless to reducesomethingto nothing.
Naturecan onlymakea particular
this,suchas water,changeintosomething
elsethatis also a particular
thisor that.
Fromthesethreearguments
Ficinoconcludesthattheremustexista formlessand impassible
matter
thatis withoutanyqualityor determination.
prime
Matteris notgenerated
or corrupted
in thenaturalcourseofthings,butpersistsas thesubstrate
beneathall change.Ficinospeaksto theimpassibility
and
51)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2,21.
Theology
52)Marsilio
Platonic
titled
Naturalis"
of
Ficino,
,Vol.2,25.Seethechapter
Theology
"Appetitus
Kristellers
ThePhilosophy
Ficino
fora consideration
ofthedoctrine
of"appetitus
ofMarsilio
naturalis."
s "Thomism
inMedieval
andItalian
Also,seeKristeller
Thought,"
Aspects
ofRenaissance
Learning.
53)Marsilio
Platonic
Vol.1,87.
Ficino,
Theology,
54)Marsilio
Platonic
s argument
resembles
anarguFicino,
, Vol.2,21.Ficino
Theology
closely
ment
madebyJohn
DunsScotus
inLectura
11.12.
Scotus
fortheconservation
ofmatter
argues
allnatural
sinceagents
do nothavethepower
tocreate
from
throughout
changes
something
Ifthere
were
foritsaction,
that
wasnoenduring
mateis,ifthere
nothing.
nothing
presupposed
rialsubstrate,
then
theagent
would
becreating
exnihilo.
something

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J.G.Snyder

of matterwhenhe writesthat"[m]attercannotbe changed

incorruptibility
fromwhatitis exceptbybeingchangedintonothing.Naturedoesnotpermit
to be turnedintonothing.So matterdoes notpassaway.Much less
anything
willthatnaturalpowerwhichrulesovermatterpassaway."55
Thus,forFicino,
thereis one "universal
theindifferent
of
all
formswhatsomatter,
receptacle
which
"is
to
the
universal
craftsman
of
nature."56
ever,"
Primematter,
subject
Ficinoexplains,does notpossessanyqualityor determination,
sinceifit did,
he explains,itwouldnot"be fitto receiveanotherformcontrary
to itsown,"
sincethepossessionof anyformwouldobtrudethepossibility
of thepossessionofanyotherformthathas contrary
qualities.57
Ficinodevotestheremainder
of thechapterto fillingin thecontentofhis
He arguesfortheunityofprimematter,
thatis,that
conceptofprimematter.
thesameprimematterservesas theultimatesubstrate
ofall materialthings.58
He also arguesthatprimematteris createdand not generated
or corrupted.
Finally,he explainsthatprimematterexistsin sucha waythatit is priorto
extension.59
Primematteris thereceptacle
of
quality,thatis, to quantitative
notonlytheformsand qualitiesthatarefoundin individualmaterialthings,
butalso of theveryconditions,
suchas quantitative
thatmakethe
extension,
existenceof such thingspossible.Ficinoexplainsthat"thisprimematteris
nevercorruptedbecauseit is thefoundationof all of corporealnature,and
wereit destroyed,
thewholeworldstructure
wouldcollapse,"and thatprime
matterdoes not require"anything
elseas it seatbywhoseremovalperchance
itwouldplungeintotheabyss"sinceit"isitself
theprimefoundation
ofall."60
V
examinedin thepreviHowever,one shouldnoticethatthethreearguments
ous sectionstatenothingabout primematterexistingin a mannerbeyond
thatwhichAquinascountenanced.
Thatis to say,everything
thatFicinosays
55)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2,27.
Theology
56)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2, 19.
Theology
57)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2, 19.
Theology
58)SeeMarsilio
Platonic
"Youwitness
onematter
Ficino,
, Vol.2,23.Ficino
Theology
explains:
allforms
inturn
asitrises
rarefaction
andsinks
condensation.
Itis
assuming
through
through
because
onematter
suffices
foroneuniverse;
one,therefore,
withbecause,
firstly
secondly
being
outform,
itdoesnothaveanything
ofwhich
itcanbedivided
intomany."
bymeans
internally
59)SeealsoFicino
s definition
inBookI,Chapter
ofbody
II ofthePlatonic
Theology.
60)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2,23.
Theology

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46 (2008)192-221
J.G.Snyder

211

in Book V, ChapterIV is consistent

withtheviewthatprimematterexists
as
of
a
form-matter
lacksanyindependent
only part
composite,and therefore
subsistence
on itsown.Therearetwofurther
distinctions
thatarerelevant
to
Ficinos theoryofprimematter.First,Ficinoarguesfora
fullyunderstanding
- the absoluteand theparticudistinction
betweentwo modesof existence
lar- thatbelongrespectively
to thatwhichis createddirectly
fromnothing,
and thatwhichbecomesa particular
thisor thatfroma pre-existing
material
substrate.
betweenprimeand corporealmatter,
such
Second,he distinguishes
thattheformer
can existwithoutparticipating
in a form-matter
composite,
whereasthelatercannot.61
Ficinoholdsthatprimematterpossesseswhathe termsthe "absolute"or
"common"existence
thatbelongsonlyto thosethingsthatarecreateddirectly
and
that
come
into beingwithouta substrate.Only God has the
by God,
causalpotencyto createtheabsolutemode of existence:"God alone creates
theprimematterofbodies,"Ficinostates,"withoutan intermediary
or a subAll otherfinitethingsthatarea particular
strate."62
thisor that- thatis,those
thingsthatpresupposeat least the existenceof the materialsubstrateand
- havewhatFicinocallsthe"particular"
extension
modeofexisquantitative
tence.Ficinoaddressesthisdistinction
in thefollowing
from
BookV,
passage
XIII:
Chapter
Theexistence
that
comes
after
iscalled
absolute
existence.
Forimmediately
after
nothing
initssimplicity.
comes
existence
. . Forsomething
cannot
become
thisorthat
or
nothing
suchunless
itexists
tobecoming
thisorthat
orsuch.Sothisorthat
orsuchanexisprior
tence
doesnotfollow
butcomes
after
andabsolute
immediately
uponnothing,
simple
existence.
since
itisGods alonetogivetoallcreatures
thiscommon
andabsoTherefore,
luteexistence,
butsince
this
existence
comes
after
andbefore
allmodes
ofexisting,
nothing
then
itwillbetheoffice
ofGodalonetobring
intoexistence
from
in
something
nothing
order
that
what
isgiven
first
toallthings,
existence
from
thefirst
itself,
namely
mayderive
andthegifts
that
aresecond
andthird
from
thecauses
that
follow.63
cause,
Thispassageaddressesthepointmadein thefirst
forprimematter
s
argument
existence
thatwasexaminedin SectionIV above.Primematteris amongthose
61)Thedistinction
between
andcorporeal
orbetween
andsecondary
matmatter,
prime
primary
iscommon
inScholastic
Asimilar
distinction
between
anddesigter,
philosophy.
undesignated
nated
matter
isalsofound
inthephilosophy
ofPlotinus.
SeePlotinus,
Enneads
,III.5.6,III.6.10.
AlsoseeLloyd
P.Gerson,
Plotinus
15.
(London,
1994),108-1
62)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.1,167.
Theology
63)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2,81.
Theology

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J.G.Snyder

fromnothing.OnlyGod hastheabilthingsthatcomeintoexistence
directly
to
into
existence
from
ity bringsomething
nothing.Humanagents,andnature
forthatmatter,
do notpossessthepowerto createsuchexistence,
lhe simple
and absolutemode of existence,
then,belongsto primematter,
amongother
in
such
a
that
it
not
does
the
of a formway
things,
dependupon
actuality
mattercompositeforitsexistence.
Ficinoconsiders
to
therefore,
primematter,
be ontologically
ofform.It exists,albeitnextto nothing,
evenif
independent
theactuality
offormis missingfromit.
Ficinoalso marksthefamiliar
Scholasticdistinction
betweenthetwokinds
- thatis, betweenprimeand corporealmatter.For Ficino,thetwo
of matter
to thetwomodesofexistence
Prime
gradesofmattercorrespond
respectively.
matteris the ultimatesubstratethatexistsin the absolutesensedescribed
above. It is not nothing,but at thesame timeit standsnextto nothingon
accountof beingbroughtinto existenceby the unique creativeact of God.
Primematter,
different
fromcorporealmatter.
In
however,
signifies
something
theorderof causes,primematterexistspriorto corporealmatteras it functionsas thesubstrate
of quantitative
extensionand of theprimary
qualities.
It is at theveryminimuma
Corporealmatteris somethingquite different.
whichFicinodefines
as
extension,
compositeofprimematterand quantitative
in
the
Platonic
as
a
of
matter
and
"body"early
Theology composite prime
extension.64
But corporealmatteralso has specificmagnitudes
quantitative
- thatis, thingsthatare a particularthisor that.Corporeal
and qualities
is thatkindofmatterthatis actuallyfoundin thematerial
matter,
therefore,
in thematerial
bodiesthatareexperienced
world,whichpossesstheparticular
mode of existencethatwas spokenof above. Corporealmatter,according
to Ficino,is dependentfortheformofquantitative
extension
foritsexistence,
whereasprimematteris not. Ficino explainsthat "[c]ommonmattercan
existwithoutthis or that act of existence;but particularmattercannot
existwithoutitsown particular
act."65For Ficino,then,theexistenceof cormatter
entails
the
existence
ofprimematteras itssubstrate,
whereasthe
poreal
64)According
toFicino,
Platodefines
as"made
andofquantity.
Itischaracbody
upofmatter
teristic
ofmatter
andextension
andbeing
onlytobeextended
byspaceandaifected
byaction;
affected
arepassive
conditions.
Butquantity
isnothing
buttheextension
ofmatter;
or,ifitis
itissuchthat
todivision
even
asitsubjects
itisalways
matter
toanunendelse,
anything
subject
ofexperiences
onanyother
andhasnoaffect
matter
thanitsown.Itfollow
from
ingsequence
initself
allthisthat
isacted
doesnotactbutsolely
Marsilio
Platonic
TheolFicino,
body
upon."
Vol.1,19.
ogy,
65)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2,67.
Theology

15:42:44 PM

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2 13

existenceof primematteralone does not entailthe existenceof corporeal

matter.One should note thatthisdistinctionis similarto the distinction
and qualifiedmatterin Plotinus.Plotinusarguesthatthe
betweenunqualified
to mattermakesit someformeris impassible,and thatany determination
material
substrate.66
fundamental
from
the
most
different
thing
in thisway:whenan
moreor lessfunction
Thesetwodistinctions
together
individualpersoncomesto be,suchas Plato,we do notsaythatPlatos father,
Ariston,createdhumanityin an absolutesense,but onlythatAriston,who
kindof matter,
was himselffashionedin a particular
"begotthisman,Plato,
world
finite
and
Nature
kindofmatter."
in a particular
thingsin thematerial
of corporealmatterwhen somethingis generatedor coravail themselves
can
rupted.They onlyworkon a matterthatis conditionedand preparedin a
certainwaythatmakesitreadyto receivea form.Primematterstandsbeneath
as itsultimate
subject.OnlyGod can actwithcorporealmatterand functions
between
becausethe"distance
Thisis thecase,Ficinoreasons,
outanysubstrate.
and
all
to
no
ratio
at
there
is
because
is
and
existence
existence,
infinite,
nothing
exist."67
to
or
be
this
can
exist
than
distance
becauseno greater
thought
on Ficinos view of
In fact,primematterperhapshas even morereality,
thenaturalbody
even
and
material
of
the
all
the
than
realm,
qualities
things,
book of thePlatonicTheology
in whichtheyinhere.In thefirst
, in thecourse
theprimacyof immaterial
of establishing
forms,Ficinoarguesthatmaterial
whenthey
areofsucha naturethattheyare"contaminated"
formsthemselves
and as a result"thissortofformis neiaredrawninto"thebosomofmatter,"
Ficinoreasonsthatthosethingsthatcannot
therpurenortruenorperfect."68
cannotactuallyexiston theirown.The qualitiesor forms
sustainthemselves,
as muchas they"lie fallowin
of materialthingsdo not sustainthemselves
fortheir
therefore
and
are
else,"
"dependenton thatsomething"
something
in this
in
mind
has
The somethingelse thatFicino
continuedsubsistence.69

^ Plotinus,
ofthe
matter
isthemeeting
that
Enneads
, 6.3.10.Plotinus
ground
prime
explains
altered
ever
itself
andthatitdoesthiswithout
thatitactslikea mirror,
bythe
being
qualities,
Plotinus
iscompletely
matter
holds
that
itreflects.
Plotinus
that
Thus,
impassible.
prime
images
not
is
of
material
matter
is
the
that
whatever
then,
strictly
speaking
things,
proximate
argues
what
itis
from
cannot
bechanges
"Matter
concludes:
else.Ficino
butsomething
matter,
prime
intonothtobeturned
Nature
doesnotpermit
intonothing.
anything
bybeing
changed
except
Vol.
Platonic
Marsilio
27.
not
So
matter
does
2,
,
Ficino,
Theology
passaway."
ing.
67)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.2,83.
Ficino,
Theology
68)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.1, 29.
Ficino,
Theology
69)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.1,31.
Ficino,
Theology

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Whilequalitiesdo notarisefromprimematteron their

case is primematter.
it
has
no
since
own,
abilityon hisviewto actbyitsownpower,theyarenonein
in sucha way
extension
thelesstaken bymatterand dividedbyquantitative
theforms
thattheycannotsubsistwithoutthematerialsubstrate.
Therefore,
ofmaterialthingsin a sensebecomematerial.In BookV, Ficinoreiterates
his
and
that
the
forms
of
material
are
matter
point, argues
things dependentupon
as a cause,since"fromMatters teemingwomb [they]aredeliveredin to the
Here one findsFicinodepartingfromPlotinus.
lightof day likea foetus."70
Ficinoascribesa robustand entitative
realityto primematterthatgoes far
the
Plotinian
of
matter.
Plotinusarguesthatprimematter
beyondeven
theory
has no realclaim to beingat all, and is in realityveritablenon-Being,but
Ficinodid not drawthisconclusion.71
Ficinoholdsthatmatterexistsand it
roleto playin thestructure
of thematerialworldthatis not
has a significant
as theemptyreceptacle
ofbecoming.
limitedto functioning
theapparentresemblance
betweenAquiSo how,then,is one to interpret
nas and Ficinoon the questionof primemattersexistencethatwas noted
thePlatonicTheology
above?Simply,throughout
, Ficinodoesnotalwaysspecifywhichtypeofmatterhe is speakingabout.Forthemostpart,primematter
is called "primematter,"
or "commonmatter"by Ficino,althoughhe freto as
calls
it
referred
simply"matter";
corporealmatteris occasionally
quently
matter"and "specificmatter,"
as well as just
matter,"
"secondary
"particular
"matter"plain and simple.Ficino holds thatprimematterexistswithout
extension
or anyqualityevenifcorporealmatterdoesnot.Prime
quantitative
in theexistence
thatis presupposed
of
the
mode
ofexistence
matterpossesses

70)Marsilio
Platonic
,Vol.2,29.
Ficino,
Theology
71)Plotinus,
toPlotinus
inhisdiscussion
oftheexistence
doesnotrefer
10.6.7.Ficino
Enneads,
inhisdiscussion
inBookI, Chapter
III ofthe
Plotinus
ofmatter
ofmatter.
He doesmention
not
but
is
next
to
Ficino
that
matter
is
and
Platonic
explains
prime
nothing,
nothing,
Theology.
the"disposition
closest
tomatter,
dimension
and
from
thisthat
that
Plotinus
concluded
namely
state."
andexists,
however
asa totally
iscompletely
insubstantial
passive
insignificantly,
quality,
matter.
In thispassage,
Ficino
is notspeaking
ofprime
butcorporeal
matter,
Also,
however,
inthe
ofqualities
found
toPlotinus
withrespect
tohisviewofthenature
Ficino
isreferring
areinsubstantial,
like"mere
shadtoFicino,
Plotinus
heldthatthey
material
world.
According
streams
ina rushing
stream."
Marsilio
oflofty
owsthat
comeandgolikethereflections
Ficino,
of
P.Gerson
todescribe
Plotinus
usesa similar
Platonic
yVol.1,41.Lloyd
theory
image
Theology
asa succession
Itisasifthenatural
world
"Asuccession
isunderstood
ofimages.
matter:
offorms
isnotinpotency
tothenextimage.
Norareany
ona movie
screen
werea film.
Oneimage
P.Gerson,
Plotinus
itself."
actualizations
ofthescreen
, 112.
Lloyd
images

15:42:44 PM

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J.G.Snyder

2 15

materialthings.Ficinodoes nothold thattheabsoluteor common

particular
is dependentupon anyform-matter
modeofexistence
compositeforitsexisviewsformsas beingmorerealthanmatter.Furtence,evenifhe ultimately
ther,unlikecorporealmatter,primematterdoes not requirethe material
or anymaterialquality,foritsexistence.
conditionsofquantitative
extension,
to primematterthatAquia gradeofexistence
Ficinois attributing
Therefore,
werewrongto assertthat
and Collins,therefore,
nas did not.BothKristeller
its
matter"has no existenceof itsown,"or thatexistencewould "contradict
from
and
instead
Ficino
In
this
nature."72
departs
Aquinas,
respect,then,
thatassertedthebasicreality
ofphilosophers
withthetradition
alignshimself
ofprimematter.
VI
aboutthequestionoftheknowlFicinohaslessto sayin thePlatonicTheology
edge of primematterthanhe does about its existence.He suggeststhathis
own viewdivergesfromtheScholasticviewwhenhe mentionsthat"[s]ome
thingsare evenapprehendedthroughthe idea of theiropposite,as eviland
privationthroughthe idea of good and of habit,or,as some people think,
have asserted
While some philosophers
matterthroughthe idea of form."73
thatprimematteris knownbyan analogywithform,Ficinoemploysalterna. To borrowa description
methodsin thePlatonicTheology
tiveepistemological
with
matteris not onlyknownthroughit relationship
fromBonaventure,
darkness."For
form,but is, forFicino,graspedin itselfas an "intelligible
beforehim,matteris graspedin a
Ficino,as forAugustineand Bonaventure
way throughour veryignoranceof it, whichamountsto a sortof learned
thatsomething
mustexistas thebasicmaterialsubignorancethatrecognizes
strateof all things,butwhichmust,at thesametime,remainin darknessto
our intellect.In theEnneads
, Plotinusarguesthatone can knowmatterin a
whichhe comparesto thebastard
certainsense,as theeyeknowsdarkness,
of
at 52b of the Timaeusfortheexistence
chainofreasoning
thatPlatooffers
thereceptacle
ofbecoming.74

72)PaulOskar
B. Collins,
is
ThePhilosophy
Ficino
TheSecular
Kristeller,
, 39;Ardis
ofMarsilio
Sacred
,45.
73)Marsilio
Platonic
Vol.1,173.
Ficino,
Theology,
74)Plotinus,
Enneads
, II.4.10.

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Ficinobroachesthequestionof theepistemological
statusofprimematter
in at leasttwofurther
in
the
Platonic
.
First,Ficinoimpliesthat
ways
Theology
one can considerthenatureofprimematterbyappealingto thevariousrelationsthatexistbetweenthesundrylevelsoftheontologicalhierarchy
ofbeing.
Ficino
avails
himself
of
the
relations
and
that
Specifically,
proportions stand
in orderto shedlightbelow,on primematter,
betweenthevarioushypostases
and quality;and upwards,on thesoul,mindand God. In
corporealmatter,
thiswayFicinobringsprimemattertogether
withtheotherlevelsofthechain
of beingintoa meaningful
with
one another,and fromthishe
comparison
drawsconclusionsaboutthenatureofeach.Ficinomakesuseofthiscomparain thePlatonicTheology
tomethodfrequently
he argues
, as when,forinstance,
forthepurityof primematter.Ficinoarguesthattheorderof naturalbodies
in such a waythatit descendsto primematterand ascendsto
is structured
theultimateform.Ficinoexplainsthatthe"closersomematterapproachesto
thebetter,
thetruer,
thepurerthematterit is."Likewise,"The
primematter,
closera formis to ultimateform,themoreperfect
it is as form."75
Ficinoalso
thinksa meaningful
comparisoncan be madebetweenmatterand soul,since
bothstandat thebottommostrungoftheirrespective
realms,thesensibleand
theintelligible.
As a result,theysharesomefeatures
in common,accordingto
Ficino,andwhatcanbe learnedaboutthenatureoftheone canalsobe applied
to theother.Specifically
Ficinohas in mindthewayin whichmaterialforms
and ideasexistin each:justas primematterpossessestheformsofall thingsin
so therationalsoulpossessestheideasin thesameway.Whileitis not
potency,
thecase,accordingto Ficinos view,thatone can cometo knowtheessenceof
on thismethod,nonetheless,
features
of primematter
primematterdirectly
are revealedobliquelyby makinga comparative
of
the
fundamental
analysis
levelsofontologyand theirconnections.
Ficinoalso addressesthequestionof Gods knowledgeof primematterin
thePlatonicTheology
. He arguesthatGod can possessa certainknowledge
of
if
in
even
human
cannot
come
to
know
it
the
same
matter,
prime
way.
beings
FicinoarguesthatGod understands
infinite
power
thingsbecauseitsinfinite
extendsthroughall things.All thingsareknownbyGod, Ficinoargues,irrespectiveof thewayin whichtheyexist,and thisincludesall thingsthatexist
in actand in potency.In thenaturalworldthisincludestheinfinite
receiving
theprogression
oftimeand thedivisionofwhatis continupowerofmatter,
vision
ous, amongotherthings.What exactlyFicinothinksthisintellectual
75)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.3, 133.
Theology

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J.G.Snyder

217

amountsto, however,
remainsmostlyunclear,save forsome crypticsuggestions.In any case, Ficino arguesthatthisview is theologically
superiorto
alternative
viewssinceitdoes notsuffer
fromthe"impiouserrorofthosephilosopherswho thoughtthatGod seesonlywhatis finite."76
VII
Ficino describesmatteras "kindling"withthe formsof all things,and he
claimsthatin formless
primematter"certainseedsof formslie hiddenand
ferment."77
When he usesexpressions
liketheseFicinois generally
tryingto
the
and
latent
that
he
thinks
to
both
capture crackling
power
belongs
prime
andcorporealmatter:
theimperceptible
sparksofall thingsthatkindlein matterawaitthefanning
ofsoulin orderto issueforthfrompotencyintoact.The
can in partbe explainedby the doctrineof
meaningof thesedescriptions
seminalprinciples:withinthe welterof primaryand corporealmatter,the
seedsofall thingsferment
andwaitfortherighttime,thatis,whentheproper
materialconditionsexist,untiltheycome fullyintoexistenceas a particular
thisor that.A discussionofnatures seedsin detail,however,
goesbeyondthe
- in which
of
this
Suffice
it
to
it
is
in
such
as
these
scope
paper.78
say,
passages
Ficinospeaksaboutthepotencyand fecundity
ofmatter thathe departsthe
mostfromtheThomisticviewofmatter,
and wherehisrobustviewofprime
matteris mostevident.
Thisfinalsectionwillconsidersomeofthelargeraimsandpurposesthatare
behindFicinosfrequent
speculationsabout matterin thePlatonicTheology.
Ficinois notinterested
in primematterforitsown sake;rather,
he generally
about
the
nature
of
matter
in
an
effort
to
make
his
case forthe
speculates
of
immaterial
soulsand forms,
and byextension,
fortheimmortality
primacy
ofthesouland thesupremacy
ofform.79
Ficinospendsmuchofthefirst
book
76)Marsilio
Platonic
torejecting
Ficino,
theThomistic
,Vol.1,161.Inaddition
view
of
Theology
anditsclaims
about
theepistemological
status
ofprime
matter,
Ficino
couldalso
matter,
prime
haveinmindtheviews
ofJohn
whoargues
thatthere
must
exist
atomic
indivisibles
Wyclif,
because
Godcannot
know
that
are
infinite.
See
sAtomism,"
Michael,
things
"John
Emily
Wyclif
inAtomism
anditsPlaceinMedieval
Philosophy.
77)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2,63;andVol.1,87.
Theology
78)SeeHiroshi
ofSeedsandNature
intheWork
Hirai,
ofMarsilio
inMarFicino,"
"Concepts
silioFicino:
HisTheobgy,
HisPhilosophyt
HisLegacy
, 257-284.
79)AlsoseeMarsilio
Ficinos
onPlato's
In Chapter
28,Ficino
commentary
Sophist.
explains:
"Whatis calledanimate
andliving
andalivenotbecause
ofthecorporeal
bodyis animate
mass.
Otherwise
would
beliving.
andlives
some
Therefore,
anybody
bodyisanimate
through

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J.G.Snyder

ofthePlatonicTheology
a conceptofprimematterthatis devoid
constructing
ofanypowerto act,or to maintainunityforanyamountoftime.Whenmatterand bodyaredefinedin thesetermsitbecomesnecessary
fortheorderliness
of formand the motivepowerof soul to shapeand movematter,
ifit is to
becomeanything
and remainone thingovertime.The overallaim ofFicinos
is to demonstrate
thatmaterialthingslack
therefore,
conceptofprimematter,
and reality,
and therefore
to "separate[our]rationalsouls desire
persistence
frommatteritself,"
as he writesin thefinalsentenceof thePlatonicTheology
,
"so that,to the extentwe departfrommatter,we may therebyapproach
God."80A consideration
of the natureof primematteris necessary
forthe
souls ascentfromthematerialto theimmaterial
realm.He explainsthatin
order"toshowclearlyhowbestthemindsofmencan unlockthebarsofmorwitnesstheirown immortality
and thusachievea stateofblessedness,"
tality,
he willattemptto demonstrate
"thatbesidestheinertmassofour bodies,to
whichtheDemocriteans,
and Epicureanslimittheirconsideration,
Cyrenaics
thereexistsan activequalityor power."81
If one does not come to a proper
of thenatureofmatterand corporeality,
Ficinosuggests,
then
understanding
one is in dangerofbeingpersuadedbythearguments
ofthematerialists,
and
ofbecomingan Epicurean.Thisis disastrous
forFicino.
- considered
Not onlyareall materialthings
in themselves
as composites
of
extension
and somequality passiveand inert,but
primematter,
quantitative
theyalso lack any unity.The unityof materialbodies can only occur on
accountofsomeforcethatis externalto matterand body.Ficinoarguesthat
to theunityofanymaterial
corporealmassis an impediment
bodyon account
of thedisparateand inertnatureof materialbodies.82
Thereis nothingabout
thatholdsfastthedifferent
corporeality
partsofa materialbody,whichis by
itsnaturedispersed.Certainly
matter
does notprovideanysuchstabilprime
claimsaboutcorporeality.
ity.Ficinogroundsthisconclusionon threefurther
First,he arguesthatthereexistsdistancebetweenthe partsof matteron
accountof quantitative
extension.Second,he arguesthatmaterialbodiesdo
thesoulitself.
Sincethesouliseverywhere
themover
ofthe
nature,
incorporeal
namely
through
andeverywhere
itsmistress
farmore
andtherefore
eminent
than
thebody,
itis
body
deservedly
tobe an incorporeal
I havewritten
substance...
at length
on these
in my
issues
adjudged
."Marsilio
Marsilii
Ficini
Commentario,
inPlatonis
trans.
Ficino,
[Platonic]
Theology
Sophistam,
in
Michael
B.
Icastes
242.
Allen,
1989),
J.
(Berkeley,
80)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.6,219.
Theology
81)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.I, 15.
Theology
82)Seeespecially
BookVI,Chapter
VIIIofthePlatonic
Theology.

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J.G.Snyder

219

not endurewithfixity
and stability.
Insteadtheyare constantly
changingin
bothperceivedand unperceived
he
ways.Third, arguesthatall materialbodin a materialsubstrate,
arealwayssubjectto opposing
ies,in virtueofexisting
such
as
heat
and
wetness
and
cold,
qualities,
dryness.FromthisFicinoconcludesthattheunityof a materialbody,be thatof a stoneor a person,does
notcomefromanycorporealprincipleon itsown;in fact,beingextendedand
assaultedby opposingqualitiesmakesthe unityof anymaterialbodycomand corporeality,
Ficinoconpletelyimpossible.Giventhenatureof matter,
cludesthat"theremustbe somethingin thebodybeyondthebody'snature
whichunitesit,arrests
the
it,and containsit:unitestheseparated
parts,arrests
contains
its
own
the
disflux,
mutually
by
unending
simpleharmony body's
A proper,thatis, Platonicconceptionofmaterialthings,
cordantqualities."83
revealsthattheyarecompletely
therefore,
passive,inert,and lackingin unity,
and therefore
formand habit.84
theyareall in needofan incorporeal
In addition,thediscussionof Book V, ChapterIV aimsat supporting
the
for
the
of
the
In
soul.
the
immortality
largerargument
openinglinesof this
Ficinostates:"Theimmortality
ofthesoulis principally
shownbythe
chapter,
factthatnaturesprimematter,
whichis movedand formedby soul, must
itselfbe perpetual."85
Ficinoclaimsthatsincematterbeginsonlybycreation
and endsonlybyannihilation,
and is therefore
then
perpetualin itsexistence,
to and rulesovermatter,
musta fortiori
be persoul,whichimpartsvitality
petual.As was arguedin SectionIV above,Ficinoheld thatmatteris never
reducedto nothingthrough
Ifmatteris perpetualin its
anynaturalalteration.
in thismanner,
thensoul mustalso be immortal,
Ficinoreasons.86
existence,

83)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2, 171.
Theology
84)G.W.Leibniz's
useofPlatonism
asa bulwark
theriseofmaterialism
resembles
Ficiagainst
no'sinthePlatonic
SeeG. W.Leibniz,
"OnNature
inPhilosophical
Itself,"
Theology.
Essays,
trans,
anded.Roger
Ariew
andDanielGarber
IN, 1989),155-167,
(Indianapolis,
especially
Section
20 ofthe"Discourse
onMetaphysics,"
281159-160;
53;"TwoSectsofNaturalists,"
284.On Leibniz's
Platonic
see
Christia
Leibnizs
:
Its
Mercer,
assumptions,
Metaphysics
Origins
andDevelopment
Mercer
discusses
ofFicino's
(NewYork,
2001),173-205.
aspects
philosophy.
85)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.2, 17.
Theology
86)Thetheory
ofprime
matter
andtheimmortality
ofthesoulcometogether
inthepenultimate
of
Book
where
Ficino
concludes
as
follows:
"Matter
cannot
bechanged
V,
IV,
paragraph
Chapter
from
what
itisexcept
intonothing.
Nature
doesnotpermit
tobe
bybeing
changed
anything
turned
intonothing.
Somatter
doesnotpassaway.
Muchlesswillthat
natural
which
rules
power
over
matter
Matters
ruler
istheefficient
which
itform.
Thatpower
passaway.
power
gives
give
matter
form
which
first
setsitinmotion.
Thesource
ofmotion
istherational
soul. . ."Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol2,27.
Theology

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It is finallyopen to speculationas to whyFicinoarguedfortheexistence

of primematter,
and did notadopta theorythatapproximated
moreclosely
theThomistictheory.
It is reasonableto thinkthattherobustviewof matter
appealedto Ficinoforat leasttworeasonsthatareconnectedwithhisbroader
First,Ficinowas motivatedto hold a robustview
philosophicalaspirations:
forreasonsthatareassociatedwithhis theologyand naturalphilosophy.
The
robustness
of matter,
in Ficinosestimation,
is a reflection
of Gods wisdom.
God governsall thingswiththegreatest
ease,because"He is notdealingwith
alienmaterials
whichHe hasreceivedfromelsewhere,
butwithhisownmaterialswhichHe makesHimself."87
God has designedthingssuchthatit does
not affectthings"fromwithout,but movesthemfromwithin,"whichis
thecase,accordingto Ficino,because"He is presentin theveryheartof all
God does not workon thingsfromwithout,as humanhandsdo,
things."88
butfromwithin,sinceprimematterhas beendisposed,bytheformless
seeds
and rudiments
offorms,
in sucha waythatitis mostreadyto haveform.89
The
robustness
of matteralso betteraccommodatesFicinos naturalphilosophy,
whichincludeshisdoctrineofseminalreasonsand hisviewofnaturalchange.
ForFicino,whena naturalchangeoccurs,itoccursas a resultofnatureworkingfromwithinthematterthatis at hand,eitherprimeor corporeal.Ficino
statesthatnaturemoulds"matter
fromwithin,as thoughthecarpenter
were
in thewood."90Thisis possiblebecausethereexisttherudiments
and seedsof
formin bothprimeand corporealmatter.91
The robustness
ofmatteris consistentwithFicinos description
ofthematteras a "womb,"and as "kindling"
or
in a stateof "ferment."
Ficinoconceivesthattheformsof all thingsare not
on
matter
as
much
as theyunfoldfromwithinthefoldsand recesses
stamped
of matteritselfaccordingto the rationalplan of divinemindand put into

87)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.1,199.
Theology
88)Marsilio
Platonic
Vol.1,199.
Ficino,
Theology,
89)SeeMarsilio
Platonic
oftheformless
seedsthat
Ficino,
, Vol.1,87fora discussion
Theology
arefound
inprime
matter.
Fora discussion
ofFicinos
view
ofnatural
anditsrelationship
change
toprime
seeChater
4 ofJames
G. Snyder,
"Matter
andMethod
inMarsilio
Ficinos
matter,
Platonic
Theologyr
90)Marsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,Vol.1,253-255.
Theology
91)Ficino
that
there
arethree
ofseeds:
there
arethe"formless"
seeds
First,
generally
argues
grades
inprime
that
reside
inindividual
there
areseeds
bitsofcorporeal
matter;
second,
matter;
third,
there
arespiritual
that
theorigination
seeds
oflifefrom
brute
andthespontanematter,
explain
ousbirth
oforganisms
where
seeds
aremissing.
SeeMarsilio
Platonic
Ficino,
,
corporeal
Theology
Vol.1,87,257.

15:42:44 PM

I Vivarium
46 (2008)192-221
J.G.Snyder

221

actionbythemotiveforceofsoul.TheviewthatGod and natureaffect

things
a
that
Ficino
hold
fromwithinthe substanceof matter,
therefore,
required
robusttheoryofmatter.
The idea thatmatterhas somethingof realityin it, thatit possessesthe
forFicino
orrudiments
offorms,
seeds,vestiges
mayhavealsobeenconfirmed
That
to
have
been
conthe
of
itself.
is
Ficino
say,
may
by
history philosophy
ofprimematter
those
that
he
vincedoftherobustness
by
philosophers
thought
Timaeusargued
a pia philosophia:
articulated
Bya bastardchainofreasoning,
fortheexistenceof thereceptacle
of becomingat 52B of Platos Timaeus.In
thePimander
, HermesTrismegistus
arguedthattheall ofnatureis contained,
within
the
welter
of
the
elements,and he describeslifeas brought
latendy,
thelivingthingsthatshe heldwithin."92
Plotinus
forth"from[earth]herself
ofbecomingwas a discussion
thoughtthatPlatosdiscussionofthereceptacle
ofprimematter.
impassibilEchoingPlotinus,Ficinoassertsthefundamental
as themeetinggroundofall qualities.ButunlikePlotinus,
of
matter
ity prime
and
Ficinodoesnotclaimthatprimematteris veritably
Augustine
non-being.
Bonaventure
bothbelievedthatnatureis conditionedbyseminalreasons,and
closerto his own time,FranciscanScholasticphilosophers
held thatmatter
can existindependent
of form,and thatit can be known.Each of thesephielementsofwhatwouldbecomeFicinos theory
ofprime
losophersarticulated
would have,in thislight,
matter.If anything,
theThomisticinterpretation
fromtheviewof primematterof
appearedpeculiarto Ficino,an aberration
whomhe thoughtmadethecrucialturnfrommatethosepiousphilosophers
rialto immaterial
things.

92)Hermetica
Brian
, trans.
(NewYork,
1992),3.
Copenhaver

15:42:44 PM

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