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15:36:40 PM

VIVARIUM
and Intellectual
An International
Journal
forthePhilosophy
LifeoftheMiddle
Renaissance
and
Ages
Aims& Scope
ofphilosophy
Vivarium
is an international
and
journaldedicatedto thehistory
of ideasfromtheearlyMiddleAgesto theearly-modern
thehistory
period.It
intheprofane
takesa particular
interest
sideofphilosohy
anditsrelationship
with
fromtheseperiods.It is widelyrecognized
otherareasof thought
and learning
forthehistory
of logic,semantics
It
as an unrivalled
resource
and metaphysics.
studiesof ideas,textsand
analysesas wellas historical
publishesphilosophical
context
ofmedievaland early-modern
and learning.
It
theinstitutional
thought
a
issue
to
also welcomeseditionsof texts.It publishes
devoted
annually special
a particular
themeor philosopher.
Editor
L.W. Nauta(Groningen)
EditorialBoard
HAG. Braakhuis
C.H. Kneepkens
L.M.deRijk(Leiden),
(Nijmegen),
(Groningen),
(Madison),E.P.Bos (Leiden)and D. Perler(Berlin).
W.J.Courtenay
AdvisoryCommittee
T. Gregory
MA).
(Rome),A. Zimmermann
J.E.Murdoch(Cambridge,
(Cologne),
forAuthors
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C/
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BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)223-231

Introduction

DominikPerler
Berlin
HumboldtUniversitt,

A specialissue dedicatedto Aristotelian

in the periodbetween
psychology
extensive
Aristoteand
or
1250
1650 hardlyrequires
explanation justification.
lianismwas so dominantin thisperiod,and De anima gave riseto such a
that
considerable
numberof commentaries,
disputedquestionsand treatises,
ifthefateofthistextdid notattracttheinterest
ofhisitwouldbe surprising
In fact,itwouldbe astonishing
ifanyoneinterested
not
toriansofphilosophy.
in
in
in
of
to
look
at
but
nature
philosophy
just psychology
generalneglected
thewayDe animashapedphilosophical
debates.Afterall,thistextis a crucial
on naturalphilosophy,
and commentators
readitas
partofAristotle's
writings
De sensu
a workbelongingto thispartofphilosophy,
oftenalongwithPhysica,
with
natural
etsensato,
De generatione
etcorruptione
and otherwritings
dealing
who
wants
to
understand
how
nature
was
conceived
by
Anyone
philosophy.
medievaland earlymodernphilosophersought to look at the way they
- as something
thatis notopposedto livexplainedthesoul as partofnature
as "theprincipleof
to
but
that
functions
bodies
or
added
them,
simply
ing
life"and thatmakeslivingbodiestheverythingstheyare.Thatis whya study
ofthesoul is a crucialpartofthestudyofnature.
the titleof thisissuemaygiveriseto some doubt,perhaps
Nevertheless,
I wouldliketo mentionthreequestionsone mightaskquite
evento irritation.
whenreadingthetitle.First,one mightwonderwhytheword
spontaneously
"transformations"
is usedas a keyword.Shouldwe nottalkin a moremodest
Afterall, itwas thecommenon Aristotelian
texts?
about
commentaries
way
in
ofAristotle's
a
role
the
transmission
literature
that
crucial
theory
tary
played
one shouldexaminethe
ofthesoulfromancientto moderntimes.Therefore,
boththeircontentand theirspecialform,and comparethem
commentaries,
to theoriginaltexts.
word"soul"is emphasizedin
Second,one mayaskwhytheold-fashioned
wroteabout the soul,
the title.Of course,Aristotleand his commentators
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
NV,
Leiden,

DOI:10.1
163/156853408X360894

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D. Perler
/Vivarium
46 (2008)223-231

"
and anima . And Aristotle
conceivedof
explicitly
usingthewords"psych"
thesoul as an all-embracing
of
the
life,
principle
including vegetative
aspects,
notonlyas a principleofmentallife.Butwoulditnotbe moreappropriate
to
talkaboutthemindwhenlookingat theAristotelian
tradition
froma modern
attention
to
those
of
Aristotelian
pointofview,thereby
parts
paying
psychologythatexplainthemindand its relationto thebody?And shouldwe not
focuson theaccountgivenoffeatures
thatarecharacteristic
ofthemind,say,
ofintentionality
and consciousness?
Third,one mayaskwhythetitleputsan emphasison theperiodbetween
1250 and 1650.Whyis thereno mentionoftheMiddleAges,theRenaissance
and the EarlyModernPeriod,as it is the case in so manyhandbooksand
And whyis no priority
encyclopedias?
givento one of thesethreeperiods?In
eachofthemthereareplentyofauthorsand textsthatdeserveto be analyzed.
So, whyshouldone coversucha longperiod?
Letmesketchan answerto eachofthesequestions.I hopethiswillnotonly
shedsome lighton mymotivation
forpreparing
thisissue,but also hintat
somemethodological
we
need
to
take
into
accountwhenapproachproblems
the
of
Aristotelian
In
field
concernsare
ing
psychology. fact,methodological
as important
as concernswithtextualdetails,becausemethodological
decisionssettheframework
foran analysisofindividualtextsand havean impact
notonlyon thesolutionspresented
to variousproblemsbutalso on thevery
problemsthatareposed.
Let me startwiththefirst
question.Whyshouldwe talkabouttransformations?Whena transformation
a simplecontinuation
of
occurs,thereis neither
nora sharpbreakwiththeold or a revolution
thatsweeps
something
existing,
it awayand replacesitwithsomething
new.A transformation
ratheris a long
and steadyprocessin whichsomething
newis growing
out ofsomething
that
exists.
What
is
so
a
about
transformation
is
the
fact
that
the
already
interesting
even
dissimilar,
pointand the end pointof the processare utterly
starting
similarto each
thoughtherearenumerousstagesin betweenthatarestrikingly
other.Take the exampleof the caterpillar
that,becominga butterfly,
goes
various
of
In
transformation.
itssecondstageitis quitesimilar
through
stages
to how it was in itsfirststage,and in itsthirdstageit is stillquitesimilarto
how it was in its secondstage.Nevertheless,
thelaststageyieldssomething
newthatis completely
dissimilar
to theanimalin thefirst
stage.Thissurprisis
because
an
internal
as
well
as
an
external
ingprocess possible
changeis taking place. The caterpillar
changesitselfinternally
by creatinga cocoon and
itsorganism.
At thesametime,theexternal
conditions(thesearestructuring

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/Vivarium

[3] 225

in theair,etc.) changeas welland

thelight,thehumidity
sonaitemperature,
of
the
the
influence
caterpillar.
development
heavily
in theperiodbetweenthe
theevolutionofAristotelian
psychology
Studying
we can observea similarprocessof
thirteenth
and theseventeenth
century,
commenWhatwe see at thestarting
transformation.
point,namelythefirst
tariesby RichardRufus,Albertthe Greatand otherLatin authors(not to
different
fromwhatwe detect
is strikingly
mentiontheirArabicpredecessors),
or Eustachiusa
whenwe examinetheend pointand readtheConimbricenses
whenwe look at Descartes,
SanctoPaulo.We discoverevenmoredifferences
who openlycritCureaude la Chambreand otherearlymodernphilosophers
oftenwithout
use manyAristotelian
icizeAristotle
butnevertheless
elements,
between
the starting
differences
In
of
the
it.
spite
striking
acknowledging
are quite
that
intermediate
we
find
and
the
end
many
stages
point,
point
similarto each other.This givesriseto a simplebut fundamental
question:
to occur?How could nonhow was it possibleforsuch a transformation
theoriesgrowout of a longAristotelian
or evenanti-Aristotelian
Aristotelian
to Albert
How could Descartes'theoryof thesoul be as dissimilar
tradition?
and nevertheto thecaterpillar
is dissimilar
theGreats theoryas thebutterfly
answerwould be: becausea
less relyon scholasticsources?The traditional
whichsweptaway
occurredin theseventeenth
revolution
scientific
century,
theold Aristotelian
tradition,
despitethepresencethistraditionstillhad in
theuniversity
curricula.But thisanswerwouldbe too simple.StevenShapin
thesis
withthe provocative
revolution
about the scientific
his
book
opened
never
there
That
revolution."1
as
the
scientific
no
"there
was
such
that
is,
thing
in whichan entiretheoretical
was a momentof radicalchangeor conversion
There
ratherwerevariouschanges,
a
new
one.
with
was
replaced
program
that
and
modifications
shifts
additions,
graduallycreateda new theoretical
framework.
It seemsto me thatit is helpfulto look at thehistoryofAristotelian
psynot
of
the
in
as
the
same
way Shapinapproached history physics: in
chology
We need to ask what kind of
but of transformation.
termsof revolution,
createda new theoretical
framework,
changes,additionsand modifications
and we oughtto examinehownewelementswerecombinedwithold onesdeniedthattheyused
eveniftheso-calledmodernphilosophers
polemically
at
numerous
look
we
should
elements.
old
Moreover,
stagesbetween
any
AlberttheGreatand Descartes,stagesthatwerein manyrespectssimilarto
!) Steven
& London,
Revolution
TheScientific
1996),1.
(Chicago
Shapin,

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46 (2008)223-231

each otherbut nevertheless

framework.
graduallychangedthe theoretical
When we carefully
these
we
can
detect
modifications
that
analyze
stages,
affectedcentralelementsof the originalAristotelian
for
instance
theory,
partsof the soul, of its
changesconcerningan explanationof the different
causalpowerand itsrelationto thebody.
Like in thecase of thecaterpillar,
bothinternaland externalchangestook
That
on
the
one
was a reinterpretation
hand
there
of keyconcepts
is,
place.
insidethe Aristotelian
community.
Metaphorically
speaking,one may say
thatAristotelians
werespinningsomekindofcocoonwhenengagingin scho- a cocoon thatenabledthemto testand re-examine
lasticdebates
keyconand assessingbasicelementsoftheold
cepts.In thisprocessofreinterpreting
different
of
Aristotelians
were opposing each other.For
theory,
groups
Scotists
were
Thomists
when
instance,
attacking
explainingtherelationship
betweenthe variousfacultiesof the soul, and Ockhamistswere fighting
againstScotistswhen givingan accountof the cognitivemechanismsthat
takeplace in thesoul. On theotherhand,therewerealso externalchanges,
due to influences
fromothertraditions.
Forexample,Neoplatonictheoriesof
causationhad an impacton thewayAristotelians
explainedthecausalpower
of thesoul, and Arabictheoriesof visioninfluenced
theway theyanalyzed
actsofperception.
Bothinternaland externalchangesmadea longprocessof transformation
possible.We can detectthisprocessnotonlywhenlookingat commentaries
in thestrictsense,butalsowhenstudying
othersources(treatises,
disletters,
in
commentaries
on
the
Sentences
some
cases
even
, etc.),
puted questions,
whenreadingtextsthatmaylookanti-Aristotelian
at first
sightbutthatreveal
Aristotelian
elements
when
more
What
is so fascinatmany
closely.
inspected
these
texts
is
not
the
about
only
way theypresentoriginalAristotelian
ing
Aristotelian
ideas,butalso thewaytheyadd newonesor substantially
modify
to be faithful
to thephilosophies.
theses,evenwhenaffirming
Let me now turnto thesecondquestion.Why shouldwe talkabout the
soul and not simplyabout themind?In contemporary
philosophyit seems
natural
that
the
mind
not
the
soul
a
quite
poses specialproblembecause
themindhas specialfeatures
thatneedto be explained.Thus,we noticethat
is a specialfeature
and askwhythisis so. Whyarementalstates
intentionality
aboutsomething?
Andwhycan this"aboutness"
notbe reducedto properties
ofbodilystates?Likewise,we noticethatconsciousness
is a specialfeature
and
askagainwhyit is so difficult
or evenimpossibleto reduceit to properties
of
In
states.
all
these
discussions
we
take
it
for
that
there
are
wellbodily
granted
bodilystateswhichprovidethebasisformentalstates.
functioning

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[5] 227

we see thatsomeofthesequesWhenturning
to theAristotelian
tradition,
tionsweregivenas muchattentionin theperiodbetween1250 and 1650 as
waswidelydistheproblemofintentionality
theyreceivetoday.In particular,
"
".2Looking
authorsevencreatedthetechnicalterm intentio
cussed;scholastic
mind
or the
it
was
not
the
we
see
that
at
their
debates,
however,
simply
closely
intellect
thatposeda problemforthem.Aquinas,Buridan,Surezand many
are intentional.
othersdid not onlyask how and whyactsof thinking
They
wereequallyintrigued
bythequestionofhowand whyactsofseeing,hearing
When analyzingthesesensoryacts,all Aristoteor smellingare intentional.
liansagreedthattheytakeplacein bodilyorgansand thatwe needto look at
bodilychangesifwe wantto explainthem.Thatis whytheydid not drawa
mentalacts.
bodilyactsand intentional
sharpline betweennon-intentional
some
of
themwere
of
intentional
rather
studied
different
acts;
They
types
in
intellect.
locatedin theexternaland internalsenses,others theimmaterial
Moreover,theywerenot concernedwiththe issueof reductionbut unanihas itsown actsthatshouldcareintellect
mouslyagreedthattheimmaterial
senseorgans.In
acts
that
take
be
from
fully distinguished
placein thematerial
ofvarioustypesof intenlookedfora detaileddescription
fact,Aristotelians
levelwereconsideredto be as important
tionalacts.Thoseon theimmaterial
as thoseon thematerialone.
I hope thisexampleshowsthatit would be misleadingto use a modern
as a special,
framework,
explainedintentionality
askinghow Aristotelians
of themind.It was notjustthemindthatwas intrigunon-reducible
feature
in thesoul as a whole,comprising
seningthem.Theyweremoreinterested
actson
soryand intellectual
capacities,and in thewayit can haveintentional
different
levels.Theywantedto knowwhatkindof levelsthereareand what
actsor statesarepossibleon eachofthem.Of course,theydid notneglectto
as thehighestlevel.Buttheywerewellawarethat
to theintellect
payattention
cannotbe understoodunlessone also
it is justone leveland thatitsfunction
we
Aristotelian
examinesthelowerlevels.In orderto understand
psychology
wasexplainedin itsrelationto otherpartsor
needto analyzehowtheintellect
capacitiesofthesoul.In fact,one couldspeakabouta mind-soulproblemthat
washow
role.The crucialquestionformanyAristotelians
playeda prominent
of
can be explainedwithintheframework
forthinking,
themind,responsible
formany
a theorythattakesthesoul to be theprincipleof life,responsible
relatedto seeingand smelling,
vitalfunctions.
How, forinstance,is thinking
2)SeeDominik
amMain,2002),
derIntentionalitt
imMittelalter
Theorien
Perler,
(Frankfurt
11-23.

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/Vivarium

How can therebe one soul thatis responand desiring?

butalso to imagining
functions?
And how can thiscomplexsoul be in a
sibleforso manydifferent
a
make
a
of
matter
or
even
body
piece
livingbodywitha specificsetofvital
discusIn lightof thesequestionsone shouldembedAristotelian
functions?
ofthesoul,thusdealsionsintowiderdebatesaboutthenatureand function
ing with the mind-soulproblemas much as withthe famousmind-body
problem.
Let me now turnto thethirdand lastquestion.Whydoes thetitlesimply
to thethreeclasmentionthetimebetween1250 and 1650 withoutreferring
AccordandEarlyModernPhilosophy?
sicalperiodsMiddleAges,Renaissance
thatcan stillbe foundin many
tradition
historiographie
ingto an influential
one shouldfavorone oftheseperiodswhenspeakingaboutAristotextbooks,
telianpsychology,
namelytheMiddleAges,becausethisperiodwas the"heyThe traditional
storyrunsas follows:Aristotelianism
day"ofAristotelianism.
theMiddleAgesandwasrespondebatesthroughout
dominatedphilosophical
later
sible forthe emergenceof so-calledscholasticphilosophy.Therefore,
Renaisin
relation
to
Aristotelianism.
terms
of
their
can
be
defined
periods
of PlatonismrejectedmanyaspectsofAristotesancephilosophyas a rebirth
brokewiththistradition,
lianism,and earlymodernphilosophydefinitely
of mechanistic
the
influence
new
theories
under
instead
physics.
introducing
of the soul, the tradiis
to
theories
scheme applied
When thisexplanatory
had subscribed
tionalstorycontinuesas follows:whilemedievalphilosophers
reintroduced
Platonicelements
Renaissancephilosophers
to hylomorphism,
and favoreda dualisttheory.
Seventeenth-century
philosophers
rejectedboth
traditions
and introducednew theories,
rangingfromnew typesof dualism
it hardly
and idealism.On the line of this interpretation
to materialism
makessenseto lookat theentireperiodbetween1250 and 1650 withoutmakAnd it makeseven less senseto speak about Aristotelian
ing subdivisions.
as somekindofcommonground.
psychology
come underattack,
approachhas repeatedly
Althoughthishistoriographie
it is stillpresentin manycurriculathatneatlyseparatecoursesin medieval,
And it is equallypresenton the
Renaissanceand earlymodernphilosophy.
eachofthese
bookmarketwithnumerousintroductions
separately
discussing
schemerevealsthatit
threeperiods.However,a closerlook at thetraditional
did notsimplydie out in the
Firstofall,Aristotelianism
is utterly
misleading.
Renaissanceand in theearlymodernperiod.Thereweremorecommentaries
in thefifteenth
and thesixteenth
on Aristotle
centurythanin theentiresoa
as CharlesLohrmadeclearwhenestablishing
calledmedievalperiodbefore,

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)223-231

[7] 229

listof theextantmanuscripts.3
Even in theseventeenth
whenphicentury,
were
there
was
a lively
still
Aristotelianism,
losophers
increasingly
opposing
debateamongAristotelians.4
It would therefore
be misleadingto talkabout
threedistinctepochsand to definethemin termsof theirattitudetowards
Aristotle.
It was precisely
thepresenceofAristotelianism
thatcreateda contithe
the
from
thirteenth
to
seventeenth
Whetherone studnuity
early
century.
iesAquinas,Buridan,Pomponazzi,Surezor Eustachiusa SanctoPaulo,they
all tookAristotle
as theirstarting
pointand cameup withtheirowninterpretationswithina commonframework.
EvencriticslikeDescartesand Cureau
iftheyarenotseenas beingrelated
de la Chambrecan hardlybe understood
to thisframework.
itis alwaysdangerousto talkaboutperiodsorepochsas some
Furthermore,
kind of historicalentitiesthatfolloweach otheralmostnaturally.
Theyare
themselves
historical
and theirdefinition
variesfromone generation
products,
tothenext,sometimes
evenfromone historian
to thenext.As itiswellknown,
thereis no agreement
about a definition
of the highlycontroversial
period
labeled"MiddleAges."Some thinkthatit endedin theearlyfourteenth
cenothersarguethatit continueduntiltheriseof
turywithDante and Petrarca,
modernphysicsin theearlyseventeenth
and stillothersdefendthe
century,
viewthattherewasa longmoyen
that
collapsedonlywiththeFrenchRevoge
lution.Giventhesestrikingly
different
to definea period,itis hardly
attempts
make
a
between
to
clear
cut
different
helpful
periodsand to look forgeneral
labelsunderwhichauthorsbelongingto a certainperiodcouldbe subsumed.
One shouldratherlook at individualauthorsand ask how theydealtwith
framework
oftheirtime.Thus,when
specific
problemswithinthetheoretical
one
not
about
should
simplyopposeso-calledRenaissance
talking
psychology,
in generalbut ask how a specificauthor,
authorsto medievalphilosophers
ofthesoul,howhe usedsomeAristotesay,LorenzoValla,developeda theory
lian elementsand rejectedothers,how he criticizedsome predecessors
and
3)SeeCharles
H. Lohr,
"Renaissance
Latin
Aristotle
Studies
intheRenaissance
Commentaries",
21 (1974)andRenaissance
in
On
the
of
Aristotelianism
28-35
(1975-82).
presence
Quarterly
ofthesoul,seetheconcise
"Renaissance
Theories
Renaissance
theories
Michael,
survey
byEmily
inPsyche
ofBody,
andSoma.
andMetaphysicians
ontheMind-Body
Soul,andMind",
Physicians
Problem
to
P.
&
P.
Potter
ed.
,
(Oxford,
2000),147-172.
J. Wright
from
Enlightenment
Antiquity
4)Foranoverview,
seeChristia
"TheVitality
andImportance
ofEarly
Modern
AristoMercer,
in:TheRiseofModern
ed.byT. Sorell
telianism",
1993),33-67;M.W.E
(Oxford,
Philosophy,
in: TheCambridge
to
"Scholastic
Schools
andEarly
Modern
Stone,
Philosophy",
Companion
D.
&
New
Modern
ed.
Rutherford
299-327.
,
York,
2006),
Early
Philosophy
(Cambridge

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followedotherswhenexplainingvariousfeatures
of thesoul. Likewise,it is
to
talk
about
a
strict
between
the so-calledearly
hardlyhelpful
opposition
modernphilosophers
Descartesand Cureaude la Chambreand theirmedieval
One shouldratherexaminewheretheyfollowedsome specific
predecessors.
and
predecessors wheretheylefttheirpaths.Onlythenarewe able to drawa
detailedpictureofthephilosophical
controversies
thattookplacein theyears
between1250 and 1650- controversies
thattook place betweenindividual
notbetweensuchabstract
and highlyartificial
entities
as "mediphilosophers,
evalphilosophy",
"Renaissance
and
modern
philosophy" "early
philosophy."
When explainingthe ontologicalstatusof individualthings,Ockham
defendedtheprinciplethateachsingular
thingis byitselfsomething
singular.5
this
can
also
be
to
the
of
Perhaps
principle
applied
study pastphilosophers:
eachofthemis byhimself
an individual
whodefendsa certainpositionforhis
own reasons.Ifwe wantto understand
hisarguhim,we needto reconstruct
ments,comparethemwitharguments
presented
byotherindividualphilosothatwas dominantin his time.
phers,and assessthemwithintheframework
Thisis themainreasonwhytheneutralexpression
"from1250 to 1650" was
chosenforthetide of thisissue.I hope thiswillenablereadersto approach
each textwithoutbeingguidedby dubioushistoriographie
and
categories,
allowthemto reacha deeperunderstanding
ofhow and whytheAristotelian
formanyindividualphilosophers
was
theorythatservedas the framework
transformed.
eventually
The articlesincludedin thisissuearebasedon paperspresented
at a workshop
of theEuropeanScienceFoundation(ESF) program"FromNaturalPhilosoand the Berlin
phyto Science,"whichtook place at HumboldtUniversity
of
Arts
in
and
Science
Berlin
on
November
16-18,
Academy
Brandenburg
2006. I am verygrateful
to theESF foritsgenerousfinancial
support,to the
membersofthesteering
committee
formakingtheworkshoppossible,to my
and
collaborators
at
Humboldt
forhelpingme to orgacolleagues
University
nizetheworkshop,
and to all theparticipants
fortheirstimulating
presentationsand contributions
to livelydiscussions.I owe a specialdebtto Simone
taskofpreparing
thepapersfor
Ungererforhelpingmewiththeunrewarding
to
and
the
editors
of
Vivarium
who
to
include
themin
publication,
accepted
a specialissue.
5)William
inlibrum
Sententiarum
dist.2, q. 6, in
Ockham,
(Ordinario),
Scriptum
primum
& G.Gi(NewYork,
ressingularis
II,ed.S. Brown
1970),196: . .quaelibet
Operatheologica
seipsaestsingularis."

15:36:45 PM

D. Perler
46 (2008)223-231
/Vivarium

[9] 231

Bibliography
21
Studies
intheRenaissance
Latin
Aristotle
Charles
Commentaries",
H., "Renaissance
Lohr,
28-35(1975-82).
(1974)andRenaissance
Quarterly
in:The
Rise
ofEarly
Modern
"lheVitality
andImportance
Aristotelianism",
Mercer,
Christia,
of
T.
Sorell
ed.
Modern
33-67.
,
1993),
(Oxford,
Philosophy
inPsyche
andSoma.
"Renaissance
Theories
ofBody,
Soul,andMind",
Michael,
Physicians
Emily,
toEnlightenment
andMetaphysicians
onthe
Problem
,ed.J.P.Wright
Mind-Body
from
Antiquity
& P.Potter
(Oxford,
2000),147-172.
imMittelalter
amMain,
Theorien
derIntentionalitt
Perler,
Dominile,
2002).
(Frankfurt
Revolution
& London,
TheScientific
Steven,
1996).
(Chicago
Shapin,
in:TheCambridge
Modern
M.W.F.
"Scholastic
Schools
andEarly
Stone,
Philosophy",
Compan& NewYork,
Modern
iontoEarly
, ed.D. Rutherford
2006),299(Cambridge
Philosophy
327.
inlibrum
Sententiarum
dist.2,q. 6,inOpera
William
Ockham,
(Ordinatio),
Scriptum
primum
& G.Gi(NewYork,
II,ed.S. Brown
1970).
theologica

15:36:45 PM

*Klc/^
A)
'4V
BRILL

lhe

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)232-252

Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic

on the Theory of the Soul

Sources

Dag NikolausHasse
1
University
ofWrzburg
Abstract
ofthesoulas thefirst
or
Albertus
theAristotelian
definition
actuality
Magnusfavours
life
But
he
Aristotle's
vocabof
a
natural
bodyhaving potentially. interprets
perfection
withtheseparability
ofthesoulfrom
the
ularyin a waythatitbecomes
compatible
to
the
s
not
The
term
is
understood
as
soul
activity
only, to
body.
"perfectio"
referring
Theterm"forma"
is avoidedas inadequate
fordefining
thesoulsessence.
itsessence.
ofitsactions
Thesoulisunderstood
as a substance
whichexists
andits
independently
a tradition
Thearticle
shows
that
Albertus'
decisions
continue
reachbody.
terminological
inparticular,
toAvicenna.
theGreek
andJohn
commentators,
Philoponos
ingfrom
onanother
issueisalsoinfluenced
sources.
His
Albertus'
byArabic
position
important
animalandrational
on argudefense
oftheunityofthesoul'svegetative,
partsrests
ItisshownthatAverroes'
ontheproblem
ments
from
Avicenna
andAverroes.
position
of the
he advocates
theunitythesis,
butalso teachestheplurality
is notclearcut:
inman.Thisdoublestanceisvisible
intheLatinrecepforms
andindividual
generic
whopresents
Averroes
bothassupporter
tionofAverroes'
andalsoinAlbertus,
works,
oftheplurality
thesis.
andopponent
Keywords
Latinphilosophy,
Arabicphilosophy,
Albertus
medieval
Avicenna,
Averroes,
Magnus,
of
the
De anima
soul
, philosophy
ofthesoulhasreceiveda goodamountofscholAlbertus
Magnus*philosophy
to understand
attention.
It
has
been
Albertus
arly
always
partoftheseefforts
1}I amgrateful
forcriticism
from
Friedemann
Mller
andMatteo
andadvice
Buddensiek,
Jrn
inBerlin,
im
diGiovanni
andfrom
theparticipants
ofcolloquia
November
2005,andFreiburg
where
this
was
Research
for
this
was
funded
2007,
by
January
paper presented.
paper
Breisgau,
theVolkswagen
Foundation.
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
NV,
Leiden,

DOI:10.1
163/156853408X360902

15:36:58 PM

D.N. Hasse/Vivarium
46 (2008)232-252

[11] 233

In hisearlyworks,such
dependenceuponArabicsourcesin Latintranslation.
as theDe homineand theCommentary
on theSentences
, whichhe wrotewhen
he firstcame to Parisin theearly1240s,Albertusincorporates
an enormous
sources,amongthemmanyofArabicorigin,withthe
rangeofphilosophical
resultthathis standpointis colouredbyArabictheories.In laterworks,for
instancein De animaof the 1250s,Albertusdistanceshimselffromsomeof
thesephilosophical
traditions.
Itwashisapparentmotiveto formulate
a philocloserto Aristotle's.
sophicalstandpoint
In theliterature
on Albertus'psychology
and itsArabicsourcesthereis a
themewhichdeserves
closerattention
thanithashitherto
received:theArabic
of the soul. Scholarshipof the past few
backgroundto Albertus'definition
decadeshas focusedon othertopics:Albertus'intellect
theoryand hisfaculty
On
the
there
does
not
seem
to discuss.Albertus
much
surface,
psychology.2
criticizes
whathe callsPlato'sdefinition
ofthesoulas an incorporeal
substance
whichis self-moving
and,in virtueofthis,movesthebody,3and he distances
himself
fromSeneca'sandAlfredofSareshel's
becausetheydo not
definitions,
definethesoulwithrespectto thebody.4As a result,
Albertussideswith,or at
2)Examples
areAlaindeLibera,
Albert
leGrand
etlaphilosophie
(Paris,
1990),DagNikolaus
"DasLehrstck
inderScholastik:
vondenvierIntellekten
vondenarabischen
Hasse,
Quellen
biszuAlbertus
Recherches
de Thologie
etPhilosophie
mdivales
66 (1999),21-77,
Magnus",
undPerspektiven
derSinneswahrnehmung
imSystem
Anzulewicz,
Hendryk
"Konzeptionen
Alberts
desGrossen",
10
und
199-238,
Anzulewicz,
(2002),
Hendryk
Micrologus
"Entwicklung
imSystem
derIntellekttheorie
Archives
et
desAlbertus
d'histoire
doctrinale
Stellung
Magnus",
littraire
dumoyen
AlaindeLibera,
etnotique:
Albert
le
ge70 (2003),165-218,
Mtaphysique
undGlck:
dieLehre
Grand
vom
unddie
,intellectus
Sturlese,
(Paris,
2005),Loris
Vernunft
adeptus
mentale
beiAlbert
demGroen
Sturlese,
",Intellectus
(Mnster,
2005),Loris
Glckseligkeit
adepe i suoilimiti
ilGrande
inIntellect
tus':L'intelletto
secondo
Alberto
e lasuascuola",
etimagination
danslaPhilosophie
ed.M.C.Pacheco
& J.E Meirinhos,
3 vols(Turnhout,
Mdivale,
2006),
1: 305-321,
"DerEinflu
derarabischen
aufdieEthik
des
Mller,
Jrn
Intellektspekulation
inWissen
Albertus
ber
Arabisches
Wissen
undlateinisches
Mittelalter
Grenzen:
, ed.A.
Magnus",
& L.Wegener
& NewYork,
(Berlin
2006),545-568.
Speer
3)Albertus
Dehomine
decreaturis,
secunda
ed.A.Borgnet,
omnia,
(Summa
Opera
Magnus,
pars),
vol.35(Paris,
enim
Platoquodanima
estsubstantia
movens
1896),qu.3,20:"Dicit
incorporea
Cf.qu.3,a. 1,sol.,28:"Dicendum
nonmovetur
ut
motus,
corpus."
quodanima
aliquaspecie
Aristoteles
et
et
CollectaAvicenna,
Averroes,
Constabulinus,
probant
philosophi,
Alpharabius
nus[i.e.Gundisalvi]
etmulti
aliinaturales.
Movet
autem
immobilis
corpus
ipsaexistens
perse."
4)Albertus
intelDe homine
autem
dicitquodanima
estspiritus
, qu.3,20:"Seneca
Magnus,
lectualis
inseetincorpore
In librosecundo
sic
ad habitudinem
ordinatus.
De motucordis
diffinitur:
Anima
estsubstantia
sunt
a
illuminationum,
susceptiva
incorporea,
quae
primo."
Cf.qu.3,a. 2,sol.,30:"Dicendum
incompaduaediffinitiones
datae
sunt
deanima
quodistae
ratione
etquiahocpercipit
sinecorpore,
hocnonfaciunt
mentionem
de
adoptimum,
propter
corpore."

15:36:58 PM

234 [12]

D.N.Hasse/Vivarium
46 (2008)232-252

leastshowshis clearsympathies
in De
definition
as formulated
for,Aristotle's
anima ILI (4l2a27): "We shall therefore
the
definition
of
the
soul,
posit
as statedat thebeginning
ofthesecondbookofDe anima, wherethephilosoof a naturalbodyhavinglifepotenphersays:The soul is thefirstactuality
Animaestprimusactuscorporis
.5Albertus'
tially":
physici
potentiavitamhabentis
Arabicsources,Avicenna(Ibn Sn) and Averroes(Ibn Rushd)in particular,
also adoptAristotle's
definition.
Albertusdoes not seemto do morethanto
continuethePeripatetic
tradition
of defining
thesoul as theactualityof the
it
is
well
known
that
Albertus
body.Finally,
Magnus- in linewithmanyother
- is muchinfluenced
scholastic
writers
Avicenna's
De anima, butthemain
by
and not the
body of thisinfluenceconcernsAvicenna'sfacultypsychology
of
the
The
soul
first
four
of
Avicenna's
De anima,
theory
proper.
chapters
whichpresenthis conceptof thesoul,arerarelyquotedand discussedin the
LatinWest- evenbyAlbertusMagnus,themostknowledgable
of all Latin
readersof Avicenna.6
The chapters1.1-4werenevertheless
both
influential,
the
masters
of
arts
the
and
Several
scholars
have
among
theologians.7
pointed
out the factthatAlbertus'definition
and theoryof the soul is colouredby
Arabicsources:AlbertusfollowsAvicennain teachingthat"one mustdistinguishwhatthesoulis in itselffromwhatitis in relationto thebody",8and he
contention
thatAristotle's
adoptsAvicenna's
analysisofthesoul "wasfocused
on the functionand not the essenceof the soul".9These are generalstatewithevidence.Thisis theaim of the
ments,whichneed to be supplemented
presentpaper.
theauthorof
My focusis on theearlyAlbertusMagnus,and, specifically,
theSummade homineand oftheCommentary
on theSentences
, who stilltreats
Greekand Arabicsourceswith equal sympathy.
Since the olderAlbertus
notto confusehiswritings
changeshismindon severalissues,it is important
5)Albertus
De homine
denMenschen:
De homine
ed.andGer, qu.4,31,ber
, select
Magnus,
mantransi,
& J.R.Sder
2004),46 (I citequ.4 a.l andqu.7
byH. Anzulewicz
(Hamburg,
a. 1after
thislatter
"Ponam
usergo
diffinitionem
insecundo
De
animae,
edition):
quaeponitur
inprincipio,
anima
ubisicdicit
. . .".
Philosophus:
6)Scholastic
references
to thefirst
fourchapters
ofAvicenna's
De animaarelisted
in Dag
Nikolaus
Avicenna's
DeAnima
intheLatinWest:
The
Formation
a
Hasse,
of Peripatetic
Philosophy
& Turin,
(London
2000),234-240.
oftheSoul,1160-1300
7)Asshown
Carlos
"TheHuman
Soul:Form
andSubstance?
Thomas
Bazn,
byBernardo
Aquinas'Critique
ofEclectic
Archives
d'histoire
doctrinale
etlittraire
dumoyen
Aristotelianism",
ge
64(1997),95-126.
8)Richard
C. Dales,The
Problem
SoulintheThirteenth
& New
(Leiden
oftheRational
Century
York
& Cologne,
1995),90.
9)Markus
L. Fhrer,
"Albert
theGreat",
in TheStanford
ed.E. N.
Encyclopedia
ofPhilosophy,
Zalta(Spring
2006Edition).

15:36:58 PM

46 (2008)232-252
DM Hasse/Vivarium

[13] 235

on whomAlbertus
draws
fromdifferent
periods.ThethreemajorArabicfigures
of eleventhand Ibn Gabirol,theJewishphilosopher
areAvicenna,Averroes
Ibn Gabirol,
The latterwas knownin Latinas Avicebron.
Andalusia.10
century
in
he is
in histories
ofJewish
as a Jew,usuallyfigures
philosophy; thiscontext,
wereall
becausehisphilosophical
subsumedunderArabicphilosophy
writings
inArabic.

1. Albertus'Theoryof theSoul
thesecond
The first
sectionofthisarticleis devotedto Albertus'theoryitself,
in this
sectionto the questionwhetherAlbertusprolongsArabictraditions
willbe described
withrespectto fourtopics:thedefimatter.
Albertus'theory
nitionofthesoul,thecompositeor simplenatureof thesoul,therelationof
ofsubstance.
and theunityor plurality
thesoulto itsfaculties,
in
ofthesoul.As I haveindicatedabove,Albertus,
(1) First:thedefinition
as the first
forthe Aristotelian
definition
De homine
, showshis preference
form
of the
calls
the
soul
the
of
a
natural
But
Albertus
rarely
actuality
body.
or
actus
is
the
term
he
the
terms
actus
(
body.Instead, prefers
primus perfectio
ofAristotle,
chosenbytheGreek-Latin
translator
bytheArabic-Latin
perfectio
because thesetermsmake the soul less dependentupon the
translator),11
It is in accordancewiththisstandpointthatAlbertusdoes notmainbody.12
- whereasthisis exactly
what
to matter
tainthatthesoul impartscorporeality
insiststhatthesoul is the
ThomasAquinasteacheslater.Aquinas,famously,
formofthebodyon thegroundsthatitis thesouls essencewhichis unitedto
thebody;thisis a majordividebetweenAlbertusand hispupil.13
10)Lessinfluential
etanimar,
three
authors
isQustibnLq,Dedifferentia
thanthese
spiritus
insupport
ofthethesis
that
of"Constabulinus",
Albertus
invokes
hisauthority,
under
thename
thesoulisincorpothesoulisa substance
in:Dehomine
,qu.2,a. 1,sedcontra
1,lib,andthat
Plato's
definition
ofthesoulasself-moving,
1-5,14,andagainst
real,
ibid.,
qu.2,a.2,sedcontra
areinqu.1,a. 1,9bandinqu.4,a. 5,49b.
references
ibid.,
qu.3,a.l,sol.,28a.Further
n) TheGreek-Latin
in:Albertus
De anima
of11,14l2a27-28
isprinted
translation
,
Magnus,
vol.7.1,ed.C. Stroick
Institutum
Alberti
omnia
. . . edenda curavit
Coloniense,
Opera
Magni
De
inAristotelis
isin:Averroes,
Commentarium
(Mnster,
1968),66;theArabic-Latin
magnum
of
ArisSee
the
convenient
list
anima
libros
ed.
F.
S.
Crawford
136.
Mass.,
,
(Cambridge, 1953),
inDaniel
A.Callus,
in12thtranslation
literature
current
and13th-century
totelian
definitions
recueil
d'tudes
dephilosophie
dAristote:
"TheTreatise
ofJohn
Blund
'OntheSoul'",inAutour
A.Mansion
ancienne
etmdivale
Monseigneur
(Louvain,
1955),490-491.
offert
,2)Albertus
Dehomine
, qu.4,a. 1,ad6,35a.
Magnus,
13)Forananalysis
"TheHuman
seeBazn,
within
itshistorical
ofThomas'
context,
position

15:36:58 PM

236 [14]

D.N. Hasse/Vivarium
46 (2008)232-252

(2) The secondtopic,thecompositenatureofthesoul,concernsthethesis

The partisans
whichis usuallytermed"universal
of thisthehylomorphism".
claim
that
all
immaterial
such
as
the
soul
and
the
are
ory
beings,
intelligences,
composedofmatterand form,so thattherearein mantwokindsofmatter:a
to the soul and the corporealmatterof the body
spiritualmatterintrinsic
extrinsic
to thesoul.Albertusrejectsthisdoctrine.He tracesitssourcesto the
of Ibn Gabiroland DominicusGundisalvi,who is dependentupon
writings
Ibn Gabirol.14
As has long been shown,the doctrineof universalhylomorwas
phism
acceptedby a numberof Franciscanthinkers:Roger Bacon,
Its main argumentative
Bonaventure,
JohnPechamand others.15
advantage
wasthatitoffered
an explanation
ofthedifference
betweencreatures
and God,
in particular
betweenangelsand God, becauseangelscould be describedas
of spiritualmatterand form,whereasGod is simple.The theory
s
consisting
maindrawback,in theeyesofAlbertusMagnus,is thatit excludesthepossiIfeventhehumansoulis not
bilitythatanybeingcouldexistwithoutmatter.
it
cannot
have
true
What is
intellectual
immaterial,
entirely
knowledge.16
Albertus'ownviewon thequestionofwhetherthesoul is simpleor composite?He rejectsuniversal
buthe doesnotmaintainthatthesoul
hylomorphism,
is simple.Rather,it is composedofquodestand quo est}7Albertushereusesa
forananalytical
seeRobert
& Christopher
The
Pasnau
Soul",113-126;
Shields,
interpretation
On
Albertus
see
Problem
The
153-174.
Colo.,
Dales,
(Boulder,
2004),
Philosophy
ofAquinas
of
theRational
Arthur
DiePsychologie
Alberts
des
SouU89-92,and,stillinformative,
Schneider,
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
desMittelalters,
vol.4.6and4.6 (Mnster,
Grossen
, Beitrge
1903and1906),20-21.
14)Albertus
Dehomine
Collectanus"
, qu.7,a. 3,sol.,102b:ethocdicit
(i.e.
expresse
Magnus,
Commentarii
inlibros
ed.A.Borgnet,
vol.25-30
idem,
Sententiarum,
omnia,
Gundisalvi);
Opera
inlibro
dePlatone
Fontis
vitae.
. .".Inlater
(Paris,
1894),II,dist.1A,a. 4, 14b:etsiobjicitur
identifies
Avicebron
astheauthor
ofFonsvitae:
"Ab
suchastheDe anima
, Albertus
writings,
in libroquemFontem
omnibus
inductis
dissentit
Avicebron
vitaeappellavit"
{De
superius
anima
,lib.III,tr.2,cap.9, 189).
15)Erich
DasProblem
derhylomorphen
der
Substanzen
im
Kleineidam,
Zusammensetzung
geistigen
bisThomas
von
"Albertus
13.Jahrhundert
, behandelt
(Breslau,
1930);James
A.Weisheipl,
Aquin
A Noteon13th-Century
andUniversal
Avicebron.
Hylomorphism:
Magnus
Augustinianism",
inAlbert
theGreat:
Commemorative
ed.F.J.Kovach
& R.W.Shahan
Okla.,
(Norman,
Essaysy
F.Wippel,
in TheCambridge
'Essence
andExistence',
1980),239-260;
John
History
ofLater
Medieval
ed.N. Kretzmann
etal.(Cambridge,
with
1982),385-410,
esp.408-410,
Philosophy
further
literature.
16)Erich
DasProblem
derhylomorphen
Alber,53-54;
Kleineidam,
Zusammensetzung
Weisheipl,
tusMagnus
andUniversal
257.
Hylomorphism',
17)Albertus
Dehomine
,qu.7,a. 3;Sent.,
I,dist.
3,a. 33;Sent.
, II,dist.1A,a.4;Sent.
,
Magnus,
II,dist.3,a. 4.

15:36:58 PM

D.N. Hasse/Vivarium
46 (2008)232-252

[15] 237

well-known
distinction
itselfis notfree
byBoethius.The Boethiandistinction
fromobscurity.
One of Boethius'claimsis thatthequod estis thecarrieror
In Alber, suchas man,whereasthequo estis theform,humanity.18
suppositum
tus'adoption,thequodestis theindividualbeingwhichunderliestheessence
whichis
and in whichtheessenceexists;thequo estis theessencein actuality,
the
of
the
est
.19
Albertus
actualizedand individuated
through properties
quod
concludes:"In thissenseI say thatthe soul is a compositesubstance":hoc
mododicoanimamessesubstantiam
.20Thispositionis notoriginal.
compositam
Albertussharestheadoptionof the Boethianformulawithmanyscholastic
writers.
Itsargumentative
aimis to explaintheindividualexistence
ofthesoul:
itsessenceexistsand is individuated
by thequod est.In sum,universal
hyloan
an
Arabic
which
the
of
Ibn
is
of
Gabirol,
theory
morphism, theory
example
hisownviewpoint.
Albertusopposesin orderto formulate
Alber(3) Thethirdthemeconcernstherelationofthesoulto thefaculties.
in his Commentary
on theSentences
tusdistinguishes,
, two respectsin which
thisquestioncan be discussed:thesoul can be consideredwithrespectto its
beingor withrespectto its operation.In the firstsense,withrespectto its
followfromthesouls beingand arederivedfromit.The
being,thefaculties
oraccidents
faculties
thusdo notbelongto thesouls being;theyareproperties
ofthesoul. In thesecondrespect,
insofaras thesoul is a substancein action,
a "totality
ofpowers".Its
thesoulis a totumpotestativum
(or totum
potentiate),
in itsfaculties;
itstotalpoweris composedoftheparticular
poweris perfected
of
the
hence
the facultiesare substantial
forthe soul,
and
faculties,
powers
in itspower:suntsubstantiates
becausewithoutthemthesoul is notperfected
forthesoul"
ei sinequibusnoncompletur
inperfectione
suiposse.21
"Substantial
meansthatthefaculties
arenecessary
of
the
soul
as such,are
and,
properties
as
form.
But
it
is
that
of
the
definition
of
the
soul
substantial
important
part
18)PiusKnzle,
DasVerhltnis
derSeele
Potenzen:
zuihren
Problemgeschichtliche
Untersuchungen
von
bis
und
mit
Thomas
Switzerland,
1956),32.
(Freiburg,
Augustin
vonAquin
19)Albertus
Sent.
, I,dist.3,a. 33,138b:"Idenim
quodpraeMagnus,
quod estesthocaliquid,
secundum
dicabile
estdeeoquodest.Quoest...Boetius
esse
ethocestessentia
actum,
ponit
individuinipsoquodest
velinistosupposito;
undeintalibus
, idestinhocaliquid
quemhabet
DasVerhltnis
adoipsius
Cf.Knzle,
esse
esta proprietatibus
quaeconsequuntur
ipsum
quodest".
derSeele
zuihren
Potenzen
50.
, 149-1
20)Albertus
Albertus
uses
Sent.,
I,dist.3,a. 33,138b.InSent.,
II,dist.3,a. 4,68-69,
Magnus,
theterms
andesse.
fiindamentum
21)Albertus
ora
ofa totum
Sent.,
I,dist.3,a. 34,sol.,140a.Theconcept
Magnus,
potestativum
inAlbertus'
totum
is discussed
De homine,
already
quod
qu.6, 87b("Exhispatet
potentiate
etrationale
estdivisio
totius
divisio
animae
etsensibile
ibid.,
qu.7,
potentialis");
pervegetabile
a. 1,ad8,95b;ibid.,
qu.8,a. 1,sol.,105a.

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Albertuswrites"notperfected
in its power",suiposse. Becausehe thusdistanceshimselffromcontemporary
Franciscanwriters,
who claimedthatthe
soul is not completedas a substancewithoutthefaculties.
ForAlbertus,the
soul is incompleteonlywithrespectto itspower,notwithrespectto itssub- to whichthefaculties
stance
do notbelong.22
of
(4) Thisleadsto thefourthtopic:thequestionoftheunityor plurality
substance.
in
De
h
ornine
the
idea
that
there
arethree
Albertus,
rejects
already
in man,i.e. thevegetative,
thesensitive
and therational,because
perfections
thenmanwouldnotbe one.23As iswellknown,in thelaterthirteenth
century
thequestionwhether
thereareone or severalformsin manwas thesubjectof
one ofthemostheatedcontroversies
in MiddleAges.In thecentreofthedisthatthereis onlyone substantial
form
putewas ThomasAquinas'contention
in man.24This was not a problematic
thesisin the decadesbeforeThomas
halfofthethirteenth
whenthegreatmajority
of
Aquinas,in thefirst
century,
and masters
ofartsheldthatthereis onlyone substancein human
theologians
Albertus
thatthethesisofa plurality
ofsubstances
saysveryexplicitly
beings.25
is nottrueand is in conflict
bothwiththephilosophers
and thesanctiAugustineand Boethius.26
It is specificto Albertusthathe seesa consensusof phiin favouroftheunitythesis.Otherauthors,forinstance
losophyand theology
the commentator
RichardRufus,countAristotleamongthe pluralists,
the
in
that
Aristotle
De
animalium
II.3 (736a36-b29)
argument
being
generatione
maintainsthatin thedevelopment
oftheembryothevegetative
soulprecedes
thesensitive
soul.27
soul,whichin turnprecedestheintellectual
Let us recapitulate.
Aristotle
s defiFirst,we haveseenthatAlbertusprefers
nitionof thesoul as thefirstactuality
of a naturalbodyto otherdefinitions,
butavoidscallingthesoul theformofthebody.Second,AlbertusrejectsIbn
22)SeeOdonLottin,
"L'identit
del'meetdesesfacults
avant
saintThomas
in
d'Aquin",
OdonLottin,
etmorale
auxXII'etXIIIesicles
etal.,1942),
,vol.1 (Louvain
483-502,
Psychologie
DasVerhltnis
derSeele
zuihren
Potenzen
Knzle,
, 150-154.
esp.497-501;
23)Albertus
Dehomine
andibid.,
den
,qu.4,a. 1,ad7,35-36,
Magnus,
qu.7,a. 1,sol,93,ber
Menschen
secundum
omnes
sanctos
etphilosophos
etnaturales
, 104:"Dicendum
quodvegetaetrationale
sunt
inhomine
substantia
unaetanima
unaetactus
unus".
bile,sensibile
24)Foranintroduction
tothese
see
tienne
Christian
inthe
Gilson,
disputes
History
of
Philosophy
Middle
(NewYork,
1955),416-420.
Ages
25)Asshown
A.Callus,
"TheOrigins
oftheProblem
oftheUnity
ofForm",
TheThobyDaniel
mist
24(1961),257-285,
esp.281-282.
26)Asinn.23above.
Cf.alsoibid.,
qu.7,a. 1,ad1,97a.
27)DanielA. Callus,
"TwoEarly
Oxford
Masters
ontheProblem
ofthePlurality
ofForms:
- Richard
Adam
ofBuckfeld
Rufus
ofCornwall",
Revue
dePhilosophie
42(1939),
Noscolastique
411-445,
430and439.
esp.422-423,

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[17] 239

Gabirols theorythat the soul is composedof formand spiritualmatter;

theessenceofthe
instead,he followstheBoethiantradition
bydistinguishing
soul,thequo est, fromitsindividualbeing,thequodest. Third,Albertus
argues
thatthefaculties,
as accidents,are ontologically
distinctfromthesoul; with
forthesoul. Fourth,
respectto thesouls power,however,
theyaresubstantial
Albertusis an advocateofthethesisthatthereis onlyone substancein man.
To whatextentdo thesepositionsreflect
the influenceof Arabicsources?I
shalldiscussthe fouraspectsof Albertus'theoryin sequence,but leaveout
universal
becauseofitslimitedinfluence
on Albertus.
hylomorphism
2. lhe Definitionof theSoul
It is an Arabicinheritance
thatAlbertusprefers
thetermsactusprimusorperIn
to
the
term
De
homine
in
the
solution
to thequestion"On
,
fectio
forma.
whetherthesoul is theactuality
of thebody",Albertusarguesthatit is substantialforthesoulto be theactusofthebody.He proceedsto explainthatthis
is not a definition
secundum
esse
withrespectto the body.
, but a definition
with
a
Albertus
his
citation
from
Avicenna
s De anima1.1.
justifies standpoint
He adoptsfromAvicennatheidea thattheAristotelian
ofthesoul
definition
as perfection
does not definethesouls essence.28
Avicennahimselfsupports
thisclaimwiththreearguments;
thefirst
twoarealso citedbyAlbertus:first,
theterm"soul"is usedonlywithrespectto thesoul beingthecauseofactivities;it is notappliedbecauseit describesthesouls substance.Second,thereis
a difference
betweenour knowingthatthereexistsa moverforsomething
movedand ourknowingwhatthismoveris in itsessence.29
Albertus
concludes
thatthedefinition
ofthesoul as "theactuality
or moverofthebody"30
differs
fromthatof itsessence.Third,thetermperfection
is what
(kaml,perfectio)
28)Albertus
denMenschen
De homine
, 58:"Etideodicit
, qu.4, a. 1,sol.,34a,ber
Magnus,
Avicenna
inVI De naturalibus
anima
nonestnomen
reiexeiusessenhuius
quodhocnomen
tia.. . Etcumanima
diffinitur
sicut
diffinita
estabAristotele,
nonaffirmatur
esseeiusnisisecundumquodestprincipium
emanandi
a seaffectiones".
29)Avicenna,
Deanima
Avicennas
DeAnima
the
, 1.1:Avicenna,
(Arabie
text):
being
psychological
etal.,1959),4-5;Avicenna,
Liber
deanima
seu
ed.E Rahman
(London
partofKitb
al-shif'
Sextus
denaturalibus
2 vols.(Louvain
etal.,1968-72),
15-16;Engl.tr.Lenn
, ed.S. VanRiet,
"ANoteonAvicennas
EvanGoodman,
oftheSubstantiality
oftheSoul",ThePhiloTheory
n.s.I,4 (1969),555.
Forum
sophical
30)Albertus
etmotor".
34/58:"actus
ibid.,
corporis
Magnus,

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man in his species,31

and by whichman (or animal or plant)
constitutes
becomesan actualman. But thedefinition
does not sayanything
about the
essenceof the soul; it does not evensaywhetherthe soul is a substanceor
Albertusconcludes,together
withAvicenna,thatthedefinition
ofsoul
not.32
to thecategory
ofsubstance.33
as actusdoesnotapplyto thesoulas belonging
s De animaII.l, wherehe equatesform{eidos)
One maycompareAristotle
and actuality{entelecheia)
(4l2al0) and maintainsthatthesoul is substance
ofa naturalbody.In contrast,
Avicenna
(ousia)becauseit is thefirst
actuality
substanceand actuality.
and Albertusdisassociate
In thesamequaestio,he
Albertusmovesa further
stepawayfromAristotle.
thanas
followsAvicennain sayingthatthesoul is betterdefinedas perfection
.34
The
form:meliusdicituractusvelperfectio
argument
givenby
quamforma
Avicennain De anima1.1 is as follows:
While
form
isa perfection,
notevery
isa form.
Fortheking
istheperfecevery
perfection
istheperfection
oftheship,
istheform
ofthe
tionofthestate
andthecaptain
yetneither
state
ortheship Ithasbeensettled
thattechnical
dictates
thatsomething
bea
usage
form
relative
tomatter;
anendandperfection
relative
tothewhole
. . . Therefore
itisclear
inthecourse
that
ofdefining
thesoul,wesaythatitisa perfection,
itwillbethe
when,
ofitsmeaning.
Whatismore,
it[i.e.theterm
all
most
indicative
perfection]
encompasses
ofsoulsinalltheir
with
thesoulthat
isseparable
from
matter
notbeing
thetypes
aspects,
anexception
toit[i.e.tobeing
a perfection].35
- because,as he says,thesoul in someof its
Albertusembracesthisposition
speciesis separatefromthebody:cum. . . animasecundum
aliquamsuispeciem
.36
separetur
31)Ibid.,
"ANoteonAvicennas
ed.Rahman,
tr.Goodman,
556.
18,Engl.
6,ed.VanRiet,
Theory",
32)Ibid.,ed.Rahman,
"ANoteonAvicennas
8,ed.VanRiet,
22,Engl.tr.Goodman,
Theory",
ofthesoulseeThrse-Anne
"TheHuman
SoulsIndidefinition
557.OnAvicennas
Druart,
after
theBody's
Death:Avicenna
ontheCausalRelation
between
viduation
andItsSurvival
andSoul",
Arabic
Sciences
andPhilosophy
10(2000),259-273.
Body
33)Albertus
denMenschen
De homine
, qu.4,a. 1,sol.,34a,ber
, 58:"...itaetanima
Magnus,
scilicet
secundum
est
idest
actus
etmotor,
etsecundiffiniri,
anima,
dupliciter
potest
quod
corporis
dumquodestsubstantia
contenta
inpraedicamento
substantiae."
secundum
quaedam
seipsam
M)Ibid.,ad6,35a,ber
denMenschen,
62.
35)Avicenna,
Deanima
TheEnglish
translation
isfrom
, ed.Rahman,
6-7,ed.VanRiet,19-21.
in
Robert
Avicennas
Context
118-119.
N.Y.,
(Ithaca,
2003),
Wisnovsky,
Metaphysics
36)Albertus
De homine
denMenschen:
De hominey
62:
, qu.4, a. 1,ad 6, 35a,ber
Magnus,
"Cumigitur
animasecundum
suispeciem
convenit
ei magis
secundum
aliquam
separetur,
omnem
suipartem
diciperfectionem
quamformam".

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[19] 241

Albertusand Avicennathusdisassociatenot onlysubstanceand actuality,

- and in thisagain theydifferfromAristotle.
but also formand actuality
is
a
more
(perfectio
)
"Actuality"
generaltermthan"form";it also coverssouls
separatefromthebody,suchas soulsafterthedeathof thebody- at least,if
formis understood
naturalem
accordingto "technical
usage"orsecundum
phi, as Albertusputsit.37One mightobject:whatis thesoultheperfeclosophiam
tion of if not of the body?Avicennasansweris thatthe perfection
is the
of thewhole.Perfection
means"a relationto thecompletething
perfection
fromwhichtheactionsissue",a relationto the"composite
whole".38
Albertus
and
this
answer:
dicit
ad
rem
approves quotes
perfectio comparationem
perfectamexqua manantactiones
.39
While Albertusstopsthe discussionat thispoint,Avicennaproceedsto
hisposition.He explainswhyhe wantsto keepapartthetwoconcepts
justify
"substance"
and "form".
The reasonis thata substanceis definedas something
whichneverexistsin anotherthingas in a substrate;
otherwise
itwouldbe an
in itsordinary
accident.The term"form",
Avicenna,
impliesthat
usage,says
the "formis impressedupon matterand subsiststhroughit".40The "Flying
at theend of thefirstchapterof
Man", thewell-known
thought-experiment
Avicennastreatise
(a passagenotquotedbyAlbertus),is in linewiththisreamanis suspendedin theairin sucha waythathe does not
soning.The flying
have any sense-perception.
This man would not affirm
the existenceof his
outerlimbsnorof his innerorgans,but he would affirm
theexistenceof an
inneressence:hissoul.The flying
man thusservesto establishthethesisthat
thesoul is independent
ofthebody.41
DimitriGutasand RobertWisnovsky
havearguedthatAvicennasgeneral
insistence
on theseparability
ofthesoulfromthebodyis influenced
byPhilothe
Greek
commentator.
This
is
to
difficult
ponos, sixth-century
prove,since
on De animais notextantinArabictranslation,
and
Philoponos'commentary
thereis no bibliographical
recordinArabicsourcesofsucha translation.
However,thetextualparallelsbetweenArabicand Greeksourcesmakeitverylikely
37)Ibid.,
ad6,35a,62.
38)Avicenna,
Deanima
comautem
7 and9,ed.VanRiet20("perfectio
, ed.Rahman
significai
"A
ad
rem
ex
manant
and
tr.
Note
24,
Goodman,
actiones")
parationem perfectam
qua
Engl.
onAvicennas
557and558.
Theory",
39)Albertus
denMenschen
Dehomine,
, 64.
qu.4,a. 1,ad6,35a,ber
Magnus,
40)Avicenna,
24 and20,Engl.tr.Goodman,
De anima,
ed.Rahman,
9 and6, ed.VanRiet,
NoteonAvicennas
558and556.
Theory',
41)Onthethought-experiment
oftheflying
itsdifferent
versions
andpurposes,
seeHasse,
man,
Avicennas
DeAnima,
80-92.

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46 (2008)232-252

be itthewholetextor
thatArabicphilosophers
had accessto thecommentary,
a reworking
of it.42The generalline of thesestudiesis thattheNeoplatonic
to a largeextentvia the
influences
on Arabicphilosophyweretransmitted
on Aristotle,
especiallythe Alexandrianschool
Neoplatoniccommentators
fromAmmoniosto Olympiodoros,and thatone should not overestimate
and the ProclanLiberde
the influenceof the PlotinianTheology
ofAristotle
causisi
beforehim,explicitly
Philoponos,like otherNeoplatonistcommentators
ofthesoul. He has a longsectionin hisprefaceto his
stresses
theseparability
on De animain whichhe arguesforthesouls incorporeality.44
commentary
comparedto moreradiPhiloponosis a moderateNeoplatoniccommentator,
cal Neoplatonists
suchas Pseudo-Simplikios.
Hence,he does notdeny,in his
on De anima 11,1,thatAristotle
concludesthatthesoul is not
commentary
from
the
But
when
he
body.
proceedsto commenton Aristotles
separable
ofthebodyin this
thesoulis actuality
puzzlingsentence"Itis unclearwhether
an
as
a
sailor
of
a
he
(4l3a8-9),
way
ship"
gives explanationof "actuality"
whichmayhaveinfluenced
Avicennaand,through
Avicenna,AlbertusMagnus. For Philoponosassociates"actuality"
(entelecheia
) with"activities"
(enerthat
"activities
which
the
the
animal".
The
activities
soul
is,
by
perfects
geiai)y
oftheshipareinseparable
fromtheship,butthe
ofthesteersman
as steersman
steersman
is separatedas a man,and theactivities
as
stop soonas he leavesthe
ship.And Philoponosproceeds:"In thisway,then,therationalsoultoo,inasis notactuality
ofthebody,butinasmuch
muchas ithasa separablesubstance,
as it has acquiredthisrelationto thebody(byvirtueofwhichalso it can be
to thebody),itis bothactuality
ofthe
called soul',foritis called soul'relative
and
from
it".45
body
inseparable
42)Dimitri
ontheSeparability
oftheIntellect",
TheGreek
andAvicenna
Gutas,
"Philoponos
Review
inGreek
inthe
Arabic
TradiOrthodox
31(1986),121-129,
repr.
Philosophers
Theological
tion(Ashgate,
n.
Dimitri
"Avicennas
Glosses
22;
Gutas,
2000),art.XI,121-129,
esp.
Marginal
inPhilosophy,
onDe anima
Science
andExegesis
in
andtheGreek
Commentatorial
Tradition",
Arabic
andLatinCommentaries
2 vols.
& H. Baltussen
& M.W.F.
Greek,
, ed.P.Adamson
Stone,
Avicennas
ch.6.
83;Wisnovsky,
(London,
2004),2: 77-88,
Metaphysics,
43)SeeWisnovsky,
Avicenna
sMetaphysics
, 113-114.
44)Philoponos,
OnAristotle's
Onthesoul1.1-2
vanderEijk(Ithaca,
, transi.
N.Y.,2005),
P.J.
ofthesoulseeHenry
Aristotle
andNeoplatonism
23-30.OnPhiloponos'
J.Blumenthal,
theory
inlateantiquity:
Deanima
Avicen
74.Cf.alsoWisnovsky,
1996),
(London,
interpretations
ofthe
nasMetaphysics
, 92-96.
45)Philoponos,
OnAristotle's
Onthesoul2.1-6' transi.
W.Charlton
N.Y.,2005),26.
(Ithaca,
Greek:
InAristotelis
deanima
libros
commentaria
, ed.M. Hayduck
(Berlin,
1897),
Philoponos,
225.

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[21] 243

This textcontainsthreenotionsthatare important

forAvicennastheory
ofthesoul:first,
theassociationof "actuality"
withactivities
(or "perfection")
or functionsof the soul, second,the idea thatthe name "soul" is used to
describetherelationto thebody,and third,a conceptof substancewhichis
- althoughthislastpoint,thedistinction
not tiedto actuality
betweensubstanceand actualityis moredrasticin Avicenna.Philoponosdoes not,howdistinction
betweenform
ever,seemto pavethewayforAvicennasimportant
and perfection.
hasshownthatPhiloponosbequeathesto theArabictradition
a
Wisnovsky
of
as
final
cause.46
When
we
turn
to
Neoplatonicconcept "actuality":
actuality
thelaterLatinphaseofthistradition,
otherfeatures
becomemoreimportant:
the associationof the term"actuality"
withactivitiesor functions,
and the
disassociation
of substanceand actuality.
AlbertusMagnus,in his earlyDe
homine
tradition
ofinterpreting
theAristotelian
, continuesthisGraeco-Arabic
definition
of thesoul,whichallowshimto stressthesouls separability
from
thebody.47
3. Hie Soul and itsFaculties
As was pointedout above,forAlbertusthesoul is distinctfromitsfaculties
With respectto thethesouls activities,
it is a totum
ontologically.
potestati
vum, a "totality
of powers",whichis composedof the particularfaculties.
Albertus'standpointowes much to the Boethiantradition.Boethiushad
developedtheidea thatthesoul is thetotumof whichthecapacitiesare the
In the earlyMiddle Ages and in the twelfth
the dominant
parts.48
century,
- a thesiswhichwas attributed
thesiswas theidentity
ofsoul and faculties
to
was known,but was
Augustine.The Boethianconceptof a totum
potentiale
not employedto keep soul and facultiesapartontologically.
Albertus,howuses
the
for
this
end:
the
totum
ever,
concept exactly
conceptallows
potentiale

46)Asinn.42above.
47)I therefore
do notagree
withthose
whomake
Albertus
a protagonist
oftheanima
forma
asdoesIngrid
Albertus
formula,
1980),39;cf.
(Munich,
corporis
Craemer-Ruegenberg,
Magnus
inGeorg
thebalanced
criticism
Zwischen
Natur
undVernunft.
desGroen
Alberts
Wieland,
Begriff
vom
Menschen
19.
(Mnster,
1999),
48)Boethius,
Dedivisione
Latina
enim
haeanimae
sednonut
, Patrologia
64,888c:"Partes
sunt,
inquantitate,
sedutinaliquapotestate
etvirtute"
areparts
ofthesoul,butnotasina
("These
butasinsomecapacity
orpower")quantity,

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himto connectthesouland thefaculties

in therealmofpower,withoutmaintheir
taining
ontologicalidentity.
Albertus'solutiontherefore
appearsto be theresultofa medievaldevelopmentratherthanan exampleof Arabicinfluence.Here too, however,
Avicennaexerts
hisinfluence.
Albertus
his
thesis
with
one
of
his
favourite
supports
citationsfromAvicenna:"Fromone substance,whichis the soul, emanate
some organiccapacitiesand some non-organic
capacities,as Avicennasays":
ab una substantiaquae estanima... fluuntquaedampotentiaeorganicaeet
ut dicitAvicennaAlbertusdrawson a passagein
quaedamnon organicae,
AvicennasDe anima,chapterV.l whereAvicennawrites:"Not one of these
(powers)is the humansoul, but the soul is a thingto whichthesepowers
substance(jawhar
belong;thesoulitselfis,as we haveshown,an independent
which
has
an
towards
actions
someofwhich
),
(different)
munfarid
aptitude
can onlybe perfected
withorgans,. . . someofwhichdo notneedorgans".50
Avicennais thusa clearadvocateofan ontologicaldistinction
betweenthe
soul and thefaculties.
The soul possessesmanypowers,butis essentially
one.
We can see thatthispositionfollowsfromAvicennasinsistence
on theseparawhichexistsindepenbilityofthesoul.Ifthesoulis,in itsessence,a substance
dentlyof its actionsand of itsbody,thenit followsthatthepowerscannot
inherein thesoul itself.
Avicennaspositionhasan additionaladvantageforAlbertus,
one thatleads
us to thefinaltopic:theunityor plurality
ofsubstances
in man.
4. lhe Unityor Pluralityof Substances
as wassaidbefore,
defendstheunitythesis:thethesisthatthesoulis
Albertus,
one and not severalsubstances,i.e. vegetative,
sensitiveand rationalsubstances.But the drawbackof Albertus'positionis thatthe same substance
and incorruptible,
as he himself
admits:in a human
appearsto be corruptible
the
rational
is
the
whereas
and sensitive
beingonly
part immortal,
vegetative
49)Thisquotation
isfrom
thelateSumma
ed.A.Borgnet,
II,qu.1-67,
omnia,
Opera
theologiae,
vol.32(Paris,
here
because
oftheexplicit
mention
ofAvicenna),
87(itisquoted
11.13.77,
1895),
inmany
butsimilar
sentences
other
seethelistofsuchsentences
inHasse,
appear
writings;
Avicenna
s DeAnima
thisbook,I wasnotyetaware
ofthepassage
inDe
, 239.Whenwriting
inthenext
anima
V.1quoted
footnote.
50)Avicenna,
De anima
80.Albertus
, V.l,ed.Rahman,
208,ed.VanRiet,
mayalsohavebeen
inDeanima,
autem
declarabitur
64-65:"Postea
1.4,ed.VanRiet,
inspired
bya similar
passage
tibiquodanima
unaestexquadefluunt
inmembra".
haevires

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[23] 245

Albertusreplieswiththe dictum,borrowedfrom
partsdie withthe body.51
substancefromwhichemaAvicenna,thatthehumansoulis an incorruptible
natesomepowerswhichoperatewithoutbodilyorgans.Corruptionconcerns
organsonly,notthesoul.52
Avicennasdistinction
betweenorganicand non-organic
powerstherefore
enablesAlbertusto remedya weaknessof his position.Albertussolvesthe
bymakingthe
problemthatthesamesubstanceappearsmortaland immortal
soul essentially
one, fromwhichflowdiversepowers,someofwhichsurvive
thedeathof thebody,whereastheorganicpowersdie. Thisseemsan elegant
wayto deal withtheproblemwhichAristotle
posesin De animaII. 1, where
he says:"Yetsomepartsofthesoulmaybe separable,becausetheyarenotthe
to theAvicennianactualitiesof anybodyat all" (4l3a5-7). The alternative
Albertinian
solutionwouldbe to saythatthesubstanceoftherationalpartis
and senwhereasthesubstanceofthevegetative
separately,
capableofexisting
sitivepartsis notseparable.This,however,
jeopardizestheunityofthesoul.
who
The otherimportant
ArabicsourceforAlbertus'positionis Averroes,
as a source
influenced
theLatinunityversusplurality
debateinseveralrespects,
in hisownright.In hisLong
on Platos viewson theissueand as a philosopher
divion
De
anima
Averroes
thePlatonictripartite
1.90,
presents
Commentary
ofthepluralist
sionofthesoul in sucha waythatPlatoappearsa protagonist
doctrine:"theintellective
partis in thebrain,thedesiring
partin theheart,the
of the thirteenth
Some Latin commentators
partin the liver."53
nourishing
thesis
of
the
with
the
Platonic
centurysympathize
compositenatureof the
them
of
Buckfleld.54
The quotaAdam
soulas formulated
byAverroes,
among
thusbecamean important
sourceforthepluralist
tionfromAverroes
camp.55
51)Albertus
denMenschen
De homine,
, 88:"Rei
1,90b,ber
qu.7,a. 1,sedcontra
Magnus,
rationessentia
etsubstantia;
sedsolaanima
etincorruptibilis
esteadem
numquam
corruptibilis
estearum
substantia
una".
vero
alisincorruptibilis
est,ceterae
corruptibiles;
ergonumquam
52)Albertus
ad1,94a.
ibid.,
Magnus,
53)Averroes
inAristotle's
De anima1.5:"Someholdthatthesoulis
comments
ona sentence
De anima,
comm.
Commentarium
divisible"
1.90,121:"Innuit
(4llb5-7).Averroes,
magnum
incorpore
divisionem
dividitur
secundum
Platonem,
quodanimaessentialiter
quiopinatur
in
non
communicatur
inquibus
sua
s
actiones
diversas
et
membrorum
membro,
aliquo
quod
agit
in
incordetantum
etnutriens
etdesiderans
itaquodparsintelligens
estincerebro
tantum
epate".
54)Callus,
"TwoEarly
Oxford
419-420.
Masters",
55)On theconsequences
fortheWestern
Hasse,"Plato
imageofPlato,seeDag Nikolaus
- Wisdom
- Occult
inThe
Platonic
Tradition
Literature
Arabico-Latinus:
Sciences",
Philosophy
Hoenen
& New
A Doxographic
& M.J.F.M.
intheMiddle
ed.S. Gersh
(Berlin
Ages:
Approach,
York,
2002),31-65,
esp.34-45.

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46 (2008)232-252
D.N.Hasse/Vivarium

Platoin hislater
AlbertusadoptsAverroes'
pictureof Platowhenhe criticizes
ofthelocalizationthesis.56
De animaforbeingtheoriginator
thesis.
forsupporting
theplurality
Averroes
Albertus
directly
Magnusattacks
in
"Therefore
As he saysin De hornin-,
manyhavebeen erroron thisissue,the
who saysthat[Aristode
first
ofwhomis thecommentator
himself,
Averroes,
s]
It
that
in
and
is
clear
fits
the
terms
of
the
soul
definition
[of soul]
prior posterior.
in man,whichis
thisis onlytrueifwe assumethattherewerethreeperfections
thatAlbertuslaterin De
In viewof this,it comesas a surprise
impossible."57
"Averroes
a
of
the
thesis:
Averroes
as
homine
unity
saysin this
supporter
quotes
that
itperforms
is
to
substance
and
that
the
soul
one
according
verycommentary
be explained?
Can thisdiscrepancy
different
different
actsthrough
powers."58
on De
The latterquotationdrawson a passagein the Long Commentary
Plato
contrasts
PlatosandAristodes
anima1.7,whereAverroes
places
positions:
thinks
thethreepowersofthesoul in brain,heartand liver,whereasAristotle
et
thattheyareone in subjectand manywithrespectto powers:unamsubiecto
Averroes
assumed
that
would
secundum
vir
tut
es?9
Albertus
always
rightly
plures
sidewithAristotle
againstPlato,and hencewithunityagainstplurality.
a pluralist,
comesfroma pasThe former
quotation,whichmakesAverroes
s
remark
that
the
nutritive
Averroes
comments
on
Aristotle
where
power
sage
in thesquare
is
as
the
contained
is containedin thesensory
powerjust
triangle
{De anima II.3, 4l4b28-30). Averroes
explainsthatthisoughtto be underThe priorfigure,
thetriangle,
exists
to priorand posterior":
stood"according
likewise
the
earlier
nutritive
in
the
later
the
and
does
potentially
figure, square,
in the latersensorypower.60
Albertussuspectsthat
powerexistpotentially
Averroesis advocatinga pluralistpositionin the footstepsof the abovementionedargumentfromAristotle
s De generatoneanimaliumthatin the
56)Albertus
in
ofa similar
De anima
, lib.I, tr.2,cap.15,58.I amnotaware
passage
Magnus,
beiAlbertus
Eine
"Dieplatonische
Tradition
De homine.
Cf.Hendryk
Anzulewicz,
Magnus.
& M.J.F.M.
in ThePlatonic
Tradition
intheMiddle
, ed.S. Gersh
Hoenen,
Ages
Hinfhrung",
207-277,
esp.258-259.
57)Albertus
De homine
denMenschen
, 64-66:"Undehie
, qu.4,a. 1, ad7,35a,ber
Magnus,
sunt
estipsecommentator
Averroes,
quidicit
quodhaecdiffiniquorum
primus
decepti
plurimi
nisi
inhomine
etposterius
animae.
non
esse
verum
tioperprius
Quod
aptatur
patet
poneremus
tres
esseperfectiones,
est".
quodimpossibile
58)Albertus
incommento
denMenschen,
88:"Averroes
Dehomine,
qu.7,a. 1,90b,ber
Magnus,
etdiversa
virtutibus".
ibidem
dicit
estunasecundum
substantiam
quodanima
agitdiversis
59)Averroes,
enim
Commentarium
Deanima
dicebat
, comm.
1.7,10:"Plato
quodvirmagnum
incorde,
inepate.
etconcupiscibilis
etnaturalis,
scilicet
tusintelligibilis
estincerebro,
nutritiva,
subiecto
etplures
secundum
virtutes."
Aristoteles
autem
easesseunam
opinatur
60)Averroes,
infiguris
comm.
enim
invenitur
etposte176:"Quemadmodum
ibid.,
11.31,
prius
inposteriori,
existit
inpotentia
itaestdevirtutibus
animae."
riusetprius

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46 (2008)232-252

[25] 247

embryothe vegetative
precedesthe sensitiveand the sensitiveprecedesthe
intellective
ofperfections.
soul,withtheconsequenceofa plurality
ButAverroes
In hiscommenton the
does notadoptthislineofargument.
ofthesouland
definition
triangle
passage,he arguesthatthereis one universal
severalspecialdefinitions
ofeachofthepowersofthesoul.AsAverroes
explains
in hisMiddleCommentary
onDe anima(nottranslated
intoLatin),thegeneral
definition
ofthesoulis notpredicated
ofall faculties
ofthesoul:"It
univocally
one in respectto priority
forsomeperfections
of
and posteriority,
is, rather,
thesouls faculties
existpriorto others".61
Thatiswhythedefinition
ofthesoul
is analogousto thedefinition
ofa figure
to
suchas thesquare.It is important
notethatAverroes
does notspeakofseveralperfections
ofthesoul itselfor of
In bothcommentaries,
severalsubstances.
he contrasts
thegeneraldefinition
of the
of the soul withthe specialdefinition
(or perfection)
(or perfection)
faculties.
The first
definition
is one, thesecondis manyand orderedin terms
a pluralist
of
ofpriorand posterior.
ThuswhilethesepassagesmakeAverroes
him
not
make
a
of
souls
or
substances.
do
faculties,
they
yet
pluralist
ofAverroes
shows.In thelater
Butotherpassagesdo, as thelaterreception
Averroes
was invokedas an authority
Middle Ages and in the Renaissance,
The advocatesof
bothforand againstplurality,
as EmilyMichaelhasshown.62
claims
orbis
where
Averroes
theunitythesiscitea passagefromDe substantia
,
thatitis impossiblethatone subjecthas morethanone form;a formcan only
be replacedif the previousformis destroyed.63
Those who favourplurality,
suchas Williamde la Mare and RichardofMiddleton,quotea passagefrom
ontheMetaphysics
VIII. 10 on theconceptofan "ultimate
theLongCommentary
form.64
theultimate
form":
theunityofthecompoundis realizedonlythrough
61)Averroes,
Talhs
kitb
Middle
onAristotelis
De Anima:
, ed.A.L.Ivry
an-nafi
Commentary
Utah,
2002).
(Provo,
62)Emily
ofForms",
Franciscan
Studies
"Averroes
andthePlurality
52(1992),155-182.
Michael,
' deAverroes
63)Averroes,
Comentario
al 'Desubstantia
orbis
De substantia
orbis
, ed.M.Alonso,
haberet
deToledo
formam,
1941),60:"Sienim
(Aristotelismo
(Madrid,
yAverroismo)
porAlvaro
habere
nisiunumsubiectum
Unamenimformam
nullam
aliamreciperet
nisiilladestructa.
160:"unum
inMichael,
'Averroes
andthePlurality
ofForms',
est"(cf.thewording
impossibile
"AristoCf.Arthur
habere
formam
estimpossibile").
enim
subiectum
Hyman,
plusquamunam
in
s andAverroes'
Form'
tle's'First
Matter'
andAvicenna
",
'Corporeal
Harry
Austryn
Wolfion
Volume
, 3 vols(Jerusalem,
1965),1:385-406,
Jubilee
esp.404.
64)Averroes,
onthe
Arabic
ed.M.Bouyges,
19383 vols.(Beirut,
Long
Commentary
Metaphysics,
inAristotle/Averroes,
omnia
Aristotelis
48),VIII.10,1067,Latinedition
Stagirite
quaeextant
libri(Venice,
inlogica,
etmedicina
. . . commentami
philosophia
aliique
ipsius
opera Averrois.
"Nosautem
a. M.,1962),vol.8,f.218rb:
dicimus
1562),repr.
(Frankfurt
quod
quodunum
formam
et
scilicet
definitio
una,estunum
perultimam
persubstantiam
queestforma,
significat
de
inRoberto
Richard
differentiam."
Cf.Richard
ofMiddleton's
discussion
ultimam
Zavalloni,

15:36:58 PM

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D.N. Hasse/Vivarium
46 (2008)232-252

These authorsunderstandthe De substantiaorbispassagedifferently:

they
has
that
Averroes
here
refers
to
the
which
to
be
form,
only
complete
argue
when
another
form
arrives.65
destroyed
The pluralists
havea point:Averroes
in two
teachesa plurality
apparently
senses.First,withrespectto theformsoftheelements,
he arguesthattheeleformsarecontainedin the"composedform"( sramurakkaba,
mentary
forma
but in a diminishedway,whichis possible
) of the compound,66
composita
- this
sincetheelementary
formsarenotsubstantial
formsin thefullsense67
is Averroes'
well-known
and remission
of elementary
theoryof theintention
forms.68
with
to
and
individual
Averroes
teaches
Second,
forms,
respect generic
thatmatter"first
receivestheformof thegenus,receiving
later,throughthe
of
the
form
of
the
all
other
forms
intermediary
genus,
up to theindividual
forms".69
Thelastformto be receivedis theso-called"ultimate
form".
Averroes
not
does
sayclearlywhethertheformspriorto theultimateformremainin
In viewofhisparalleltheoryofelementary
thematteror aredestroyed.
forms,
it is possiblethathe thoughtthattheultimateformunitesall previousforms
withouttheirbeingdestroyed.
In viewofthis,itisnotsurprising
inDe homine
thatAlbertus
Averroes
presents
bothas supporter
andopponentoftheplurality
thesis.
Averroes'
on the
teaching
issueallowsforbothinterpretations.
Note thatAverroes
himself
doesnotlink
thediscussionofthesouls unityto hisintellect
becausehis
theory,
presumably
- which,famously,
intellecttheory
makesthe materialintellectone forall
Mediavilla
etla controverse
surlapluralit
desformes.
Textes
indits
ettude
(Louvain,
critique
1951),144.
65)See Richard
of Middleton,
De gradu
Richard
de Mediavilla
, in: Zavalloni,
,
formarum
Richard
"Exhissatis
concludes:
ut
non
fuit
intendo
Commenta153-154.
videtur,
quod
patet,
toris
esset
unaforma
substantial
tantum".
quodinquolibet
composito
66)Averroes,
onMetaphysics
, XII.22,ed.Bouyges,
1520,Latined.of1562,
LongCommentary
f.308ra,
IbnRushd's
A Translation
with
Introduction
Engl.tr.Charles
Genequand,
Metaphysics:
of
IbnRushd's
on
Aristotle's
Book
Lm
Thecon118-119.
(Leiden,
1986),
Commentary
Metaphysics,
form"
alsoinAverroes'
onthe
Latin
edition
ceptof"composed
appears
Long
Commentary
Physics,
inAristotle/Averroes,
Aristotelis
omnia
. . . Averrois.
. . . commentarii
Stagirite
quaeextant
opera.
inlogica,
etmedicina
libri
a.M.,1962),
(Venice,
1562),
(Frankfurt
aliique
ipsius
philosopha
repr.
voi.4, f.6rb:"Queenimsuntpreter
materiam
et
ultimam
formam
cuiuslibet
rerum
primam
naturalium
suntmaterie
etforme
composite
composite".
67)Averroes,
Commentum
libro
De cebetmundo
ed.E J.Carmody
&
Aristotelis,
magnum
super
R.Arnzen
(Leuven,
2003),III.67,634-635.
68)Thistheory
hada significant
influence
onlatemedieval
scholastic
seeAnneliese
philosophy;
AnderGrenze
vonScholastik
undNaturwissenschaft:
Studien
zurNaturphilosophie
des14.
Maier,
(Rome,
1952).
Jahrhunderts
69)Averroes,
ontheMetaphysics,
1.17, ed.Bouyges,
97,Latined.of1562,
LongCommentary
f.I4vb.

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46 (2008)232-252

[27] 249

- is an epistemological
humanbeings
theoryin thefirst
place.ThomasAquinascriticized
Averroes
forturning
thematerial
intellect
intoa substance
which
cannotbe theformofthebody,withdetrimental
for
the
unity
consequences
ofthesoul.Butit is notclearwhether
Averroes
abandonedtheconceptofthe
unityofthesouls substancewhendevelopinghisintellect
theory.70
5. Conclusion
The first
an interpretation
ofAlbertus'theoryof
partof thispaperpresented
of
thesoul,as developedin his earlywritings,
thesecondpartan assessment
his debtto theArabicphilosophers
Ibn Gabirol,Averroes
and Avicenna.We
forAlbertus:
have seen thatIbn Gabirolservedas an importantadversary
Albertustracesthe doctrineof universalhylomorphism
to its source,Ibn
GabirolsFonsvitae, rejectsit and distinguishes
insteadbetweena quo estand
a quodestin thesoul.
In Albertus'
ofthe 1240s,Averroes
is notyetperceivedas a philowritings
is important
for
of
the
same
rank
as
Aristotle
or
Avicenna.
ButAverroes
sopher
thatthepartsofthesoulare
as thesourceofthePlatonictheory
Albertus,
first,
and
localizedin different
organs,and,second,in thedoubleroleas supporter
alsoas opponentofAlbertus'
positionthatthereis onlyone substancein man.
It has emergedthatcentraltenetsofAlbertus'earlytheoryof thesoul are
thesisthattheArismuchinfluenced
byAvicenna.AlbertusadoptsAvicenna's
does not pertainto the soul's
toteliandefinition
of the soul as perfection
and he sharesAvicenna'scontentionthat
essence,but only to its activity,
of theessenceof thesoul.Albertusdraws
"form"is an inadequatedefinition
Avicenna
when
he
tries
to
definethesoul'srelationto thefaculties.
againon
and
betweenthesoulas a substance
WithoutAvicenna's
distinction
ontological
in avoidingsomesortofpluitspowers,Albertuswouldhavehad difficulties
a mortaland an immortal
thesisin orderto distinguish
partofthesoul.
rality
traditionof Peripatetic
Albertusthus continuesa Greek-Arabic-Latin
Aristotelian
the
This
tradition
theoryof the soul, but
accepts
philosophy.
in
a
that
it
becomes
Aristotle's
compatiblewiththe
vocabulary way
interprets
from
the
of
the
soul
body.
separability
of the soul is clearlya Neoplatonic
The insistenceupon the separability
It is trueto saythatPhiloponos,Avicennaand Albertusdo not
inheritance.
70)Cf.Herbert
"Averroes
didnot
Thomas'
A. Davidsons
defense
ofAverroes
critique:
against
A.Davidson,
Avithematerial
intellect
isnotmansform"
(Herbert
Alfarabi,
saythat
explicitly
Active
andTheories
Their
Theories
andAverroes,
onIntellect:
Intellect,
cenna,
of
Cosmologies,
ofthe
& Oxford,
Human
Intellect
1992),300-302).
(NewYork

15:36:58 PM

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46 (2008)232-252
D.N.Hasse/Vivarium

s definition
of the term"actuality"
followAristotle
) when they
(<entelecheia
with"activities"
and whentheydisassociate
the
associatetheterm"actuality"
term"actuality"
fromtheterm"form".
follow
Aristotle
However,theyclosely
of thesoul or of theintelon all thosepassageswhichstresstheseparability
lect- passagesthataredownplayed
who emphabyotherreadersofAristotle
size his hylomorphism.71
It would therefore
be a one-sidedsimplification
to
that
Avicenna
and
Albertus
deviate
from
Aristotle's
say
theoryof
Philoponos,
thesoul.The basisofa separabilist
ofAristode
is in hisverytexts.
interpretation

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Physics
Stagirite
omnia
- Averrois.
. . . commentarii
inlogica
et
, philosophia
quaeextant
opera
aliiqueipsius
medicina
libri
a. M.,1962),
vol.4.
(Venice,
1562),repr.
(Frankfurt
ontheMetaphysics
inAristode/Averroes,
edition
Aristotelis
Sta, LongCommentary
, Latin
omnia
extant
Averrois.
.
.
.
commentarii
in
et
girite quae
opera
aliique
ipsiuslogica,
philosophia
medicina
libri
a. M.,1962),
vol.8.
(Venice,
1562),repr.
(Frankfurt
71)Thispoint
isalsomade
Avicennas
hesupports
itwith
a list
94-96;
byWisnovsky,
Metaphysics,
ofAristotelian
theseparability
408b18-19,4l3a3-9,
429a22-25,
(Deanima
passages
stressing
De partibus
animalium
De generatione
animalium
64la32-64lbl0,
736b28-30,
Metaphysics
Themodern
ofAristode
s position
thesoul1026a5-6,
1070a24-26).
understanding
concerning
relation
isfarfrom
unanimous.
Fora survey
ofcontemporary
of
Aristotle's
body
interpretations
ofthesoulinterms
ofmaterialism,
dualism,
functionalism,
theory
psychophysical
supervenienceoremergentism,
seeVictor
s Psychology"
inThe
"Aristode
Blackwell
to
Caston,
Companion
Ancient
ed.M.L.Gill& P.Pellegrin
(Oxford,
2006),316-46.
Philosophy,

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ontheMetaphysics,
Arabic
ed.M. Bouyges,
3 vols.(Beirut,
, Long
1938-48).
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orbis
Comentario
al 'Desubstantia
orbis'
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, Desubstantia
, ed.M.Alonso,
(Aristotelismo
deToledo
(Madrid,
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yAverroismo)
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Commentarium
inAristotelis
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, ed.F.S. Crawford
magnum
(Cambridge,
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(Provo,
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Bernardo
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ge64 (1997),
95-126.
andNeoplatonism
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Henry
interpretations
oftheDeanima
(London,
1996).
ontheProblem
ofthePlurality
ofForms:
Adam
Daniel
Oxford
Masters
Callus,
A.,"TwoEarly
- Richard
42 (1939),
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Revue
dePhilosophie
ofBuckfield
Rufiis
Noscolastique
411-445.
d'tudes
dephiofJohn
'OntheSoul' inAutour
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Blund
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ancienne
etmdivale
Monseigneur
471-495.
(Louvain,
1955),
losophie
offert
24 (1961),257-285.
oftheUnity
ofForm",
TheThomist
oftheProblem
, "TheOrigins
inTheBlackwell
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toAncient
, ed.
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Companion
Psychology",
M.L.Gill& P.Pellegrin
2006),316-46.
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C., TheProblem
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Avicenna,
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Cosmologies,
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andTheories
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Intellect
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(New
1992).
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andPhilosophy
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ed.E. N.Zalta
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Lm(Leiden,
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Philosophy
Ages
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oftheSoul",The
of
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LennEvan,"ANoteonAvicenna's
Goodman,
Substantiality
Theory
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n.s.I,4 (1969),547-554.
Philosophical
TheGreek
OrthoontheSeparability
oftheIntellect",
andAvicenna
Gutas,
Dimitri,
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the
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repr.
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(Ashgate,
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andtheGreek
Commentatorial
Glosses
onDeanima
Tradition",
, "Avicenna's
Marginal
&
inGreek,
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andLatinCommentaries
Science
andExegesis
, ed.P.Adamson
Philosophy,
2 vols.(London,
H. Baltussen
& M.W.F.
Stone,
2004),2: 77-88.

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vondenvierIntellekten
vondenarabi"DasLehrstck
Hasse,
DagNikolaus,
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et
mdivales
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bis
zu
Albertus
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Thologie
Philosophie
Magnus'*,
(1999),21-77.
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inthe
Latin
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ofthe
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in The
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, "PlatoArabico-Latinus:
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ed.
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Hoenen
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derhylomorphen
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13.Jahrhundert,
(Breslau,
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derSeele
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zuihren
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(Berlin
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The
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& Shields,
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(Boulder,
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Philoponos,
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P.J.
Onthesoul2.1-6,transi.
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Alberts
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"
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, Tntellectus
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Avicebron.
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Zavalloni,
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critique

15:36:58 PM

{}'i*v
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)253-274

lhe
Mental

Inner Cathedral:

Architecture

in High Scholasticism

PeterKing
University
ofToronto
Abstract
wasa "faculty
a confederation
ofsemiMediaeval
theory
psychological
psychology":
autonomous
theinteraction
ofwhichconstitutes
ourpsychologisub-personal
agents,
thatis,thewill.On what
calexperience.
One suchfaculty
wasintellective
appetite,
a brief
ofAristotle's
wasthewilltakento be a distinct
After
survey
faculty?
grounds
I lookinsomedetailatthe
foridentifying
mental
criteria
anddistinguishing
faculties,
mainstream
mediaeval
view,givenclearexpression
byThomasAquinas,andthenat
with
thedissenting
viewsofJohnDunsScotusandWilliamofOckham.I conclude
onwhythemainstream
somereflections
mediaeval
viewwasdiscarded
byDescartes.
Keywords
Ockham
medieval
will,mental
faculties,
Scotus,
Aquinas,
psychology,
1. Introduction
ofmindis muchconcernedwithissuespertaining
Contemporary
philosophy
- describinghow mentalprocessesare organized,
to "mentalarchitecture"
by identifying
typically
subpersonalfunctionalmechanismswhichcausally
of a mentalrepresentation,
oftenthroughtheintermediary
interact,
thereby
internal
mental
mechanisms
rise
to
Such
phenomena.
giving
psychological
if
can be quitelow-leveland operatewitha degreeof relativeindependence;
A
ofmentalactivity.
"modules"or minimalcentres
so,theymaybe considered
moduleor a setofmodulesmaybe specificto a givendomainofphenomena,
visualdata.The wayin whicha setof mentalmodulesis
e.g. onlyprocessing
structure
to "inner
makes
the
architecture
of the mind,offering
arrayed
up
articulation
of the mindoffers
psychological
space".The detailedstructural
realmofthemental.
theories
sometraction
on theslippery
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
Leiden,
NV,

1
DOI:10.1
163/156853408X36091

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254 [32]

P.King/Vivarium
46 (2008)253-274

Mediaevalphilosophy
ofmindwas likewiseconcernedwithissuespertainin muchthe same way and formuchthe same
to
mental
architecture,
ing
reasons:sub-personal
functional
mechanisms
areidentified
and organizedinto
thesefaculties
suchthatone reducesanotherfrom
faculties;
causallyinteract
to
the
of a mentalrepresentation
act,
potency
perhapsthrough intermediary
a
s
rise
to
(called pedes),thereby
phenomena.Thesefaculgiving
psychological
tiesoperatewitha degreeofrelative
as
independence, centresofmentalactivof
ity,each concernedwithitsown domainofphenomena.The arrangement
thesefacultiesmakesup thementalarchitecture
of humanbeingsas understoodin theperiodofHigh Scholasticism.
In factthis
Suchmediaevalmentalarchitecture
hasa greatdealofstructure.
bit of architecture,
looks
like
so
as
a
much
vastinner
appropriately,
nothing
as
cathedral.
our
a
hike
the
nave
of
the
up
TakingAquinas
guide, long
vegetativesoul, withits fundamental
drivesand urges,bringsus to the realmof
proper:thecentralareain whichthe"space"is partitioned
bytwo
psychology
- on theone handa distinction
distinctions
thatcriss-cross
betweentheclusterof principlesand capacitiesthataccountformovementand sensation,
knownas thesensitive
and capacpartofthesoul,and theclusterofprinciples
itiesthataccountforthoughtand volition,knownas theintellective
partof
the soul; on the otherhand a distinction
betweenthe apparatusof powers
abouttheworldis acquiredand assimilated,
knownas
wherebyinformation
thecognitive
or apprehensive
and theapparatusofpowerswhereby
potencies,
one engagestheworld,knownas theappetitive
potencies.Each regionofthis
"innercathedral"is markedoffby theintersection
of thesedistinctions
and
coversa specificand uniquedomainof psychological
withfaculexperience,
tiesapportioned
as follows:
sensitive
whichincludesthe
, betterknownas sense-perception,
cognition
five"outersenses"(sight,smell,hearing,touch,taste)as well as "inner
sense"(thecommonsenseand perhapsimagination
and memory)
intellective
is
the
of
domain
intellect
or
reason,the faculty
cognition
behindthe operationsof thinking(concepts),judging(propositions),
and ratiocination,
withtheoretical
and practicalsides;it is therealmof
thesubordinate
oftheagentintellect
faculties
and thepossibleintellect
sensitive
includes
the
emotions
), dividedintotheconappetite
(passiones
and
the
each
several
kindsof emotions
irascible,
cupiscible
comprising
and actingsemiautonomously
intellective
is thedomainofthewill,whichis thefaculty
ofvoliappetite
tion,decision,choice,and action

15:37:07 PM

P.King/Vivarium
46 (2008)253-274

[33] 255

Each regionis the focusof intensestudy,leadingto a wealthof detailed

theorythatis oftenuniqueto a givenmentalregion.In addipsychological
the
interaction
ofthedifferent
tion,
amongthefaculties
regionsneedsclarifiwith
link
cation,
specialattention
beingpaid to threecases:the"transductive"
betweensensitive
and intellective
the
influence
of
on
the
emotions
cognition;
theintellect
and conversely;
and therelative
and
of
intelstanding autonomy
lectand will.
In whatfollowsTil use a particular
question,one thathas to do withthe
of
affective
as
a
autonomy
psychology, wayof raisinggeneralissuesaboutthe
mediaevalaccountof mentalarchitecture.
The particular
questionis roughly
this:Whatarethegrounds
thatthewillisa distinct
? To answer
forholding
faculty
thisquestionwe needto getstraight
abouthow to identify
facpsychological
ultiesas well as how to judge their(degreeof) distinctness.
Y11proceedas
follows.In 2 I'll talkaboutAristotle's
remarks
on thefoundations
of
sketchy
therawmaterials
forconstructing
theinnercathedral.
We'llfade
psychology,
in to themediaevalaccountaround1250 in 3, whereI discussAquinasat
somelengthas representative
ofwhatI'll callthe"mainstream"
viewofmental
In 4 I'll talkabout the dissentfromthe mainstream
architecture.
view by
Duns Scotusand Williamof Ockham.Scotussdissentis in theend minor,
but Ockhamsis not; he inaugurates
a radicalminority
tradition
opposedto
themainstream.
I'll
of
conclusion
offer
some
for
Byway
suggestions whythe
radicalminoritytraditioneventuallywon out and became the dominant
in theCartesianaccountofthemindca. 1650.
tradition
majority
2. Aristotleand FacultyPsychology
For Aristotle,
was a branchof naturalphilosophy,
the branch
"psychology"
with
whose
involves
alive.
Yet
little
of
the
natural
dealing
things
physis
being
in the
of
the
carries
over
to
as
found
philosophy (say)
Physics
psychology
De anima, apartfroma generalconcernwithmotionand the explanatory
makesa newbeginning,
workapparatusofthefourcauses.1Instead,Aristotle
his
"life"
definitions
of
and
accounts
of
senseing waythrough
physiological
in
Now
the
of
the
anima
Aristotle
course
De
there
are
three
perception.
things
and
does notdo thatareworthnoting.First,apartfroma fewprogrammatic
in De anima 1.1, Aristotle
remarks
doesn'toffermuchreflection
on
sketchy
makespsychology
a science,or the kindof scienceit is.
what,if anything,
1}HieDeanima
hasmuch
more
incommon
with
thebiological
works
that
follow
itthan
with
the"physical"
works
itinthetraditional
ofthecorpus.
preceding
arrangement

15:37:07 PM

256 [34]

46 (2008)253-274
P.King/Vivarium

an accountof themindin termsof faculties,

Second,he doesn'tput forward
of
its
he
does
speak
powersand capacities.Third,he doesn'thaveany
although
understoodit,namelya
clear-cutnotionof "will"as mediaevalphilosophers
ofvolition,choice,decision,and action.Thesethreeabsences
distinctfaculty
foreach passage
make two passagesin the De anima extremely
important,
a systematic
that
invite
on philosophical
raisesgeneralreflections
psychology
- in particular,
are
to
accountof mentalarchitecture
they open a "faculty"
and thesecondpassageseemsto suggest
ofmentalarchitecture,
interpretation
in
connection
withchoiceand decision,that
thefaculty
approachspecifically
in
the
case
of
the
will.
is,
whenAristode
concludeshis
Thefirst
passageislittlemorethana throwaway,
oflifein De anima2.2 (4 13b11-16) :2
oftheconstituent
elements
discussion
- principium
Forthepresent
letussayonlythis,
thatsoulistheprinciple
(arche
) ofthe
the
the
them
that
aforementioned
and
is
characterized
is,
by vegetative,sensiby
things
isa soulora partofa soul
Whether
eachofthese
theintellective,
andbymotion.
tive,
= anima
in
whether
itisseparable
morion
autparsanimai)
, andifa part
psuchs
(psuch
- some
=
alone
ofthese
arenothard
toknow,
account
things
(logiration) oralsoinplace
whereas
forsomethere
isdifficulty.
Aristotle
goeson to pointout thatthepowersand capacitiesofthesoul form
is assoforthetimebeing,nutrition
naturalclusters.
Puttingasidemovement
with
ciatedwiththevegetative
soul as foundin all livingthings,perception
thesensitive
soul in
soul foundin animals,and thoughtwiththeintellective
distinhumanbeings.Broadlyspeakingthesesoulsareorderedhierarchically,
intellective
the
classes
of
to
which
the
soul is
theybelong;
things
guishedby
perhapsseparable(4l3b24-27). Hence thereis some kindof realdifference
amongthevarious"parts"ofthesoul,andthispassageinDe anima2.2 became
of substantial
the locusclassicusforarguments
overthe unicityor plurality
form.Moreimportant
forourpurposes,though,is thefactthatAristotle
associatesa clusterofpsychological
powerswith"a soul or withpartofa soul"but he does not clearlysettletheissueof how thepowersare relatedto the
2)There
intheMiddle
were
three
Latin
versions
oftheDeanima
available
Theearliest
was
Ages.
in
ofVenice
andisknown
astheuetus,
itwascomposed
ca.1125-1
150,andisextant
byJames
as thealiatranslation
some144 manuscripts.
Thenext
wasbyMichael
Scotus
andisknown
in
ca.1220-1235,
insome62 manuscripts,
andextant
forthemostpartincluded
composed
Averros
s Great
on
the
"De
anima".
the
last
and
most
influential
translation
Finally,
Commentary
ofMoerbeke
asthenoua'itwascomposed
ca.1265-1268,
wasbyWilliam
andisknown
andis
extant
insome268manuscripts.
butwithaneyeto
Thetranslation
hereis from
theGreek
Moerbeke's
version.

15:37:07 PM

P.King/Vivarium
46 (2008)253-274

[35] 257

is thattheyare"parts"in somesense,a sense

souls,thoughtheclearsuggestion
read
mediaeval
thinkers
as a psychological
naturally by
faculty.
The secondpassageseesAristotle
returnto thedeferred
issueofmovement
and itsstandingin thesoul,De anima3.9 (432a18-b13):
Next
wemust
lookintowhat
itisofthesoulthat
movement:
whether
itisa part
produces
ofitseparate
either
inaccount
orinmagnitude,
orwhether
itisthewhole
soul;andifitis
a part,
whether
itisa partdifferent
from
those
described
oralready
mentioned
usually
by
itisoneofthem.
Theproblem
arises
ofhowwearetospeak
of
us,orwhether
immediately
=partes)
ofthesoulandhowmany
there
are.On theonehandthere
isan
(moria
"parts"
indefinite
number:
notonlythose[parts]
thatsomemention
in distinguishing
them,
theratiocinative
andpassionate
anddesiderative,3
orasothers
and
do,therational
namely
theirrational;
forinvirtue
ofthedifferentiae4
these
other
bywhich
they
separate
things,
- the
than
seem
tohavea greater
theoneswehavementioned
these,
parts
namely
disparity
which
both
to
and
to
all
the
which
cannot
animals; sensitive,
plants
vegetative, belongs
=
beclassed
aseither
irrational
orrational;
theimaginative
(tophantastikon
easily
yetagain
=
isdifferent
initsbeing
from
them
all(hotimen
einai
heteron
ywhich
fantastica)
pantn
abomnibus
altera
est
itisvery
difficult
tosaywith
which
ofthe
),while
quidem
quaeperesse
others
itisthesameorisnotthesameifonewere
topostulate
ofthesoul;in
separate
parts
tothese
addition
there
istheappetitive,
which
inaccount
different
and
is,onewould
think,
inpotentiality
from
allofthem.
itwould
beoutofplacetosplit
the
for
latter,
Surely
up
= uoluntas
there
iswishing
in
anddesire
andpassion5
(boulesis
[!])intheratiocinative
part,
theirrational;
andifthesoulisthreefold
there
willbeappetite
ineach.
Toturn
nowtothe
matter
athand,
what
isitthat
inrespect
ofplace?
moves
ananimal
Aristotle
beginsby askingaboutthesourcewithinthesoul of animalmovewhether
thesoulas a wholeis responment,whichis a matterofdetermining
ifnot,whichpartis responsible,
sibleformovement;
and how it is relatedto
otherpartsofthesoul.Thismethodological
pointleadshimto wondergenerwhat
a
about
of
the
soul
is.
Yet
rather
thantreatthequestionin full
ally
"part"
Aristotle
several
different
divisions
of thesoul: thePlagenerality,
compares
tonictripartite
analysis,therational/irrational
splitmobilizedin theNicomacheanEthics
earlierin theDe anima, namely
, andtheseriesofsoulsinvestigated
thevegetative
soul. Criteriafor
soul, the sensitivesoul, and the intellective
are
to
alluded
but
not
differentiae
parthood
by which [various
given("the
3)Here
theLatin
doesnotproperly
match
theGreek:
for
kaithumikon
kaiepithumtikon
,
logistikon
William
ofMoerbeke
hasrationatiuam
etirascibilem
etappetitiuam.
Seealsonote5.
4)"Differentiae":
tasdiaphoras
meant
here
but
(,differentiae
), likely
non-technically
byAristotle,
later
asa term
ofart.
interpreted
strictly
5)Again
there
isa mismatch:
forepithumia
kaihothumos
ofMoerbeke
hasconcupiscen,William
tiaetira.

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in
notesthedifficulty
thinkers]
separatethesethings"),and Aristotle
rightly
of
both
and
into
the
aforementioned
any
incorporating imagination appetite
to thematschemes.Withthathe abandonsthegeneralquestionand returns
terat hand.Threepointsto note.
like
notedin thefirst
movement,
First,thesuggestion
passageis reinforced:
In
that
to
the
the
case
stems
from
soul.
of
such
something belongs
perception,
features
the"something"
fundamental
belongingto thesoul is to be undercouldeasily
stoodas a partofthesoulactingas a principle.In short,Aristotle
to
account
for
be readas lookingfora psychological
movement,
faculty
though
he does notsayso in so manywords.
thatthesourceofanimalmovement
is foundin
Second,Aristotle
suggests
a
the appetitivepower.He therefore
sets
generally "appetite"(as principle)
whichlooksto thedistinction
betweencognitive
and affecagainstcognition,
tivepsychology
thatwillbe a leitmotiv
ofmediaevalphilosophy.
floatedtheidea thatone part
Third,recallthatin thefirst
passageAristotle
ofa soul can be distinctfromanotherin account.Herehe explicitly
saysthat
partscan differin accountor essencewithoutthatsettlingthe ontological
witha givenpartofthesoulor not;
theyareto be identified
questionwhether
in theworldanswersto parts
itis an openquestionwhether
real
difference
any
in definition.
differing
Thesetwopassagesin Aristotle
do not put forward
an accountof how to
If
a psychological
Aristotle
seemsto deliberately
construct
theory. anything,
refrain
fromgivingsuchan account.But thepassages,suggestive
as theyare,
withtherawmaterials
withwhichto construct
providedhismediaevalreaders
the
Lets fast-forward
a
built
lines
here.
theories,
implicit
psychological
along
and a halfto watchthemin action.
millennium

3. ThomasAquinas and theMainstreamView

Fade in on Aquinasis representative
of his generation
of scholasticthinkers.
Thedetailsofpresentation
arehis,butthepositionsketched
herecanbe found
in his teacherAlberttheGreat,his fellow-student
his renegade
Bonaventure,
Durand
of
Giles
of
of
Rome,Godfrey Fontaines,and
St.-Pourain,
disciple
in hiscommenmanyothers.6
AquinasdiscussesbothpassagesfromAristotle
6)SeePiusKiinzle,
DasVerhltnis
derSeele
zuihren
Potenzen:
Problemgeschichte
Untersuchungen
vonAugustin
bisundmitThomas
vonAquin(Freiburg,
ofviews
aboutthe
1956)fora survey
relation
ofthesoultoitspowers
itsfaculties)
from
toAquinas.
(andhence
Augustine

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[37] 259

tary,theSententialibride anima, and coversmuchthe same groundin his

Ia q.77
de animaq.l2 as well as in Summatheologiae
Quaestiones
disputatae
lucid.7
is exceptionally
art.1. As usual,hispresentation
De anima3.9, 432al8AquinasdiscussesthesecondpassagefromAristotle,
b13,in hisIn De anima3.8. He takestheopeningsentence,whereAristotle
raisesthequestionwhatthesourcein thesoul ofmovement
is,to layout the
it is a partof it
wholeagendaofAristotlessubsequentdiscussion:"whether
or whetherit is thewholesoul"
separateeitherin accountor in magnitude,
movement
is either(a) thewhole
of
choices:
the
three
principle
possible
gives
in
is
of
the
soul
that
a
soul; (b) part
separable magnitude;(c) a partofthesoul
thatis separablein account.
to be rejected,accordingto Aquinas,is (b). Aquinas
The firstalternative
'
as "in subject","as thePlatonistshold"
"in
interprets magnitude(megethei)
is
to
think
thatdistinct
Their
mistake
(239A16-18).
requiredistinct
principles
subjects,so thattherewouldbe at leasttwosoulsin a humanbeing,one that
thinksand senses,theotherthatfeelsand moves.Aquinasrejectsthismove
unities:thelifeof
becausehumanbeings,as indeedall animals,aresubstantial
which
is
to sayin Aristoas wellas perception,
an animalinvolvesmovement
tle'stermsthattheseprinciples
prinbelongto a singlesoul (thefundamental
does
it
What
then
soul".
cannot
mean
"distinct
of
Hence
life).8
"part"
ciple
arises."
mean?Thatis theproblemAristotle
says"immediately
ofAristotle's
secondpassageas addressedto
Aquinastreatstheremainder
thatproblem,in theformof a scholasticdebate:"Aristotle
pursuesthepoint
second
and
firstin the mannerof a disputation(,disputatio
),
by settlingthe
to first
takes
Aristotle
(239A26-29).Roughly,
Aquinas
question(determinatio)
threearguments
presentcandidatesfordivisionsofthesoul,and thento offer
has
to
be
that
movement
them,
explainedbypostulatthereby
proving
against
division,one thatencompassesboth desiresand wants- the
ing a different
the
and incorporates
"part"ofthesoul,a conceptionthatsupersedes
appetitive
of
the
s
divisions.But ratherthanfollowing
traditional
text,
Aquinas exegesis
with
we can getto hissolutionoftheproblemaboutpsychicpartsbystarting
hisfundamental
principles.
7)SeeDavidGallagher,
ontheWillasRational
"Thomas
Journal
oftheHisAppetite"
Aquinas
will
as
rational
account
of
the
of
for
a
29
559-584
study Aquinass
tory
ofPhilosophy(1991):
appetite.
8)Aquinas
form:
ofsubstantial
toestablish
theunicity
same
variant
ofthis
usesa close
argument
inthehuman
andthought
forperception
accounts
itmust
beoneandthesamesoulthat
being,
willnotbea substantial
thehuman
since
otherwise
unity.
being

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In Summatheologiae
Ia q.77 art.3,Aquinasgivesthetheoretical
background
involvesbotha passiveaspect(emoto his analysis.The souls "movement"
- something
thesoul
tion)and an activeaspect(choice).Thesearepotencies
is ableto experience,
wherethemodality
hereis interpreted
as roughly
akinto
themodernnotionsof an "ability"
or "capacity."
Thesemodernnotionscordistinction
respondto a fundamental
amongkindsof potencies:abilitiesto
activepotencies,capacitiesto passivepotencies.Activepotenciesenabletheir
whereaspassivepotenciesenabletheirpossessor
possessorto "do" something,
to "suffer"
Thisintuitive
senseis capturedin theidea
or "undergo"
something.
thatthereductionof a potencyto act9requiresa causeor explanation:those
is due to an internal
potencieswhoseactualization
principleareactivepotencies; thosepotencieswhoseactualizationis due to an externalprincipleare
betweenthem,buta unified
differences
passivepotencies.Therearesystematic
in
A
accountis nonetheless
brief
look
is
order.
possible.
so do thepotenciesthatareindiActshaveobjects(<obiecta
), and therefore
What is an "object"in thistechnicalsense?An acorn
viduatedby theacts.10
has an activepotencyforgrowth,
forabsorbingnutrients
fromthesurroundthemto upwardgrowth(stem,seedling,sapling ).
ingsoil and converting
Yettheacornspotencyis not forunlimitedgrowth.Oak treesstopgrowing
To reachthefull
whentheyreachtheiradultform,whichlimitstheirpotency.
of its
adultheightis the "goal"of theacorn,theculminationand terminus
cause of the acornsgrowth,
growth.Biochemicalprocessesare the efficient
whereasitsformaland finalcauseareitsend.Thisend is theobjectoftheact,
and hencethe objectof the acornspotencyforgrowth.The pointmaybe
summarized
as follows:
(oap) The objectofan activepotencyis theacts end.
Now considera passivepotency,such as waterscapacityto be heated.The
principleor causeand existsso
heatingofthewateroccursdue to an external
as
external
is
the
the
principle reducing potencyto act:thewaters capaclong
9)Actsarenottobeconfused
Thelatter
caseoftheformer,
with
actions.
area special
namely
realizations
ofpotencies
where
theprinciple
iswithin
theagent.
an act'isan
Strictly
speaking,
oractualization
ofa power,
someofthese
areactions.
andonly
actuality
10)Potencies
areindividuated
their
acts
because
andactsarenot
by
potencies
corresponding
ofdefinition:
thedivision
ofpotency
andactisa transcendental
ofbeing,
ona
division
capable
ofbeing
intothetencategories,
unable
tobecaptured
ina
andhence
parwiththedivision
iswhatmakes
definition
Yetbecause
actisprior
to
(which
hierarchy
possible).
genus-species
can
be
their
acts.
by corresponding
potency,
potencies distinguished

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[39] 261

ityto be heatedis actualizedbya fireso longas it actively

heatsup thewater.
The external
acts
as
the
formal
and
final
cause
of
the
of
actualization
principle
- its end.11As before,the end is the objectof the act.
the passivepotency
Hence theobjectofseeingis thethingseen;theobjectofbeingheatedis heat
(moreexactlybeinghot),whichis impartedby the fire.The pointmaybe
as follows:
summarized
(opp) The objectofa passivepotencyis theacts external
principle.
Actsarethemselves
thekind
bytheirobjects,whichdetermine
distinguished
ofactinquestion:"potencies
aredistinguished
inaccordance
withtheaccounts
(rationes
) oftheirobjects"(In De anima3.8 240B124-125).
Sincetheactuality
ofeitherkindofpotencyis defined,
and
(or realization)
henceindividuated,
to itsobject,thereareas manydistinct
byreference
potenciesas therearedistinct
Yetwe do notwantto identify
eachpotency
objects.12
forthesouls movement
as a principlethatis a distinctpartofthe
responsible
soul.Aquinastakesthisto be theproblemAristotle
diagnosesat thebeginning
ofthesecondpassage(In De anima3.8 L45.1, 239A38-B45):13

n) Inthis
casetheexternal
isalsotheefficient
causeofthepassive
reduction
principle
potency's
from
to
act.
The
efficient
cause
a
differ
from
itsformal
potency
passive
potency
may
actualizing
andfinal
however.
cause,
12)Following
Aristotle's
theendsofanactive
intoroughly
lead,Aquinas
distinguishes
potency
twokinds
Ethics
where
thegoaloftheactistheact
2.5and10.4):(a) activities,
(Nicomachean
suchasdancing
orwalking;
orachievements,
where
theendorcompleitself,
(b)performances
tionoftheactisthestate
that
obtains
atorafter
thetemporal
limit
oftheact,suchaswinning
theraceorbeing
married.
Bothactivities
andachievements
arekinds
ofactions.
Passive
potenareofa single
Since
theactuality
ofa passive
isan
cies,
(orrealization)
bycontrast,
type.
potency
actthat
isdefined
toanexternal
toopp,suchactsmust
therebyreference
principle,
according
fore
beoccurrent
states
ofthesubject:
theexternal
exercises
itsinfluence
onthesubject,
principle
a change
within
itinsomeway,
onewhich
so longas theexternal
causing
persists
principle
continues
toexercise
itsinfluence.
Thesubject
ofa passive
potency
maybeputintoa state
by
theexercise
ofa passive
that
after
thepotency
isnolonger
but
exercised,
potency
persists
being
thestate
isnotproperly
theexercise
ofthepassive
itisinstead
theresult
ofitsexercise.
potency;
Since
thepassive
isonly
actualized
theactsofpassive
potency
byanexternal
principle,
potencies
areexamples
ofwhat
thesubject
suffers
orundergoes.
arenotactions
butpassions.
They
13)"Dicitergoprimo
huiusinquisitionis
habetdubitationem
quoquodmoxinprincipio
modooporteat
et
partes
secundum
modum
animae,
sint,
quot
distinguere
quia
aliquem
viDENTUR
esseINFINITAE,
idestnonposse
subaliquocerto
ethocuerum
numero;
comprehendi
si singulis
animae
etmotibus
esset
attribuere
esset,
operationibus
quisuntab animanecesse
diuersas
animae."
partes

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Aristotle
first
ofallthat
immediately
atthebeginning
ofhisinvestigation
theproblem
says
arisesofhowweought
todistinguish
the"parts"
ofthesoulandhowmany
there
inonewaythereisan indefinite
that
are,since
number,
is,notabletobesummed
up
under
number.
Thiswould
betrue
ifitwere
toattribute
diverse
anydefinite
necessary
parts
ofthesoultoeachofthesouls operations
andmovements
from
thesoul.
stemming
- theapparendyendlessfragmentation
lhe properwayaroundthisdifficulty
ofthesoul- is to takeinspiration
fromAristotle
in De anima2.2 and
s remark
look not foreach proximatepotencyinvolvedin movementbut fortheir
on the"primary
principle.
underlying
Aquinasdoes thisbyfocussing
object"
ofthepotenciesforanimalmovement,
a notionwhichitselfrestson theidea
ofa "perseobject".
Somethingcountsas theperseobjectofa potencyifit is theproperobject
of thepotency.For instance,theperse objectof buildingis thehousethatis
built.The buildermayalso becomestrongthroughhis physicallabor,but
healthis notwhatbuildingis aboutbydefinition:
healthis onlyan incidental
or accidentalresultof construction.
could
takeplacewithoutany(Building
one becominghealthy,
but notwithoutsomething
gettingbuilt.)Thusperse
are
in
objects
particularitems the world,such as the newly-constructed
house.
The "primary
feature,
object"ofa potencyis themostgeneralnonrelational
orsetoffeatures,
in virtueofwhichitsperseobjectcountsas itsperseobject.14
The primary
themostgeneralcharacterization
objectofa potencyis therefore
that
counts
as
the
of
the
anything
object
potencycan fallunder;it is theconditionanyobjectmustsatisfy
in orderto be intelligible
as an objectof the
whether
the
be
potency,
potency activeorpassive.The primary
objectmustbe
sinceotherwise
itrisksbeingempty.
To saythatJonessvisionis
nonrelational,
actualizedbyanything
visibleis truebut trivial,
since"visible"is a relational
termthatmeans"ableto actualizethefaculty
ofvision."The primary
object
mustequallybe general:to saythatJonessees theblacknessof thecats fiir
in virtueofitsblacknessis truebutunhelpful,
sincewe can see gingercatsas
well as black ones. The most informative
of what
generalcharacterization
can be seen is colour(or morepreciselythecoloured
the
,
primaryobjectof
theprimary
isfigureratherthan,say,
sight.(Analogously,
objectofgeometry
.)
triangle
14)Thenotion
seems
derived
from
Aristotle's
discussion
ofcommensurate
inPosterior
subjects'
s terminology
isnotcompletely
I amusing
theaccep1.4,73b32-74a3.
stable;
Analytics
Aquinas
tedlater
ofthevocabulary.
He sometimes
callstheprimary
the'formal
regimentation
object
object'.

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[41] 263

shouldnow be evident.He identifies

a "part"ofthesoul
Aquinass strategy
as anypsychicprincipledefinedthroughitsprimary
object,whichhe callsa
In
of
for
allowsus
.
the
case
sensitive
faculty
cognition, example,thisstrategy
to identify
visionand hearingas independentfaculties.The primaryobject
of visionis thecoloured,and of hearingis toneand pitch;theseare clearly
distinct,sincewe can neithersee soundsnor hearcolours.Hence each is a
ofthesoul.
faculty
had in mindin
objectis whatAristotle
Accordingto Aquinas,theprimary
in De anima3.9, listedas (c) at thebeginning
histhirdalternative
ofthissection:a partofthesoulthatis separate"in account."In thecaseat hand,then,
powersis the
Aquinasdeclaresthattheprimary
objectofthevariouscognitive
of
the
various
true
, whereastheprimary
object
appetitive
powersis thegood
15
Ia
1
In
art.
ad
the
{Summatheologiae q.80
2).
particular, primary
objectofthe
sensitive
appetite,the
appetiteis thesensible
goodand thatof theintellective
Ia q.80 art.2).Thesediffer
as
will,is theimmaterial
good{Summatheologiae
the
sensitive
is
home
to
and
active
passive
principles:
appetite
passivepotenwhereasthe intellective
cies,the emotions,16
appetiteis home to the active
betweencogniterms,thedifference
potencythatis thewill.In contemporary
an
intensional
He sums
tivepsychology
and affective
is
difference.
psychology
in
in
his
on
De
anima
his
In
De
anima
view
2.3
2.5
up
pithily commenting
(L45.1, 87A1-9):17
Buta
ingeneral,
Aristotle
nowturns
togiving
anaccount
ofitsparts.
After
"soul"
defining
inthiswaytheparts
of
as itspotencies
arecalleditsparts;
soulhas"parts"
onlyinsofar
canbecalled
foreachofthem.
ofmany
capacities
Accordingly,
capable
things
something
ofeachofitspowers.
togiveanaccount
ofparts
ofthesoulistogiveanaccount

15)Remember,
hemeans
oftheappetite
isthe
when
theprimary
saysthat
object
Aquinas
good,
be
characterized
as
not
that
that
item
that
counts
as
an
of
must
any
object appetite
good,
goodthat
ofappetite.
nessitself
(whatever
maybe)istheobject
16)There
isgiven
Inkeeping
with
ofanyemotion
isa further
relevant
difference.
opp,thenature
ofthese
define
distinct
kinds
thesensible
asanobject
under
objects
falling
good.Thedifferentiae
and
desire
and
them.
Thus
the
ofpotencies
defined
hate,
(love
concupiscible
passions
through
taken
sensible
or
evil
and
have
the
common
aversion,
sorrow)
absolutely
primary
object
good
joy
havethecommon
confidence
andfear,
andtheirascible
pri(hopeanddespair,
anger)
passions
Iaq.81art.2).
asdifficult
orarduous
sensible
oreviltaken
(.Summa
mary
object
theologiae
good
17)"Postquam
incommuni,
de
animam
nuncaccedit
addeterminandum
Aristoteles
definiuit
eius
anima
nisi
secundum
eius
non
autem
habet
aliter
eius;
partes
quod
potentiae
partes
partibus
undedetermiadsingula;
alicuius
dicipossunt
multa,
dicuntur,
potestates
prout
potentis
partes
eius."
nare
animae
estdeterminare
desingulis
departibus
potentiis

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The description
ofthepsychological
faculties
spellsoutthe"partsofthesoul",
eachin itsowndomainofpsychological
phenomena.
Thatmightseemto settlethematter:
and affective
are
cognitive
psychology
thatit does not,fortwo interreTo his credit,Aquinasrecognizes
different.
distinclatedquestionshavenotyetbeenanswered.
First,whilean intensional
tionamongtheobjectsof potenciesmightbe enoughto showthattheyare
distinctqua potencies,thatdoes notyetsettletheissueabouttheontological
in thesoul.Second,Aquinashasyetto addressAristotle
s
standingoffaculties
alternative
(a) raisedin De anima3.9, namelywhetherthesourcein thesoul
is thewholesoul ratherthana part.
ofanimalmovement
Aquinasaddressesboth problemswitha singleresponse,presentedvariIa q77 art.l,In
on De anima2.2, Summatheologiae
ouslyin hiscommentary
de
anima
Sent. 1 d.3 q.4 art.2,and Quaestiones
q.l2. He underdisputatae
between
faculties
with an
writesthe intensionaldifference
psychological
extensional
difference
betweenthesouland itsfaculties,
and one faculty
from
whichhe
another.His avowedtargetis theviewthat"thesoul is itsfaculties,"
de animaq.l2, 108B131-142):18
expoundsas follows( Quaestiones
disputatae
Those
whoholdthat
thesoulisitsfaculties
that
thevery
essence
) haveinmind
{potentine
ofthesoulistheimmediate
ofallthesoulsoperations,
that
itisthrough
principle
claiming
ofthesoulthat
a human
ofthe
theessence
anddoesother
understands,
senses,
being
things
names
inlinewith
ofthese
andthat
itisreferred
tounder
diverse
thediversity
sort,
operainsofar
asitistheprinciple
ofsensing,
"intellect"
insofar
asitistheprinciple
tions:
"sense"
torefer
totheheatoffire
ofunderstanding,
andsoon- justasifwewere
asthe"melting
since
itdoesallthese
and"drying
power",
"heating
power",
power",
things.
The appeal of thisviewis obvious:"sinceit is one and thesame mindthat
thereseemsto be no advantagein regarding
the
wills,thatsenses,thatthinks,"
facultiesas separatepartsof themind.19The intensionaldifference
between
in
fact
neither
and
affective
be
nominal,
purely
cognitive
psychology
might
18)"Ponentes
sitsuaepotentiae,
hocintelligunt,
animae
sit
quodanima
quodipsaessentia
igitur
immediatum
omnium
dicentes
homo
essentiam
anianimae,
principium
operationum
quod
per
maeintelligit,
etaliahuiusmodi
etquodsecundum
diuersitatem
sentit,
operatur,
operationum
inquantum
diuersis
nominibus
nominatur:
sensus
estprincipium
intellectus
sentiendi,
quidem
inquantum
autem
estintelligendi
etsiedealiis;utpote
sicalorem
nominareprincipium,
ignis
muspotentiam
calefactiuam
etdessicatiuam,
quiahaecomnia
operatur."
liqufactiuam,
19)Descartes,
Meditations
6 (Adam-Tannery
etiam
facilitates
7,86):"Neque
uolendi,
sentiendi,
etc.eiuspartes
dicipossunt,
mens
estquaeuult,
quiaunaeteadem
quaesentit,
quae
intelligendi
intelligit."

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[43] 265

to nor in anyneed of a distinction

a parterei. But thisview
corresponding
is as follows.
doesn'twork,Aquinasdeclares.His reasoning
An agentcausesan effect
onlyto theextentthattheagentactuallyis or has
thefeatures
oftheeffect:
firedoesn'tcauseheatbecauseit shines,butbecause
in itselfit is actuallyhot.The principleof theactionand theactualeffect
are
"conformai"(<conformae
then
offers
a
causal
therefore
). Aquinas
principle
(109A152-155):20
When thatwhichan agentdoes doesn'tpertainto thesubstantial
beingof
thething,it is impossiblethattheprinciplebywhichit does it belongto the
essenceofthething.
naturalagentsin
theprinciplebyan exampleinvolving
Aquinasillustrates
but
His
is
not
entirely
perspicuous, perhapsa moments
generation. example
willmaketheprinciple
seem
reflection
on theconformality
ofcauseand effect
if
a
that
"doesn't
to
the
substanpertain
plausible: an agentbringsabout result
tialbeingofa thing,"thenthatresultmusthaverecourseto a formtheagent
theagentwould
essential
to theagent- forotherwise
possessesthatis notitself
be theperse cause of an accidentalresult,whichis not possible.Hence the
causalprinciplemusthold.And thisis all themoreclearforthesubjectsof
that
passivepotencies,since theydo not "suffer"
anythingnon-substantial
in
Once
we
have
the
causal
to
their
essence.
principle place,
properly
belongs
(109B192-110A209):21
Aquinasthinkshisconclusionfollowsdirectly
inrespect
of
active
orpassive,
arenotsaiddirectly
Itisclear
that
thesoulspowers,
whether
andtobe
tobeactually
substantial
butrather
accidental:
understanding
something
anything
that
theessence
arenotsubstantial
butaccidentalHenceitisclear
being
actually
sensing
ofitsoperations,
butitoperates
ofthesoulis nottheimmediate
mediately
principle
essence
ofthe
thesoulspowers
arenotthevery
accidental
principles.
Accordingly,
through
it.
of
soul,butproperties
iproprietates)
In Summatheologiae
la q.77 art.l Aquinasclarifies
(say)is not
whythinking
in the senseat issue:if thinkingor willingdid pertainto the
"substantial"
essenceofthesoul,thenmerelyin virtueofhavinga soulwe wouldbe always
20)"Quando
estquod
nonpertinet
ad essesubstantial
idquodagitur
rei,impossibile
igitur
essentia
rei."
sit
de
principium
quoagitur aliquid
21)"Manifestum
nondicuntur
siuepassiuae,
estautem
siuesintactiuae
animae,
quodpotentiae
uel
etesseintelligens
sedadaliquid
accidentale:
adaliquid
directe
substantial,
perrespectum
essenestigitur
sentiens
actunonestessesubstantial
sedaccidentaleManifestum
quodipsa
sedoperatur
mediantibus
immediatum
suarum
tiaanimae
nonestprincipium
operationum,
sedproprietatianimae
nonsunt
Undepotentiae
accidentalibus.
animae,
ipsaessentia
principiis
buseius."

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we arenot,and so thesemustnotbelongto
and willing;manifestly
thinking
between
thesouls essence.The upshot,then,is thatthereis a realdifference
thesoul and itsfaculties.22
mediaevalview:theminds mentalarchitecThis,then,is themainstream
of itsfaculties,
each of
tureconsistsin thearrangement
and interconnection
a
its
and
covers
which is definedintensionally
by
unique
primaryobject
domainof psychological
phenomena;thereis a realdifference
amongthese
severalfaculties,
as wellas betweenanypsychological
and thatofwhich
faculty
it is a faculty,
the
soul.
This
seems
to
have
been
the
dominant
viewin
namely
is
clear:
a
distinction
that
seems
borne
Scholasticism.
Its
appeal
High
strategic
in
betweencognitive
is underwritten
out experience
and affective
psychology
The soulis thefundamental
bymetaphysics.
subject,buttheeachpsychological faculty
waslicensedto operateas a sub-personal
locusofactivity
(bynature
connected
with
other
defined
and
faculties,
functionally
separable),causally
stream.
linkedin an input-output
4. Scotus and Ockham
For all itsvirtues,though,Aquinaslefttwo componentsof themainstream
viewunacceptably
metaphysically
vague:(a) whatkindofentity,
speaking,is
a psychological
betweenthe
(b) whatexacdydoesthe"realdifference"
faculty?
in hisanswers.Psysoul and itsfaculties
amountto?At best,Aquinaswaffles
faculties
are
a
word
he
from
AlberttheGreat;
"properties",
adopted
chological
it is vague enough to mean almost anything,and Aquinass arguments,
rehearsed
offaculties
as accidents,
sinceAquinasis
above,encouragethinking
at suchpainsto contrastthemwithessentialfeatures.23
As fortheirdistinctarenotthesameas thesoulin reality;
ness,allAquinasdoesis saythatfaculties
he leavesitopenhowthisis to be understood.
The usualconstrual
tookAqui22)Aquinas
forhisconclusion
offers
further
that
whereas
thesoulisa single
bynoting
support
and
faculties
must
bemultiple,
since
someareactive
(suchasintellect
principle,
psychological
arepassive
asperception
andemotion);
hence
must
stem
from
distinct
will)andsome
(such
they
"andsince
theessence
ofthesoulisa single
itthus
cannot
betheimmediate
principles:
principle,
ofallitsactions,
butmust
instead
haveseveral
diverse
faculties"
Since
(110A2
14-220).
principle
thisdepends
ontheclaimthatnothing
cansimultaneously
bethesource
ofbothactive
and
it
is
as
an
not
well-founded
acts,
passive though,
argument.
23)Including
totheessence."
takes
, which
technically
propria
"pertain
Aquinas
"proprietates"
from
Alberts
I d.3M (135),whousesittoexplain
Sent.
howAugustine
s triad
ofmemory,
intela unity:
"Iliaueratrianaturales
sunt
seuuires
lect,andwillaredistinct
yetform
proprietates
et
a
se
inuicem
differunt."
mentis,
ipsius

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P.King/Vivarium

[45] 267

thatis, to
betweenthesoul and itsfaculties,
nas to upholda realdistinction
of
the
maintainthatone was metaphysically
other,
separableby
independent
divinepowerat theleast.
on the latterscore.Henryof Ghent,for
Therewas some dissatisfaction
wererealrelational
faculties
that
instance,
aspectsofthe
psychological
argued
ratherthan
"intentional
distinction"
infamous
his
hence
distinct
and
soul,
by
But
the
3 q.l4).
( Quodlibets
positionwiththe
dissenting
bya realdistinction
was articulatedin the succeedinggenerationby JohnDuns
mostfollowers
2 d.16 q.un.
Scotus,who proposedthe followingaccountin his Reportatio
nn.17-19(WV 13, 43A-44A):24
isnot
thesoulanditsfaculties]
I saythat
"unitive
containment"
[ofthesort
characterizing
of
norisita feature
aren't
thesame,
sincethey
that
areentirely
a feature
ofitems
united;
butthose
items
their
hadbefore
remain
distinct
items
that
union;
they
bythedistinctness
orarethesamebyrealidentity
oneyetremain
that
arereally
distinct,
yetdistinct
formally
which
aren't
the
of
the
intellect
and
in
the
case
take
it
this
.
.
.
We
can
will,
way
formally.
were
in thesoulas though
contained
ofthesoulbutareunitively
essential
they
parts
- notthat
itsacts
thesoulisabletoperform
andaccording
towhich
itsattributes,25
they
the
arereally
andnevertheless
butareformally
arethesoul'sessence
distinct,
formally,
inthatnone
canevenbecalled"parts"
. . . The[faculties]
andunitively.
sameidentically
butonlypartial
oftheessence
thewhole
ofthem
them,
containing
perfection
expresses
[perfection].
distinctfrom
Scotusis proposingthatthesoul is not reallybut onlyformally
Thismightseemto explaintheobscurebythemoreobscure,but
itsfaculties.
it is notso bad as all that.The coreintuitionbehindScotussformaldistincin defidoes notentailidentity
thatexistential
tionis, roughly,
inseparability
the
a
fact
about
this
is
the
that
nition,backedup by conviction
waythingsare
Sinceformally
distinctitems
ratherthana matterofhowwe conceivethem.26
24)"Ideodicocontinentia
sunt
omnino
nonesteorumquae
unitua
idem,
quiailianonuniuntur;
sed
anteunionem;
distincta
ista
fiierunt
distinctione
manent
necesteorum
distincta,
qua
quae
idem
identitte
siuequaesunt
manent
tarnen
distincta
unum
reali,
formaliter,
realiter,
quaesunt
etuoluntate,
deintellectu
... Sicergopossumus
tarnen
formaliter.
distincta
quaenon
accipere
in
anima
contenta
sed
sunt
unitiue
essentiales
sunt
eius,
animae,
quasipassiones propter
partes
sedsuntformaliter
eiusformaliter,
nonquodsintessentia
estoperatiua,
distinctae,
quasanima
secundum
etiam
dicipartes,
etunitiue etpossunt
identice
idemtarnen
quodnulladicit
sedquasipartialem."
essentiae
totam
continentis,
perfectionem
25)"Attributes":
ofsomething
with
the
technical
here
,
truly
perse
predicable
meaning
passiones
ofbeing.
areattributes
and"good"
ofanother,
theway"one",
secundo
modo
"true",
26)Scotus
1 d.8p.l q.4nn.172-188;
inhisLectura
exprofesso
distinction
discusses
theformal
Parisian
andseveral
andd.8p.lq.4nn.191-217;
1d.2p.2qq.1-4nn.388-410
Ordinatio
lectures,

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areexistentially
theyarereallyidentical,in thesensejustdefined.
inseparable,
Hence theformaldistinction
onlyappliesto a singlerealthing.Now some
in theirdefinitions.
identical
items
differ
Moreprecisely,
may
theymay
really
in account[in ratione
of thestrictnotionof
differ
), whichis a generalization
or
Aristotelian
"definition":
an account,likea definition,
picksout thefeature
setoffeatures
thatmakesomething
to be whatit is,thoughit neednotdo so
All definitions
are accountsbut not conby genusand specificdifferentia.
that
thereareitemsthatlackdefinitions
versely:
yetdo havea setof features
makethemwhattheyare:thehighestgenera,potencies,thefourcauses,accidistincthave nondentalunities,and so on. Thus itemsthatare formally
or accounts,thatis,theaccountofone does notinclude
identicaldefinitions
thatof theother.Nevertheless,
theitemsthatareformally
distinctare comthathas themin sucha wayas to makeup a
binedtogether
intosomething
- "unitivecontainment".
Hence Scotuss positionis thatthepsychologiunity
cal faculties
ofintellect
and willarereallyidenticalwiththesoul,butformally
distinctfromone another,
sincewhatit is to be an intellect
does notinclude
thewill,and whatit is to be a willdoes notincludetheintellect.
Exactlyhow
thisworksout on themetaphysical
sideis a bitofa mystery,
buttheposition
is clearenough;it maintainsintensional
withextensional
difference
identity,
in
the
intensional
is
somehow.
difference
underwritten
reality
although
YetalthoughScotusexplicitly
arguesagainstAquinasat length(nn.3-10),
thedifference
betweentheirpositionsis, I think,minor.WhateverAquinas
have
arenotthesame
intended
may
bytheclaimthatthesouland itsfaculties
in reality,
itis clearhe thought
thatthereis somerealdifference
betweenthem.
in reality.
Scotuslikewisethinksthatthesouldiffers
fromitsfaculties
Indeed,
is not a "distinction
of reason"(a merelyconceptual
the formaldistinction
becauseit is basedin reality.
Thisis apparentfromScodistinction)
precisely
tuss description
of theformaldistinction.
For bothrealidentity
and definiWe discover
tionalnon-identity
areindependent
ofanyactivity
oftheintellect.
the accountsof thingsthroughthinking;
we do not therebycreatethem.27
Hence thedistinction
betweenformally
distinctitemsseemsto be presentin
theworld,notevenpartially
It is therefore
causedbytheintellect.
"real"in the
broadsense.Thatis sufficient
to be countedin themediaevalmainstream.
instudent
I willignore
here
thevexed
mostly
only
surviving
transcriptions
(reportationes).
question
about
whether
Scotus
hisaccount
oftheformal
distinction.
changed
27)Scotus
inOrdinario
makes
thispoint
1 d.8 p.l q.4n.193:"Furthermore,
thedefiexplicitly
nition
indicates
notonly
anaspect
that
iscaused
ofa thing;
formal
butthequiddity
bythemind,
istherefore
exparte
rei Seealsod.25q.un.n.10andhisQuaest.
inMetaph.
7 q.13
non-identity
nn.90-91.

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[47] 269

WilliamofOckhamdissentsfromthemainstream,
a minority
inaugurating
tradition
thatis radically
to
the
"real
difference"
tradition
opposed
represented
holdsthatthe
byAquinasand others(includingScotus).Ockhamexplicitly
He devoteshisReportatio
2 q.20 to the
souljustis itspsychological
faculties.
and
will
are
distinct
facul"whether
matter,
intellect,
memory,
really
asking
at lengththeviewsof ThomasAquinas,Henryof
ties";he statesand refutes
Ghent,and Duns Scotus,beforedeclaringhisopinion(435.4-8):28
I saythat
thefaculties
ofthesoulthat
wearespeaking
intelofinthecaseathand,
namely
lectandwill(I'mnottalking
about
thesensitive
willbea treatment
nowsince
there
powers
ofthem
arereally
thesameaseachother
andwith
theessence
ofthesoul.
later),
Ockhamenunciatesthisconclusionafterhis mind-numbing
detailedexaminationand refutation
ofthephilosophers
mentionedabove.Buthe doesoffer
somepositivegroundsforadoptinghisview.When he turnsto thestrongest
forthinking
thatthereis a realdifference
facargument
amongpsychological
that
distinct
must
from
distinct
ulties,namely
really
really
operations
proceed
and theoperationsofintellect
and willarereallydistinct(425.5-7),
faculties,
he beginshisreplywitha flourish
oftheRazor(444.2-8):29
Asfortheinitial
I saythat
sometimes
distinct
and
operations
require
principles
argument,
sometimes
do
not.
For
sensitive
and
intellective
a
distincinstance,
they
bespeak
cognition
tionbetween
sense
andintellect.
Butasfor
when
this
tobepostulated
andwhen
not,
ought
weshould
in
turn
backtoexperience
oranevident
Yetsinceneither
ispresent
argument.
thecaseofintellect
andwill],
a plurality
ofprinciples
should
not
thecaseathand,
[namely
bepostulated
duetotheplurality
ofoperations.
Ockham sketchesan accountof when such pluralityshouldbe postulated
(444.17-445.12):30
28)"[Dico]quodpotentiae
in proposito,
scilicet
intellectus
et
de quibusloquimur
animae,
- nonloquendo
uoluntas
depotentiis
sensitiuis
deeis- suntidem
nunc,
quiaaliaseritsermo
realiter
inter
seetcumessentia
animae."
29)"Adprimum
dicoquodaliquando
distinctae
distincta
principale
operationes
requirunt
prinsicut
sensitiua
et
intellectiua
distinctionem
inter
sensum
non;
cipia,
aliquando
cognitio
arguunt
etintellectum.
Sedquando
istud
estponendum
etquando
estadexperiennon,recurrendum
tiamueladeuidentem
rationem.
Sedquiainproposito
neutra
est,ideoexpluralitate
operationumnonestponenda
pluralitas
principiorum."
30)"Ideoadsciendum
inferri
exdistinctione
distinctio
potentiarum
quando
operationum
potest
sunt
et quandonon,sciendum
quoduniuersaliter
quandoomniaextrnseca
cognoscenti
- putaquando
etmedium
uniformia
obiectum
estaequaliter
uelplura
obiecta,
aequaliter
praesens,
- situnccognoscens
extrnseca
sehabent
etomnia
respectu
dispositum
aequaliter
cognoscentis

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Inorder
toknow
when
thedistinctness
ofpowers
canbeinferred
from
thedistinctness
of
note
the
and
when
not,
operations
following:
- e.g.when
Inevery
casewhen
allthefactors
external
areuniform
totheknower
the
is equally
areequally
andthemedium
is
(orthemany
objects
present),
object
present
- if
inrespect
andallexternal
factors
areequally
related
oftheknower
equally
disposed,
atthatpoint
theonewhoknows,
andalsohasthepower
canhaveoneactwith
desires,
to
one
and
no
other
act
with
to
the
same
itis appropriate
to
(if
respect
object
respect
havetheactwithregard
tothatobject
orwithregard
tosomeother
inrespect
of
object
which
itisappropriate
tohaveit),suchthat
itcannot
haveanother
actinanyother
way,
whether
orappetitive
orsensitive
orintellective,
then
from
thediseachactiscognitive
tinctness
ofsuchacts,
thedistinctness
ofthepowers
arethesource
oftheacts]follows
[that
ofnecessity.
external
On theother
obstacle
is removed,
theonewhoknows,
hand,
if,when
every
andhasthepower
hasoneactwith
tosomeobject
andbythat
desires,
fact,
respect
very
with
hisnature
thesame,
canhaveanother
actwith
tothesame
or
remaining
object
regard
toanother,
from
thedistinctness
oftheacts,
thedistinctness
ofthepowers
are
then,
[that
thesource
oftheacts]never
anidentity
follows.
andunity
ofthepowers
follows
of
Instead,
inrespect
ofthose
acts.
necessity
Not forOckhamthe"evident"
difference
betweentheprimary
objectsofintellectand will,suchas Aquinassaw,to underwrite
a realdistinction.
Ockham
holds thata merelyintensionaldifference,
in proper
such as the difference
a realdifference.
To establisha realdisobjects,can neveras suchunderwrite
tinctionamongpowers,and therefore
Ockham
faculties,
amongpsychological
invokesthestringent
standardoutlinedin thispassage:ifit is notpossibleto
elicitdistinctsimultaneous
actsdirectedat thesameobject,holdingall other
relevant
circumstances
fromwhichtheactsstemarereally
fixed,thefaculties
distinct;31
otherwise,
ontologicalparsimonyholds sway,and the acts stem
fromone and thesamefaculty
or power.
enunciated
this
criterion
fortherealdistinction,
Ockham
Having
stringent
out
that
acts
of
intellect
and
will
fail
to
since
can
it,
points
satisfy
they be elicei appetens,
habens
habere
actum
unum
circa
unum
obiectum
etnonalium
potentiam,
potest
- sinatus
actum
circa
idem
sithaberi
circa
illudobiectum
uelcirca
aliudobiectum
circa
quod
- itaquodnullo
natus
esthaberi
modopotest
habere
alium
siueuterque
actus
sitcogniactum,
tiuus
siueappetitiuus
siuesensitiuus
siueintellectiuus,
tunc
exdistinctione
talium
actuum
necessariosequitur
distinctio
Sedquando
etappetens,
habens
potentiarum.
cognoscens
potentiam,
amoto
omni
habet
unum
actum
circa
et
extrnseco,
obiectum,
impedimento
cognoscens
aliquod
eo ipso,stante
natura
habere
aliumactum
circaidemobiectum
uelaliud,ibiex
sua,potest
distinctione
actuum
distinctio
immo
necessario
idennunquam
sequitur
potentiarum,
sequitur
titas
etunitas
illorum
actuum."
potentiae
respectu
31)Ockhams
here
isthat
canonly
elicit
oneactata time,
andhence
anygiven
faculty
reasoning
ifthesecond
actinquestion
canoccur
itmust
stem
from
a different
andifnot,not.
faculty,

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[49] 271

itedsimultaneously
withrespectto thesame object.He does not botherto
the
since
he believes,correctly,
thatit is obvious.Likewise,there
argue point,
is no reasonto postulatea realdistinction
betweenthesoul itselfas a whole
and anyof itsvariousfaculties.Hence on Ockhamsalternative
picture,the
difference
betweenthesouland itsvariousfaculties,
and betweenthefaculties
is merelyconceptual.Willingsomething
and knowingit (say)are
themselves,
two
that
one
and
the
same
the
has
itselfto the
ways
just
thing, soul, ofrelating
thing.Nor is thereanyreasonto thinkthatthese"ways"aredistinctin themselves.Whatappearsconvexmaycometo appearconcavebychanging
position;
andwillingareno moredistinct
thanthat;towantsomething
perhapsthinking
maybe nothingotherthatto makecertainjudgmentsaboutit,forinstance.
Ockhamsradicalrejectionofthemainstream
viewseemsto havehad some
in
at
Oxford
the
Robert
Holcot
was apparently
an adherent,
1320s;
currency
and WilliamCrathornidentified
thesoul not onlywithitsfaculties
but also
- a mediaevalHume,indeed,finding
withitsactions
onlymentalactswithin:
Sent. 1 q.l (74-97).32But it is notclearhow farOckhamsopinionextended.
Eventhearch-nominalist
JeanBuridan,whenhe discussedtherelationofthe
soul to itsacts,optedto endorseAquinass viewratherthanOckhamsin his
in De anima3.20:33
Quaestiones
I firmly
these
themainstream
tothe
adhere
Still,
view]notwithstanding,
replies
[against
I
isneither
that
as
as
understand
and
know,
myintellect
contrary
opinion:
namely, long
aredispositions
intellection
norknowledge;
onthecontrary,
intellection
andknowledge
init.
distinct
from
itandinhering
As forintellect
and actofcognition,
so too forthesouland anyofitsfaculties
in general.Ockhamsoppositionwas strident
but it did not evenbecomean
entrenched
of
nominalism.
dogma
5. Conclusion
view of mentalarchitecture
Despite Ockhams opposition,the mainstream
all thewayto thepointwhereit vanishespractically
seemsto predominate,
32)Heinrich
contra
II"inPhilosophisches
"Holkot
dicta
Crathorn
79(1972),
Jahrbuch
Schepers,
when
hesays
toOckhams
view.
Buthesurely
describes
Holkots
adherence
106-136
goestoofar
at
time.
that
Ockhams
view
wasthe"common
of
Oxford
the
opinion"
33)Translation
CorinJack
ofMind"(Ph.D. dissertation,
Buridans
"John
Zupko,
Philosophy
nellUniversity,
1989).

15:37:07 PM

272 [50]

P.King/Vivarium
46 (2008)253-274

withDescartes.It is no surprise
to findCajetandefending
Aquinass
overnight
thatSurezdoes so. But it is a
view,as he does; it is likewiseunderstandable
view defendedby the independent-minded
surpriseto see the mainstream
Renaissance
GiacomoZabarella,whotreatsthequestionatlength
philosopher
in hisLiberdefacultatibus
animae- one of thethirty
"books"makingup his
Renaissance
tome
De
rebus
naturalibus
in libros
standards)
weighty(evenby
Aristotelis
De anima of 1590. Zabarellaeven apologizesfordefendingthe
mainstream
viewat suchlength,sinceit is a traditional
chestnut.
Asidefrom
a fewdiehardOckhamistsand a fewmaterialists
who wantedto identify
the
far
of
bases
of
all
too
ahead
their
time
the
mainpsychology
biological
stream
viewwaspartoftheprevailing
intellectual
instead
climate;philosophers
their
into
the
relative
of
the
put
energies
determining
standing
psychological
in particular
whethertheintellectis dependenton thewillor confaculties,
The realdistinctness
of thefaculties
seemsnot evenon thetablefor
versely.
discussion.
Whathappened?Descartescouldbreezily
dismissthewholemediaevaltrain
his
with
a throwaway
thatseemsalmost
alive
and
well
dition,clearly
day,
6 (86) :34
liftedfromOckhamat theend ofMeditation
Neither
canthefaculties
ofwilling,
andsoonbecalled
of[the
sensing,
"parts"
thinking,
since
itisoneandthesamemind
that
that
that
thinks.
wills,
senses,
mind],
A cartesiansoul is itselfa substance,relatedto but reallydistinctfromthe
a "thinking
substancewhichis itsassociatedbodilymachine.It is notoriously
a
res
.
to
Meditation
a
is
2,
thing," cogitansAccording
thinking
thing something
that"doubts,understands,
and also imagines
affirms,
denies,wills,refuses,
in
and senses{imaginans
(28). Descartesdefines"thought"
quoqueetsentiens)"
theappendixto hisRepliestotheSecondObjections
as "allthatofwhichwe are
in us,and thatis whynotonlyunderstanding,
consciousofoperating
willing,
and imaginingbut also sensingarethoughts"
(160). Indeed,Descartesmore
thanonce speaksofsensations
as "confused",
as whenhe statesin Meditation
6 that"allthesesensations
ofhunger,
and so on,arenothingother
thirst,
pain,
thancertainconfusedmodesofthinking"
and sensTherefore,
(81).
thinking
are
a
as
in
treated
on
which
are
par phenomena
equallygrounded thesame
ing
thecartesian
soulitself,
onlybydegreesofclarity
thing,namely,
distinguished
and distinctness.
Pains,perceptions,
ideas,and truthsaretheimmediatesub34)"Neque
etiam
facultates
etc.eiuspartes
dicipossunt,
uolendi,
sentiendi,
intelligendi
quiauna
eteadem
mens
estquaeuult,
quaesentit,
quaeintelligit."

15:37:07 PM

P.King/Vivarium
46 (2008)253-274

[51] 273

awareness;at leastsome of theseelementsare

jectsof non-representational
themselves
where
is analyzedas thepresence
representational, "representation"
of whatis represented
in objectivebeing.The assimilation
of sensations
the
pains and perceptions to ideas and truthsis motivatedby construing
automaton;thedistinction
livingbodyas a well-functioning
amongpsychobetweendegrees
logicalphenomenaseemsto be groundedon thedistinction
of clarityand distinctness
distinctions
on
(althoughtheremaybe non-trivial
thebasisofrepresentative
Withthelocationof (second-grade
and
character).
on
the
side
of
the
cartesian
divorced
from
the
soul,
third-grade)
sensing
physof thebodilymachine,Descarteshas createda unitary
iologicalsense-organs
"innerspace":themind.A distinction
ofsubjectand objectis possible,butthe
articulated
Scholastic
framework
ofdistinct
faculties
is notpresent;
the
highly
cartesiansoul containsonlya selfand its "thoughts"
(includingvolitions),
confusedor otherwise.
The factorthatbroughttheinnercathedralto ruins,I suggest,
is eliminatthe
between
the
sensitive
and
the
intellective
on
the
sideofthe
souls,
ing
gap
intellect.
Once therealdistinction
betweenanimalsoulsand humansoulshad
- possiblesinceDescartesrejectedtheideathatanimalshavesoulscollapsed
therewas no reasonto keep the otherfundamental
thatof the
distinction,
the
in
and
Descartes
of
affective,
himself,
course,
cognitive
place.
hungonto
thedistinction
as wellas he could;we learnin Meditation
for
4,
instance,that
theintellectis finitewhereasthewillis infinite.
But withouta metaphysical
distinction
to supporttheirdistinctness,
therewas no reasonto adopt the
mainstreammediaevalview,and the successof Cartesianphilosophy,in
essence,razedtheInnerCathedralto theground.35

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Primary
Albert
theGreat,
InSent.
1inB.Alberti
omnia
Paris
1893:torn.
25.
,ed.A.Borgnet.
Magni
opera
Thomas
Sententia
libri
deanima
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omnia
Aquinas,
Aquinatis
Angelici
opera
tom.45.1,ed.R.Gauthier.
Roma:
Commissio
Leonina
1984.
de
S.
Thomae
Doctoris
omnia
tom.
, Quaestiones
animay
disputatae
opera
Aquinatis
Angelici
Roma:
Commissio
Leonina
1996.
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ed.P.Caramello,
cumtextu
exrecensione
leonina.
Torino:
Marietti
, Summa
theologiaey
1962-1963.
35)Special
thanks
toAnnaGreco
forassistance
andcritical
comments.

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libros
Sententiarum
andM. F.Moos.Paris:1929, Scriptum
, eds.P.Mandonnet
super
1947.
inDeanima
inJohn
Buridans
Ph.D.
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,ed.J.Zupko
Jean
Quaestiones
Philosophy
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Cornell
1989.
dissertation,
University
William
zumersten
ed. F. Hoffman
in Beitrge
zur
Crathorn,
Sentenzenbuch,
Qustionen
Geschichte
derPhilosophie
undTheologie
desMittelalters
neuefolge
Aschendorff
29,Mnster:
1988.
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inOeuvres
Meditationes
deDescartes
tom.7,eds.C. Adam
andP.Tannery,
Paris
1897.
GilesofRome(Aegidius
deanima.
libros
Venice
Frankfurt-am1500.Reprint
Romanus),
Super
Main:Minerva
G.M.B.H. 1982.
ofGhent,
Badius
Paris
Leuven
1520.Reprint
1961.
Ascensius,
Quodlibeta.
Jodocus
Henry
DunsScotus,
Lectura
inIohannis
andOrdinatio
DunsScoti
Doctoris
Subtilis
etMariani
John
omnia
Vaticanae
1950-.
, eds.C. Balieetalii.Rome:
opera
Typis
Polyglottis
andReportatio
inJoannis
DunsScoti
Doctoris
Subtilis
Ordinis
Minorum
, OpusOxoniense
ed.L. Wadding,
withslight
omniay
alterations,
Lyon1639;republished,
opera
byL. Vivs,
Paris
1891-1895
(abbreviated
"WV").
inB.Ioannis
subtilissimae
inMetaphysicorum
libros
Aristotelis
DunsScoti
, Quaestiones
opera
etalii.St.Bonaventure,
N.Y.:TheFranciscan
Institute
3-4,eds.G. Etzkorn
philosophica
1997.
inGuillelmi
William
ofOckham,
deOckham
etphilosophica
Reportatio
opera
theologica
(Opera
tom.5),ed.S. Brown,
G. Gi.St.Bonaventure,
N.Y.:lhe Franciscan
Institute
theologica
1967-1985.
De rebus
inlibros
naturalibus
Aristotelis
deanima
XXX(1590).Frankfurt
libri
Zabarella,
Jacobus
Liberde facultatibus
animae
Frankfurt-am-Main:
Minerva
1506-1507.
683-728.
Reprint
G.M.B.H.1966.
Sources
Secondary
D. "Thomas
on theWillas Rational
inJournal
Gallagher,
Aquinas
Appetite"
oftheHistory
29(1991),559-584.
ofPhilosophy
P.Das Verhltnis
derSeelezu ihren
Potenzen:
von
Kiinzle,
Problemgeschichte
Untersuchungen
bisundmitThomas
1956.
Augustin
vonAquin.
Freiburg
Universittsverlag
H. "Holkot
contra
dicta
Crathorn
II"inPhilosophisches
79(1972),106-136.
Jahrbuch
Schepers,

15:37:07 PM

>0
i)'V
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)275-301

Some Varieties
Duns

of Semantic

Scotus's

Cognitive

Externalism

in

Psychology

RichardCross
Dame
ofNotre
University
Abstract
in the
inherent
to Scotus,an intelligible
content,
specieswithuniversal
According
selfis
the
whose
immediate
of
an
occurrent
is
a
cause
mind, partial
object
cognition
ofthiscausal
thepossibility
to explainhowScotusdefends
samespecies.I attempt
makesno
thatforms
arecauses,andthatinherence
Scotusclaims,
activity.
generally,
this
an
He
illustrates
ofa form
tocause effect.
tothecapacity
difference
byexamining
in theproduction
ofa
ofa substance
is an instrument
a casein whichan accident
to
isthattheaccident
isrelevantly
Allthatisrequired
sortofeffect.
certain
joined the
arebearinthesubstance.
Sinceintelligible
whether
ornotitinheres
substance,
species
canalsobethe
ofthought
thatnon-inherent
itfollows
ersofsemantic
content,
objects
and
inthemindwithout
areincluded
Suchobjects
bearers
ofsuchcontent.
inherence,
istothisextent
broken
down.
themindandexternal
theboundary
between
reality
Keywords
instrumental
DunsScotus,
cause,semantics,
cognition
species,
intelligible
1. Introduction
ofScotuss cognitive
features
One ofthemanymoreor lesscontroversial
psythat
the
is
the
belief
species accordingto Scotus the
intelligible
chology
- hasan
mentalobjectofan occurrent
cognitionwhosecontentsareuniversal
Thisbelief
ofsucha cognition.1
causalroleto playin theformation
efficiently
nota subis
an
accidental
becausean intelligible
is controversial
form,
species
thereis a
evensettingasideitsnon-substiantiality,
stance;and moregenerally,
l) ForScotuss
andSomeLateThirseemy"DunsScotus
infavour
ofthisclaim,
arguments
and
in
Word
in
Medieval
The
on
the
Mental
, Theology,
Word",
Logic
teenth-Century
Opinions
Charles
Burnett
Tetsuro
Shimizu
and
ed.
,
(Turnhout:
forthcoming).
Brepols,
Philosophy
DOI:10.1
2008
163/156853408X360920
Brill
Koninklijke
NV,
Leiden,

15:37:18 PM

276 [54]

R. Cross
/Vivarium
46 (2008)275-301

ofa formimmanent,
inherent
or
moregeneralquestionaboutthepossibility
thinkof as the
intrinsic
to theagentor mindbeingwhatwe mightproperly
ultimatecauseofa cognition:howcan sucha formbe an efficient
causejoint
withthe substanceor agentin whichit is immanent?Scotus attemptsto
defendhisviewagainstthisgeneralworryas follows:
thisintellect
isaccidental
insofarasitisa
tothespecies,
[A]That[thespecies]
perfects
cause
with
to
the
act
of
with
the
intellect
astheother
partial
respect
cognizing,
concurring
cause.
Forevenifitperfects
itdoesnotgivetheintellect
[theintellect],
partial
anyactivity
totheintellects
themotive
ina handcanusea knife
causality.
Example:
pertaining
power
tocutupa body,
insofaras [theknife]
issharp.
Ifthissharpness
inthehandasits
were
then
thehandcoulduseitforthesameoperation,
andnevertheless
itwould
be
substance,
in
accidental
tothehand(insofar
asthemotive
is
that
is
in
and
vice
it,
it)
power
sharpness
because
thesharpness
thehandnoperfection
to [motive]
versa,
gives
power.
pertaining
Thisisapparent,
because
themotive
isequally
suchsharpness,
without
and
power
perfect
inthesame
ituses[the
tothehand
itisinsomeother
sharpness]
waywhen
joined
thing
- asitwould
inthehand.
suchasa knife
useitifitwere
Ifthespecies
Soitisinthecaseathand.
intheintellect
couldexist
without
in
inhering
ofexistence
in[theintellect]
itinthemanner
ofform,
andifbythat
mode
itwere
orcould
besufficiently
totheintellect,
these
twopartial
toeachother,
causes,
conjoined
conjoined
could[tend]
tothesameoperation
towhich
nowcanwhen
thespecies
informs
the
they
ifweposit
intellect.
Thisisalsoapparent
someintelligible
without
a
[object]
present
species.Thatobject
isa partial
causethatdoesnotinform
theintellect
istheother
(which
twopartial
butthese
closetoeachother
without
theinforming
ofthe
causes,
cause);
partial
onebytheother,
causeonecommon
effect
alone.
bytheir
required
proximity
Ifthislatter
isposited,
there
isa reason
forittobeimpossible
that
anaccident,
perhaps
which
isanimmanent
andnota transeunt
be
tothe
(transiens)
principle,sufficiently
joined
- which
substrate
unless
itisinitsubjectively
iswhy
itiscalled
anaccident.
Butsurely
the
- which
divine
essence
intheintellect
ofa blessed
isneither
intheessence
immanent
[of
- isa principle
theblessed]
norinsomething
ofwhich
itisa form
ofintuitive
cognition?2
2)"Accidit
inquantum
estcausapartialis
actusintelligendi,
concurrens
cum
speciei
respectu
intellectu
utaliacausapartiali,
intellectum,
eum,non
quodipsaperficiat
quiaetsiperficiat
tarnen
datintellectui
a causalitatem
intellectus.
activitatem,
aliquam
pertinentem
Exemplum:
inmanupotest
motiva
inquantum
uticultello
acutus
est,ad dividendum
potentia
aliquod
inmanu
Istaacuties
siesset
utinsubiecto,
manus
utieaadeandum
corpus.
posset
operationem,
- inquantum
- quodacuties
ettarnen
accideret
manui
estineapotentia
ineaesset,
motiva
ete
nullam
daret
manui
adpotentiam
motivam.
converso,
quiaacuties
perfectionem
pertinentem
estpotentia
motiva
sinetaliacutie,
etodemmodounitur
ea
Quodapparet,
quiaaequeperfecta
estinalio,coniuncto
manui
inmanu.
sicut
uteretur
easiesset
Itainpro(utcultello),
quando
Sispecies
esseinexsistens
intellectui
inhaerentia
siilio
formae,
posito.
posset
absque
permodum
modoinexsistens
esset
velposset
essesufficienter
conuincta
istae
duaecausae
intellectui,
possent
intellectus
etspecies,
coniunctae
sibiinvicem,
ineandem
inquammodo
partiales,
operationem
informat
intellectum.
Quodetiam
possunt
quando
species
apparet
ponendo
aliquod
intelligibile
sinespecie:
illudenim
obiectum
estcausapartialis,
etnoninformat
intellectum,
praesens
quiest

15:37:18 PM

R. Cross
46 (2008)275-301
/Vivarium

[55] 277

In whatfollows,I shallpresentwhatis in effect

an extendedcommentary
on
thisstriking
to
draw
out
some
of
its
not
and
attempt
implications,
passage,
but also forhis accountof themindonlyforScotusscognitivepsychology
bodyrelationas such. [A] involvestwo generaland on thefaceof it unexpectedclaimsthatturnout to be instancesof generalbeliefsaboutcausation
heldbyScotus:(1) thatthecauseofthemotionofa materialsubstanceis not
thearm),buttheformofsuch
thewholesubstanceitself(here,bysynecdoche,
a whole(herethemotivepowerthatis in thearm);and further
(2) thatboth
in analoforms
are
used
the
cause
extrinsic
and intrinsic
by
objects/accidental
in
I
in
a
deal
with
a
knife
and
sharpness hand).
gousways(here,sharpness
in
1
2
to
and
then
on
thesegeneralclaims sections and respectively,
apply
go
themto generalquestionsoftherelationbetweenmindand body(section3)
and specificissuesin cognitive
(section4).
psychology
2. Formand Causal Power
an
On thefaceofit,itis surprising
to be toldthatthecauseofsuch-and-such
- is strictly
- one composedofmatterand form
effect
ofa materialsubstance
speakingtheformof thatsubstance,and not thesubstanceitself.But Scotus
makesthepointexplicitly:
inanother
tothat
that
itisdenominated
asa form
form,
Every
[thing],
gives
thing
existing
tothething.
Andalthough
existence
action,
gives
justas[theform]
byits[viz.theforms]
nevina suppositum
isdenominated
a form
action,
[i.e.a substance]
byits[viz.theforms]
ismore
denomibutthesuppositum
ertheless
denomination,
[itis]not[so]byfinal
finally
nated
bythesameaction.3
alterius
informatione
altera
causapartialis;
sedistae
duaecausae
absque
partiales
approximatae,
communem.
Hoc
causant
unum
effectum
debitam
ab altera,
solam
per
approximationem
immaestaccidens
siponitur,
nonsinecausaforte
secundum,
quodestprincipium
impossibile
dicitur
coniuctum
nentis
etnontranseuntis
essesufficienter
quare
passonisisitiniliosubiective,
inintellectu
beati
estprincipium
accidens.
Nonne
essentia
divina
intuitionis,
quaenonimmanet
nn.500-501,
Vatican
ed.III,
Ord.1.3.3.2,
illinecalicui
essentiae
cuius
Scotus,
ipsasitforma?":
296-297.
3)"Omnis
denominari
inalioutforma,
sicut
datilliesseitadatillialiquomodo
exsistens
forma,
ultimata
insupposito
abactione
etlicetforma
denominaretur
a suaactione,
sua,nontarnen
Ord
. 1.12.1,
actione":
ab
eadem
sedulterius
denominaretur
Scotus,
denominatione,
suppositum
inmyThe
inmore
detail
thispassage
n.51,Vatican
ed.V,54.1discuss
Metaphysics
oftheIncarCommunicaand"Divisibility,
toDunsScotus
nation:
Thomas
2002),222-23,
(Oxford,
Aquinas
Medieval
inDunsScotuss
Theories
oftheCommon
andPredicability
Nature",
Philosophy
bility,
11 (2003),43-63,
andTheology
59-60.

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/Vivarium

Actionsaredone byforms;theactionsoftheseformsbelongto thesubstance

fromthe form,to the substance.This accountlocates
by "piggy-backing":
rather
forsuch relations,
causal explanations"at the levelof the principles"
in
of
their
all
the
richness
thanat "thelevelofprimary
substances,
properties
as we shallsee, inhereequallyin
lhe relationsthemselves,
and principles".4
boththeformand thecomposite,and it is thisjointinherencethatenables
Scotussaccountto avoid possiblecausaloverdetermination.
Presupposedto
offorms:formsareas real,and
or hypostatization
Scotuss viewis a reification
whichtheycompose.5Furthermore,
as thecompositesubstances
as particular,
Scotussupposesthatat leastsome such formsare active-,
that,forexample,
A paradigm
do things,or makethings,unlessprevented.
theyautomatically
or
case,one muchbelovedof Scotus,mightbe heap,we sometimes(rightly
rather
than
which
heats
of
heat
as
that
speakof
things
speak
being
wrongly)
a hotthingbeingthatwhichheatsthings.6
To graspprecisely
An activeformis one thatdoes or makessomething.
between
what Scotuswantsto say,we need to understandthe distinction
and
as
Scotus
or
between
and
putsit.
operation production,
making
doing
theformer
is "thatwhoseultimategoal is a doing(usus),not
Fundamentally,
theactivity
about
(actio)ofwhichremainsalsoin
(actum),
something
brought
ofactionbutto that
theagent".7Scotusascribesoperationnotto thecategory
fashionas the"secondact"ofsomeof quality,and talksof it in Aristotelian
thingactual(of somethingin "firstact").8The latter,production,resultsin
located
Itisproduction
whichisproperly
somefurther
objectorstateofaffairs.
in the categoryof action.9Scotusdividesit into two sorts:immanentand
arethosethatresultin someeffect
Transeunt
transeunt
(transiens).
productions
to be (p,or simplymakingit to be.10
external
to theagent:makingsomething
4)Peter
inSelf-Motion
Aristotle
to
ontheReality
ofSelf-Change",
from
King,"DunsScotus
G.
Lennox
Newton
ed.
Louise
Gill
and
261;notethat
, Mary
(Princeton,
1994),229-90,
James
which
I offer
here:
seeKing,
"Duns
onthispoint
isopposed
tothat
ofScotus
Kingsreading
ontheReality
ofSelf-Change",
260-62.
Scotus
5)On this,
The
seemyMetaphysics
, 44-46;andThePhysics
ofDunsScotus:
oftheIncarnation
Vision
Context
a
95-100.
34-41,
1998),
Scientific of Theological (Oxford,
6)SeeScotus,
below.
Ord.1.7.1n.70,Vatican
ed.IV,137-38,
quoted
7)"Activa
cuius
etiam
... estcuius
ultimus
finis
estusus(etnonaliquid
actum),
propria
sumpta
inagente":
actiomanet
Inmetaph.
9.11,n.8,OPhIV,607.
Scotus,
8)Seee.g.Scotus,
nn.14-15,
referred
Ord.1.6.un.,
Vatican
ed.IV,92-94;seetoothepassages
in theHistory
ofPhilosophical
to in myDunsScotus
on God,Ashgate
Studies
Theology
VA,2005),20,n.8.
(Aldershot/Burlington,
9)Seen.8 above;
seealsoInmetaph.
n.49,OPhIV,557-58.
9.3-4,
10)SeeScotus,
n.48,OPhIV,556-57.
Inmetaph.
9.11,n.10,OPhIV,607;alsoInmetaph.
9.3-4,

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[57] 279

Immanentproductionis paradigmatically
the productionof an operation:
in
an activestate.11
The technical
itself
to
be
such
and
such
something
making
is "eliciting",12
and theelicitedproduct
termforthissecondsortofproduction
forourpsychological
relevant
purposeshereis an occurrent
cognition.When
we think,we makeourselvesto be in the stateof occurrently
cognizingby
in
or
that
state
occurrent
ourselves.13
producing eliciting
cognition
The notionofan intrinsic
mayseemat bestotiose,and at worst
production
- its
incoherent.For we mightthink,first,that a substancesoperations
isjustto be in a certain
doings- do notneedto be produced(to do something
willentaila
we
that
the
and
state),
mightthink,secondly, positing contrary
sinceif operationsneed to be produced,it looks as though
viciousregress,
to be producedtoo, and so on ad infinitum.
need
Indeed,this
productions
is one oftheclassicarguments
thatcan be offered
secondconsideration
against
Scotusundermines
bothobjections(parthewholenotionofagent-causation.
how productionshouldbe
simonyand incoherence)by clarifying
precisely
understood.For as he sees it theAristotelian
categoryof actionis merelya
or
immanent
. Specifically,
therelationofproduction(whether
kindofrelation
is justwhatScotuscallsan "intrinsic"
relation:itexistsjustso long
transeunt)
as itstermsdo. The relationofproductionthusarisesautomatically
giventhe
external
or merely
of theagentand of theproduct,be it something
existence
an immanentoperation.On thisanalysis,thinking(forexample)reallyis at
and theproductiondoes notneedto be prorootjusta doing,nota making,
duced;it simplyarises,giventheexistenceof theagentand theoperation.14
activlikethis:(i) productive
Thelogical(nottemporal)ordergoessomething
ityof producer(form);(ii) existenceof product;(iii) productionrelation
betweenproducer(form)and product;(iv) productionrelation(identicalto
thatin [iii])betweencompositeand product.
is explainedby form,in thevery
Scotusis clear,then,thatcausalactivity
for
strongsensethattheformofa compositematerialsubstanceis responsible
thatthiscausalactivity
He claims,nevertheless,
theproductionof an effect.
can be predicated
ofthewholesubstance.In talkingaboutthispiggy-backing,
thewhole substance.
Scotususes a technicalterm:the activitydenominates
butScotusmakesa stronger,
Denominationis a logicalrelation,
metaphysical
- inheresin boththe
- a quality
claimas well: one and the same operation
n) Seen.8 above;
alsoScotus,
Inmetaph.
9.3-4,n.48,OPhIV,556-57.
12)SeeScotus,
Inmetaph.
9.3-4,n.49,OPhIV,557-58.
13)Seen.8 above.
14)Onthis,
ed.VIII,796-97.
seeScotus,
Ord.4.13.1,n.12,Wadding

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- a relation
formand thecomposite,15
and one and thesameproduction
likewiseinheresin bothformand composite.Specifically,
theseitemsinhere
in theformdirectly,
and in thecompositeindirectly,
fromthe
piggy-backing
form:
Sometimes
there
aresaidbythesameabstract
term
which
denominatives
many
naturally
denominate
diverse
towhich
that
diverse
which
issignified
things,
bytheabstract
things
term
hasa relation.
inmany
ifprolixity
Thiscouldbeshown
didnotprevent
it.
examples
that
which
andthat
itprincipiates
indifferent
aredenominated
Thus,
bywhich
principiates
intheabstract,
which
iscalled
iati
forthatby
on",signified
ways
bythisrelation
"princip
isdenominated]
which
and
that
which
isdenom[itprincipiates
immediately,
[principiates
Andinthis
canbeappropriated
tothese
inated]
mediately.
waytwodenominatives
things,
suchthat
that
iscalled
theprinciple,
andthat
which
iscalled
namely
bywhich
[principiates]
theprincipiator.16
ElsewhereScotusmakesjustthesamepointfortherelationofcausing,propexternalto theagent.17
The idea is that
erlyspeaking:producingsomething
thesamerelation principiatinginheresin boththeformand
numerically
thecomposite,and it inheresin thecompositein virtueof itsinherence
in a
of
the
in
the
form.
is
the
same
relation
part
composite namely,
Principiation
as production.Bothrelationsarewiderthanthatof causing,because,unlike
results.Elicitingis a
causing,theycan have immanentas well as transeunt
determinate
of principiating;
is
another.
Both
relations
are intrinsic
causing
the
sense
outlined
once
the
and
the
(in
exist,
above):
principiator
principiated
therelationofprincipiation
obtainsbetweenthem.To thisextent,
necessarily
neitherprincipiation
norproductionaredirectly
causallyexplained:it is the
factthatthe formis activethatexplainsthe existenceof the product,and
thencetherelationof productionthatexistsbetweenproducerand product.
And whatallowstheproductive
of theform(in all casesotherthan
activity
voluntaryactivity)to resultin the existenceof the productis merelythe
15)SeeScotus,
Inmetaph.
nn.48-49,
OPhIV,556-58.
9.3-4,
16)"Abeodem
abstracto
dicuntur
natasunt
denodenominativa,
quandoque
plura
quaescilicet
minare
adquaediversa
habet
habitudinem
illud
abstractum
Posset
diversa,
quodper
significatur.
inmultis
siprolixitas
nonobstaret.
Sicabistarelatione
exemplificari
quaedicitur
principiano
inabstracto,
diversimode
denominatur
'illudquod'principiat,
et'illudquo'princisignificata
et'illud
Etsecundum
hocpossunt
duodenomipiai,quia'illud
quo'immediate,
quod'mediate.
nativa
istis
ut
scilicet
illud
dicatur
et
illud
dicatur
appropriari,
quo
principium, quod
principians":
Inmetaph.
seealsoTh.4,n.7,OPhII,626;Ord.1.7.1,
Scotus,
9.3-4,n. 19,OPhIV,541-42;
n.13,Vatican
ed.IV,111.
17)SeeScotus,
Th.4,n.2,OPhII,625.

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[59] 281

removalofblocks:forexample,oflocaldistancebetweensomesuitableextrinsic substrate
and theproductive
form,or theadditionof somesuitablejoint
on
the
of
kind
ofthe
cause,depending
production
envisaged.It is theidentity
productionrelationin bothformand compositethatblocksanymisleading
to viewtheformas something
usedbythecompositein productemptation
- something
tion18
thatturnsout to be a centralin theaccountofpart-whole
thatI givein thenextsection.
instrumentality
Aswe shallsee,Scotusinsiststhatnotall formsareactive,and thisturnsout
to be important
forhisaccountofinstrumental
whichI considerin
causality,
thesenseof"active"is technical,
thenextsection.Furthermore,
and itis idenactiveforms(in therequiredsense)are thosethatare
tifiedas "productive":
and
ofotherforms/substances
ofthe
productive
productive, paradigmatically
samekind- "univocal"causes,in thejargon:
inevery
Notonly
isa relation
ofactive
notfounded
butalso[itisnotfounded]
power
being,
inevery
itisclear
that
what
isextended,
asidevarious
lessperfect
form.
For,
setting
things,
another
toit,tobe
asextended,
doesnotmake
extended
nearby
previously
unequal
thing,
inquantity,
as
what
is
hard
does
not
make
hard
made
likeitorequaltoitself
just
something
what
is
isactive,
that
waspreviously
nothard.
Butwhat
contrariwise,
immediately
changes
inthe
isremoved,
asisclear
itlikeitself,
it,making
[every]
impediment
nearby
provided
thatthere
isnoactive
form
other
thansome
caseofwhatishot.Thusitcanbeargued
some
in
the
of
substantial
form
and
perhaps,
genus quality.19
In fact,as we shallsee,univocity
is nota requirement
forbeingan activeform;
is.
butproduction(as opposedto mereoperation)certainly
The lastsentencein the passagejust quoted assertsthatbothsubstantial
- namely,qualities
- can be active,and thuseffiformsand certainaccidents
cientcausesof products.In thecomplexpassagethatfollowshere,Scotusis
causes.
formsareefficient
to showthatbothaccidentaland substantial
trying
if
if
are
and
are
is a worrythat forms causes,
The background
they onlyacci(be it matteror substance),thenit follows
dentallyjoined to theirsubstrate
18)SeeScotus,
1h.4,n.3,OPhII,625.
19)"Nonsolum
fundatur
relatio
sednecinquacumque
noninquocumque
forma,
ente,
poteninostendendo
minus
tiaeactivae.
Necvidetur
dificultas
perfectis
quoditasit.Namcaeteris
siveadaequat
sibiin
nonassimilat
inquantum
quantum,
praetermissis,
patet
quodquantum,
aliudpriusnon
necdurum
indurai
aliudquantum
priusinaequale,
quantitate
proximatum
ut
statim
sibiapproximatum
modose habens,
durum.
Activum
autem
transmutat,
opposito
decalido.
Itapotest
sibicircumscripto
assimilei
quodnullaforma
argui
impedimento;
apparet
In metaph.
forte
etaliquadegenere
activa
estnisialiquasubstantial
Scotus,
9.6,
qualitatis":
n.11,OPhIV,579-80.

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thatall (embodied)causesaremerelyaccidentalunities.The replyis thatthe

statusof thecause as an essentialunityis irrelevant
to itscapacityto cause.
formsareunitiesin a waythatcompositesubBothaccidentsand substantial
to thecausal
stancesor accidentalunitiesarenot,butthismakesno difference
question:
anaccident
with
Itcanbeconceded
that
aloneisanefficient
cause
toitseffect,
and
respect
anaccident
aloneistheeffect,
because
anaccident
isa being
se
its
per completely
having
to
another.
...
It
can
anditisnotessentially
be
conceded
[also]
entity,
belonging
something
that
a substantial
form
alone
causes
. . . Hiecomposite
[does
this]
really
efficiently.
primarily
itdoesitthrough
toit,anditisone Forthenotion
perse,because
something
belonging
ofefficient
there
isnotrequired
that
itisa subsistent
butonly
that
itexists,
or
cause,
being,
isanact,fortheaccident.20
Theclaimaboutsubstantial
formis thatitcausesdirectly;
thecompositecauses
becausea partof it causes- so it does notdo so directly,
eventhoughit does
itperse, thatis,as something
thatis a substantial
unity.
Of course,Scotusdoes notmeanto suggestthatinactive(non-productive)
formsaresimplystatic:
There
areproper
ofnatural
. . .- at leastifweextend
operations
perseexistent
things
whether
immanent
or
or
eventocausing
a form,
or
transeunt,
"operation'to
any[activity],
tolocalmotion.
Andinthis
isheavy
hastheproper
of
downwaywhat
operationtending
wards
itisoutside
when
itsproper
Andwhen
itisatrest,
itissaidtohavea more
place.
than
itmoves ButAristotle
when
doesnotseem
toextend
perfect
operation
"operation"
inthis
hesaysinDecelo
2 that
theimperfect
lacks
waywhen
operation.21
Many such formswill be productiveof theirown (intrinsic)operations:of
in kindfromthemselves
thatis, different
(and thusbe casesof
productions,
20)"Potest
concedi
tantum
estcausaefficiens
suieffectus,
etaccidens
quodaccidens
respectu
tantum
estperseenshabens
suamentitatem
etnonestesseneffectus,
quiaaccidens
complete
tialiter
alicuius
- Potest
concedi
solaforma
substantial
efficit
aliquid
quodsimiliter
primo
realiter.
. . . Compositum
. . . perse,quiaperaliquid
causae
eius,etestunum Adrationem
efficients
nonrequiritur
sedactuexsistens
velactus":
quodsitenssubsistens,
proaccidente
Ih.4,nn.11,13,OPhII,627-28.
Scotus,
21)"Entium
- ethocextendendo
naturalium
. . . suntpropriae
perseexsistentium
operationes
adquamcumque
siveimmanentem
sivetranseuntem,
siveetiam
sitadformam
'operationern
siveadubi.Etsicgrave
habet
tendere
deorsum
est
causandam,
operationem
propriam
quando
extra
locum
etiam
dicitur
habere
etperfectiorem
suum;
quando
quiescit,
operationem
quam
. . . Sedoperationem'
movetur.
nonvidetur
Aristoteles
itaextendere,
II Decelo
etmundo,
quando
ubivultquodimperfectum
caret
In
n.
OPh
referScotus,
9.6,
14,
IV,
581,
operatione":
metaph.
toAristotle,
Decelo
seetooInmetaph.
2.12,292b17-21;
9.7,n.15,OPhIV,586.
ring

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[61] 283

"equivocai"causes,in thejargon).Some formsare closeto static:but all the

formsof materialbodies (bodilyforms)haveat leastsome directionto par- upwardsforlightthings,and downwardfor
ticularplacesin the universe
forthe
heavythings.But it is transeunt
productionthatassumesimportance
of "active",and thus,as we shallsee, forthedistinction
technicaldefinition
betweeninstrumental
and non-instrumental
causality.
In good philosophical
fashion,Scotuswonderswhattheexplanationis for
thefactthatsomeformsareactiveand othersnot,and forthefactthatsome
areactivein one way,and othersin otherways.He concludesthatexplanatory
bedrockliessimplyin thefactthatthevariousformsare thekindsof thing
thattheyare:
andsome
forms
areactive,
reason
Itisdifficult
toassign
a general
whysomesubstantial
not
and
some
are
substantial
forms
and
are
whereas
some
active;
active,
qualities
qualities
than
and
some
incommon
under
havemore
nevertheless
concept
qualities
general
qualities
ofthe
forms
areactive,
suchasthose
substantial
do.Likewise,
somelessperfect
substances
ofcompound
suchasa stone
suchasthose
onesinactive,
andmore
elements,
things
perfect
such
are
of
some
those
andother
inanimate
Also,
compound
perfect
things active,
things.
of
are
not
communicative
other
more
whereas
asthose
ofanimate
[forms]
perfect
things,
does
forms.
There
therefore
bodies
andangelic
ofheavenly
suchastheforms
themselves,
ingeneral
areactive,
andothers
notseemtobea reason
not,justas,in
whysomeforms
heat
other
than
heat
can
cause
to
be
some
reason
there
does
not
seem
why
particular,
"heat
isproducisimmediate,
that
this[proposition]
itseems
because
heatisheat;
andthus
. ..
andallrelations
inthegenus
ofquantity,
toothat
allforms
Thusitseems
tiveofheat".
areinactive.22
hereis inductive.
I supposethesupportfortheclaimmadein thelastsentence
it is had bythe
form
is
that
of an active
of theactivity
One crucialfeature
or
becauseofcircumstances
formevenin thecasethattheformfails(whether
22)"Difficile
suntactivae,
formae
substantiates
rationem
estassignare
communem,
quiaaliquae
non
etaliquae
fomae
substantiales
autem
suntactivae,
etaliquae
qualitates
aliquae
qualitates
- ettarnen
inaliquoconceptu
communi
etqualitates
suntactivae,
qualitates
plusconveniunt
suntactiformae
substantiales
etsubstantiae.
Similiter,
imperfectiores
aliquae
quamqualitates
et
sicut
sicut
nonsuntactivae,
etperfectiores
mixtorum,
elementares,
vae,sicut
lapidis aliorum
- aliquae
alisicutanimatorum;
suntactivae,
mixtorum
etperfectorum
etiam
inanimatorum,
caelestium
nonsuntcommunicativae
sui,sicutformae
corporum
quaetamen
perfectiores
incommuni
suntactivae,
Nonvidetur
etformae
ergoratioquarealiquaeformae
angelicae.
- sicut
nisiquia
est
ratio
calor
calefactivus
inspeciali,
nonvidetur
etaliquae
non,
aliqua quare
Itaetiam
videeffectivus.
estcaloris
'calor
calor
estcalor;
etitavidetur
quodhaecsitimmediata
. . . nonsuntactivae":
relationes
etomne
formae
degenere
turquodomnes
Scotus,
quantitatis,
OPhIV,
Inmetaph.
seetooScotus,
ed.IV,137-38;
Ord.1.7.1,n.70,Vatican
9.6,nn.12-13,
579-80.

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effect.
The formhas theactivactuallyto producetherelevant
opportunity)
even
in
esse
as
Scotus
its
,
ity
putsit.23Claimingthat
productivity
quieto
theformis alwaysactivein thissenserequiresus to talkaboutnaturalactivity
A voluntarily
activeformis one thatis
(as opposed to voluntary
activity).
1supposewe shouldsayofsuchactivity
activewhenitchooses.24
thattheform
is activein essequietoas and whenit chooses.Voluntary
in essequieto
activity
is trying(and failing)to producethe relevanteffect.Havingsuch a capac- is sufficient
forbeinga voluntary
activeform.
ity- thatoftrying
None ofthisexplainswhyScotuswantsto ascribecausalactivity
toformsin
thissortofway.He presents
a ratherquestion-begging
argument:
form
thatissufficiently
ifitexists
ofsomeaction,
Every
productive
perse[i.e.indepenthat
about
action
andautomatically]
(for
dently],
brings
perse[i.e.independently
example:
ifheatissufficiently
ofheat,
then
heatheats) Ifheat,
that
has
productive
separated
perse
were
a
miracle
to
exist
it
could
[i.e.
participated
being, through
perse independendy], perse
andautomatically]
aboutthat
ofwhich
itistheprin[i.e.independendy
bring
operation
ciple[viz.heating].25
The ideahereis thatwe can inferfromthefactthatheatis sufficiently
productiveof its effectthatheat if separatedfromits subjectwould stillcause its
effect.
And thissupportstheviewthatitis forms,
notsubstances
as such,that
arecauses.Still,a lot dependson howwe understand
thepremisethatheatis
ofheat.Foritmightbe no morethana misleading
sufficiently
productive
way
of claimingthathot substancesaresufficiently
of heat.So it may
productive
be thatScotusis movedbytheinitially
appealingthoughtthatsomeaccidents
to
be
causes
for
heat
ofheat.But I suspectthatunderlying
appear
example,
all thisaresomemorecomplextheological
in the
considerations,
particularly
doctrineof theTrinity,
wherea desideratum
Scotus
is
that
by
acknowledged
threedivinepersonsshould not be threediscretecauses. Makingthe one
- a form
- thecause of divineeffects
divineessence
providesa wayto avoid
theinference
fromthreepersonsto threediscretecauses.26
23)Seee.g.thediscussion
inInmetaph.
OPhIV,553-54,
where
thisclaim
is
9.3-4,nn.39-40,
Fortalkof11
inesse
inthenext
discussed
section
ofthis
, seethepassages
presupposed.
quieto*
essay.
24)SeeScotus,
Ord.4.49.9-10,
n.3,ed.Wadding
X,506.
25)"Omnis
forma
sufficienter
elicitiva
alicuius
siperseest,perseagitillaactione
actionis,
(exemsicalor
estsufficienter
calor
habens
calefactiva,
calefacit)Sicalor
plum:
potentia
separatus
per
seessse
esset
illaoperatione
cuiusest
participatum
permiraculum
perse,posset
perseoperari
Ord.1.7.1,nn.11-12,
Vatican
ed.IV,110;seeTh.4,n.9,OPhII,626.
Scotus,
principium":
26)Onthis,
seemyDunsScotus
onGod
andMetaphysics
,221-22,
, 231-32.
oftheIncarnation

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[63] 285

Forms,then,have accordingto Scotusa poweror powersto cause/elicit

certainkindsof product.Scotusis clearthatthesepowersare reallyjust the
sameas theformitself:
inwhich
than
a non-relational
ofpower
other
tothedefinition
essence,
Nothing
belongs
suchthatno relation
to thething
is immediately
founded
somerelation
principiated,
theprintoprincipiate
which
isactually
determined
[the
actually
precedes
power]
through
without
is
from
the
non-relational
the
non-relational
eifect
But
[essence],
any
cipiation.
ina natural
theactual
isposited,
there
follows
once[this
relation;
effect]
sequence
prior
inneither
ifoneof
totheprinciple,
which
couldexist
relation
oftheprincipiated
mutual
theextremes
were
notposited.27
he is reallyusinga hyposWhenScotustalksabouta powerto do something,
form
the
itself
the
shorthand
for
beingable to do someagent
tatizing
powersas thingsdistinctfrom
thing.He does notin factwantto hypostatize
wouldnotwantto thinkofcausesor formsusingtheir
and he certainly
forms,
regress).28
powers(on painofinfinite
thatbothformand compositeare,in virtueof
Scotusbelieves,accordingly,
theirrespectively
beingactivepowers,or havingsuchpowersas parts,in passiveor receptive
potency")to the
potency(whatScotusherecalled"subjective
inherence
ofproductionrelations:
existence
ofits,and
toactive
andistosomerelational
isapplied
power,
potency
Subjective
willbeinitwhen
itacts,
andisnotinitbefore
which
toanactual
relation,
[itacts].29
such as "the formis
This inherencethus explainsthe truthof utterances
and "thecompositeis a
a principle"or "theformis actuallya principle",30
27)"Nihil
aliinquaimmediate
fiindatur
nisiabsoluta
estderatione
aliquaessentia,
potentiae
in
actu
ita
nullus
ad
principiatiorespectus
praecedit ipsam
quod
quisrespectusprincipiatum,
sineomnirespectu
Sedab absoluto,
ad principiandum.
nemperquamquasideterminetur
mutua
relatio
actualis
natura
esteffectus
absolutus;
sequitur
quoposito,
posterius
praecedente,
In
extremo
nonposito":
essepotuit,
altero
adprincipium,
Scotus,
quaeinneutro
principiati
see
also
n.
OPh
n.
OPh
565.
IV,
IV,
563;
18,
9.5,
13,
metaph.
28)Onthis
n.15,ed.Wadding
seeScotus,
XI,348a.
Rep.2.16.un.,
29)"Poten
esseeiusnonabsolutum,
etestadaliquid
tiasubiectiva
activae,
potentiae
applicatur
Inmetaph.
etprius
noninest":
sedadrelationem
Scotus,
actualem,
quando
quaesibiinerii
aget,
is thecorrect
inherence
whether
herewonders
9.3-4,n. 45,OPhIV,536.NotethatScotus
issomesortoftruthwhat
isatstake
thepossibility
that
relation
fortheactivity,
andconsiders
inherence:
seeIn metaph.
relation
thatdoesnotinvolve
9.3-4,n. 44,OPhIV,555.
making
here.
norformyargument
s general
neither
forScotus
thematter
iscrucial
position
Deciding
30)Forthetwopossibilities
- Scotus
seeInmetaph.
9.3-4,nn.39,42,44,OPhIV,553-5
here,
heprefers.
which
locution
doesnotdecide

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or "thecompositeis actuallya principiator".

And,as outlined,
principiator"
orprincipiation
relations
obtainin thecaseofoperationtoo:
suchproduction
- say,theoperationthata livingsubstancehasof
theoperationis principiated
bytheform,and mediately
bythecombeingalive and itis so immediately
As notedabove,operationssuchas theseinherein the
positesubstanceitself.
in theform.31
compositein virtueoftheirpriorinherence
Much thesamesituationobtains,mutatismutandis
, forthecausalactivity
of accidents.Heat, forexample,heats(causesheat),and in virtueof thiswe
can saythata hot thingheats,on thebasisof thegeneralrulethatfirst-order
in this
predicatestrueof partsare trueof theirwholestoo.32The difference
case is thatalthoughthe production heating is essentially
one thing,its
- is not;33thewhole composedof
remotecause- the accidentalcomposite
formand matteris essentially
substantial
one thing(thoughas we saw above,
not as much of a unityas an accidentalformalone,or a substantial
form
alone).34

3. Varietiesof Instrumentality
Now thatwe areclearon thesensein whicha formcan be said to be active,
we arein a positionto understand
thesecondimportant
conceptrequiredto
in
the
Scotus
makes
and
that
is
the
[A],
grasp point
conceptofa substanceor
- fora keyclaimmadein [A] is thatthereis no difformusingan instrument
ference
betweenthecaseofusingsomething
accidentalexternal
to a bodyand
usingsomethingaccidentalinternalto the body:sharpnessin a knife,and
sharpnessin a hand.And it is thisclaimthatturnsout to be crucialforthe
in cognitive
innovation
thatI examinein section4 ofthispaper.
psychology
In book 4 of the Ordination
Scotus formulates
an increasingly
nuanced
accountofthevarieties
ofinstrumental
The
causality. fully-developed
analysis,
foundin distinction
fivepossiblevarieties,
towhichI givethefol6, identifies
lowinglabels:
31)Seee.g.Inmetaph.
OPhIV,556-57,
where
istreated
9.3-4,nn.48-49,
eliciting
analogously
toproduction.
32)SeeScotus,
Th.4,n.12,OPhII,627;notethat
this
rulecannot
beasgeneral
asScotus
imagineshere,
itdoesnotobtain
inthecaseofproperties/predicates
because
inthecategory
ofquanI am.
areallsmaller
than
tity:
myproper
parts
33)SeeScotus,
Th.4,n.12,OPhII,627.
34)On this,
seemyPhysics
Forthedegrees
ofunity,
seemy
, 77-93,100-107.
ofDunsScotus
aresimple
entities
ina waythat
neither
substances
7-9.Forms
Physics
ofDunsScotusy
(part-free)
noraccidental
unities
are.

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[65] 287

(i) Secondarycausation
(ii) Dispositiveinstrumentality
(iii) Receivedinstrumentality
(iv) Part-whole
instrumentality
(v) Artificial
instrumentality.35
The orderis Scotuss,and the varietiesare arrangedin decreasingorderof
I discusseachone in turn.36
causalactivity.
independent
in themostgeneralsensethat
It is onlybyunderstanding
"instrumentality"
Scotuss theologiScotusincludessecondary
causationas one ofitsvarieties.37
cal beliefslead him to hold thatGod is the primarycause of all creaturely
betweenthingsthat
orderedcausalrelations
activity,
thoughtherearecertainly
for
are themselves
causes
example,essentially-ordered
genuinesecondary
of
efficient
causes:Scotuss exampleis thesun and a fatherin thegeneration
lhe basic idea is thatactivecauses(causeshavingor beingforms
offspring,
in essequieto)can be causallyrelatedto eachotherin producingan
productive
- whether
to
orwithone causallysubordinated
effect
cooperatively
genuinely
theother.38
As Scotusputsit,theorderis of"powerto powerin essequieto".39
The secondvariety
ofinstrumentality
is similarto this:twoformsactivein
suchthatone in
essequietosomehowcontributing
jointlyto thesameeffect,
or
the
somesenseusestheother.But unlikesecondary
causation, instrument
oftheeffect.
subordinated
causedoes nothavea directrolein theproduction
thatis a necessary
condition
theinstrument
causessomestateofaffairs
Rather,
forthe
effect.
Scotustalksofwhatis producedas a disposition
fortherelevant
thanthat
finaleffect,
butI do notthinkhe meansthatit is anything
stronger
As Scotusputsit,in suchcasesthere
it is a necessary
conditionforthiseffect.
35)Forthewhole
seeScotus,
Ord.4.6.5,nn.6-8,ed.Wadding,
VIII,321-22.
discussion,
36)Book4 oftheReportatio
the
lacks
thefully-developed
Ordination
, almost
certainly
predating
ofreceived
asthough
itisa straightforward
andtreats
artificial
account,
example
instrumentality
- anapproach
intheOrdinatio
: seeRep.
asweshall
abandons
which,
see,Scotus
instrumentality
andatRep.4.6.5,n.5,ed.Wadding
XI,605a.InRep.
XI,559b-60a
4.1.1,nn.8-9,ed.Wadding,
ofartificial
TheReportatio
4.1.4Scotus
issilent
onthequestion
thus,
account,
instrumentality.
s earlier,
lesscomplex
account
ofinstrumentality.
isa representative
ofScotus
37)SeeScotus,
n. 14,ed.
Ord.4.1.1,n. 26,ed.Wadding
VIII,47-48;seetooOrd.4.1.4-5,
VIII,95.
Wadding
38)Forthedifferent
"DunsScotus
onAutonoseeWilliam
A.Frank,
kinds
ofcausal
cooperation,
2 (1992)142-64.
andTheology
Medieval
mous
Freedom
andDivine
Co-causality",
Philosophy
39)Scotus,
ed.VIII,
Ord.
VIII,322;seetooOrd.4.1.1,n.26,Wadding
4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding,
47-48.

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is an orderof "effect
to effect",40
ofa
and hisparadigmcasesaretheactivities
s accidentsin disposingsomesubstrate
fortheunivocalgeneration
substance
- archetypically
offire
ofa newsubstance41
theroleofheatin thegeneration

or ofa humanbeingbyhumanbeings.43
byfire42
Neitherofthesetwovarieties
is offurther
interest
here,sincetheyareboth
markedbythefactthattherelevant
formsexercise
causalactivity
in essequieto,
ofeachother.The examplesofinstrumentality
and do so independently
given
in [A] failto exhibitthesefeatures
But theremaining
varieties
of
conjointly.
in
are
their
different
relevant
to
here.
all,
instrumentality
ways,
mypurposes
In thecaseofreceivedinstrumentality,
a formthatis inactive
Scotusenvisages
in essequietobut whichcan, whenmovedin theappropriate
way,be made
active:it "actsbysomething
to
it
.
.
.
but
not
so
otherthanin
does
do
proper
virtueoftheactionoftheprincipalagent":44
theintrinsic
formis "active... in
a process{infieri),whenitis totallymovedbya higheragent".45
As in secondthe instrument
"has a form
ary causationand dispositiveinstrumentality,
whichis a properprincipleof actingin itsorder".46
The difference
is that,in
thecaseofreceivedinstrumentality,
thisformis activeonlyin theprocessitself.
- itis notactivein essequieto.It mightbe
It is notactiveoutsideoftheprocess
is thatofan
thoughtthatan obviousexampleofsuchreceivedinstrumentality
artificial
A knifehas a sharpblade;left
suchas a knifein cutting.
instrument,
- itsformis inactivein esse
- butwhenmoved
to itselfit does nothing
quieto
in theappropriate
in two- it
forslicingsomething
wayitsformis responsible
is activewhenmoved,or whenin a process(infieri).Thiswouldmakeartici- the fifthon mylist- a case of receivedinstrumentalfialinstrumentality
ity thethirdon thelist.The discussionat theverybeginningof book 4 of
- in theveryfirst
theOrdinatio
1- suggests
thatthisis
questionofdistinction
indeedthecase,as does [A], fromtherather
earlierbook 1 ofthesamework.47
40)Scotus,
Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding,
VIII,322.
41)Scotus,
Ord.4.1.1,n.21,ed.Wadding,
VIII,32-33.
42)Scotus,
Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding,
VIII,322.
43)Scotus,
Ord.4.1.1,n.19,ed.Wadding,
VIII,32.
44)".. .peraliquid
sibiproprium
. . . nectarnen
agat
perilludproprium
agitnisiinvirtute
prinOrd.
n.
ed.
13.
Scotus,
4.1.1,
9,
VIII,
cipalis
agentis":
Wadding
45)"Necesse
estipsum
habere
formam
intrinsecam
activam
... infieri,
totaliter
aliquam
quando
movetur
a superiore
Ord.4.1.1,n.26,ed.Wadding
Scotus,
VIII,48.
agente":
46)"Habet...formam
insuoordine":
Ord.4.6.5,n.6,ed.
Scotus,
quaesitprincipium
agendi
321.
VIII,
Wadding,
47)SeeScotus,
Ord.4.1.1,nn.9-10,26,ed.Wadding
VIII,13-14,
48;atOrd.4.1.1,n.31,ed.
notes
that
notevery
instrument
isproperly
active"
VIII,52,Scotus
("Forte
Wadding,
"perhaps
nonomne
instrumentum
estpropie
activum").

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[67] 289

A littlelaterin distinction
1,Scotus(as we shallsee) comesup withan account
that avoids ascribingany activityto artificial
of artificialinstrumentality
- thatis, as
thisweakerview as "moreprobable"
He classifies
instruments.
6 of the
in favourof it.48By distinction
suchthattherearebetterarguments
samebook Scotustreatstheweakerviewas thoughit is true.So hisexample
is ratherdifferent,
hereofreceivedinstrumentality
avoidingthepossiblyconis
this:an illuminated
and
it
case of artificial
troversial
body
instrumentality,
formofthebody)and the
to illuminated
"colour",therelevant
(Scotusrefers
The ideais thatthebodyis seenbymeans
in medioin relationto sight.49
species
and so presumthe
air- otherwise
such
that
in medio
ofthespecies
invisible,
,
The exampleis
ablyinactivein essequieto is givenan activeform:thespecies.
of
because
the
notentirely
course,
is,
by
generated thebody,but
species
happy,
letthatpass.
to therelationbetweena bodyand its
caseis relevant
The fourth
specifically
and
relationis betweenthewholeform/substance
organs.In [A],therelevant
nottherelationbetweenanyof
thatis, or is in, thehand/arm:
theform/part
thatis in theblade.As Scotustreatsofit
theseand the(accidental)sharpness
here,theorganshaveformswhichareactivein therequiredsense,evenin esse
oftheformofthewhole- indeed,
quieto, buttheseformsarenotindependent
Scotusclaimsthatthe powerof the partand the powerof thewhole (and
arethesamepower
theformofthepartand theformofthewhole)50
therefore
the same form)"participated[i.e. possessed]in different
(and therefore
In
bythewhole.51
bythepartand "secondarily"
ways" possessed"primarily"
of thewholein thesensethattheformof
thiscase,thepartsareinstruments
- thatbelongprop- perhapsoperations
thewholeproducescertainthings
betweentheparts
to theparts.In virtueoftherelationship
erlyand primarily
to the whole. Scotuss
and the whole,theseoperationsbelongderivatively
powerand thewholeanimalwithrespect
exampleis "theorganofthenutritive
to nutrition".52
Clearly,thepointhereis thattheformof theorganand the
formofthewholeareone and thesame.
a problemin the
confronts
On thefaceof it,part-whole
instrumentality
formswithinan animate
on substantial
shapeof Scotuss beliefin a plurality
48)Scotus,
n.14,ed.Wadding,
Ord.4.1.4-5,
VIII,95.
49)Scotus,
Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding,
VIII,322.
50)I usethese
form
of
form
andofthesubstantial
oftheorganic
here
totalkrespectively
terms
- notintheir
on
these
andessence,
form
assubstantial
senses
technical
thebody
respectively:
seemyPhysics
, 87.
senses,
ofDunsScotus
51)Scotus,
Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding,
VIII,322.
52)Scotus,
Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding,
VIII,322.

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caninclude
substance.Scotusholdsthatan essential
suchas a substance,
unity,
morethanone substantial
form.Forexample,a humanbeingincludesmatter,
bodilyform,and soul.53Of these,onlythesoul is an activeform,explaining
theimmanentand transeunt
of thewholeperson.But
activities/productions
Scotuspuzzleshowone undifferentiated
homogeneousformsuchas a bodily
formcouldaccountforthedifferentiated
and heterogeneous
structure
of,for
In
thinks
that
a
Scotus
there
are
human
body. fact,
example,
good arguments
in favourof theview thatthe different
organsof the bodyhave theirown
properforms.What unitestheseformsintoone substanceis thateachone is
in potencyto a higherform(thesoul),and thateachone actualizesthepassive
of theformofthewholeis
potencyofprimematter.54
Perhapstheinherence
sufficient
fortheunityofpowereveniftheorganshaveproperforms.
- is in somewaysmorepuzzling,
The finalcase- artificial
instrumentality
at leastas it is distinctfromreceivedinstrumentality.
I have alreadynoted
inclinationto believethatat leastsome artificial
Scotuss increasing
instrumentshaveno properactivity
at all. Buton thefaceofit,thisis an extremely
implausible
(efficiently)
thingto think.Scotusreasonsthattheonlygenuinely
causal agentis whatever
wieldstheinstrument,
and he does so by a careful
ofa relevant
case.Considertheuse of
analysisofthephysicsand metaphysics
a sawin dividingwood. The reasonwhythewood is dividedis thatthesawis
placedwherea partofthewood oncewas. Now,it is naturally
impossiblefor
twobodiesto be in one and thesameplace.Butwe wouldnotusuallysay,in
thecaseofsuchnaturalincompossibilities,
thattheone formor stateofaffairs
a
s
or
as
in
a place) is theefficient
such-and-such
(e.g. body heap, body being
causeofthedestruction
ofanotherincompossible
formorstateofaffairs
(that
a place). Rather,we would
; or bodyb's beingin such-and-such
bodyscoldness
(theagentcausing
saythatitis theagentcausingtheformorthestateofaffairs
a body'sheap,or theagentcausingbodyas beingin such-and-such
a place)that
is theefficient
causeofthedestruction
ofanotherincompossible
formor state
ofaffairs
or bodyb'sbeingin such-and-such
a place).55On
(thatbodyscoldness-,
thislineof argument,
thesaw has no efficiently
causalrolein thedivisionof
thewood: itsbeingin theplacewherepartofthewood oncewasis merely
the
formalcauseofthedivisionofthewood.56Scotusclearlycomesto acceptthis
53)Onthis,
seemyPhysics
, ch.4.
ofDunsScotus
54)On this,
seemyPhysics
Duns
Scotus
In metaph.
, 69; seetooScotus,
7.20,nn.31-37,
of
OPhIV,387-89.
55)SeeScotus,
Ord.4.1.4-5,
n.15,ed.Wadding,
VIII,96.
56)Scotus,
Ord.4.1.4-5,
n.15,ed.Wadding,
VIII,96.

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[69] 291

accountas uncontroversial,
and in distinction
6 characterizes
suchan instrumentas something"moved,receptiveof an earliereffectorderedto a later
- receptive
effect"
of themotion,and orderedto thedivisionof thewoodbutnotactive,since"itneither
hasanypower(virtutem
) in essequieto, nor[has
anypower]infieri".57
Forall Scotuss attemptto defendit,thisaccountofartificial
instrumentalseems
on
the
of
it
face
even
when
viewedin the
ity
implausible,
astonishingly
lightofAristotelian-style
physics,forit does notseemto includean explanationof whythewood is divided,ratherthan,say,thesaws beingprevented
fromoccupyingtheplace once occupiedbythewood. Clearly,thenatureof
thethingactedup cannotexplainthis,becauseon Scotuss accountit has no
relevant
activecausalpower,whetherin essequietoor infieri. Scotusattempts
to dealwiththisbyascribing
to harderobjectsnotanyactivecausalpowerbut
- specifically,
a certain"impassibility
a corruptive
one that
resisting
agent"
allowsitsquantityto resistcorruption:
Of course,
i.e.,in thiscase,division.58
theresistor
cannotbe an activepower(elsetheharderobject- thesaw- would
havean activepowerin thedivisionof thewood: againstthehypothesis).
In
the late book 9 of the Metaphysics
questions,Scotus considersAristotles
- the powerof resisting
- and seemsto
"immobilitative
power"
corruption
be thoughtofeitheras an activepoweror as
suggestthatit couldlegitimately
in such-and-such
a principleof"resting
a perfection".59
1 takeit thatifScotus
is seriousabouthisaccountofartificial
he shouldbelieveitto
instrumentality,
be merelythelatterof theseprinciples.In thiscase,whatis positedis that
harderobjectshavemorepowerful
non-active
forremaining
undiprinciples
vided- forstaying
are
as they
notmorepowerful
activepowersfordividing
otherobjects.
accountof instrumentality
foundin book 4
Clearly,the fully-developed
oftheOrdinatiomakesthecomplexargument
of [A] look strangely
straightforward.For the discussionin [A] seems to treatreceivedand artificial
- indeed,such that artificial
as equivalent
instrumentality
instrumentality
is simplya speciesof receivedinstrumentality.
Still,nothingabout thegen- thekindultimately
in the
eralaccountof receivedinstrumentality
relevant
discussionof [A] requiresus to denythatartificial
can exercise
instruments
receivedinstrumentality.
That is to say,we could rejectScotuss mature
accountofartificial
withoutrejecting
hisaccountof received
instrumentality
57)Scotus,
Ord.4.6.5n.8,ed.Wadding,
VIII,322.
58)Scotus,
Ord.4.1.4-5,
n.14,ed.Wadding,
VIII,96.
59)Scotus,
Inmetaph.
seen.38,OPhIV,553.
9.3-4,n.5,OPhIV,536;forthediscussion,

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And thecaseofintrinsic
is nota caseofpart-whole
instrumentality.
sharpness
because
such
is
treated
as
an accidentin [A]. In this
instrumentality,
sharpness
its
is
not
identical
with
the
of
the
case, activity
whole,or ofthewhole
activity
form.And it is theactivity
ofsomething
movedbytheformofthe
explicitly
otherthanas receivedin thisway.So it is not
whole,and thathas no activity
ascribedto thewholesubstancein thewaythattheactivity
ofan activeinherentaccidentis (namely,
as
outlined
forgeneralcases
bypart-whole
prediction,
in section1 above).So I shallproceedas ifbothcasesofaccidentalactivity
thesharpness
ofthehand- arecasesofreceived
oftheknifeand thesharpness
eventhoughScotus,had he revisited[A] in thelightof his
instrumentality,
later,more minimalist,
instrumentality,
thoughtson artificial
mighthave
modified[A] in someway.

4. Instrumentality
and Causal RelationsbetweenSoul and Body
In the remainingtwo sectionsof thispaper,I shallattemptto applythese
to theissuesthatarisein [A]. In fact,[A] raisestwo
generalcausalobservations
distinctkindsof causalquestions.The firstis how theactivity
of thesoul- a
- relatesto thewholecompositebody.The secondis how thesoul cogform
nizes- and in particular,
whatitsrelationship
to theintentional
ofcogobjects
nitionmightbe. The issuesare relatedin variouscomplexwaysthatwill
becomeclear,and issuesabouttheinherence
and intrinsicity
offormto agent
aremosteasilyseenin relationto thefirst
that
the
of
causalprocesses
question,
involvedin bodilymotionand activity.
I deal withthisissuein
Accordingly,
section4, and withthoseinvolvedin cognitionin section5.
On thefirst
ofthesetwoissues,it shouldbe keptin mindthatthedistinctionbetweeninvoluntary
and voluntary
is,in termsofthecausalrelaactivity
tionbetweensoul and body,unimportant.
Scotuss lineis thatformscause,as
we have seen,and in termsof the way in whichthe formscausal activity
denominates
thewhole,it makesno difference
whethertheactivity
is volunor
For
this
distinction
to
one
amounts
of
the
conscious
or
tary involuntary.
non-conscious
controlmerely.
ornaturalcausalactivity thenutriInvoluntary
tiveand vegetative
activities
for
fromvolunnecessary life,forexample,differ
in
ones
the
sense
that
are
not
to
tary
merely
they
(ordinarily)
subject conscious
control.Butas muchas voluntary
are
bodilyactions,they causedbythesoul,
and denominatethewholecomposite.
The mainaim ofthecurrent
sectionofthisessayis to spellout thevarious
causalrelations
involvedin thetwocasesofthemotionofthesharpness
out-

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[71] 293

seemsto be Scotuss
linedat thebeginningof [A]. The firstpointof interest
talkofthe"motivepowerofthehand".We mightexpect"motivepowerofthe
(whole)body",or "ofthe(whole)composite".But thewayof talkinghereis
withScotuss matureaccountofpart-whole
instrumentality
whollyconsistent
in thewaythatit is
outlinedabove.It is thefactthatthehand is structured
knifecan be used:themotivepower,then,is in
thatexplainshowtheextrinsic
In fact,themotivepowerin
thehandprimarily,
and in thewholederivatively.
thehandis justidenticalwiththeformofthehand;thisformis (presumably)
thatmakes
actualizedby the formof thewhole,and it is thisrelationship
from
distinct
a
case
of
bodilyactivity genuine
part-wholeinstrumentality,
receivedinstrumentality.
Sharpnessis, of course,an accidentof the knife,and an accidentof the
willnotbe itselfa
case.So theuse ofthesharpness
handin thecounterfactual
were
a
case
of
instrumenit
caseofpart-whole
(If
instrumentality.
part-whole
to
to thecase thatScotusis trying
itwouldnotbe an examplerelevant
tality,
in
Scotus
the
role
of
the
illustrate:
namely,
species cognition.)
intelligible
thatis moved,on theprinciplethatforms
claimsthatit is theknifes sharpness
are active,and that causal relationsproperlyobtain betweenforms,not
it is formsthatareproperly
betweensubstances.In receivedinstrumentality,
it
makes
sense
to
thinkof theknifes sharpOn
this
activated.
view,
speaking
nessbeingused- theimmediateuse of theformresultsin theremoteuse of
theknife(cuttingor slicingis denominated
of,or inheresin,theknifein virtue of itsbeingdenominatedof,or inheringin, theform).Accordingto the
ifwe posit
at all to thecausalrelationship
analysishere,itmakesno difference
thatthe sharpnessinheresdirectlyin the hand itself:"the
counterfactually
in thesamewaywhenitis in someother
motivepower. . . uses[thesharpness]
- as itwoulduse it ifitwerein the
as
a
knife
to
the
hand
such
thingjoined
hand". Clearly,neitherof thesecan be cases of part-whole
instrumentality.
and this
arereallydistinct,
thesouland thesharpness,
The tworelevant
forms,
inheresin theknifeor in thehand.Presumor notthesharpness
is so whether
in thiscase,thatthe
spatialproximity:
ably,all thatis requiredis therelevant
in
to
make
no difference
knifeis heldbythehand.Inherencerelations, short,
and thecuttingup
thecausalstoryto be toldin themotionof thesharpness
of thebody.One conclusionis thatthegeneralcausalrelationin production
betweena soul/composite
and itsaccidentsis one ofuse- be theinstrumentalin [A]) or artificial.
in
the
hands
sharpness
ityreceived(as
It is importantto note thatthe conclusionsthatwe can drawfrom[A]
aboutthegeneralrelationsbetweensoul and bodyfromareon thefaceof it
is an
Fortheaccountrelieson thefactthatthesharpness
somewhatrestricted.

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- be itofthehandoroftheknife
- and as suchtheexampleis notan
accident
The sharpnessis used as an
instrumentality.
exampleof generalpart-whole
where
the
relevant
instrumental
is received
instruinstrument,
relationship
But one generallessonthatemergesclearlyis that,evenin cases
mentality.
ofpart-whole
itis theformorformsthatdo all thework,lhe
instrumentality,
moves
is
moved
(i.e.
body
by the soul) simplyin virtueof the factthat
therelevant
formsareactivein certainways.Forexample,thesoul can move
thebody,and itdoesso standardly
bymovingone organbymeansofanother60
(wherethebody,and an organ,arethemselves
compositesofmatterand rele- specifically,
vantbodilyor organicform)
thesoul movesthebodythrough
theheart,and thencebyphysiological
processesto moreremoteorgans(i.e.
thesoul movestheorgansthroughtheorganicforms).61
An angel,interest- suggesting
can
move
an
inanimate
in
the
same
that
body just
ingly,
way62
casesof part-whole
and
received
are
not
too
instrumentality
instrumentality
dissimilar
to eachother.

and CognitivePsychology
5. Instrumentality
Much thesamesituationobtainsin thecaseofcognitive
as obtainsin
activity
thecaseofaccidentalsharpness.
Putin summary,
it makesno difference
at all
to cognitionwhetheror not theobjectof cognitionis inherent
in themind.
Justthesamecausalstoryis toldin bothcases,and in bothcaseswe can think
of themindas somehowor otherincludingitsobject- evenifthatobjectis
external
to it.At stakein [A] is theroleoftheintelligible
speciesas an object
of cognition.Accordingto Scotus, intelligiblespecies are (universalor
of extramental
and accidentsthat
abstracted)representations
particulars,
inherein themind.The intelligible
content"shinesout" fromtheinherent
accident.63
But externalparticulars
are likewiseaccidentsof the common
nature.In thiswaythesamenaturecan be said to existin realityand in the
or aspectsof suchexternal
mind,and to thisextentextramental
particulars,
somehow"in the mind".But
are,in a qualifiedway,themselves
particulars
thereis a muchstronger
sensein which[A] licensesthethoughtthatexternal
60)SeeScotus,
Ord.4.49.14,
n.4,ed.Wadding,
X,584-95.
61)SeeScotus,
Ord.4.49.14,
n.6,ed.Wadding,
X,595.
62)SeeScotus,
nn.3-6,ed.Wadding,
seetooOrd.2.8.un.,
n. 10,
XI,299a-300a;
Rep.2.8.un.,
Vatican
ed.VIII,127.
63)Forsome
seeScotus,
Ord.1.3.3.1,
nn.375,382,386,Vatican
ed.III,
representative
passages,
n.54,Vatican
ed.VI,86.
228,232-33,
235;Ord.1.27.1-3,

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[73] 295

objectscan be somehow"in"themind,and I willreturnto thissensebelow,

sinceit turnsout to be centralto thekindsofexternalism
thatScotusdefends
in [A].64
Thisspeciesis supposedto be a partialcause- alongwiththeminditself
of an occurrentcognition.(Note that the intelligible
speciescountsas a
not
as
a
instrumental
mutatis
cause.65
mutandis
cause,
But,
,
secondary
merely
the relevantcausal insightsare the same in the cases of inherentand noninherent
mentalobjects:inherent
and non-inherent
formscan be secondary
causesin justthesameway.)The exprofesso
problemthatScotussetshimself
to solvein [A] is how exactlyan inherent
formcan be a partialcauseofanyhow it can be a partialcauseof an effect
thatis
thing,and morespecifically
And thegist
producedwithinthesubstanceinwhichthespeciesitselfinheres.
ofthesolutionis thatin termsoftherelevant
causalstoryit makesno differencewhether
theobjectofcognitionis inherent
in themindor not,at leaston
theassumption
thatsuchan objectis accidentalto theminditself,
and notan
essential
of
it.
this
latter
we
would
have
an
instance
of
case,
(In
part
part-whole
instrumentality,
somethingthatScotus ignoresin thiscontext,as we have
to see formsas causes,theanswerto the
seen.)GivenScotuss globaltendency
moregeneralpartof theexprofesso
questionraisedin [A] shouldcomeas no
- at
forms
are
of
cases
inherent
forms
causes,so a fortiori
surprise:
paradigm
forms
active
inherent
can
be
or
are
causes.
But
since
the
idenleast,
question
tifiesinherence
as creatingthe potentialcausal difficulty,
Scotus understanforhispurposes
dablytreatsthecaseofan external
objectas lesscontroversial
thanan internal
or inherent
The
is
that
the
inherence
oftheobject
idea
object.
inthemindmakesno difference
totherelevant
causalrelations,
sinceinherence
is independentof the entity'sstatusas an object of cognition.All thatis
- theobject
access
epistemic
requiredforan occurrent
cognitionis appropriate
close to themind.In [A], Scotustalksof suchaccessible
mustbe relevantly
in it.I willreturn
to thisspaobjectsas being"in"themindwithoutinhering
tialtalkin a moment.What theconditionsforsuchaccessmightbe Scotus
does not specify.
But he givesan examplein thelastparagraph:thatof the
beatificvision,thedirectepistemicaccessthattheblessedin heavenhaveto
access
thedivineessence.Whatis notableaboutthiscaseis thatsuchepistemic

inThe
Onthecommon
seemy"Medieval
Theories
ofHaecceity
nature,
Stanford
Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy)
ed. Edward
N. Zalta:<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entr
>.
medieval-haecceity/
65)SeeScotus,
makes
itclear
thatthe
Ord.1.3.3.3,
n.560,Vatican
ed.III,333,where
Scotus
isimplied
hasa "naturally
uniform"
itisactive
even
inesse
Muchthesame
activity:
species
quieto.
inthefirst
few
lines
of[A].

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- thedivineessenceis notaccessibleto sucha personmerelyin

is notnatural
- it is somethingthatis grantedby the
virtueof his or her naturalpowers
divinewill,66
and thisbecauseall external
divinecausalactivity
is contingent
on thedivinewill.67This is of coursean exampleof Scotusscelebrateddoctrineof intuitivecognition,and the lessonwe can learnis that,causally
thanabstractive
speaking,intuitivecognitionis less problematic
cognition,
and can be usedas a lesscontroversial
illustration
ofthecausalfactors
involved
in aspectsof abstractive
cognition.Of course,theremay be otherwaysin
whichintuitive
in particular,
in an Aristotelian
unicognitionis problematic:
areintelligible
at all. Butthisrelatesto a more
verse,howit is thatparticulars
ofsemanticcontent,and I willreturn
generalquestionabouttheexternalism
to it in a moment.
Of course,as justnoted,suchobjectsofdirect,intuitive
areparcognition,
because
Scotus
believes
that
all
are
ticulars,
reallyexisting
things particulars.68
ScotusthusbelievesPlatonismto be false.Buthisobjectionsto Platonismare
not worriesabout thecoherenceof Platonism,but merelyworriesabout its
failureto satisfy
conditionsof explanatory
universais
of thekind
parsimony:
- extrinsic
- are
thatPlato envisaged
to theparticulars
thatexemplify
them
to requirements.69
Butifthereweresuchuniversais,
and ifwe had
superfluous
access
to
them
Plato
to
be
under
certain
(as
epistemic
supposed
possible
clearly
delineatedcircumstances),
we could likewiseenvisagetheseobjectsas being
relatedto the mind in just the way that intelligiblespeciesare, barring
inherence.
Thisis thepointof thefirst
suppositionmadein thesecondpara- a universal,
of
that
an
or something
graph [A], namely,
intelligible
species
withuniversal
content couldbe in theintellect,
an objectofcognition,
witin it. [A] is phrasedin a waythatmakesthesuppositioncounhoutinhering
- as indeedit is, sincethereare in factno Platonicuniversais.
terfactual
But
about
or
about
s
of
Scotus
Platonism
makes
this
[A]
nothing
rejection
suppositioncounterpossible.
I undertook
justnowto commenta littlemoreon Scotussclaimin [A] that
someepistemically
accessibleobjects,whether
ornotinherent
in themind,are
nevertheless
somehow"in" the mind,and are somehow"conjoined"to the
mind.In [A],Scotuspositsa numberofoptions:thespecies(something
with
66)Seee.g.Scotus,
XII,369.
Quod.14,nn.10-11,ed.Wadding,
67)Seee.g.Scotus,
XII,382.
Quod.14,n.17,ed.Wadding,
68)Heascribes
some
ofbeing
kind
tocommon
butthis
whatever
itis,isnotthat
natures;
being,
ofrealexistence,
anditdoesnotseemtobecognitively
initself:
accessible
onthis,
seemy
"Medieval
Theories
ofHaecceity".
69)SeeScotus,
Inmetaph.
7.18,n.14,OPhIV,340-41.

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[75] 297

in it in
existence)could be in themind"withoutinhering
merelyintentional
the mannerof form";an object (withrealextramental
existence)could be
or
the
to
"close"
the
mind
proximdirectly
bybeing
present
having "required
existence)could be
ity";thedivineessence(an objectwithrealextramental
suchan object"in"themind.I takeit thatin at leastsomeofthesecasesScornsis happyto sanctionthe claimthatan objectcan in the mindwithout
inheringin it, whetherthisobjectis somethingwithmerelysome kindof
existextramental
or something
withreal,independent,
intentional
existence
it just
ence.On thisview,inclusionin theminddoes not requireinherence;
This claimseemsto be of considerequiresthe relevantcausal relationship.
At theveryleast,Scotusclaimsthatthingsthatarediscrete
rableimportance.
in it,can
fromthemind,in thesenseofneitherbeingthemindnorinhering
ofexternalism.
be "in"it,be partsofit.And thisgivesus a variety
nevertheless
in relationto semanticcontent
Amongotherthings,itgivesus externalism
to things
in particular,
theviewthatsemanticcontentneed notbe restricted
semanticrole
in themind.We can see thisbykeepingin mindthespecifically
betweenthetwo cases
species.The onlydifference
playedby theintelligible
- thatin whichthecognitive
and that
thatScotusconsiders
objectis inherent
in whichit is not is theinherence
of theobject.The semanticcontent,and
arenot,inScotuss example,
thecapacity
oftheobjecttobearsemantic
content,
contentin thesecases
ascribes
semantic
I
than
he
So
infer
expressly
changed.
A
to itemsexternalto (non-inherent
in) themind. consequenceof a general
accountof the possibleintuitive(immediate)cognitionof all extramental
objectsis thatall objectshaveor are semanticcontent:theuniverseis (just)
information.
account
But the view gives us too more than merelythis externalist
to itemswithintentioofsemanticcontent,suchthatcontentis notrestricted
The viewthatsemanticcontentneed not be (indeed,is not,
nal existence.70
accordingto Putnamand others)in themindhasbeenlabelledbyAndyClark
forthereasonthat
and David Chalmers"passiveexternalism",
or
ofcontent]
external
itisnotclearthatthese
[viz.theexternality
playa causal
aspects
where
internal
structure
In
cases
in
of
action.
counterfactual
role
the
explanatory
generation
70)Claiming
content
doesnotentail
havesemantic
external
tothemind
that
might
particulars
inanysense
or
whether
claim
that
thefurther
semantic
universais,
words,
particulars
signifying
that
Scotus
claims
I
know
of
a
where
do
not
external
to
the
mind.
place
particular
things
signify
even
tosucha claim,
himtocommit
himself
isnoreason
for
andthere
words
suchthings,
signify
claimisin
Thepsychological
ofcognitive
hisexternalist
instincts
onissues
psychology.
given
of
of
the
of
language.
questions philosophy
independent
principle

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arechanged,
looks
so
remains
constant
butthese
external
features
behaviour
justthesame;
internal
structure
seems
tobedoing
allthework.71
Scotuss viewoutlinedin [A] is akintoo to a ratherdifferent
kindofexternalas a "coupled
ism, one thatsees the mind and its cognitiveenvironment
system":
- ifweretain
Theexternal
features
ina coupled
role
internal
system
playanineliminable
structure
butchange
theexternal
behaviour
Theexternal
features,
maychange
completely.
features
relevant
asthetypical
internal
features
ofthebrain.72
here
arejustascausally
Thisgivesus whatClarkand Chalmerscall an "activeexternalism",
an externalismwherethemindand itscognitive
environment
arecausallyinteractive.
to theseauthors'radicalproposal,themindis notcontainedwithin
According
thebody,butcan be thoughtofas "extended"
to includeitsimmediate
cognitiveenvironment.
In Scotuss case,themindis extendedin thesenseofincludthenotionofan external
ingthingsthatdo notinherein it.We havein effect
(non-inherent)
objectofcognitionthatplaysan immediaterolein occurrent
in themind.Botha
cognition one thatis notplayedbyanyobjectinherent
Platonicformand a createdparticular
be replacedas cogcould,presumably,
in themind- namely,
nitiveobjectsbysomething
inherent
an intelligible
species or some kind of intellectual
of a particular.
But in the
representation
is certainly
paradigmcase,thatof thebeatificvision,therelevantparticular
sinceno createdrepresentation
can encompassall thesemantic
ineliminable,
contentofthedivineessence.73
It is worthtoo keepingin mindthatone oftherolesoftheintelligible
species is to act as the storeof semanticcontent;it containsour dispositional
andwhenorganized
suchspeciescontainourdispositional
beliefs.74
cognitions,
71)Andy
Clark
andDavidChalmers,
"TheExtended
Mind"
58(1998),7-19,9.
Analysis
72)Clark
andChalmers,
"TheExtended
9.
Mind",
73)SeeScotus,
Ord.2.3.2.2,
n.335,Vatican
ed.VII,562.Aquinas
makes
a similar
claim
atST
intellectus
creatus
videt
Deumperessentiam,
essentia
Dei
fit
1.12.5c: "Cum...aliquis
ipsa
forma
A more
intellectus".
andwide-ranging
ofthesemantics
and
intelligibilis
study
general
indiscussing
theimmediate
vision
ofthedivine
essence
ismuch
cognitive
psychology
developed
tobedesired.
doesnotdevelop
this
account
intoa more
externalism
intheway
Aquinas
general
that
Scotus
doesin[A].
74)Onthis,
seemy"DunsScotus
andSomeLateThirteenth-Century
ontheMental
Opinions
Word".
itshould
benoted,
doesnotclaimthatthere
is anyrelevant
hereto
Scotus,
syntax
therelevant
andisnotcommitted
toanykind
ofmental
Indeed,
explain
organization,
language.
itishard
toseehowhecould
heholds
that
thesignificates
ofwords
aremental
be,since
concepts,

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[77] 299

can functionin a similarway,at leastforour

Externalobjects,presumably,
kindsofexternal
and
objects(e.g.
presumably
appropriate
simplecognitions
via
an
written
can
be
words)
syntaxto act as (thestore
appropriate
arranged
beliefstoo.And thisis one oftheparadigmcaseswhere,
of) ourdispositional
can
Clarkand Chalmersargue,theboundarybetweenmindand environment
breakdown,suchthatthemindcan be thoughtofas extendedintoand inclu- itemssuchas external
environment
storagedevices,comdingitscognitive
puters,notebooks,labels,and thelike.75
utilizedby Scotusin this
themedievalnotionof inherence,
Furthermore,
for
clearer
accountofthedistincallows
a
much
context,
perhapsunexpected
tionbetweenwhatis internalto themindand whatis external.For evenon
mind-brain
kind,talkof
theories,at leastthoseof a non-reductive
identity
is a pretty
"in"
not
the
head
content
with
semantic
in)
(or
being
something
- itemswithsemanticcontentare not straightforcrudeway of proceeding
views.And on an account
wardlyphysicalitems,at leaston non-reductive
with
thesoul,talkof "in"the
the
mind
is
to
be
identified
to
which
according
and talkof "in"thesoul clearlynothingmorethanmetahead is irrelevant,
developedaccountof inherence(vs. non-inherence)
phorical.But a properly
Itemswithsemancouldon eitheraccountprovideexactlywhatis required.76
or external
to themind(inherent),
ticcontentcan be internal
(non-inherent).
forceto theclaimthattheseitems
In eithercase,thereis somemetaphorical
are "in"themind.I will not tryto developthisthoughthere,forreasonsof
ifwe decideto
space,but I willcommentthat,as a merelysemanticmatter,
view
that
attaches
as
semantic
internalism
any
meaningto objects"in"
classify
thenScotuss
ornotinherent,
themind(in thesensesoutlinedin [A]),whether
as a variety
as
well
be
classified
mind
thesis
could
of
the
extended
just
variety
to thisextentbreaksdown.
distinction
ofinternalism.
The mind-world
is thenatureof thecausal
Scotussversionof externalism
What motivates
thathe wantsto tell- specifically,
storyon thelevelof cognitivepsychology
that
his insight,based on his generalaccountof receivedinstrumentality,
formscan be used in causallyidenticalways.By
inherent
and non-inherent
- accordingto Scotus- theinherence
to an examplewhere
drawingattention
of the formis irrelevant
(namely,the case of sharpness),Scotus is able to
that
suchconcepts
realormental,
there
arenofurther
holdthat
andwould
entities,
presumably
doesnot
butthisconcept
istheresutintellects
couldthemselves
(Themental
concept
signify.
see
as
res
ut
intellect
of
words
On
the
Pini,
a>
Giorgio "Speany
significate
further
thing.
signify
andTheology
Medieval
andThing",
, 8 (1999),21-52.)
cies,Concept,
Philosophy
75)SeeClark
12-18.
"TheExtended
andChalmers,
Mind",
76)ForScotus
seemyMetaphysics
34-35.
oninherence,
oftheIncarnationy

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theirrelevance
oftheinternalism
ofsemanticcontentin hisphilosohighlight
of
how
mind.
But
Scotus
phy
respondto theAristotelian
objectionthat
might
More
how
can
universais?
external
intelligibility
generally,
particulars
requires
be the bearersof semanticcontent?Scotusis quite explicitin rejectingthe
Aristotelian
restriction
ofsemanticcontentto universais,
evenas earlyas this
firstsetof questionson On interpretation
, wherehe makesit clearthatthere
are conceptsnot onlyof universais
but also of individuals.77
On the more
in a broadlyAristotelian
generalquestion,itseemsthatthinkers
(Aphrodisian)
and Avicenniantraditionon the questionof universais
have a ready-made
in themindand theexternal
response.As notedabove,theuniversal
particularsarebothmerelyaccidentsofwhatwe mighthypothesize
to be thebearer
of intelligibility
and semanticcontent,namely,thecommonnature.78
To the
extentthatthecommonnatureis in, or in somesenseis, theparticular,
the
can
be
a
of
bearer
semantic
content.79
particular
Does thispsychological
externalism
weakentheaccountof theself,such
thattheselfis no longera self-contained
wholebutextendsout intotheenvironmenttoo? In generalmetaphysical
terms,Scotuss talkof thingsas (in
- formscan
collectionsofformsseemsto makeinherence
lessrelevant
effect)
be connectedmoreor lesslooselyto eachotherwithoutthisnecessarily
alterthe
causal
stories
we
tell
about
the
interactions
of
these
connected
forms.80
ing
Inherentformscan be efficient
causeswitheffects
on otherformsin thecollectionjustas wellas non-inherent
formscan and viceversa.Andviewedin
thisway,we can thinkof Scotuss accountof intuitive
cognitionas partof a
that
involves
talk
of
self
the
as
an integrated
whole.
project precisely
weakening
Mentalcontentsare"in"themindwhether
or nottheyinherein themind.To
be in themind,all suchcontentshaveto be are actualobjectsof occurrent
cognition.Equally,thisaccountenablesus to get a bettergraspof Scotuss
77)Scotus,
Inperiherm.
85-86.
(I) 5-8,nn.44,51,OPhII,83-84,
78)Thespeculation
thatthecommon
nature
isthebearer
ofsemantic
content
isentirely
my
own.Butthepoint
ofthecommon
nature
isthat
itisinsomesense
thesameinparticular
and
inuniversal,
andifweask"thesamewhat theonlyavailable
answer
seems
tobe"thesame
content".
79)Onthis,
seeScotus,
XI,873b.
Rep.4.45.3,n.13,ed.Wadding,
80)Moretechnically,
Scotuss
account
oftheconstitution
ofsubstances
allows
forthefollowing
relations
between
andtheir
substances
order
oftightness
and/or
decreas(inincreasing
properties
ofgenerality):
neither
norcausal
inform(with
ingorder
dependence
informing
requirements);
real
the
first
see
the
on
inherence;
three,
(On
Incarnation,
34-50;
ing;
identity.
myMetaphysics
of
thelast,
seemyDunsScotus
onGod
anobject
ofcognition
without
satis, 112-13,
168-9.)
Being
relations
on
is,itturns
out,another
anyofthese
fying
wayofbeing
partof("in")a substance
Scotuss
account.

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R. Cross
46 (2008)275-301
/Vivarium

[79] 301

For on thisaccount,internalstatesare not necessarily

representationalism.
moreconsciously
accessiblethanexternal.Innerand outertheatres
havethe
- themindor intelligence
- and thisbreakdown
sameobserver
ofthedistinctionbetweenrepresentation
and represented
hingeson thelooseningofwhat
itis to be "in"themind:notas suchinherent,
butsimplypartofa causalstory
with
semantic
contents
and
originating
issuingin an occurrent
cognition.

15:37:18 PM

litio
i)'v
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.bnll.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)302-317

Why Is Thought Linguistic? Ockham's

Two Conceptions
of the Intellect

MartinLenz
Humboldt-Universitt
zuBerlin

Abstract
OneofOckhamsfundamental
tenets
aboutthehumanintellect
isthatitsactsconstitutea mental
this
of
shares
someofthefeatures
language.
Although language thought
ofconventional
is
considered
as
priorto conventional
language,
thought commonly
This
tries
to
show
that
this
consensus
is
inOckseriously
language. paper
challenged
I shallarguethat,in claiming
hamsearlywritings.
thepriority
of conventional
overmental
Ockhamestablished
a novelexplanation
ofthesystelanguage
language,
of
whichanticipates
theideathatthought
becomes
maticitythoughtanexplanation
theacquisition
ofconventional
systematic
through
language.
Keywords
mental
oflanguage
overthought,
semantics,
concepts,
language,
priority
systematicity
1. Introduction
One ofthecentralquestionsthatWilliamofOckhamtackledthroughout
his
academicwritings
is how thehumanintellect
what
works,or moreprecisely,
we have to assumeabout the intellectin orderto explaincognitionand
As is well-known,
Ockhamcouldappealto long-standing
traditions
thought.
accordingto whichthoughtis likelanguage,sinceit is bymeansof language
thatwe communicateour thoughts.Ockham,however,
was rathercautious
and readilyadmittedthatwe do not reallyknowwhatkindof entitiesarein
the intellect.1
So ratherthan relyingon the analogybetweenthoughtand
1}SeeOckham,
inlibrum
d.27,q. 2,OThIV,196-197,
where
Sententiarumt
Scriptum
primum
headdresses
thisissue
asa dificultas
realis
asopposed
tomere
(<
terminological
problems
difficul
tates
vocales).
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
DOI:10.1
163/156853408X360939
NV,
Leiden,

15:39:16 PM

M. LenzI Vivarium
46 (2008)302-317

[81] 303

and evendevelopeddiflanguage,Ockhamtookthisquestionveryseriously
ferent
accountsofwhatcameto be knownas mentallanguage.
Yet,on thefaceofit,at leastone thingseemsto be certain:ifthoughtis like
of concepts,thenthis
languageor evena kindof mentallanguageconsisting
mentallanguageis priorto conventional
If,
language. forinstance,I havea
that
can
be
the
sentence
expressed
by
'Mypaperis notlong',thenthis
thought
of
is
valuablein virtueofthethoughtthatit
plainstring words semantically
of thoughtis clearlystated
expresses notviceversa.The idea of thepriority
in
Aristotle
s
third
book
of
De
anima
:
"For
thecombination
already
ofconcepts
is truthor falsity."2
Thisviewwas and is easilymarriedto Aristotle's
famous
semantic
sketchdrawninthefirst
,whichaccounts
chapterofDe interpretatione
forthepriority
ofthoughtoverconventional
language.
The basic idea is thatwrittensignssignify
spokensounds,whichin turn
thepassionsofthesoul or thesimilitudes
ofthings.3
Around1250 we
signify
a newwayofinterpreting
encounter
thesesimilitudes
orconcepts:theyareno
of thingsbut as mentalsigns.And fromthe
longersolelyseenas similitudes
fourteenth
at leastsinceOckhamsmatureworks,quite
onwards,
early
century
a majority
ofmedievalphilosophers
taketheseconceptsto be constituents
of
a compositionally
structured
mentallanguagewhichis bysomemoderncommentators
likenedto the notionof an ideal languageand by some evento
Fodors notionofa languageofthought.4
AlreadyBoethiuss readingof Aristotlemightpoint into thatdirection,
whenhe saysthatconcepts{intellectus)
aresignificative
of thingsand thatthe
of
are
not
written
and
but
also
parts speech
only
spoken
tacitly
thoughtin the
mind.5So whereasAristotle
construed
and thedivisionintoparts
signification
2)Aristotle,
III 8 (432a11-12):a')^i7C^OKi
Deanima
vaxix^T10
f'yeSo.
yapvotinoci
Cf.Boethius,
Commentarti
inlibrum
Aristotelis
Perihermeneias
intellec,28:"conplexio
namque
tuum
estVeritas
velfalsitas."
3)SeeAristotle,
Deinterpretatione,
Ahelpful
ch.1(l6a3-8).
overview
isprovided
byHansArens,
Aristotle
s Theory
andItsTradition:
Texts
andcommen500to1750, sel.,trans,
ofLanguage
from
H.Arens,
1984).1984.
tary
(Amsterdam/Philadelphia,
4)SeeClaude
Ockham
onConcepts
Panaccio,
Meier-Oeser,
(Aldershot,
2004);cf.Stephan
"SpraimGeist.
cheundBilder
Skizzen
zu einem
philosophischen
Langzeitprojekt",
Philosophisches
111.Jahrgang,
2. Halbband
fora more
critical
assessment.
(2004),312-342
Jahrbuch
5)SeeBoethius,
Commentarii
inlibrum
Aristotelis
Perihermeneias
vero
,24:"intellectus
ipsinihil
aliudnisirerum
sunt."
Seeibid.,
autem
verbum
etnomen
30:"quare
significativi
principaliter
orationis
erunt
aliaverba
etnomina
aliaquaedicantur,
aliaquae
sunt,
partes
quaescribantur,
. . . triplex
tacita
mente
tractentur
autem
nominum
estatqueverborum
. . ."Fora concise
natura
introduction
toBoethius
s semantics
seeJohn
Boethius
Marenbon,
(Oxford,
2003),34-37.

15:39:16 PM

304 [82]

46 (2008)302-317
M. Lenz/Vivarium

ofspeechas properties
ofwritten
or spokenlanguage,Boethiustreatedthem
thathavementalcounterparts.
as features
Butalthoughmanycommentators
disagreeaboutthenatureorfunctioning
of conof concepts,thereseemsto be hardlyanydisputeabout thepriority
Aristotle
himself
never
seems
to
over
written
and
spokenlanguage.
quescepts
tionwhetherthe reversemightbe trueand whetherwordsof our language
ofsemanIndeed,itis a keyfeature
mightbe priorto theconceptstheysignify.
himthatconceptsare
ticexplanationin Aristotle
and thetradition
following
this
idea
when
he
claims
thatthesemantic
to
words.
Boethius
epitomizes
prior
of
and
is
orderofwritten
things an inversion
signs,spokensounds,concepts
thenconcepts,thenspokensounds
thenaturalorder,wherethingscomefirst,
and finally
written
words.6
In thispaper,I wouldliketo addressone of thefewpositionswhichchalaccordingto whichconceptsarepriorto words
lengedthisgeneralagreement
lanor, moregenerally
speaking,mentallanguageis priorto conventional
to
show
some
of
the
I
Ockham
s
work
and
shall
concentrate
on
try
early
guage.
ofhisearlytheoryofmentallanguage;I willfinishwitha
widerimplications
ofturning
theAristotelian
discussionofthebenefits
theoryupsidedown.
of conventional
I shallarguethat,in claimingthepriority
languageover
a novelexplanation
ofthesystematicity
mentallanguage,Ockhamestablished
- an explanation
theidea thatthoughtbecomes
whichanticipates
ofthought
language.
systematic
throughtheacquisitionofconventional
2. FromConceptsto Termsin a Language
ofAristotle's
account.Spokensounds
Letmebeginwitha briefreconstruction
orwordsareconventional
signsofourconceptsofthings.Andwhereaswords
the conceptsof
differin accordancewith different
linguisticconventions,
view
that
for
all.
This
amounts
to
the
are
the
same
conceptsarenaturally
things
conceptsdependon thingsfortheir
priorto words.Since,qua similitudes,
ofwordsdependson concepts,notviceversa.
whilethesignification
content,
Forthepurposesofthispaperwe mighttreatconceptsas unitsofthemental lexicon.Now Aristotlealso claimsthattheseconceptscan be mentally
composedor divided,whichlatermedievalauthorstook to mean thatthe
6)SeeBoethius,
inlibrum
Aristotelis
Perihermeneias
Commentarii
, 20-21: .litterae
quidem
res. . . quaehabent
voces
vero
intellectus
autem
voces,
intellectus,
quandam
concipiant
significent
naturae
suaeordinatione
consedterminata
nonconfusam
consequentiam,
nequefortuitam
..
autem
resintellectum,
intellectus
vero
voxlitteras
stant praecedit
vocem,

15:39:16 PM

MLenz/Vivarium
46 (2008)302-317

[83] 305

Butwhereasit mightseem
conceptscan be composedintomentalsentences.
rather
to
that
are
to
unproblematic say
concepts prior words,itis quiteanother
So itis
to
that
mental
sentences
arepriorto conventional
sentences.
thing say
worthwhile
to examinehowthispriority
is qualified.
2. 1 Epistemic
orSemantic
Priority
As mentalsimilitudes
ofthings,conceptsmaybe claimedto havesomeofthe
the
of
properties
thingsgraspedthroughthoseveryconcepts.If I havebeen
standingin a gardenin frontofa greentreeI and formedtheconcept"tree",
I can thinkaboutthetreebymeansof theconceptevenifI am no longerin
the garden.My capacityof doing so can be explainedby appealingto the
- the formal
whichinclude- dependingon the theory
conceptsproperties
ifI hear
to trees.Bycontrast,
features
oftreesorat leastsomesortofsimilitude
theutterance
"tree"I can also thinkof trees,butthereis nothingin thatvery
whichwould explainmycapacityto do so; theworditselfhas no
utterance
relevant
to explainingmycapacityof thinking
abouttrees,unless,
properties
of course,we add theclaimthatthewordevokestheconcept"tree",which
as a
thenenablesme to thinkabouttrees.Accordingly,
thewordsfunctioning
placeholderof a thing as Aristotleclaimed in the SophisticRefutations
to a concept.Thisis whyconcepts
(l65a6-8)- is grantedbyitssubordination
werelatercallednaturalsignsas opposedto wordswhichsignify
conventionIf
the
word
"tree"
were
to
a
different
subordinated
ally.
concept,saytheconof "tree"would evoketheconcept"cat".So
cept "cat",thenyourutterance
have
overwords,and thustheyarealso semanticoncepts
epistemicpriority
In
other
words:
callyprior.
conceptsgrantthe semanticidentitybetween
wordsand things.7
2.2

Syntactic
Priority

Commentators
such as ThomasAquinas and JohnDuns Scotusdeveloped
thisviewintoa logico-psychological
doctrineofmentaloperations,
bymergDe anima: theyclaimthattheformaing it withsome tenetsin Aristotle's
tionofconceptsis thefirstoperationof theintellect,
followedbythesecond
or
the
of
division
and
third
operationof syllogizing.8
operation composition
7)SeeDominik
amMain,2002),
Theorien
derIntentionalitt
imMittelalter
Perler,
(Frankfurt
Mentale
vonOckhams
Thesen
zurSprachandMartin
Stze.Wilhelm
361-374,
Lenz,
319-342,
lichkeit
desDenkens
15.
2003),esp.107-1
(Stuttgart,
8)SeeThomas
libri
1.1,ed.Gauthier,
5,andScotus,
Quaestiones
Aquinas,
Peryermenias
Expositio

15:39:16 PM

306 [84]

M. Lenz/Vivarium
46 (2008)302-317

The explanatory
powerofconceptsis thusextendedto therealmofsentences
and arguments.
Couchedin psychological
termsand definedas mentaloperaI
this
seems
tions,
straightforward.form,say,a simpleconceptof man,
I formanothersimpleconceptofanimal,and then- bymeansofthesecond
- I combinethoseconceptsand forma mentalsentence,
operation
say"every
man is an animal".However,thisextensionis not as harmlessas it might
Forwe arenotonlydealingwithdifferent
appearat first.
typesofmentalacts;
theseactsshouldalso havedifferent
outcomes:thefirst
rather,
operationproduces a concept,the seconda sentence.In contrastto a concept,a mental
sentenceprobablyhas quitedifferent
it is complex,has a different
properties:
semantics
and containscertainpartsthatarenotexplicablethrough
a relation
to things.In additionto the intentional
relationsbetweenconceptsin the
mindand thingsin theworld,we obviouslyhaveto takeintoaccountsyntacticrelations
betweenconcepts.
on De interpretatione
we findstrongobjecAlreadyin Scotuss commentary
tionsto the idea thattheAristotelian
viewof conceptscan be extendedto
on thegroundsthattherealmofthementaldoesnotcontainstrucsentences,
notionofconcepts,however,
turalparts.Appealingto theAristotelian
Scotus
defendstheviewthatthementalsentencehas priority
overspokenand written sentences:the enuntiationes
in menteare sentencesproperlyspeaking,
in a derivedsense.9
whereasconventional
sentences
aresentences
The interesting
pointofthisdebate(risingin thelate 13thcentury)is that
thisviewrequiresa justification
at all.As we shallsee,theconsensusthatconare
to
words
is
shaken
by the ( primafacie quite plausibleand
cepts
prior
is
congruous)attemptto extendthisviewto theclaimthatstructured
thought
to
prior language.

octoinduoslibros
Perihermeneias
, prooemium
(Vivs,1891),581,whoappealnotonlyto
Aristotle's
De interpretatione
butalsotoDe anima
: seeesp.De animaIII 6 (430a26-28)
and
III 8 (432al0-12).
9)SeeScotus,
inlibros
Perihermenias
Aristotelis,
II, ed.
Quaestiones
q. 1,Operaphilosophica
R.Andrews
etal.,44-45(cf.Vivs1891,539-540):
".. .Siautem
istae
[sc.
proprietatesopposiinvoce,hocnonestperseprimo,
enuntiationi
sedinquantum
est
tio,habitudo
etc.]insint
inmente [Objection:]
inmente,
enuntiationis
Item,
signum
quodnonestenuntiatio
probatio:quiaillius
nonsuntnomen
etverbum
cumutrumque
sitvox;sedenuntiationis
de
partes,
hic
determinatur
sunt
illae
.
.
.
in
dico
sicut
nomen
et
verbum
voce
sunt
qua
partes.
[Reply:]
quod
enuntiationis
invoce,sicipsainmente
inmente.
suntpartes
enuntiationis
Quaeenim
partes
inprima
abintellectu
eiusoperatione,
insecunda,
licet
nechaecnec
concipiuntur
componuntur
illaexpriman
tur."

15:39:16 PM

M. Lenz/Vivarium
46 (2008)302-317

[85] 307

The idea behindScotuss defenceseems straightforward:

if you want a
coherenttheorywhichexplainsthegeneralpriority
of thementaloperations
- and thisis whatyouwantifyouwishto say,for
overconventional
language
of
example,thatall logiciansstudythesame logicand not thepeculiarities
different
then
better
had
account
for
the
of
,
both,
you
priority
languages
thesemanticand thestructural
ofthought.
At thebeginning
ofthe
properties
14thcentury
we consequently
encountera seriousdebateaboutthepossible
candidatesthatcoherently
thesemanticand structural
that
satisfy
properties
hitherto
havebeenascribedto thought.Things(res)as theyareconstruedin
s accountof thepropositio
in reareseenas semantically
Burley
unambiguous,
buttheydo notfulfil
thestructural
whereasconventional
requirements,
spoken sounds (voces) lack semanticidentityunlesstheyare tied to concepts
(conceptus).10
Now, obviouslythequoted criticisms
againstScotusaffectthetraditional
viewof conceptsas well.Conceptsqua constituent
partsof thoughtseemto
different
from
similitudes
ofthings.
require
properties
conceptsqua
3. Ockham'sAccountofMentalLanguage
3.1

Ockham'smature*
Theory

This problemis spelledout in Ockhams earlywork,whichis stilllargely

who favourOckhams
ignoredor quicklydismissedbymanycommentators,
laterpositionthathe presented
around1323, notablyin hisSummaLogicae
.
The current
viewof Ockhamsmaturetheoryrecognizes
thatOckhamsolved
theproblemsalludedto above by assigningtwo different
rolesto concepts:
are
the
basic
units
of
semantics
as
well
as
constituents
of structured
they
to
this
later
content
is
thought.11
theory,
According
conceptual
acquiredbya
causalrelation
betweentheworldandthemind;butsinceourmindisendowed
withthecapacityto formstructured
theseconceptscan function
sentences,
as constituent
of
mental
sentences.
parts
Especiallythe latteraspectseems
to renderOckhamsnotionof mentallanguagecomparableto Jerry
Fodors
10)Seeonthisdebate
Lenz2003,52-71andChristian
undDinge.Diepropositio
Rode,"Stze
inrebeiWalter
undanderen",
Bochumer
undMittelalJahrbuch
Burley
Philosophisches
frAntike
ter10(2005),67-91.
n) Fora concise
discussion
ofthisdifferentiation
seeDominik
"DieSystematizitt
des
Perler,
Denkens.
Zu Ockhams
Theorie
dermentalen
111.Jahrgang,
Jahrbuch
Sprache"
Philosophisches
2. Halbband
Cf.Panaccio
2004,5.
(2004),291-311.

15:39:16 PM

308 [86]

46 (2008)302-317
M. Lenz/Vivarium

Ockhams maintenetis: mentallanguage

LanguageofThoughtHypothesis.12
is semantically
and syntactically
priorto spokenlanguage.
is
as
as
However, probably
just wellknown,Ockhamadmittedevenin these
laterworksthat,althoughwe are endowedwitha dispositionto formsentencesout ofnaturally
concepts,thereis stillthetroubleto explain
significant
relevantpropertiesof concepts.13
the originof certainstructurally
Typical
terms
are
examples syncategorematic suchas "is","all"etc.Althoughtheyare
sincetheyrendersentencestrueor false,theycannot
semantically
necessary,
be derivedfromthe experienceof things.So wheredo theycome from?A
likelyconclusionin line withOckhamsgeneralthesiswould be thatthese
conceptsarepartofourmentalcapacitieswhichenableus to formsentences.
Thisis indeedtheconclusionthathe seemsto suggestin severalpassagesofhis
laterworks.14
theseinnatefeaPutin termsofFodors LanguageofThoughtHypothesis,
of thought:theyaccountforthe
turesof conceptsexplainthesystematicity
between
fact,forinstance,thatwe arenot onlycapableto tellthedifference
suchas "allsheeparewhite"and "somesheeparewhite"butalso to
sentences
- whichis indeeda majorpointforOckham,too.15
thinkthisdifference
of
notderivefromfeatures
ofthoughtdoes certainly
But thesystematicity
hasto be at least
worldis like,thought
theextramental
theworld.So whatever
12)SeeJerry
inthePhilosophy
: The
Problem
A.Fodor,
ofMind(CamofMeaning
Psychosemantics
toconcepts,
Fodor
alsoassigns
bothroles
Tobesure,
1987),1-26and135-154.
bridge/Mass.,
see
tobeinnate
andphysically
that
Fodor
takes
oneofthecrucial
differences
real;
concepts
being
Went
Where
Science
A.
1-39.
1998),
(Oxford,
Wrong
JerryFodor,
Concepts: Cognitive
13)SeeOckham,
dicitur
intendo
IV,q. 35,OThIX,471:"Similiter
Quodlibeta
large
accipiendo,
intentiones
animae
naturalia
animae
nonsolum
secunda
quaesunt
quisignifcat
signa
conceptus
mentalia
sedetiam
ad
stricte
cuiusmodi
suntintentiones
rerum,
potest
primae
acceptae,
signa
nonhabementalia.
Etistomodoforte
putasyncategoremata
placitum
significare,
significantia
a second
intenintentioni
secundae."
musnisivocale
[Likewise,
loosely
speaking,
correspondens
ofthesoulwhich
arenatural
notonly
those
intentions
ofthesoulthat
tionisa concept
signifies
itcanalsosignify
mental
inthestrict
rather
intentions
taken
ofthings,
suchasfirst
sense,
signs
mental
terms.
This
such
as
which
institution,
waywe
byvoluntary
syncategorematic
signify
signs
to
the
second
haveperhaps
but
a
sound
intention.]
nothing spoken corresponding
14)Seeforinstance
inlibrum
d. 2, q. 8, OThII,
Sententiarum,
Ockham,
Scriptum
primum
289-290.
15)SeeOckham,
inlibrum
Perihermeneias
Aristotelis,
6, OPhII,354prooemium,
Expositio
"Oratio
mentalis
undMentaCf.Perler
2004andMartin
Lenz,
358,andFodor
1987,149-151.
inHerbst
Einsptmittelalterlicher
Blick
aufdiegegenwrtige
desGeistes",
lesisch.
Philosophie
des14.und15.Jahrhunderts,
ed.J.Aertsen
andM.Pickav
desMittelalters?
zurBewertung
Fragen
Mediaevalia
York
{Miscellanea
31),2004),105-130.
(Berlin/New

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[87] 309

as systematic
as language,sinceotherwise
we wouldnotbe ableto capturethe
varieties
and differences
thatoccurin conventional
languages.
In somerespects
subscribed
to thisthesis,butevenin his
Ockhamcertainly
matureworkssomedoubtsstillremain,whichpointbackto hisearlytheory.
accountis thathisacknowlReminiscent
ofhisadherenceto theAristotelian
of
these
doubts
are
accompaniedby phrasessuchas "improperly
edgements
buttheystillremainvital.Let us nowlook morecloselyat them.
speaking",
3.2

Ockham
s EarlyTheory

- as I see it- is quite simple:we

The basic idea of Ockhams earliertheory
neitherhavean inbornmentallanguagenoran inbornsystematic
capacityto
Allwe can do as itwerefromtheoutset is to exercise
menformsentences.
is ratherderivedfromouracquaintalacts.The systematicity
ofourthoughts
is correct,then,
tance with conventionallanguage.If this interpretation
to whatOckhamlaterclaimed,conventional
contrary
languageis structurally
priorto mentallanguage.16
Centralto Ockhamsearlyand laterpositionsis theidea thatmentalsentencesrequirecertaingrammatical
and logicalfeatures
just as conventional
canonesdo. The mentalcounterpart
oftheword"man"(homo),forinstance,
ofthetermin thegenitive
case:"of
notbe thesameas thementalcounterpart
can be
man" (hominis).The problemis just how such grammatical
features
in
We easilyrecognize
thisproblem ourcommon
saidto belongto concepts.17
wayofspeaking.Althoughwe mightcommonlysaythatwe havetheconcept
of man,we are unlikelyto claim thatthe conceptappearsin a genitiveor
in wordsare
accusativecase. But we would stillagreethatsuch differences

16)Fora more
seeLenz2003,98-130.
detailed
examination
17)Seeforinstance
inlibrum
Sententiarum
, d.2,q. 1,OHi II,24:
Ockham,
Scriptum
primum
sedetiam
illud
"Undeper'hominis
nontantum
per'homo',
importatur quodimportatur
dominium
illud
Similiter,
per
super
quodimportatur
per'homo'.
importatur
aliquid
quodhabet
etuniversaliter
'homines'
nonimportatur
reseodem
modoquoimportatur
per'homo';
quaelibet
frefalsificant
etconceptui
etnomini
talesmodigrammaticales
propositiones
quiconveniunt
Sed
tales
modi
eas
et
non
et
reddunt
qualiter
quenter,frequenter
incongruas intelligibiles
notonly
what
'ofman'conveys
convenire
[Thus,
conceptui
postpatebit."
possunt
grammaticales
isconveyed
that
hasdominion
over
that
which
isconveyed
butalsosomething
by'man.
by'man'
inthesamewayinwhich
itisconveyed
'mendoesnotconvey
Likewise,
by'man'.
everything
as
to
names
freto
as
well
those
modes
which
Andgenerally,
pertain concepts
grammatical
- But
andunintelligible
false
render
them
make
sentences
andfrequently
incongruent
quently
toconcepts
willbeclarified
inwhat
modes
canpertain
later.]
waythose
grammatical

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so theyshouldoccurin thoughtin some

relevant
to themeaningofsentences,
or
another.
way
features
come from?Ockhamsreplyis that
So wheredo thesestructural
discussesthecase of
fromconventional
theyareabstracted
language.He first
in theexternal
since
there
is
terms
and
that,
nothing
argues
syncategorematic
termssuchas "is"or "all",theyhaveto be
worldfromwhichwe couldabstract
fromconventional
sentences.But in contrastto whatmanyand
abstracted
evenrecentcommentators
claim,he goes on to saythat,generally
speaking,
and logicalmodescan be imposedonlyad placitumon conthegrammatical
cepts,sincetheydo not naturally
belongto any concept.Thus,in factwe
alwaysabstractthese featuresfromspoken sounds and impose concepts
accordingly.18
conto notethatthisis notjust trueof syncategorematic
It is important
modes
all
to
and
With
of
all
grammatical
concepts.
regard logical
ceptsbut
fromconventional
language.So withregardto therole
conceptsareabstracted
and imposedto functionin
in syntactic
all conceptsareabstracted
contexts,
wordsdo.19
thewaythatconventional
18)SeeOckham,
Sententiarum
inlibrum
, d.2,q. 8,OThII,285-286:. .et
primum
Scriptum
istis
nec
universaliter
necmodi
conceptibus
possunt
plusexsecompetere
logicales
grammaticales
velabstrahi
Possunt
autem
tales
utentium.
sed
tantum
ad
illis,
conceptus
imponi
placitum
quam
istivoci'homo'
Verbi
velsemper
velcommuniter.
a vocibus,
etitafitdefacto
competit
gratia,
etsic
masculini
nominativi
talis
modus
casus,
numeri,
generis,
quodestsingularis
grammatical
neither
.
.
.
and
alii
modi
dealiis;etistivoci'hominis'
[
generally,
competunt
grammaticales."
than
tothose,
more
tothese
canbythemselves
norlogical
modes
concepts
pertain
grammatical
orabstracted
from
canbeimposed
butonlybyvoluntary
use.Suchconcepts,
however,
spoken
Thegrammatical
modethat
orgenerally
andthisiswhatinfactoralways
sounds,
happens.
nominative
issuchthat
itisofsingular
for
tothespoken
soundman',
number,
instance,
pertains
to
modes
while
there
are
different
and
the
like,
case,masculine
grammatical pertaining
gender
thespoken
soundofman'.]
19)SeeOckham,
abistis
inlibrum
Sententiarum
,d.2,q. 8,OThII,268:"Tunc
Scriptum
primum
communes
de eis,et
abstrahit
intellectus
vocibus
sicsignificantibus
praedicabiles
conceptus
Eteodem
voces
extra.
iliaeadem
istos
adsignificandum
quaesignificant
ipsae
imponit
conceptus
consimiles
consimiles
ethabentes
format
modoetdetalibus
proprietates
quales
propositions
ita
instituere
tales
adsicsignificandum,
Etsicut
habent
conceptus
prolatae.
potest
propositiones
subeisdem
modis
abstractos
a rebus
adsignificandum
instituere
grammaipsos
conceptus
potest
abstracHoctamen
fitconvenientius
subquibus
ticalibus
perconceptus
ipsaevoces.
significant
illi
sunt
distincti
sicut
tosa vocibus
vitandam,
conceptus
ipsae
quia
aequivocationem
propter
common
insucha way,
theintellect
abstracts
voces
. . .".[From
sounds
then,
spoken
signifying
thesameas
these
tosignify
ofthem;
anditimposes
which
canbepredicated
concepts
concepts
in
thesame
from
these
the
intellect
extramental
sounds.
And
issignified
the
forms,
by
spoken
senwhich
tothespoken
haveproperties
similar
tothose
similar
sentences
which
pertain
way,
tosignify
insuchandsucha way,
it
caninstitute
suchconcepts
tences.
Andjustastheintellect

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3.3

[89] 311

ofHis EarlyTheory
Consequences

An immediate
consequenceofthisviewis thatconventional
languageis strucon Ockhams
recent
commentators
to
mental
turallyprior
language.Many
as
rather
It
not
would
see
this
result
unattractive.
onlycontradicts
philosophy
of mentallanguageas a logicallyideal language
the earlierinterpretations
fromtheVienneseCirclebut also theviewof
the
lines
of
the
models
along
mentallanguageas a Fodorianmentalese.20
viewof conceptsas
theAristotelian
Worsestillperhaps,it also contradicts
of
overwords.For if certainsemanticproperties
havingsemanticpriority
markersand if conceptshave to be abstracted
termsare based on syntactic
on theirsleeves,then
fromlanguagebecausetheydo notwearthesemarkers
conventional
priorto mentallanguage.
languageis also semantically
thatsome conof
this
view is therefore
Anotherimportant
consequence
it
notcomeas a
but
instituted.
So
should
are
not
naturally
cepts
significative
ad
to
there
certain
thatOckhamadmits
conceptus placituminstisurprise
being
it is rather
aresomehowarbitrary,
tutuThisdoes notmeanthatour thoughts
as themind.Not
a consequenceoftheviewthattheworldis notas systematic
To thinkthatall
we conceiveof is rootedin extramental
reality.
everything
humansaremortal,forinstance,does notrequirean entitycalledallness.On
with
theotherhand,thefactthatall humansaremortal,can onlybe expressed
term"all".21
thehelpofthesyncategorematic
thevery
samegrammatical
tosignify
caninstitute
theconcepts
abstracted
from
under
things
to
avoidequivocameans
of
which
the
sounds
themselves
modes
However,
by
spoken
signify
ofconcepts
abstracted
from
moreconveniently
sounds,
tion,thishappens
bymeans
spoken
themselves
. . .]
since
these
areasdistinct
asthespoken
sounds
concepts
20)Seeforinstance
in
onSupposition
andEquivocation
Catarina
Dutilh
"Ockham
Novaes,
and
Mental
the
Medieval
3
(2004),
Proceedings
of Society
for
Logic Metaphysics
Language",
CalvinG.
URL=http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/SMLM/PSMLM3/PSMLM3.pdf,
Summa
ofOckhams
"Material
andtheMental
Normore,
Logicae'Topoi
Supposition
Language
inOckhams
Mental
andEquivocation
16(1997),27-33andPaulVincent
"Synonymy
Spade,
ofinterlines
18(1980),9-22.Onthedifferent
Journal
Language",
oftheHistory
ofPhilosophy
seeLenz2003,13-16.
pretation
21)SeeOckham,
inlibrum
Sententiarum
, d. 30,q. 1,OThIV,317:"...iste
primum
Scriptum
inanima,
ettarnen
sineisto
velintentio
'omnis'
esttantum
quoddam
conceptus
syncategorema
sitrisibilis
omnis
sineomniconceptu,
omnis
homoestrisibilis.
homo,
Quodtarnen
conceptu
orintention
nonpossumus
nisiperconceptum
[.. .theconcept
exprimere
syncategorematicum."
is
human
inthesoul,yeteven
without
this
isonly
a syncategorematic
term
every
concept
every'
iscapable
that
without
oflaughing.
Butthefact
whatsoever,
human,
anyconcept
every
capable
SeealsoOckham,
ofa syncategorematic
oflaughing
canbeexpressed
concept.]
only
bymeans
OTh
and
in
librum
d.
Ockham,
ibid.,
405-407,
Sententiarumi
31,
1,
IV,
q.
Scriptum
primum
d.3,q. 2,OThII,403.Cf.Fodor
1998,26.

15:39:16 PM

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46 (2008)302-317
M. Lenz/Vivarium

A moreinteresting
resultof thisview is- to adjusta phrasecoined by
canthinkmoreclearlythanwe underAshworth thatwe sometimes
Jennifer
stand.We can use instituted
with
a certainsemanticvaguenessto
concepts
thinkabout somethingthatwe do not (fully)understand.
Thisway certain
as
such
"sun"
or
"weather"
can
be takenas pro"electron",
"God",
concepts
have
of
to
which
we
do
not
or
distinct
concepts22 things
complete
epistemic
Thisopensup thepossibility
thatconceptsdo notnecessarily
access.23
needan
To adopt a famoustermfrom
epistemic,let alone ontological,foundation.
Dennett:we can use conceptsjustlikewe usewordsas "toolsforthinking".24
we cannotdo withnaturally
concepts,so
(Again,thisis something
significant
of wordsgainspriority
overtheepistemicvalueof concepts.)
thearbitrarity
institute
a termthatmeanssomeWe can,to takeone ofOckhamsexamples,
which
is
different
from
all
other
and
name
it'Go justas we can
thing
things
I meetnext'.So we can devisea linguistic
institute
a termto mean whomever
precisionwithoutfoundingit on distinctepistemicaccessto certainobjects:
is notalwaysthesameas intelligereP
significare
22)Incontrast
whose
isfixed
natural
can
toconcepts
content
bytheir
signification,
pro-concepts
adhocinstitutions
whose
content
iscontextually
See
Dan
beseenona parwith
specified. Sperber
inLanguage
"TheMapping
between
theMental
andthePublic
andDeirdre
Lexicon",
Wilson,
Themes
andThought:
andJ.Boucher
,ed.P.Carruthers
1998),184Interdisciplinary
(Cambridge,
- tobe
200.I borrow
thisterm
from
their
relevance-theoretic
account
ofconcept-formation
to
a
of
this
without
Ockham
kind.
sure,
ascribing
fully
fledged
theory
23)SeeOckham,
inlibrum
Sententiarum
, d.22,q. 1,OThIV,45-57;seeesp.
Scriptum
primum
solemnondistincte
vidt
necintelligit
solem
distincte
videns
quianonvidt
p. 57:"aliquis
estipsius
ettarnen
istavoxsol'apudeumdistincte
solem
solis,
quidquid
quiasignificai
significat
thesunneither
sibiillam
remquamvidet
confuse
etnullam
aliam."
[Someone
distinctly
seeing
since
he
not
see
that
seesnorintellectually
the
does
sun,
distinctlyeverything
cognizes
belongs
for
himthespoken
tothesunassuch.
soundsundistinctly
thesun,since
Nevertheless,
signifies
forhimitsignifies
thevery
that
heseesconfusedly
andnoother
Cf.Lenz2003,
thing
thing.]
A Problem
118-124
thanI Understand?
of
andE. J.Ashworth,
"CanI SpeakMoreClearly
in
in
of
Duns
Studies
in
and
Medieval
Ghent,
Scotus,
Ockham",
Religious
Language Henry
andR. H. Robins
, ed.K. Koerner,
(Amsterdam,
1980),
H.-J.Niederehe
Linguistic
Thought
29-38.1980.
24)Notethat
this
viewisvery
inlinewith
Ockhams
much
tenet
that
areficta.
See
early
concepts
in
librum
Sententiarum
d.
OTh
and
273
285.
Ockham,
2,
,
8,
II,
q.
Scriptum
primum
25)SeeOckham,
inlibrum
Sententiarum
, d. 22,q. 1,OThIV,55.Cf.ibid.:
primum
Scriptum
siviator
nonposset
instituere
nomen
addistincte
divinam
"Praeterea,
essentiam,
significandum
nisiquianonpotest
hocnonesset
Deumdistincte
Sedhocnonobstat,
intelligere.
quiavoxalidistincte
fuit
Patet
distincte
intellectum.
dehac
quapotest
aliquid
significare
quodnumquam
voce'homo'
hominem
futurum
etiam
sinenovaimpositione."
[Furquoddistincte
significabit
ifa wayfarer
were
toinstitute
a nametodistinctly
unable
thedivine
thermore,
essence,
signify
thiswould
besosolely
because
hecannot
God.Butthisdoesnotmake
distincdy
any
cognize

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[91] 313

4. Benefitsof thisTheory
Thisaccountclearlycontradicts
Ockhams"mature"
butneitheris this
theory,
a reasonto avoidthequestionof itshistorical
impactin favourofa coherent
viewof medievaltheoriesof mentallanguage,nordoes his earlytheoryneed
to be seenas philosophically
immature.
Withregardto thehistoryof philosophywe seemto preferto thinkthat
neverquestionedwhetherlanguagemightinfluence
medievalphilosophers
thought.
But I do not thinkthatOckhamsearlyapproachwas justan embarrassed
forlack of a bettertheory.So it willprobablybe rewarding
to
hand-waving
to readingauthorssuchas Crathornor RichardBrinkley
in orderto get
return
a bettergraspof alternatives
to the commonview of mentalesewhichwas
questionedagainin latescholasticand earlymodernphilosophy.26
To sharpenthephilosophical
graspofOckhamsearlyapproach,itmightbe
to
look
for
not
helpful
parallels to Fodorbut to his opponents:mostnotably
- "suggested
to Daniel Dennett,who- as Fodor himselfremarked
thatits
that
makes
a
mind
systematic."27
learning
language
A standardobjectionto thisview is thatmentallanguagewould be as
true,ifone
ambiguousas conventional
language.But thisis not necessarily
takesintoaccountthedistinction
betweenthehearers and speakers perspective.28
Of course,a hearermightneedto go througha processofdisambiguation,by listeningto othersentencesan so on. But thisis not trueforthe
we normally
do notwonderwhether
speakerorforthefirst
personperspective:
we think(of) thisor thatwhilewe employthisor thatconcept.29
sinceanyspoken
soundcandistinctly
thatwasnever
difference,
distinctly
signify
something
Thisisclear
from
thecaseofthespoken
willdistinctly
soundman'which
cognized.
any
signify
maninthefuture
without
anynewimposition.]
26)SeeLaurent
'"Ubiestpropositio?'
Richard
surleslieuxdeleproposition
Cesalli,
Brinkley
V.
in
Medieval
Theories
Assertive
and
Non-assertive
Acts
CSumma
1-5)",
Logicae
of
Language:
ofthe
14th
onMedieval
and
Semantics
ed.
A.
L.
Valente
Maieru
and
,
(Rome,
European
Symposium
Logic
onBrinkley.
OnCrathorn
seePerler
Fora con1997andLenz2003,179-181.
2004),445-471
ciseexamination
oflater
seeMeier-Oeser
2004.
developments
27)Fodor1998,26.Fora succinct
ofthisviewseeDanielC. Dennett,
presentation
"Learning
andLabeling",
MindandLanguage
8/4(1993),540-547.
Cf.DanielC. Dennett,
Consciousness
(boston,
1991),218-228.
Explained
28)Thisdefence
isputforward,
that
"much
others,
byDavidCole,whoargues
amongst
thought
isindeed
internalized
of
a
conventional
see
David
Yourself
Cole,
speech"
language:
"Hearing
Think:
Natural
Inner
andThought",
1997(http://www.umn.edu/-dcole/
Speech
Language,
hearthot.htm).
29)Inthesame
veinOckham
between
theintentio
auctoris
and
,theusus
distinguishes
loquentium

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M. Lenz/Vivarium
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Anothermoremodernobjectionis to pointout thatthisviewleadsto the

of conceptualrelativism.
But eventhisviewcan be counincompatibilities
teredby appealingto a distinction
betweena cognitiveand communicative
function
oflanguage.30
The mostchallenging
objectionhoweveris thatit seemsincongruousto
a languagewhoseverymeaningis said
claimthatwe acquireconceptsthrough
to dependon themeaningoftheconcepts.If I solelyperceivea word,thenI
do not understand
it, unlessit evokesa concept;it remainsa meresound.
is thatwe indeed"mustclimbstepsin whichwe
Dennetts idea,bycontrast,
but
dont
understand
oui
ownrepresentations."31
So we learnto employ
perceive
we can use termssuchas "God"
Similarly
conceptsbyusingrepresentations.
or "sun"without(fully)understanding
them.Once we can employa representationad placitum
itis notreallya distinctly
, understanding
epistemic
process
but also a matterof decision(whichis not stricdydependenton epistemic
access).This idea is not properly
spelledout in Ockham but it is certainly
to theclassicalconception
worthconsidering
thisviewas a valuablealternative
ofmentalese.

5. Conclusion
On thisaccount,then,conventional
languageis priorto mentallanguagein
markthreerespects:
it
is
(1)
syntactically
priorin thatitcontainstherelevant
erswhichwe abstract
and applyto concepts;(2) itis semantically
priorin that
thenon-ambiguity
ofmental
isgenerally
thevirtus
sermonis.
since
to
However,
language
argued
restonthenatural
of
its
there
is
still
room
for
as
terms,
syntactic
signification
equivocation,
Ockham
Summa
admits
that
III.4,c.4,OPhI,763).Yetthisdoesnotentail
(Ockham,
Logicae
Ockham
iscommitted
totheclaim
that
thethinker
inquestion
beconfused
astowhether
might
for
shethinks
thisorthat.
Remember
wasconstrued
alsoasa medium
thatmental
language
communication
between
so
can
be
the
byinvoking
angels, possible
ambiguities explained
distinction
between
hearer
andspeaker.
Cf.Lenz2003,162-165
and128-131.
angelic
30)Thebasicideaofthecognitive
isthat
conscious
isconducconception
propositional
thinking
tedinandpartly
evenconstituted
Thisisargued
conventional
tobe
by(internalized)
language.
tenable
without
to
embrace
the
so-called
Whorfian
and
its
relativist
consehypothesis
having
Fora detailed
seePeter
andConsciousness:
An
account
Carruthers,
quences.
Language,
Thought
inPhilosophical
1996).
Essay
Psychology
(Cambridge,
31)SeeDennett
wehuman
canachieve
1993,542: . .thesortoflearning
beings
justbyconin
of
not
on
our
symbolic
merely,somesense,
representations
depends
templating
knowledge
inorder
butalsounderstanding
andmyrather
curious
isthat
them,
them,
perceiving
suggestion
toarrive
atthismarvellous
wemust
inwhich
weperceive
butdontunderclimb
summit,
steps
stand
ourownrepresentations."

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[93] 315

at leastsomesemanticrelationsdo dependon syntactic

combinations;
(3) it
of a kindat least,in thatit enablesus to label
can haveepistemicpriority,
access.(We can mentally
ofthedegreeofourcognitive
objectsindependently
of them.)
"handle"objectswithouthavingto resortto an understanding
thekindof mentallanguagethatOckhamdepicts
UnlikeFodors mentalese,
our cognitiveprocesses,ratherit
in his earlytheoryis not one underlying
thatwe use in thinking.
ofrepresentations
grantstheavailability
in defending
a
This is probablywhythe earlyOckhamsaw no difficulty
mental
acts
to
means
in re-theory.
kindofpropositio
things
Thinking
applying
thususingbothres
and applying
themto conceptswhenno thingsarepresent,
in thought.
Whenthequestionarises
as representations
and conceptus
cognitae
of construingrelations
are
of
how
we
capable using representations,
just
the
answer
is: itis becausewe have
betweenontologically
independent
things,
learneda languagewhichenablesus to turntheobjectswe havecognizedinto
whichin turnallow forsome vitaleleconstituents.
Constituents
syntactic
and recursion.32
mentsin thought:structure

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15:39:16 PM

KtG/^
i.j
'v
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341

Ame intellective,
Jean de Jandun

me cogitative:

et la duplex farma propria

de l'homme

Brenet
Jean-Baptiste
Universit
deParis
X-Nanterre

Abstract
Thearticle
theideathataccording
totheaverroist
of
Master
JeandeJandun,
analyses
Artsin Parisat thebeginning
ofthe14thcentury,
humanbeingsarecomposed
ofa
doubleform
theseparated
intellect
ontheonehand,thecogitative
soulontheother
After
hand.
several
ofthetime,weexplore
of
Jeansreading
recalling
majoraccounts
Averroes'
theproblem.
we challenge
theidea
majorconceptions
Finally,
concerning
inhiswritings
towhichweobserve
theradical
thesis
ofa sometimes
according
cogitatdoublehumanbeingthatmakesofthehomointelligens
a
ingsometimes
thinking
andexclusive
newbeing,
whichis accidentally
whilethethinking
punctual
produced
takesplace.
Keywords
soul,intellect,
form,
humanity
cogitative,
anthropology,
1. Introduction
Dans le GrandCommentaire
Averros
du livreDe l'me, deuxphrasesparaissentse contredire,
ou du moinsse faireconcurrence,
surla questionmajeure
de la spcification
de l'homme.Dans le textequi ouvreson commentaire
du
livreIII, Averros
critabord ceci proposde la facultrationnelle
: c'est
des autrestresvivants,commeil estdit en de
par elle que l'hommediffre
nombreuxpassages1.L'ideestordinaire,
elle correspond
la
videmment;
1}Averros,
etlaPense.
Grand
Commentaire
du'Deanima'.
III (429a 10-435
Livre
L'Intelligence
b 25)ytraduction,
introduction
etnotes
cf.
(Paris,
1998),49; pourle latin,
parA. deLibera
Averrois
Cordubensis
commentarium
inAristotelis
deanimalibros
Averros,
, d.F.S.
magnum
Crawford
rationabilis
(Mass.),
1953),379,21-23:perhancvirtutem
[lavirtus
]
(Cambridge
Danssoncommentaire
differt
homo
abaliisanimalibus,
utdictum
estinmultis
locis.
6 dulivre
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
NV,
Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/
156853408X360948

15:39:44 PM

/Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

[97] 319

Mais quelques
caractrisation
courantede l'hommecommeanimalrationnel.
fin
Averros

du
commentaire
l'extrme
loin,
parlede l'invingt,
pagesplus
assimile

la
facult
tellectpassible{intellectus
imaginative
passibilis)2,qu'il
en tant
de l'imagination
aux formes
humaine3,ou encore,plusexactement,
il
et
crit
cette
fois:

l'homme
elles
la
sur
4;
propre
qu'agit
facultcogitative
les hommes
cet intellectqu'Aristoteappellepassibleest ce qui diffrencie
numre
dans les Topiques
selonles quatrefacultsmentionnes
, qu'Alfarabi
danslesElenchi ; puisil ajoute: cest[. . .] par cetintellect
diffre
que l'homme
desautresanimaux, carsi teln'taitpas le cas,il y auraitjonctionde l'intellect
possibleavecles [autres]animaux,etde la mmemanire
agentetde l'intellect
faitedu dtailde ces thses,le problmeest
[qu'avecl'homme].5Abstraction
des autresespces,le texte
clair: s'il s'agitde savoirpar quoi l'hommediffre
n'articule
deux
d'Averros
pas de faonnette:
rponses,qu'il
paratindiquer
en
de l'autre,Xymaginatio
d'un ct,la virtusrationalisa
, ou plusprcisment,
. De cettepossible
elle,cettepuissanceindividuelle
qu'estla virtuscogitativa
les Latinsont faitune querelle,roulantsurla formede l'homme,
ambigut,
danslaquellele problmenotiquede la sparation
ontologiqueetde l'unicit
de l'intellectcroisela questiontrsembrouillede la pluralitdes formes
virtus
homini
crit
rationalis
Averros
416,
(ibid.,
III,parexemple,
appropriatur
galement:
86-87).
2)Ilreprend,
De l'me
d'Aristote
dansletrait
comme
onsait,
, III,5,430a24.
l'expression
3)Averros,
etlaPense
, 120.
L'Intelligence
4)Ibid.,118;noussoulignons;
deanimalibros
cf.Averros,
Commentarium
, 449,
magnum
formas
secundum
Etintendebat
hicperintellectum
173-175:
quod
passibilem
ymaginationis
Surla cogitative
voir
engnral
chezAverros,
ineasagitvirtus
homini.
propria
cogitativa
inAverroes"
in
Aristotelis
De
Commentarium
Richard
C.Taylor,
"Remarks
onCogitatio
Magnum
: Sources
andReception
inAverroes
andthe
Aristotelian
Tradition
Anima
, Constitution
Libros',
ofthe
& G. Endress
Rushd
1999),217-255
(Leiden,
), d.J.A.Aertsen
(1126-1198
Philosophy
oflbn
in
: Remarks
ontheCogitative
Power
andCogitare
etRichard
C.Taylor,
"Cogitatio,
Cogitativus
Hamesse
&
C.
Steel
au
inL'laboration
duvocabulaire
Aver
,
roes",
Moyen
AgeJ.
philosophique
totalement
dforme
enparticulier,
etsareprise
(Turnhout,
2000),111-146;surcepassage
par
laruine
d'Aver l'espce
voir
"Duphantasme
deJandun,
Brenet,
Jean
intelligible:
Jean-Baptiste
inIntellect
etimagination
dansla Philosophie
mdivale.
deJandun",
rosparl'averroste
Jean
d.
naFilosofia
Intellecto
eimaginao
Intellect
andImagination
inMedieval
Medieval.,
Philosophy
du
etBrenet,
M.C.Pacheco
& J.F.Meirinhos
2006),vol.2, 1179-1190
(Turnhout,
Transferts
, 195-276.
sujet
5)Averros,
deanima
cf.Averros,
Commentarium
etlaPense
, 122-123;
magnum
L'Intelligence
diversantur
vocavit
Aristoteles
:
Et
istum
intellectum
libros
315-318
, 454,
quem
passibilem
per
inElenchis.
Etper
inTopicis,
numeravit
inquatuor
virtutibus
dictis
homines
quasAlfarabius
esset
utcontinuatio
etsinon,tunenecesse
differt
homoabaliisanimalibus,
istum
intellectum
Noussoulignons.
eodem
modo.
intellectus
etrecipientis
cumanimalibus
esset,
agentis

15:39:44 PM

320 [98]

! Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

substantielles.
Dans ce qui suit,on examine grandstraitsquelle futsurce
la
lecture
de Jeande Jandun,matres arts Parisau dbutdu XIV
point
et
sicle, principaltenantde ce que, dans l'historiographie
mdivale,on a

latin6.Il ne s'agitnullement
d'unearcholoappel l'averrosme
longtemps
complte;on tcheseulementde pointercertains
gie et d'une prsentation
lmentsconceptuels
d'unecomplexedisputedontl'histoire
reste crire.
2. Deux antcdents: Thomasd'Aquin et Sigerde Brabant
Si l'on s'entient l'essentiel,
l'intervention
de Jeande Jandunestprcdede
ces deuxlecturesprincipales:(a) cellede Thomasd'Aquin,d'abord,i.e. celle
Averros,
etdontsa condamnation
que Thomasattribue
dpend; (b) cellede
cellede son De animaintellectiva
,
Sigerde Brabant,ensuite;et en particulier
et
dont
on
fait
De
unitate
une
au
intelleccite7,
Jean
que
gnralement rponse
de l'Aquinate.
ts l'ultimeattaqueanti-averroste
ces deuxinterprtations8.
D'une certaine
Rappelonsen brefquellesfurent
la lecturecritiqueque Thomasd'Aquinfaitde la notiqued'Averros
manire,
tienten deuxphrases:
dansla mesureo il estspardansl'tre,l'intellect
chez
(1) premirement,
Averrosn'estpas la formedu corps; et il fautentendrequ'il ne l'estnullement.C'est ce qu'on lit,parexemple,dansla Sommecontre
lesGentils
II, 59 :
ces raisonsont conduitAverros
et certainsanciens,d'aprslui, soutenir
que l'intellect
possible,parlequell'mepense,estspardu corpsselonl'tre,
et quii nestpas la formedu corps9.
C'est aussice qu'affirme
le dbutdu De
unitateintellectus
: Averros[. . .] tentede soutenirque l'intellect
qu'Aristote
appelle"possible"[. . .] estunesubstancedu corpssparedu corpsselonl'tre,
6)SurJean
deJandun,
etnotamment
sursanotique,
voirJean-Baptiste
du
Brenet,
Transferts
La
d'Averros
selon
de
(Paris,
2003).
Jean
Jandun
sujet. notique
7)Jean
deJandun,
Ioannis
deIanduno
acutissimi
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
subtiphilosophi
super
lissimae
a. M.,1966),III,5,col.245.
(Venise,
1587); rimpr.
(Frankfurt
quaestiones
8)C'estvolontairement
onn'entre
dansl'examen
del'ventuelle
succinct;
pas,parexemple,
volution
dechacune
despositions.
les
relativement
Signalons
simplement
parmi publications
AlaindeLibera,
L'unit
del'intellect.
Commentaire
duDe unitate
intelrcentes,
pourThomas,
lectus
contra
averroistas
deThomas
Antonio
Aristo(Paris,
2004); pourSiger,
d'Aquin
Petagine,
telismo
L'intelletto
umano
nella
diAlberto
Tommaso
e Sideri
difficile.
prospettiva
Magno,
d'Aquino
diBrabante
(Milan,
2004).
9)Thomas
Somme
contre
lesGentils.
Livre
surlavrit
delafoicatholique
contre
leserreurs
d'Aquin,
desinfidles.
Traduction
indite
C. Michon
4 vols.(Paris,
etD. Moreau,
2:
1999),
parV.Aubin,
59,241.

15:39:44 PM

I Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

[99] 321

Si
forme.10
qui nestd aucunefaon (necaliquo modo)unieau corpscomme
l'on en croitThomas,donc, l'intellectchez Averrosn'esten rienla forme
du corps.
: si l'intel(2) La deuximeideestcommeuneconsquencede la premire
nestrienque
la formedu corps,l'homme,chezAverros,
lectn estaucunement
Thomasd'Aquin croitpouvoirl'crire,
le corpsanimdesfacultsinfrieures.
par exemple,dans la Sommecontreles GentilsII, 60: Averros[. . .] dit que
des btespar l'intellectqu'Aristoteappelle
l'hommediffre
spcifiquement
et
la
facult
est
propre l'homme[...]. [. . .] Et cetintelcogitative,
passif qui
lectpassifse trouvechezl'enfantds le dbut,et lui confrel'espcehumaine
avantqu'il ne penseen acte.n
Le raisonnement
de l'Aquinateestle suivant: si l'on pose avecAverros
que
l'intellect
n'estpas la formedu corpsmaisqu'il se joint l'hommeparle biais
des imageslors de l'oprationintellective
(c'est--dire:si l'on soutientque
l'hommen'estjoint l'intellectque lorsqu'ilimagine),forceest d'admettre
pas l'espce
que l'trequi n'estpas sortidu sein materneln'appartient
humaine(tantdonnqu'il n'a pas encored'imagesen acteet qu'il n'estpas,
voireque l'individuadulte,chaque foisqu'il
ainsi,effectivement
rationnel),
cessed'imaginer,
cesselui-mmed'trehumain: l'humanitde l'homme,susd'un intellect
sparde lui,serait la fois
pendue l'exercice
ontologiquement
tardiveet intermittente12.
Nanmoins,reconnat
Thomas, il y a une rponse
celle qui, prcisment,
aux arguments
que nous venonsde dvelopper13:
maisla facultcogitative
consiste poserque ce n'estpas l'intellect
qui confre
10)Thomas
lesaverrostes
contre
Averros
L'Unit
del'intellect
contre
, suividesTextes
d'Aquin,
notes
antrieurs
1270.Texte
introduction,
latin,
traduction,
bibliographie,
chronologie, et
index
(Paris
1994),77.
parA.deLibera
n) Thomas
constitu
contre
lesGentils
idedel'homme
Somme
, II,60,245.Cette
par
d'Aquin,
intellectus
l'unedesthses
leseulcorps
anim
del'mesensitive
dansleDe unitate
correspond
: l'individu
selon
del'individu
humain
averrostes
selon
surlanature
Socrate,
Thomas,
possibles,
n'est
comme
cela
semble
me
et
anim
une
cette
sensitive,
thse,
par
qu'uncorps
vgtative
constitu
ceuxquisoutiennent
n'est
invitable
parl'inquecethomme-ci
passpcifiquement
del'intellect
oucouplage
maisparl'mesensitive
ennoblie
tellect,
rayonnement
paruncertain
L'Unit
del'intellect,
143).
(Thomas
d'Aquin,
possible
12)Thomas
est
intellectus.
Ainsi
note-t-il
cette
dans
quesil'intellect
reprend critique leDeunitate
s'tablir
supposer
leprtend
Averros),
(comme
qu'une
jonction
puisse
spar
ontologiquement
lamise
avecl'homme
ilconteste),
encontact
del'intellect
desimages
(cequ'envrit
parlebiais
(Thomas
L'Unit
del'intellect,
la
lieu
ds
le
moment
de
n'aurait
d'Aquin,
pas
premier
gnration
Aristote
cequedfendent
et
serait
contraire
II,
(enPhys.
137),cequi,assure-t-il,
Thophraste
ici.
unetude
Salecture
detelles
autorits
demande
4, 194b9-13).
qu'onnepeutmener
13)Thomas
Somme
contre
lesGentils
, II,60,245.
d'Aquin,

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l'individuson espcehumaineet que, par consquent,ni le caractre

tardif
ni sesfluctuations
ne sontproblmatiques.
L'humade la jonctionintellective
: l'hommed'Averros,
nitserait la foispr-et //^-intellectuelle
certescapable d'une union l'intellectextrinsque,
seraitfondamentalement
le corps
cogitant.
La thseestabsolument
fausseauxyeuxde Thomas.Ce n'estpourluiqu'une
tentative
de
absurde,vaine, compensercettepremireide insanequ'est la
dansl'trede l'intellect
sparation
possible.Quoi qu'il en soit,telleestla premirelecture(partiale,polmique)qui tranchel'apparenteindcisionqu'on
l'hommedoitson espce l'mecogitarelevait
dansle GrandCommentaire:
circuleau XIIIe
tive;et cetteide,plusou moinsassocieau nomd'Averros,
textes
la
c'est
sicle,commeparaissentl'attester
dnoncent14;
qui
plusieurs
elle,encore,que E. Tempiercondamneen 1277: Quodhomoesthomopraeter
15.
animamrationalem
d'Averros
crucialepourJean,issued'une
Quant l'autreinterprtation
favorable
l'ide d'une sparationsubstantielle
de l'intellecturealternative
De
anima
intellectiva
de
elle
est
constitue
la
thse
du
lect,
par
Sigerde Brabant.Ce derniersoutientce qui suit:
) du
(1) premirement,
que l'intellectest sparselon l'tre(in essendo

nature
naturam
suam
mais
lui
est
humain,
) et
corps
qu'il
appliqu par
(per

titre
d'
s'unit lui dansl'acteintellectif
(in operando)
oprantintrinsque
intrinsecum
)16.
(operans
14)C'estcette
averroste
. Pourdes
histoire
sousl'angle
dela cogitative
quiest faire,
prcis
Guillaume
deBaglione,
Pseudo-Gilles
Pierre-Jean
rfrences
Bacon,
Olivi,
Roger
pertinentes
und
deRome,
voirSylvain
'Olivietlesaverrostes',
Piron,
frPhilosophie
Freiburger
Zeitschrift
XIVe
certains
ce
Notons
dbut
du
sicle
de
251-309.
53
(2006),
qu'au
partisans que
Theologie
radical
semblent
Z. Kuksewicz
avoir
aumoins
enpartie,
lathse
l'averrosme
appelle
adopt,
ausujet
del'homme
comme
Ce serait
notamment
lecasd'Antoine
deParme,
corps
cogitant.
l'appui,
Z. Kuksewicz
: l'homme
nes'unit
dssanaissance,
texte
crit
duquel,
pas l'intellect
maisseulement
partir
sontsuffisamment
dumoment
osesfacults
sensitives
dveparfaites,
etexerces
lesintentions
dematriaux
l'intellect
desintellects
loppes
poursaisir
quiservent
(Zdzislaw
etpossible
DeSiger
deBrabant
Jacques
dePlaisance.
La thorie
de
Kuksewicz,
agent
l'intellect
latins
desXIIIeetXIVesicles
& Varsovie
& Cracovie,
chezlesaverrostes
(Wroclaw
cequedfend
Emanuele
Coccia(quitend
lepropos
tout
1968),155).C'estaussi
l'averrosme)
La trasparenza
Averro
e l'averroismo
notamdanssonlivre
delle
2005)(voir
(Milan,
immagini.
ment
lechapitre
intitul
"Puer.
L'intelletto
separato",
57-82).
15)C'estle proposition
11:quel'homme
esthomme
endehors
del'merationnelle;
voir
La condamnation
texte
introduction
et
comDavidPich,
de
1277,
latin,
traduction,
parisienne
Paris
mentaire
surles219articles
condamns
; etRoland
Hissette,
(Paris,
1999),82-83
Enqute
le7 man1277(Louvain
& Paris,
1977),184-186.
16)Eneffet,
intellectus
inintelligendo.
a corpore
Sunt
anima
intellectiva
unum
depend[et]
igitur

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[101] 323

le corpsanim,mais
(2) deuximement,
que l'hommenestpas simplement
le compos
de cet operansintrinsecum
et du corps; ce qui expliqueque cet
hommepense,puisquel'intellect
comprisde cettefaonconstituel'une des
l'actede la
partiesde l'hommeet que, en vertud'un principemtonymique,
au tout17.
rcuse
donc
de
Thomas
partiepeuts'attribuer
l'interprtation
Siger
l'homme
rduit
d'Averros
au
son
qui
corpscogitantpour fustiger impuissance vrifier
cetteproposition
C'est
pourtantindniable: hichomointelligit.
bien l'intellectqui faitl'homme(la cogitativen'estpas ici mentionne18),
mmesi cetintellect
n'estpas substantiellement
uni quelquematireque ce
soit19.Sur la questionde la formahominis
les
deux principaleslecturesdu
,
GrandCommentaire
sontdonc lessuivantes
: d'un ct,l'ide(le plussouvent
dnonce)que c'estla cogitative
qui faitl'homme; de l'autre,dans une doctrineoptantpour la sparationontologiquede l'intellect,l'ide que c'est
formedu corps titre
l'intellect,
nonobstant,
l'homme,un intellect
qui dfinit
et,en tantque tel, partie du composhumain.
d'oprateur
intrinsque
{Deanima
inopere,
etcorpus
intellectiva
deBrabant,
, in: Siger
quiainunum
opusconveniunt
intertium
deanima
lematre
, 85,67-69);sibien,conclut
Quaestiones
brabanon,
qu'onpeut

affirmer
inintelligendo
estoperans
intrinsecum
adcorpus
queintellectus
persuamnturm
(ibid,
80-81).
17)Rponse
vidente
Thomas
Notons
aussiqueThomas,
danssonDeunitate
intellec
d'Aquin.
tus
cette
thorie
del'homme-compos
dlicate
de
, attaque
( 68),ce quiposeunequestion
danslaquelle
nousn'entrons
chronologie
pas.
18)Reprenant
cequ'ilcrivait
danssesQuaestiones
intertium
deanima
, Siger
parle
cependant
d'unemecompose
runissant
l'intellect
d'unct,lesprincipes
etsensitif
de
vgtatif

l'autre.
Voir
:
in
tertium
de
de
Dicendum
enim
58-64
anima,
3,
Brabant,
Quaestiones
quod
Siger
nonradicatur
ineadem
intellectivum
anima
etsensitivo,
sicut
cumvegetativo
simplici
Vegetativumetsensitivm
ineadem
radicantur
sedradicatur
cumipsisineadem
anima
comsimplici,
Undecumintellectus
tuminsuoadventu
unitur
et
sit,cumadvenit,
posita.
simplex
vegetativo
; etDeanima
etsicipsaunita
nonfaciunt
unam
sedcompositam
intellecsensitivo,
simplicem,
deBrabant,
intertium
deanima
tiva,
, 110,30-36:Sentit
Quaestiones
chap.8,in:Siger
ergo
intellectivum
seupotentiam
nonpertinere
formam
ad eamdem
ad
Philosophus
intelligendi
etsentiendi.
Siautem
dicatur
hocnonestsimplicis
quampertinet
potentia
vegetandi
potentiae,
sedquodammodo
exintellectu
deforis
adveniente
etunasubstantia
formae,
compositae
vegetativietsensitivi
educta
depotentia
materiae
tertio
deanimaintellectivum
; undePhilosophus

vocat
animae.
partem
19)Siger
deBrabant,
Deanima
intellectiva
intertium
deanima,
deBrabant,
,in: Siger
Quaestiones
deanimaintellectiva
mundi
& Paris,
, deaeternitate
, d.B. Bazn(Louvain
1972),87,17-20:
Dicendum
dit-il
sansambigut,
nectarnen
quodhomoesthomoperintellectum,
propter
hocoportet
alteram
huius
uniri
alteri
utfigura
cerae
sedsufficit
unitur,
partem
compositi
parti
modouniatur
intrinsecum
ab eo
[i.e.comme
] uttotum
quodpraedicto
compositum
operans

denominetur.

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3. La double formepropreselonJeande Jandun

ce que futla solutionde Jean
Ce rapidepralablepermetde mieuxapprcier
de Jandun.Quelle estselonluila formede l'homme? S'agit-ilde l'intellect
(on
la

stricte
de
de
en
ce
une
cas,
s'attendre,
position Siger)ou
reprise
pourrait
assude la cogitative(ce qui seraitune thseaudacieuse,sinonprovocatrice,
me la barbede Thomasd'Aquin)? La rponseest: ni l'un ni l'autre,ou
plutt: l'un etl'autre.Car la thsede Jean,promise une certainerenomme,
consiste direqu'il n'ya pas une seuleformeproprede l'homme,maisdeux:
textesdu GrandCommensi bienque les diffrents
l'intellect
et la cogitative,
maisdfenou d'hsitant,
tairen'ontriend'antinomique,
de contradictoire,
sait
les
une
doctrine
dentau contraire,
.cohrente.
articuler,
pourqui
est
Voyonscommentil le justifie.Premierpointde son analyse: l'intellect
bienla formede l'trehumain,ce parquoi l'hommeesthomme.Cetteseule
que l'hommeest
phraseesttout faitnette: etj'ajouteque c'estparl'intellect
. . 20Contraireou
rationnelle
.
la
nature
intellectuelle

savoir
homme,
par
de
Thomas
ment ce que dduitl'exgsespcieuse
d'Aquin,parconsquent,
l'intellect,bien qu'ontologiquement
spardu corps,n'estpas absolument
gnrale
sparde lui. PourJean,il ne faitaucun doute que la dfinition
dansson De animafinitpardonnerde l'me,selonlaquellel'me
qu'Aristote
de sorte
estl'actepremierd'un corpsorganis21,
s'appliqueaussi l'intellect,
En
l'intellect
est
une
me
.
tant
ce
dernier
est
bien
,
tel,
que
aliquidcorporis
que
n'est
donc
au
ou encore:forma. La dfinition
pas quivoque point
gnrale
forme
commed'unemeintellective
d'exclurequ'on puisseparlerde l'intellect
du corps.
C'est vident,du reste,pourJeande Jandun; c'estla lettremmedu Grand
Il suffit
18 du livre
de lire,dit-il,le commentaire
Commentaire
d'Averros.
comme
III22,danslequelAverros
expliqueque si nousagissonsparl'intellect,
est notreforme,puisqu'unechose
c'estle cas, cet intellect,
ncessairement,
Ainsile problmen'est-ilpas de savoirsi l'intellect
n'agitque par sa forme23.
20)Jean
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
deJandun,
, III,5,col.245: etdicoulterius
quodper
Super
... ; cf.Jean
deJandun,
scilicet
natura
intellectualis
seurationalis
intellectum
homoesthomo,
in10Ethico.
ubi
Aristotelis
deanima
libros
, III,5,col.241: item
patet
pereiusverba
Super
intellectus
est,velmaxime
vult,
[ed.intelligit],
quodnullo
quodhomovelintellectus
pluries

nonesset
actus
etforma
hominis.
modoverum
estsiintellectus
21)Aristote,
4l2b4-6.
Del'me,
II, 1,
22)Commentaire
s'est
lui-mme
eneffet,
dontThomas
inspir.
capital,
largement
23)Voir
ilestconstant
etlaPense
, 108: Comme
Averros,
(cum
quenousagissons
L'Intelligence
etpuisnosagere)
invenimus
) del'intellect
(virtutes
quandnouslevoulons,
parcesdeuxfacults
ilestapparu
denousattribuer
cesdeuxfacults
de
sinon
ncessaire
parsaforme,
querien
n'agit

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J.-B.Brenet

[103] 325

estla formedu corps,maistabliren quel sensil l'est.Car formacorporis

,
critle matreparisien,s'entenddoublementdans la philosophied'Aristote.
En premierlieu, est formela perfection
qui donne l'treau corpset lui
confreson actualit.C'est une me inhrente,
inscritedans le corpsqui,
la constitue- et c'est,ditJean,le sensle plus courantqu'on
corollairement,
attribue forme.Mais en un secondsens,ajoute-t-il,
on appelleforme
du corpsl'oprateurintrinsque
appropri ce corps24.Expressioncom:
plexe,dontle dtailestainsiformul
dsigne
Enunautre
sensforme
ducorps
aucorps
; et
l'oprateur
intrinsque
appropri
dis
au
est
cet
n'est
distinct
je quel'oprateur
intrinsque
appropricorps
oprateur
qui
pas
ducorps
etdontl'acte
etprcisment
parlelieuetparlesujet,
propre
dpend
proprement
dececorps,
oudequelque
chose
existant
danscecorps,
desorte
quel'oprateur
intrinsque
etcecorps,
bienqu'ilsnesoient
detellefaon
del'unserait
pasundansl'tre,
quel'tre
l'tre
del'autre,
sontnanmoins
undansuneopration
immdiatement
propre
quidpend
del'unetl'autre25.
(cf.Averros,
l'intellect
Commentarium
: Etcum
deanimalibros
, III, 18,439-440
magnum
nosagere
has
duas
virtutes
intellectus
invenimus
cum
et
nichil
nisi
voluerimus,
per
agit persuam
ideofuit
necesse
attribuere
nobis
hasduasvirtutes
intellectus.
L'Intelliformam,
) Cf.Averros,
etlaPense
cemodequenouspouvons
desintel, III,36,167: Etc'estgrce
gence
engendrer
volont.
ceparquoiquelque
chose
effectue
sonaction
estlaforme,
Car,puisque
ligibles
propre
etquenouseffectuons
l'intellect
notre
nostram
ilfaut
ncessairement
) action
par
agent (
propre,
soitpournousforme
Commentarium
deanima
(cf.Averros,
quel'intellect
agent
magnum
intellecta
cum
585-590:Etperhunemodum
libros,
III, 36,499-500,
poterimus
generare
voluerimus.
suampropriam
actionem
estforma,
nos
Quoniam,
quiailludperquodagitaliquid
autem
nostram
actionem
necesse
estutintellectus
agimus
perintellectum
agentem
propriam,
innobis.
sitforma
)
agens
24)Cette
distinction
fondamentale
estrcurrente
dansl'oeuvre
deJean
deJandun.
Cf.parexemdeJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
est
, II, 1,col.69-70:dicoquodduplex
pleJean
Super
estforma
dansesseetdansoperari,
estanima
et
cuiusmodi
forma,
quiaquaedam
vegetatiua
sensitiua
danssolum
sicut
estanima
utdicitComintellectiua,
[.. .] sedaliaestforma
operari,
mentator
Surtoutcela,cf.Brenet,
dusujet
3 huius.
, 52-84.
Transferts
25)Jean
aliomodosumitur
deJandun,
libros
deanima
Aristotelis
, III,5,col.239-240:
Super
forma
intrinseco
intrinse; dicoautem
corporis
prooperante
appropriato
corpori
quodoperans
cumappropriatum
estilludoperans
a corpore
locoetsubiecto,
corpori
quodnonestdistinctum
cuiusactus
etpraecise
abiliocorpore,
velabaliquoexistente
inilio
proprius
proprie
dependet
itaquodoperans
intrinsecum
etilludcorpus,
licet
nonsintunum
inesse,
itaquodesse
corpore,
inunoopere
unius
sitessealterius,
sunt
tarnen
unum
immeproprio,
quodabutroque
dependet
Cf.ibid.,
diate.
col.246: [.. .] operans
sehabet
adcorunite
intrinsecum,
quodinoperando
naturam
: cumintellectus
directement
auDeanima
intellectiva
,cequirenvoie
pussecundum
inoperando
sitoperans
sinemotu,
estoperans
unite
sehabens
adcorpus
persuam
intelligendo
naturam
deBrabant,
intertium
deanima,
3,in:Siger
87,15-16).
Quaestiones
(chap.

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C'est de cettefaon,prcisment,
humainestnotreperfection
que l'intellect
n'estpas la formesubstanet qu'il estla formede nos corps: l'meintellective
tielledu corpshumain(si l'on entendpar l qu'ellele faittre),elle lui est
Elle n'en est pas distinctepar le
appropriecommeoprateurintrinsque.
lieuet le sujet; son acte,la pense,dpendd'un lmentqui se trouveen lui,
dans une ralisation
communequi permetaux
l'image,et les deuxs'unissent
en propre.
individusd'intelliger
Il fautpasserici surlesparticularits
etnotamment
de cettecaractrisation,
sur l'analogiecosmologiquequi la sous-tend.L'essentielconsisteen ce que
l'intellect
dansla dfinition
Jeantient rinscrire
gnralede l'medonnepar
Aristote.Il estvraique ce dernier,
commeavecrticence,
sa dfiniintroduit
tiongnraled'un si26; mais pourJeance n'estpas un moyend'excepter
l'intellect
de cetteformule,
une manirede suggrer
qu'on ne devraitpas l'y
inclure; cela tientau faitqu'Aristoten'a pas encoreprciscommentchaque
mela vrifie.
subconditione
de cettedfinition
n'estdoncpas une
L'expression
la porte,maisle signequ'ilestncessaire
faond'indiquerqu'ilfauten limiter
les modalits.L'intellect,
d'en distinguer
pourJean,estsanscontestela forme
du corps; une formequi, certes,ne donnepas l'treau corps,maisqui s'unit
lui commele piloteau navire, titred'oprateur
et constitue,
intrinsque,
C'est
comme
chez
une
d'un
ainsi,
compos.
Sigerde Brabant,
ipsofactOy partie
est
la
forme
l'homme.
de
qu'elle
CependantJeann'ignorepas qu'unetellepositionprtele flanc toutesles
: que l'intellect
soit
; commencer
critiques
parcelle-ci,massive,et rcurrente
la formede l'hommesansfairetreson corpsimpliquencessairement
l'existenceet l'intervention
d'une autreformecharge,elle,de confrer
au corps
son esse.Or, d'une part,quellepourraittrecetteautreforme? D'autrepart,
n'ya-t-ilpas qu'uneseuleet uniqueformedu compos, savoirl'meintellective?27Devantcettevocationdu pluralisme
des formes,
que l'objecteurvou:
draitdirimante,
la ractionde Jeanestsanshsitation
ditqu'ilfaut
uneautre
forme,
Lorsqu'on
qu'existe
je rponds
quecelaestvraiselonl'opiils'agit
niond'Aristote
etduCommentateur;
eneffet
del'mecogitative
quiestla plus
noble
desformes
etparellel'homme
estengendrable
etcorruptible,
comme
le
matrielles,
26)VoirAristote,
De l'me
d'unedfinition
en
, 4l2b4sqq.:etsil'ona besoin
quis'applique
commun
toutme...
27)Voir
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
deJandun,
intellectiua
, III,5,col.241: Sianima
Jean
Super
nonesset
forma
substantial
dansessecorpori
aliam
esseformam
substantihumano,
oporteret
alemdantem
essesubstantialem
etquaeestillaforma,
mirum
etimpossibile
est
videtur,
corpori,

essealiam
nisianimam
intellectiuam.
formam,

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J.-B.Brenet

[105] 327

ce
ditleCommentateur
danslecommentaire
33decelivre
3; etiln'ya riendegnant
l'homme
ait
une
double
forme
l'une
donnant

son
l'tre
substantiel,
que
propre,
corps
ilestditpensant
tant
delamanire
susdite
;
[l'autre]
l'oprateur
intrinsque
auquel
grce
etcelasurtout
estle plusparfait
etle plusnobledestres
parce
quel'homme
quisont
ici-bas.28
Il est vident,autrement
dit,quii fautoutrel'intellectune autreformequi
inhrente
la matire,
confrer
l'tre
au
puisse
corps; une formeindividuelle,
en vertude laquelleil revient l'hommed'treengendrable
et corruptible.
l'intellect
Pourdiverses
raisons,qu'on litd'aborddansle De animad'Aristote,
ne peutassumercettefonction(il ne peutavoird'organe,tremlang,etc.);
cela revient une me sensitive,
et plus exactement
la plus noble d'entre
elles: la cogitative,
laquelle,pourJean,constituedans l'chelledes formesla
derniredes formesmatrielles
et se trouve,par son travaild'abstraction,
au
serviceimmdiatde l'intellect.
Ainsiy a-t-ildeux formes,ou plutt:deux
formes
de l'homme,c'est--dire
deuxformes
constitutives
etcaractrispropres
tiquesde son humanit.
La prcisionestimportante.
Jeanesten effet
partisande ce qu'il appelleluis'insrant
dans
une
histoire
mme,
dj longue,la pluralitet la gradation
desformes
29.Il estconvaincu,parexemple,que la formeparlaquelleSocrate
estanimal(la formedu genre),estrellement
autreque la formeparlaquelle
il esthomme(la formede l'espce); son ide tantque la formedu genreest
et imparfaite
potentielle
parrapport la formede l'espce,qu'ellelui estantl'information
de la matirepremire
rieure,et qu'elleprparencessairement
cette
forme
L'individu
donc
par
enveloppe
spcifique30.
plusieursformes
28)Jean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
, III,5,col.245: cumdicitur
quodoportet
Super
aliam
etCommentatoesseformam,
dicoquodhocestverum
secundum
Aristotelis
opinionem
ris; namiliaestanima
etperearn
homo
formarum
materialium,
quaeestnobilissima
cogitatiua
inisto3 comm.
incoestgenerabilis
etcorruptibilis,
utdicit
Commentator
33,necestaliquod
una
eius
esse
subsnueniens
hominis
sit
forma
det
quodipsius
duplex propria,
quarum
corpori
et [alia]estintrinsecum
a quadenominatur
modosupradicto,
tantial,
operans,
intelligens
etperfectius
omnium
hie.
praecipue,
quiahomoestensnobilius
quaesunt
29)Nousnedonnons
deJean.
Unexadanscequisuitquequelques
indications
surlaposition
Kukmenexhaustif
demande
untravail
part.Surcette
voir
Zdzislaw
question,
cependant,
"Deprincipio
individuations
dutexte
lems.Upsal.
deJean
deJandun.
Edition
sewiez,
d'aprs
11(1963),93-106.
Bibi.Univ.
Polonorum
C615",Mediaevalia
Philosophica
30)VoirJean
libros
deanima
forma
deJandun,
Aristotelis
, II, 8,col.40: namquamuis
Super
formae
sit
realiter
diuersa
a
forma
tamen
est
speciei
speciei,
ipsa potentialis
respectu
generis
et
intantum
eamateria
formas
utdicitCommentator,
quodmediante
prima
recipit
specificas,

a formis
cumhocipsaforma
estsecundum
subsistentiam
specierum.
nunquam
separata
generis

libros
Aristotelis
de
anima
col.
:
unius
rei
Ouencore
de
43
Dico,quod
, II,8,
Jean Jandun,
Super

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328 [106]

/Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

une seule
communesordonnesles unesaux autres,et toutessubordonnes
ultimedansTordrede la gnration,
formesubstantielle
individuelle
qui riest
la
mdiation
des
autres31.
la
son
vritable
dans
matire,
reue
sujet,que par
une pluralit
Mais il fautdistinguer
ce premierniveau,o se rencontre
rellede formesaboutissant une seule formesubstantielle
proprede la
de la
d'un deuximeniveau,sparcettefois ontologiquement
matire32,

sont
et
Ton
seconde
forme
o
trouve
une
matire,
propre laquelle
galement
ordonnestouteslesautres.Ce qui signifie
qu'il fautharmoniprincipalement
ou incohrenserles autorits
d'Averros
contradictoires,
quon pouvaitjuger
maisil en diffre
bien des autresespcespar l'intellect,
tes: l'hommediffre
tantde
aussipar la cogitative,
toutel'affaire,
pour viterl'inconsquence,
saisirque ce n'estpas sousle mmerapport.C'est ce que Jean,danssa dmarche concordataire,
souligne:
desautres
sedistingue
A la premire
onpeutrpondre
[espces]
quel'homme
objection,
se
dit,comme
intrinsque
qui,enoprant,
paruneoprateur
proprement
parl'intellect
il
et
l'me
se
distinmanire

ne
faire
au
nature
de
;
qu'un par
cogitative
par
rapportecorps
dansl'tre
substantiel
comme
spciparuneforme
quileconstitue
[espces]
guedesautres
saforme.33
etainsil'uneetl'autre
d'unemanire
diffrente,
sont,
fique,
Il n'y a qu'une seule formesubstantielle
propresur un mode donn (celui
de l'inhrence,
par exemple),maisrienn'empchequ'existeune autreforme

reibenepossunt
esse
etfinale,
unius
tamen
etomnino
actale
unicum
estesseperfectissimum
et
alterum
et
et
ordinatum
ad
aliud
unum
est
esse
diminutum
esse,
imperfectum
plura quorum
namesse
etsiceritinproposito;
etcomplementum,
ad quodaliaordinantur,
estperfectum
estimperfectum
etfinale,
esseverogenerale
etsimpliciter
actale
estesseperfectum
specificum
etc.
sicut
adactum
adessespecificum,
etpotentiale,
etordinatur
; quare,
potentia
31)Voir

col.
44
:
etabsolute
libros
Aristotelis
de
anima
deJandun,
II,
8,
,
Jean
Simpliciter
Super
sicquod
simul
habere
diuersas
formas
estinconueniens
unumsubiectum
nullum
ordinatas,
sintdispositiones
ad
mediante
unamrecipiat
alia,velmediantibus
aliis,velquodquaedam

aliam.
32)Jean
deanima
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
, II,8,col.42: SicSorestanimai
perunam
Super
ettamen
estunumens
etperaliamcorpus;
formam
etesthomoperaliam,
substantialem,

ultimam
etperficientem.
numero
formam
indiuidualem
perunam
33)Jean
anima
col.
246:
Adprimam
dici
libros
Aristotelis
de
deJandun,
, III,5,
potest
Super
intrinseab
aliis
intellectum
homo
dictum,
tanquam
peroperans
proprie
quod
distinguitur per
adcorpus
secundum
naturam
unite
sehabet
; etperanimam
cum,quodinoperando
cogitainessesubstantiali
tiuam
abaliissicut
constituentem
ipsum
specifico,
performam
distinguitur

etsicutraque
esteiusforma
diuersimode.

15:39:44 PM

/Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

[107] 329

surle faitque
Jeanle rediraplusbas35,en insistant
propresurun autremode34.
la cogitative
et l'intellective
sontbiendeuxmes(et non pas deuxpuissances
d'une mmeme),ou encoreque ce sontbiendeuxformessubstantielles
(ce
derniertermetantquivoque)36.
4. Deux sourcesde Jean: ThomasWyltonetAverros
Pourtayersa thse,qui retrouve
l'ideanciennede l'homme la jointurede
deuxmondes,et qui ainsicombineen lui le matrielet l'immatriel,
Jeanse
rfre
clairement
ThomasWylton.Copiantla Quaestiode animaintelectiva
du thologienanglais,qui sjourneet enseigne Paris peu prs la mme
il faitvaloirune exigencecosmique: non seulementil n'estpas
priode37,
dansun mmetre,ou pluttdanscettreparticulier
qu'est
gnantd'imaginer
selon deux modes distincts,
sur deux
l'homme,deux formessubstantielles
34)VoirJean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
cum
, III, 12,col.291: Adprimam
Super
unius
reiunum
estessesubstantiate
et
dicitur
etindiuiduatum
coniunctum
materiae,
proprium
inmateria
et
ideo
bene
volunt
hominis
non
est
nisi
una
forma
indiuiduareceptm,
quodipsius
lispropria
inhaerens
suaemateriae,
sedhocnonobstante
esse
diuersae
substanpossunt
ipsius
formae
tiates
ita
unalet
esse
adcorpus,
etalianoninhaeret,
sedpersubsistid
yqmrum
persuiinhaerentiam
tarnen
inclinationem
habet
ad corpus
humanum
adsuum
quodpersuamnaturam
tanquam

a quodependet
eiusoperatio
modoprius
dicto.
perfectibile,
35)Voir
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
de
anima
,
III,
12,col.290:Sedestnotandum
Jean
Super
aliomodoestforma
etaliomodoanima
nam
intellectiua
hominis,
sensitiua,
quod[.. .] anima
anima
intellectiua
estforma,
idestprincipium
utdeclaratum
operationis
appropriatum
corpori,
estprius,
estforma
sedanima
sensitiua
inhaerens
etextensa
secundum
eius
humano,
ipsicorpori

extensionem
accidens
[...].
per
36)Voir
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
ad
III, 12,col.289:Tunediceretur
Jean
Super
intentionem
Aristotelis
et Commentatoris
et
secundum
quaestionem
quodanimasensitiua
inhomine
suntdiuersae
etJean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
de
intellectiua
substantiae;
Super
anima
sunt
diuersae
unaestforma
materiasubstantiae,
,III,12,col.290: illaeanimae
quarum

lisinhaerens
et
alia
non.
Dans
la
la
dmonstration
se
fait
entrois
humano,
12,
corpori
question
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
: AdeuidendeJandun,
; voir
, III,12,col.288-289
Jean
temps
Super
tiam
Primum
humni
necesse
estesse
est,quodinmateria
quaestionis
praemitto
aliqua.
corporis
formam
indiuidualem
etinhaerentem
homini,
[.. .] Secundo
aliquam
propriam
ipsimateriae.
uniuersali,
intellectiua,
suppono
quodanima
quiditatem
comprehensione
quacomprehendimus
nonestforma
est
inhaerens
materiae
humni.
[.. .] Tertio
corporis
accipio,
quodsiinhomine
substantial
etpropria
indiuidualis
homini,
intellectum,
praeter
oportet
quodilla
aliquaforma

sitanima
sensitiua.
37)Pourdesindications
surlavieetl'uvre
voirLauge
deThomas
O.Nielsen,
Timothy
Wyton,
to
B.Noone,
Cecilia
"Thomas
ton's
ontheFormal
Distinction
asApplied
Question
Wyl
Trifogli,
14(2003),327-388.
theDivine",
Documenti
eStudi
sullaTradizione
Medievale
Filosofica

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330 [108]

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J.-B.Brenet/

plans,maisla concidencede ces deuxaspectsestmmerequisepar la cohrencede l'univers

: un mondesanshiatusdemandeque s'ajointentl'immatrielet le matriel
; et c'esten l'hommeque cela se fait.
Jeancrit:
a deuxperfections
substantielles
savoir
Ainsi
onvoitbiencomment
l'homme
diffrentes,
ce quisemble
tout faitrationnel
enraison
dela
l'meintellective
etl'mecogitative,
connexion
desparties
dumonde
enunseultre.38
L'ide se retrouveplusieursfois. La naturecompose de l'homme est
conforme l'ordreet la cohrencede l'univers,qui exigel'existenced'un
:
et immatriels
nudaux confinsdes deuxmondesmatriels
estcompos
leCommentateur,
dirait
d'unenature
C'estpourquoi
Averros,
quel'homme
de
la
matire
et
etd'unenature
non-individue
l'individuation
individue
corporelle,
par
ncessairement
dansl'homme
enraison
del'ordre
dumonde
quirequiert
quecelaseproduit
enl'homme
. . .39
s'unissent
enuntre,
savoir
etl'immatriel
quelematriel
la causefinalede cettecopulatio
Ou encore,dansun texteo il distingue
, etla
:
il crit,toujoursgrce ThomasWylton40
causeefficiente,
38)Jean
homo
libros
deanima
deJandun,
Aristotelis
, III,12,col.290: sicpatet
quomodo
Super
scilicet
animam
intellectiuam
et
animam
habet
duasdiuersas
substantiates,
perfectiones
cogitainaliquouno
connexionem
uniuersi
ethocvidetur
multum
rationabile
tiuam,
propter
partium
; jesouligne.
homo
habet
ente
Voici
letexte
entier
: Sicpatet
duasdiuersas
quomodo
perfectioethocuidetur
multum
nessubstantiates,
scilicet
animam
etanimam
intellectiuam,
cogitatiuam,
in
ente
Cum
enim
sunt
rationabile
connexionem
uniuersi
uno
[...].
partium
aliquo
propter
omnes
suasperfectiones
substaninuniuerso,
secundum
substantiae
quaesunt
perpetuae
aliquae
substantiae
sintgenerabiles
etcorruptibiles,
scilicet
substantiae
etquaedam
tiales,
immateriales,
omnes
substantiae
inferiores
homini
substantiates
sicut
adsuasperfectiones
proprias,
quantum
et
et
est
inordine
elementa
et
rationabile
ut
animalia,
mineralia,
quodaliplantae,
perfectionis,
substantilis
sitperpetua,
etnonnumerabilis
subunaspecuiusunaperfectio
quasitsubstantia,
sic
estinsuperioribus,
etaliagenerabilis
etcorruptibilis,
etnumerabilis
subunaspecie,
cie,sicut
inaliquaunanatura,
enim
etinferiora
multum
conueniens
erunt
unita
quoduidetur
superiora
uniuersi.
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
ordini
III,12,col.290).
(Jean
Super
39)Jean
diceret
de
:
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
anima
col.
Commenta267
III,
7,
,
itaque
Super
nonindiuiduata
torAverroes
estcompositus
exnatura
indiuiduata
etnatura
indiuiquodhomo
duatione
materiae
etquodhocnecessario
accidit
inhomine
ordinem
uniuersi
qui
corporalis,
propter
inhomine
etimmaterialia
scilicet
... ; jesouligne.
uniantur,
requirit
quodinaliquomaterialia
40)VoirThomas
in"Tomasza
deanimaintellectiva
Wiltona
, d.W.Seko,
Quaestio
Wylton,
deanima
Studia
5 (1964),75-116,
101-102,
intellectiva'",
'Quaestio
disputata
Mediewistyczne
cumquaeritur
decausacopulationis
intellectus
materialis
38-5:Adultimum,
nobis,
diceret,
causa
fnalis
est
commixtio
et
ordo
universi,
quod
partium
quaeexigunt,
quodsitaliquod

15:39:44 PM

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46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

[109] 331

surla causedecette
leCommentateur
dirait
Lorsqu'on
s'interroge
jonction,
quela cause
finale
estlaliaison
ncessaire
desparties
dumonde,
ait
un
intermdiaire
quiexige
qu'ily
lecorporel
entre
etl'incorporel
dela manire
susdite.
decette
Quant la causeefficiente
C'estlamme
en
chose,
conjonction,
je crois
qu'iln'ya decauseactive
queparaccident.
ilbrlerait
lefeu: enlui-mme
ilnebrle
maisqueparfois
effet,
qu'avec
toujours,
pastel
decelailn'ya decauseefficiente
c'est-combustible,
puisqu'illebrle,
queparaccident,
quelqu'un
il
direquegrce
ce
combustible
du
feu
et
en
va
mme
ici.41
de
;
quiapproche
MaisJean,sanssurprise,
fondegalement
sa thsesursa lectureAverros,
en
d'autres
textes
Grand
ceux
du
Commentaire
du
De
anima
convoquant
que
surlesquels,on Ta vu, une grandepartiedu problmerepose.Ses rfrences
principalessont toujoursles mmes.Pour dfendre,
par exemple,la pluralit des formessubstantielles,
on trouvesystmatiquement,
couple une
medium
inter
insuicompositione
etincorruptibilia
corporalia
corruptibilia,
perpetua
comprehendens
naturam
istorum
extremorum.
De causaeffectiva
huiusmodi
utramque
copulationis
nisiperaccidens.
Sicut
enim
credo,
quoddiceret,
quodeiusnonestcausaeffectiva
quanignis,
tumestexparte
nonardet
modohoccombustibile,
nihil
aliud
sua,semper
arderei,
quodautem
etpostea
huiusmodi
noncausaeffectiva
nisiperaccidens,
scilicet
ardet,
quicombustibile
apponit
intellectus
materialis
itaquodexparte
suanihil
; sicnaturaliter
humanum,
igni
perficit
corpus
Diceret
... Voiraussicette
deficit
autre
chezJean:
Auerroes
ratiosquence;
quodhocmulto
nabilius
estetconvenientius
alii.Namordo
etconexio
quamsitmodus
quemponunt
partium
universi
hocexigit.
Cumentia
sintimmaterialia
aeterna
etnonmultiplicabilia
ineadem
superiora
et
inferiora
sunt
materialia
et
in
et
eadem
Rationabile
specie,
corruptibilia
plura
specie.
ergoest
sit
universi
in
se
intrinsece
in
naturam,
quod aliquaspecies
composita
comprehendens
utranque
sicutetiam
medium
exextremis,
constituitur
etilla
inferioribus,
quoconiungantur
superiora
media
estnumerabilis
secundum
differentias
innumerabilis
autem
secundum
species
corporales
(Jean
formam
immaterialem
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
III,7,col.268-269
;
Super
ChezThomas
: Diceret
estrationabilius,
Averroes,
jesouligne).
Wylton
quodmultum
quamsit
catholici
nolunt
maledisponi,
exfine
12Metaphysicae,
modus,
; namexquoentia
quemponunt
ordoetconnexio
universi
hocexigit,
cumsuperiora
entia
suntimmaterialia,
aeterna
et
partium
nonnumeralia
ineadem
inferiora
autem
sintmaterialia,
ineadem
etplura
specie,
corruptibilia
inseintrinsece
quodestdarealiamspeciem
specie,
compositam
comprehendetem
utramque
inquacopulantur
etcommittuntur
sicut
medium
naturam,
inferioribus,
superiora
componitur
exextremis,
etillaspecies
media
erit
numerabilis
secundum
differentias
innumerabicorporales,
(Thomas
lisautem
etnonmultiplicabilis
secundum
formam
deanima
intelQuaestio
Wylton,
lectiva,
101,1etsuiv.).
41)Jean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
scilicet
de
III,7,col.269: Cumquaeritur,
Super
causailliuscopulationis,
diceret
Commentator
estconiunctio
debita
quodcausa
finalis
partium
utsitaliquod
medium
inter
etincorporalia
modo
Sedde
uniuersi,
quaeexigit
corporalia
supradicto.
causaeffectiua
huiusconiunctionis,
credo
nisiperaccidens,
quodnonestaliquacausaactiua
sicutenimignis,
estexparte
suasemper
nonardet
modohoc
arderet,
quantum
quodautem
etpostea
huius
nonestcausaeffectiua
nisiperaccidens,
scilicet
combustibile,
ardeat,
respectu
sedsicesthic... ; noussoulignous.
huius,
quicombustibile
apponit
igni,

15:39:44 PM

332 [110]

46 (2008)318-341
/Vivarium
J.-B.Brenet

du premierchapitredu De substantia
rfrence
aux quantitsindtermines
du traitDu ciel, III, 8, 306b11-20,
orbis
, unecitationdu GrandCommentaire
com. 6742; pourexpliquerque la matirepremire
reoitabord la formedu
genre,puis,par son biais,la formede l'espceet cellede l'individu(qui ne
il cite,avecle prcdentcomde la formespcifique),
diffre
pas rellement
de la Mtaphysique
mentaire
du De caelo, le GrandCommentaire
, I, com. 1743;
42)Voicideuxpassages
libros
Aristotelis
de
Danslepremier,
enJean
deJandun,
deJean.
Super
immdiat
entre
la forme
mallerapport
anima
, I, 8,col.44,Jean
explique
quel'oncomprend
sivisperillam
omnis
medii
etlamatire
immediationem
substantielle
priuationem
intelligere
et
contra
veritatem
et
naturam
hoc
est
contra
Aristotelem
et
Commentatorem,
rei,
dispositiui,
secundum
suasessentias
dimensiones
illam
utputo,
secundum
doctrinam,
quaeponit
praecipue
eteismediantibus
subforma
manere
easdem
numero
subforma
quaefuerunt
corrupti,
generati,
insuoTractato
Commentator
deSubstantia
uniri
materiae
utdocet
formas
substantiates
primae,

Cf.Jean
col.
44
:
hoc
eiquod
libros
Aristotelis
de
anima
orbis.
deJandun,
I,
,
8,
rpugnt
Super
in
elementorum
remanent
substantiales
in3 Caelietmundi,
quodformae
ipsedeterminauit
PourleGrand
autrait
Du ciel,
voir
AverCommentaire
Averros
mixto
remissae
etrefractae.
commentariis
cum
Averrois
InDe coelo
; rimpr.
, in:Aristotelis
ros,
1562-1574)
(Venise,
opera
etles
f.
in
hoc
tarnen
differunt
vol.
226vM:
am
M.,
5,
[lamatire
(Frankfurt 1962),
premire
haec
idest
haec
sunt
materia
sensibilium,
lments],
corporum
compositorum,
quoniam quidem
mediansecundo
vero
autem
estmateria
corporum
compositorum
corporum
simplicium
primo,
; cf.Averros,
libro
Decelo
Averrois
commentum
istis
elementis.
Cordubensis
tibus
magnum
super
edidit
Francis
etmundo
Aristotelis
ex
Arnzen,
t,inlucem
, recognitione
James
Carmody
Rdiger
InDe
estGerhard
Endress
Editioni
(Leuven,
2003),633,79-82.VoiraussiAverros,
praefatus
formae
eorum
elementorum
estquadecausanonremanent
coelo
, f.227rBC:Etquaerendum
cumiamposuistis
inactu,
aliasformas,
deferentes
quodnonsuntmateriae
proquasrecipiunt,
necesse
essetut
Dicamus
formis
nisipersuas formas.
quod,si esset,
igitur
priaequibusdam
inaccidentibus,
abeiusinforma
sedtantum
ensgeneraretur
exeisdiuersum
nullum
substantiali,
formae
eorum
secundum
unaforma,
utcorrumpantur
etideonecesse
est,cumexeisgeneratur
tune
materia
sicorrumperentur
secundum
totum,
medietatem,
reciperet
primo
prima
quoniam,
istis
formas
mediantibus
etessentialiter
omnes
etnonreciperet
formas,
compositorum
corporiDe celo
libro
Commentum
, 634,96-105.Surle faitquela
bus;cf.Averros
magnum
super
deanimay
cf.aussi
deJandun,
libros
mdiation
estncessaire,
I, 8,col.43:
Jean
Super Aristotelis
forma
nonunitur
materiae
nisimediantibus
autem
materialis
dispositionibus
aliquibus.
primae
inpotentia
existente
in2 huiusdicitquodactusuniuseuiusque
determinate
UndeAristoteles

fieri.
materia
estnatus
etinpropria
aptus
disposita
43)VoirAverros,
InMetaph.
,
, in:Aristotelis
primo
reeipit
operavol.8.,f.l4vK:[materia]
formas
aliasusqueadindivietpostea
mediante
forma
universali
formam
universalem,
reeipit
; pourd'autres
voirJean
deJandun,
textes
deJean
deJandun
surcepoint,
duales
Quaestiones
induodecim
libros
Ioannis
deIanduno
(Venise,
1553);
Metaphysicae
peripatetici
perspicacissimi
f.96ra-100rb;
a.M.,1966),
VII,17(quidsitprincipium
indiuiduationis),
(Frankfurt
rimpr.
uelperaliquod
forma
materiae
immediate
substantialis
ibid.,VIII,11 (utrum
coniungatur
suntduo.Primo
f.113ra-rb;
medium
(f.113rb):Dicenda
intrinsecum),
Jeancrit
quod
dicendum
forma
noniungitur
materiae
intrinsecum
[...]. Secundo
permedium
principale

15:39:44 PM

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J.-B.Brenet

[111] 333

pour rpondre l'objectionselon laquellela formede l'espce,survenant

un tredj actu par la formedu genre,seraitun accident,il se rfre
cettefoisau GrandCommentaire
du De animaII, 444et proposeune distinction entrele faitinformerune substanceen acte, et celui de l'informer
en tantqu'elleesten acte,ou sous le rapportde son actualit45
; enfin(mais
cettelisten'estpas exhaustive),
trouve
dans
le
Grand
Commentaire
de
Jean
la Physique
un passagequi, sesyeux,dveloppetrsmanifestement
la thse
de la double forme.C'est le texte,difficile,
, II,
qui commentePhysique
194bl046.Jeany repreces deuxphrasescls:
medium
intrinsecum
Etcausaest:formae
mixtorum
quodrequiritur
dispositum.
recipiuntur
inmateria
mediante
etformis
elementorum
3 Coelidicencomplexione
perCommentatorem
temquodprima
materia
formas
et illismediantibus
formam
elementorum,
recipit
recipit

mixtorum
44)Voir
Commentarium
deanima
libros
32-38: Etetiam
Averros,
, 133-134,
equivoce
magnum
dicitur
forma
esseinsubiecto,
etaccidens
esseinsubiecto.
Subiectum
enim
accidentis
estcorpus
exmateria
inactuetnonindiget
etforma,
etestaliquod
existens
insuoesseaccicompositum
dente
autem
forme
nonhabet
esseinactu,
secundum
nisiper
; subiectum
quodestsubiectum,

etindiget
forma
utsitinactu.
formam,
45)Lamatire
estcertes
actue
dugenre,
maislaforme
nelui
del'espce
premire
parlaforme
arrive
estenactey
mais
entant
; etcelaparce
pasentant
quelleestenpuissance
quelaforme
quelle
dugenre
n'est
delamatire
nereoit
del'espce
; lamatire
pasl'essence
paslaforme
parlaforme
dugenre
etprincipaliter'
cen'est
unedisposition.
Voir
de
Jean
primo
qu'une
prparation,

libros
Aristotelis
de
anima
col.
:
dico
ad
hoc
differt
aduenire
43
,
I,
8,
Jandun,
Super
quod
aliquid
entiinactusecundum
etaduenire
entiinactu,
nonsecundum
sed
quodinactu,
quodinactu,
secundum
exmateria
etforma
[.. .] Mododicoquodquamuis
quodinpotentia.
compositum
sitensactualiquo
tamen
forma
nonunitur
eiratione
nec
modo,
generali
speciei
quaestensactu,
illeactus,
scilicet
forma
est
ratio
formam
sed
recipiendi
propriam
generalis,principalis
speciei,
solum
estmedium
in
autem
essentia
materiae
est
est
dispositum.
Ipsa
quae
ipsocompositoprinsubiectum
illius
formae
substantial
etspeciei,
etsubiectum
etprincipale
receptiuum
primm
ethocsufficit.
Etadillam
in2 huius
intentionem
dixit
Commentator
cipale,
prope
principium
com.4 quodsubiectum
formae
secundum
nonestaliquid
substantial,
eius,
quodestsubiectum
actunisiperillam
etperillam
unius
dedit
subiectum
formam,
reduplicationemintelligere
quod
formae
substantial
essealiquod
modoensactuperaliquam
formam
sed
substantialem,
potest
inratione
nonerit
subiectum
formae
substantial
nechabebit
illam
formam
subsprincipaliter,
secundum
etprincipale,
itaquodforma
sitratio
tantialem,
quodsubiectum
primum
principalis
formam
sed
e
sua
natura
eritsubiectum
substantialem,
converso,
recipiendi
potentialis
magis
etprincipale
formae
substantialis
unaillarum
sitdisposiprimum
ipsius
cuiuscumque,
quamuis

noetpraeparatio
adrecipiendum
aliam.
46)Dansla traduction
dugrec,
nouslisons:
donc,le Physicien
franaise
Jusqu'
queldegr,
connatre
la forme
etl'essence?
doit-il
N'est-ce
comme
le
mdecin
le
pas
quidoitconnatre
tendon
etlefondeur
d'airain
ceenvuedequoiestchaque
l'airain,
chose,
quidoitconnatre
jusqu'
et<enconsidrant>
leschoses
etd'autre
quisontd'unepartsparables
parla forme
partdans
unematire
?Carc'estunhomme
unhomme,
etaussilesoleil.
Cequ'ilenestdu
quiengendre

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I Vivarium
46(2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

uneforme
savoir
Il estncessaire
abstraite,
parvienne
parsonexamen
quelephysicien
avant
deparvenir
l'examen
dela forme
de
la dernire,
sisontreestdansla matire,
l'homme.47
Et:
ladernire
des
cequ'elle
considre
l'tre
desformes,
Laphysique,
donc,
parvienne
jusqu'
ouauxformes
desformes,
des[formes]
formes
et lapremire
abstraites,
matrielles,
qui
forme
de
comme
c'estlecasdeladernire
intermdiaires
entre
dansl'tre,
celles-ci,
sont,
l'homme.48
Dans le De untiateintellectus
, ThomasAquin, recourant Thophraste
s'taitservide ce texteAristotecontreAverros
d'Erse travers
Thmistius,
ncessairement
en expliquantque l'intellect,
compriscommeformesubstandansle cas de l'hommele termede l'examenphysitielledu corps,constituait
voitles chosesautrement
aid
du
de
; il est
Commentateur,
que. Jean Jandun,
substantielles
de
de
formes
clairement
deux
lui
l'homme,l'une
question
pour
l'autrerelativement
inhrente,
spare.
? D'abord, ditJean,il exaFace l'homme,en effet,
que faitle Physicien
mine les diffrentes
formesdu corpspour arriver la derniredes formes
la forme
la plusnobledes formesmatrielles,
la plusspirituelle,
matrielles,
ultime, ce niveau,qu'on pourradire abstracta
en vertu,prcisment,
de
cette
forme
de
de
son haut degrde spiritualit;
,
premire
puis ajoute-t-il,
l'hommele physicienaccdera sa deuximeet dernireformeproprequi,
et constitue,
dansl'chelledes tres,occupele rangimmdiatement
suprieur
des ralitsspares.
donc,la premire
proposde la formeinhrente
la matire,
Jeancrit:
dansl'tre
savoir
cellequileconstitue
forme
del'homme,
Etausujet
decette
substantiel,
II delaPhysique,
commentaire
cequ'ilsoutient
aulivre
leCommentateur
a pens
26,c'est (Aristote,
deledterminer.
dela philosophie
etcequ'ilest,c'estl'affaire
premire
sparable
P.
et
index
notes,
,traduction,
2000),127).
(Paris,
prsentation,bibliographie par Pellegrin
Physique
47)Averros,
Naturalem
InPhys
, vol.4,f.59rAB:
., in:Aristotelis
Oportet
peruenire
per
opera
ante
siesseeiusestinmateria,
scilicet
adformam
suamconsyderationem
ultimam,
abstractam,

hominis.
deforma
quodperueniat
apudconsyderationem
48)Id.,f.59rCD: Scientia
ad
de
esse
naturalis
quousque
perueniat
consyderat formarum,
igitur
sunt
autadformas
ultimam
formarum
etprimam
formarum,
abstractarum,
materialium,
quae

hominis
ultima.
inesseinter
existimatur
deforma
mediae
sicut
illas,
49)Voirlesparagraphes
53,54et63.

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/.-B.Brenet

[113] 335

-dire
lephysicien
doitncessairement
uneforme
abstraite,
queparsonexamen
parvenir
savoir
ladernire
relativement
l'tre
a
la
avant

dans
matire,
qu'elle
qu'ilneparvienne
l'examen
delaforme
del'homme.50
Et il poursuit,
:
abordantle cas de l'intellect
l'examen
laplusnoble
de
Lephysicien,
avant
deparvenir
del'intellect,
quiestlaforme
laforme
dernire
: dansl'ordre
delagnration)
doitexaminer
l'homme,
spare
(ajoutez
estdanslamatire
dontl'tre,
cette
forme
estl'mecogitative,
; etsansconteste
cependant,
dansla mesure
oellereoit
demanire
trs
[...].Etc'est
qu'onditspare
spirituelle
nousvoyons
avant
d'examiner
l'intellect
a
danscelivre,
immatriel,
pourquoi
qu'Aristote,
il
l'a
examin
dans
la
de
ainsi
dit
l'homme,
qu'on
l'imagination,laquelleplace cogitative
plushaut.
leCommentateur
enpense
del'homme
Quant laforme
quiestoprateur
intrinsque,
cequ'ildit lafindececommentaire.
Laphysique
examine
doncl'tre
desformes
naturellesjusqu'
cequ'ilparvienne
ladernire
desformes
savoir
l'mecogitative,
matrielles,
et la premire
desspares,
savoir
l'intellective
oubien,
cequiestla mme
humaine,
dans
comme
auxpremires
formes
desformes,
chose,
je lepense,
quisontintermdiaires
l'tre
entre
comme
on le pensepourla forme
savoir
dernire
de l'homme,
celles-ci,
l'intellective.51
Du pointde vue de Jean,toutestsens,y compris,prcisele matres arts,la
structure
du De animaAristotedanslequelchacunpeutnoterque l'examen
de la phantasiaprcdecelui de Xintellectus.
Et tout conduit l'ide que
l'hommearticuleen lui, commehomme,deux formespropresqui en font
50)Jean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
,III,5,col.246: ... etdeistaforma
hominis,
Super
in2 Phys.
scilicet
inessesubstantiali,
intellexit
Commentator
constituit
quoddicit
quaeipsum
naturalem
com.26,quodoportet
adformam
abstractam,
persuamconsiderationem
peruenire
scilicet
ultimam
secundum
esseeiusinmateria,
ad
considerationem
de
antequam
perueniat

forma
hominis.
51)Jean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
III,5,col.246: Naturalis,
antequam
perueSuper
nitadconsiderationem
deintellectu,
est
forma
hominis
debet
considerare
de
nobilissima,
qui
in
forma
abstracta
via
cuius
tarnen
esse
est
materia
et
haec
indubiultima,
;
;
supple generationis
tanter
estanima
et
dicitur
abstracta,
quiamultum
spiritualiter
recipit,
cogitatiua,
quaeprotanto
omnes
formas
materiales.
Etideovidemus
Aristoteles
inistolibroantequam
super
cognoscit
immateriali
considerauerit
deintellectu
considerasse
dephantasia,
subquacomprehendit
cogitatiuam
utprius
declaratum
fuit.
De forma
vero
hominis
intrinsecum
hominis,
quaeestoperans
esse
Commentator
naturalis
considrt
quoddicitinfineilliuscom.Scientia
intelligit
igitur
animam
formarum
formarum
scilicet
naturalium
adultimam
materialium,
quousque
perueniat
etprimam
scilicet
intellectiuam
humanam
abstractarum,
est,utputo,
, autquodidem
cogitatiuamy
in
ad formas
sunt
esse
inter
sicut
existimatur
deforma
mediae
formarum,
illas,
primas
quae

hominis
scilicet
intellectiua.
ultima,

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46 (2008)318-341
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J.-B.Brenet

sanscoupure: la dernire
l'lmentcruciald'un univers
desformes
matrielles,
la premire
des formesspares.
5. La mprisede l'hommedouble
Nous avonsl l'essentiel
de la positionde Jeande Jandunsurla questionde la
et pouvaittre,du
.
Elle
ne
hominis
manquepas d'treproblmatique
forma
consiste

a
dforme.
La
reste,
mprise
penserqu'il n'y pas chezJeanun simdu propre,mais un dualismede substancesconduisant
ple dimorphisme
en chaqueindividu,de
une doubledfinition
de l'homme,voire l'existence,
deuxhommes: l'hommequ'il seraitdansune formede vie quotidiennenonc'est--dire
intellectuelle,
lorsqu'ilcogite,lorsqu'ilimagine,lorsqu'ilsent,ou
lorsqu'ilvit,toutsimplement;et un autrehomme,l'hommepensant,qu'il
serait, l'occasion
, lorsquece corpscogitantse joint l'intellect
sparet qu'il
titre
l'intellect

de
L'homme

ce
partie.
pensantserait
intgre, moment-l,
alorsun agrgat,
ponctuellement
composdu corpscogitantet de l'intellect,
maisau fonddistinctde cet individude
discrtes,
ralis,lorsd'intellections
de l'homme
base qu'est l'hommedu sens et de l'image.Thoriefascinante
l'homme
serait
comme
l'accident
d'uneautre
dans
double,
laquelle
qui pense
Elle futeffectivement
humanit,moinsnoble,maispermanente.
attaque52,
excessive
et

de
une
ses dtracteurs
Jean
Jandun
reprochant
anthropologie
dchiredans laquelle,si l'hommepense,il n'estplusle mmeque celuiqui
sent.C'est encoreelle que, par exemple,dnonceraPaul de Venisedans son
commentaire
du De animalorsqu'ilcrit:
leCommenLatroisime
futcelledeJean
deJandun
disant
opinion
quel'intellect,
d'aprs
le
estuniaucorps
nonpascomme
uneforme
donnant
maiscomme
l'tre,
tateur,
humain,

et
aumobile

la
manire
dont
est
unie
l'orbe
moteur
donnant
l'opration,
l'intelligence
: l'unestcompos
et
iladmet
ducorps
lepilote
aunavire
; decefait
qu'ilya deuxhommes
estcompos
del'intellect
etdetoutlereste
del'mecogitative
; proportionnelle; l'autre
: l'homme
deuxactes
depenser
leurcorrespondent,
l'ununiversel,
l'autre
ment,
particulier
ilnepense
nepense
; prisdelaseconde
faon
faon,
prisdelapremire
quelesparticuliers
quelesuniversels.53
52)Nousl'avons
tudi
ailleurs
enanalysant
destextes
de Grgoire
de Rimini
etde Pierre
"Moiquipense,
moiquisouffre
: laquestion
del'identit
du
d'Auriole
; cf.Jean-Baptiste
Brenet,
et
in
humain
dans
la
anti-averroste
de
Pierre
d'Auriol
de
Rimini",
compos
riposte
Grgoire
Desaint
Malebranche*
dusujet.
Anselme
d.O. Boulnois
(Paris,
2007),151-169.
Gnalogies
53)CitparBruno
diBrabante
nelpensiero
delrinascimento
italiano
Nardi,
(Rome,
1945),
Sideri
fuit
deianduno
dicentis
secundum
Commentato123: Tertia
Joannis
quodintellectus,
opinio

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[115] 337

Sans doute,pourtant,n'tait-ce
En
pas ce que Jeande Jandunvoulaitdire54.
effet:la cogitativeet l'intellective
vont ensemble,toujours.L'hommequi
cogiten'existepas,s'il n'estpas,en mmetemps,un tredotde la puissance
de penser.L'erreur
estde rifier
cettedistinction
des formes,
lesquellesne sont
mais
ou
ncessairement
artialternatives,
pas concurrentes,
parallles,
toujours
culesl'une l'autre,la moinsparfaite
s'orientant
versla plusparfaite,
etcelleci prsupposantcelle-l.J'admets,critJean dans ses questionssur la
, que les puissancesvgtative,
sensitive,cogitativeet intellective
Physique

des
substances
de
l'me
diffrentes.
appartiennent
Cependantil estvraique
fois
l'une
d'elles
en
une

chaque
prsuppose autre, savoirla plus parfaitela
moins parfaite.55
Puis il ajoute, quelques lignesaprs: la vgtativeest
commeune prparation
la sensitive,
la sensitive
la cogitative,
et la cogita56
tive l'intellective.
estuneformedu corps,etuneformede l'homme,mais
Certes,la cogitative
c'estune formequi n'existequ'en tantqu'elles'ordonne cetteautreforme,
fut-elle
L'hommecogitant,
seulement
n'est
spare,qu'estl'intellect.
cogitant,
fiction
et
l'homme
n'est
un
accident.
Une
citation
autre
;
qu'une
pensant
pas
cetgard,taitcapitalepourJean.Dans son GrandCommentaire
d'Averros,
de la Mtaphysique
critceci: il esttout faitclairque
, 12, com.38, Averros
Aristote
la
forme
des
en
tant
hommes,
pour
qu'ilssonthommes,n'existeque
Ce qui
par la jonctionde l'intellectavec eux57.Jeany souscrittotalement.
vautpourles formesinfrieures
vautaussipourla
par rapport la cogitative,
unitur
nonutforma
dansesse,
sedutmotor
mobili
eomodo
dansoperari,
rem,
humano,
corpori
orbietnauta
navi
homo
:
; concedens
quounitur
consequenter
intelligentia
quoddatur
duplex
unus
excorpore
etanima
exintellectu
ettoto
; etaliusquicomponitur
quicomponitur
cogitativa
residuo
scilicet
universale
etparticulare
; quibus
;
proportionaliter
respondet
duplex
intelligere,
homosumptus
solum
secundo
modointelligit
modo,
; etsumptus
primo
particularia
intelligit
solum
cf.galement
Zdzislaw
"PauldeVenise
etsathorie
del'me",
universalia;
Kuksewicz,
inL. Olivieri
veneto
e scienza
moderna
, d.L. Olivieri
(d.),Aristotelisme
(Padova,
1983),130164,304-306.
54)Nousnepartageons
deBradeZdzislaw
De Siger
Kuksewicz,
l'analyse
pas,parconsquent,
bant
Jacques
dePlaisance.
La thorie
del'intellect
chez
lesaverrostes
latins
desXIIIeetXIVesicles
& Varsovie
& Cracovie,
(Wroclaw
1968),208-209.
55)Jean
deJandun,
deJanduno
dephysico
auditu
nouiter
emendate
(Venise,
Quaestiones
Joannis
et
sensitiuam
et
etintel1519),VII,8,f.98va:Concedo
potentiam
vegetatiuam
cogitatiuam
lectiuam
addiuersas
substantias
animae.
Verum
esttamen
unaistarum
pertinere
quodsemper
scilicet
minus
.
aliam,
praesupponit
perfectior
perfecta.
56)Ibid.: vegetatiua
estsicut
adsensitiuam
etsensitiua
adcogitatiuam
etcogitatiua
preparatio

adintellectiuam.
57)Averros,
InMetaph
benequodAristoteles
homi.,f.321rF:apparet
opinatur
quodforma

ineoquodsunthomines,
nonestnisipercontinuationem
eorum
cumintellectu.
num,

15:39:44 PM

338 [116]

/Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B.Brenet

l'intellect
: de mme,en effet,
infrieures,
parrapport
cogitative
que cesformes
rellement
distinctes
dans
le
n'existent
ne
subsistent
quoique
corps,
pas,
pas
sansla cogitative,
laquelleellessontordonnes(comme leurachvement)58,
la cogitative
n'existeet ne fonctionne
commecogitative
qu'en tantqu'ordonne cetteautreet dernireforme(peu importequ'elle soit spare)qu'est
l'intellect
: elleest son service,
et n'existeque danscettemesure.De son ct,
l'intellect
lui aussiestpar naturedestin dpendrede la cogitative
; ce pour
quoi Jeande Jandunpeutcrire:l'hommeindividueln'estdithommeselon
l'intellect
,
que si se trouveen mmetempsdanssoncorpsunemecogitative
si bienque si elleestl, l'hommeestl aussi,et si on la supprime,
il estsupprim59.Deux formesde l'hommeaccordes,donc,et non pas deux homun
mes,ou un ddoublementde l'individuqui feraitde l'homointelligens
nouveltre,ponctuel,exclusif,
tandis
lieu
la
produit
qu'a
pense.
6. Conclusion
Cettethse,assurment,
ne manquepas d'antcdents
dansla scolastiquedu
XIIIe sicle.Mais il est frappant
retrouver
d'y
presquemot mot,outreles
chosexplicites
du De animaintellectiva
donton a parl,le Sigerde Brabant
du De intellectu
perduauquel A. Nifo,commeon sait,se rfre plusieurs
Dans
son
De anima,Nifocritceci,usantd'unplurielqui vautpour
reprises60.
Siger:
58)VoirJean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
, II, 8,col.40: cumhocipsaforma
Super
est
secundum
a
formis
enim
subsistentiam
est
; nunquam
nunquam
separata
generis
specierum
habeat
formam
animal
formam
alicuius
nam
animalis,
[...];
aliquod
per
quin
propriam speciei
nonestaliquid
secundum
essesubsistentiae
a speciebus
suis,licetsit
ipsum
separatum
genus
realiter
diuersum
adsuamformam
a formis
tamen
estsicutmateria
resquantum
specierum,
etpotentialis
formarum
et
earum,
pectu
quiaestforma
imperfecta
generis
respectu
specierum,

nisi
cum
forma
Ou
encore
materiam,
nunquam
potest
perficere
aliqua
specifica
perfection.
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
nonerit
III,12,col.291: homo
animata,
Jean
Super
plura
sedunum
eoquodunaillarum
animarum
estpropter
sicut
finem
et
animatum,
aliam,
propter
nonvalet.
Etcumaccipitur,
animae
constituunt
; quare
animata,
perfectionem
quodplures
plura
verum
estplures
unanonordinatur
adaliam,
sicut
adsuamperfectionem,
ad
animae,
quarum

etverum
estindiuersis
sednoninunocorpore.
quamdisponitur,
corporibus,
59)Jean
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima,
hominis
non
III,7,col.262: indiuiduum
Super
dicitur
homosecundum
nisi
in
simul
eius
sitanima
intellectum,
[...]; qua
corpore
cogitatiua

etquaremota
remouetur.
homo,
posita
ponitur
60)Surcepoint,
voir
videmment
lelivre
fondateur
citplushaut
deB.Nardi,
diBrabante
Sigieri
nelpensiero
delRinascimento
italiano.
Ontrouvera
danslelivre
diffrentes
decette
reprises
positiondansl'aristotlisme
padouan.

15:39:44 PM

/Vivarium
46 (2008)318-341
J.-B. Brenet

[117] 339

dicunt
intellectum
nonessetotam
hominis
sedquasisemianimam
velsemiforanimam,
mam.
enim
de
mente
illud
anime
ex
semine
deducitur,
Averroys,
quod
Fingunt
quoddicaessemedietatem
anime
humane.
Alteram
vero
medietatem
tur,
exempli,
gratia
cogitativum,
esseintellectum
extrinsecus
intellectivum.61
accedentem,
quoddicatur
Et dansson De intellectu
, toujours proposdu matrebrabanon:
Etilajoute:
'l'intellect
nepeutpasinformer
lamatire
sansquelacogitative
ne[1]
'informe
nesetient
constitue
dansl'tre
[galement],
parce
quelamatire
passansuneforme
par
sonbiais;etl'intellect
nepeut[1']
informer
sanssadisposition
etdernire
prochaine
qu'est
ilditquelacogitative
lacogitative.
Raison
estordonne
l'intellective,
bien
pourlaquelle
nesoitpasuneforme
son
la
ne
infor[De
ct]
quelacogitative
peut
gnrique.
cogitative
merlamatire
sansquel'intellect
ne[1']
Eneffet,
informe
sil'onposequelque
[galement].
chose
etquelque
dansuntatdeprparation
chose
d'informable,
ultime,
quipeutl'inforonposel'information:
orla matire
informe
estuninformable
mer,
parla cogitative
audernier
recevoir
l'intellect.
Ainsi
uneforme
substantielle
prochain
dispos
degr
peutelletre
uneprparation
uneautre,
danslamesure
ocette
forme
n'est
prparante
pasce
Voicicomment
l'tre
del'homme,
entant
reoit.
d'aprs
quoilamatire
qu'ilesthomme,
la findecetintellect;
etcomment
la diffrence
entantqu'ilest
del'homme,
procde
estfinalement
tire
decetintellect.62
homme,
B. Nardi,dans son grandlivresurSigerde Brabant,notaitque les formules
semianimaet semiforma
n'taientpeut-trepas de Sigerlui-mme63.
Reste
on
sont
et
dont
valoir
quelles
remarquables quelles pourraient
pour Jean,
mesurevitecombiensa reprised'Averros
dpendde mdiationslatines.Sur
cettequestionprcisede l'humanitde l'homme,on le rpte,l'histoirede
l'intrication
du problmede la pluralit
desformes
etde celuide
substantielles

la notique averrosten'a pas encoretfaite.Entredeuxcritiquesextrmes

(celled'uneanthropologie
ampute,o l'hommen'estqu'uncorps; celled'une
o l'hommequi pense est un autremoi), elle
ddoublante,
anthropologie
61)CitparNardi,
diBrabante
, 16.
Sigieri
62)CitparNardi,
18: Etaddit
di
Brabante
: necpotest
intellectus
informare
materiam,
,
Sigieri
noninformante
inesseperearn
sineforma
constitua
; etnon
quianonstatmateria
cogitativa,
intellectus
informare
sinesuaprxima
etultima,
Propter
potest
dispositione
queestcogitativa'.
inintellectivam,
ordinari
nonsitforma
quod,inquit
quamvis
cogitativam
cogitativa
generica.
Necpotest
informare
noninformante
intellectu.
Positis
eniminformabili
materiam,
cogitativa
: estautem
ultimate
etinformativo,
informatio
materia
informata
disposito
ponitur
cogitativa
Etsicpotest
una
informabile
etultimate
adrecipiendum
intellectum.
propinquum
dispositum
forma
illaforma
sit
materie
ratio
substantial
essedispositio
adaliam,
dummodo
non
preparans
ineoquodhomo,
Eccequomodo
essehominis,
estultimo
; et
recipiendi.
perhuncintellectum

ineoquodhomo,
differentia
sumitur
abhocintellectu
ultimate
hominis,
quomodo
63)Nardi,
diBrabante
, 30; 76.
Sigieri

15:39:44 PM

340 [118]

46 (2008)318-341
/Vivarium
J.-B.Brenet

uneconceptionde l'hommealternative
prsenter
qui n eutpas moins
pourrait
l'intellect
et
le
souci
d'une
forme
d'unit
de
du
les
autres
corps.Dans cette
que
la placede Jeande Jandunn'estpas mineure.
histoire,

Bibliographie
notes
etbibliographie
De l'me,
traduction
indite,
Aristote,
(Paris,
parR.Bods
prsentation,
1993).
etindex
, Physique
, traduction,
notes,
(Paris,
prsentation,
parP.Pellegrin
bibliographie
2000).
InPhys
cumAverrois
commentariis
Averros,
., inAristotelis
(Venise,
1562-1574);
rimpr.
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a. M.,1962),
vol.4.
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cum
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commentariis
; rimpr.
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1562-1574)
(Venise,
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a. M.,1962),
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(Frankfurt
cumAverrois
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., inAristotelis
(Venise,
1562-1574);
rimpr.
opera
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vol.8.
(Frankfurt
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libros
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commentarium
, d.F.S. Craw,Averrois
magnum
ford
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etlaPense.
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Commentaire
duDeanima'.
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etnotes
A.
de
Libera
introduction
traduction,
1998).
(Paris,
par
libro
De celoetmundo
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commentum
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, Averrois
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2003).
dusujet.
La notique
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Brenet,
(Paris,
JeandeJandun
Jean-Baptiste,
Transferts
2003).
l'espce
: laruine
d'Averros
deJandun",
, "Duphantasme
Jean
parl'averroste
intelligible
inIntellect
etimagination
danslaPhilosophie
mdivale.
Intellect
andImagination
inMedieval
International
eimaginao
naFilosofia
Medieval.
Actes
duXIeCongrs
de
Intellecto
Philosophy.
Internationale
Mdivale
delaSocit
delaPhilosophie
Mdivale
Philosophie
pourl'tude
& Jos
F.Meirinhos
du26 au31aot2002,d.M. C. Pacheco
Porto,
(Turn(S.I.E.P.M.),
190.
hout,
2006),vol.2, 1179-1
moiquisouffre:
la question
del'identit
ducompos
humain
dansla
, "Moiquipense,
inGnalogies
dusujet.
De
anti-averroste
dePierre
d'Auriol
etGrgoire
deRimini",
riposte
saint
Anselme
Malebranche,
d.O. Boulnois
151-169.
(Paris,
2007),
La trasparenza
delle
Averro
e l'averroismo
Coccia,
Emanuele,
(Milan,
2005).
immagini.
surles219articles
condamns
Paris
le7 mars
& Paris,
1277(Louvain
Hissette,
Roland,
Enqute
1977).
deJanduno
dephysico
auditu
nouiter
emendate
(Venise,
JeandeJandun,
Quaestiones
Joannis
1519).
Ioannis
deIanduno
induodecim
libros
, Quaestiones
perspicacissimi
peripatetici
Metaphysicae
a. M.,1966).
(Venise,
1553);rimpr.
(Frankfurt
deIanduno
acutissimi
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
subtilissimae
,Ioannis
philosophi
super
quaestiones
a. M.,1966).
(Venise,
1587);rimpr.
(Frankfurt
"Deprincipio
individuationis
deJean
deJandun.
Edition
dutexte
Kuksewicz,
Zdzislaw,
d'aprs
lems.Upsal.
11 (1963),93-106.
Bibi.Univ.
Polonorum
C615",Mediaevalia
Phibsophica

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del'intellect
latins
deBrabant
Jacques
dePlaisance.
La thorie
chezlesaverrostes
, De Siger
& Cracovie,
desXIIIeetXIVesicles
& Varsovie
1968).
(Wroclaw
inAristotelisme
veneto
e scienza
moderna
etsa thorie
de l'me",
, d.
, "PauldeVenise
L.Olivieri
(Padova,
1983),130-164.
de
duDe unitate
intellectus
contra
averroistas
Alain
eiel'intellect.
Commentaire
Libera,
de,L'unit
Thomas
(Paris,
2004).
d'Aquin
nelpensiero
delrinascimento
italiano
diBrabante
Nardi,
Bruno,
(Rome,
1945).
Sigieri
"Thomas
onthe
B.& Trifogli,
O. & Noone,
Cecilia,
Nielsen,
Question
Wylton's
Timothy
Lauge
e Studi
sullaTradizione
Distinction
asApplied
totheDivine",
Documenti
Formal
Filosofica
14(2003),327-388.
Medievale
L'intelletto
umano
nella
diAlberto
Aristotelismo
,
Antonio,
Magno
prospettiva
difficile.
Petagine,
di
Tommaso
e
Brabante
(Milan,
2004).
Sigieri
d'Aquino
etcomde1277
introduction
La condamnation
traduction,
',texte
latin,
Pich,
David,
parisienne
mentaire
(Paris,
1999).
undTheologie
"Olivietlesaverrostes",
53
Pirn,
Sylvain,
Freiburger
Zeitschrifi
furPhilosophie
(2006),251-309.
mundi
intertium
deanima.
deaeternitate
deBrabant,
,deanima
,d.
intellectiva,
Quaestiones
Siger
B.Bazn(Louvain
& Paris,
1972).
inAverroes'
inAristotelis
onCogitatio
Commentarium
Richard
C.,"Remarks
Taylor,
Magnum
Tradition:
Constitution
andRecepDeAnima
Libros
andtheAristotelian
Sources,
",inAverroes
A.
&
G.
Endress
Ibn
Rushd
126-1
d.
Aertsen
tionofthePhilosophy
(Leiden,
(1
198),
J.
of
1999),217-255.
in
inAverroes",
: Remarks
ontheCogitative
Power
andCogitare
, "Cogitatio,
Cogitativus
auMoyen
d.J.Hamesse
& C. Steel
L'laboration
duvocabulaire
(Turnhout,
ge,
philosophique
2000),111-146.
Averros
antL'Unit
del'intellect
contre
lesaverrostes
contre
Thomas
, suividesTextes
d'Aquin,
notes
etindex
rieurs
1270.Texte
introduction,
latin,
traduction,
chronologie,
bibliographie,
(Paris
1994).
parA.deLibera
delafoicatholique
contre
leserreurs
desinfidles.
contre
lesGentils.
Livre
surla vrit
,Somme
4
vols.
V.
&
C.
Michon
&
D.
Traduction
indite
Aubin
Moreau,
(Paris,
1999).
par
in"Tomasza
Wiltona
deanima
d.W.Seko,
Thomas
intellectiva,
Quaestio
'Quaestio
Wylton,
deanima
intellectiva'
5 (1964),75-116.
",Studia
disputata
Mediewistyczne

15:39:44 PM

'S^
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)342-367

Diversit

des fonctions

psychologie

et unit de l'me dans la

pripatticienne

(xive-xvi<: sicle)

JolBiard
Universit
Tours
,
Franois-Rabelais,
d etudes
de
la
UMR6576,CNRS
Centre
Renaissance,
suprieures
Abstract
Thequestion
oftheunity
ofthesoulisposedintheMidleAges,atthecrossing
point
oftheAristotelician
whichdistinguishes
several
evenseveral
theory,
potencies,
parts
in thesoul,andtheAugustinin
whichunderlines
theunityofthemind
doctrine,
whencommenting
theTreatise
ontheSoulof
JohnBuridan,
usingcorporeal
powers.
in
of
the
reaction
Aristotle,
John Janduns
emphasizes unity,
probably
against
position.
Fromthemiddleof 14thcentury
tilltheendof 17th,thisproblem
goeson being
thetwoquestions
ofthesubstantial
debatedthrough
unityof thesouland ofthe
therelation
between
thesouland itspotencies.
Thisarticlestudiessomestagesof
in NicoleOresmes
someof themimmediately
afterBuridan,
thisdevelopment,
in AntoineRubioswork.It
and Peterof Ailly
s positions,
another
moredistant,
in
thatwe findstillthesameproblematics,
reelaborated
and transformed,
suggests
Descartes.
Keywords
substantial
soul,form,
intellect,
unity,
operation
1. Introduction
La questionde l'unitde l'mesurgitds l'poquedu traitaristotlicien.
La
distinction
de ces espcesd'mesque sontl'mevgtative,
l'mesensitive
et
l'intellects'accompagned'une rflexion
surle statutde ces parties.Ainsi,
Aristotes'interroge
surson caractre
ce qui
sparou non de l'intellect,

l'videncesignifie
alors spardes autresparties. D'autrestraditions
viendront,au Moyenge,compliquerla question.Il fautnotamment
prendreen
influences
la thsearistotcomptecertaines
qui contredisent
augustiniennes,
liciennede l'me commeformeau bnficed'un rapportplus instrumental
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
NV,
Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/
156853408X360957

15:39:50 PM

46 (2008)342-367
J.Biard/Vivarium

[121] 343

entreTmeet le corps.Quoi quii en soitde ces influences

on
qui se croisent,
XIVe
chez
certains
du
sicle

de
auteurs
une
tendance
accentuer
l'unit
repre
l'melorsqu'ilsabordentlesquestionstraditionnellement
dans
les
composes
mentaires
surAristote.La double questionde l'unitsubstantielle
de l'me
d'unepart,du rapportde l'me sespuissancesd'autrepartn'taitassurment
d'Albertle Grandou de Thomasd'Aquin;
pas absentedes textesd'Avicenne,
maisil semblequ'avecJeanBuridanun sautqualitatif
soitopr.La question
est longuement
comme
en
de
la
doctrineofficielle
de
si,
dpit
argumente,
avait
dfini
lors
du
Concile
de
en
l'me
Vienne,
1311-1312,
l'glisequi
comme formedu corps,on devaitencorese confronter
aux discussions
rcurrentes
sursonstatut,
surle rapportde l'meetdu corps,surl'unitessentiellede l'me,surle caractre
des diffrents
univoqueou non des dfinitions
Il
d'mes.
est
dans
le
cas
cette
a t
de
discussion
Buridan,
types
probableque,
voireexacerbeparla distinction
la suite
relance,
opreparJeande Jandun,
de Sigerde Brabant,entreplusieurstypesde formes,
une formesubstantielle
et donnel'tred'unepart,une formeopranted'autrepart,cette
qui informe
dernire
le statutde l'intellect1.
de dfinir
Les moyensconceptuels
permettant
misen uvreparBuridanpourrelever
ce dficonduisent une radicalisation
desthsessurl'unitde l'me,inflexion
donton peutreprer
leseffets
jusqu'au
xviiesicle.

2. La radicalisationde la thsede l'unitde l'me au XIVe sicle

Thomasd'Aquina dj fortement
de l'me, l'opsoulignl'unitessentielle
de
la
la
thorie
de
des
formes
substantielles
pos
pluralit
qui devaitdonner
lieu biendescontroverses
durantlestroisdernires
dcenniesdu sicle.Dans
la Sommede thologie
, il le fait l'occasionde la questionLXXVI de la
premire
partie,surl'unionde l'me et du corps,dans les articles1, 3 et 4.
Dans l'article3, il rfre
la thsede la pluralit
desmes Platon2,etla meten
1}Voir
deJandun,
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
subtilissimae
(Venise,
1587);
Jean
Super
quaestiones
am
livre
Main,
Minerva,
III,qu.5; Jean-Baptiste
Brenet,
(Frankfurt
1966)
rimpr.
parexemple
dusujet.
La notique
d'Averros
selon
deJandun
en
(Paris,
2003),chapitre
Jean
Transferts
premier,
part.
p.33-41etp.53-59.
2)VoirThomas
Summa
Thomae
doctoris
d'Aquin,
prima
pars,Sancti
Aquinitatis
theologiae,
omnia
XIII
P.
M.
V
iussu
Leonis
t.
edita,
(Rome,
1889),
Opera
p. 220:
angelici
impensaque
Respondeo
dicendum
animas
esseincorpore
secundum
diversas
uno,etiam
quodPlatoposuit
vimnutritivam
diversa
vitae
dicens
esseinhepate,
distinctas,
attribuebat,
organa
quibus
opera
; unexpos
incorde,
incerebro
similaire
setrouve
dans
concupiscibilem
critique
cogniscitivam
la Somme
contre
lesGentils
Summa
contra
Gentiles
Sancti
,
, II,chap.57: voirThomas
d'Aquin,

15:39:50 PM

344 [122]

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relationavecla thoriede l'mecommemoteur,

dj rcusedansl'article1
de
au
de
l'intellect
comme
formedu corpshumain3.
l'intellect,
propos
profit
Se fondantsurl'exigenced'unitde l'trecompos,surlesdifficults
qui rsulteraient
la
contraire
concernant
formes
de thse
les
de prdication
(attribution
de formes
de cesformes
entreelles),etsurle risque
diverses,
rapportprdicatif
il affirme
de conflitentredes oprationsprovenant
de formeshirarchises,
:
est
en
Ainsidoncil fautdireque la mmeme,numriquement
l'homme
une,
intellective
et nutritive
4.
sensitive,
Mais cetteaffirmation
doit trecompltepar l'analysedu rapportentre
l'meet sespuissances,
que l'on trouvedansla questionLXXVII, en particulierdans l'article1, Est-ceque l'essencemmede l'me est identique ses
puissances?,et dans l'article2, Est-ce qu'il y a plusieurspuissancesde
surl'me.L, le problmedu
l'me?, ainsique dans les Questions
disputes
entre
essence
et
et
celui
de
la
puissance,
pluralitdes puissancessont
rapport
commedans
dans la question11 en une seuleinterrogation,
dj rassembls
les commentaires
ultrieurs
: Est-ceque, en l'homme,l'merationnelle,
senDans la question12, L'me
sibleetvgtative
soutune uniquesubstance?5.
?6,l'argumentation
est-elleidentique sespuissances
voqueune thseselon
l'me
serait

ses
et
serait
elle-mmele principe
identique
puissances
laquelle
l'essencede l'metantnommepardivers
immdiatde touteslesoprations,
nomsselonla diversit
:
de ces oprations
sespuissances
Doncceuxquiposent
comprennent
quel'meestidentique
parl que
l'essence
mme
del'me
estleprincipe
immdiat
detoutes
sesoprations,
endisant
quepar
choses
l'essence
del'mel'homme
etfait
lesautres
decette
etque
sent,
sorte,
comprend,
selon
ladiversit
desoprations
elleestappele
dedivers
noms7.
XIIIP.M.,t.XIII-XV
Thomae
doctoris
iussueditaLeonis
Aquinitatis
Operaomnia
angelici
1918-1940).
(Rome,
3)Thomas
Summa
Ia pars,
art.1,p. 209: Quidam
autem
d'Aquin
theologiae,
qu. LXXVI,
dicere
voluerunt
unitur
utmotor
vanum.
[...].Sedhocestmultipliciter
quodintellectus
corpori
exipsaoperatione
intellectus
unitur
[.. .]Sicergo
apparet
quodintellectivum
principium
corpori

utforma.
4)Sicergodicendum
inhomine,
sensitiva
etintellectiva
et
estanima
quodeademnumero
Thomas
Summa
contra
Gentiles
nutritiva
art.3,p.221); voiraussi
, II,chap.58.
(ibid.,
d'Aquin
5)Thomas
deanima
Sancti
Thomae
deAquino
, d.C. Bazan,
Questiones
d'Aquin,
disputatae
fratrum
tomus
OperaomniaiussuLeonisXIII P. M. editacuraetstudio
praedicatorum,
XXTV-1
11: Utrum
inhomine
anima
sensibilis
et
rationalis,
(Rome& Paris,
1996).Questio
situnasubstantia,
vegetabilis
p.95-104.
6)Op.cit.,qu.12: Utrum
12.
animam
sitsuepotentie,
p. 105-1
7)Ponentes
sitsuepotentie,
hocintelligunt,
anime
sit
quodanima
igitur
quodipsaessentia

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[123] 345

Mais selonThomascettethsene peuttresoutenue.Il prfre

parlerde forforme
De
mmedans
une
substantielle.
mesaccidentelles,
qui prsupposent
l'article138,il poseque l'essencede l'men'estpas le principeimmdiatde ses
raffirmant
maisquelle opreau moyende principesaccidentels,
oprations,
en
fonction
des
et
de
des
des
de
genres puissances9,
l'exigence distinguer degrs
caractrisent
donc
les
se
Pour
et
des
lui,
par
puissances
oprations.
objets
de l'me,si bienque
de l'tresubstantiel
diverses
qui se distinguent
oprations
avecl'essencemmede l'me. L'essence
leurprincipene sauraitse confondre
maiselleoprepar
de l'me n'estpas le principeimmdiatde ses oprations,
la mdiationde principesaccidentels10.
bien l'unitessentielle
de l'me. Mais il
Thomas,par consquent,affirme
de
cetteunitessentielle
de distinguer
estimedansle mmetempsncessaire
de l'me.
la pluralit
des puissancesou fonctions
LesQuestionsdeJeanBuridan
surl'unitde l'meet de
JeanBuridan,au siclesuivant,insisteconstamment
et sensitive
dans
Il affirme
d'abordl'unitde la formevgtative
sesfacults11.
surl'me12
:
la question4 du livreII de ses Questions
l'meestunique
etqu'iln'ya pasenluiuneme
[.. .] je crois[.. .] quedansuncheval
niunemesensitive
del'mevgtative13.
distincte
distincte
del'mesensitive,
vgtative
dicentes
immediatum
omnium
anime,
quodhomoperessentiam
operationum
principium
etquodsecundum
diversitatem
etaliahuiusmodi
anime
sentit,
operationum
operatur,
intelligit,
deanima,
diversis
nominibus
nominatur
(Thomas
Questiones
d'Aquin,
disputatole
qu.12,p. 108).
8)Question
13:Utrum
potentie
distinguantur
perobiecta
(p.113-122).
9)Voirnotamment
op.cit.,p. 120.
10)Manifestum
suarum
anime
nonestprincipium
immediatum
estigitur
quodipsaessentia
(ibid.,
accidentalibus
setoperatur
mediantibus
principiis
p. 110); [...]essentia
operationum,
setoportet
omnium
suarum
esseimmediatum
anime[.. .] nonpotest
actionum,
principium
actionum
diversitati
suarum
habeat
et
diversas
(p.110).
correspondentes
plures
potentias
quod
n) Jereprends
"Le
deBiard,
dansunepartie
iciquelques
lments
decequej'aidvelopp
Jol,
Blaise
sicle
deJandun,
naturelle
duxrv*
dessensdanslaphilosophe
Buridan,
Jean
(Jean
systme
deParme)",
(2002),p.335-351.
MicrologusX
12)Letexte
II a tdit
Soboldans
etdernire
lecture
surlelivre
delatroisime
John
parPeter
liber
inAristotelis
Deanima
anEdition
oftheQuaestiones
Buridan
onthe
SoulandSensation
,with
ineodem
ani4 a pourtitre
Utrum
lectura
secundus
, detertia
1984).Laquestion
(AnnArbor,
et
sensitiva
malisiteadem
anima
cit.,
(d. p.42-57).
vegetativa
13)[.. .] egocredo[.. .] quodinequounicasitanima
etquodnonsitineoanima
vegetativa
deanima
a vegetativa
Buridan
a sensitiva
necsensitiva
distincta
distincta
, II,8,
Questiones
(Jean
Buridan
ontheSoul).
Soboi,
John
p.48,dansPeter

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ses
La questionsuivanteexaminel'identitde Tmeavecelle-mme travers
l'me
sensible
et
de
l'me
encore
surtout
de
Buridan
y parle
oprations14.
vgAinsi,le
tative,mais certainsarguments
voquentdj le cas de l'intellect.
septimeargumenten faveurde la distinctionfaitappel au caractrenon
tendude l'intellectalorsque les puissances(virtutes
) organiquessonttenLe huitime
dues, de mmequ' son caractreperptuelet incorruptible15.
distance
entre
les
ou
vertus
introduit
une
puissances
cognitives
argument
etsens)etlespuissancesou vertusnoncognitives
(commel'imagina(intellect
,
tion)16.Le proposgnralvise affirmer
que l'on ne doitpas,au senspropre
l'me
humaine
:
dans
plusieurspuissances
distinguer
ilya plusieurs
ilya undoute
: est-il
dedirequ'enl'homme
de
Etalors
correct
puissances
aussiselon
?Jecrois
despuissances
l'me
[.. .] etenparlant
principales
quenon,enparlant
lesenspropre
desmots17.
en revanche,
on peutbien
On s'cartedoncde Thomas.En un sensimpropre,
Buridan
les
selon
leurs
Jean
appliquealors
oprations.
distinguer puissances
commeil
une analyselinguistique
pourdmlerun problmede psychologie,
dansla physique.
le faitfrquemment
ilya denombreuses
nousconcdons
Maisselon
unsensimpropre
puissanqu'enl'homme
etqueselon
desraisons
cesdel'me,
encesensquel'mepeutexercer
diverses
oprations,
luisontattribus
desnomsdivers
de cesoprations,
diverses,
quenous
reprsentatives
lesensitif
etlevgtatif
nousdisons
difdisons
diffrer
Ainsi,
quel'intellect,
parlaraison.
raisons18.
cesnoms
lamme
chose
selon
diverses
laraison,
frent
selon
puisque
signifient
14)Question
anime
sintdistincte
adipsaanima
5: Utrum
(p.58-70).
potentie
15)Septimo
necextensa
suntorganice
et
nonestvirtus
(alieautem
quiaintellectus
organica
a corrumptibili
abaliissicud
etquiaintellectus
(II,qu.5,p.59).
extense),
separatur
perpetuum
16)Octavo
etintellectiva,
etalienon.
utsensitiva
suntpotentie
quiaquedam
cognoscitive,
ut
fantasia
et
alie
sunt
reservative
non,
59).
(ibid.,
Quedam
p.
specierum,
ergo
17)Ettunc
Et
utrum
sitbenedictum
sintplures
anime.
estdubitatio
quodinhomine
potentie
deproprietate
depotentiis
[.. .] etetiam
principalibus
loquendo
quodnon,loquendo
egocredo
sur
desQuestions
surl'thique
insiste
encore
sermonis
(ibid.,
p.63).Unpassage
plusnettement
non
sit
inconveniens
l'unit
del'meintellective
etdel'mesensitive:
Itaetiam
putoquod
sintidemrealiter
animae
sensitiva
etpotentia
intellectiva
dicere
[.. .] potentia
quodexparte
decern
libros
Ethicorum
etinter
se(Jean
Buridan,
1513),
(Paris,
Quaestiones
ipsianimae
super
P 45rb- citd'aprs
Pour
l'histoire
dusens
: lacontroverse
entre
de
Adrian
Pattin,
agent
Barthlemy
Ancient
series
et
de
ses
antcdents
et
son
volution
and
Medieval
,
Jean
Jandun,
Philosophy,
Bruges
1,6 (Leuven,
1988),p.239).
18)Sedsecundum
inhomine
anime
sensum
concedimus
essemultas
improprium
potentias
etquodsecundum
adistum
estpotens
exercere
diversas
ratiosensum,
operationes,
quodanima

15:39:50 PM

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[125] 347

estencore
L'ditionLockert,compilesansdoute partirde plusieurs
lectures,
:
plusexplicite
A l'autre
pourla mme
je rponds
quelesnomssensetmesupposent
argument
Le nom
connotations
etsontdediverses
chose,
catgories.
cependant
qu'ilsontdiverses
estunnomrelatif,
me estpeut-tre

ditenrapport
unnomabsolu
; etlenomsens
il
rien
la
de
la
:
ne
en
effet
d'autre
le
mode
de
l'acte,
puissance
que
par
puissance signifie
sentir19.
Or on doit noterquune dmarchesimilairetaitvoque (et refuse)par
De spirituet
au traitpseudo-augustinien
Thomasd'Aquin,qui l'attribuait
en faveurde l'identit
de l'me
anima. Dans le premier
etdeuximeargument
en effet ce traitla doctrineselonlaquelle
et de ses puissances,il attribuait
nomsen raisonde ses diffune me essentiellement
uniquereoitdiffrents
rentesoprations.
: l'mea sespuissances
naturelles
etelle
Il estditeneffet
De l'esprit
etdel'me
danslelivre
etvertus
sontlamme
chose
estidentique
ellestoutes,
carsespuissances
[.
qu'elle.. .] En
lafonction
estappele
ilestditdanslemme
livre
: l'meselon
desonuvre
outre,
pardes
com: carelleestditemelorsqu'elle
noms
varis
sent,
vit,senslorsqu'elle
lorsqu'elle
esprit
serappelle,
volont
veut.
mmoire
raison
discerne,
lorsqu'elle
lorsqu'elle
prend,
lorsqu'elle
les

la
elles
diffrent
dans
ces
choses
ne
diffrent
en
dont
substance,
faon
pas
Cependant
carellessontl'me20.
noms,
diversa
adistasoperationes,
sibinomina
nesdiversas
quedicimus
imponuntur
representativas
differre
sensitivm
et Vegetativum
rationem.
Sic dicimus
differre
secundum
intellectum,
rationes
remeandem
secundum
diversas
secundum
rationem,
quiahecnomina
significant
deanima,
II,5,p.63-64).
(Buridan,
Questiones
19)Adaliam
tamen
habent
sensus
etanima
hecnomina
dicoquod,licet
pereodem
supponant,
estforte
nomen
Hocnomen
anima
etsuntdiversorum
aliasconnotationes
praedicamentorum.
sensus
estnomen
relativum
dictum
adactum
absolutum
;
; ethocnomen
permodum
potentiae
Le
ad
sentiendum
sensus
nonenim
aliudsignificai
Benot,
cit.,
(op. dansPatar,
quampotentia
& Longueuil,
Trait
del'medeJeanBuridan
lectura]
(Louvain-la-Neuve
[leprima
Qubec,
1991),p.640-641).
20)Dicitur
etillaomniaest,
etanima
: animahabetsuanaturalia
eniminlibroDe spiritu
ineodem
:
libro
dicitur
eiusidemsuntquidipsa.[.. .] Praeterea
namque
atquevires
potentiae
anima
dicitur
variis
nominibus:
animasecundum
suioperis
officium
namque
nuncupatur
ratio
dumdiscernit,
mens
dumintelligit,
sensus
dumsentit,
animus
dumsapit,
dumvegetai,
insubstantia,
nondifferunt
voluntas
dumvult.statamen
memoria
dumrecordatur,
quemadde
innominibus,
istasuntanima
modum
(Thomas
Questiones
d'Aquin,
disputatae
quoniam
estd Costaben
etanima
despiritu
anima
, citsansnomd'auteur,
, qu.12,p. 110); leLiber
cette
onvalevoir,
a misendoute
Augustin
comme
tattribu
; Thomas,
Luca,maisilavait
attribution.

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De fait,la citationestassezprcisepuisqu'onlitdanscetouvrage:
estappele
dedivers
noms.
Carelleestdite
desonuvre
[.. .] selonla fonction
[l'me]
senslorsqu'elle
melorsqu'elle
vit,esprit
sent,animus
) lorsqu'elle
(spiritus
contemple,
se rappelle
mens,
mmoire,
sait,lorsqu'elle
comprend
lorsqu'elle
lorsqu'elle
lorsqu'elle
ceschoses
nediffrent
lafaon
dontelles
volont.
consent,
pasensubstance,
Cependant
me
toutes
ces
choses
sont
une
les
sont
diffrent
danslesnoms,
puisque
unique, proprits
maisl'essence
estune21.
diverses,
certes,
:
assezcavalirement
cetteautorit
Thomas,cependant,traitait
Del'esprit
etdel'me
n'est
mais
Aupremier
pasd'Augustin
jerponds
quecelivre
argument,
il
certain
Cistercien
et
ne
faut
se
soucier
de
ce
onditqu'ila tcrit
un
;
pas
beaucoup
par
quiestditenlui22.
le convoquera l'appuide sa thse.Il ractualise
cette
Buridan,au contraire,
et diffrence
et il peut
d'appellations,
approchequi combineunitessentielle
le rapcela
mobiliser
toutes
les
ressources
de
la
terministe.
Dans
pour
logique
ni
on
n'a
donc
une
comme
on
entre
les
facults
de
l'me,
quivocit
port
ni proprement
l'avaitlu chez Averros,
du moins proposde l'intellect,
maisune distincJeande Jandun23,
parlerune analogiecommel'avaitsuggr
tionde raison entendre
ici commediffrence
de signesconceptuels.
les rponsesaux arguments
contraires.
Nous pouvonsds lorscomprendre
L'uneadmetque lespuissancesou vertusinstrumentales
sontbientendueset
diversesmaisqu'aucunevertuprincipalen'esttendueen l'homme:
21) [.. .] secundum
suioperis
officium
variis
nominibus.
Dicitur
[anima]
nuncupatur
namque
dumsentit;
dumsapit;
dumvgtt;
dumcontemplatur;
dum
sensus,
animus,
anima,
spiritus,
dumconsentit,
voluntas.
statarnen
nondifferunt
dumrecordatur,
mens;
memoria;
intelligit,
insubstantia,
innominibus
omnia
istaunaanima
; quoniam
est,proprietates
quemadmodum
- ], Liber
sedessentia
una(Augustin
despiritu
etanima,
diverse,
quidem
[pseudo
Patrologie
XL(Paris,
latine
col.788-789)
estaussi
dit
dansCariSigmund
Barach,
; letexte
1845),
Excerpta
e libro
'Demotu
cordis
Costa-ben-Luca
De differentia
animae
etspiritus*
liber
' item
Alfredi
Anglici
2
translatus
aJohanne
Bibliotheca
Mediae
Ataris
(Innsbruck,
1978),
philosophorum
Hispalensis,
p. 120-139.
22)Adprimm
dicendum
isteDespiritu
etanima
nonestAugustini,
setdicitur
quodliber
ergo
cuiusdam
Cisterciensis
necestmultum
curandum
dehiisquaeineodicuntur
fuisse;
(Thomas
deanima,
Questiones
d'Aquin,
qu.12,p. 110).
disputatae
23)L'ide
d'uneprdication
nonunivoque
deladfinition
del'me(prdication
entre
analogique
etmme
l'mevgtative
etl'mesensitive
entre
l'meintellective
etlesautres)
quivoque
provenait
etelleseretrouve
chezJean
deJandun
: voir cepropos,
libros
d'Averros,
Jandun,
Super
Aristotelis
dusujet
, II,3,col.81; etBrenet,
,p.36-41.
Transferts

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[127] 349

lesvertus
instrumentales
del'mesonttendues
maisqu'aucune
[.. .]jedisqu'enl'homme
ni
ni
vertu
de

savoir
la
la
vertu
vertu
l'me,
sensitive,
principale
principale
principale
n'est
tendue
enlui24.
vgtative,
De mme,le caractrespar,qu'Aristotesemblaitrserver
l'intellect,
est
tenduaux autresvertus.Mais que faut-ilentendreici? Il ne s'agitplusde la
des partiesentreelles,maisde la sparabilit
de l'meet du corps;
sparation
or cettesparabilit
n'estpas rserve l'intellect,
elle vautgalementpour
toutepartiede l'me:
sensitive
etvgtative
estperptuelle
etsparable
du
Jedisencore
quelavertu
principale
autant
la
il
intellective.
Mais
est
de
et
faon
corps
que puissance
possible
spare
d'intelliger
iln'est
nidesentir
desenourrir
defaon
naturellement,
paspossible
spaorganiquement,
dumanque
despuissances
instrumentales25.
re,enraison
Il ressortde ces passagesque pour Buridan,ds le livreII, c'est bien une
mmeme, une mme forme, la foisintellective,
sensitiveet vgtative,
qui peut treconsidresoit en relationavec les puissancesinstrumentales
soiten elle-mme.
(on emploiealorspourla dsignerdes termesconnotatifs),
il
De ce dernier
a
de
de
diffrences
entre
point vue, n'y pas
partiescarl'meest
unique.
Le problmeestreprisdansle livreIII en un seulequestion,la question17 :
On demande[. . .] si en l'hommeil y a une me intellective
autreque l'me
sensitive.
initiaux,la conclusionestbrvemaisnette:
Aprsles arguments
Etjeposedanscette
d'me
intellective
cette
conclusion,
qu'iln'ya pasenl'homme
question
autre
maisquec'estlamme
[.. .]26.
quelasensitive,

24)[.. .] dicoquodinhomine
virtutes
anime
sednulla
virtus
anime
instrumentales,
principalis
ineoestextensa,
scilicet
necvirtus
sensitiva
necvirtus
(Buriprincipalis
principalis
vegetativa
deanima,
dan,Questiones
p.69).
25)Dicoetiam
sensitiva
etvegetativa
etseparabilis
a
itaestperpetua
quodvirtus
principalis
et
non
est
sicud
intellectiva.
Sed
est
eam
corpore potentia
possipossibile
separatam
intelligere,
bileeamseparatam
nutrire
naturaliter
velsentire
defectum
instrupropter
potentiarum
organice
men
talium
(ibid.,
p.69).
26)Etegoponoinistaquaestione
istam
anima
intellecconclusionem
quodnonestinhomine
tivaaliaa sensitiva,
sedeadem
deanima
Buridan,
, III,qu.17,dansJack
[.. .] (Jean
Questiones
III ofhis"Questions
Buridans
AnEdition
andTranslation
John
Zupko,
Phibsophy
ofMind.
ofBook
onAristoles
De anima"
Arbor,
(Ann
1999),p. 192).

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raisonsthologiAprsun renvoiau livreII27,Buridanajoutede nombreuses

L'unit
de
l'me

travers
la
de
ses
fonctions
est fortement
ques.
pluralit
dans
une
entre
l'me
informe
tout
le
exprime
comparaison
qui
corpset Dieu
qui assistela totalitdu monde,ce qui conduit la conclusion:
Etcette
meestditeintellective
selonqu'elle
estapte intelliger,
etsensitive
selonquelle
estapte sentir,
etvgtative
selon
etmotrice
selon
estapte
quelleestapte nourrir,
qu'elle
mouvoir
lecorps
selon
lelieu,comme
ila tditailleurs28.
Nous allonsau del,semble-t-il,
de la conceptionthomiste
d'unefacultsuprieureintgrant
lesfonctions
desmesinfrieures.
Car il fautprendre
la mesure
du nouvelensemblequi s'estmisen placeds le livreII29: me uniqueet disinstrumentales.
positionscorporelles
Cependant,cettepuissanceuniquepeut
tredsignede plusieursnoms,dans la mesureo ses diversesoprations
diffrentes
Commele primpliquent
dispositions
organiquesetmatrielles30.
cisela rponseau premier
dans
la
du
livre
17
III, la mme
argument
question
me qui est sensitiveet intellective
utiliseun organecorporeldans toutson
actede sentirmaisnon dansson acted'intelliger31.
Une mmepuissancese
le cas chantaux organescorporelssur un modeinstrumental
,
rapportant

diffrents
noms
selon
diffrentes
raisons
telle
est
l'ide
essen,
par
signifie
tielledu dispositif
buridanien.
CommesouventavecBuridan,le coup d'essaiestun coup de matre,et,dans
sa radicalit,
ce dispositif
ne se retrouve
pas intgralement
parmises contemOn a cependanttracede dmarchessimilaires.
Preporainsou successeurs.
nons commetmoinles questionsattribues,
avec quelque vraisemblance,

27)[]quodprobatur
sicut
insecundo
libro
deanima
sensitiva
etvegetativa
inaniprobatur
mali(ibid.).
28)Etillaanima
dicitur
intellectiva
secundum
estintelligere,
etsensitiva
secundum
quodinnata
estsentire,
etvegetativa
scundum
estnutrire,
etmotiva
secundum
quodinnata
quodinnata
estmovere
secundum
sicut
aliasdictum
fuit
locum,
(ibid.p. 192-193).
quodinnata
corpus
29)Sicdicimus
sensitivm
et Vegetativum
differre
secundum
intellectum,
rationem,
quia
hecnomina
rem
eandem
secundum
diversas
rationes
deanima,
(Buridan,
Questiones
significant
II,5,p.64).
30)De la mmefaon
naturelle
ainsiqueplusieurs
de l'meet
quela chaleur
dispositions
co-agissent
ducorps
la
nutrition
tout
comme
la
et
dansla
,
pour
speciesl'organe
co-agissent
sensation.
31)Eadem
anima
etintellectiva
inomniactusuosentiendi
utitur
quaeestsensitiva
organo
(Buridan,
sednoninactusuointelligendi
deanima,
lib.III,p. 193).
Questiones
corporeo

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[129] 351

Nicole Oresmeet qui sontpostrieures

134732.Le livreIII ne contientpas
de questionportantsurl'identit
de l'meintellective
et de l'mesensitive.
En
I
on
le
livre
trouve
dans
des
considrations

celles
revanche,
que
analogues
l'on a vueschezBuridan.Il s'agittoujoursde se demandersi les puissancesse
entreelleset si ellesse distinguent
de l'meelle-mme33.
Oresme
distinguent
introduit
un doublepointde vue,selonque l'on considrel'mecommesubset
tance,activeou passive,ou bien selonque l'on considreles dispositions
accidentsau moyendesquelsellepeutagir,lesquelssont quasiagendainstrumentaba. Or la premire
conclusioninsistesurl'identitsubstantielle:
La premire
estqu'enprenant
la puissance
au premier
lespuissances
del'mesont
sens,
l'memme
ousesparties34.
noussommestrsprochesdesexpressions
Parcontre,
buridaniennes.
Jusqu'ici,
et c'estla troisime
conclusion(la deuximeconcerneles animaux),en prenantla puissanceau secondsens,c'est--dire
alors les
pourdes dispositions,
puissancesde l'mesontles accidentsdes corpset des organes35.Le paragracettethse.Ce par quoi une substancepeut
phe qui suitjustifielonguement
ou
est
une
du
disposition sujet,et cela peuttreditpuissanceactive
agir ptir,
ou passive;or l'me peut cela par les dispositionsdes organes(mediantibus
dispositionibus
organorum)'de tellesdispositionspeuventdonc tre dites
de
l'me.
Si l'on s'carteun peu de Buridan,on doitmesurer
les
puissances
effetsproduitspar la doctrinedu matrepicard.L'me resteune en tant
en sontdes dispoque substanceet forme,tandisque les puissancesplurielles
sitions.Si Oresme est attentif
soulignerla diversitde ces dispositions,
l'une des rponsesaux arguments
initiauxconfirmeque nous sommestrs
prochesdu vocabulaireet de la conceptualit
reprsplushautchezBuridan.
Il s'agitdansce passagede s'interroger
surl'oppositiondu cognitif
et du non
cognitif:

32)Laquestion
IIIsemble
eneffet
contenir
uneallusion
Jean
deMirecourt
9 dulivre
(jeremercieJean
ses
informations
surcetaspect).
Celeyrette
pour
33)Voirlaquestion
II Utrum
animae
sintipsaanima
veldistinguantur
3 surlelivre
potentiae
abipsaetinter
Nicolai
Oresme
etquaestiones
inAristotelis
De
se,dansNicole
Oresme,
expositio
anima
& Paris,
, d.B.Patar
(Louvain
1995),p. 132-140.
34)Prima
estquodcapiendo
animae
suntipsaanima
aut
modo,
potentiam
primo
potentiae
eius(ibid.,
partes
p. 137).
35)Tertia
conclusio
estquod,accipiendo
secundo
modoprodispositionibus
etc.,
potentiam
animae
sunt
etorganum
accidentia
(ibid.,
potentiae
corporis
p. 138).

15:39:50 PM

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46 (2008)342-367
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Aucinquime
l'onditquel'une[.. .] estcognitive
non,
etc.,etl'autre
argument,
lorsque
en
admettant
c'est
la
mme
la
nutritive
est
me,
je rponds,
que
que
cependant
cognitive,
le concept
selonlequelelleestappele
nutritive
ne
raison,
passousla mme
puisque
connote
connat
maisquellenourrit.
aumoyen
dediverses
Ainsi,
pasqu'elle
dispositions,
elleexerce
diffrentes
etd'aprs
celaelleestappele
dedivers
comme
fonctions;
noms,
disent
lesanciens36.
La question5 reprenddirectement
la questionde la pluralitdes mes,ou de
la multiplicit
des formessubstantielles:
Est-ceque dans le mmevivant,
commeen l'homme,il y a plusieursmes, savoirvgtative,
sensible,intellective?37.Il convientabord de distinguer
plusieurssens en lesquelson

de
des
formes
et
de
en quel sensla questionest
peutparler pluralit
prciser
:
ici pertinente
Au quatrime
senssontposesplusieurs
formes
en raison
de diverses
et
puissances
Etainsicertains
danslemme
vivant
mesparmi
oprations.
posent
plusieurs
lesquelles
uneestvgtative,
uneautre
uneautre
intellective.
Et c'estce quiconcerne
sensitive,
celivre38.
Les argumentsquon peut numreren faveurde la pluralitsont nombreux.On y trouved'abord des argumentsgnrauxsur la diversitdes
surles proprits
oprations,
propres une espce,surla pluralitdes intelligencespour les orbesclestes,mais surtout,alorsque nous sommesencore
dans les questionssur le livreII, neufarguments
qui concernentspcialementl'me intellective:
sur
l'immatrialit
et l'incorclassiques
arguments
sur
le
caractre
nouveausur la
ruptibilit,
organiquede l'me vgtative,
diversit
des oprations,
maisaussisurl'infusion
de l'meintellective
dansun
etc.
La
en
est
anim39,
revanche,
embryondj
positionoppose
renvoye
l'autorit
d'Averros
si l'on pensait la
(ce qui seraitsurprenant
simplement
notique,maisil s'agitdu renvoiclassiqueau premier
chapitredu De substan
36)Adquintam,
cumdicitur
etc.etalianon,dico,posito
quoduna[...] estcognoscitiva,
estcognoscitiva,
tarnen
nonsubillaratione,
anima,
quodsiteadem
quodnutritiva
quiaconceptussecundum
vocatur
nonconnotat
earn
nutritiva
sednutrire.
Etideomedianquem
cognoscere
tibus
diversis
diversa
hocdiversis
nominibus
dispositionibus
ipsaexercet
opera;etsecundum
utdicunt
(ibid.,
appellatur,
antiqui
p. 139).
37)Ibid.,p. 146-157.
38)Quarto
<modo>
formae
etoperationes
diversas.
Etsic
ponuntur
plures
propter
potentias
in
eodem
animae
una
est
alia
alia
intellective
sensitiva,
aliquiponunt
plures
quarum
vegetativa,
Ethocspectat
adistum
librum
II,qu.5,p. 146).
(ibid,
39)Laquestion
del'embryon
tenait
uneplaceimportante
danslesQuestions
surl'me
de
disputes
Thomas
voirop.cit.,p.95sqq.
d'Aquin:

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[131] 353

tia orbis,o le commentateur

pose qu'un sujetne peutpas avoirplusquune
forme40).
et pose un certainnombrede
D'emble,Oresmetablitdes suppositions
conclusions.
La premire
suppositionestquune oprationprovientd'une formeou est
en raisond'une forme;la secondeest que dans une action,outreun agent
desagentsinstruon peutavoirdesagentsspcifiques
etdtermins,
principal,
extrieures
mentauxet que peuventmmetrerequisescertaines
dispositions
ou la proximit41.
tellesque l'loignement
La premirethseest que de la mmeformeet du mmeagentpeuvent
provenirdes oprationsdiverseset mme contraires.Des prcisionssont
ou
en raisondesagentsqui concourent,
apportes,
qui dclinentlesvariations
desinstruments
des
desdispositions,
desagentsparticuliers,
extrinsques, parentrecause
tiesde telleou telleforme,de la liberthumaine,de la distinction
La deuximethseprincipaleestqu'il n'estpas
parsoi et causeparaccident42.
mes
de
dans le mmecorpspour rendrecomptede
requis poserplusieurs
diffrentes
La
diverses
qu' partirde l'mese produisent
oprations. troisime,
recenvitales,bienplusnombreuses
que les quatrehabituellement
oprations
ses.La quatrime,que dans un mmesujet,commeun cheval,il n'ya pas
le tout.Les conclusionssuiplusieursmestotalesdontchacuneinformerait
de l'me d'un animal,et la ncessit
vantesmontrent
le caractre
htrogne
des parties plusque des mestotales.
de distinguer
la verJusquel, la dmarchede Nicole Oresmeesttout faitconforme
dansson principed'unifisionburidanienne
de l'meunique- pas seulement
mais encore dans le mode de
cation des fonctionsinfra-intellectuelles,
et causes
des organes,dispositions
faisantappel la diversit
raisonnement,
est
reste
en susl'me
intellective
la
de
concourantes.
Cependant, question
et le plus
pens.C'est l que l'examende Nicole Oresmeestle plusminutieux
prudent.
affirme
l'unittotalede l'me:
Il prsente
La premire
plusieursthories.
iln'ya qu'une
meayant
Etilestuneopinion
plusieurs
unique
quiposequ'enl'homme
etc43.
l'autre
dontl'uneestintellective,
sensitive,
puissances,
40)Averros,
Desubstantia
orbis
1562),P 3v.
(Venise,
41
) VoirOresme,
Nicolai
Oresme
p. 149.
exposition
42)Ibid.,
149-150.
p.
43)Etestunaopinio
anima
habens
nonestnisiunica
plures
potenquodinhomine
quaeponit
aliasensitiva,
etc. (ibid.,
unaestintellectiva,
tias,
p. 152).
quarum

15:39:50 PM

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cettepositionestassezsimple,rapide.Elle repose
qui justifie
L'argumentation
surle principeconomie,appliqudans le cadredes suppositions
initiales
de
unit
de
la
forme
et
diversit
des
qui permettaient conjuguer
oprations.
Deux autresarguments
rationnels
sontajouts: l'un pour direque plusieurs
formesimpliqueraient
l'autrefaisantappel la
plusieurstressubstantiels,
la
divine
de
ralits
diffrentes.
Mais il n'estpas
sparabilit
par puissance
Il
indiffrent
noter
autorits
sont
ici
de
quelles
convoques. s'agiten premier
lieu d'Augustin ce qui confirme
le rleque jouentses textesdans le faitde
et
l'unit
le
caractre
actif
de l'me44.L'autreautoritcite est,
souligner
commechezJeanBuridan,le De differentia
etanimae.
spiritus
une seconde
Oresme,toutefois,
exposeaussi,et un peu plus longuement,
thorie( aliavia), selonlaquelleil yauraiten l'hommedeuxmes45,
uneme
matrielle

l'me
des
et
une
me
immatrielle
(semblable
animaux)
unique
Il donneen faveurde cettethseun certainnombred'ar(l'meintellective).
commedifficiles
rfuter46.
Le premier
gumentsdontdeuxsontconsidrs

sur
d'avoir
chose
constitue
un
repose l'exigence
quelque
qui
supportparsoi
le
terme
de
et
donne
forme
la matire,
ce
(il n'emploiepas
substance), qui
). L'meorganiquen'auraitpas un
qui supposequ'ellen'ensoitpas tire(educta
tel statut.Le secondargumentinsistesur les diffrences
de formeentreles
du
des
fonctions
diffrentes.
L'me
uniintellective,
parties corpsremplissant
en rendreraison,pas plusque la seulematire,
que, ne pourrait
qui,considre
en elle-mme,
estpartoutde mmenature.Oresmeajouteencoredeuxautres
et prendla peinede rpondreaux arguments
contraires
arguments,
(que j'ai
le
d'conomie
n'estvidemment
rapports
plushaut).L'argument
par principe
des oprations,
on accordel'exigenced'avoir
si,outrela diversit
pas suffisant
une formematrielle.
Celui de la pluralitdes tresesten partieadmis: il y
auraitun trecorruptible
et un treincorruptible
parla formesensitive
parla
formeintelligible,
maisle composestdnommd'aprsla formesuprieure
(l'hommeestaussiun animal).On concdeque Dieu pourraitsparerl'me
44)Oresme
nedonne
Voir
La Trinit,
uvres
de
pasderfrence
prcise.
parexemple
Augustin,
Bibliothque
s.Augustin,
del'dition
traduction
,vol.XV: texte
bndictine,
augustinienne
etnotesM. Mellet,
O.P.,etTh.Camelot,
O.P.,introduction
O.E.S.A.;
parE. Hendrickx,
vol.XVI: texte
de l'dition
traduction
de P.Agasse,
bndictine,
S.J.,notesencoll.avec
X,xi,18,p. 155-157.
1955),
J.Moingt,
S.J.(Paris,
45)Aliaviaestquodinhomine
suntduaeanimae
etduaeformae
sicut
inequo
tantummodo,
autasinoestunica
forma
itaetiam
inhomine,
est
et
de
materialis,
quae corruptibilis
generabilis
materiae
intellectiva
materialis
; etcumhocestineoanima
[.. .]
potentia
quaenonestdeforma
Nicolai
Oresme
(Oresme,
exposition
p. 152-153).
46)Etistae
duaerationes
sunt
difficiliores
(ibid.,
proistaparte
p. 153).

15:39:50 PM

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[133] 355

maisce n'estjamaisle cas naturellement

avantla mort.Enfinles
intellective,
autoritscitesauraientpu admettrela prsenteopinion.Quant aux arguilssontgalement
mentsdu dbutconcernant
l'meintellective
en particulier,
estinterrcuss.Parexemple,celuisurl'impossibilit
d'avoirplusieurs
formes
comme
valant
la
forme
mais
un
mme
matrielle,
prt
pour
sujetpourrait
avoirune formematrielle
et une formeimmatrielle.
NicoleOresmen'enrestetoutefois
pas l. Aprsavoiraccordtoutel'attentionqu'elle mrite la thsede la dualitdes mes,il revient la premire
Il ne s'agitpas d'avancerde nouveauxarguments
en sa faveurpuisposition47.
ont
t
au
mais
de
ceux-ci
que
proposerun rapideexadj
apports dbut,
mencritiquedes arguments
qui viennentd'tredonnsen faveurde la thse
Cela

admettre
conduit
que la mmeme immatrielle
peutconfoppose.
forme
rerdes tressubstantiels
et
diffrents
selon
donne
partiels
qu'elle
diverses
:
parties
divers
tres
substanforme
comme
immatrielle,
l'me,
[.. .] lamme
peutdonner
partiels
selon
forme
estendivers
lieux
etendiverses
desorte
tiellement,
parties,
qu'en
quelamme
unlieuelledonne
l'tre
enunautre
l'tre
chair,
os,etainsidesuite48.
C'est aussil'occasionde prciser
nouveaucomments'articulent
unitetpluon
ralit.Dans lesfonctions
etsensitives) parlerad'une
organiques(vgtatives

des partiesintgrales
de
(entendons
pluralitde formespartielles
intgrales
la forme),maisd'uneseuleme:
estla forme
etautre
estla
Auquatrime,
autre
dela chair
je concde
quedanslecheval
forme
formes
del'os.C'estpourquoi
; etiln'est
jedisqu'ilya plusieurs
partielles
intgrales
chose
sorte
soitunememaisilsuffit
cequesoit
decette
pasrequis
quen'importe
quelle
unepartie
d'me49.
et les autresque
Mais c'estsurtout proposde l'unitentrel'meintellective
Parexemple:
les formulations
sontles plusfortes.

47)Nuncergo,
siquisveliet
tenere
aliam
viam
... (ibid.,
p. 155).
48)[.. .] eadem
darediversa
essepartialia
substantialiter
forma
sicut
immaterialis,
anima,
potest
itaquodinunolocodatesse
hocquodipsaestindiversis
locisetindiversis
secundum
partibus,
carnem
etinaliodatesseos,etitadealiis(ibid.,
p. 155).
49)Adquartam
Etideodiccarnis
etaliaestforma
ossis.
concedo
quodinequoaliaestforma
talissit
etnonoportet
tumestquodsuntplures
formae
quodquaelibet
partiales
integrales;
anima
sedsufficit
(ibid.,
p. 156).
quodsitparsanimae

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Aupremier
onrpondrait
de
[ausujetdel'meintellective]
argument
quel'mesensitive
l'homme
estimmatrielle,
est
l'intellective50.
puisqu'elle
Tous les arguments
sontainsirexamins
pourallerdansle sensde l'affirmationd'uneme unique,immatrielle,
aux partiesdu
s'appliquantdiversement
corps.
Si l'on faitle bilan,on voitque l'auteurde ce textene ditpas explicitement
estaccorde chaquepartie.
quellepositionil faitsienne.Autantd'attention
Mais la disposition
des arguments
confreuneplacede choix ceuxqui affirmentl'unicitde l'me.Et le sensgnraldanslequelcetteunicitestprsente estle mmeque celuique nous avonstudiplus hautchez Buridan.Si
doncOresmeestplusprudent,
il partageavecle matrepicardla mmeapprhensiondu problme.
La structure
du Traitde l'mede Pierred'Ailly,un quartde sicleplus tard,
estun peu diffrente.
D'emblePierred'Aillys'interroge
surla dfinition
etles
divisionsde l'me. En revanche, la diffrence
de ses prdcesseurs,
il n'y
revient
sur
pas l'occasiondu livreII ni du livreIII. Il commenceparrflchir
le statutde la dfinition
selonlaquellel'meestl'actesubstantiel
d'un
premier
ce qui
corpsorganiqueayantla vie en puissance,puis il examinebrivement
tombe sous cettedfinition.De l'expriencede troissortesd'actes,nous
concluonsque l'meestelle-mme
triple.De l, troisquestionsse posent: sur
la distinction
localedesmesen un mmesuppt,ensuite, supposerqu'il n'y
ait pas de distinction
selonle lieu,si nanmoinsellesse diffrencient
relleestdistincte
de sespuissances.
ment,et enfinsi l'meelle-mme
En ce qui concernela premire
question,Pierred'Aillyattribue Platonla
thsed'unerpartition
des mesqui seraitlocalement
etla rcuse
diffrencie,
assezrapidement.
La deuximequestionen revanche
doittreexamineun peu plusen dtail.
Le traitement
de Pierred'Aillyesttoutefois
trsrapideen comparaison ce
nous
trouvons
chez
et

forte
raisondans les textesde la
Oresme,
que
plus
Renaissance.L'auteurcommencepar voquerla thsede la pluralitdes
formessubstantielles51.
Un tel empilement
de formesest rejetau nom du
50)Adprimam
diceretur
sensitiva
hominis
estimmaterialis,
[deintellectiva],
quodanima
quia
estintellectiva
(ibid.,
p. 156).
51)[...] dixerunt
nonsolum
animam
etsensitivm
ineodem
quidam
veetatvam
supposito
ineodem
sedtotesseformas
substantiates
diferre,
quotsibicorrespondent
praedicata
quidditativaessentialiter
subordinata
c. 1,dansOlafPluta,
Diephilosophische
(Pierre
d'Ailly,
Psychologie
desPeter
von
(Amsterdam,
1987),p.9).
Ailly

15:39:50 PM

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[135] 357

raisonni autoritne nous

principed'conomie,puisqueaucuneexprience,
C'est pourquoiunedeuximepositionparatplusprobable:
force l'accepter.
etde l'me
cellede l'identit
relle,dansun premier
temps,de l'mevgtative
sensible:
etl'mesensiC'estpourquoi
certains
defaon
diront,
quel'mevgtative
plusprobable,
selon
la
leditAristote,
ellesdiffrent
tive
sontrellement
lamme
mme
si,comme
chose,
etque
meestvgtative
c'est--dire
raison,
quenouscomprenons
paruneraison
qu'une
nouscomprenons
raison
meestsensitive52.
quelamme
paruneautre
:
Mais il fautencoretendrecetteconclusionau cas de l'meintellective
la
enl'homme
ensuivant
Etla mme
chosesemble
devoir
treditedel'meintellective
raison
bienquesurcepoint
nousn'ayons
d'Aristote53.
naturelle,
pasdeclaire
explication
est peu approfondie,seul le problmede l'embryonest
L'argumentation
en
abord, quelqueslignes.Ce qui estoriginal,c'estque Pierred'Aillycontisouunedifficult
nue en opposant cetteconclusionselonla vritnaturelle
sembleavoirdes attributs
levedu pointde vue de la foi: l'me intellective
ceuxdesdeuxautres, savoirqu'elleestindivisible,
contraires
inengendrable
et incorruptible.
C'est pourquoi,dit-il,certainssoutiennent
qu'il y a deux
mes distinctes54.
Cependant,il s'agitselon lui d'un problmeindcidable
lesdeuxpointsde vue,etqui veut
On peutdoncsoutenir
neutrum).
( problema
et
de l'hommeestindivisible
soutenirl'identitdevradireque l'mesensitive
n'estpas de mmenatureque celledes btes; c'estle composqui estle sujet
de la sensation,et non l'me elle-mme.On retiendra
par consquentl'affirmationde l'identit
du pointde vue naturel,
et le caractre
indcidablesi l'on
la foi.
faitintervenir
etl'on
et dernire
La troisime
questionva encoredansle sensde l'identit,
bien
Cette
Pierre
sur
la
diversit
des
retrouve
des
accents
connus.
fois,
y
passe
l'me
et
la
et
celle
de
son
choix
:
l'identit
de
de
puissance.
opinions expose
52)Ideoprobabilius
ineodem
animam
etsensitivm
dixerunt
supposito
quidam
vegetativam
intelutdicit
diffrant
secundum
idestaliaratione
esserealiter
rationem,
idem,
licet,
Aristotiles,
Le
mot
et
alia
ratione
esse
sensitivm
eandem
animam
esse
(ibid.,
9).
p.
vegetativam
ligimus
icipar
littralement
ratio
serait
rendu
raison,
plusprcisment
parlequelnoustraduisons
deconcevoir.
ouparmanire
concept
53)Etidem
naturainhomine
rationem
essedicendum
deanima
intellectiva
videtur
sequendo
(ibid.,
ciaram
declarationem
dehocnonhabeamus
deAristotelis
lem,quamvis
p.9).
54)Voirparexemple
C. Wey,
Guillaume
d'Ockham,
, d.Joseph
Quodlibeta
Operatheoseptem
IX,St.Bonaventure
1980),II,qu.10,p. 156-161.
(NewYork,
logica

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46 (2008)342-367
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desonopration.
Orilya
estprincipe
actif
oupassif
[.. .] l'meestpuissance,
puisqu'elle
autre
instrumentale
: lapreune
une
de
l'me
elle-mme,
principale,
plusieurs
puissances
accidentelle55.
estessentielle,
laseconde
mire
Pierred'Aillyse livredonc une doubleoprationqui n'estpas sansvoquer
de l'me et
Buridan.D'un ct il cartela puissanceprincipaleet essentielle
et
estune,lessecondessontplurielles
La premire
sespuissancesaccidentelles.
de mulen leurexercice,
se distinguent
de l'essenceen ce quelles impliquent,
estcorrle
avec
De l'autre,l'identit
essentielle
corporelles.
tiplesdispositions
Cettefois,Pierred'Aillyne se contenteplusde
une pluralitde significations.
clairement
en un sens
de raison, il l'interprte
la notionvaguede diffrence
:
linguistique
de
etselonellesplusieurs
noms,
[.. .] onditquel'mepeutexercer
plusieurs
oprations,
lecasdu
c'est
lapuissance
del'me,
diverses
raisons,
pourelle,comme
supposent
signifiant
etdel'intellectif56.
dusensitif
vgtatif,
Parfoismoinsprcis.
Pierred'Aillyest plus succinctque ses prdcesseurs.
Mais pardelsa prudencequandle problmeestconsidrdu pointde vuede
la foi,sa positionpenchebien pour une conceptionde l'unitde l'me et
dans les termesd'une
d'une identitde celle-ciavecses puissances,formule

.
de
raisons
pluralit
signifiantes
de
Il y a donc Paris,au milieudu XIVesicle, Paris,une constellation
une mmetendance.Dans le cadredes commentaires
textesqui expriment
aristotliciens
(auxquelsje me suislimit),on trouveunenouvelleformed'ar la lettre
en
gumentation faveurde l'unitde l'me,qui n'estpas conforme
la sparation
de lectures
d'Aristote,
qui radicalisaient
qui prendle contre-pied
de l'me intellective
(commecellede Jeande Jandun),maisqui n'estplus la
l'autorit
positivement
positionde Thomasd'Aquin.Cettedmarcheretourne
en
de raisons diffrences
du Liberde spiritu
etanima,et dploielesdiffrences
d'une analyselinguistique,
de nomssusceptibles
qui serameneau moyende
la thoriede la suppositionet de la connotation.Buridanest sans doute le
55)[.. .] anima
suaeoperationis.
activum
velpassivum
estpotentia,
Ipsius
quiaestprincipium
estessentialis,
aliainstrumentalis
animae
estmultiplex
unaprincipalis,
autem
; prima
potentia,
(Pierre
desPeter
von
c.1 dansPluta,
Diephilosophische
secunda
accidentalis
d'Ailly,
Psychologie
,
10).
Aillyp.
56)[.. .] dicitur
illassupponunt
exercere
etsecundum
estpotens
plures
operationes
quodanima
sicut
suntVegetatinomina
diversarum
rationum
animae,
potentiam
proeaplura
significant^
(ibid.,
sensitivm
etintellectivum
10-1
vum,
1).
p.

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[137] 359

des chos
le plusradicalde cettedmarche.On trouvetoutefois
reprsentant
de cettefaonapprhenderla questionde l'unitde l'me non seulement
chezNicoleOresme,maisencorechezPierreAilly.
3. Echos lointains
se retrouve
chez des
La dmarchemenepar Buridanet ses contemporains,
Il
xvie
faudrait

cet
sicle.
le buridanisme
auteursprolongeant
gard
jusqu'au
examiner
en dtail,ce que je ne pourraifaireici,lesquestionsetcommentaires
ou de JeanMair.
de ThomasBricot,de Georgesde Bruxelles
en contrepoint
montrer
un
autre
comment,
Je prendrai
exemple,pour
le
est
mmechezdes auteursde traditions
diffrentes,problme marqupar
Prenonsici commetmoinle richeet
les termesque nousvenonsde reprer.
d'AntoineRubio57.N en 1548 et morten 1615,
volumineuxcommentaire
AntoineRubio (ou Ruvio)a enseignau Meximembrede la socitde Jsus,
surla logiqueet la philosophienatuque puisen Espagne.Ses commentaires
du Traitde l'me,
Dans son commentaire
relleeurentune grandediffusion.
de nombreusesquestionstouchentau problmeque nous tudions.L'une
du livreII qui demande
d'entreellesestla question7 surle chapitrepremier
de
de l'mecommeformedu corps: Cettedfinition
proposde la dfinition
l'meest-elleunivoque touteslesmes? Elle estsuivieparunequestionsur
selon laquelle
la dfinition
c'est--dire
l'autredfinition
( posterior
definitio),
l'me estle principepar lequelnousvivons,sentons,nous mouvonset com l'me
suivantede l'meest-elleune,etconvient-elle
prenons: La dfinition
en commun? On y ajoutera,entreautres,la question1 surle chapitre3 du
livreII : Y a-t-iltroisespcesd'mes,quatredegrset cinq genresde puissandansla senest-elleincluseformellement
ces?, la question2 : La vgtative
ou seulementde faonminente?,la
sitiveet chacunedans la rationelle,
distinctes
et une me sensitive
une me vgtative
question5 : Trouve-t-on
une sensibleet une rationnelle
dansun mmeanimal,et aussiunevgtative,
dansun mmehomme,ou y en a-t-ilseulementune dansun compos?
d'AntoineRubioestprochede cellede
De faongnrale,
l'argumentation
l'unit
Thomasd'Aquin.Comme nous l'avonsvu plushaut,Thomasaffirme
entrelespuissancesetrefuse
unedistinction
essentielle
de l'memaisintroduit
l'me sespuissances.
d'identifier
57)VoirAntoine
Aristotelis
deanima
inlibros
Antonii
Ruvio
Rodensis
Rubio,
[ . .] commentarti
deLyon,
laversion
datede1611 Alcala;
dition
1613,estacces1613).Lapremire
(Lugduni,
nationale
deFrance.
Gallica
delaBibliothque
sible
surleserveur

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Mais AntoineRubios'carteparfoisde ThomasAquin. Tel sembletrele

cas dansla question2 surle troisime
estchapitredu livreII : La vgtative
elle incluseformellement
dans la sensitiveet chacunedans la rationelle,
ou

seulement
de faonminente
? La questionestl'occasiond'uneprcisionterles
sens
en
sur
lesquels
quelque chosepeuttredit contenir
minologique
autrechose.La divisionmajeureestentrecontenirde faonformelle
{formaliter
) et contenirde faonminente(eminenter
). Une choseen contientformellement
une autrequand elleestde mmenature(ou raison,ratio)ysi bien
ses oprations;c'esten ce sensqu'une
qu'elle peut la produireou effectuer
chaleurproduitune autrechaleur.En revanche,une choseen contientune
autrede faonminentequand lesdeuxne sontpas de mmenatureet que la
; c'esten ce sensque la lumire
plus parfaitepeutproduitela moinsparfaite
de
la
chaleur58.
Mais
Rubio complexifie
l'ide de
ultrieurement,
produit
en
contenance
dans
formelle,
qui peuttreentendue deuxsens: premirement
une sriedontles degrssontde mmeespce(et teltaitle cas des deuxchadans une sriedontles degrssontd'espceet d'ordre
leurs),deuximement
divers59.
Commentces distinctions
sont-ellesinvestiesdans la
conceptuelles
questionde l'unitde l'me?
Il estvidentpourtousque le degrvgtatif
estcontenud'unemanireou
d'une autredansle degrsensitif
: l'mede l'animaln'estpas seulement
sensiA ce stade,certaines
ble maisaussivgtative.
l'unit:
expressions
soulignent
[. . .] il estvidentque l'mesensitive
estle principeoriginaire
de leursoprationsvgtatives60.
Mais AntoineRubio transposeimmdiatement
cette
relation l'me rationnelle
: et ce qui estprouvde l'me sensitive
l'gard
de l'mevgtative,
l'gard
je penseque c'estaussiprouvde l'merationelle
58)Illuddici<tur>
inseformaliter
continere
aliudformaliter
esseeiusdem
rationis,
quodhabet
illudproducere,
veloperationes
eiuspraestare,
utcalor
aiteunus,
perquodpotest
quiproducit
illum
formaliter.
Eminenter
vero
continere
aliudestperaliudessediversae
dicitur
continere
rum,
etideoperfectius
illud
velsaltem
rationis,
quodinsehabet
posse
producere,
perfectius
praestare,
utluxdicitur
continere
calorem
eminenter
diversae
rationis,
quiaperseperfectius
quodinse
eumproducere
f
habet,
(ibid.,
135).
potest
59)Secundo
notandum
estdupliciter
alterum
formaliter.
contingere,
quodunumcontineat
ingradu
Primo
eiusdem
et
in
ordinis.
Secundo
diversae
et
Exemordinis.
speciei
gradu
speciei,
modi
estcalor
alium
velpraestare,
calorem,
plum
prioris
potens
producere
quodillepraestat,
qui
illum
dicitur
continere
sedingradu
eiusdem
etordinis.
formaliter,
[.. .] Unde
propterea
speciei
sitduplicem
essequoquemodum
insuperiori
continendi
unum
foreminenter,
quidem
gradu
maliter
formaliter
non
sed
solum
tali,aliomodoinsuperiori
tali,
virtualiter,
quopacto
gradu
P"138-139).
forma
soliscontinet
calorem
(ibid.,
60)[.. .] evidens
estquodanima
sensitiva
eorum
sitprincipium
radicale
operationum
vegetatif*136).
varum
(ibid.,

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[139] 361

de chacunedes deux61.Il nest donc pas questiond'une coupureentrel'me

; l'unitde ces troisdegrsestadmise,de telle
organiqueetl'meintellectuelle
Il restemaintemanireque c'estle degrsuprieur
qui inclutles infrieurs.

nant savoirsi cetterelationde contenance estformelle

ou minente.
AntoineRubioexposedeuxopinions.La premire
soutientque l'mevgtativeest contenuede faonvirtuelleou minentedans l'me sensitive,
et
chacunedesdeuxsurle mmemode(etnonpas de faonformelle)
dansl'me
rationnelle.
Si l'on se rappellela distinction
faiteplushaut,cela signifie
qu'elles ne sontpas de mme raison et qu'il y a entreelleune hirarchie
de perfection.Parmiles autoritsen faveurde cetteposition,Rubio citeJavellus
Javellus,dominicainthologienn en 1470, morten 1538,
(Chrysostome
auteurde commentaires
surles livresd'Aristote
dans une tradition
thomiste,
dontun commentaire
surle De animaa tpubli Veniseen 1555), Cajetan,
PierreMartinez(PetrusMartinezde Osma, ca. l427-ca. 1480, qui futmatre
s artset professeur
de thologie Salamanque),FranoisTolet; et il ajoute
c'est
ce
semble
que
que
penserThomasd'Aquindansla question76 de la premirepartiede la Sommede thologi
2.En vrit,ce textede Thomaspourrait
treinterprt
dansle sensd'unerduction
c'estpeut-tre
plusstricte63,
pour

Antoine
Rubio
reste
mais
c'est
sans
doute
l'ide
de
quoi
prudent,
perfection

nous
avions
rencontre
la
dans
dfinition
de
l'inclusion
minente
) qui
(que
emporteici la dcision64.
La secondeopinionaffirme
une inclusion
que nousavonsaffaire
formelle
et nonpas seulement
:
virtuelle

61)etquoddesensitiva
simul
de rationali
respectu
probatur
vegetativae,
respectu
utriusque
136).
censeo
(ibid.,
probatum
62)[...] etidemvidetur
4 ubiait[...] (ibid.,
D. Thomas
I. par.quaest.
sentire
76. artic.
f>136).
63)VoirThomas
art.4,p.224: UndedicenSumma
, Iapars,
d'Aquin,
qu.LXXVI,
theologiae
dumestquodnullaaliaforma
substantial
estinhomine,
nisisolaanima
etquod
intellectiva;
virtute
continet
animam
sensitivm
etnutritivam,
itavirtute
continet
omnes
inferioipsa,sicut
resformas,
etfacit
inaliisfaciunt.
Etsimiliter
formae
est
ipsasolaquidquid
imperfectiores
dicendum
deanima
sensitiva
inbrutis,
etdenutritiva
inplantis,
etuniversaliter
deomnibus
- Rubiociteexactement
formis
le texte,
remplaant
perfectioribus
respectu
imperfectiorum
parimperfectarum
seulement
lafinimperfectiorum
.
64)Onretrouve
cethme
fait
danslarponse
au3eargument:
Adtertium
dicenqueThomas
sentire
etinteldumquodinmateria
considerantur
diversi
sicut
vivere
esse,
perfectionis,
gradus
autem
est.Forma
secundum
Semper
ligere.
superveniens
priori,
perfectius
ergoquaedatsolum
estimperfectissima,
sedforma
et
materiae,
primm
perfectionis
quaedatprimm
gradm
ettertium,
etsicdeinceps,
estperfectissima
secundum,
(ibid.,
p.224).

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Ladeuxime
Lapremire,
affirme
deuxchoses.
inclut
formelleopinion
quel'mesensitive
et
la
le
de
rationnelle
du
sentir
etdu
ment
ledegr
duvgter
commune,
pris faon
degr
La seconde
inclut
formellement
l'mevgtative
demanire
quel'mesensitive
vgter.
etquel'merationnelle
inclut
l'mevgtative
etl'mesensitive,
desorte
spciale,
que
mesensitive
estformellement
l'merationnelle
estquel'merationnelle
n'importe
quelle
etsensitive65.
estformellement
l'mevgtative
Cette positiondemandecependant treexplique,et cest ce moment
la subdivision
du formel.Le secondsensde l'inclusionformelle
qu'intervient
au
cas
celuid'un animalcontenant
la perfection
correspond
prcisment
vgdansce cas?
tativede la plante.Que se passe-t-il
estl'animal
contenant
laperfection
delaplante,
Unexemple
dumodesuivant
vgtative
elle
selon
une
raison
effectuer
ses
puisque peut
propres
oprations
univoque,
parlavertu
a ensoiformellement
etsurunmode
qu'elle66.
qu'elle
plusnoble
L'mesensibleestla sourceselonune raisonunivoquede toutesles oprationssensiblesetvgtatives.
Elle contientdoncen soiformaliter
le degrvgtatif.Cependantelle accomplitces fonctionsur un mode plus noble que
dans un vivantnon sensible.Nous sommesdonc toujours,cela n'estpas mis
en cause,dans des cas d'implicationformelle,mais ce derniermode,en
raisondes diffrences
de degret de perfection,
peuttreditaussiminent!
Etcette
manire
formellement
estencore
decontenir
diteunemanire
decontenir
mise
trouve
dans
un
haut
et
lev67.
nemment,
puisqu'elle
degr
plus
plus
L'inclusionminenteapparatdonc en deuxoccurrences
: soitau senspremier
de ce qui estminentet non formel{solumvirtualiter
), soitau sensque l'on
vientde dire,c'est--dire
commesubdivision
du formel.
65)Secunda
duoasserit.
Primm
sensitiva
formaliter
includit
opinio
quodanima
gradm
vegetandi
incommuni
etrationalis
sentiendi
etvegetandi.
Secundum
acceptum,
gradum
quodanima
sensitiva
includit
formaliter
animam
inspeciali,
etanima
rationalis
animam
veetatvam
vegetativam
etsensitivm,
itautquelibet
animasensitiva
sitformaliter
anima
etanima
vegetativa
rationalis
sitformaliter
anima
etsensitiva
Antonii
Ruvio
Rodensis
Rubio,
(Antoine
vegetativa
/,II,c.3,qu.2,f*137).
[.. .] commentari
66)Exemplum
modiestanimai
continens
posterions
perfectionem
plantis,
quia
vegetativam
eius
rationem
secundum
univocam,
proprias
operationes praestare
potest
pervirtutem
quam
habet
inseformaliter
etnobiliori
modoquamipsa[.. .] (op.cit.,P 138).
67)[.. .]etistemodus
formaliter
etiam
continendi
dicitur
modus
continendi
cumsit
eminenter,
ingradu
altiori
etelevatiori
P 138).
(ibid.,

15:39:50 PM

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[141] 363

Qu'en retientnotreauteur?Immdiatement
aprsexposla thsede l'inil avaitdj indiquque telletaitla positiondominante,
clusionformelle,
et
aussila siennepropre: C'est la doctrinedj communeparmiles contemporainset elledoittretenueparnouscommela plusprobable68.Les dvelopcettepositionmaisne la remettent
pementsultrieurs
prcisent
pas en cause.
En ce qui concernela me rationnelle,
elle contientutrumquegradumet
et minente,
au secondsensde
utramqueanimam de faon la foisformelle
l'minence.
La positionestassurment
assezcomplexe.L'auteurveutvitertoutrductionnisme
En mmetemps,l'hommeestformellement
desfonctions.
etessentiellement
animaletvivant,et pourcela il n'estpas d'autreformesubstantielle
l'me
rationnelle.
On comprendque le professeur
de la Socitde Jsusse
que
soit diffrenci,
fut-ceavec prudence,de Thomasd'Aquin: il ne s'agitpas
d'inclusionditevirtuelle
, qui supposerait
quelque chosequi soitformellementdiffrent
des objetset des
; la prioritn'estpas, partirde la diversit
d'accentuer
la
diffrence
des
Mon
oprations,
puissances.
proposn'estpas ici
d'accentuerl'cartavec la traditionthomiste,mmesi elle est suggrepar
Rubiolui-mme,
etcelui-cine s'aventure
d'unerelation
pas dansl'exploration
instrumentale.
Mais mmequelqu'uncommelui paratmarquparune volutionqui se manifeste
de cettedoctrine communeparmi
parla prsentation
lesrecentiores
lesprcisions
destines
rcup, nonobstant
supplmentaires
rerl'ided'minence.C'est une tendance la simplification
et l'accentuationde l'unitd'une mmeme diffrencie
seulement
ses
par oprationsqui
se manifeste
encoreici.
Parmiles Jsuites,
FranoisSuarezdonneralui aussi,sans quivoque,la

l'affirmation
de l'unit: Sittarnenconclusio: eademnumeroanima
priorit
estprincipium
sentiendietvegetandiin homine69.
intelligendi,
Descartes
La doctrinecartsienne
cettetenprolongeelle aussi,mais plus nettement,
dancerepreds le XIVesicle.Certes,les diffrences
sontmanifestes,
et bien
connues.La premireest le refusde l'ide de formesubstantielle;cela
vautpour la physique,mais plus forteraisonpour la questiondu rapport
entrel'meetle corps.Il estvraique danslesRgles
de l'esprit
,
pourla direction
68)Haecestiamcommunis
sententia
inter
Recentiores
et tamquam
a nobis
probabilior
f3137).
tenenda
(ibid.,
69)Francisco
Commentaria
unacumquestionibus
inlibros
Aristotelis
deanima
Surez,
, introduccinyedicin
critica
Salvador
3 vol.(Madrid,
Castellote,
1978,1981,1991),p.322.

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46 (2008)342-367
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Descartesutilisele verbeinformare
, maisparla suiteon ne retrouvera
plusde
tellesexpressions.
Descartesprnel'indpendance
de l'mecommesubstance
pensante,alors que pour Aristotela pensene sauraittreune substance.
me faisaitle partageentrele vivantet le
Enfin,si la notionaristotlicienne
ici la vie estjusticiabled'une explication
non-vivant,
purement
mcanique70.
On retrouvenanmoinsd'trangessimilitudesconcernantl'identit soi
d'unemmeme qui sentet pense.
De faongnrale,Descartesentreprend
dansla rgleXII un travailsurles
schmasissusde la psychologie
tellequ'ill'a reuede l'enseignement
scolaire71,
l'imaincluantl'intellect,
jsuite,au pointde proposerunethoriedesfacults
lessensetla mmoire.Il ne m'intresse
pas ici de medemandersi cet
gination,
va
ensuite
ou
non
de
la
doctrine
seulement
de
cartsienne,
disparatre
hritage
voircomment,dans ce cadre,la rinterprtation
cartsienne
accentuecertaineslignesd'interprtation
de cettetradition.
Descartess'oppose la traditionaristotlicienne
de la pluralitdes mes,
et en toute rigueur, la lettre,aucune variantene trouverait
grce ses
me
est
nom
lui
un
les
inclut
yeux: pour
quivoquepuisqu'il
puissances
et sensitives
des animaux; maisil affirme
en mmetemps,conforvgtatives
mmentprcise-t-il
la doctrinede l'glisecatholique(que ne manquaient
d'ailleurspas de rappeleren la matireles Jsuites
telsque Rubio),que chez

il
l'homme s'agitd'une seuleet mmeme: En l'hommel'me estunique,
savoirrationnelle72;
c'estpourquoiil prfre
employerle termede mens,
esprit.
Descartesmodifieprofondment
la thoriedes sens,en sparantce qui
relvedu corpsetce qui relvede l'esprit
aussila thoriedu sens
; il transforme
commeuneautrepartiedu corps73,
ainsique la conception
commun,prsent
de l'imagination,
unevraiepartiedu corps:
qui estgalement
Il faut
sereprsenter
troisimement
fonctionne
sontour
comme
un
quelesenscommun
imprimer
destin
cesfigures
ouides,
lui
cachet,
quisousuneforme
pureetsanscorps
70)Voir
Lettre
Henri
More
du30juillet
1640,dansDescartes,
Correspondance
janvier
1640-juin
& P.Tannery,
vol.III (Paris,
1643, d.C. Adam
1996),p. 182.
71)VoirMarion,
Surl'ontologie
deDescartes
(Paris,
2000).
Jean-Luc,
grise
72)Anima
inhomine
unicaest,nempe
VoirDescartes,
Lettres
Regiusy
de mai
rationalis;
& Tannery,
vol.Ill,p.369-370
: ici,p.371.
1641,d.Adam
; etp.371-375
73)VoirDescartes,
ad directionem
d.Adam& Tannery,
vol.X (Paris,
1996),
Regulae
ingenii,
r.XII,p.413-414
: [.. .]dumsensus
externus
movetur
abobjecto,
deferri
quamrecipit
figuram
adaliam
ensus
communis
Aristote
[.. .].Aucontraire
quamdam
corporis
partem,
quaevocatur
niait
unorgane
sensoriel
lessensibles
communs
,425a 13-14).
(Del'me
quiiexiste
spcial
pour

15:39:50 PM

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[143] 365

dessensexternes,
lelieuoillesimprime
comme
enuneciretant
lafantaisie
parviennent
ouimagination
fantaisie
estunevritable
.
du
; etquecette
[. .]74.
partie corps
En contrepartie
il montre,en tudiantle rle de ces diffrentes
toutefois,
facults
dansla connaissance,
que toutreposesurl'unitune forcepurement
:
spirituelle
Elleestcette
seuleetmme
force
dontondit,si elles'applique
avecl'imagination
au
senscommun,
etc.; sielles'applique
l'imagination
en
voit,
touche,
seule,
qu'elle
qu'elle
tant
estcouverte
dediverses
sesouvient
elle
; sielles'applique
quecelle-ci
figures,
qu'elle
denouvelles,
ouquellesereprsente
elleagitseule,
; sienfin
pourencrer
qu'elle
imagine
Et
cette
mme
force
le
conformment
cesdiverses
nom,
[...].
reoit
qu'elle
comprend
tantt
d'entendement
tantt
demmoire,
tantt
de
fonctions,
pur,tantt
d'imagination,
sens[.. .]75.
Descartesen vientde ce fait rcuserla notionla notionde parties, objet
chezlessuccesseurs
Aristotede biendesdiscussions,
maisfinalement
admise
partousen sensdivers:
De plus,
lesfacults
deconnatre,
devouloir,
desentir,
deconnatre,
tre
etc.,nepeuvent
dites
sesparties
c'est
un
seul
et
mme
connat76.
veut,
sent,
parce
que
esprit
qui
qui
qui
C'est uneseuleet mmeforcequi, s'appliquant telorgane,voit,c'estellequi
se rappelle,c'estellequi imagineou conoit,c'estellequi intellige.
C'estpouralors
d'un
certain
de
vue
sens
sens,
commun,imagination,
quoi,
que
point
74)Tertio
communem
etiam
vicesigilli
adeasdem
vel
est,sensum
concipiendum
fungi
figuras
a sensibus
externis
etsinecorpore
inphantasia
velimaginatione
in
veluti
ideas,
venientes,
puras
ceraformandas
esseveram
esse
; atquehancfantasiam
; atquehancphantasiam
partem
corporis
veram
& tantae
vtdiversas
abinvipartem
corporis,
magnitudinis,
ejusportiones
plures
figuras
cemdistinctas
induere
ad
directionem
d.
Adam
&
,
(Descartes,
possint
Tannery,
Regulae
ingenii
vol.X, 1996,p. 414; RenDescartes,
del'esprit
, trad.
J.Brunschwig,
Rgles
pourla direction
dossier
etglossaire
(Paris,
2002),p. 135).
prface,
parK.S.Ong-Vac-Cung
75)Atque
vna& eadem
estvis,quae,siapplicet
secumimaginatione
adsensum
communem,
dicitur
&c.; siadimaginationem
solam
vtdiversis
remidicitur
videre,
indutam,
tangere,
figuris
nisci
vtnovas
dicitur
vel
si
sola
dicitur
; siadeandem
;
fingat, imaginariconciperedenique agat,
etiam
idcirco
hasfunctiones
diversas
vocatur
velintellectus
[.. .] Eteadem
intelliger
juxta
purus,
velimaginatio,
velmemoria,
velsensus
& Tannery,
vol.XI,p.415-416).
,d.Adam
[...] (Regulae
76)equeetiam
facultates
&c.eiuspartes
dicipossunt
volendi,
sentiendi,
quiauna
intelligendi
& eadem
mens
estquasvult,
Meditationes
de
sentit,
(Descartes,
quae
quaeintelligit
prima
philo& Tannery,
vol.VII(Paris,
Mditations
,d.Adam
,
1996),
sophia
p.86;Descartes,
mtaphysiques
M.Beyssade
trad.
(Paris,
1990),p.247).

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sontdes partiesdu corps(et Descartesirajusqu' tenterde les localiser),d'un

autrepointde vuerienn'empchede direque c'estun seuleetmmeespritqui
sent,imagineou conoit.
de
danslesRgles
En retravaillant
la psychologie
desfacults
pourla direction
telleque l'avaient
, c'est une traditionen elle-mmetrsdiversifie,
l'esprit
rassembleles textesjsuitesles plus dtaillscommeceux de Rubio ou de
Au seinde
Suarez,maisaussilesmanuelsscolaires,
que Descartesse confronte.
il accentue,au pointde les retourner
cettetradition,
plusou moinsconsciemmentcontrecettetraditionelle-mme,des tendancesqui, apparuesau XIVe
dansle dbatdu xvieetdu dbutdu
sicle,taientencorefortement
prsentes
xviiesicle.
commesouvent,lesfilsse croisent.
En vrit,danscettehistoire,
JeanBuridansle cadredu
dan commentele Traitde l'meen philosophequi travaille
Mais discutant
avecJeandeJandun,
qui avaitaccentula
corpusaristotlicien.
ou d'opration
entrela formequi donnel'treet la formeoprante
distinction
,
l'me
doit
l'unit
de
une
de
dfend
Buridan
beaucoup,
Jean
qui
conception
: c'est
au sensstrict
l'augustinisme,
autantqu' l'aristotlisme
me semble-t-il,
la doctrinede l'me,forcespirituelle
uniqueusantdes organeset dispositions
Sans
douteentreles deux termesde cette
comme
d'instruments.
corporelles
entre
Buridan
et
Descartes,
y a-t-ilune rencontreconceptuelle
squence,
avre.Il n'en restepas moinsque
textuelle
tradition
imprvueplus qu'une
tissantentreeux d'une nouvellemanire,ainsiqu'il
l'inflexion
buridanienne,
ne se retrouve
et augustiniens,
vientd'trerappel,des filsaristotliciens
pas
le dbat,elle
chezquelquesmules; ellemarqueplusprofondment
seulement
elledonneuneimpulsionqui se
dansdescourantsconcurrents,
estintriorise
retrouve
dansles texteslesplusvaris- et c'estpourquoij'ai souhaiten marlisibledanscertains
pos la leonthomiste,
querl'chodans le contrepoint
fil
le
de ces dbatssurle
bien
suivre

on
textesjsuites.De l'un l'autre, peut
thmede l'unitdes diffrentes
puissancesde l'meentreelles,etde l'unitde
l'meavecsesfacults.

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deanima
inlibros
Aristotelis
Antonii
Ruvio
Rodensis
Antoine
Rubio,
[ . .] commentarii
(Lugduni,
1613).
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latine
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etanima,
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Patrologie
Augustin
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1955).
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e libro
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iEtatis
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Jean
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Parme)",
(2002),p.
MicrologusX
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Jean-Baptiste,
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2003).
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etP.Tannery,
,Meditationes
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philosophia
trad.
M.
,Mditations
,
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1990).
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mtaphysiques
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, trad.
J.Brunschwig,
parK.S.
prface,
pourladirection
(Paris,
2002).
Ong-Vac-Cung
addirectionem
& P.Tannery,
vol.X (Paris,
,Regulae
, d.C. Adam
1996).
ingenii
Francisco
Commentaria
unacumquestionibus
inlibros
Aristotelis
deanima
Surez,
, introduccin
critica
Salvador
3 vol.(Madrid,
1978,1981,1991).
Castellote,
yedicin
Guillaume
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,d.Joseph
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(NewYork,
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Jean
Quaestiones
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deanima
, Questiones
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1999.
, lib.III: voirZupko,
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deanima
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(Venise,
Jean
Super
quaestiones
amMain,1966).
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Pattin,
Adrian,
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agent:
in
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ses
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son
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Ancient
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,
1,
,
(Leuven,
Jandun
Philosophy
1988).
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Tractatus
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: voirPluta1987.
d'Ailly,
von
Diephilosophische
desPeter
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Olaf,
(Amsterdam,
1987).
Ailly
Psychologie
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Soul
and
Sensation
anEdition
oftheQuaestiones
Buridan
on
,with
Sobol,
Peter,
John
totelis
Deanima
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lectura
secundus
Arbor,
, detertia
(Ann
1984).
deanima
Sancti
Thomae
deAquino
Thomas
,d.C. Bazan,
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Opera
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1
tomus
XXIVXIIIP.M. editacuraetstudio
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iussuLeonis
praedicatorum,
1996).
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Gentiles
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Aquinitatis
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iussu
edita
Leonis
1918-1940)
(Rome,
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doctoris
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, Summa
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Aquinitatis
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XIIIP.M.edita,
omnia
iussu
Leonis
t.V (Rome,
1889).
impensaque
andTranslation
Buriilan's
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John
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Philosophy
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De anima"
onAristole's
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1999).
"Questions

15:39:50 PM

c'0
()'6V
BRILL

VIVA
RI UM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)368-391

From an Outsider's
Lorenzo

Point of View:

Valla on the Soul

Lodi Nauta
University
ofGroningen
Abstract
In hisRepastinatio
a heavy
attack
onAristotelian-scholastic
. . . Lorenzo
Vallalaunched
book
is
to
andargumentaWhile
most
of
this
devoted
metaphysics,
language
thought.
on
the
soul
and
natural
Valla
also
tion,
incorporates
chapters
philosophy.
Usingas
he rejected
muchof
criteria
goodLatin,commonsenseandcommonobservation,
onthesoul,replacing
thehylopmorphic
account
ofthe
standard
Aristotelian
teaching
one.Inthisarticle
hisarguments
onthesouls autonomy,
scholastics
byanAugustinin
fromthebodyarestudiedandanalysed.
His critique
of
andindependency
nobility
as beinguntrue
to whatwe observe
will
Aristotles
on natural
opinions
phenomena
tobedeeporconsistent
Hisarguments
do notshowhimalways
alsobebriefly
studied.
from
somephiloreview
ofAristotelian
butthecritical
thinker,
philosophy
proceeds
his
from
a broader
historical
Moreover,
perspective
sophically
assumptions.
interesting
ofAristode
s authority
as a contribution
to thefinal
maybe regarded
undermining
eventhough
thehumanist
wasjustone
demiseoftheAristotelian
critique
paradigm,
inthisprocess.
factor
Keywords
Lorenzo
Valla,soul,humanism,
Augustianianism
1. Introduction:An Archcritic
ofAristotelianPhilosophyin our Midst?
humanismintoa discussionon
Todayone no longerneedsto excusebringing
Aristotelian
traditions
the
scientia
de
anima} Humanistscontribregarding
0 SeeDennisDes Chene,
LateAristotelian
Form.
N.Y,
oftheSoul(Ithaca,
Life's
Conceptions
w
"
deanima'.
Theterm
t"wascoined
2000),11n.3 onthetermscientia
bytheGerpsychologu
in 1575(Kathleen
manhumanist
Thomas
ParkandEckhard
"The
Kessler,
Joannes
Freigius
in TheCambridge
ofPsychology",
, ed.C. Schmitt,
Concept
History
ofRenaissance
Philosophy
andE. Kessler
455.
York,
1988),455-463,
Q. Skinner
(Cambridge/New
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
156853408X360966
DOI:10.1163/
NV,
Leiden,

15:40:06 PM

L. Nauta/Vivarium
46 (2008)368-391

[147] 369

uted significantly
to the rediscovery,
dissemination
and understanding
of a
number
of
texts
on
natural
mathand
medicine,
great
important
philosophy,
ematics.Throughtextualstudies,theyalso influenced
scientific
practicesand
as wellas fostered
newideason scientific
Humantechniques,
methodology.2
istsinterested
in Aristotelian
turned
to
the
Greek
text
of
theDe
psychology
anima. New translations
weremade,thougholderones,particularly
thatof
WilliamofMoerbeke,remainedin use.3Theyalso exploredtheancientcomtradition
on Aristotle,
theworksof,forexammentary
editingand translating
and
Themistius.
ple,Philoponus,Simplicius
LorenzoValla(1406-1457),however,
is notgenerally
associatedwithnaturalphilosophy
or psychology.
Vallawas one ofthemostimportant
Certainly,
humanistsof QuattrocentoItaly.His ElegantiaelinguaeLatinaebecamean
international
bestseller
and gavethehumanistprogramme
some of itsmost
trenchant
and combativeformulations.
Vallahas longbeenunderstood
to be
- someonewho accused
an extremely
hostilecriticof all thingsAristotelian
theentirenatioperipatetica
ofpresenting
a skewedpictureofthesupernatural
and naturalworld,and of man.Thispicture,he implied,was basedon their
of Latinand of theworkingsof languagemore
completemisunderstanding
Valla
thus
attacked
theAristotelian-scholastic
traditiontoutcourt
,
generally.
of
their
methods
and
disproving
language,
approaches.4
2)SeeAnnBlairandAnthony
Humanism
andScience",
Grafton,
Journal
"Reassessing
ofthe
andAnthony
Grafton
andNancy
in
Siraisi,
"Introduction",
History
ofIdeas53(1992)529-540,
Natural
Particulars.
Nature
andtheDisciplines
inRenaissance
andN. Sir, ed.A.Grafton
Europe
aisi(Cambridge,
ofthehistoriographical
with
further
litera1999),1-21,fora resum
debates,
ture.
Foranexcellent
seeLucaBianchi,
andChange
intheAristotelian
survey
"Continuity
inTheCambridge
toRenaissance
ed.J.Hankins
Tradition",
Companion
Philosophy,
(Cambridge,
aswellashisStudi
sull'Aristotelismo
delRinascimento
2007),49-71,
(Padua,
2003).Cf.alsoSte"TheIntellectual
inTheCambridge
PhilosoMenn,
phen
Setting",
History
ofSeventeenth-Century
andMichael
, ed.DanielGarbers
York,
1998),33-86,esp.78
phy
Ayers
(Cambridge/New
n.35.
3)Eugenio
"Letraduzioni
umanistiche
diAristotele
nelsecolo
tlell'AccaIemia
Garin,
XV",Atti
discienze
morali
'LaColombaria'
'G (1951)55-104;
Ferdinand
E. Cranz,
fiorentina
"Perspectives
delaRenaissance
surle'De Anima'",
Platon
etAristote
la Renaissance:
XVIeColloque
international
deTours
Charles
B. Schmitt,
Aristotle
andtheRenaissance
(Paris,
1976),359-76;
(CamE. CranzandCharles
B. Schmitt,
A Bibliography
1983),64-88;Ferdinand
bridge,
ofAristotle
ParkandKessler,
1501-1600
of
EditionSy
, 2nded.(Baden-Baden,
1984),165-67;
"Concept
De anima
wastranslated
458.In thefifteenth
Psychology",
century
bytheByzantine
migrs
ofTrebizond
andJohannes
atleastfive
more
intoLatin
translations
folGeorge
Argyropoulos;
inthesixteenth
lowed
century.
4)A critical
discussion
ofValla's
ispresented
inmyforthcoming
bookInDefense
programme
of
Common
Sense.
Lorenzo
Valla's
Humanist
in
(I TattiStudies
Critique
ofScholastic
Philosophy

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whichis not onlyspecifically

anti-Aristotelian
Althoughsuchan attitude,
butalso generally
not
seem
useful
forconsidmay initially
anti-philosophical,
in
transformations
Aristotelian
there
are
several
reasons
ering
why
psychology,
itis interesting
to bringVallaintothepicture.Valladid in factwriteaboutthe
soul- namelyin thecontextofhisattackson Aristotelian-scholastic
thought.
As he himself
hisreformation
ofAristotelian
anddialecobserves,
metaphysics
ticshad to includemoraland naturalphilosophy;
indeedthechapteron natuinhisDialcticais amongthelongestin thework.5
ralphilosophy
Thesearenot
themostwidelystudiedpartsofVallascorpus,and it is worthwhile
to explore
bothhistreatment
ofthesethemesand theirrelationship
to hisbroadercritical
aims.My contribution,
is limitedto hisremarks
on thesoul.
however,
VariousscholarshavearguedthatVallas criticisms
of Aristotelian
natural
in
the
for
innovation
the
and
philosophy
helpedpave way
philosophy science
ofthelaterRenaissance.
Forinstance,
CharlesTrinkaushasstressed
thenature
of Vallas empiricism,
which appeals to common sense and observation.
Thoughcarefulto avoidsecuring"a place forValla in thehistoryof natural
science",TrinkausconcedesthatValla,"doeshavea placeas partoftheinternaldissidence
withinthedominantnaturalphilosophy
ofhisownage,thelate
middleages and theRenaissance".6OtherscholarshavelocatedValla more
withinthetradition
of dissidentthinkers,
whichfinally
culminatedin
firmly
the riseof the new scienceof the late sixteenth
and seventeenth
centuries.
GianniZippel thushas suggested
thatVallaforeshadowed
Renaissancenaturalismin formulating
solutionsof
positionswhich"preludelate-Renaissance
Telesio".7Zippel viewsVallas positionas "thefirstconsciousanticipation
in
Renaissance
March
I, Harvard
Press,
Mass.,
2009).Thisarticle
History
University
Cambridge,
isbasedonparts
ofchapter
4. Someofthesameground
inLodiNauta,
iscovered
"Lorenzo
Valla's
ofAristotelian
41 (2003),120-143.
Vivarium
I shallrefrain
from
Critique
Psychology",
extensive
documentation
here.
Seeesp.C.Vasoli,
Ladialettica
elaretorica
dell'Umanesimo
giving
P.Mack,
Renaissance
Renaissance
Valla
andAgricola
(Milan,
1968),28-77,
Argument.
Argument.
intheTraditions
andDialectic
Dialettica
efilosofia
in
(Leiden,
1993),M. Lanfranchi,
ofRhetoric
Lorenzo
Valla(Milan,
"William
ofOckham
andLorenzo
Valla:FalseFriends.
1999);L. Nauta,
Semantics
andOntological
Renaissance
"Val56(2003),613-651;
Reduction",
idem,
Quarterly
lasCritique";
"Lorenzo
VallaandtheRiseofHumanist
in TheCambridge
idem,
Dialectic",
toRenaissance
ed.J.Hankins
York,
2007),193-210.
Companion
Philosophy,
(Cambridge/New
5)Valla,Repastinatio
dialectice
etphilosophie
Padua1982,2 vols(= Valla
, ed.Gianni
Zippel,
vol.I,7.
1982),
6)Charles
"Lorenzo
Valla's
Anti-Aristotelian
1 Tatti
Natural
Studies.
Trinkaus,
Philosophy",
intheRenaissance
5 (1993),279-325,
322.
Essays
7)Zippel
s introduction
toValla1982,1,cxviii
storica
del
("laprima
consapevole
anticipazione
diBacone").
pensiero

15:40:06 PM

L. Nauta/Vivarium
46 (2008)368-391

[149] 371

in naturalscience
historyof Bacons thought",and claimsthathis interests
Not diswerebased"on a verypreciseinductive
and experimental
approach".8
in
the
of
"la via
Riccardo
Fubini
Vallas
tradition
similarly,
placed
Repastinatio
razionalistico
moderno",despiteadmittingits limitedinfludell'empirismo
...
enceon Vallascontemporaries.
This"roadofmodernrationalist
empiricism
in
the
ambithe
of
Bacon
and
would
become
much
later
Descartes,
only
age
tiousfoundation
oftheNew Scienceofknowledge".9
in the Renaissance,
Valla has been linkednot onlyto laterdevelopments
but also to the so-called criticaltendenciesin later medievalthought,
especiallythe nominalismof William of Ockham. Indeed, it has become
ofan orthodoxy
to callVallaa "nominalist"
and an "Ockhamist"
something
on accountof his simpleontologyand his critiqueof abstractterms.Moreover,Vallasaccountofthesoul has beenlinkedto Ockham,sincebothseem
in theprocessofcognition.10
to rejectspeciesas a kindofintermediary
- an anti-philosophical
The natureof Vallas generalprogramme
crusade
the
worldview
is
also
valuable
to
underthe
Aristotelian-scholastic
against
his
is
carried
out
of
Aristotelian
because
using
psychology
agenda
standing
of
Afterall,thehistory
somephilosophically
ideasand approaches.
interesting
A
its
critics.
its
but
also
is
not
by
onlyby practitioners
philosophy shaped
modernhistoriancan acknowledgeand analyseideas withoutnecessarily
is to attackwhathe considersthe "fondaendorsingthem.Vallas strategy
of
menta"of theAristotelian
edifice.11
This does not requirean examination
to demonstrate
thatthe
each and everystone.Rather,forhimit is sufficient
oftheedificearehighlyunstable;theywerebuiltuponthequickfoundations
sand of a languageand methodology
largelyunrelatedto thewaysin which
strives
to present
view
and
describe
the
world.Vallatherefore
peoplenormally
theoretical
an alternative
to thatscholasticapproach,whichhe findsabstract,
and argumenHe wantsto studywords,propositions
and ratherunscientific.
in
each
theoriginal
tationsas theyoccurin reallifesituations,
understanding
8)Zippels
andcxviii-cxx
introduction
toValla1982,I, cxviii
("unapiprecisa
impostazione
induttiva
e sperimentale
dellaricerca").
9)Riccardo
in
di Lorenzo
"Contributo
dellaDialctica
Valla",
Fubini,
perl'interpretazione
F.
e
l'et
moderna
ed.
G.
Vescovini
e
arabo-latina
medievale
scienza
classica,
,
(Louvain-laFilosofia
razionalistico
316("viadell'empirismo
Neuve,
moderno").
1999),289-316,
10)Trinkaus,
ofthisinterpre"Vallas
Anti-Aristotelian
Naturai
301.Forcriticisms
Philosophy",
Valla"
and
andLorenzo
"William
ofOckham
tation
ofVallaasa nominalist
seeLodiNauta,
InDefense
Sense
ch.
Common
1-3.
,
idem,
of
n) Seee.g.thetitle
univertotius
dialectice
etfundamentorum
ofthesecond
version
Reconcinnatio
inthree
versions
section
salis
Valla's
text
isextant
2).
(seebelow,
philosophie.

15:40:06 PM

372 [150]

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46 (2008)368-391

The basisforVallas
contextfromwhichit derivesitsmeaningand function.12
is
thus
two-fold:
valid
human knowledge
of
scholastic
rejection
thought
- thatis,
a
sense
of
the
world
and
both
a
common
picture
requires
language
and refinement
necesgood classicalLatin whichpossessesall theresources
The
at
was
of
humanist
to
describe
that
world.
latter,
least,
fairly
typical
sary
tastes.
itconstituted
Vallasobjectivewasmorethanmerely
aesthetic;
Significantly,
basisof law,theology,
a seriousphilosophical
philosomessage:thelinguistic
in
all
activities.
The
and
fact
of
intellectual
programmeaccordingly
phy
attemptsto make the studyof languageinto an incisivetool, one able to
Vallaalsoassumesthatthe
and misunderstandings.
exposeall manneroferrors
and writsinceit is essentialto thinking
use oflanguageis farfromharmless,
or
misunderstands
either
words
their
use will
whoever
ing. Consequently,
and
It
is
not
necesfallpreyto muddledthinking emptytheorizing.
inevitably
to allowthatVallas
saryto agreewiththisas a diagnosisofscholastic
thought,
relevant.
is
position philosophically
Thisdiscussion
ofthesoulis butone ofthemanyquestionsand issuesraised
norrelatively
terribly
byVallasposition.The accountis neither
profound
origof
his
inal. It is not evena particularly
example
representative
generalprogramme:the bindingof philosophicalspeculationto what the sensescan
- namely,
classicalLatin- can
and to thatwhicha particular
language
register
it containssomethought-provoking
expressthroughgrammar.Nevertheless
ofthetraditional
and
ideas.
Vallas
simplification
picture
arguments
thorough
of
to
be
as
one
answer
the
Aristotelian
may regarded
type
paradigm:one can
also reforma paradigmby simplyignoringthe questionsand issueswhich
formitscore(whichis notto saythatthiswasVallasonlytactic.)
Beforeturning
ourfocusto Vallasdiscussionofthesoul,it maybe helpful
to introduce
hisDialctica
, inwhichhiscritiqueofAristotelian-scholastic
philosophyis mainlyfound.
2. Valla'sDialctica
VallabeganhisDialcticain Paviain theearly1430s; thefirst
versionis entitledRepastinatio
dialectice
etphilosophie
or
of the
(therecultivating resowing

12)SeeNauta,
"Lorenzo
VallaandtheRiseofHumanist
andidem,
InDefense
Dialectic",
ofCommon
Sense.

15:40:06 PM

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46 (2008)368-391

[151] 373

The workis no lessambitraditional

groundof dialecticand philosophy).13
In BookI Vallaattempts
to undermine
Aristoteliantiousthanitstitlesuggests.
a
of
its
tenets.
Some
scholastic
number
fundamental
bycriticising
metaphysics
firefromValla include:theten
of thepreceptswhichcome underparticular
and
the
nine
accidental
substance,
ones,includingquality,quancategories
and
the
six
transcendental
terms
such as "good","one" and
relation);
tity
the
such
as
and
"true";concepts
predicables,
species,bywhicha thing
genus
can be definedand placedin theso-calledtreeofPorphyry;
formand matter,
to
whenever
these
and actand potency.
terms,
Valla,
concepts,and
According
or even rebarbative
distinctions
are couchedin ungrammatical
Latin,they
oftheworld,rather
thanenlighten
andconfuseones understanding
complicate
it.Vallamaintains
thatones understanding
shouldbe basedon comorclarify
in good,classicalLatin.Book I further
includeschapmonsenseandexpressed
a critiqueof
on
substance.
The
former
constitute
ters materialand spiritual
thelattertreatGod, thesouland thevirtues.
Aristotelian
naturalphilosophy;
in BooksII and III to convertthe
Vallafollowsthisanalysiswithan attempt
Aristotelian
into
a rhetorical-grammatical
diaformalscholastic
of
study
logic
lectic,one tailoredto the practicalneedsof publicdebate,communication
extendthe rangeof admissible
and argumentation.
Seekingto considerably
Valla
draws
Cicero,
Quintilianand theRomanidealof the
upon
arguments,
orator.Accordingly,
he is lessconcernedwiththeformalvalidityofargumentation,whichhe findsrathernarrowifnotinsipid,and moreconcernedwith
itspracticalefficacy.
Does it convinceitsaudience?ThusVallarejectstheforin favourofa dialecticbasedon reallanguage,
malapproachofthescholastics
on arguments
studiedin context.And whatcountsas contextforVallais far
ofthescholasticexample.
moreexpansivethanthesinglesentencestructure
a majorrevisionin
He continuedto workon theDialctica, undertaking
A
was
the1440swhileat thecourtofKingAlfonsoofAragon. secondrevision
versionsofthe
cutshortbyVallasdeathin 1457. None ofthethreesurviving
to
textachieveda breadthof circulation
remotely
comparable thatofVallas
Book I ofthe
Latinae
. Nevertheless,
handbookon Latin,theElegantiae
linguae
- is of
as I preferto call it, afterthefirstversion
Dialctica or Repastinatio
forourpurposes.14
specialrelevance
"
"
13)Orperhaps
usedinthissense
rather:
out",repastinatio
back",
by
"weeding
being
"cutting
Debate
Erika
The
inhisExhortatio
noticed
Tertullian
Rummel, Humanist-Scholastic
castitatis' by
intheRenaissance
andtheReformation
1995),156.
(Cambridge,
14)Forthetext
a
third
Vol.1 (pp.1-356)
contains
Vallas
seeZippel's
edition.
version,
including
version.
Vol.2 (pp.357-598)
from
thesecond
critical
which
listsvariant
apparatus
readings
contains
thefirst
version.

15:40:06 PM

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- a rathergrandwordwhichhe
an alternative
Here,employing
ontology
would strongly
dislike Valla challengesthatof the scholastics.His own is
the
verysimple: worldconsistsofthings;thesethingscan be analysedas substanceswiththeirrespective
Theprimary
therefore,
qualitiesandacts.15
things,
are not substances,
sincesubstancecannotexistby itself;it is alwaysalready
informed
byquality.Thesearecalledthings(res)byValla,a simplecommon
wordwhichhe obviouslylikes.The threecategories
intowhicha thingcan be
analysedare also calledthings:qualityis a thing,actionis a thingand substanceis a thing.Hence, "thing"is a transcendental
the
term,transcending
in
it
is
the
transcendental
term:
the
other
or
six
five
only
categories; fact,
To anotherbasic
good,one,being,and so forth canall be reducedto thing.16
division,thatbetweenbodyand soul (or spirit),Vallaaddsa thirdclasswhich
he calls "animal",consistingof both and rathersimilarto theAristotelian
notionofthecomposite.17
Valla does not arriveat thispictureby systematically
all of the
reviewing
doctrinesof thescholastics,
but by assumingthatlanguagegivesus a direct
- substance,qualityand actionapproachto the world.Behindhis triad
ofnoun,adjectiveand adverb,and verb.
clearlylie thegrammatical
categories
suchas relation,
Hence,thereis no needforotheraccidentalcategories
quanor
time.
these
too
are
tity,
place
Grammatically,
qualitiesofthings.Thusbeing
twometerstallis a quality,as is beingwhiteor a father.
Thisconclusionleads
Vallato explorein detailthemultifarious
whichthingsaretalked
waysthrough
he makesherearepertinent
and interesting.18
about,and manyobservations
Not thatthereis a simpleone to one relationship
betweenlanguageand the
world.Vallanotesmanyinstances
wherethesuperficial
ofan expresgrammar
sioncan mislead;a verb,forinstancedoes notalwaysreferto an action.And
whenone statesthatqualitiesarethingswhich"arepresentto thesubstance",
thiswronglysuggeststhattheycan existapartfromone another,but,Valla
In general,
thegrammatical
and
however,
says,"wecannotspeakotherwise".19
semantical
features
ofclassicalLatinoffer
reliableguidelines
forexpressing
our
viewsof theworld,ourselvesand ourbeliefs.In VallasmindtheLatinofthe
15)Repastinatio
andinfact
Fora good
, ed.Zippel,
46-50,110-115,
127-134,
134-156,
passim.
discussion
seeMack,
Renaissance
22-116.Amore
extensive
treatment
canbefound
in
Argument,
Sense.
1-3ofmyInDefense
chapters
ofCommon
16)Repastinatio
11-21.
, ed.Zippel,
17)Repastinatio
, ed.Zippel,
49,422-424.
18)Seeesp.Repastinatio
134-156.
, ed.Zippel,
19)Repastinatio
365.
, ed.Zippel,

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[153] 375

is closelyconnectedwiththecommonspeechofthe
greatauthorsofantiquity
I
to realise
shall
not
butitis important
discusshisrationale,20
people(populus).
for
classical
Latin
is
not
a
suited
for
that, Valla,
only language
higherintellecsuchas oratory,
butalso an
tualand literary
poetryand composition,
pursuits
forspeaking,writingand thinking
abouttheworldin general.It
instrument
Whoever
is semantically
precise,syntactically
complexand richin vocabulary.
lacksthisfacultasloquendiis bound to go wrongin speaking,writingand
Vallaletshimself
be ruledbythisidea
thediscussion,
thinking.21
Throughout
thatgood Latinis theperfect
vehicleforexpressing
our commonworldview,
assumingthatwhatcommonsensetellsus is plainenough.
3. Valla'sDiscussion of theSoul
HavingsketchedsomeofVallasmainideas,it is nowpossibleto considerhis
discussionof the soul. This, togetherwithhis chapteron God, consitutes
Vallas accountof "incorporeal
substance"(or spirit),whichis followedby a
long discussionof "corporealsubstance"(body). Valla advancesan underof
similarto hisrepresentation
standingofGod and thesoul thatis strikingly
- by definition,
and
action.
a thing
of
Thus,as
consisting substance,quality
versionofhiswork,God is divinesubstance thethree
Vallasaysin thefirst
couldeasilylead
Sucha formulation
Personsofwhichcan be calledqualities.22
oftheTrinto
which
each
Person
to accusations
ofSabellianheresy,
according
it
was
not his
or
of
the
one
Godhead.
is
a
mode
ity merely
aspect
Though
intentionto givesupportto heretical
views,Vallawas dulylinedup bylater
criticsofTrinitarian
such
as
Lelio
Sozzini.
theology
is appliedto thesoul.23Valla
The samemodelof substance-plus-qualities
comparesboth God and the soul to the sun a favouriteand traditional
20)SeeMirko
di unaquestione
umanistica
Storia
Latino,
Tavoni,
(Padua,
grammatica,
volgare:
"LeEleRicerche
sullatino
umanistico
Rizzo,
(Rome,
2002)Mariangela
1984),Silvia
Regoliosi,
italiana
Studidigrammatica
delVallacomegrammatica'
19 (2000),
antinormativa",
gantie
InDefense
Common
Sense
andNauta,
315-336,
("Conclusion").
of
21)Repastinatio
, ed.Zippel,
5,145,278andelsewhere.
22)Repastinatio,
seeSalvatore
402-408.
ForValla's
controversial
ideasontheTrinity
ed.Zippel,
"Lorenzo
e teologia
Lorenzo
Valla:Umanesimo
Trinkaus,
1972);Charles
(Florence,
Camporeale,
Ideas
The
the
ofSpeaking
about
theTrinity",
VallaontheProblem
57
(1996)
Journal
of History
of
6.
InDefense
Common
Sense
ch.
andNauta,
27-53,
,
of
23)Forhischapter
and
andthird
onthesoulseeRepastinatio
59-73(second
,ed.Zippel,
version)
them
here.
I shall
nottreat
thedifferences
between
408-419
(first
version).

15:40:06 PM

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46 (2008)368-391

376 [154]

lhe sun is substancewiththreeessentialqualities(or,as Vallapreanalogy.24

fersto say,naturalqualities):vibration,
lightand heat.Thesequalitiesarealso
foundin thethreePersonsof theTrinity,
as wellas in thehumansoul- the
threeessentialqualitiesofwhicharememory,
reasonandwill.The activities
of
thesoul arethuscomparedto thevibrating
and radiantbeamsof thesun by
whichthingsaregrasped,illuminated
and heated:25
sun

vibratus

lux

ardor

soul

memory
eternitas

reason

will

sapientia

bonitas

God

Vallastresses
thatthesoulis a substance,
not
Usingthismodeland argument,
- thatis,a compositething
- is madeofmata quality.
As he says:a substance
terand form,and thesoul is likewisea substance,beingmade of body (or
ratheressence)and form.26
Valla thusdoes not accepttheAristotelian
definition
of the soul as "the
substance(ousia) in thesenseoftheformofa naturalbodyhavinglifepotenanimamusiamesse,ut speciemcorporisnatutiallywithinit" ("necessarium
ralispotentiavitamhabentis").ThoughValla quotesthedefinition,
he does
not reallydiscussit. Thisdefinition,
was absolutely
fundamental
to
however,
thescholastics.
Each word,as one scholarrecently
became
"a
site
of
consaid,
In Vallas
tention,a point of heresydividingone school fromanother".27
- not
account,formis thesameas qualityand thesoulis simplynota quality
ofa humanor an animalbeing;callingita substantial
formwouldnotchange
24)OntheplaceofthesuninRenaissance
seeEugenio
La cultura
del
Garin,
thinking,
filosofica
Rinascimento
italiano
Charles
"Italian
Humanism
and
Trinkaus,
(Florence,
1961),432-441;
inRenaissance
Scholastic
Humanism:
Forms
andLegacy
Foundations,
, 3 vols.,ed.
Theology",
Albert
Ilpensiero
cristiano
diLorenzo
Valla
nelquadro
Rabil,
Fois,
1988).Mario
Jr.,
(Philadelphia,
storico-culturale
delsuoambiente
toTertullian,
Lactantius
andStBasii
(Rome,
1969),541points
aspossible
sources.
25)Repastinatio,
ed.Zippel,
71and410.
26)Valla,
vocetur
,46:"Quodcumitasit,primm
(utBoetio
libuit)
Repastinatio
predicamentum
substantia'.
Namcorpus
e materia
constat
etforma,
siveessentia
etqualitate,
etitem
animam
constare
confitendum
est".Cf.113:"etusitatius
accomodatius
estvocabulum
multoque
qualitas'quam'forma',
sicut'essentia'
In spiteofValla's
towords,
he
quammateria'".
sensitivity
with"metaphysical"
terms
suchassubstance,
matter
inthefirst
andquality:
essence,
struggles
version
hetalks
ofa thing
interms
of"consubstance"
ofsubstance
inthe
andquality;
existing
later
versions
thisbecomes
substance
ofessence
andquality.
existing
27)DesChene,
Form
4l2a20.
, 68onDeanima
Life's

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[155] li

Thisargument
thatfact.28
raisesthequestionofthenatureoftherelationship
- thatis,
betweensubstanceand quality:is thesoulidenticalwithitsqualities
- oraretheyontologically
themselves
withitspowers
distinct?
The scholastics
weredividedon thispoint.Augustinians
had initially
arguedthatthedifferencebetweenthesouland itspowersis merely
verbal;thesoulbeingidentical
to itspowers,thesenamesreferonlyto thediverseactionsof a singleentity.
Once thewritings
ofAvicennaandAverroes
becameknown,scholastic
authors
to
the
notion
of
an
essential
between
the
soul
and its
distinction
accept
began
them
Albert
the
Great
and
Thomas
for
described
instance,
powers.
Aquinas,
as substanceand its qualitiesor as essenceand its accidents.29
Nominalists,
maintainedtheAugustininline thatno real difference
however,generally
exists.30
thanAristotelian,
Vallas
Thoughhis overallapproachis moreAugustinin
its
unwitof thesoul and itscapacitiesas substanceand qualities
description
sideswithThomisticteachings
tingly
againstOckhamistones. Qualitiescannotbe absentfromthesubstance,
butarenotidenticalwithit. Nevertheless,
Vallaalso saysthatit is one and thesamesoulwhichcarriesout all thefuncreasonand will. Memory,Valla
tionsassignedto its threepowers:memory,
and
retains
Reason
examinesandjudgesthem.Will
says,comprehends
things.
desiresor rejectsthem.But,sinceone and thesamesoul does all this,it does
in factseemas thoughsubstanceand qualityareonlydifferent
namesforthe
Valla does not drawout fullythe consequencesof
souls different
actions.31
28)Vallarejects
formulate
thenotion
ofsubstantial
form
buthetoomust
(ed.Zippel,
112-113),
inorder
accidental
a kind
ofinseparability
tosort
essential
outfrom
ones,
requirement
qualities
inhisdistinction
between
"natural"
and"non-natural"
which
results
(113)."Natural
qualities
a genus)
sense:
within
both
strict
(intheir
species
qualities"
comprise
distinguishing
differentiae
Forhisideaisthat
eachthing
anduniversal
suchascolour,
touch
andweight.
accidents,
shape,
from
itssubject,
must
have
some
colour
andshape,
andhence
beinseparable
justlikeheatinfire.
heat
of"natural
isnotunproblematic,
unlike
Butthiscoupling
ofdifferent
for,
qualities"
types
infire,
a species
from
other
whiteness
does
theexistence
ofcolour
doesnotdistinguish
species:
strict
sense
ofdifhegives
thetraditional,
notdistinguish
manfrom
horse.
Elsewhere,
however,
a species
from
other
viz.a quality
which
(169).Seech.1ofmyIn
species
ferentia,
distinguishes
Sense
Renaissance
46-47.
, and,more
Mack,
briefly,
Argument,
Defense
ofCommon
29)E.g.Albert
theGreat,
De homine
Thomas
Summa
I-I,q. 77,
1.73.2.2.2;
Aquinas,
theologiae
der
SeePiusKnzle,
Das Verhltnis
art.6 ("Utrum
animae
fluant
abeiusessentia").
potentiae
Seele
zuihren
Potenzen
1956),144-218.
(Freiburg,
30)ForOckham's
seeInLibros
Sententiarum
thesoulanditsfaculties,
arguments
concerning
in
on
late
medieval
11.24
Cf.
Kathleen
"Alberts
influence
Park,
(Ockham
1981).
psychology",
and
A.
Albertus
and
the
ed.
517-519
501-535,
Sciences,
1980),
(Toronto,
J.
Weisheipl
Magnus
DesChene,
143-154
Form,
debate).
(onthelate-scholastic
Life's
31)Repastinatio,
ed.Zippel,
66,75,410.

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thesevariousstatements
or oftheirapparentcontradictions.
He is verymuch
concernedwiththeunityof thesoul,yethe also speaksaboutitsqualitiesin
termsofautonomouspowerswhichhavetheabilityto act upon one another.
- nottheconverse.32
The will,forinstance,is saidto teachtheintellect
Therefore
Valla is certainly
a dualist;soul and bodyareverydifferent
substances.For thisveryreasonValla reactsagainsttheTreeof Porphyry,
which
has substanceat thetop and itsfirst
as corporealand incorporeal.
differentiae
Vallareplacesthiswithmultipletrees:one forbody,anotherforsoul,and even
adds a thirdtreefor"animal"whichis thecompositeof thefirsttwo.33
Valla
mustthenaccountforhow thegap betweenbodyand soul is bridged.The
soul permeates
thebody,he says;it is presentin thesenses,in theheartand
the
The soul (or ratheritspowthroughout body.It is thesoul thatperceives.
therefore
influences
the
The
for
will,
instance,
ers)
body.
providesthebody
withitswarmth,
whilereasongivesthebodyitsingenuoussystem
ofhumours
distributionem
But the soul is also influenced
(solertam
humorum)?A
by the
a
or
headache
drunkenness
affects
our
mental
When
we
body,e.g.
capacities.
aretiredwe becomeangrymoreeasily.Valladoes notdelvefarintohow the
twosubstances
whichis hardlysurprising
interact,
giventhatto thisdaytreatmentofthesubjectremainstricky
at best.Buthiscontemporary
philosophers
did raisea question,one whichValladoes notconsider,
whatthe
concerning
of
the
soul
reveals
about
the
in
dependency
physiological
ontologicalcategory
whichitshouldbe placed.35
does makeit clearthatthesoul mustnotbe consideredin
Valla,however,
thesamemanneras onewouldan ordinary
thing.Forexample,restand movementare not termswe can applyto thesoul, nor,forthatmatter,
to God.
32)Repastinatio
411andelsewhere.
, ed.Zippel,
33)Repastinatio
hemakes
someinteresting
Valla's
ownpro46-50.Though
, ed.Zippel,
points,
itsproblems.
posalisnotwithout
34)Repastinatio
71-72.
, ed.Zippel,
35)SeeKathleen
"Theorganic
in TheCambridge
Park,
soul",
,
History
ofRenaissance
Philosophy
ed.C. Schmitt,
andE. Kessler
468andDes
York,
464-484,
1988),
Q. Skinner
(Cambridge/New
ofwhether
soulissubstance
oraccident
71.Onthelate-scholastic
Chene,
Form>
Life's
question
seeDesChene,
Valla
makes
a
brief
remark
on
the
status
of
animal
soul
67-102.
Form,
Life's
that
itcannot
bea quality,
foronemayask:a quality
ofwhat
itmust
Therefore,
namely
thing
bea substance,
which
thatitis"created
outofnothing,
with
divine
than
aid",rather
implies
from
"the
ofmatter"
a section
inthethird
added
version
oftheRepasti(65:3-16,
potency
only
Theideathat
a soul(ofwhatever
onorarise
would
outofmaterial
was
natio).
body
type)
depend
ananathema
for
Valla.Ingeneral,
scholastics
were
lessadverse
toit,since
distinthey
generally
between
human
soul(created
substantial
forms
guished
byGod)andother
bynatural
(generated
processes).

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[157] 379

he findsthe description
of God as the unmovedmoverboth
(Accordingly,
and heat
ridiculousand impious).The heartreceivesitsvibration,
perception
fromthesoul;hencetheheartis movedmorethananyotherpartofthebody
oftheheat,causingbodilyeffects.
Nevertheand responsible
forthediffusion
less,thesoul itselfis in neitherrestnormovement.36
YetevenVallacannotavoidterminology
thattreatsthesoulan objectwhich
thebody,
is capableofvariousactions.Thusthesoul,permeating
throughout
thatthesoulcan (and often
is also presentin thesenses.Vallahereemphasises
does) activelyparticipatein the processof perception,ratherthanbeinga
merepassiverecipient
of an outsideworldactingupon it. He thusdiscusses
thedirection
ofperception:
is it thepowerofthesenseswhichactively
go out
to meettheobjects(a positionknownas extramission)
or,viceversa,arethe
Valla
theirimagesto the(passive)senses(intramission).37
objectssendingforth
in
easier
for
our
soul
because
the
is
the
it
is
much
soul
senses,
saysthat,
present
to extend,bymeansoftheeyes rays,to coloursthanit is forcoloursto come
into the eyes.He clearlyfavoursextramission,
whichhe thinksdoes more
of
the
soul
than
the alternative
to
the
autonomous
status
theory.In
justice
Vallaseemsto suggestthatthesoul emits
spiteofsomeambiguousphrasing,
itsraysvia theeyes,whichrays,whenfallenon an object,are thenreflected
as a kindof "mirror"
and receivedbytheeye,theeyefunctioning
{ad oculum
velutad speculum).The soul thendoes not see the raysor imagescarried
throughthe medium,but rathersees the objectin its own place, and, the
therays,thebettertheobjectis seen.Thisdiscussiondoes
and brighter
sharper
"
Whiletheterm imago
notemploytheterm"species"or "phantasm".
", which
use here,is takenoverfromLactantius,it does not
Valla does infrequently
in thesameway.
function
on Vallas part.He
This choice of wordsmay be a deliberatestratagem
the
and
to
mention
and
phantasms, ignores entirepanoplyof
species
neglects
of souls,or as he
Valla rejectstheexistenceof a plurality
soulsand faculties.
rational
souls".38
He further
and
"the
sensitive,
says
imaginative
vegetative,
36)Repastinatio
infact
Aristotle
butbothwere
72.Vallacriticises
here,
, ed.Zippel,
quiteaware
his
own
of
the
thesoulasa thing.
Before
ofthedanger
oftreating
presenting theory soul,in
inbookI; hecriticised
a number
ofpertinent
bookII oftheDeanimay
Aristotle
raised
questions
- notunlike
that
thesort
ofcriticism
fortaking
thesoultobea magnitude
forinstance,
Plato,
Vallamakes.
37)Repastinatio
"Valla's
is rather
seeNauta,
Vallasexplanation
155-156.
obscure;
yed.Zippel,
InDefense
Sense
andidem,
, ch.4.
Critique",
ofCommon
38)Repastinatio
ofthe"imaginative
soul"isodd,since
mention
409.Theseparate
, ed.Zippel,
tothesensitive
soul.
asoneoftheinternal
senses,
belongs
imagination,

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46 (2008)368-391

as thevisaestimativa
and
suchfaculties
, omitting
rejectsthesensuscommunis
The
result
is
an
of
uncomplicated,
depiction the
Augustinin
imagination.39
substancewhichwas made in the
soul as a whollyspiritualand immaterial
intellect
consistsofmemory,
andwill.
imageofGod, and,thoughitis a unity,
Thisrepresentation
does notexplaina numberof processes,
includingsensationand cognition.
ofthevegetative
ThisAugustinin
and hisrejection
and senrepresentation
sitivesouls do have some noteworthy
consequencesforhis ideas about the
soul of animals,the soul of plants,and about cognition.Of these,thefirst
seemsto be themostsignificant.
Men are not alone in possessinga rationalsoul; animalsalso do.40The
debateoverwhetheranimalsarecapableof reasonwas,of course,longstandas RichardSorabjihas shown,thecase foranimal
ing.In classicalAntiquity,
reasonwas remarkably
werebased on the
strongand diverse.Its arguments
had in commonwithmen- namely,
capacitieswhichanimalssupposedly
persome
form
of
communicative
emotion,
ception,memory,
preparation,
speech,
vicesand theliability
to madness.41
ForVallathecaseforanimal
skills,virtues,
reasonwas different.
It followsfromtheunityofthesoul.Sincethecapacities
- likehumans
- havea
ofthesoulareso closelyconnected,
and sinceanimals
willand memory,
theytoo mustpossessa rationalsoul.As is typicalofValla,
he alsosupportshispositionbyintroducing
considerations,
linguistic
quoting
author.The Latinrhetor,
Quintilian,hisfavourite
arguingthat"animalshave
to a certainextent",had regardedspeechas the
thoughtand understanding
main difference
betweenman and animals.42
Valla adds thatlogoshad been
confusedbylaterphilosophers
whothoughtthat"a-loga"means"without
reait meantonly"withoutspeech".The etymology
oflogos
son",thoughinitially
fromlego(I speak,I say) is further
evidence,saysValla. Thus,forhim,the
- distinguishes
to
rather
than
the
men
capacity speak
predicate"rational"
fromanimals.
Thislineof argument
further
impliesthatanimalsoulsarealso createdby
God- thusa substancecreatedfromnothing,and not fashionedfrompre39)Repastinatio
73.
, ed.Zippel,
40)Repastinatio,
ed.Zippel,
67-68.
41)Richard
Animal
minds
andhuman
Theorigin
morals:
debate
(Ithaca,
Sorabji,
oftheWestern
1993),30-96.
42)Quintilian,
Institutio
oratoria
transi.
Russell
the
2.16.15-16,
2001,vol.1,373.Vallapresents
inhisgloss
same
toQuintilian;
LePostille
alVInstituto
Oratoria'
diQuintiseeL.Valla,
argument
lino
Martinelli
andA.Peroa
theeditors
comment
on
, ed.L.Cesarini
(Padua,
1996),70,with
pp.lvii-lviii.

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[159] 381

have denied
existingmaterial.Valla claimsthatall schoolsof philosophers
this.43
Butwhatthenis thedifference
betweenhumanand animalsouls?Valla
answersthattheformer
aredirectly
inspiredbyGod, havingbeenmadein his
image;animalsoulsdo notsharethishonour.Moreover,
thoughanimalsouls
are createdwithdivineaid, theyare mortal.Valla thussafeguards
thepriviof
the
human
soul.
his
criterion
for
discriminatNevertheless,
legedposition
ing betweenthe two is unclear.What he rejectsis the notionthatone can
fromreason,which,as
instinct
separateanimalfromhumanbydistinguishing
Vallawrites,
is "totakeshelterundertricksofterminology".44
Instinctis nothmore
than
a
sort
of
which
men
also
impulse(impetus),
possesswhenthey
ing
"
areexcited;hencetheyarecalled instinct
f . Impulsearisesfromthewill, by
whichassertionValla subvertsthe argumentthatthe presenceof instinct
entailsa lack of reason
. Aristotle,
was wrong,Valla continues,to
therefore,
claim thatanimalsand youngchildrenlack the powerto choose (electio
)
- perbecausetheylackreason.Thiscritique,
Aristotle
however,
misrepresents
sincehis opinionwas actuallythatreasondevelopsas chilhapsdeliberately,
in theearlyyearsoftheir
drengrowolder- appetitebeingtheprimary
faculty
s Politicson thistenet.45
life.In fact,Vallaelsewhere
quotesAristotle
A secondconsequenceofVallasrejectionoftheplurality
ofsoulsconcerns
theontologicalstatusof plants.While animalsare- so to speak- upgraded,
theydo nothavea soul.Valladrawson theStoicsand
plantsaredowngraded;
for
Epicureans support,claimingtheytoo deniedthatplantshavean ensouled
His view
on thegroundsthatplantslackappetite,
souland reason.46
principle,
modwas notuncontroversial.
for
wrote
that
"certain
Later,Suarez, instance,
erns(so I am told) havedaredto denythatthevegetative
form,considered

43)Repastinatio
65.
, ed.Zippel,
44)Repastinatio
for
which
Avicenna
wasanimportant
67and409.Acommon
view,
,ed.Zippel,
wasthat
theseemingly
rational
behaviour
ofanimals
isduetotheestimative
source,
faculty;
Dag
intheLatin
The
Formation
Nikolaus
Avicennas
'Deanima*
West:
Hasse,
ofa Peripatetic
Philosophy
ideathat
tookupAvicennas
(London/Turin,
2000),127-53.
Aquinas
oftheSoul1160-1300
the
which
forinstance
enables
a sheep
toapprehend
animals
havea natural
estimative
faculty,
Animal
64
ofthewolf
Summa
Mindsi
I-I,q. 78,art.4.;cf.Sorabji,
(Aquinas,
theologiae
danger
Liber
PaulofVenice's
and75,86and113).Inthesource
apparatus
Zippel(67:21adloc.)cites
. . . agunt
exinstinctis
naturae
... etitanonproprie
deanima-,
solum
agunt
"apesetformicae
naturalis".
sedsolum
prudentiae
opera
prudentiae,
45)Politics
atRepastinatio
VII.15, 1334b22
asgiven
, ed.
(not1334al7-18
byZippel),
quoted
This
is
1214
be
or
62.
Cf.
Politics
1260a
1.13,
(reason
may completeincomplete). part
Zippel,
andothers
somepeople
never
reason
ofAristotle's
toPlatowhohadsaidthat
only
acquire
reply
late{Republic
SeeSorabji,
Animal
70.
Minds,
441A-B).
46)Repastinatio
60.
, ed.Zippel,

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, is a soul; and consequently

absolutely[praecise]
theydenythatplantsare
alive".47Valla is correctthat Stoics and Epicureansgenerallydenied an
"ensouled"principleto plants;48
thequestionofhow plantsliveifnotbythe
a
of
remains.
Valla'sargument
driveshimto thebrink
presence soul,however,
of concludingthattheyactuallydo not live,but therehe seemsto hesitate,
wouldcontradict
theordinary
perhapsbecausesucha statement
usageof the
word "live".Hence, if theymustbe said to live at all, it can onlybe said
(metaphorice
), justas we use "living"(vivus
) in othermeta"metaphorically"
such
as
water"
and
viva)
phoricalexpressions
"flowing
{aqua
"glowingsulvivum
References
to
in
as
the
bibleand in
).49
phur"{suphur
plants "living"
of
Gregorius Nyssa("theydo livebuttheydo notsense")makehimconclude
thatplantsmay be said to live not by havinga soul but by theirviriditas
liveliness
or powerto grow).If by viriditas
Vallameans
or,rather,
(greenness
thepowerto grow,as thequotationpurportedly
his
suggests, positionmaybe
said to comecloseto Aristotle's
afterall,who had assignedsoulsto plantson
accountoftheircapacityto feedand reproduce
theirorganicstructure.50
A thirdconsequenceof hisAugustinin
pictureconcernscognition.Since
he does notaccepttheviewthatobjectsacton thesenseswithefficient
causationto producecognition,
he cannotacceptan abstractionist
accountof any
kind.His Augustinin
picturewould entailthatthesoul,as an autonomous
is
universais
and ideas.And
substance, capableofdirectly
spiritual
perceiving
indeedthereis one notoriouspassagein whichhe seemsto accepttheAugustinindoctrineofdivineillumination.
It is howeveran isolatedpassage,and it
remainsunclearhowVallaenvisagedtheprocessofcognition.51
4. lhe Place ofValla'sCritiquewithinLate-Medievaland Renaissance
Philosophy
Valla'scritiqueoftheAristotelian-scholastic
scientiade animais characterized
a
return
to
an
of
the
soul as a whollyspiritualand
by
picture
Augustinin
immaterial
substancewhichwas made in the imageof God, consistingof
intellectand will. His basic convictionis thatthe soul is a much
memory,
47)Quoted
Form
, 25n.31,andcf.57n.10.
byDesChene,
Life's
48)Onancient
for
soulstoplants
seeSorabji,
Animal
97-104.
Minds,
argumentsdenying
49)Repastinatio
60.
, ed.Zippel,
50)Deanima
41Ob10-15,416a6-7.
51)SeeNauta,
"William
ofOckham
andLorenzo
Valla"
andidem,
InDefense
Sense
,
ofCommon
ch.2.

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[161] 383

morenoblethingthanthehylomorphic
accountofAristotle
implies,at least
thataccount.He stresses,
at variousplacesthe
as Vallaunderstands
therefore,
souls dignified
nature,itsimmortality,
unity,
autonomyand superior
position
vis--vis
thebodyand vis--vis
animalsoul,comparingit to thesuns central
placein thecosmos.52
He does notattempt,
to geta clearpictureofAristotle's
however,
position.
in thelaterrevisions
ofhiswork
He citesvariousworksofAristotle,
especially
worksmorethoroughly,
whenhe hasbecomeacquaintedwiththeAristotelian
We findquotationsfromDe anima, De
buthisuseofthemis highlyselective.
animaanimalium
, De partibusanimalium(called De membris
generatione
Ethicsand the Politics
.53He thinkstheAristotelian
theNicomachean
liurr),
accountdefendsa pluralityof souls,and thatAristotleholds a composite
ofa rationaland an irrational
natureofthesoulconsisting
part(herehe quotes
that
the
soul
is mortal,though
He
attacks
Aristotle
for
his
view
thePolitica).
of Aristotlefavourimmortality
he also notesthatotherstatements
(of the
which
Valla
a
rationalpart,whichstrongly
nature,
presupposes composite
of
a
has
Another
rather
tendentious
example
handling alreadybeen
rejects).54
thatAristotle
heldtheviewthatanimals
i.e. whereVallasuggests
mentioned,
andyoungchildren
lackthepowerto choose(electio
) becausetheylackreason.
s opinionwasclearlythatreasondevelopsas children
ButAristotle
growolder;
in
faculty theearlyyearsoftheirlife.EarlierVallahimappetiteis theprimary
his knowledgeof
s Politicswhichreflects
selfusesa quotationfromAristotle
in thiscase.
Aristotle's
trueintention,
butValladoesnotapplythatknowledge
to his polemicalaimsratherthanapplyinghis impresHe thusgivespriority
text.
to Aristotles
siveskillsin philology,
Greekand Latinscholarship
is at leastcited,thesamecannotbe said ofthescholastics.
WhileAristotle
evento mentionAlberttheGreat,ThomasAquinas,Williamof
Vallaneglects
in his
Ockham,JohnBuridan,AlbertofSaxonyor othermedievalscholastics
with
book,thoughthereis evidencewhichsuggestshe had somefamiliarity
He omitsdiscussionof thewealthof questionsthat
themand theirworks.55
52)Repastinatio,
ed.Zippel,
71.
53)I havenotyetfound
orthe
translation
translation
heused;itisnottheMoerbeke
outwhich
and
translations
oftheEthics
VallausedLeonardo
Brunis
ofMoerbeke
usedbyAquinas.
version
when
became
available
tohiminthe1440s.
Politics
they
54)Repastinatio
61-62.
, ed.Zippel,
55)Ina letter
AlberVallalists
somescholastic
authors:
"autillosdialcticos,
tohisfriend
Serra
and
Venetum"
tmutrunque,
, ed. O. Besomi
Occam,Paulum
Strodem,
(Valla,Epistole
thatVallawaswell
M. Regoliosi
(Padua,1984),20).Thislisttoodoesnotnecessarily
imply
a number
ofValla
inmyforthcoming
bookagainst
their
asI haveargued
with
works,
acquainted

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scholastic
authorsposedon thesoul,itspowers,and on theprocesses
ofcognitionand sensation,and posesno argument
the
of
the
souls
against panoply
Ifhe is acquaintedwithconceptssuchas sensibleand
faculties
and functions.
to be silent
species,intuitiveand abstractcognition,he prefers
intelligible
aboutthem.Thus,primarily
theprocessesofsensationand cogbyneglecting
them.
nition,he succeedsin simplifying
This simplification,
the notionof directperception,
has led
particularly
scholarsto likenVallas positionto Ockhamsrejectionof sensiblespeciesas
in theprocessofperceiving.
intermediaries
But,as I havenoted,Vallasdiscussiondoes notcontaintheterm"species"or "phantasms",
nordoes it mention
Ockhamsnotionsofintuitive
and abstract
cognition.Ockhammayhavesugas
Eleanore
that
for
intuitivecognition"thereare no
writes,
Stump
gested,
mechanisms
or processes.Thereis just directepistemiccontactbetweenthe
Directcognitioncannotbe explained,
cognizerand the thingcognized".56
becauseitis directand thusdefiesfurther
precisely
analysis.Suchassumptions
also
account
for
Vallas
omission.
it
is
But
nevertheless
to realise
may
important
unlike
he
does
not
seem
to
be
motivated
that,
Ockham,
by epistemological
considerations.
Vallaratheris concernedwiththeintramission
theoryofperception,whichhe feelswould jeopardizethe souls noble and autonomous
nature.Thatage-olddebateon intramission
versusextramission
is in factthe
directcontextofhis remarks,
and hisquestionaboutthedirectionofperception unrelatedto Ockhamstheory.Hence it incorrect
to claim,as Trinkaus
has done,thatValla "is undoubtedly
to
the
scholastic
controversy
referring"
about the existenceand natureof sensiblespecies.57
Valla would agreethat
thereis directcontactbetweencognizerand object,and that- insofaras it is
- itrequires
directand immediate
contact
no explanation.
However,hewould
notallow,as Ockhamdoes,thattherearetwosouls- a rationaland sensitive
one.Vallais quitefirmon thepointofone soul.ThusOckhamstheory
would
be as unacceptable
to Vallaas anyotherscholastictheory.
Vallas accountdoes containsome echoesof certainscholasticdebates
betweensouland itspowersand on theontological
namelyon therelationship
someofthem
sofartosaythat
theRepastinatio
makes
careful
useof
scholars,
going
"knowing,
scholastic
andmethods
ofargumentation"
orthat
"Valla
meant
toremake
terminology
seriously
scholastic
onitsownterms"
"Lorenzo
Valla:
A Symposium.
Intro(W.J.Connell,
metaphysics
duction5
the
',Journal
of History
ofIdeas57(1996),1-7,at5.
56)Eleanor
"TheMechanisms
ofCognition:
Ockham
onMediating
in The
Stump,
Species",
toOckham
, ed.P.V.Spade,(Cambridge/New
York,
1999),168-203,
Cambridge
Companion
184;cf.194-95.
57)Charles
"Lorenzo
Vallas
Anti-Aristotelian
Natural
301.
Trinkaus,
Philosophy",

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[163] 385

theseareveryfaint;it is doubtfulthathe did

statusof thesoul. Nevertheless
morethanleafthroughsome of thescholasticworks.As I havearguedelseofVallaas a rhetorical
follower
where,in spiteof thecommoninterpretation
in
of Ockham,no morethanthissameglancingknowledgeis present Vallas
entirecritiqueofAristotelian-scholastic
and dialectic.
metaphysic
But if one scarcelyengagesin criticaldiscussionof a paradigm,can one
it?Some modernhistorians
makemuchofVallas approachin his
transform
As mentionedin theintroduction,
theyargue
chapteron thenaturalworld.58
in naturalphilosophy
which
thelaterdevelopments
thatValla foreshadowed
not
necesto
scholasticism.
does
dismantle
however,
helped
(Foreshadowing,
and observation,
sitateinfluencing.)
Frequently
appealingto dailyexperience
He rejectsor qualifiesa
Vallas approachshowsa kindof naveempiricism.
- namely
tenetsof Aristotelian
naturalphilosophy
numberof fundamental
thatmovement
is thecauseofwarmth,thatone movementis alwayscaused
intoone another,
thateachelethatelementscan be transformed
byanother,
menthas itsown properqualities(fireis warmand dry,airwarmand moist,
etc.), thatpure elementsexist,and that the combinationof warmthand
of life.59
Vallas rejections
oftenhave
is sufficient
forthegeneration
humidity
the character
of a reductio
ad absurdum
; ifAristotle's
theoryweretrue,one
Forinstance,
wouldexpectquitedifferent
phenomenathanthoseoneobserves.
the
moon
claimed
of
a
below
Aristotles
for
the
existence
fiery
sphere
argument
Vallacountersthis
that"leadenmissilesshotout byforceliquefyin theair".60
In
never
see
balls- whether
we
to
common
life,
byappealing
experience. daily
a
or
a
cannon
heat
iron
or
stone
shot
out
of
leaden,
up in theair;even
sling
LaterGalileowoulduse a
oflaunchedarrowsdo notcatchfire.61
thefeathers
similarargument.62
However,does thiswarrantthe conclusionthatValla
or in earlymodern
ofRenaissancenaturalism
occupiesa placein thetradition
science?
Valla'sappealto thesensesratherhas a polemicalaimofshowingthatAristoteliannaturalphilosophymakes,as he believes,gratuitousassumptions
termsand
theboundaryofsenseand introduces
aboutthingswhichtranscend
pictureofthenatural
conceptswhicharefarremovedfromourdaily,ordinary

58)Repastinatio
n.6-9.
98-110.Seeabove
, ed.Zippel,
59)Cf.Mack,
onwhich
Vallacontradicts
a number
ofpoints
Renaissance
69,wholists
Argument,
In
Fordiscussion
seeNauta,
thescope
ofhisstudy.
falls
outside
butnatural
Aristotle,
philosophy
4.
Common
Sense
ch.
,
Defense
of
Decelo
II.7,289a26-28.
61)Repastinatio,
ed.Zippel,
98-99.
62)Trinkaus,
288n.15.
Anti-Aristotelian
Natural
"Lorenzo
Valla's
Philosophy",

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46 (2008)368-391

is notan invitation
to collectas muchdataas possible
world.His "empiricism"
and investigate
theworkings
ofnaturebutratherservesas a curbon speculaand pretensions
tion,as an antidoteagainstwhathe seesas thepresumptions
who aretoo inquisitive
of thephilosophers,
aboutGods artistry
(artificium).
ForValla it shouldbe enoughto knowthatGod madethestars,theheavens
in
and theelementsat thebeginning
of time:we willlearnabouthis artistry
thenextlife.God did notneedthespinningofthespheresin orderto create
theelementsand givethemtheirplace.He is notboundbytheprinciplethat
nothingcan ariseout of nothing,as is shownbythenatureoffire.ButValla
was smartenoughto use the Bible as sourceof positiveknowledgeabout
naturewhenit suitedhim:thebiblicalaccountof thecreationof man from
as evidenceagainsttheview
mud,whichis soil soakedin water,is presented
thatthehumanbodyconsistsofall thefourelements.63
To evaluateVallas relationship
withlaterRenaissancenaturalist
thinkers,
let us briefly
considerhis argumentthatanimalsalso havea rationalsoul.64
This argumentdoes not reston a consistendy
naturalist
approachtowards
menas partofthenaturalworld.Vallastilladheresto an Augustinin
account
ofthecreationofmanssoul,a reflection
of theTrinity.
As mentionedabove,
Vallarather
ascribes
to
animals
a
soul
createdbydivine
inconsistendy
similarly
aid. Moreover,
a theoryof cognitionis conspicuously
absentfromhiswork.
A theoryof cognition,
was ofcentralconcernto thescholastics
and
however,
to thoseearlymodernphilosophers,
suchas Telesioand Hobbes,advancing
towarda mechanistic-naturalist
philosophy.Hobbes reduced sense perin
to
local
motions
the
bodycausedbyexternalobjects.The underception
whichman
standingis thusnothingbut a specialformof the imagination
shareswithanimals.65
Telesiohad previously
that
the
intellect
is a conargued
tinuationof thesenses,and thatthedifference
betweenman and animalsis
thusofdegreeonly- "humanspiritbeingmorefineand copiousthanthatof
otheranimals".66
sinceValladoesnotpresent
Therefore,
anyseriousalternative
63)Repastinatio
100(spinning
ofspheres),
102(nature
offire),
98 (Godsartistry),
, ed.Zippel,
109(four
elements).
64)Theterm
"naturalism"
however
israther
andshould
beusedwith
forsome
caution;
vague
comments
seeBianchi,
intheAristotelian
andChange
68.
Tradition',
pertinent
"Continuity
65)Hobbes,
Leviathan
11.ForHobbesdebttoRenaissance
naturalistic
, ch.2,ed.Molesworth,
thinkers
seeCeesLeijenhorst,
The
Mechanisation
TheLateAristotelian
ofAristotelianism:
Setting
Thomas
Hobbes'
Natural
,
(Leiden,
2002).
of
Philosophy
^ Quoted
"Hobbes
andTelesio",
1 (1988),109-133,
Hobbes
Studies
116
byKarlSchuhmann,
from
s De rerum
Telesio
natura
iuxta
Telesio
between
anintellecpropria
principia.
distinguished
immortal
inmen)andanorganic
soul(only
soul(spiritus);
seeDanielP.Walker,
tive,
Spiritual

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[165] 387

forthescholasticand naturalist
accountsof sensationand cognition,it is by
no meansintuitive
thathe shouldbe regarded
as having"a placeas partofthe
internal
withinthedominantnaturalphilosophy"
ofhisownage.67
dissidence
Furthermore,
hardlyanyevidencesuggeststhatValla is on theroadto an
razionalistico
moderno".68
Vallawritesthatone and thesamesoul
"empirismo
wills.
This
is
reminiscent
ofDescartes,who stateslikewise
and
retains,
judges,
in theMeditations.69
But Descartescameto hisdualismbyanotherroad- by

thescholastictheoriesand notions.Moreover,
Vallasworkhas no
rethinking
or
for
his
for
Descartes'
clear
and
distinct
ideas
methodof doubt.
equivalent
Vallaand Descartesthusappropriated
ofthesoul
representations
Augustinin
in diversemanners.
We should,therefore,
resistthetemptation
to assessValla,an earlycriticof
in
terms
of
the
of
later
critics.
Vallawas notdevelopingan
Aristotle,
agendas
to Aristotelian
alternative
naturalphilosophy
, and hencedid not- as is often
or "a newmentalenvironment",
at
claimed contribute
to a "newmentality"
naturalist
and
leastinsofaras "mentality"
cultivated
mathematical,
empirical,
mechanist
strandsofthoughtin theRenaissance.
themes
Buteventhoughhisattitudeand positionon naturalphilosophical
naturalist
do
not
bear
structural
likeness
with
those
of
later
phiusually
any
which
losophers,yetit can be arguedthatValla gave ventto a sentiment
saw thatArisVallarightly
erodedfaithin theAristotelian
ultimately
system.
observations.
totle'sconclusionscould not be made to squarewitheveryday
of the faithin
withhindsight
we can see thatany undermining
Moreover,
to its
to itsdemiseand finally
scholastic-Aristotelian
worldviewcontributed
to this
mechanistic
one. Valla surelycontributed
bya different,
replacement
hermetic
Ficino
toCampanella
andDemonic
(London,
1958),190-194.
Against
Magic
from
Patrizi
thatanimals
havea rational
, dissoul;Novadeuniversis
Philosophia
teachings,
argues
andonThomas
Hobbes
onRenaissance
cussed
Selected
, eds.
byK. Schuhmann,
philosophy
papers
164.
P.Steenbakkers
andC. Leijenhorst
157-170,
2004),
(Dordrecht,
67)Trinkaus,
to
"Lorenzo
Valla's
Anti-Aristotelian
Natural
322,butheiscareful
Philosophy",
inpositive
terms"
hisownnatural
admit
that"itwouldbehardtooutline
(324);
philosophy
more
difItismuch
Valla"ispre-Copernican,
moreover,
(322-23).
pre-Galilean"
pre-Keplerian,
ofboth
ofAristotelian
doctrines
"aretheresult
ficult
toagree
with
Trinkaus
that
Valla's
criticisms
with
ofscholastic
with
natural
andhisknowledge
hisfamiliarity
teachings,
together
phenomena
hisconcentrated
about
them"
(325).
thinking
68)Fubini,
"Contributo
316.
perl'interpretazione",
69)Repastinatio
that
VI:"itisoneandthesamemind
Meditation
75.Cf.Descartes,
, ed.Zippel,
The
R.
andhassensory
willsandunderstands
Descartes,
Philosophical
Writing
of
perceptions";
2 vols.(Cambridge/New
R.StoothofF,
andD. Murdoch,
Descartes
York,
, transi.
J.Cottingham,
vol.II,59.
1984-85),

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necessary
preparatory
stageof doubtingtheAristotlesauthority.
Thoughhe
does notmentionValla,Menn'sjudgementon humanistanti-Aristotelianism
maybe appliedtoVallatoo: "thoughtheirfirst
stepstowardsa newphilosophy
werestumblingand may be comparedunfavourably
withthe accomplishmentsoflatescholasticism,
we mayseewithhindsight
thattheirbold experimentspreparedthe way forthe emergenceof mechanicalphilosophyand

science.70
In short,Vallascritiqueproveda necessary
of a domistepin dismantling
nantparadigm;ithelpedto undermine
faithinAristotle
and theAristotelianscholasticapproach.His rejections
areoftenbasedon linguistic
grounds,and
extendto philosophical
as wellas manyscholastic
speculationand theorizing,
and terms.While thisis typicalof a humanist,Vallas
entities,distinctions
critiquewentwell beyondthe usual diatribeon theiropponents'so-called
barbarous
and ungrammatical
Latin.Language,forValla,cannotbe abstracted
fromthelivingcontextin whichit functions
and fromwhichit derivesits
and
Words
and
should
not be takenout of conpower.
meaning
arguments
- consequently
for
so
alters
their
common
text, doing
normal,
meaning
giving rise to philosophicalproblemswherenone previouslyexisted.This,
whatthephilosopher
does. Philosophical
accordingto Valla,is precisely
spec- withits technicalabstruse,
ulation
and
esoteric
withits
vague
vocabulary,
rulesand conventionsof the Latin
tendencyto disregardthe grammatical
language soon takeson a lifeof its own. Leavingthe worldof common
farbehind,thephilosopher
whichcan only
experience
employsterminology
be handledand understood
other
by
philosophers.
Againstthis,Vallachampions the ordinaryconception(or "folk"conceptionas modernphilosophers
wouldsay)oftheworldand ofthewayitis reflected
in classicalLatin.He thus
takesissuewithwhathe considersthephilosophers'
ficta,theirabstractions
and theories,
whichtakeconceptsand termsout of theirordinary'
semantic
network.Hence,Valla'scritiqueof scholasticthoughtis essentially
a critique
oftheirlanguage,consciously
and deliberately
so. Thisimportant
insightcan
also be foundin manylaterphilosophers,
and is prominent,
forinstance,in
70)Menn,
"Intellectual
sense
then
Fubini
A related
47.Inthis
maybesaidtoberight.
Setting",
butbynomeans
identical
factor
inthedecline
ofAristotelianism
iswhat
hasbeencalled
"her- ofAristotle's
- orevenoverkill
meneutic
animmense
increase
ofknowledge
hypertrophy":
works
anditslate-antique
andmedieval
wellattested
ofedicommentators,
bya hugenumber
translations
andcommentaries.
Thisultimately
ledtoa watering
down
ofthecontours
of
tions,
whatwasoncea powerful
SeeL. Bianchi,
Studi
sull'Aristotelismo
delRinascimento
paradigm.
external
factors
ofnatural
were
also
(Padua,
2003),136.Ofcourse,
(e.g.discoveries
phenomena)
very
important.

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[167] 389

theworkofThomasHobbes. (But,one mayadd, scholasticpilosophers

were
thefirstto recognizethepotentialfallacieswhicharisefromtheirtechnical
terminology.)
theAristotelian
Thus,in fighting
paradigm,Valla oftenappealedto common senseand everyday
and observations.
Forhim,thewisdom
experiences
ofthecommonpeopletookpriority
overphilosophical
analyses.Philosophical analysisis doomedto failurebecauseitsaimsat refining
'folk'notionsby
and makingunwarranted
claims
speculativeargument,emptytheorising,
whichtranscend
theboundariesofsenseexperience
and commonsense.It is
notdifficult
to throwdoubton thelegitimacy
of thiscontrast.
The concerns
and questionsofphilosophers
aresimplydifferent,
and aim at theelucidation
and analysisofconcepts.Thus,forthosefollowing
theAristotelian
dialectical
and somedailyobsermethod,commonopinions,common-sense
intuitions,
vationsareimportant,
butonlyas a starting
reflecpointforrationalcriticism,
at a correct
accountofthe
tion,and generalization.
Bythisprocessone arrives
would retort,thatthislaterstageof rational
phenomenon.Valla,however,
criticism
and reflection
has degenerated
intoa languagegamewhichhardly
bearsanyrelationship
to theworldit allegedlyattempts
to analyse.One may
turnup ones nosein contempt
ofsuchconvictions,
butthisparticular
convictiondoesin factsurfaceat variouspointsin history
and undeniably
hasphilosophicalrelevance.
Vallasimportance
shouldnot,therefore,
be soughtat thelevelofargument;
his
with
frequently engagement
philosophicalenemiesor straw-men
pierced
littlemorethanskin-deep.Rather,his importance
lies in recognizing
thata
completechangeof paradigmwas required.This is farfromeasyto accomin hischapteron thesoul.Vallamay
plish,as hisworkbearsout- particularly
havethoughtthathisAugustinin
ofthesoulwas moresimple
representation
and truerto bothhumanexperience
and Christianfaith.Nevertheless
he is
unableto avoidmakinga numberofstatements
are
which,on closeranalysis,
not so simple,commonor straightforward.
Even "commonsense"is shot
- fortuthroughwith philosophicalassumptions,and thus it continues
nately to be the job of the philosopherto articulateand analysethese
and convictions.71
assumptions

71)I amgrateful
Zinnforstylistic
toPamela
suggestions.

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ofThomas
Hobbes'
Natural
2002).
(Leiden,
Philosophy
andDialectic
VallaandAgricola
intheTraditions
Mack,P.,Renaissance
Argument.
ofRhetoric
(Leiden,
1993).
inTheCambridge
Menn,
S.,"TheIntellectual
Philosophy,
Setting",
History
ofSeventeenth-Century
ed.D. Garbers
andM.Ayers
York,
1998),33-86.
(Cambridge/New
ofOckham
andLorenzo
Valla:FalseFriends.
Semantics
andOntological
Nauta,
L.,"William
Renaissance
56(2003),613-651.
Reduction",
Quarterly
41 (2003),120-143.
Valla's
ofAristotelian
Vivarium
, "Lorenzo
Critique
Psychology",
in TheCambridge
to
VallaandtheRiseofHumanist
, "Lorenzo
Dialectic",
Companion
Renaissance
ed.J.Hankins
York,
2007),193-210.
(Cambridge/New
Philosophy,
Sense.
Valla's
Humanist
Lorenzo
, In Defense
ofScholastic
Philosophy
ofCommon
Critique
March
Mass.,
2009).
(Cambridge,
inTheCambridge
"TheConcept
ofPsychology",
K.andE. Kessler,
Park,
History
ofRenaissance
E.
Skinner
and
Kessler
ed.
C.
York,1988),
,
Schmitt,
Q.
(Cambridge/New
Philosophy
455-463.
inAlbertus
andtheSciences
influence
onlatemedieval
,
Park,
K.,"Alberts
Magnus
psychology",
ed.J.A.Weisheipl
(Toronto,
1980),501-535.
in TheCambridge
, ed.C. Schmitt,
, "Theorganic
soul",
ofRenaissance
Philosophy
History
464-484.
andE. Kessler
York,
1988),
Q. Skinner
(Cambridge/New
digrammatica
Studi
delVallacomegrammatica'
antinormativa'",
M.,"LeElegantie
Regoliosi,
italiana
19(2000),315-336.
sullatino
umanistico
Rizzo,
S.,Ricerche
2002).
(Rome,
andthe
Debate
inthe
Renaissance
Humanist-Scholastic
Rummel,
E.,The
Reformation
(Cambridge,
1995).
C. B.,Aristotle
andtheRenaissance
Schmitt,
1983).
(Cambridge,
1 (1988),109-133.
Hobbes
Studies
andTelesio",
Schuhmann,
K.,"Hobbes
and
Hobbes
andonThomas
onRenaissance
, eds.P.Steenbakkers
, Selected
philosophy
papers
C. Leijenhorst
(Dordrecht,
2004),157-170.
debate
morals:
Theorigin
minds
andhuman
R.,Animal
1993).
(Ithaca,
oftheWestern
Sorabji,
inTheCambridge
Ockham
onMediating
ofCognition:
E.,"TheMechanisms
Species",
Stump,
toOckham
York,
, ed.P.V.Spade(Cambridge/New
1999),168-203.
Companion
una
umanistica
Storia
di
Tavoni,
M.,Latino,
(Padua,
1984).
volgare:
questione
grammatica,
FoundainRenaissance
Humanism:
Humanism
andScholastic
Trinkaus,
C.,"Italian
Theology",
Forms
andLegacy,
ed.A.Rabil,
3 vols.,
tions,
1988).
Jr.(Philadelphia,
inthe
RenaisI Tatti
Studies.
Anti-Aristotelian
Natural
Valla's
,"Lorenzo
Philosophy",
Essays
sance
5 (1993),279-325.
theTrinity",
The
ofSpeaking
about
VallaontheProblem
, "Lorenzo
Journal
oftheHistory
ofIdeas57(1996),27-53.
dell'Umanesimo
e la retorica
Vasoli,
C.,Ladialettica
(Milan,
1968).
Ficino
toCampanella
andDemonic
D. P.,Spiritimi
1958),(repr.
Walker,
(London,
from
Magic
Press
PA:Pennsylvania
State
Park,
2000).
University
University
ed.G.Zippel
inL.Valla,
dialectice
etphilosophie,
(Padua,
G.,"Introduzione",
Zippel,
Repastinatio
1982),ix-cxxxii.

15:40:06 PM

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

'
BRILL

Cardano's

Vivarium
46 (2008)392-417

Eclectic

Psychology and its Critique

by Julius Caesar Scaliger

Ian Maclean
AllSoulsCollege
, Oxford
Abstract
Thispaperexamines
thetheories
ofthesoulproposed
CardanoinhisDe
byGirolamo
immortalitele
animorum
CaesarScaliger
s
(1545)andhisDe subtilitate
(1550-4),Julius
of theseviewsin theExercitationes
exotericae
de subtilitate
comprehensive
critique
of 1557,andCardano's
to thiscritique
in hisActioin calumniatorem
of 1559.
reply
Cardanoargues
thatthepassive
isindividuated
intellect
andmortal,
andthattheagent
intellect
is immortal
butsubject
toconstant
indifferent
reincarnation
humanbeings.
His theory
ofcognition
leadshimto claimthatat itshighest
is
level,theintellect
converted
intotheobjectofitsperception.
In hisrefutation
ofthevarious
elements
ofCardano
s theories,
useshisknowledge
oftheGreektextofAristotle
to
Scaliger
stress
thereflexive
ofthesoul,itsability
to conceive
ofobjectsgreater
than
faculty
anditsstatusas theindividuating
ofthehylemorphic
humanbeing.
itself,
principle
In spiteofCardanospretention
tonovelty
andScaliger
s humanist
both
credentials,
thinkers
areshownto conducttheirdiscussions
in an inherited
scholastic
matrix
of
thought.
Keywords
Girolamo
CaesarScaliger,
Cardano,
soul,intellect,
Julius
cognition
ZweiSeelen
wohnen
ach!inmeiner
Brust,
Dieeinewillsichvonderandern
trennen;
Dieeinehlt,
inderber
Liebeslust,
SichandieWelt
mitklammernden
Organen;
Dieandere
hebt
sichvomDust
gewaltsam
ZudenGefilden
hoher
Ahnen.
Faust
(Goethe,
I)

Koninklijke
Brill
2008
NV,
Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/
156853408X360975

15:40:13 PM

/.Maclean
46 (2008)392-417
/Vivarium

[171] 393

1. Introduction
in thenatureofthesoul
lhe Renaissancewitnessed
a strongrevivalofinterest
The
and of mentalactivity
whichinvolvedboth theologyand philosophy.1
in
the
set
of
fifteenth
had
inherited
addressed
century
questions
Aquinass
anima
Summatheologiae
on Aristotle's
De
, and
, the medievalcommentaries
These
the investigation
of cognitionby Duns Scotus and the nominalists.
on
materials
wereenrichedbythenewlyavailablelateantiquecommentaries
of thesoul and
Aristotle
whichreactivated
thediscussionof theimmortality
oftheintellect;
theAverroistic
doctrineoftheunicity
and thesein turnrevived
to religion,
a numberofrelateddoctrines
subversive
notablytheclaimthatthe
doctrineof immortality
of thesoul was no morethana meansof enforcing
compliancewithhumanpoliticalinstitutions
throughthethreatof punishNiccolettoVerniaof Padua was thefirstscholarof
mentin thelifehereafter.
thelate fifteenth
to
century fallfoulof his local bishopin discussingthese
his
Pietro
and suggestedthat
issues; pupil
Pomponazziwentmuchfurther,
His De animaeimmort
Aristotle
had arguedforthesouls materiality.
alitate,
in
after
the
Fifth
Lateran
Councils
directives
three
1516
years
published
and the necessary
of philosophical
about thesouls immortality
consistency
and theologicaltruth,unleasheda stormof protestand becamethepointof
from
forlaterdiscussions.2
Theseincludedhumanistcommentaries
reference
Luis
theGreekof theDe animaand new monographs
Vives,
Philip
byJuan
and GirolamoCardano.3
Melanchthon,
Are therenew
A numberof questionsariseabout thesedevelopments.
the
ancients
into
the
of
the
texts
of
throughthereadingof
insights
meaning
Is a distinction
theGreek(a questionofhermeneutics)?
clearlydrawnbetween
!) SeeEckhard
inTheCambridge
ofpsychology"
Kessler
& Katharine
"Theconcept
Park,
history
Dennis
ed.C. B.Schmitt
& Q. Skinner
455-534;
1988),
(Cambridge,
philosophy,
ofRenaissance
Les
soul(Ithaca,
DesChene,
lateAristotelian
Vidal,
2000);Fernando
conceptions
ofthe
Life's
form:
del'me
: XVIe
-XVIIIe
sicle
sciences
2006).
(Paris,
2)Seetheworks
inIanMaclean
innote1,andtheliterature
cited
cited
Gratarolo,
"Pomponazzi,
andreligion
& I. Maclean
inHeterodoxy
inearly
modern
science
,ed.J.Brooke
Cardano",
(Oxford,
2006),10-31.
3)Juan
deanima
1538);Philip
Commentarius
etvita(Basle,
LuisVives,
Deanima
Melanchthon,
deanima
Liber
Melanchthon,
1552).Onthese
1540)andPhilip
recognitus
(Wittenberg,
(Lyon,
De immortalitate
del'me
twoworks,
seeVidal,Lessciences
Girolamo,
, 50-8.AlsoCardano,
references
to
I
shall
cite
the
M.
Garca
Valverde
animorum
ed.
(Milan,
2006).
(1545), J.
pages
Valverde
the
Garcia
inCardano,
omnia
ed.
C.
thistext
456-536;
,
1663),
(Lyon,
Spon
Opera
comApertinent
ofa humanist
asmarginalia.
edition
includes
references
tothese
example
pages
isFrancesco
diVimercate
1543.
mentary

15:40:13 PM

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)392-417

theinterpretation
ofAristotle
and thefreeconstruction
ofphilosophical
argument?In otherwords,is scholastic
Aristotelianism
stillthedominantmatrix
of thoughton theseissues?If newphilosophical
do
positionsareelaborated,
thesearisefroma new agendaof questionsor fromnew configurations
of
or fromboth?Is thereevidenceof a growingdesireforliberation
argument,
fromtheologicalconstraints
on philosophicalspeculation?
Or rather,
arewe
theories
of
the
nature
and
interaction
of
soul
and
merely
composite
witnessing
in theworkofAverroes,
bodywhoseelementshaveprecedents
Aquinasand
othermedievalmasters,
eveniftheseelementsaremotivated
bysubtlydifferentquestions,and informed
different
and princibyslighdy
presuppositions
The
excellent
section
on
Katharine
Park
and Eckhard
ples?
by
psychology
Kesslerin theCambridge
History
byitsnarofRenaissance
Philosophy
suggests
rativethatthereis a significant
evolutionin whichneoplatonism
andAlexanderofAphrodisias
s interpretation
ofAristotle
roles;Fernando
playsignificant
Vidals La science
de l'meon theotherhandlocatesthedecisivedevelopments
ofthenewsciencein theseventeenth
One
later,aftertheemergence
century.4
of
to
choose
between
these
is
close)positions by
way attempting
(admittedly
one ofthemostpublicand widelyconsulteddisagreements
on the
examining
GirolamoCardano,who
subject,thatbetweentwoself-promoting
polymaths:
claimsbothhermeneutical
and philosophical
and JuliusCaesarScalnovelty,
who
seems
to
be
as
a
neo-Aristotelian
for
a peripatetic
solution
iger,
arguing
thatis notin conflict
withtheChurch.Bothofthesewriters
eschewtheprecisionofargument
and thecloselogicaldevelopments
oftheirmedievalpredeto
cessors;theirdiscussionswill appearas a consequenceverybroad-brush
scholarsofAquinas,Duns Scotusand thosewho followin theirwake.
Throughouthis writingcareer,Cardano returned
again and again to the
of
the
his
most
sustained
discussion
is
in theDe immortalifound
soul;5
topic
4)Vidal,
Lessciences
del'me-,
Kessler
& Park,
"Theconcept
ofpsychology",
476:"wecansee
intheyears
1500a marked
around
ifgradual
inemphasis
shift
which
Renaisbeginning
gives
sance
ontheorganic
soulitsownflavour
andprepared
thewayfor
thedevelopments
that
writing
were
totransform
intheseventeenth
tothe
ibid.,
494,referring
radically
psychology
century";
ofhumanism
andneoplatonism
onlater
Renaissance
impact
psychology.
5)According
tothe1557edition
ofCardano
s De libris
, ed.I. Maclean
(Milan,
2004),
propriis
bookoftheunpublished
DeFato,
written
between
a chapter
contained
177),thefourth
1533-4,
entided
"deanimae
substantia"
aeternitatis
there
arechapters
onthe
; intheDearcanis
(1538-9),
soulanditsimmortality
totheContradicentia
medica
between
(ibid.,
188);theadditions
(written
thequestions
andetur.
Etanresurrectio
1550and1562)contain
mortuorum?"
and
"generatio
"intellectus
anexcerebri
of
vi.657-6l,
(seeCardano,
668);theDe natura
temperie?"
Opera,
contains
a chapter
onthesoul(ibid.,
bookfour
oftheTheonoston
1561
written
ii.283-98);
(first
between
oftheimmortality
ofthesoulindialogue
1555and1561)isa newaccount
form
(ibid.,

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)392-41
7

[173] 395

tateanimorum
of 1545. Thisworkis in parta responseto PomponazzisDe
immortalitate
animae(itevenhas thesamenumberofchapters),
and similarly
consistsin expositions
ofphilosophical
and
positions independent
argument.6
Fiveyearslater,Cardanos surveyof thewhole rangeof naturalphilosophy
entitledDe subtilitate
revisedin 1554)
appeared;book 14 (substantially
thequestionofthesoul and theintellect.
addresses
The De subtilitate
was not
if
writtenas a formalacademicexercise.It was aimedat a non-professional,
neither
as a commentary,
norbyquaestiones
Latinate,audience;itis structured
and dubia, butconsistsin a seriesoftopics(beginning
withthemostgeneral
issuesin naturalphilosophy)
whicharefurther
casualsort
analysedbya rather
of via divisiva
whichstructure
the textseemnot
> in whichthe distinctions
alwaysto be fullyworkedout.
by the confusionsand errorshe perceivedin
Scaligerwas so exacerbated
Cardanosworkthathe produceda comprehensive
of it entitled
refutation
Exotericae
exercitationes
whichappearedin 1557 and consistsin
de Subtilitate,
eacha dailyexercise).
These
365 numberedsections(presumably
representing
in sequence,and subjectthemto a savage
takepassagesfromtheDe Subtilitate
is thelongestoftheexercritique.The riposteto book 14 oftheDe Subtilitate
citationes
it
is
subdivided
into
sectionsamountingto
39
("practicepieces");
some 30,000 words.7Like theothers,Exercitatio
307 on the"animivireset
is describedbytheirauthoras "exoteric",
thatis,accessibleto nonnturm"
It attacksnotonlythetextoftheDe Subtilitate
butalso Cardanos
specialists.
earlierDe immortalitate
animorum(whichScaligerdescribesas a "confiisissima rhapsodia"),8
as well as recently
publishedmonographsby two other
JuanLuis Vivesand PhilipMelanchthon.9
contemporaries,
Scaligers readers
in1575-6
comment
isfound
intheDepropria
vita
thefinal
onthesubject
, written
ii.403-33);
scioesseimmortales,
modonscio."
(ibid.,
i.49):"nimos
6)SeeIanMaclean,
ofthesoul",
inCardano
e la tradizione
dei
"Cardano
ontheimmortality
M.
&
De
immortalitate
animoed.
Baldi
G.
Canziani
191-207;
Cardano,
,
(Milan,
2004),
saperi
much
ofPomponazzi
s work;
theearly
Defato
rum.
Cardano
seems
tohavesetouttorefute
onincantaattacks
swork
onthesametopic;
a section
oftheContradicentia
medica
Pomponazzi
theissues
De
tions(2.2.7)which
first
in 1548addresses
covered
byPomponazzis
appeared
incantationibus
vi.467-87).
(Opera,
7)Scaliger,
Exotericae
exercitationes
desubtilitate
Caesar,
(Frankfurt,
1592),307,916-97.
Julius
8)Scaliger,
987.
Exercitationes,
307.30,
9)Seeibid.,
ontheintellects
ofitself)
942(Vives
953
307.19,
307.2,918,307.13,
knowledge
onfaculty
on
the
of
the
of
the
955
307.20,
(Vives
(Vives
unprovabilityimmortality
psychology),
on theagentintellect
as the"autor
omnium
inventionum");
soul);307.953(Melanchthon
lasttwo
mistaken
ofendelechia
forentelechia).
Onthese
307.39933-7(Melanchtons
reading
thecaseofPhilip
Thetransformation
seeSachiko
Kusukawa,
questions,
ofnatural
philosophy:

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)392-417

arehoweverexpectedto be ableto understand

Greek,and to makesenseofthe
allusions
to
classical
and
medieval
in thetext;thediscussions
works
are
many
not howeverpresented
in strictsyllogistic
nor
do
to
comform,
theyaspire
however,Scaliger
pleteness.Behindthejauntinessand linguisticvirtuosity,
setsout to presenthimselfas orthodoxperipatetic
whose interpretation
of
Aristotle
is notat oddswiththatoftheChurch.10

2. Cardano,De immortalitate
animorum(1545)
As I havesuggested,
animopartofCardanos projectin theDe immortalitate
rumwastherefutation
ofPomponazziin hisinterpretation
ofAristotle,
as well
as thedemonstrative
of
the
mind
s
its
other
proof
immortality;
explicitclaim
is thatitusestheGreekmedicalcanon(principally
Hippocratesand Galen)to
theancientand medievaltextson thesoul and themind.As the
supplement
earliestmedievalsynthetic
accountsof the soul had takeninto accountthe
of
both
Avicenna
and
whoalso usedGreekmedicalsources,
Averroes,
writings
notall ofCardanos materialis new;buttherearereferences
to textsunknown
to the medievais,notablyGalens Quod animi morestemperamenta
corporis
and De placitisHippocratis
etPiatonis
.n Thisdoes notstopScaliger
sequantur
fromaccusingCardanoofAverroism
in
(an accusationlevelledagainsthimself
turnbyothers).12
Much ofthetextofCardanos De animorum
immortalitate
is takenup with
revisionist
of
Aristotelian
and
other
ancient
texts,whichis
interpretations
done both to discreditpreviouswriterson the topic and to lay bare their
Melanchthon
"Between
theDe animaand
Kusukawa,
1995),90-1,andSachiko
(Cambridge,
- a prolegomenon
dialectics
to Philippo-Ramism",
inSapientiam
amemus:
Humanismus
und
Aristotelismus
inderRenaissance,
ed.P.R.Blum(Munich,
1998),127-39,
131.
10)Scaliger,
Exercitationes
ex principiis
, 307.29,985 ("declaravimus
307.20,
Philosophi");
hisclaim
tobeorthodox:
seePaganinus
957-9.Butothers
Depythagoraea
Gaudentius,
dispute
animarum
Accedunt
Caesaris
exercitationes
[ . .] deAperipato
transmigration
opusculum,
Scaligeri
Kristin
Rhetorical
andphilosophical
(Pisa,1641),200,quoted
Jensen,
by
philosophy
grammar:
Caesar
Julius
(Munich,
1990),47.
Scaligeri
theory
oflanguage
n) Cardano,
Seealso
, ii.460,464,465-7,
475-6(Hippocrates).
474,512,514(Galen);
Opera
Manuel
Garcia
"ElGalenismo
critico
deGirolamo
Cardano:
anlisis
delapresenValverde,
Jos
' Asclepio
ciadeGaleno
enelDe immortalitate
animorum
, 69(2007).
12)Scaliger,
Exercitationes
tuisdeanima
Avenrois
, 307.14,942:"tuinlibris
sequutus
atqueeo
Themistii
fecisti
animam
mortalem."
Fortheclaim
that
isanAverrvaesaniam,
prioris
Scaliger
seeJohannes
Crato
vonKrafltheim,
Consilia
etepistolae,
ed.L.Scholzius,
oist,
5vols.(Frankfurt,
suum
V.312:
Averroem."
1591-4),
sequitur magistrm
"[Scaliger]

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[175] 397

a novel
and arguments;
but Cardanowantedalso to put forward
premisses
novel
is
viewofhisown.Whetherthisconstitutes
entirely
open to
something
of
since
all
the
elements
Cardano's
nearly
question,
compositetheoryhave
in theworkofAlbert,Aquinas,Averroes,
and thehumanistcomprecedents
in each casearises
he cites.The difficulty
ofdetermining
influence
mentators
and therelationbecausetheelementsof thetheoryofsoul-bodyinteraction
questions,and
shipof thepartsof thesoul aremotivatedbysubtlydifferent
In thesearchfora yardinformed
and principles.
bydifferent
presuppositions
stick,a helpfultextis theThomistDominicusde Flandriasmanualentitled
etannotationes
in treslibros[Aristotelis]
de anima, whichindicates
Quaestiones
whatan agreedsetofquaestiones
and dubiamightbe around1500 (it continthesixteenth
cenued to be publishedin Italyat regularintervals
throughout
the
of
is
close
to
Its
doctrines
very
tury).13 summary agreed
positionadopted
as Scaligerwas to pointout.14
byCardano,forall hisclaimsto novelty,
to his workas "de animi immortali
Cardano alwaysreferred
tate",even
of
the
with
a
title:
the
choice
his
work
different
appeared
singular
though
as we shallsee.
and theavoidanceoftheword"anima"is significant,
"animus",
A distinction
wasgenerally
madebetweentheorganicsoul("psyche",
"anima"),
weredefined
thatis,theprincipleoflifein virtueofwhichanimatecreatures
as animate,and the rationalsoul, or intellect,or mind ("nous","animus",
13)I citeheretheresolutions
in
S Thomae
ofvarious
locibyDominicus
deFlandria,
Aquinatis
scilicum
textus
translatione:
tres
libros
Aristotelis
deanima
expositio
duplici
antique,
praeclarissima
Dominici
deFlandria
adhaecacutissime
etnova
cet,
[ . .] accedunt
Maistri
Aegyropyli
questiones
willbevery
closetotheresolutions
offered
which
[...] (Venice,
1510),211-13,
byCardano:
non
sedintellectus
estseparatus
"Sensitivm
nonessesinecorpore
[.. .] Intellectus
possibilem
nisi
.
enim
non
est
unum
cum
Intellectus
essea corpore
.]
[.
intelligibili,
separatum
possibilis
intellectus
nonestforma
estinactu[.. .] Species
secundum
intelligibilis
quodintellectus
igitur
est,etnonsubstantia
[.. .] Nonsolum
[.. .] Intellectus
separata
parsanimae
possibilis
possibilis
universale
et
tuncpotest
alia,sedetiam
[.. .] Intellectus
seipsum
intelligere
potest
intelligere
sive
et
alio
modo
enim
naturam
sed
alio
est,
speciei, quodquid
particulate
Cognoscit
cognoscit,
redit
extendendo
autem
directe
reflexionem,
inquantum
perquandam
seipsum,
ipsum
singulare
:
abstrahuntur
a quibus
entries]
[.. .]"; ibid,*6r[index
super
phantasmata,
species
intelligibiles
estpotentia
Nonestsubstantia
"Intellectus
separata;
intelliguntur
passiva;
Singularia
possibilis
nonestillud,
sedquointelligitur;
nondirecte
sedreflexive;
quodintelligitur,
Species
intelligibilis
Intellectio
nonpersuamessentiam,
sedperspeciem
seipsum;
intelligit
possibilis,
intelligibilem,
abanima,
sedestaliquid
Intellectus
nonseparatur
Intellectus
estsicut
eius;
habitus;
agens
agens
etincorruptibilis;
Intellectus
Intellectus
agensan estunusin omnibus;
agensestperpetuus
wereeditions
ofthistextin 1503,
There
Intellectus
Nequit
absquephantasmata
intelligere."
1518,1533,1549,1560,1565,1570,1587and1597.
14)Exercitationes
nihil
enim
aliussunt,
989: "[tuicommentarii]
,307.31,
praecepquamfarrago
Domini
meorum
deFlandria."
torum
Suessani,
Pomponatii,

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Cardano'susage
"animaintellectiva",
"mens","animarationalis",
"intellectus").
in his textis fairlyconsistent.
The title"De animorumimmortalitate"
had
Plotinus
and
beenusedbyMarsilioFicinoin thefifteenth
century,
following
to
Augustine.It was adoptedby PierNiccol Castellaniforhis tractwritten
refutePomponazziof 1524. Cardanos publisher,SebastianusGryphiusof
Lyon,had publishednineyearsbeforeCardanos worka poembyAoniusPalIt seemsplausibletherefore
thatthe publisher
eariuswiththe same title.15
withoutconsultation,
perhapsto
simplyimposedthetitleon themanuscript
stresstheorthodoxy
ofthecontents.
It is verydifficult
to summarizeCardanosown position.His mostrecent
editor,JosManuel GarciaValverde,believesthatthe"Gordianknot"of the
ofAristotle
s
book is to be foundin chapter11, whichis Cardanos statement
on
the
which
he
to
those
of
Plato.
He
sets
to
out
prefers
subject,
arguments
ofAlexander,
Averroes
showagainsttheinterpretation
and Pomponazzithat
thatthedisemis immortal,
Aristotle
arguesthatthesoul qua agentintellect
bodiedagentintellect
iswithoutsensationormemory,
and hencethatitis not
in theafterlife
in
fortheactionsit instigated
apt to be punishedor rewarded
thisworld.16
Thisplacesgreater
on Cardanosre-interpretation
of
importance
Such a view
the Stagyrite
than on the elaborationof his own arguments.
in orderto recover
accordswiththehumanist
to return
"adfontes"
programme
the pure doctrineof the ancients;in manycases,thishad the unintended
effect
ofdistracting
scholarsfromresin favourofverba.A hermeneutic
project
ofthiskindis at variancewithCardanos own claimshowever.
He sedulously
devotesseparatesectionsto thedoctrinesof pastphilosophers
("sententiae")
and theirrationalfoundations("rationes").Accordingto him, one of the
lies in theconfusionof hermemajorcausesof erroramongrecentthinkers
neuticsand truephilosophy;his contemporaries
are accusedby him of not
the
two
what
did
thephilosopher
meanby
distinguishing following questions:
15)SeeIanMaclean,
ontheimmortality
ofthesoul",
De immortali"Cardano
192-3;
Cardano,
11In.
tate
animorum^
16)Ibid.,
ofthepunishment
ofsoulsintheafterlife
hastwodistinct
26-7.Thedoctrine
applications:
islinked
tothepresupposition
thatreligions
havepurely
thefirst
human
purely
origins
ofpunishment
isoneoffour
suchexplanations,
theothers
the
evhemerism,
(thedoctrine
being
divinsation
ofnatural
andthefear
thesecond
islinked
to
forces,
events);
provoked
bycelestial
in
will
thepresupposition
ofthedivine
of
and
the
manner
which
God
dispense
origin religion,
intheafterlife.
Pietro
De immortalitate
animae
, ed.G. Morra
justice
Pomponazzi,
(Bologna,
dwells
more
onthefirst;
Cardano
refers
toboth:
seeOpera,
471("plurima
ii.460,
1954),200-8,
in reipublicae
inconvenientia
necessarie
administratione
nonsupsequi[...] immortalitate
503.
488,
posta")

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/Vivarium

[177] 399

hiswords?And is it clearlythecase in thelightofnaturalreason?17

He is not
as
therefore
ancient
texts
authorities,
treating
straightforwardly
althoughhe is
in
to
cite
them
when
are
with
his
own
views.
they
happy
agreement
Cardanos own readingof Aristotle(whichsharplyopposesthatof Pomponazzi,eventhough,as GarciaValverdeand Scaligerpointout,he borrows
to
deniesimmortality
muchfromhim)18leadshimto stressthattheStagyrite
the passiveintellect{De anima, iii.5, 430a 23-5) and concedesit only to
whichis individuatedand not the unique intellectof Averagentintellect,
roes.19
The choiceofan Aristotelian
framework
entailstheacceptance,at least
of theworldand
as a hypothesis,
of the(heterodox)doctrineof theeternity
theequallyheterodoxprinciple"exnihilonihilfit".A consequenceofthisin
numintellects
ofan infinite
wouldbe thegeneration
respectofindividuated
in
berof them,whereasAristotleclearlydeniestheexistenceof anyinfinity
that
be
a
finite
It
follows
therefore
there
must
act CPhysics
, iii.5, 204a 20).
in individualhuman
reincarnated
numberofagentintellects
beingconstantly
bodies.
Cardanospreferred
position(whichhe claimsto havealreadysetout in a
work)20
probablyalso appearsin a sectionentitledthe
previousunpublished
cerimmortalitate
secundumnaturaliter
de
animi
loquentes";21
"Digressio
In
be
stated.
own
views
to
that
is
where
assumes
Cardanos
tainly
Scaliger
in
with
the
of
and
accordance
directcontradiction Pomponazzi,
injunctionof
ofthe
theLateranCouncilof 15 13,Cardanosetsoutto provetheimmortality
and assertsthattheviewofthesoulheldbytheosoulfromnaturalreasoning,
and
viewis perfect
is thesame,eveniftheformers'
logiansand philosophers
thattheend ofmanis seento be the
he aversmoreover
thelatters'imperfect;
17)Opera
haecduoquaesita,
erroris
confuderunt,
fuit,
, ii.492:"Causatanti
quod[Philosophi]
ofRobinG.
Readers
estmanifestum?"
naturali
Qui ex ratione
Philosophus?
quidsenserit
ofhis
here
anantecedent
willrecognize
Anautobiography
(Oxford,
1939),29-43,
Collingwood,
of
his
claims
about
theOxford
philosophy youth.
18)Seeabove
note14.
19)Opera,
nihilintelsinepatiente
intellectum
ii.520:"Triaproponit
Philosophus:
agentem
intelintellectum
actum
sehabere;
eodem
modoadipsum
ligere;
intelligendi
agentem
semper
lectum
haec
omnia
ideo
non
obnoxium,
patientem
corruptioni
atque
atque
semper
intelligere,
intra
metam."
parvi
spatii
20)TheDearcanis
aeternitatis:
seeabove,
note5.
21)Thetitle
docta
etarguta
toGianfrancesco
Deanimae
immortalitate
refer
dellaMirndolas
may
in
of
which
had
a
reference
to
the
Albertine
doctrine
there
also
be
1541;
appeared
may
digression
andthe
"denaturalibus
onwhich
seeWeisheipl,
A. (ed.),Albertus
naturaliter",
James
Magnus
sciences:
commemorative
, ii.530(on"naturale
1980).SeealsoCardano,
(Toronto,
Opera
essays
lumen").

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In thischapterit is allegedthatour "mens"(or

same in both disciplines.22
or "animus"),whichas an immaterial
"intellectus"
entityis not educedfrom
materialsemen(as Alexanderhad alleged)buthas a divineorigin;23
thatit is
thatthe"animus"is a sortofeternal
nota substance,
buta power("virtus");24
and impassive
fromone source,distributed
light,flowing
amongthebodiesof
theirbodies,as lightcan penindividualmen;and thatit is able to penetrate
etratewater,butnotthebodiesofanimals.Thedifferences
betweenthehuman
intellect
and thesoulsofanimalsconfirm
the
reason
is
this;
whytheintellect
not alwaysactive,and whyit is diversein its powerin different
men,and
absentfrombeastsaltogether,
is theinterference
ofmatter(whichis compared
to cloudswhichobscurethesun).25The incorporated
mindis a complexofthe
the
"total
i.e. thecombinationof
intellect
contains
substance":
(which
agent
thelightand the "simulachra"),
thematerialintellect(thelightitself)26
and
the patientintellect(whichreceivesthe "simulachrarerum");the lightis
in reason,imaginationand memory.The intellectcan governthe
reflected
will.It is in a certainsenseinfinite,
becauseitcanconceiveofall things,
includand eternity.27
The animalspirits,
as therarestcorporealmatter,
inginfinites
22)Opera
atreligionis
naturae
deanima
ferme
sententia
, ii.529:"unaigitur
est,
Philosophorum,
differens
solum
velut
a perfecto:
a pietura";
De
velut
imperfectum
puera viro;sicdelineatio
immortalitate
etPhilosophos
hominis
secundum
animorum,
1545,
Lyon,
p.316:"finis
Theologis
etqualis
sit."
unus,
23)Ibid.,.485F.
OnAlexanders
viewoftheorigin
ofthesoulinmatter,
seeKessler
andPark,
ofpsychology",
Lessciences
"Theconcept
del'me
502.SeealsoVidal,
, 62-5;GuidoCanziani
lapalingenesi.
lamens,
sulterzo
libro
delTheonostor
e la tradi"L'anima,
, inCardano
Appunti
deisaperi
thelater
zione
of
Cardano
onthis
209-48(for
, ed.M. Baldi& G.Canziani,
thoughts
subject).
24)Cardano
touches
twice
ontheimage
drawn
from
Deanima
, ii.1 (413a7-8)ofthesoulasthe
sailor
ina ship;Opera
and497:"Itaque
hocargumento
namaliudfortius
ad
, ii.475,
(nifallor,
hocdemonstrandum
invenire
nonqueo)adductus
estGalenus,
utfateretur,
velhominem
eundempermanere
nonposse,
autanimam
naviuti,undeinv
corpore
ipsononsecusacnautam
subtitulo
iurisconsulti
deIudiciis,
Hominem
sanxit,
Alphenus,
digestom
legeproponebatur:
secundum
omnem
velut
etsenatum,
suctransmutetur,
quamvis
tempore
partem
quiperpetuo
cessu
etiam
scula
eandem
dicidebere."
reparatur,
postaliquot
25)Scaliger
would
nothavedisgreed
with
this:
seehisHippocratis
liber
desomnis
cumcommentariis
instrumentis
nonlaedianimam
laesis
sedimpediri."
1539),14:"[corporis]
(Lyon,
26)ThisdoesnotseemtobeAverroes
s version
ofthematerial
intellect:
seeScaliger,
Exercitathematerial
intellect
tobesynonymous
seems
with
thepassive
inteltionesy
307.19,
954,where
when
combined
with
theagent
itbecomes
theadept
intellect
lect;
intellect,
(seeThomas
Aquinas,
Summa
la 79,10).Scaliger
liststhefunctions
ofthematerial
intellect
as "facultas
theologiae,
dividendi,
componendi,
separandi,
colligendi."
27)Opera
infinitus
est
, ii.496:"intellectus
est",ibid.,500: "considerandum
quoddammodo

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I Maclean

[179] 40 1

orthodoxGalenic
ensuretheinteraction
ofmindand body(thisis a perfectly
finitein
s singleintellect,
Cardanos is individuated,
view). UnlikeAverroes
numberand separable;on the deathof one individual,each agentintellect
whathe is
to another.Cardanoslipsbackhereintoattributing
transmigrates
to
to
avoid
accusation
of
Aristotle,
heterodoxy.28
perhaps
any
claiming
lhe virtueofthisview,in Cardanos mind,is thattheanimawhichhe recognizesas theformofthebody,canbe leftto carrywithitthepatientintellect,
theimagination
and thememory.
The lattertwohaveproblematic
corporeal
whichis
linksand locations,and carrythestoreofmemoriesand impressions
a
would
not
have
to
each
disembodied
intellect
mortem
individual;
unique
post
accessto them.ScaligeraccusesCardanotherefore
of adoptingtheAverroist
The innovative
and Themistianview thatthe soul qua "anima"is mortal.29
natureof Cardanos viewcan also be gaugedfromthestatement
byhispredecessorGaetano da Thienethatthe intellective
soul is eitherindividualor
oftheThomistclaimthatthe
immortal
butnotboth,and byitscontradiction
and reader
soulhasa memory.30
Cardanospeakshereas a naturalphilosopher
ofAristotle
and claimsthathis viewis consistent
withthatof a theologian,
exceptin respectof theknowledgeof singulars(a pointwithwhichScaliger
as we shallsee). It is verydifficult
to see howsucha doctrinecould
disagrees,
withscholasticChristianity,
be said to be consistent
unlessCardanobelieves
in it
thatat theresurrection
ofthebody,thepassiveintellect
withreconstitute
all ofitsstoreofmemories
and sensations,
and itsrecordofdecisionsmadeby
itswillforwhichit can be held to accountand dulypunishedor rewarded.
Thismaybe implied,butit is notexplicitly
stated.31
hancnostram
non
animam
infiniti
aeternum
etiam,
undequaque
prodere,
tempus
argumenta
acnumerum."
solum
sedimaginamur,
infinitam,
intelligimus,
maginitudinem
quoque
28)Ibid.,529:"eque
verum
unum
omnibus
conveniebat
sednumero
certo
esse,necinfinitos,
autexunoprodire
omnes
innumerabiles
etrevertentes"
constitutos,
existentes,
[.. .] "peripatetici
etaeternam,
ferme
etquaeratioipsanosdocet,
mentem
esselucem
concordant,
quandam,
in
etimpatibilem,
etabunoprincipio
et
illorum
numero
distrinostra,
proficiscentem
corpora
inaliacorpora
buam
: exquibus
etiam
eadem
mens
revertatur."
confiteri,
cogimur
quoddenuo
Cf.thefollowing
from
thethird
bookoftheTheonoston
, ii.433):"Aristotelem
(Opera
passage
in
.
:
non
definitae
adhaesisse
scilicet
ut
animae
sed
certo
numero
commisceantur,
[. .] opinioni
non
:
tarnen
diversa
suis
ut
sint
idem
homines
descendant,
prorsus
corpora temporibus
eque
obidquenecpriores
necposteriores
dicipossunt."
sedplusquam
diversi,
iunxit,
aliis,
specie
29)Seeabove,
note12.
30)SeeKessler
inSumma
la
& Park,
"Theconcept
ofpsychology",
486.Aquinas
says
theologiae
intheseparated
remains
soul.
77,8that
memory
31)Opera
inlucisexemplo
"concordant
etreligio
, ii.529-30:
nostra]
[i.e.John
1:9],
[philosophi
in
inoriginis
inimmortalitate,
incognitione
divinitate,
beata,
novit,
quaecuncta
postmortem

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leadshimto commentat length

Cardanos discussionoftheagentintellect
on cognition.Accordingto him,thereareeightdegreesof an objectsbeing,
of the"resipsa",followedbythe"resin
thefirstbeingthematerialexistence
medio",the "res"separatedfromits materialbeing "in sensu",the "resin
and ending
the"resin ratione",the"resin patienteintellectu"
imaginativa",
For
the
"res"
to
reach
this
last
withthe "resin intellectu
state,its
agente".32
intellect
Alexander
and
be
willed
the
(which
Pomponby agent
presencemust
described
as no morethantheaction
azzi,accordingto Cardano,hadwrongly
of the intellect);33
thiscreatesproblemsabout perpetualagency,about the
which
and abouttheirseparability
of
relationship patientand agentintellect,
I shallpass overhere.34
At thishighestlevel,theagentintellectis converted
but not in
into the objectof itsperception(whichis a speciesintelligibility
but in form,whichcan be
substance(as theagentintellectis immaterial),35
is thuscapaThe "animaintellectiva"
outsidetimeand placein a certainway.36
ble of assumingall forms(whichhere are immaterialand incorruptible),
is a proofofitsimmortaland thispossibility
includingtheformofinfinites;
in
is
Cardano
to
The
of
this
provethattherecan be
ity.37 purpose
argument
in twodifferent
thesamethoughts
men,situatedin a certainway
incorporated

abobitu
eandam
animam
namreviviscere
videtur
resurrectionis
quodcunque
quodam,
genere
non
nisi
merito
tarnen:
autem
retinet:
etquamvis
nonmeminerint,
corpopatiuntur
intelligunt
hocest,inquoa lege
existimabant:
risannexi:
hocautem
haeretici
Fraeticelli
itaque
parvum
etpostmortem
reminisciEtautem
idtale,
namsingularia
nostra
dissident.
intellectus,
agnoscit
finem
non
intellectu
etinitium
noninaliudcorpus
etvere
habet,
transeunte,
homo,
tur,
resurgit
et
etiam
nondum
adiunctus."
habiturus,
patitur
corpori
32)Ibid.,ii.508-9;inthe1554edition
iii.585),thelastfive
ofthis
oftheDesubtilitate
(ibid.,
ordins
sensus":
"exterior
haveapparently
beentranslated
into"septem
phantasia,
sequence
etuniversale
universalis,
iunctio,
memoria,
ipsum
quod
compraehensio
generalis,
propositio
inthethird
bookofTheonAlater
ofthesequence
istobefound
est."
version
mentis
proprium
which
include
false
andimaginary
ii.417),discussing
the"ximodicognoscendi",
oston
(ibid.,
perception.
33)Ibid.,ii.520,
526.
34)Ibid.,ii.482,
489,499,519,498.
35)Ibid.,ii.501:"recipiens
inthistext
with
thisisnotlinked
estdenudatimi
a natura
recepti":
onwhich
admodum
theother
madeclaim
recipientis
recipitur",
"quicquid
recipitur
frequendy
inthelateRenaissance",
inPhilosointhemind:
reflexive
seeIanMaclean,
thinking
"Language
&
conversations
with
Aristotle
andseventeenth
centuries:
, ed.C. Blackwell
phyinthesixteenth
incalumniatorem
S. Kusukawa
313.SeealsoActio
iii.708,
, ibid.,
(Aldershot,
1999),296-321,
ofpotency
totheintellect).
andactinrelation
andii.524,
526,531(onproblems
36)Ibid.,ii.509,
520.
37)Ibid.,ii.500;De natura
ii.297.
, ibid.,

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7

[181] 403

in timeand space;in thissensethereis a unityofintellect

betweenall men.38
in the
Thisphilosophical
is
with
some
defended
and
subtlety
position
vigour
De immortalitate
animorum
.

3. Cardano,De subtilitate(1550, 1554)

The approachCardanoadoptsin theDe subtilitate
aboutsevenyears
, written
and is partlydictatedbythethemeofthebook,which
later,is quitedifferent,
is to celebratesubtlety,
definedas "certainformalrelationship
("ratio")in virtue of whichsensoryobjectsare graspedwithdifficulty
by the senses,and,
in book 14
the
intellect":39
that
is
he
by
intelligibles
probablywhy digresses
anima
et
from
to
discuss
the
that
the
mind
derives
("de
intellectu")
pleasure
rarethings.He beginstherewitha surveyofthefaculties
ofthemind,which
fallintotwoparts:"[mens]connexa"(consisting
ofreason,memory
and imagand
A
and
sixth
is
mentioned:
ination)
(intellect will).
"separabilis"
faculty
thatbywhichthemindknowssensiblesin respectof themselves,
but also of
eachother.Therearesaidto be twoappetites,
one withoutsense(i.e. immaterial)whichresidesin thewill,and thematerialappetitewhichis constituted
animae".Fouryearslater,thesixthfaculty
is subdividedinto
bythe"affectus
theninepartsof the "animasensfera"
(to whichmemoryand imagination
havebeenannexed);a longdigression
is addedaboutthementalcapacitiesof
animals;thepartsofthemindhavebecomefourfromtwo,namely"iunctio,
et voluntas".40
Cardanonextconcentrates
on theratioiudicium,intellectus,
nal soul in respectof truthand falsity(includingfiction),and discussesthe
pleasuresof reading,and the dutiesof responsible"sapientes"in respectof
38)Ibid.,ii. 506:"unitatem
certe
si de natura,
etessentia
illis
intellectus,
loquimur,
origine,
ofAverroes]
concedimus:
namnonplushomines
inter
sedifferunt,
[supporters
quamequi,vel
canes:
etiam
videtur
unaomnium
omnes
indita
abineunte
aetate
eadem
habent
quoniam
origo,
ethirundinibus
velut
nidum
construendi
ratio
omnibus
eadem.
Atvero
siperintellecprincipia,
tumpotentia
dicitur
nospatientem
a natura,
etreiproprietate
apudaliquos,
quamquam
potius
inomnibus
utiamdiximus,
eundem
essefatemur
hominibus:
hunc,
[.. .] namres
appellemus,
unaest,atqueiisdem
mediis
intellecta".
ButCardano
to
scita,
atque
cognita
goesontolinkthis
thegrowth
ofknowledge:
"sedhaecscientia
estaccidens
suinatura
quoddam
perpetuum,
atque
sicunum,
insingulis
utautem
hominibus
necperpetua,
incremencumindiesaccipiat
diversa,
tum:namquodexillaposthaecnosinvenimus
nemointellexit".
On "consuetudo"
andthe
of
the
see
ii.
509-10.
swallow,
ibid.,
example
39)Ibid.,iii.359
: "ratio
a sensibus,
abintellectu,
difficile
quaedam,
quasensibilia
intelligibilia
compraehenduntur."
40)Girolamo
Desubtilitate
iii.582.
Cardano,
(Paris,
1550),244-5;Opera,

15:40:13 PM

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/.Maclean
/Vivarium
46 (2008)392-417

In 1554,thisis supplemented
witha longpassageaboutspeakinterpretation.
and
with
a
of
the
criteria
of knowledge(apparently
description
writing,
ing
thestoictrioofaisthesis
which
and
Melanchthonalso citesat
,prolepsis
,
gnosis
and ofanimalspirits.41
Therefolaboutthistime),ofspeciesand perception,
lows an enumeration
of the passionsof the soul and theirrelationto the
the
humoursof the bodyand an accountof theseparationof the intellect,
of
the
intellect
to
its
and
artificial
Cardano
intermemory:
object,
relationship
to the souls reflexive
The
poses herea briefreference
knowledgeof itself.42
the
of
contain
his
claims
about
nature
following
strongest
cognition,
passages
whichprovokeScaligers mostdetailedcritiques:
I understand
when
a horse,
Theintellect
isthething
itself
which
isunderstood,
suchthat
toprimary
matter.
istheform
Itistherefore
a general
andsimilar
ofa horse.
form,
mymind
itiscarried
Ontheother
itisthewillwhen
anditistherefore
to
hand,
outside,
posterior
intwo
butonly
similar
toit.Willandintellect
differ
theobject,
northesame
astheobject,
similar
totheobject,
because
theintellect
consists
thewillisonly
andsecondly,
ways:
major
intheobject
thewillisposterior
toit.Aslight
anddark
tothe
intellected,
simultaneously
totheintellect.
isof
soishateandlovetothewill,
andtrue
andfalse
[.. .]Theintellect
eye,
I ampresendy
these
itself
from
thebody.
Forwhile
my
entirely
separated
writing
things,
which
whenI write
about
mindis thosethings
youareunderstanding
bymywriting:
I wrote
itwasthen
andit
medical
itismedicine;
when
aboutnumbers,
number,
matters,
whowrite
sothat
follows
that
this
toallothers
ondiverse
while
necessarily
happens
topics,
I seem
I nowam[.. .]The
I amre-reading
tobedifferent
from
what
tomyself
mywritings,
asyoureadandcontemplate
these
ourintelform
oftheintellect
iseternal,
because
things
andspecies
ofuniversais
arethesameforall
andtheforms
lectremains
andhasbeing,
eternity.43
41)SeeIanMaclean,
intheRenaissance:
thecaseoflearned
medicine
andnature
(CamLogic
signs
2001),116,243-4.
bridge,
42)Opera
necpercipit
medio
velut
homo,
, iii.586: "verum
tempore
principia
neque
intelligit,
sentire
sepercipit,
cumabstracta
estmens
[.. .]."
semper
43)Ibid.,iii583-4: "intellectus,
resestipsaquaeintelligitur,
velut
cumequum
intelintelligo,
lectus
meus
estforma
estforma
etvelut
materia.
Sedvoluntas
est
equi.Ideoque
prima
generalis,
cumfertur
estobiecto
necestidem
obiecto
sedillisimilis.
Differextra,
tunc,
ideoque
posterior,
induobus
untigitur
maxime:
estresipsaintellecta,
voluntas
vero
Primm,
quodintellectus
illisimilis.
tantummodo
intellectus
eodem
momento
constat
intellecta
Secundo,
res,
quia
quo
nisivelquiacumratione
voluntas
eodem
est.[.. .] Intellectus
verononimmutat,
et
posterior
ilium
necesse
delectatur
totus
est,velquiadumintelligit
homo,
operari
ipseenim
imaginatione
intellectus
omnino
a corpore
est.Nuncenim
dumhaecscribo,
meus
intellectus
perseseparatus
haectuintelligis,
numeris
estea,quaeperscripta
medica
dum
de
medicina,
dumque
pertracto
tuncnumerus
erat.
evenire
necesse
Adeoquodaliisomnibus
scriberem,
quidiversa
scripserunt
aliusmihi
abilioquinunc
Verum
temfuisse
videar
sum.
medio
est,utdummearelego
scripta,
necpercipit
velut
sentire
sepercipit,
cumabstracta
homo,
pore
principia
neque
semper
intelligit,

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[183] 405

withitsinterpolaOverall,the1554 versionofthissectionoftheDe subtilitate

tionscertainlyresemblesa hotchpotch;Cardano does not alwaysuse the
habitualtermsfor mentalfacultiesand functions,his enumerations
and
dichotomiesare farfromclear,and his accountis not completely
freefrom
digression.
4. Scaliger,Exercitationes
de subtilitate(1557)
The wide-ranging
natureof Cardanos textgaveScaligerthescopeto develop
his own comprehensive
accountof psychology:
thisis structured
by rubrics
the
which
at
one
level
makes
it
follow.44
The
easier
to
indicating topic,
progress
oftheargument
is notrigorously
bymarginaorganized:thepointsidentified
lia to be "subtilissima"
areoftenincidentalto themainlineofargument,
and
intendedto be virtuosodisplaysof Scaligers "truly"
subtlemind.His discusin nature;someofhiscritiquesaretrivialor
sionsaredigressive
and extensive
thisbyinserting
at variouspointsthemargin(he evenacknowledges
flippant
alium "jocus"),but he does not set out to misrepresent
Cardanos thought.
estmens
noster
dumhaeclegis
et
estforma
intellectus
intellectus,
[.. .] Aeterna
quoniam
igitur
manet
etest,eaedemque
suntformae
scilicet
etspecies
rerum
universalium
contemplaris
usque
inaeternum."
is a longdiscussion
There
ofthisissueinDe immortalitate
animorum
, Opera
,
nilsitnisiresintellecta"
iii.7
doctrines
"intellectus
531-2ontheAristotelian
ii.519,
(Deanima,
and"anima
intellectiva
omnium
formarum
431a18-20)
iii.8,431b20ff.)
(ibid.,
capax"
44)1.Expostulatio
etCensura.
2.DeAnimo,
Anima,
Mente,
Intellectu,
Ratione,
Ratiocinatione,
Dianoea
4. De affectibus.
toalogon.
Ratio.
natura
3.De appetitu.
5.Ansitinhumana
Ingenium.
fiat
Iudicium.
6. Intellectus
faciat
7. Quomodo
intellectus,
quama specie
ipsa.
speciem
potius
8.Voluntas.
acvoluntatis
cumoculocomparano.
10.Anintellectus
Cardani
afficia9.Intellectus,
11.Falsa
tur
delectant.
12.Repetitiones
entelechia.
voluptate
quomodo
quorumdam
quaesitorum
anseipsam
: etquomodo
moveat
moveat.
14.Anintellectus
aliudsitabanima.
13.Anima
corpus
16.Anintellectus
situniversalis.
naturae
individuae.
15.Quidsitintellectus.
17.De principiis
18.Ansitnecessarium,
De
et
Beatitudine.
Intellectum
intellectu
19.
ponere
adepto,
agentem.
20. De Animae
21. Intellectio,
immortalitate.
et species
Primum
intelligibilis.
cognitum.
22.Universalia
24.Anpossumus
suntresextra
intellectum.
etappetere
23.De volntate.
velie,
nonentia,
etquaeessenonpossunt.
voluntas
habeat
internum
a quo
25.Utrum
principium,
moveatur:
annon.26.Utrum
sitnobilius,
anvoluntas.
Proton
oikeion.
27.De obiintellectus,
ectovoluntatis,
etbono,acmultiplici
Bonitate.
28.De memoria,
reminiscentia.
recordatione,
anima
informet
sententia
deintellectu.
Cardani
29.Quomodo
30.Barbara
31. Anpraccorpus.
ticusintellectus
sitexiis,quaeopinione
constant.
sensecat
membra.
32.Ancoranteomnia
metus
solius
sensitivae
sit.34.Quaremorituri
discessum
suum
33.Anmortis
privilegium
magis
utaitCardanus.
37.An
35.Ansinttres
36.Ancorpus
intellectus,
edat,etbibat.
praevident.
memoria
sitinomnibus
verborum
minus
38.Consequutio
quorundam
apta,
corporis
partibus.
adanimae
Entelechiae.
definitionem.
39.Anabasis
apudTrismegistium.
Repetitio

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46 (2008)392-417

containexactquotations;whenScaligerchoosesto
Manyoftheexercitationes
or
a
theseareusuallyfair,at leaston theissueofthe
paraphrase give summary,
he
soul.45Ratherthantreathis workas a narrowcritiqueor commentary,
allowshimselfto addressothertextsand broaderissuesabouttheanimaand
theinterpretation
ofAristotle
intellect.Like Cardano,he distinguishes
(over
as wellas Cardano),fromphilwithAquinasandAverroes
whichhe disagrees
Thatdoes notstophimciting
perse whoseend is truth.46
osophicalreasoning
ofsomeaspectsofStoicthought
as sources:heclearly
ancientthinkers
approves
and docand
borrowsarguments
the
of
(oftenthrough intermediary Cicero),
ofAristotle
and
trinesfromit. He also claimsto offercorrectinterpretations
shoulders"
thoseof Cardano,especiallyhis "loadingon to Aristotle's
refutes
immortal
of theindividuated
thedoctrine("sententia")
transmigratory
agent
whichhe comparesto a hermitcrabin searchof a newemptyshell
intellect,
stanceleads him intodetailed
in whichto takerefuge.47
This interpretative
and its
conflict
withCardanooverthenatureof thesoul,itsmentalfaculties
modesofcognition.
Therehad beena livelymedievaldebateaboutthedivisionofthesoul into
Cardanoaccepts
faculties
and theubiquityofthesoulin all partsofthebody.48
of
thatthesoulis in somesensenothingotherthanthevariousmanifestations
relieson thematerial
intellect
itspowers,and thattheincorporated
supportof
oftheeleand memory.
But this,forScaliger,is a reification
theimagination
and the
ofthesoul (to whichhe givesvariousdesignations),
mentsor faculties
its
immaterial
and
matebetween
of
an
distinction
inappropriate
imposition
to offeran analysisof
setsout almostparadoxically
rialparts;he therefore
45)E.g.Exercitationes
animorum
ofchapter
13oftheDeimmortalitate
987(asummary
,
,307.30,
nonesse
itwasa quotation):
"intellectum
unum
essesubluna:eumque
as though
presented
inhominem:
eo
nisiquatenus
abhominis
materia
humanuni,
atque
suscipi
potest.
Ingredi
igitur
ambire.
Atipsinon
etiam
belluis
Eundem
intellectum
uthomo
imminere,
fieri,
easque
intelligat.
circum
belluas
hominem
intus
materiae
irradiare,
aditum,
ineptitudinem.
Igitur
parere
propter
Iccirco
differre
belluarum.
intellectum
abintellectu
extrinsecus
collucere.
equealiarehominis
sunt."
eaomnia
habere
belluas
inchoate,
quaeinhomine
perfecta
46)Seeforexample
Averroes
s commentary
onMetaphysics
Exercitationes
947(against
,
, 307.16,
"hoc
enim
non
solum
Aristotelis
viiandAquinas,
Summa
la
925:
ibid.,
307.4,
,
56);
theologiae
veritati."
sententiae
adversatur
sedetiam
47)Exercitationes
illam
exhumeris
955: "Quare
Aristotelis,
, 307.19,
quoquesarcinam
depones
ad
Inlibro
enim
tuoDe anima,
exeiussententia,
intellectum
ilium
onerasti.
statuis,
quatemere
in
illico
non
adsit
reverti.
ille
si
defuncto
novum,
faciet,
Caesare,
Quid
corpus
aliquod
corpora
inConchas
?"
: sicuti
vacuas
Carcinades
quodseseabdat
48)Kessler
inthe
Itsbeginnings
areattributed
& Park,
"Theconcept
ofpsychology",
468-79.
ofNyssa
tothetheologian
Renaissance
byMelanchthon.
Gregory

15:40:13 PM

I. Maclean
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46 (2008)392-417

[185] 407

For Cardano,the disincorporated

somethingindissoluble.49
agentintellect
does not have memory;Scaligerassertsthatit does, as it can reflectupon
itself.50
it is thesoul,nottheagentintellect,
thatis theindividuatMoreover,
humanbeing.51
It is thewholesoul which
ingprincipleof thehylemorphic
mental
activities
and
the
of
notjustthe
performs
grasps objects itscognition,
intellect.
It is thewholemanwho is understands,
notthesoul; thesoul is the
instrument
The soul is locatedin all partsof
throughwhichhe understands.
thatbeing;52
it is immortalin all of itsfaculties,
whereasCardanomakesthe
In section307.20 on thesouls immortality,
animamortal.53
Scaligerasserts
49)E.g.Exercitationes
andrefuting
thefollowing
from
theDe
, 307.35-6,
991,quoting
passages
immortalitate
animorum:
"intellectus
estpars.
substantiam
continent.
triplex
Agens,
quitotam
lumen
eius.Patiens,
cumsimulacra
rerum
homini
IntellecMaterialis,
recipit";
"triplex
operatio.
bibere.
hominis
iustum
tus,etestSapientia.
edere,
totius,
esse";ibid.,307.2,921,
Corporis,
andrefuting
thefollowing
from
book14ofDesubtilitate:
"Mentis
duae:
quoting
passage
partes
connexa,
Rationem,
memoriam,
quaeinrestresdividitur:
Separabilis,
imaginationem.
quae
voluntas.
Estpraetor
haecsextum
intellectus,
virtutis,
duplex:
genus
quosensibilia
cognoscit:
necsolum
verumetiam
invicem
sitappetitus:
hie
ratione,
propria
comparata.
Cumque
duplex
ille
cum
sensu:
involntate,
sedent
acsensili
nimae
affectus
sensu,
quidem
absque
parte
ipsi:
velutmisericordia,
etreliqua";
crudelitas,
ira,mansuetudo,
audatia,
timor,
ibid.,307.2918
Tusculanae
with
"animus
anima
i.9.18-19
Cicero,
continetur";
(quoting
disputationes,
approval):
estmemoriam
essefacultatem,
etimaginationi
etintellectui
comibid.,307.2921:"necesse
intellectus
extensus
adhabendum,
autfacienmunem";
ibid.,307.3,923:"estenimvoluntas
ofwillandintellect;
307.5
dum,
ibid.,
307.4,924,ontherelationship
ibid.,
quodcongnoscit";
veroestvisanimae,
seab effectibus
ad caussas
928:"ratio
ibid.,
quaemovet
investigandas";
forma
nostra
estsubstantialis,
307.6,930:"[intellectus]
aeternus";
separabilis,
incorruptibilis,
ofAlexanders
thatintellectus
materialis
isa "praeparatio",
954:a refutation
307.19,
argument
because
that
would
make
itanaccident;
forma
sitintotoetin
985-7:"quomodo
ibid.,
307.29,
"una
enim
in
nobis
suis
omnibus
307.37
992:
tota";
ibid.,
anima,
quacumque
parte
undique
essentialibus
4: "quid
Desomnis,
994.AlsoHippocratis
sibi";
307.39,
stipata
potestatibus,
nempe
innobis
enim
nonproficiscatur?"
fit,
quoda concretione
corporis
50)ibid.,
fortheimportance
ofthereflexive
function
oftheintellect.
953:seealsobelow,
307.18,
51)ibid.,307.17,950:"ergo
eritindividuano
animam.
Anima
erit
eius,
per
igitur principium
Barbari
scitissima
voceindividuationem
quodest:quamnostri
appellarunt."
52)ibid.,
sitinomnibus
Deimmor307,37992"anmemoria
(written
corporis
partibus"
against
talitate
animorum
which
asserts
thatthefingers
ona cithara
move
, Opera
, ii.498,
apparently
memoria").
"absque
53)Scaliger
"Anintellectus
thesection
entitled
aliudsitabanima"
the
(307.14,
942)with
begins
accusation
that"inlibris
tuisDe anima,
Themistii
vaesaAvenrois,
sequutus
atqueeo prioris
fecisti
animam
mortalem.
Intellectum
ensunum,
omniimplens,
niam,
vero,
primm,
atquein
entium
sese
insinuans:
suo
et
et
habeant
ad
admittant,
unumquodque
quaepro quaeque
captu
usum
tuendae
vitae.
UtsitquasiSolincorporeus
nulli
aut
sed
oriens,
occidens,
quidam,
semper,
etubique,
etomnibus
Thisorigin
ofthis
view
issaidbyScaliger
nottobeAristotle,
as
praesens".
Cardano
butAnaxagoras
Themistius
andPlotinus
claims,
(whom
follow).

15:40:13 PM

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46 (2008)392-417

thatit is of a different
essence(thecelestial"quintaessentia")fromthebody
whichis composedof thefourmaterialelements,
and has a different
origin.
of matterand the
Like Cardano,Scaligeruses the doctrineof the eternity
axiom"exnihilonihilfit"to arguethecaseforthesouls immortality.54
ofthesoul,andaredescribed
lhe processes
ofcognitionrevealthesefeatures
at lengthbyScaligerto highlight
theomissionsfromCardanos accountofthe
as welllas universais,
and of
mind,namelyitsabilityto conceiveofsingulars
itself.LikeCardano,Scaligeris a realist(section22 (963-5) is entitled"univerAs Kristin
saliasuntresextraintellectum").
Jensenhaspointedout,one may
in histhoughtin hisreferences
to theperception
of
detecta Scotistinflection
thatas thehigherfaculties
havemoreperfect
and in theargument
singulars,
the
intellect
is
bound
to
have
that
the
lower
ones,
cognitionofthe
cognition
the
senses
have
of
which
perception.55
singulars
ForScaliger,theassertion
that"Caesaris a man"can onlyhaveanysenseif
ofthecommon
we perceiveCaesaras an individualas wellas a representative
nature"man":
isdifferent
from
theuniversal
nature
ofman.Nor
TheCaesar
whowrites
this
commentary
ina different
istheuniversal
nature
ofman.Heisother
canyousay:thisCaesar
wayfrom
how
from
horse
or
this
horse.
So
it
is
to
understand
Cato;andina different
necessary
way
theparticulars.
So there
iscognition
ofsingular
Caesar
differs
from
theuniversal
through
things.56
in
Cardanos accountof theobjectsofcognitioncitedaboveis verydifferent,
are universais.
thathe seemsto implythatall intelligibles
Againstthisview,
of
the
intellects
divides
the
object
cognitionintothreemodes:
Scaligerclearly
real(the"individuum"),
and
(the"idea"or
logical(the"species") metaphysical
commonnature).57
54)Ibid.,
ofthesoul,including
for
certain
955-9.Quintessence
307.20,
explains
powers
Scaliger
andofmoving
itself.
that
ofmoving
left,
upanddown,
right,
55)Jensen,
mentions
ofScotus
Rhetorical
There
areexplicit
, 132-44.
laudatory
(e.g.
philosophy
vir
ontheconcept
of"configurado"
attributed
tothe"acutissimus
Exercitationes
960-1,
, 307.21,
suchasthat
over
todisagreements
between
Scotus
andThomas,
Ioannes
andreferences
Duns"),
ormodum
onlogicasscientia
sciendi
307.23,
(ibid.,
966-7).
56)ibid.,307.16,347:"hicCaesar
estaliudquiddam
a natura
quinunchaeccommentatur,
Caesar
estnatura
hominis
universalis.
Sicaliusestalio
hominis
universalis.
Necpotesdicere:
necesse
modoa Catone;
aliomodoabequoetabhocequo.HieCaesar
est,Caesarem
ergo
cognosci:
utdiffer
abuniversali
Seealsothediscusperparticularia:
singularia
igitur
cognoscetur."
sioninJensen,
Rhetorical
139.
philosophy,
57)Exercitationes
three
functions
oftheintellect,
ofwhich
y307.23,964.He alsodistinguishes

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[187] 409

the mindcan conceiveof

As well as beingable to conceiveof singulars,
an
and
of
itself.
had
material
objects
Scaliger given earlyaccountofthisin his
:
s
on
commentary HippocratesDe somnis
thisintellecting
takes
andtheprocess
Thething
theintellected
bywhich
thing
intellecting,
its
inseparated
intellects.
intellects
[.. .]Theintellect
corruptibles
through
placearea unity
the
Inthiswaytooweintellect
a vacuum
ownnature
theirs.
[.. .] notthrough
through
Ourminddoesnothowever
become
anda fiction
thetruth.
thereby
plenum,
through
in
in
itself
the
mind
becomes
all
It
is
this
that
either
or
fictive.
way
intellecting
empty
itself
notthrough
its
moves
allthings;
itisallthese
doesallthings,
through
things
things,
mental
foritintellects
these
byitself.58
objects,
things
Scaligermakesthe issue whetherthe intellectcan know itselfand objects
in hisexercitatio
thanitself
307;59as Cardanoomitsto make
primordial
greater
muchof it,he choosesto refutea texttakenfromtheepistemological
pessithepossibility
ofthesoulknowingitself.60
mistJuanLuisVives,whodismisses
He claims
"turnsitselfintotwins"to do this.61
Scaligerclaimsthattheintellect
- not
as does Aquinas,thatwe can knowthingsbeyondourselves
moreover,
Prithefirst
isthecognition
ofsingulars:
intellectus
ibid.,
307.2,922:"estigitur
opustriplex.
statim
rerum
utLeonis.
Haecduplex:
mm,
recta,
apprequaeestinprima
simplicium,
cognitio
: e quibus
ubiconiuncta
hensione:
etreflexa,
Secundum,
quoties
ipsam
intelligimus.
cognoscit
Effata.
iccirco
nostri
barnostri
vocant
Ciceroniani
Hunc
actum
confiunt,
Propositiones.,
quas
: ut,homoestanimal.
Tertium
bariComplexum
est,cumhisitaconiunctis
appellant
adiungiratiocinatio.
Vocabuli
aliudeducamus.
Haecdicitur
musalia:utexea compositione
aliquid
inhisquoSedetreflexa
est.syllogismon
Graeci
a collectione
vocant.
inOriginibus
dicta
caussa
queest."
51
' Hippocratis
esseinintellectibus
10:"intelligens,
intellectionem
unum
desomnis,
intellectum,
[.. .] nonperilia.Sicquoque
[.. .] illeintellectus
corruptibilia
perseipsum
separatis
intelligit
Undefit,
utanimus
nosvacuum,
noster,
ficta,
nequeinanis,
pervera.
perplenum:
intelligimus
omnia
facit:
omnia
movet:
omnia
fictus
ist.Itailleseseintelligendo,
est,a se,nonabillis
eque
illaabseesseintelligit."
quoniam
59)Thisisa standard
from
a locusinDeanima
, iii.4:seeMaclean,
"Language
deriving
quaestio
inthemind".
6(0307.2,918:passim;
estinlibertatem
animas
"contra
Ludovici
Vivis
asserta
307.13,
opinione,
reflexionem".
tothe"opus
suicognoscendi"
953alsorefers
307.13,
per
61)Scaliger,
nonintelligit
seperspeciem:
sicuri
noster
Exercitationes,
307.2,920:"Intellectus
altera
eiusactiones
duae:unarecta,
caetera
entia
sedperreflexionem
omnia;
[.. .] Suntautem
etcognoscendi
Secunda
seetcognoscere,
reflexa.
Prima
quidem
aliquid.
cognoscit
cognoscit
tamen
alsoibid.:
tametsi
non
habere
reflexione
Qua
potestatem.
seipsum,
disiungit, geminat."
seintelligere:
naturalis
"intellectus
autem
ergaquatenus
atqueintelligit
philosophi
cognoscit,
sea se
etintelligit
a se,etseintelligere
est.Atque
iliaduodeseipso
actuintellectus
cognoscit:
intelligi."

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firstprinciples
and futureevents,but also God and his
onlyindemonstrable
in
and
moveourselves
to greater
and almost
can,
ourselves,
angels
knowing
unlimitedknowledge:"thesoul is not limitedby itsfirstentelechy,
nor is it
restricted
withinsuch narrowconfines,
so thatit mighteverremainwhatit
is.
it
But
has
the
to
only
power developitself("sed habetquo sese promoand
its
without
essence
which
veat"):
beingchanged,it reachesitsperfection
is called"suitedto its nature"("oikeion")by thewise [i.e. theStoics]"62In
thisway the mind is different
fromthe senses:human beingscannotsee
themselves
or
see
vision
in the
itself,but theycan knowthemselves
seeing,
of
veryprocess knowing.63
The powerof the mindto discovernew things("inventio")is associated
withits reflexive
function.64
theminds reflexive
Traditionally,
knowledgeof
itselfderivesfromknowingotherthings,
and byreflecting
on itsknowledge
of
In thisaccount,the
them,comingto know itselfindirecdyor reflexively.
mindsself-awareness
is therefore
an understanding
of itselfofa hermeneutic
kind:thatis to say,thatitmovesfromtheknown(theobjectofperception)
to
theunknown(themind)ofwhichtheknownis an object.Scaligerseemsto
in yetmorepositiveterms,as self-induced.
conceiveof themindsreflexivity
Cardanowouldnotdissentfromthisviewofa self-moving
intellect
capableof
not
also
but
and
entities
than
itself,
comprehending onlyindividuals,
greater
commendsitforitsknowledge
ofinfinite
and eteritself;indeed,he explicitly
nal things.65
But his accountof theintellectdoes not explainhow it knows
of
itself;indeed,his accountof cognitionappearsto excludethepossibility
reflexive
and
to
reduce
all
its
to
of
the
knowledge
objects intelligible
species
highestorder.
The refutation
of Cardanos passageson theintellecttakesseveralcloselyin
. VeryfewelementsofCardanos arguarguedpages Scaligers Exercitationes
mentgo uncriticised.
Amongotherthings,he accusesCardanoof confusing
62)Ibid.,307.2,918:"Intellectus
enimnatura
nonestpraescripta
iliaentelechia
sua,
prima
terminis
cohibetur:
uthocsemper
est.Sedhabet
sit,quodtantum
nequetamangustis
quosese
summam
illamadipiscatur
essentia,
promoveat:
nequemutata
perfectionem:
quamoikeion
vocant
On
oikeion
see
Cicero
Acadmica
ii.37-8.
,
,
Sapientes".
63)SeealsoExercitationes
between
"lumen"
, 307.9934,on thedistinction
"opus"("visio")
"color"
and"voluntas
"non
video
mevidere
necvisionem."
("visum")
("volitio"):
potentia"
("agens")
64)Ibid.,307.18953:"intellectum
autorem
esseomnium
inventionum"
(a marginalagentem
iumrefers
toMelanchthon:
seeabove
note9).Cardano
hasa different
to
(complexional)
theory
thedifferent
intellectual
ofmen:seeOpera
indicat
, x.396("subtilitas
explain
capacites
ingenii
subtilem
substantiam
cerebri
etecontra").
65)Seeabove,
note26.

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[189] 411

eternalwithperpetual,66
and of failingto graspAverroes
s argument
thatthe
of
the
is
in
intellect
the
"modus
similitudinis
et
and
object
receptionis", thatit
is therefore
not identicalwiththeintellect.67
Scaligeralso disagreeswiththe
claimthattheintellect
and itsobjectareboth"formaegenerales".
Moreover,
thesoul is priorto theobjectin theintellect;
theintellect
is notinternaland
the will external,forthe intellectdirectsitselfto objectsoutsidethe soul,
andthewillto objectsinsidethesoul.68
WhereCardanopostulates
eightstages
in thepassageof resto theintellect(see above,402) Scaligeronlymentions
oftheintellect
four,namelytheintentional
("dianoia")whichextracts
activity
thementalspeciesfromtheintendedobject,thespecieswhichis abstracted,
theimpression
ofthespecieson theintellect,
and finally
theactofintellecting
in theintellect
itself.69

5. Cardano,Actioin caluminiatorem(1559)
and conclusionsis complexand
Scaligers responseto Cardanos arguments
ofCardanos positionseemsto me to be generally
allusive;his understanding
accurate.That is not how Cardanosaw matters,
however.In 1559, he publishedanActioin calumniatorem
in whichhe setsoutto
librorum
de Subtilitate
dismissScaligers criticisms.
He impliesat variouspointsthatScaligermaybe
the
truth
on
butclaimsthatitshouldhavebeenproduced
occasions,
uttering
in a longand properly
book.
argued
Scaligers wrongphilosophical
approach
to evidenceis revealedthrougha thoughtexperiment.
Cardanorecordsthat
an honest,straightforward
and clever("minimestultus")farmer
friendof his
said thathe had hearda cow speakand say "alas,thispoor country"("heu
a) ibid.,
tuusintellectus
aeternus
est:sedperpetuus
intellectionum
307.6,931:"eque
propter
continuitatem."
67)SeeAverroes
s commentary
onDeanima
iii.4429a16("the
mind
aspotentially
thesameas
itsobject,
not
identical
to
and
Exercitationes
"intel430a
ibid.,
2;
,
307.6,
it")
930-2):
although
lectum
esseresintellectas
. . . intellectum
fieri
nonsimpliciter,
sed. . . permodum
similiomnia,
tudinis
etreceptionis";
also307.16,
accuse
Cardano
ofnotfully
or
946-9.Others
understanding
about
thisissue:
seeNicolaus
Commentari
deVilanova,
Taurellus,
/,inArnau
being
wrong
Opera
differentiam
inter
idemetunum."
Seealso
simile,
(Basle,
1585),1184:"[Cardanus]
ignoravit
inthemind".
Maclean,
"Language
68)Exercitationes
eumvolo,atqueipsum
intellexit
, 307.8,934:"cumequum
volo,nonaliter
seealsoibid.,
966-7.
intellectus";
307.23,
69)ibid.,
educit
emateria
: putaluxadvisionem,
307.21
,959: "primm,
quod[dianoia]
speciem
inintellectum.
intellectus."
Tertium,
Quartum,
species,
quaeeducitur.
ipsaimpression
speciei
Ondianoia
, seealso307.2,922.

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patriaehuic"). The imaginedreactionsof variousphilosophicalschoolsare

thenrecordedby Cardano. Epicuruswould have immediately
accusedthe
man of being stupid,or drunk,or mendacious;a theologianwould have
to demons.A
referred
to God and our sins;a Platonistwould havereferred
truecautiousperipatetic
would havetriedto makedeductionsfromnatural
as sensibly
as possible.An astrologer
wouldhavederivedthepower
principles
of speechin thecow fromthestars.If Cardanohad himselfbeen asked,he
themansveracity,
and thenprotellsus thathe would firsthaveestablished
ceededfromthefactthatthecow could not havespokenof itsown nature.
Thatdid notnecessarily
meanthatithad beenpromptedbythedivinewill,as
withmen withoutbreachingnaturallaws (theonly
God can communicate
similarcase knownto theologiansis Balaams ass, throughwhom an angel
who heardthecow speak,heardit as he would have
spoke).So thefarmer,
in
a
heardwords
dream,or in an ecstaticstate,or in greatfear;thecausesof
such sensoryimpressions
beingeithermaterialsuch as an imbalanceof the
humours,or celestial.As theimbalanceofhumourscouldbe ruledout in the
case in question,it must have been a celestialcause, the messagebeing
or (moreplausibly)to mankindin
addressedeitherto thefarmer
personally
in Cardano:to thevalue
a
commitment
This
reveals
curious
double
general.70
on the
of rationalenquiry,argument,
observation
and experiment
empirical
in
belief
the
one hand,and,on theother,to an indemonstrable
communicationby thesuperlunary
aboutthepresentand future
spheresof information
it.Atthesametimeas occupystateoftheworldand ofindividuals
inhabiting
this
Cardano
complexposition,
rejectsScaligersclaim thatthe soul is
ing
as inconsistent
withtheperipatetic
naturalphicomposedofthequintessence
in
he
to
There
are
of
bad
faith
Cardanos
which
losophy
purports espouse.
signs
of
that
when
Cardano
of
his
He
accuses
adversary.
reading
Scaliger declaring
was thinking
abouta horse,his soul was thesubstanceof a horse(a claim,if
madeat all,madeonlyin jest).71He also bridlesat theaccusationofimpiety,
ofwhichhe accusesScaligerin turnin a passagein whichhe is allegedto say
"Deum essenaturam".72
70)Actio,
inOpera
, iii.707.
71)Exercitationes
Cardani
estequiforma.
, 307.6,931:"intellectus
equusest."
ErgoCardanus
72)Opera,
sectione
intoleranda
sunt.
Deum
denuo
iii.708:
"porro
quaeinvigesimanova
repetit,
inipsis.
essenaturam.
Natura
estinrebus,
utPhilosophus
ait,etDeuserit
Quinquodevidentius
fieri
a Deo:anima
ibidem
naturam
vultesseinanimatis,
Deusest.Quaeatqueanimam
igitur
Anima
enim
eidem
suntunum,
unum
etinter
sesunt.
cum
Deus,quaecumfiat
cunque
igitur
Porro
ferat
totimpietates
huius
hominis?
Hocenim
mihi
snus
Deo,Deusa Deofiet.
quismente
nihil
aliudestquamdicere,
meusestsubstantia
aut
quodanimus
equi,dumequum
intelligit,

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[191] 413

6. Envoi
and hisexplicit
It seemsto methatin spitebothofCardanos claimsto novelty
and constructive
separationof hermeneutics
argument,and of Scaligers
no greatchangehas
humanistcredentials
and philosophicalself-confidence,
occurredin therangeof questionsaskedabout thesoul and in theevidence
adducedto determinetheiranswers.Nor has the use of textsin the Greek
of
radicallychangedtheirinterpretation,
althoughthe Greekcommentaries
stimulated
thereconsideration
ofcertainArisAlexander
and otherscertainly
toteliandoctrines.
One can go backto themedievaloriginsofthedebate,and
abouttheissuesunderconsidfindin Aquinasand hiscriticsas muchclarity
erationas in thewritings
ofthegeneration
ofCardanoand Scaliger.An indito
cationof thisis to be foundin thecontinueduse of theSummatheologiae
contexts.
discussthesoul,evenin medical(and hencenatural-philosophical)
GermandoctorGregorHorstproduceda
When,forexample,thecelebrated
littlebook entitledDe naturahumanaforhisstudentsat Giessenin 1612, he
was contentto structure
his materialby usingAquinass questionsaboutthe
and to acceptThomistsolutions.73
Nor does thereseem to be the
intellect,
here
of
a
march
towards
the
secularisation
of knowledge.
signs
progressive
Both partiesto the disputeclaim to be orthodoxin theirviews,and both
accusetheotherofimpiety:
thisin spiteofthefactthatbothhad beentrained
in the naturalistic
schoolsof NorthernItaly.Equally,both partiesclaim to
betweenthe interpretation
of Aristotle,
and independent
philodistinguish
but bothend up by mappingtheirviewsback on to an
sophicalargument,
Aristotelian
matrix.I do not meanto implybythisthattheywereunableto
animalia
illustret.
illeutimpia
accusai.
Sedsiulla
Quaetamen
quodmens
quaepiam
equum
esset
eimens,
essepossunt?
anapudTheologos?
anPhilosophos?
[.. .] Ita
quomodo
impia
rogo,
In fact,
videscalumniatoris
inexcusabilem."
hadwritten
only"siNatura
impietatem
Scaliger
Deum[.. Exercitationes
, 307.21962.
intelligis
73)Gregor,
1.An
Horst
De natura
humana
deintellectu):
(Frankfurt,
1612),ii.2(quaestiones
vel
intellectus
inintelligendo
a corpore
, la 84,7f.)2. Ansingulare
{Summa
pendeat
theologiae
la 85,1f)3. Numsingulare
veluniveuniversale
abintellectu
(Summa
cognoscantur
theologiae,
la 86,1)4. Ansingularia
raleprimo
abintellectu
{Summa
perspecies
cognoscatur
theologiae,
la 85,1)5.Anspecies
abintellectu
(Summa
cognoscantur
theologiae,
intelligibilis
intelligibiles
diffrant
nobis
actuinsint
a natura
la 84,3)6.Anintellectus
etpatiens
{Summa
agens
theologiae,
etnumintelligere
la 79,4ff.)
diciqueat,
7. Numintellectus
{Summa
passiva
potentia
theologiae,
etvoluntas
diffrant
sitpati{Summa
la 79,2)8. Numintellectus
{Summa
practicus
theologiae,
intellectus
etvoluntas
diffrant
, la
, la 79,11)9. Anspeculativus
{Summa
theologiae
theologiae
intellectu
79,11;82,Iff.)10.Anvoluntas
, la 82,3)11.Anhomini
{Summa
dignior
theologiae
insit
liberum
arbitrium
, la 83,1).
{Summa
theologiae

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betweeninterpretation
and philosophicalargument,
whichthey
distinguish
could clearlydo; only,thatthe conceptualschemewhichtheyfoundmost
no matterhow fartheywerepreparedto
congenialwas thatof theStagyrite,
modifyit.
The unconventional
viewsof GirolamoCardanoand theirexhaustive
criin
Caesar
are
not
mentioned
the
section
on
tiquebyJulius
Scaliger
psychology
in theCambridge
. Theyarehowevernotonly
ofRenaissance
History
Philosophy
as expressions
of a broadintellectual
debateof themid-sixteenth
important
also
as
but
influences
much
the
context
oftheirfirst
century,
beyond
publication. Cardano acquiredthe reputation
as a free-thinking
proponentof the
ofthesoul,andwasvilified
afterhisdeathbysuchorthodoxdefendmortality
ers of Christianity
as FranoisGarasseand Marin Mersenne.74
The antiauthoritarian
toneofCardanos writings,75
with
their
presenceon the
together
Indexlibrorum
he
, mayhaveled to theposthumousreputation
prohibitorum
acquiredas a freethinker(althoughthiswas mainlyfuelledby the almost
falseassertion
Martindel Rio thathe had
certainly
bytheJesuitdemonologist
writtena clandestinebook entidedDe mortalitate
animi).76That,together
in thefrenzied
withthedenunciations
of 1620s ParisbyGarasse
atmosphere
and Mersenne,and the approbatory
citationof Cardano in worksby freethinkers
suchas GiulioCesareVanini,77
incitedthemanuscript
ofthe
hunters
earlyseventeenth
centuryto searchforhis lostworkssuchas theDe arcanis
74)Franois
La doctrine
curieuse
desbeaux
decetemps,
ouprtendus
tels(Paris,
Garasse,
esprits
l'undesplusraffins
atheistes
Cardan,
iamais";
1624),24-5:"Hierosme
quele monde
porta
desdistes
etlibertins
decetemps
Marin
>athes
Mersenne,
(Paris,
1624),223-4:"[...] il
L'impit
secachetantqu'il
desonvenin
comme
laseche,
depeurd'estre
peutdansl'ancre
pour
recognu
athee."
75)E.g.Opera
nonquoniam
illius
, vi,62:"egoHippocrati
credo,
sit,sedquatenus
Hippocrati
rationibus
adcredendum
cogor."
76)Martin
Del Rio,Disquisitiones
229: "sedetCardanus
1633),ii.26.2,
magicae
(Cologne,
addit
errorem
errori
error
to
claim
that
canbeperceived
[theprevious
spiritual
by
being
beings
thesenses],
dumcenset
deanimae
immortalitate
utindicant
omnes
fere
illius
dubius,
(homo
libri
editi:
etmaxime
sednonediderat,
amicis
autem
familioribus
quemconscripserat,
aliquando
deanimae
mortalitate
omnes
etspecies
illarum
ostendebat,
esse,
liber)
apparitiones
imaginarias
tamtum
in
reference
to
this
is
found
Paolo
San;
primas
opinatur"
imaginando concipi
passage
Cenni
storici
sulle
dueUniversit
doPaviaediMilano
(Milan,
1831),170.Hedescribes
giorgio,
itasa "accusa
which
itis,prima
indeed
cf.themore
in
measured
comment
calunniosa",
facie:
DelRio,Disquisitiones
deSubtilitate
etVarietate
libris
latet
, i.13,9: "inCardani
magicae
passim
inherba,
etindigent
anguis
"expurgatione."
77)SeeNicholas
'Leplusbeauetleplusmeschant
science
Davidson,
esprit
queieayecogneu':
inthewritings
andreligion
inHeterodoxy
ofGiulio
Cesare
Vanini"
inearly
modern
science
and
& I. Maclean
59-80(68).
, ed.J.Brooke
(Oxford,
2006),59-80,
religion

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[193] 415

aeternitatis
and the De fato,whosetitleshad alreadyalarmedthe authority
whichgrantedCardanohis firstlicenceto printin Milan 1538.78Scaligers
Geron theotherhandwereadoptedbya numberofreformed
Exercitationes
manuniversities
fromaboutthesametime,and usedas a textbookofperipaButevenhe cameto be
teticphilosophy
century.79
up to themid-seventeenth
as
one
German
doctoralstudentputit
seenno longeras a trustworthy
guide:
"first
let
in whichhe comparedthetwothinkers:
in 1645, in thedissertation
Thisis theprinthetruth".80
us considerCardano;nextScaliger;and finally
their
in
refer
order
to
which
both
Cardano
and
to
distinguish
ciple
Scaliger
fromthoseproducedbyAristotleand others;it
own rationalconstructions
whichat leastCarcomeshereto be directedagainstthemin turn(something
dano foresaw
wouldhappen).81

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79)Seeibid.,
Ramism
anditsGerman
324-5;Howard
Hotson,
ramificalearning:
Commonplace
tions
232.
1543-1630
2007),
(Oxford,
80)Gottfridus
etdensitate
exerciatione
IVderaritate
eI C Scaligeris
(WitDisputatio
Kronbigell,
deinde
Veritas."
A2r: "primus
Cardanus
videndus:
1645),
postScaliger:
tenberg,
81)Seeabove,
notes
colimus,
amamus,
, ii,475:"Galenus
18,46,75;andCardano,
[...]
Opera
etiam
nobis
etquamvis
hacinparte
obveritatem,
est,abeodissenquamilleamica
quae
magis
extulit.
Sedcumadeo
volntate
nullus
tarnen
licuit,
ilium,
ardentiore,
tiamus,
quantum
pervires
scribere
videaurae
ambitionis
ilium
properantem
aliquaperperam
inanisque
cupidum
gloriae,
admonenomnes
essepossunt,
necessarium
obauthoritatem
iacturae
musquaemultis
duximus,
illisdixisse,
Aristoteles
necsufficiat
ratio
dosuttantum
credant,
quantum
ipsacoegerit,
cuique
sedvires
autGalenus:
autArchimedes,
velPtolomaeus,
velPlato,
dixit,
penargumentorum
libenter
nonsolum
sialiquaunquam
futura
estnobis
sitene
autoritas,
placitis,
quodetinnostris
sedrequirimus."
permittimus,

15:40:13 PM

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I. Maclean
/Vivarium
46 (2008)392-41
7

w'Le
science
and
Davidson,
Nicholas,
plusbeauetleplusmeschant
esprit
queieayecogneu:
in
the
of
Vanini"
in
Giulio
Cesare
in
modern
science
and
religion writings
Heterodoxy
early
ed.J.Brooke
& I. Maclean
(Oxford,
2006),59-80.
religion^
DelRio,Martin,
1633).
Disquisitiones
magtcae
(Cologne,
DesChene,
lateAristotelian
Dennis,
2000).
Life's
form:
conceptions
ofthesoul(Ithaca,
S Thomae
in
deanima
Dominicus
deFlandria,
tres
libros
Aristotelis
Aquinatis
praeclarissima
expositio
cumduplici
textus
translatione:
adhaec
, scilicet
, etnova
[ . .] accedunt
antique
Aegyropyli
acutissime
Dominici
deFlandria
[ . .] (Venice,
1510).
Maistri
questiones
La doctrine
curieuse
desbeaux
decetemps
tels(Paris,
> ouprtendus
Garasse,
Franois,
esprits
1624).
"ElGalenismo
Garcia
critico
deGirolamo
Cardano:
anlisis
delapresValverde,
Manuel,
Jos
enciadeGaleno
enelDeimmortalitate
animorurn
69
,
(2007).
Asclepio
Depythagoraea
animarum
Accedunt
Gaudentius,
[...] de
Paganinus,
transmigration
opusculum,
Caesaris
exercitationes
(Pisa,1641).
Aperipato
Scaligeri
De natura
humana
Horst,
(Frankfurt,
1612).
Gregor,
Ramism
anditsGerman
1543-1630
Hotson,
Howard,
Commonplace
learning:
ramifications
(Oxford,
2007).
Rhetorical
andphilosophical
CaesarScaligers
Kristin,
Jensen,
Julius
philosophy
grammar:
oflanguage
(Munich,
1990).
theory
inTheCambridge
& Park,
"lheconcept
ofpsychology"
Kessler,
Katharine,
Eckhard,
history
of
Renaissance
ed.C. B.Schmitt
& Q. Skinner
1988),455-534.
philosophy,
(Cambridge,
el C Scaligeris
exerciatione
TVderaritate
etdensitate
Gottfridus,
(WittenKronbigell,
Disputatio
1645).
berg,
thecaseofPhilip
Thetransformation
Melanchthon
Kusukawa,
Sachiko,
ofnatural
philosophy:
1995).
(Cambridge,
- a prolegomenon
toPhilippo-Ramism",
inSapitheDeanima
anddialectics
, "Between
entiam
Humanismus
undAristotelismus
inderRenaissance,
ed.P.R.Blum(Munich,
amemus:
1998),127-39.
in Girolamo
andhispublishers",
Cardano:
Maclean,
Ian,"Cardano
Philosoph,
Naturforscher,
Arzt
, ed.E. Kessler
(Wiesbaden,
1994),309-38.
inthelateRenaissance",
inPhilosophy
inthemind:
inthe
reflexive
, "Language
thinking
sixteenth
andseventeenth
centuries:
conversations
with
ed.C. Blackwell
& S.Kusukawa
Aristotle,
(Aldershot,
1999),296-321.
intheRenaissance:
andnature
thecaseoflearned
medicine
, Logic
2001).
signs
(Cambridge,
on theimmortality
ofthesoul",in Cardano
e la tradizione
deisaperi
, "Cardano
, ed.
M. Baldi& G.Canziani
(Milan,
2004),191-207.
inHeterodoxy
inearly
modem
science
andreligion
, "Pomponazzi,
Gratarolo,
Cardano",
, ed.
Brooke
&
I.
Maclean
10-31.
(Oxford,
2006),
J.
Commentario
deanima
Melanchthon,
1540).
Philip,
(Lyon,
deanima
1552).
, Liber
recognitus
(Wittenberg,
desdistes,
athes
etlibertins
decetemps
Mersenne,
Marin,
(Paris,
1624).
L'impit
De
immortalitate
ed.
G.
Morra
Pietro,
animae,
1954).
Pomponazzi,
(Bologna,
storici
sulle
dueUniversit
doPaviaediMilano
Paolo,Cenni
(Milan,
1831).
Sangiorgio,
desomnis
cumcommentariis
liber
Caesar,
1539).
Julius
(Lyon,
Scaliger,
Hippocratis
exercitationes
desubtilitate
,Exotericae
(Frankfurt,
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deVilanova,
Commentari
/,inArnau
Taurellus,
Nicolaus,
1585).
Opera(Basle,
sicle
Lessciences
del'me: XVIe-XVIIIc
Vidal,
Fernando,
(Pars,
2006).
rationali
Francesco
di,Deanima
1543).
Vimercate,
(Paris,
disceptatio
peripatetica
1538).
etvita(Basle,
Vives,
Luis,Deanima
Juan
andthesciences
: commemorative
A. (ed.),Albertus
(Toronto,
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essays
Weisheipl,
Magnus
1980).

15:40:13 PM

it.)
'v
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)418-442

Cartesian

Scientia

and the Human

Soul

LilliAlanen
University
ofUppsala
Abstract
in terms
of
ofmatter
theaccountofphysical
nature
Descartes
s conception
changed
into
animals
were
turned
extension
terms.
Plants
and
andrelated
species
quantitative
Thisarticle
canbe explained
ofmachines,
whosenatural
functions
mechanistically.
ofhumansoul.
forthepsychology
ofthistransformation
reflects
on theconsequences
with
thebodyand
itlacksextension,
it
is
also
united
In so farthesoulis rational
yet
matter.
The
article
examines
Desso
it
is
able
to
act
on
extended
affected
and
byit,
andarguesthatthereis
s conceptofscientia
andhisdifferent
usesofnature,
cartes
thanis usually
Aristotelian
andCartesian
between
muchmorecontinuity
psychology
embodied
human
of
the
functions
of
the
when
it
comes
to
an
explanation
recognized
in
of
its
for
the
new
science
If
unfit
inclusion
soul. thismakespsychology
nature,
within
scientia
as
andhasan important
place
phenomenon
objectis stilla natural
Descartes
conceived
ofit.
Keywords
Descartes
dualism,
mind-body
1. Introduction
thatDescartess mind-body
dualismseta limitto
Whileit is uncontroversial
of nature,it is
theuniversalistic
demandsofthenewmechanistic
philosophy
lessclearto whatextenthisnotionofthehumansoulor mindqua embodied
did. "Physics",or "naturalphilosophy"in Descartess timewas used in the
would coveranything
senseof "thescienceof nature".Nature,traditionally,
or
so
rational
at
a
nature
essence,
animals,
being thetopofthehierarhaving
the
of
inside
Lunar
chy natural,livingthings
sphere,werepartofnature.Sciand so itdidwithinthe
enceofnaturein thissensewouldincludepsychology,
Aristotelian
wherethestudyofall naturalthingsincludsystemofknowledge
thelimits
animated
fell
under
physics.In spiteofredrawing
ingliving,
beings
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
Leiden,
NV,

DOI:10.1
163/156853408X360984

15:40:27 PM

L Aknen
46 (2008)418-442
/Vivarium

[197] 419

betweenmindand matter,
Descartes,it has beenclaimed,continuedto conceiveofthescopeofphysicsin thetraditional
way,includingnotonlyanimal
- notaandhumanphysiology,
butalsoimportant
partsofhumanpsychology
of mindand body withinhisphilosobly,thepassionsand theinteraction
of
nature.1
phy
Such claims,I haveargued,restin parton themistakenassumptionthat
would treatthemindas supernatural
or transcendent,
anyotheralternative
it
inaccessible
to
natural
means.
Descartess
definition
making
knowledgeby
of soul as distinctfrommatterin combinationwithhis viewof thehuman
beingas a mind-bodycompositedid bringabout a breakin thecontinuity
betweenpsychology
and the restof the philosophyof nature,but did not
excludemindfromnature.Recognizing
thatitis notpartofphysicalnatureas
Descartesconceivedthelatteris notto makeit supernatural
butto recognize
thatDescartess conceptofnatureis lessrestrictive
thanthatofcontemporary
naturalists
who oftenidentify
naturewiththe domainof physics,or,more
thatofsubsumption
underthelawsofphysics.2
precisely,
in
Nature Descartesswide senseof the termincludesall createdthings,
as muchas extended.Theyinstantiate
the two kindsof natureor
thinking
essencesthereare,whicharealso radically
different
so thatthereis nothingin
no
between
them.
That
common, continuity
thinkingnatureand extended
naturearemutually
meansthattheyhaveexplanatory
independent
autonomy.
The createdorderofthingsincludes,in addition,humanbeingscomposedof
thesetwokindsofsubstanceand hencepartaking
in twokindsofnatures
with
These mindmutuallyindependentand exclusiveessentialcharacteristics.
areendowedwithnaturesoftheirowninyeta different
sense
bodycomposites
of the termintroducedin the SixthMeditation.This senseof natureis far
fromunproblematic
itself.Qua compositesof two mutuallyexclusivesubessenceor essentialattristances,humanbeingshaveno distinctly
intelligible
buteof theirown,comparableto theessencesof thesubstancescomposing
them.Embodiedhumannatureis thinkingand extended,and displays,in
whichcan be derivedfromneitherof thesetwoessences
addition,properties
^ Thus,
while
thatDescartes
"wasn't
clear
whether
thehuman
mind
considered
by
admitting
itself
fellwithin
"he
was
Hatfield
claims
clear
that
union
and
interaction
physics",
mind-body
were
ofphysics
orthescience
ofnature".
Descartes
andthe
Meditations
Hatfield,
(Lonpart
Gary
donandNewYork,
"Descartes
andtheCorporeal
Mind.
Wilson,
2003),284,seealsoCatherine
inDescartes'
SomeImplications
oftheRegius
Natural
&
Affair",
, ed.S. Gaukroger
Philosophy
& NewYork,
(London
2000),631-659.
J.& J.Sutton
2)LilliAlanen,
"Descartess
inNaturalandNaturalism",
Mind-Body
Composites,
Psychology
isminModern
vol.51,3(forthcoming).
ed.byM.Kisner,
issue
ofInquiry
Philosophy,
special

15:40:27 PM

420 [198]

46 (2008)418-442
L.Alanen
/Vivarium

consideredapart,but dependon theirclose and intimateunion.3Including

the phenomenadependingon the union- the actionsand passionsof the
betweenmindand body- withinthesciembodiedmindand theinteraction
ence of physicalnaturewould mean turningtheminto somethingthatby
definition
theycannotbe: merematerialprocessesor events.
forpsycholOne mightaskhowclearDescarteswas abouttheimplications
a
he
not
dualism.
Did
of
his
mind-body
marking departurefromhis
ogy
predecessorswritethat he was treatingof the passionsof the soul "en
did he not,withhistheoryofthepinealgland,sketch
Moreover,
physicien"?4
ofa theory
ormind-body
thefoundations
interaction,
bywhichmentalstates,
withsuitablebridging
laws,couldbe subsumedunderphysics?
Opinionswere
on thisissue,someof
dividedalreadyamongDescartess immediatefollowers
thembeingless,some moresensitiveto the problemsthe inclusionwithin
in termsofCartesianmindofhumannatureunderstood
naturalphilosophy
outright.He
body compositesinvolved.Spinoza condemnsthe enterprise
abouthuman
Descartes"amongthosewho inwriting
includes"thecelebrated
affects
and waysof livingseemto treatthemnot as naturalthingsfollowing
whichareoutsidenature."5
as "things
the"commonlawsofNature",butrather
creditforat leasthavingsoughtto explainthehuman
He giveshispredecessor
affects
theirfirst
causes,and also to showthewaybywhichthemind
"through
What he showedhoweverwas
have
dominion
overitsaffects".
can
absolute
ofhisunderstanding"
(E3pref.)IfDesnothingexceptperhapsthe"cleverness
becausehis dualismhindered
it was precisely
cartesfailedin thisenterprise
as merephysicalbodiesin a way
himfromtreating
hismind-body
composites
theapplicationofthecommonlawsofnaturerequired.
3)I differ
thatDescartes
atleastinsomecontexts
heldthatthe
from
whoargues
TadSchmalz
inmind-body
with
anessence
andmodes
ofitsown.SeeTad
unions
come
substances
consisting
ThePhilosophical
Review
ontheMind-Body
M. Schmalz,
"Descartes
andMalebranche
Union",
Descartes's
Mind
I discuss
thisinLilliAlanen,
101(1992),281-325.
(Cambridge,
Concept
of
inAlanen,
'Descartes
s Mind-Body
Mass.& London,
Two,andmore
2003),Chapter
recently,
Composites'.
4)RenDescartes,
12vols.,
revised
edition
Oeuvres
deDescartes
, ed.C. AdamandP.Tannery,
as"AT"followed
andpagenumber;
11:326- subsequently
cited
(Paris,
1964-76),
byvolume
translation
ThePhilosophical
RenDescartes,
byJ.Cottingham,
Writings
ofDescartes,
English
2 vols.(Cambridge,
citedas
R. Stoothoff,
andD. Murdoch,
1985),1: 327- subsequently
"CSM"followed
andpagenumber.
byvolume
5)"Indeed
Forthey
asa dominion
within
a dominion.
seemtoconceive
maninNature
they
theorder
of
thanfollows
believe
thatmandisturbs,
rather
[magis
perturbare,
quamsequi],
inBaruch
Works
Ethics
TheCollected
ed.andtransi,
Nature."
, 3 pref.
by
Spinoza,
ofSpinoza,
E. Curley
vol.I,491(G II 137).
(Princeton,
1985),

15:40:27 PM

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46 (2008)418-442
/Vivarium

[199] 421

- one thatSpinozapretty
muchtakes
Descartess newconceptionofmatter
in
the
over- did bringwithit a fundamental
conceptionof physical
change
forin related
and
what
can
be
accounted
it
to
mere
extension
nature,reducing
terms.Thischangedthewaylivingthingswereto be conceived.
quantitative
Plants,animalsand in so faras theyare animals,humanbodies too, were
can onlybe
into speciesof machines,whosenaturalfunctions
transformed
not
from
extension
were
derivable
Minds
lacking
explainedmechanistically.
matterand could not be so explained,henceanyaccountof therelationof
mindto bodydefinedin termsofextensionhad becomeutterly
problematic,
aware
to fullyrealize.ButwasDescarteshimself
as Spinozawasamongthefirst
Ifso,where,on theCartesian
oftheexplanatory
gap hisdualismhad created?
be located?
shouldhumanpsychology
treeofphilosophy,
To shedsome lighton thesecomplexissuesand thekindof answerDesI proposeto considerDescartessphilosophyof
cartescould have offered,
ofhisnotionofScientiain thegeneralsenseof
natureagainstthebackground
sensesofnaturethathe
close
attention
to thedifferent
truephilosophy,
paying
and elsewhere.
workswithin theMeditations
is
lhe first
withthelatter,
therearemainlyfoursensesto consider,
Starting
naturein thesenseofextendedmatterwhichis theobjectofnaturalphilosophy.The secondappliesto the natureof thinkingthings,and the thirdto
all thingsthereare: God himself
naturein a moregeneralsensecomprising
includingtheorderof createdthings thinkingas well as extendedthings.
- is naturein the senseof
The fourthand last- a specialcase of the third
Scienceof naturein
has
as
God
us
mind-body
composites.6
everything
given
Descartess senseofnaturalphilosophy
cannot,I argue,be extendedto include
also the interaction
betweenmindand bodyand the mentalstatesensuing
fromthisinteraction:
naturein thefirstsensedoes not includenaturein the
be an extensionof Cartecannottherefore
fourth
sense.Psychology
properly
sian physicsand henceis not partof his naturalphilosophy.
Philosophyof
natureon theotherhandis notforDescartesas itwouldbe forcontemporary
all thereis to human science.CartesianScientiaproperlyhas
physicalists
naturein thethirdand mostgeneralsenseas itsobject,and naturalphilosophy
6)Thelasttwo,
intheSixth
inmyenumeration,
Meditation
areintroduced
thethird
andfourth
inwhich
arelisted
insection
4. Theorder
below
(AT7,80;CSM2,56)andarediscussed
they
kinds
ofconcerns,
inwhich
different
ischronological,
Descartes,
i.e.,itistheorder
confronting
inthe
whothen
became
interested
ofnature,
them.
Hestarted
outasa philosopher
developed
about
his
life
also
became
concerned
of
and
who
at
the
end
of
order
metaphysical things,
general
Descartess
SeeAlanen,
thenature
ofhuman
andmoral
Concept
ofMind,
psychology.
beings
Two.
Chapter

15:40:27 PM

422 [200]

L.Alanen
/Vivarium
46 (2008)418-442

concernsonlyone kindofthingsthatfallsunderit: thosethatcan be undertheattribute

ofextension.
stoodthrough
In additionto thebasicmetaphysical
on
Scientia
is
not
which
it
rests,
just about extendedand thinking
insights
natureconsideredapart,but also includeswhatresultsfromtheirunion as
by God, and that,as it turnsout, can onlybe known
speciallyinstituted
the
senses
lifeexperience.
Forwhiledepriving
and
ordinary
sensory
through
of
its
earlier
foundational
Descartes
neverdenieditsimporrole,
experience
tanceas a sourceof information
thatno mathematico-physical
science(or
can
and
that
we
have
to
on
both
as
rely
metaphysics) replace
cognitiveand
moralagents.As partof our naturalendowments
whichare the objectsof
theaspectsofsensoryexperience
thatarerelevant
herefalloutside
psychology
naturalphilosophy
that
in Descartess senseoftheterm,butsinceitis through
that
we
obtain
to
this
access
actual
it
also
has
world,
only
experience
cognitive
in
a legitimate
within
Scientia
taken
the
of
If
broadest
sense
this
term.
place
thisis granted,and if by CartesianScientiawe mean humansciencein the
senseoftruephilosophy
as usedin thePrefaceto thePrinciples
, thennotonly
ScientiaforDescartesbut moreparticularly
does afterall
humanpsychology
I suggest,
retainsomething
oftheoverallAristotelian
Whatitretains,
project.7
is precisely
theinductionbasedgeneralizations
about
involving
assumptions
endsand strivings
thatDescartesmadea pointofbanishingfromhisphilosothecontinuity
betweenCartesian
phyof nature.But then,not surprisingly,
andAristotelian
is precisely
whatmakesthedisciplineofpsycholpsychology
in
for
the
new
of philosophyor scienceof nature
unfit
inclusion
kind
ogy
Descartesis advocating.
2. Natureand theFabricationof theMan-Machinein theEarlyWork
In hisearlierwritings
Descartesmakesa pointofshowingthata wholerange
of what within the Aristotelianscheme would count as lower psychic
7)Scientia
inthesense
hereintended
comes
closetotheidealofsapientia
orhuman
wisdom
inRuleOneofRegulae
outlined
addirectionem
Itisnot
CSM
10,
359-360;
1,
(AT
9-10).
ingenii
exhausted
kindoftrueandevident
alsocharacterized
asscientia
bythehighest
knowledge
by
hecalls"good
butincludes
what
sense"
mente
Descartes
touniverDescartes,
{bona
) that
equates
salwisdom
Asthehighest
endofallenquiries
itispursued
for
itsownsake,
(universali
Sapientia).
anditisbestpursued
the
ones
natural
of
not
for
scholastic
reason,
byincreasing
light
solving
asmuch
asforpractical
the
intellect
in
"each
of
s conlife
philosophical
problems
by
guidance
inthissense
isnotonly
oriented
tothetrue
but
(AT10,361;CSM1,10)Scientia
tingencies".
alsotothegood,
thegood,
asitshould
inthis
bepursued
andthus
itstheoretical
moreover,
life,
from
whatthecasemaybeforAristode,
areultimately
subordinated
toits
differendy
goals,
moral
practical,
goal.

15:40:27 PM

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/Vivarium
46 (2008)418-442

[201] 423

to the animalsoul, notablyvisualperception,

were
phenomenaattributed
in
terms
of
causal
mechanisms.
It
is
to
explainable
law-governed
important
note whatexactlythesecausal mechanismsexplained.Theyconcernedthe
conditionsof sensoryperceptions
and their
bodilyand neuro-physiological
butdid notextendto theircontentsor theawareness
variations,
accompanyofhumanperception.8
Descartesin factneveras much
ingthemcharacteristic
as suggests
thattheseexplanations
would extendto thenatureof man propAs
the
observer
of
the
erly.
phenomenonoflight,man,afterall,staysoutside
naturein theoriginalprojectof TheWorld?wherea trulyoriginalnewconceptionofnatureis invented.Once theidea had beendevelopedto includeman
as a self-regulating
machinewithinthescopeofthelawsofnature,thelawsof
motionshad to be completedwithassumptionsabout regularconnections
betweenbrainpatternsand theirmentalcorrelates.10
These regularities
are
be subsumedunderor reducedto thelaws
positedbut could not themselves
of naturethatexplainedtheformation
of thebrain-patterns.
The questionis
whether
suchregularities
or correlations
couldhavethestatusofnaturallaws
in Descartess sense,thatis,whethertherearepsycho-physical
lawsthatmeet
therequirements
Descartesputson clearand distinctexplanation.11
8)Theanimal-machine
unlike
thehuman
doesnothavetheability
toseeorthink
that
perceiver
itsees.(ATI,413;Descartes,
The
vol.3: TheCorrespondence
Philosophical
Writings,
(Cambridge,
- subsequently
in
citedas "CSMK"followed
Thatcapacity,
1991),61-62
bypagenumber)
whatever
isa prerequisite
forthehigher
order
that
Deswayitisexplicated,
capacities
cognitive
cartes
seesasessential
inhissense
tothinking
oftheterm.
9)Itsfulltitle
LeMonde,
ouletrait
delalumire.
being
10)ThoVerbeek
that
notes
toinclude
manasa self-regulating
intheproject
machine
probably
wasa latedevelopment.
SeeThoVerbeek,
"TheInvention
inDescartes'
ofNature",
Natural
& Schuster
& Sutton,
toMersenne,
I63n29.Cf.letter
,ed.Gaukroger
149-167,
June
Philosophy
1632(AT1,254-5;CSMK39).
n) Thelawsofmotions
donotapply
here.
Tostate
a lawful
connection
a minimum
requirement,
onewould
would
bethat
thephenomena
toberelated
canbeparameterized
ordescribed
think,
incomparable
E.
Terence
"Nonreductive
Material(Cf.
quantitative
magnitudes.e.g.,
Horgan.,
- A Critical
ismandtheExplanatory
inNaturalism
ofPsychology",
ed.by
Autonomy
Appraisal,
S.J.Wagner
andR.Warner
scholars
296if.)Yetmany
Dame,Indiana,
(Notre
1993),295-320,
with
would
Hatfield
that
Descartes
s mechanistic
seesallbodily
agree
although
prophysiology
cesses
"asinteractions
between
to
the
laws
of
there
"wasnoconflict
motion",
particles
according
between
dualism
andpsycho-physical
laws"
forDescartes,
oflawwhojust"extended
thenotion
fulregularity
tomind-body
a permanent
relation
between
brain-states
and
interaction,
positing
thesensations,
inthemind."
andemotions
Descartes
and
Hatfield,
appetites,
they
produce
(Gary
theMeditations
andNewYork,
tobevery
clear
aboutthe
(London
2003),284)Itisimportant
this
istrue.
Farfrom
that
there
wasnoconflict
forDescartes
between
point
uptowhich
agreeing
dualism
andpsycho-physical
I myself
sdualism
have
claimed
that
Descartes
iswhat
Donald
laws,
Davidson
calledanomalous
is positing
cannot
be
andhencethattheconnections
Descartes

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Descartesis notveryexplicitin thesecontexts

aboutthenatureofthepsychic phenomenahe is concernedwith,traditionally
to the two
attributed
lowerkindsof Aristotelian
souls. He describes,in his thought-experiments,
machineswhichcould imitateall thesesamefunctions
thatarefoundin real
fromthemachinesimitating
men,who differently
them,are endowedwith
rationalsouls.He talksofsensory
as ideasbutis notveryclearon
perceptions
whethertheseideasare anything
the
tracedin thebrainby
beyond patterns
neuralmotions.In theearlyunpublishedTreatise
onMan, sensory
perceptions
aredescribed
as theeffects
ofthewayGod setup themind-body
union,giving
themindhe unitedto thebodyitsmainseatin thebrainand makingit of a
naturesuchas to giveitdifferent
sensations
(likethosewe have)dependingon
thewaysin whichtheporeson thesurfaceofbrainareopenedbythenerves.
(AT 11, 143; CSM 1,102)
The regularconnections
he positsbetweenparticular
kindsofbrainmovementsand kindsof perceptionare explainedwithsome detailsboth in the
or
Regulae,l'Hommeand La Dioptrique.However,the'ideas'or perceptions',
'sentiments'
arenotyetconceptualized
as essentially
distinct
fromthepatterns
ofmotionsin thebrainand themechanicalreactions
to these,whicharefound
in animalsas wellas humanbeings.It is onlylaterthathe explicitly
speaksof
as
kinds
of
or
modifications
of
the
mind,more
sensoryperceptions
thought
confusedmodesofmind,dependingon itsunionwiththebodyand
precisely,
causedbybodilymotions.One maythus,legitimately,
askhowclearDescartes
himself
was aboutthelimitsofhisexplanatory
schemein thiscontext.12
lawful
relations
ofthekindnatural
science
assumes
between
mental
andphysical
states.
See
Descarteis
and
"Descartes's
ComAlanen,
Mind,
Two,
Alanen,
Chapter
Mind-Body
Concept
of
note25,andreferences
there
Fora clarifying
assessment
ofrecent
discussions
on
posites",
given.
thisissue
seeLoeb2006,65-85.
12)lheambiguity
inhisuseofideaintheearlier
work
hasoften
beenpointed
out,most
recently
Desmond
who
voices
about
Descartes's
at
this
dualism
Clarke,
(2002,50).
by
skepticism
point
IfDescartes
didnotcomeoutclear
onthisissue
then
theclaim
that
there
aremechanical
causal
relations
andideas,
thelatter
to
between,
objects
sensory
e.g.,external
stimulating
organs
taking
bepatterns
orfigures
inthebrain,
thattheminddirectly
wouldperhaps
notbeso
inspects,
Hecouldhaveheldthat
theconnections
between
stimulations
ofsensory
problematic.
posited
andpatters
ofmotion
inthebrain
which
arethebodily
of"ideas"
aresuborgans
counterparts
sumable
under
thelawsofnature.
Butevenintheearliest
work
there
arecontexts
where
the
difference
whatisinthemind
between
orthecognitive
itself
andthebodily
of
power
organs
is
XII
of
the
AT
1
CSM
Rule
stressed,
1,
415;
1,
perception
unambiguously e.g.,
Regulae.
(e.g.,
ofhowthese
ofmotion
canberelated
tothetrain
ofideasonthe
42),andthequestion
patterns
- that
mental
levelremains
unanswered
answer
seems
tobeforthcoming
thanthat
is,noother
Godputthem
us
such
these
correlations
obtain
ofnature".
there,
creating that
by"institution

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[203] 425

itself"(AT 11, 37; CSM

By nature'in Le MondeDescartesmeans"matter
it are laws of motionand theyact through
1, 92), and the laws governing
contactbetweentheextendedparticlesor chunksof matterthatmove.Laws
ofnaturein thissensecanonlyexplainchangesofspeedorquantity
ofmotion,
etc.
of
extended
matter.
The
first
on
of
the
Treatise
configuration,
paragraph
Man (L'Homme)written
as a complement
to the Worldstatesthatthemenof
theworldhe describesare "composed,as we are,of a soul and a body".His
thehumanbodyon itsown,"thenthesoul,againon
planwas to describefirst
itsown";and finally
"showhowthesetwonatures
wouldhaveto be joinedand
unitedin orderto constitute
menwho resembleus" (AT 11,1 19-120; CSM
is thefirst,
aboutthefunctions
1, 99). The onlypartworkedout or preserved
ofthebody,butthereis no explanation
ofhowthemindisjoinedto thebody.
Whathis thought-experiment
withmachinesimitating
humanscan showat
and bodilymovements
thoseoftheanimal
most,is thatfunctions
simulating
all
conative
and
functions
common
to humansand
i.e.,
vital,
body,
cognitive
animals,can be givena mechanistic
account,in somebroadsenseofmachinemechanism
thatpresupposes
functions
and endssetbythemachine-maker.13
In additionto biologicalfunctions
of blood,nourish(digestion,circulation
ment,growth,respiration,
etc.),thelistincludessenseperception,
imaginaand the "internalmovements
of theappetitesand passions".
tion,memory,
No need henceto postulatevegetative
or sensitivesouls or principlesof life
and movementin the body-machine,
"apartfromits blood and its spirits,
- a
whichareagitatedbytheheatofthefireburningcontinuously
in itsheart
firewhichhas thesamenatureas all thefiresthatoccurin inanimatebodies."
(AT 11, 202; CSM 1, 108)
Thesesamepointsarerepeatedin PartFiveofDiscoursde la mthode
(AT 6,
in so faras Descarteshas laid out, for
50- 59). The contextnow is different
the firsttimemoreexplicitly,
his dualisticthesisthatthe soul is essentially
and
fromthebody"(AT 6, 33). 14He startswitha
distinct
thinking "entirely
in Le Monde and l'Homme
ofsomeofhisdiscoveries
, in particular
summary
hisaccountof theblood circulation
and thevitaland cognitivefunctions
we
sharewith the animal-machine
(AT 6, 52-56), i.e., the phenomenalisted
above.15
Butnow,forthefirst
realhuman
time,he explainswhatdistinguishes
13)Cf.thelucidaccount
ofDennis
DesChene,
& Clocks.
Machines
& Organisms
inDesSpirits
cartes
& London,
6.
(Ithaca
2001),Chapter
14)Thisisnottosaythat
hadnotalways
helda dualistic
view.
Thathedid,isobvious
in
already
theearly
But
it
is
to
that
he
not
too
much
to
the
had
say
Regulae.
given
thought consequences
for
dualism
ofhisnewconcept
ofmatter.
SeeAlanen,
1and2.
Descartes's
ofMind,
Chapters
Concept
,5)Fora clear
account
ofDescartes's
non-finalistic
commitment
tomechanical,
uncompromising

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theirmovements:
namely,theposbeingsfrommechanicaldevisesimitating
sessionof reasonrevealedthroughtheuse of meaningful
speech(AT 6, 56to
of
his
earlier
work
that
has
not
he claimshe
survived,
58). Referring parts
had shownnotonlythattherationalsoulunliketheotherfunctions
explained
"cannotbe derivedin anywayfromthepotentiality
of matter,
but mustbe
speciallycreated"butalso thatitis notenoughthatitis "lodgedin thehuman
bodylikea helmsmanin a ship. . . butthatitmustbe morecloselyjoinedand
unitedwiththebodyin orderto have
and appetiteslikeoursand
feelings
thusto constitute
a realman."(AT 6, 59; CSM 1, 141)
Descarteshereadmitsthattheanimal-machine
describedin thepartofthe
L'Hommewe knowdiffers
froma realmanon twoaccounts:in lackinga ratioin nothavingfeelings
nal soul,and,moreover,
and appetiteslikeours,which
a
more
intimate
union
of
the
soul
with
itsbodythanthatofthepilot
require
in theshipofthePlatonicmetaphor.
The pilot,likethefountainengineeror
theorganplayerin themetaphors
of l'Hommecan controlthemovements
of
thevesselor automatonit inhabits,but it cannotfeelthedamagedone to it
norcan it experience
in workingproperly.
Ifitwerepossibleto
itswell-being
locatea rationalsoul withina machinein all respectssimilarto thehuman
bodywe wouldstillnothavea realhumanbeing,buta machinewitha rational controlorgan.
It is howevernotuntiltheMeditatones
deprimaphilosophiae
thatDescartes
in
saysa bit moreabouttherealhumanbeing.What he now saysconfirms,
line withthe remarkquoted above fromtheDiscours
, thatthe union as he
conceivesit goesfarbeyondwhatanyplatonicmetaphors
couldcapture.
3. ThinkingNature
BeforeconsideringDescartess more matureview of human nature,as it
unfoldsin theSixthMeditation,
and thequestionsconcerning
ourknowledge
aboutit,something
whichby
shouldbe saidabouthisviewofthinking
itself,
intoa thinking,
humanbody.
beingunitedto it changesthebody-machine
the questionswe are concernedwithheredependson how one
Answering
this
oressence
interprets notions,i.e.,on whatone takesthenatureofthinking
of mind(naturein thesecondsenseof theterm)to be, and whatdifference
in thesenseone prefers,
to matter,
makes.Therearea number
addingthought,
ofvitalfunctions
seeAnnie
"Cartesian
inDescartes
explanation
Bitbol-Hespris,
Physiology'
Natural
& Schuster
& Sutton.
, ed.Gaukroger
Philosophy

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[205] 427

ofcandidates.
whichis notone I prefer,
is one ofthem.Agency
Consciousness,
is another.Beinga cognitive
or a rationalagentare,to mymind,clearlymore
suited(thanhavingconsciousawareness)
to capturewhatitis forDescartesto
be a thinking,
Awareness
forratiomaybe one prerequisite
reasoningbeing.
aremoreimportant,
notleastthecapacityto use and
nalitybutotherfeatures
to
and
to
form
thatinvolves
speech
respond meaningful
judgments,
something
thecapacityto distinguish
to reasonand drawinferences.
truthand falsity,
Ideas as analyzedin theThirdMeditationhavean intentional
structure,
they
have objectsor contents,and intentionalactionsare done forreasonsand
ends.Rationalagencyas discussedbyphilosophers
sinceAristotle
presupposes
notonlydesireforsomegoodmovingtheagentbuta capacityfordeliberation
and decisionor choice involvingevaluativeand normativeconsiderations.
Rationalagentsin deliberating
about theend to pursueand decidingabout
theappropriate
to
them
are thoughtto be themselves
activeor
way pursue
self-movers.16
None of thisis amenableto explanationin termsof efficient
causesof thekindDescartess physicsoperateswith,and cannotbe included
even in some extensionof mechanistic
physics,fromwhichconsiderations
aboutendsand intentionality
areon principleexcluded.One mayarguethat
Cartesiandualismleftroomfora purelyspeculative
and
scienceofrationality,
Whatindeed,Descartesseemsto laythegroundsforthisin hismetaphysics.
eversucha sciencemightrevealabout rationalnaturein generalit is not of
muchhelp whenit comesto understanding
the humanmindor predicting
actionsofhumanagents,who arenotpurelyrational.Qua embodiedtheyare
is affected
bywhathappassiveand acteduponbyotherbodies:theirthinking
as one with.17
This leavesus with
pens to the bodies theyfindthemselves
in
which
do
not
fall
eithercamp,i.e.,
naturally
composites,
thought-matter
in thatoftheobjectsofthescienceofphysicalnaturenorthatofrationeither
nal souls.Let us now turnto considering
theseand theaccesswe can haveto
theseas objectsofcognition.
16)Descartes
inthesense
takes
thisideatoitsextreme:
ofa capacity
forself-determinaActivity
that
hecallsliberum
arbitrium
voluntatis
onesexternal
oneresponsible
notjustfor
tion,
, renders
actions
butforonesvery
or
beliefs
and
is
essential
to
the
human
thinker,
rendering
thoughts
intheFourth
assuchis
asDescartes
animage
ofGod.Theintellect
her,
Meditation,
explains
- a capacity
- ittakes
forseeing
andunderstanding
thetruth
thewilltoendorse
truth
passive
inmakthewilltogiveupthat
andtocommit
oneself
toseeking
it,asitalsotakes
commitment,
I develop
inAlanen,
these
andassenting
tobeliefs
without
points
ingmistakes
goodreasons.
Descartes's
and240-246.
224-233
Concept
ofMind,
17)Formore
ofDescartes's
ofideasaswellasother
ofhis
extensive
discussions
concept
aspects
broad
notion
ofthinking
seeAlanen,
Descartes's
Concept
ofMind.

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4. Two New SensesofNature

In the SixthMeditation,havinggivenhis finalproofforthe existenceand
distinctness
of mindand body,Descartesenquiresabouttheepistemicstatus
ofsenseperceptions
whichare"lessclearlyunderstood"
thantheproperties
of
4
bodieswhichcan be comprisedwithinthesubject-matter
of mathematics"
(AT 7, 80; CSM 2, 55). He worrieson theone handaboutbeliefsaboutparticularobjectsof senseperception,
(how do we knowthatthesun is of such
and such a size or shape),and, moregenerally,
about sensoryphenomena
"suchas lightor sound or pain" in themselves.
Theyweredescribedin the
ThirdMeditationas obscureand confusedto thepointthatwe do notalways
knowwhattheyare about or whetherindeedtheyhave any objector not.
(AT 7, 43-4; CSM 2, 29-30) Thesearehighlyuncertain,
yet,he writes:
ofthere
... thevery
fact
that
andtheconsequent
Godisnota deceiver,
impossibility
being
inmyopinions
which
cannot
becorrected
anyfalsity
bysomeother
faculty
by
supplied
I canattain
inthese
mea sure
thetruth
even
matters.
there
is
God,offers
Indeed,
hopethat
that
I
am
Italics
nodoubt
that
nature
contains
some
truth.
56.
2,
(CSM
everything taught
by
added.)18
What thendoes natureteachus and whattruthdoes thatteachingcontain?
Two further
sensesof"nature",
naturegenerally
(3) and mynaturein particular(4), areintroduced
here:
I understand
Forifnature
isconsidered
initsgeneral
(3),then
bytheterm
aspect
nothing
other
thanGodhimself,
ortheordered
ofcreated
established
system
byGod.And
things
inparticular
other
thanthetotality
ofthings
(4) I understand
bymyownnature
nothing
bestowed
me
God.
56.
2,
(CSM
added.)19
upon by
Numbering
The first
of thetwonewsensesof nature,naturein itsgeneralaspects,covers
- thinking
God himself
orthewholecreatedsystem
ofthings
and extended
withtheorderhe established.
Here,in theSixthMeditation,Descartesis not
concernedwithour knowledgeof thisorderedsystemas a whole but with
whatwe can nowaboutnaturein thelattersense(thefourth
and lastsenseon
- the
in
in
It
stands
for
own
all
its
nature
list).
my
my
particular
complexity
18)"Etsanenondubium
estquineaomnia
a natura
habeant
veritatis."
(AT
quaedoceor
aliquid
7,80).
19) . .pernaturam
nihil
nuncaliudquamvelDeum,ipsum,
vel
enim,
spectatam,
generaliter
rerum
creatarum
coordinationem
a Deo instittam
necaliudpernaturam
meam
in
intelligo,
a Deosunt
eorum
omnium
tributa."
(AT7,80).
particulari,
quamcomplexionem
quaemihi

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[207] 429

ofthethingsI havebeengiven,includingmind,bodyand theirunion

totality
sense
as instituted
by God. Amongthe thingsthatnaturein thisrestricted
with
teachesis thatI have a body,thatthereis something
mybody
wrong
the body needs food
when I feelpain, "thatwhen I am hungryor thirsty
and drink,and so on". By theaboveprinciplethereis sometruthin all this.
Moreover:
I am
sensations
ofpain,
andthirst
andsoon,that
Nature
alsoteaches
me,bythese
hunger
inmybodyasa sailor
ina ship,
ispresent
butthatI amvery
notmerely
closely
present
I andthebody
with
with
it(quasi
and,asitwere
), sothat
permixtum
joined
intermingled
form
a unit.
(AT7,81;CSM2,56)
In feelingpain and othersensationsI feelmyself
affected
my
bywhataffects
and
since
there
is
some
to
the
of
not
and
self,
body
body
point
distinguishing
withor
likethis,it is truethatI am as itwereintermingled
truthin teachings
one withmybody.For,as he explains,ifthiswerenot so, ifI werea merely
would not feelpain but would
thinking
thingin thebody,I, qua thinking,
as an
the
insteadperceivethedamagesuffered
bodythroughtheintellect,
by
if
in
his
as
"the
sailor
external
observer,
bysight anything
shipis
perceives
just
broken".
Takeanyotherexample.Supposemyarmor legwas blownoffin an
- something
I wouldnoticeonlybyseeingthelimbthornawayfrom
explosion
or starving,
whenmybodywas dehydrated
therestofmybody.Similarly,
sensations
I should
ofthefact,
instead
ofhaving
confused
haveanexplicit
understanding
but
sensations
ofhunger,
ofhunger
andthirst.
Forthese
thirst,
painandsoonarenothing
of
which
arise
from
theunion
confused
modes
ofthinking
and,asitwere,
intermingling
CSM
themind
andthebody.
7,
81;
2,
(AT
56)
In additionto teachingme about myown bodilystates,naturein thislast
sensealso teachesme thatI, or mybody,is surrounded
byotherbodies,some
are to be soughtout and thelatter
someharmful,
thattheformer
beneficial
avoided.
I perceive
ofcolours,
smells
and
thefact
that
a great
Andfrom
sounds,
bymysenses
variety
I amcorrect
ininferring
that
the
inheat,
aswellasdifferences
hardness
andthelike,
tastes,
corredifferences
which
arethesource
ofthese
various
bodies
sensory
perceptions
possess
notresembling
them.
tothem,
Also,thefactthatsomeofthe
perhaps
sponding
though
itquite
certain
that
to
me
while
others
are
makes
are
my
disagreeable
perceptionsagreeable
me
andmind,
insofarasI form
a composite
orrather
(sive
potius
body,
ofbody
mywhole
self,
beneficial
etmente
sumcompositus),
canbeaffected
excorpore
totum,
bythevarious
quatenus
it."(AT7,81;CSM2,56.Italics
orharmful
bodies
which
surround
added).

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betweenteachings
ofnatureof
It importsto be veryclearaboutthedifference
thiskind,whichpresupposeactualsensoryexperience,
and whatwe can disofnaturein general(naturein thethirdsense),
coverabouttheorderedsystem
lhe latterincludesthetwogeneralattributes
ofextensionand thought,
from
whichanything
underthese(nature
thatcanbe knownaboutthethingsfalling
in thefirst
and thesecondsense)can be derived.All thechangesthatcan hapto
body consideredas a piece of mereextensioncan in principlebe
pen
- similarly,
deducedmathematically
pure,rationalthoughtscan be inferred
fromthesimplenotionsgiventhenormsor lawsof thought.But thereis no
thepain I
wayone could deduceor predict,fromeitherof theseattributes,
suffer
whenmyarmis blownoff,or thewarmnessI enjoywhenthisbodyof
on mysensory
mineis seatedby thefire.I can findthisout onlyby relying
which
the
stimulation
of
my sensoryorgansby
experience,
presupposes
thusand so, with
mymindor thinking
affecting
changesin myenvironment
theseparticular
vividbutconfusedthoughts
thatsensations
characteristically
are forDescartes.20
The waysthoughtsand bodilymotionsare connected,
- i.e., thewaysGod has joinedhumanminds
of nature
giventheinstitution
or disto theirbodies can onlybe foundout byexperience.
Understanding
these
connections
eludes
us.
tinctly
explaining
in the SixthMeditation,what merely
Descartesgoes on to distinguish,
appearsto be taughtbynature,butis in facttheproductofhastyjudgments
and prejudice,fromwhat naturereallyteachesand is reliable.Thus what
of thingsis oftenfalse.
natureappearsto teachme aboutthetrueproperties
On the contrary,
whatevernatureappearsto teachme thatmattersto the
, is- at leastundernormal
wellbeingofmywholeself,theselfas a compositum
circumstancestrustworthy:
Fortheproper
ofthesensory
mebynature
issimply
toinform
purpose
perception
given
ofwhich
themind
ofwhat
isbeneficial
orharmful
forthecompositum
themind
isa part;
clear
andtothisextent
are
and
distinct.
CSM
7,
83;
2,
(AT
57)
they sufficiendy
20)Itdoesnotfollow,
hasargued,
thatsensations
bemodes
ofmind,
asTadSchmalz
cannot
ifthey
because
would
betransparent
Toavoidthis,
heproandwholly
were,
they
intelligible.
unionisa third
kindofsubstance
withanattribute
ofitsown,of
posesthatthemind-body
which
sensations
aremodes.
"Descartes
andMalebranche",
and298.)But
281-325
(Schmalz,
in
this
Descartes
s
the
Passions
the
Soul
that
aremodes
of
claims,
explicit e.g.,
they
goesagainst
of
inthebody,
caused
andthat
there
areonly
twomain
attributes
for
clear
and
bymotions
thought
distinct
ofthings.
onmyreading,
arecomplex
the
states
under
Sensations,
expressed
knowledge
twoattributes
atonce:they
aremodes
ofthought
thatresult
from
theunion
ofthought
with
- asDescartes
- beexperienced
toRegius
(Descartes
bodyandcannot
bypureminds.
explains
ina passage
asI readhim,
viewexpressed
holdsthevery
byMalebranche
bySchmalz,
quoted
"Descartes
andMalebranche",
305).

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[209] 43 1

as everyreaderoftheSixthMeditation
Thingsarenotall thatsimplehowever,
knows.Becauseof thewaysthemindand bodyareput together
to formthe
the
mind
indivisible"
and
the
,
body"byitsnature
compositum
being"utterly
errors
ofnatureareboundto happen.21
alwaysdivisible"ad infinitum,
Errorshappenbecauseas thoseofyouwho havestudiedDescartess physithata givenmotioncaused
ologyknow,"naturehaslaiditdown",forinstance,
in
nerves
from
the
foot
the
should
brain,
by
"producein themindthesensain thefoot".However,thereis somedistanceto the
tionofpain,as occurring
brainfromthefoot,and so theminddoes not distinguish
at whichpointof
theneuraltransmitters
themotionhas begun.Suppose,forinstance,thatthe
nerveis pulledat thelumbarregioninsteadofin thefoot:
willoccurinthebrain
as occurs
whenthefootis hurt,
andso it
...thesamemotion
willnecessarily
thesamesensation
ofpain.(AT7, 87;
comeaboutthatthemindfeels
CSM2,60)
It mayseemall setup formaddoctorsexperimenting
withbrainsin a vatand
forphilosophers
to speculateaboutwhethertherestof thebodyapartform
thecrucialregionsofthebrainhas anyseriousroleto playforourexperience
But we need notworryaboutthatherebecause,as Desbeingwhatit is
we can trustin a benevolent
cartesdeclaresin a moodofLeibnizianoptimism,
in thebestpossibleway,withourgoodas hisgoal.
God whohasordainedthings
inthepart
. . .anygiven
movement
ofthebrain
that
affects
themind
immediately
occurring
be
one
and
hence
the
best
that
could
devised
sensation;
system
produces
just corresponding
isthatitshould
theonesensation
ofallpossible
ismost
which,
sensations,
produce
conducive
tothepreservation
ofthehealthy
man.
Andexperience
shows
that
the
frequently
sensations
which
nature
hasgiven
isabsolutely
usareallofthiskind;
andsothere
nothing
inthem
ofGod.(AT7,
tobefound
that
doesnotbearwitness
tothepower
andgoodness
87-88;CSM2,60)
The motionsoccurringin the brainare linkedwithsensationsthat(given
the union) are mostusefulforpreserving
the
Gods purposesin instituting
21)Heexplains:
"Themind
isnotimmediately
affected
ofthebody,
butonly
bythe
byallparts
which
to
contain
the
orperhaps
one
small
of
the
the
is
said
brain,
brain,
namely part
justby
part
thesamesignals
common
sense.
time
thispart
ofthebrain
isina given
itpresents
state,
Every
ofthebodymaybeina different
atthetime."
tothemind,
eventhough
other
condition
parts
istheconarion
orpineal
sense
forDescartes
(AT7,86;CSM2,59-60)lheseatofthecommon
connection
of
the
and
as
he
states
somewhat
carelessly,
presumably, regular
gland,
speaking,
"this
is established
brain
states
between
andthesignals
bycountless
perceived
bythemind,
which
there
isnoneedtoreview
here"
observations,
(!) (AT7,86;CSM2,60).

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continuedwellbeingofthebody,e.g.,thosesignifying
thirst
whenthelevelof
is
too
low
for
the
to
CSM
7,
88;
2, 61). I am
(AT
liquid
body stayhealthy
over
all
this
familiar
to
note
how
far
Descartes
has
going
very
groundjust
movedfromeffects
thatcould be explainedby invokingmeremechanical
causesand lawsofnaturein thesenseofnatureinventedin Le Monde, which
is and remainstheproperdomainofCartesianphysics.Gods endsthatDescarteshasbannedfromhisphysics,
becausetheyareand remainhiddento us22
are now invokedas something
we are invitedto takeforgranted,relying
on
our dailyexperience.
Descartesseemsto thinkthatwe mayconjecture
about
God s purposesin creating
thingsforpracticaland ethicalpurposes,wherever
- to back everyfinding
we are not required as we arewhendoingphysics
i.e., by clearand distinctproofs(AT 7, 375;
by "thestrongest
arguments",
CSM 2, 258). Thatwe do nothavesuchproofsdoes notmeanthatourconThe ends and valueshereare not arbitrarily
jecturesare groundless.
posited
- theyare,moreover,
butinferred
inductively
bywhatwe canknow
supported
in generalaboutournatureand thatofourcreator
whenwe do ourmetaphysI am taughtthroughrepeatedexperiences
ics properly.
thatifI neglectthat
weak,
tuggingfeelingin my stomachtoo long I will become increasingly
or thatwheneverI feela certaindryness
in mythroat,I needsomeintakeof
liquid,and I mayrelyon thiseventhoughthesameexperience
mayoccasionlead
me
I
were to suffer
fromdropsyand had better
(forinstance,
ally
astray,
avoidfollowing
onceI knowhow
myimpulse).I can alwayscorrect
myerrors
other
I
faculties.23
So
have
to
on
occur,
they
rely my experience
usingmy
on pain of starving
or dyingof thirst,
and I inferthatthefeelingsI relyon
aregivenme,by God or nature,withthispurpose,to servemysurvivaland
forone to rely
wellbeing.Note thatthereis nothingelsethanpastexperience
on here.
Note also thatwhatever
we discoverin following
theteachings
regularities
of nature,and whatwe can inferfromour experience,
arebetweenperceived
22)Fourth
Meditation
DesChene,
Form:
LateAristo(AT7,55;CSM2,39).Cf.Dennis,
Life's
telian
andLondon,
2000).
Conceptions
oftheSoul(Ithaca
23)"Atque
haecconsiderado
nonmodouterrores
omnes
natura
mea
plurimum
juvat,
quibus
abnoxia
estanimadvertam,
sedetiam
utillosautemendare
autvitare
facile
Namsane,
possim.
cumsciamomnes
sensus
circaea,quaead corporis
commodum
multo
spectant,
frequentius
verum
indicare
utifere
exiisadeandem
remexamiquamfalsum,
possimque
semper
pluribus
etinsuper
cumpraecedentibus
etintellectu,
nandam,
memoria,
connectit,
quaepraesentia
quijam
omnes
errandi
causas
nonamplius
vereri
debeoneilla,quaemihi
a sensibus
perspexit;
quotidie
sintfalsa,
sedhyperbolicae
dierum
utrisudignae,
sunt
exhibentur,
dubitationes,
superiorum
(AT7,89;CSM2,61)
explodendae."

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[211] 433

external
thingsor internalstatesofthebody,and ourdesiresand beliefs.The
observedare thus, strictlyspeaking,betweensensations,i.e.,
regularities
of
a
thoughts certainkind,and beliefsaboutwhatcausesthem,i.e., thoughts
ofanotherkind.The thoughts
and vivid,
maybe clearin thesenseofmanifest
none
of
them
are
and
what
matters
here
are
distinct,
very
though
regularpatternsofassociationbetweenthem,whichI havereliedon successfully
before.
The tuggingfeelingin mystomachunfailingly
bringsthethoughtof foodto
of natureDescartesinvokesin theSixthMeditation
mymind.The teachings
do notinvolveanyobservations
aboutconnections
betweenneuralmotionsor
brainstatesand thoughts.
The latterkindofregularities
areand remainpurely
aboutmybodilynaturein thesense
speculative,
theybelongto postulations
in Cartesianphysics.
ofnatureinvented
Thisis notto saythatsuchsensations,
theirvariationsof intensity
and correlations
withstimulicould not be the
Butone mustaskwhatabouttheembodobjectsofempiricalinvestigations.24
in different
ied mindapartfromtheoccurrences
conditionsofdifferent
types
of sensationsand beliefssuch investigations
could reveal.Theyinformus at
bestoftheneuro-physiological
mechanisms
certainkindsofexpeunderlying
no lighton the contentof thoseexperiences,
which
rience,but contribute
on
one
s
former
and
the
whole
context
of
wellbeliefs,
depends
experiences
basedor not,thatprovidethemwiththeirmeaning.
5. Materialand FormalPrinciplesofExplanation
Descartesmayhaverealizedthelimitsof his conceptof physicalnatureand
henceof mathematical
He
physicsin his senseof thewordonlygradually.
seemsto havecome out defeatedfromthequestioningon thistopicthathis
smartestand most admiredstudent,PrincessElizabeth,put him through,
whenshe demandedan explanationof themind-bodyinteraction.
The best
he can do is to spellout,in termsof thethreeprimary
a
distinction
notions,
kinds
I, art. 48, when listingdifferent
alreadyhintedat in the Principles
of objectsof cognition.Thereare onlytwo ultimateclassesof things,thinkwiththeirrespective
modes.He nowadds to these"certain
ingand extended,
otherthingswhichmustnot be referred
eitherto the mind alone or the
24)Descartess
abouttheneural
connections
instituted
asHatfield
speculations
bynature
may,
havesettheframework
for
later
century
experargues,
empirical
investigations,
e.g.,ofthe19th
imental
ofrelations
between
stimulus
andsensation.
SeeGary
Hatfield,
psychologists,
physical
inDescartes'
"Descartess
Naturalism
abouttheMental",
Natural
, ed.Gaukroger,
Philosophy
Schuster
andSutton,
644ff.

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body alone", but "arisefromthe close and intimateunion of our mind

and body".
Thislistincludes,
likehunger
andthirst;
theemotions
orpassions
first,
secondly,
appetites
ofthemind
which
donotconsist
suchastheemotions
ofanger,
alone,
joy,sadness
ofthought
andlove;andfinally,
allthesensations,
suchas thoseofpain,pleasure,
colours,
light,
hardness
andtheother
tactile
sounds,
smells,
tastes,
heat,
(AT8A,23;CSM2,
qualities
209.Italics
added)
Thesearemodesdependingon bothmindand bodyas unitedand aresaid to
be "experienced"
as suchbyus- so taughtbynature.Theincreased
beatofmy
heartrateand thetrembling
ofmylimbscan be independently
but
observed,
I
I
can
feel
the
fear
that
the
of
the
threat
am
under
and
slim
only
my
thoughts
chancesof escapesimultaneously
producesin me. This does not mean that
othersobserving
me could not also see thatI am frightened,
but in orderto
state
as
fear
need
to
know
about
the
contextand
identify
my
they
something
thereasonforwhichI am trembling.
Fearis a complexpsycho-somatic
phenomenonthatcannotbe reducedto eithertypeofmode- mentalorbodilycomposingit.25
Contraryto whatDescartessuggestsin thisconnection,we do not learn
muchlaterabouthowthesephenomenaarisefromtheunion.The reference
is
to articles188-203ofpartIV ofthePrinciples
. We therelearnthathisoriginal
planwas to writetwofurther
parts:a fifth
parton animalsand plants,and a
sixthparton man. "But I am not yetcompletely
clearaboutall thematters
whichI wouldliketo dealwiththere,and I do notknowwhetherI shallever
haveenoughfreetimeto completethesesections."(AT 8A,312; CSM 2, 279)
So he borrowsagainfromhis earlierworkto explainwhatsensationis and
how it operates.Addingto theearlieraccountshe now also mentionshow
mentalstateslike imaginations
can cause bodilychanges.Imaginingsomeor
for
instance,
thingpleasant,
receiving
goodnewscausesjoy,and thesomatic
this
in
involves
contribute
their
turnto sustainthe emotionprochanges
duced,keepingthemindfocusedon thethingsimagined.Emotionsare"confused thoughts,which the mind does not derivefromitselfalone but
as a resultof something
experiences
happeningto thebodywithwhichit is
and
as
such
fromrational
different
closelyconjoined",
theyare completely
aboutwhatis worthy
ofdesireand pursuitandwhatis not.(AT 8A,
thoughts
117; CSM 2, 281) Descartesobviously
appeals,withoutexplicitly
mentioning
25)Compare
theremarks
innote29.
from
Aristode
below
quoted

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[213] 435

of nature.26
He explainsthatwhile"we understand
it,to theinstitution
very
ofthebodycan
wellhowthedifferent
size,shapeand motionoftheparticles
producevariouslocal motionsin anotherbody.. . thereis no wayof under(size, shape and motion)can produce
standinghow thesesame attributes
is
fromtheirown."Yetwe know
else
whose
nature
different
quite
something
that"thenatureofourmind"is suchthatthishappens,for"weactuallyexperiencethevarioussensationsas theyareproducedin thesoul,and we do not
findthatanythingreachesthe brainfromthe externalsenseorgansexcept
formotionsof thiskind".We thushave"everyreasonto conclude"thatthe
propertiesin externalobjectsto whichwe apply the termsof sensations
or sensoryqualitiesare "simplyvariousdispositionsin thoseobjectswhich
makethemable to setup variouskindsofmotionsin ournerves"which- by
- producethevarioussensationsin the soul. (AT 8A,
dispositionof nature
322-323; CSM 2, 285)
how it happensmerely
We takeall thisforgrantedwithoutunderstanding
it. One mightobjectthattheappealto theinstitution
becausewe experience
ofnaturein thiscontextis an appealto thegeneralorderofthingsestablished
by God- i.e., to naturein thethirdsenseabove.That orderwould include
thelawsofnaturelaid downbyGod in creatingextendedmatter(instantiatin Le monde).
senseofnaturethatDescartesintroduces
ingnaturein thefirst
- naturein
If so, the institution
of naturehere(concerninghumannature
thefourth
sense)wouldbe buta specialcase oftheapplicationofthelawsof
- suitablyextendedperhapswith psycho-physical
nature
bridging
physical
sucha readlaws.Thereare,as we haveseen,seriousreasonsforquestioning
ofnaturetowhichDescartesappealsin thiscontextapplies
ing.Theinstitution
to
the
waysin whichthehumanmindand bodyhavebeen
only
particular
God
to
composethe unitywe can onlyexperience(but not disjoined by
tinctlyunderstand).It presupposes,of course,the generalorderof things
establishedby God (naturein the thirdsense),but in so faras thatorder
accessto it
as wellas hiscreationofthingsourcognitive
includesGod himself
for
we
have
The twomainattributes
is limited.27
thingsclearlyand
conceiving
26)Heclaims:
occurrence
issuchthat
themere
thenature
ofourmind
"Itcanalsobeproved
that
which
haveno
ofthoughts
ittohaveallmanner
inthebodycanstimulate
ofcertain
motions
wecall
true
oftheconfused
inquestions.
Thisisespecially
likeness
tothemovements
thoughts
inusmerely
ofpainisexcited
orfeelingsWeclearly
see. . . thatthesensation
sensations
by
with
sowemayconclude
another
ofourbodyincontact
thelocalmotion
ofsomeparts
body;
asa
sensations
toalltheother
issuchthat
itcanbesubject
thenature
ofourmind
that
merely
CSM2,284)
ofother
localmotions."
result
(AT8A,320-321;
27)I discuss
onourknowledge
ofGodinLilliAlanen,
Descartes
sview
Modality
"Omnipotence,

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distinctly
presentmaterialand thinking
thingsas mutually
independent
separateobjectsof cognition,so do nothelp,buthinderus fromconceivingdis- unitiesof mind and
tinctlythe unitytheycompose.Yet human beings
ofGod too so arepartofthegeneralorderhe established.
body arecreations
This generalorderof things,consequently,
extendsbeyondthatof the two
naturesto whichwe can accesscognitively
in termsofclearand distinct
rational concepts:it is not exhaustedby the mechanicallaws determining
the
motionsof extendedmatteron theone hand,completedbyideologicaland
morallawsgoverning
rationalthinking
on theother.It comprises
phenomena
we clearlyexperienceeven thoughwe cannotdistinctly
accountforthem,
hencetheappeal to yetanothernature(thefourthsenseof nature)specially
instituted
ofnaturein any
byGod. Descartesneverappealsto theinstitution
othercontextthanthatofhumannature,
andhe needsithereprecisely
because
humannatureeludescomprehension
in termsoftheconceptsofthoughtand
extensionand cannotbe derivedfromeither.Human naturehad to be spefora specialpurposewe can at besthavemerelymoralcerciallyinstituted,
about
it
does not flowfromGods immutability
in the way the
tainty
ofmotionornecessity
ofeternaltruths
do. The regularities
quantity
governing
it as wellas theendstheyservecannotbe derivedin anyotherwaythanby
The teleologybanishedfromCartesianphilosophyof nature,reexperience.
enterswithhis theodicyin theFourthand theSixthMeditationsin thecontextof accountingforour errorsas finite,willingand embodiedcreatures.
aboutendsand purposesas we sawarealso acceptableforpractiSpeculations
cal purposesin ethics.What is excludedfromphysicsis not onlyacceptable
but a necessaryrequirement
ethics
(or postulation)forhumanpsychology,
and practicalrationality.
and practicalrationality
Here,in so faras psychology
areconcerned,Descartesseemssimplyto followtheverytradition
he rejects
in hisphilosophy
ofnature.
as it evolvedin thetradition
ofScholasticDe AnimacommenPsychology
- not becauseof any
tarieswas indeedpartand parcelof naturalphilosophy
reduction
ofsoulto matterbutbecausetheveryprinciples
ofnaturalphilosothehumansoulbeingtheformofthehumanbody
phywereformand matter:
belongswithotherthingscomposedofformand matteramongtheobjectsof
naturalphilosophy.28
Des Chenes rightly
stressesthe importanceof seeing
andConceivability
toDescartes
andJ.Carriero
' inA Companion
, ed.byJ.Broughton
(Oxford,
forthcoming).
28)Thusina presentation
ofthesciences
intheprolegomenon
toToletus
onAriscommentary
- a work
- thepartonDe anima
totle's
Descartes
issaidtodealwith
Physics
mayhavestudied

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[215] 437

What he had to
of thisliterature.
Descartessprojectagainstthebackground
no
of
a
unified
science
where
was
an
edifice
phenomenon
impressive
replace
to outlinea modern
was leftbehind.Descartesis oftenseenas one ofthefirst
to the
versionofa unifiedscience.Whatis striking,
comparinghisenterprise
one he wantsto replace,is nothow muchis includedunderthenewphysics,
how muchofwhatused to be includedin thetraditional
but rather,
philosoin thetraditional
senseis one example:
is leftout. Psychology
pha naturalis
soul or mindis severedfrommatteronce and forall and can thusnotbe the
withmatterand motionand
objectofCartesianphysicsthatdealsexclusively
Ifwewant
material
and mechanicalprinciples.
whatcan be explainedthrough
oftheanimalmachine"animal
ofthefunctions
to callDescartess explanations
we might
himself
or
as
Hatfield
suggests,"bodypsychology",
psychology",
remembered
but
it
should
be
well
call
it
"machine
as
simply
psychology",
just
himself
can represent
thatsuchexplanations
onlyone aspectofwhatAristotle
that
the
natural
scientist
phenomena
psychological
investigating
thought
of the
shouldoccupyhimselfwith,the otherbeingthe formor definition
that
a
"dialectician".29
phenomenon require
onthesoul,likesleep,
lhefunctions
thesoulthat
iscommon
toalltheliving
depending
things,
inParva
themselves
i.e.
with
naturalia.
Animate
were
dealt
youth,
things
age,lifedeath
waking,
inHistoria
animalium
andDe
animalium
andinDepartibus
animals
andplants,
were
treated
in
Natural
inDennis
DesChene,
isquoted
Toletus
Philosophy
Physiologia.
commentary
plantiis.
for
an
invaluable
source
and
LateAristotelian
andCartesian
London,
1996)
(Ithaca
Thought
confronted
andwanted
toreplace.
about
thetradition
Descartes
knowledge
29)Consider
ofemotions
oraffections
ofthesoulthathe characterizes
Aristotle's
account
affections
ofthebody.
Their
definitions
involve
concurrent
accounts"
because
"emmattered
they
theformal
the
material
cause
but
also
and
reflect
this:
should
should
importantly
they
provide
bedefined
asa certain
modeofmovement
writes:
should
orfinal
causes.
Aristotle
"[E].g.anger
end.
orfaculty
ofa body)
causeforthisorthat
ofsuchandsucha body(orpart
bythisorthat
- must
- either
fall
soulorsoulsofthissort
ofthesoul
Thatisprecisely
every
whythestudy
which
It
is
Anima
1.1.
Aristotelian
ofnature"
within
thescience
403a26-28).
{De
hylomorphism
is
theframework
ofwhich
science
ofnature
ofAristotelian
makes
ita suitable
{episteme)
object
inDesofnature
ismuch
than
ashere
defined
Science
ofnature
philosophy
larger
teleological.
accounts"
them
which
andwith
cartess
sense
excludes
any"emmattered
hylomorphism,
teleology
the
material
causes
accounted
that
ofthekind
Aristotle
andhisfollowers
with,
comprises
operate
Aristotle
those
a narrow
sense
forbythephysicist
and,inaddition,
bythedialectician.
given
the
from
a dialectician;
ofthesouldifferently
woulddefine
anaffection
writes
"...a physicist
likethat,
orsomething
forreturning
astheappetite
latter
would
define
painforpain,
e.g.anger
the
ofthebloodorwarm
substance
itasa boiling
while
theformer
would
define
surrounding
oraccount;
for
what
hestates
theother
theform
thematerial
heart.
Theoneassigns
conditions,
ofitina
there
must
beembodiment
foritsactual
existence
ofthefact,
istheaccount
though
Aristotle
concludes
material
suchasitisdescribed
{Deanima1.1.403a29-b33)
bytheother."

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Farfromincludinganimaland humanphysiology
as partofwhatwas traunderstood
as
a
broader
science
of
life
ditionally
includingbiology,
physiology
and psychology,
Descartes,as Dennis des Chene has shown,eliminatedthe
(orreduced)livingthingsto a species
conceptoflifeas a kindand transformed
ofmachines.Theyhavewhatlookslikea restricted
but
capacityofself-motion
in factis nothingbut a passivepowerof beingheldin motionundercertain
- foranimalsincludinghumans,as longas a certainfire,procircumstances
requiredto keeptheanimalspiritsin motion,keepsburnducingthepressure
in
their
.
hearts
.
.30
ing
The capacityforself-motion
is reserved
properly
byDescartesforwhatthe
Aristotelians
took to be the highestkind of soul, humanmind or reason,
whichin theCartesianstoryhad to be separately
createdbyGod and joined
to thehumanbody.31
Butthatdoes notmakeit supernatural,
and thenatural
- one,I takeit,doing
thatthe"genuine
ofnature
inthesense
science
hethinks
it
physicist"
- "ishewhoconcerns
bedone
should
himself
with
alltheproperties
active
andpassive
ofbodies
ormaterials
thus
andsodefined"
1.1.403b8-13).
Allthese
arediscovered
(DeAnima
properties
observation
of
the
characteristic
activities
of
the
ensouled
human
through
empirical
beings.
30)SeeDesChene,
& Clocks
, Introduction
p [2-3]and1998.
Spirits
31)I havesuggested
inother
contexts
thatDescartes's
notion
ofthemind-body
union
canbe
seenasa paradigm
instantiation
oftheAristotelian
ideaofanimmaterial
form
matter.
informing
SeeLilliAlanen,
"Descartes's
Dualism
andthePhilosophy
ofMind",
Revue
deMtaphysique
etde
Morale
Cf.Schmalz,
"Descartes
andMalebranche".
Thismayseem
, No.3 (1989),391-413.
theCartesian
transformation
oftheconcepts
ofmatter
andmind,
with
quite
inappropriate
given
theensuing
ofthehierarchy
offorms
theAristotelian
kosmos.
There
areno
rejection
structuring
inCartesian
matter
thatcouldbeactualized
intheform
ofthinking,
lhe point
potentialities
Descartes
ininvoking
himself
wants
tomake
with
associated
Scholastic
in
forms
powers
respondisthat
thevery
Aristotelian
ideaofsouls
andforms
matter,
ingtoElisabeths
question,
informing
- stones,
- asthefinal
material
andanimals
causes
oftheir
is
moving
things
organisms,
changes,
derived
from
ourhuman
of
moved
desired
orintended
endsinacting.
What
experience
by
being
Descartes
inAristotelianism
isnottherecognition
ofthisfamiliar
ofactopposes
phenomenon
ourbodyaccordingly,
butitsillegitimate
extension
toserve
as an
ingforendsandmoving
model
fornatural
motions
Asheexplains
toElisabeth,
soisconfusexplanatory
generally.
doing
wehaveofexperiencing
ourselves
united
with
andbeing
acted
i.e.,ofacting
ingthenotion
body,
with
the
kind
of
force
that
on
mindless
like
the
bodies,
uponbybody,
operates
supposed
quality
ofheaviness
doesinstones:
"Parexemple,
ensupposant
estunequalit
relle,
quelapesanteur
dontnousn'avons
dautre
sinon
demouvoir
lecorps,
dans
connaissance,
point
quellea laforce
elleest,
vers
lecentre
delaterre,
nousnavons
concevoir
comment
ellemeut
lequel
pasdepeine
ce corps,
nicomment
elleluiestjointe;
etnousnepensons
pointquecelase fasse
parun
attouchement
reldunesuperficie
contre
uneautre,
carnousexprimentons,
ennous-mmes,
unenotion
malde
cela;etje crois
quenousavons
particulire
pourconcevoir
quenoususons
cette
enl'appliquant
la pesanteur,
ducorps,
notion;
quinestriende rellement
distingu
comme
montrer
enlaPhysique,
maisqu'elle
nousa tdonne
lafaon
j'espre
pourconcevoir
dontl'me
meut
lecorps."
Letter
toElisabeth,
21may1643(AT3,667;CSMK219).

15:40:27 PM

L.Alanen
/Vivarium
46 (2008)418-442

[217] 439

withthematerial
world.32
Butphysics,
worldforDescartesis notco-extensive
as we haveseen,extendsto thelatterkindofnaturealone,natureas definedin
Le mondein thepassagequoted above.So fromthefactthatDescartesand
consideredsome aspectsof the humanmind to be,
manyof his followers
of
the
union
mind
and body,partofnature,itdoesnotfollowthathe
through
thattheseaspectswereexplainable
thelawsofphysics
ortheythought
through
as theyconceivedofit.
6. Scientiaand theMetaphorof Philosophyas a Tree
Let me finally
turnto Scientiain thewide sensewithwhichDescartesmust
itis supposed
havebeenfamiliar.
He setsitup as an idealin hisearlywritings:
also forpractical
to providecertainknowledgethatcan serveas a foundation
if
it
is
at
least
worked
out in the
and
never
realized
fully
rationality,
partly
34with
.33
to
the
Aristotelian
ideal
of
It
has
been
compared
epistem
Principles
sciwhichit has morein commonthanwithmodernideasofa universalistic
in thesenseof
ence. LikeAristotle's
ideal of episteme
, it is all-encompassing
includingan accountof thesubjectof knowledgeitselfand itsplace in the
generalorderof things,and also an orderingaccordingto theirvalueof the
different
domainsof cognition.It is thisbroadsensewhichis intendedby
Descarteswhenhe writesto Elisabeththatall humanscienceconsists"solely
in properly
notionsfromeachotherand
these[threeprimitive]
distinguishing
Thissamebroad
eachofthemonlyto thethingstheypertainto."35
attributing
32)Thisisalsopointed
s Naturalism",
outbyHatfield,
"Descartes
636.
33)Cf.note6 above.
34)Asunderstood
iswhat
onehasingrasping
inthePosterior
(100al4-bl3).
Analytics
Episteme
than
a proof
oftheconclusion,
that
Aristotelian
domore
provide
granting
syllogism
syllogisms,
ofwhy
the
inaddition,
hasargued,
toprovide
aresupposed
asMyles
Burnyet
understanding
they
in
would
be
thinks
that
fact
andforthisreason,
conclusion
holds,
"understanding" a
Burnyeat
than"knowledge"
or"scientific
better
translation
ofepisteme
(Cf.MilesBurnyeat,
knowledge".
: Proceedings
inAristotle
onScience
"Aristotle
onUnderstanding
ofthe8thSymposium
Knowledge",
inanunpublished
Carriero
Aristo
ed.byE. Berti
97-139,
telicum,
1981),
(Padua,
byJohn
quoted
I
Underto
which
owe
this
the
Cartesian
Circle"
and
Scientia,
(1998)
point.)
paper,
"Cognitio,
Scientia
than
characterize
with
rather
and
certainty,
justification,
together
standing explanation
ForDescartes,
theexplanatory
inthissense,
which
withtheexplanatory
order.
isconcerned
ofourthinkwhich
istheobject
ofphysics,
matter
order
involves
ofGod,ofextended
cognition
and
of
the
which
is
the
of
nature
as
created
God,
phenomena
belonging
by
object metaphysic
ing
which
ofsensory
nature
aretheobject
toourembodied
experience.
35)"Jeconsidre
ces
neconsiste
aussiquetoute
la science
deshommes
qu'biendistinguer
ellesappartiennent."
et n'attribuer
chacune
d'elles
notions,
(AT3,
qu'auxchoses
auxquelles
665-666;
CSMK218)

15:40:27 PM

440 [218]

L.Alanen
/Vivarium
46 (2008)418-442

sensecan be seen at workin the letterprefacing

the Frencheditionof the
where
Descartes
what
explains
Principles
philosophyis, namely"thestudyof
wisdom"where"wisdom'la sagesse]
is takento mean"notonlyprudencein
oureveryday
affairs
butalso a perfect
ofall thingsthatmankindis
knowledge
of
both
for
the
conduct
of
life
and
thepreservation
ofhealth
capable knowing,
and theinventionof all thearts."(AT 9B, 2-3; CSM 1, 180) All thethings
mankindis capableofknowingforDescartesis comprehended
bywhatcanbe
deducedfromtheirfirst
causesorprinciples
whichmustthemselves
be so clear
and evidentthattheycannotbe doubted,i.e., thosethathe laysout in his
in PartOne ofthePrinciples
Meditations
and summarizes
(AT 9B, 3-20). Scientiain thisbroadsenserecognizes
theroleandvalueofthethirdkindof,lets
call it "practical
constituted
notjustofsensoryexperience
ofthe
knowledge",
union
also
of
whatever
in the
but
lesson
one
have
learnt
itself,
mind-body
may
courseof ones life.This experiencegatheredfromones ordinary
life,from
conversations
and interactions
withfellowhumanbeingsin dailyaffairs,
interin
the
of
dualism
and
the
limits
this
on
i.e.,
pretedproperly,
puts the
light
and universalistic
reductionist
claimsof physicalscience,has its own legitimate partto playwithinScientiaor "truephilosophy".It constitutes,
one
could say,thesoil fromwhichtheCartesiantreeof philosophyspringsand
thatitsfruitsin theirturnaresupposedto enrich.It is a kindof knowledge
evenwhenit fallsshortof thecertainty
and distinctness
thatthescienceof
naturehasas itsidealbutitcanat leastaspireat moralcertainty.
A clearinsight
intotheconditionsof perfect
in handwith
hand
moreover,
knowledge,
goes
therecognition
thatitsidealscannotbe metin thedomainofdailylifewhere
is exercised.
practicalrationality
thatgoesbeyondthephysiology
ofperception
Thus,thepartofpsychology
andemotions,
forinstance,
theclassification
andanalysisofconfusedthoughts
likesensationsand passions,falloutsidethedomainswherestrictcriteria
for
evidenceand demonstration
humanpassions
apply.Qua modesof thinking
- becauseof theirconfusednature
- be
arenot partof physics,norcan they
of
a
rationalistic
on
or
ratioobjects
separate
psychology
relying introspection
nal speculation.To the extenttheyhave bodilyexpressions
and behavioral
effects
in somewide
theymayindeedbe objectsofa behavioristic
psychology
senseof theword.But thattoo wouldhaveto relyheavilyon commonsense
of and interaction
experienceand whatwe learnthroughdailyobservation
withfellowhumanbeings,and cannottherefore
count as an extensionof
ofnature.
physicsin Descartess senseofphilosophy
As hereunderstood,
CartesianScientiais broaderthanphilosophy
ofnature
and rationalpsychologyor metaphysicstaken together.It encompasses

15:40:27 PM

L.Alanen
/Vivarium
46 (2008)418-442

[219] 441

bothand allowsin additionfora third,lessperfect

but irreplaceable
formof
in
which
is
also
its
irreducible
kind.
The
moral
and
cognition
psychology ethicsone findsin Lespassionsde l'meflowsneitherfromphysicsnorfromphysicsinanycombination
withrationalpsychology,
althoughtheymaypresuppose
both.In Descartess familiar
is comparedto a treewhich
metaphor
Philosophy
can be dividedin threeparts,of whichthe first,metaphysics,
providesthe
rootsorthefirst
of
with
all
"the
clear
and
principles knowledge
simplenotions
withinus", thesecond,physicscontains"theprinciplesof materialthings",
in "alltheothersciences"(AT IIB, 14; CSM 1, 186).
and thethirdconsisting
The wordingis vagueenoughto leaveit open whetherthe investigation
of
manbelongsto physicsor to thespecialsciences,i.e., to thebranchesemergingfromthetrunk,ofwhichmedicine,mechanicsand moralsaretheprinci"
"
pal ones.Whicheverviewon takes,it mustbe recognizedthatif l'homme
standsforanyhere,in thecontextofthemetaphorofthetreeofphilosophy,
describedbymechanistic
physiolthingaboveand beyondthebody-machine
it
owes
a
like
the
morals
that
out
of
the
to
thefirst
lot,
tree,
just
ogy,
grows
that
constitute
its
roots
and
the
soil
of
dailyexperiprinciples
metaphysical
encefromwhichtheyspring.It cannotbe stressed
enoughthatthephysiology
ofsenseperception
and emotionswhichareobjectsofCartesianphysicsor its
coversverylimitedaspectsof human nature.The
extension,
physiological
of
phenomenology perception,as well as beliefs,motivation,intentional
- briefly
ofreasonsand passions
mostofthephenomena
action,theinterplay
thatpsychologyin general,and moral psychologyin particularaspireto
explain,falloutsideCartesianscienceof nature.None of thisis to say that
Descartesmaynothaveentertained
theideaofextending
hisscienceofnature
to includehumannatureor aspectsofit at somepoints.He did not- indeed
- takethatidea veryfar.
couldnotas I haveargued

Bibliography
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Revue
deMtaphysique
etde
Dualism
andthePhilosophy
Alanen,
Lilii,"Descartes's
Morale
, No.3 (1989),391-413.
Mass.& London,
, Descartes's
2003).
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tonandJ.Carriero
(Oxford,
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forthcoming
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ernPhilosophy
issue
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, ed.byM.Kisner,
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Works
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Aristotle,
(Princeton,
1995).
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Baruch
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(Princeton,
byE. Curley
ofSpinoza,
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inDescartes
"Cartesian
Natural
Annie,
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Physiology"
Philosophy
Schuster
and
349-382.
Sutton,
J.
J.
roger,
A Companion
& Carnero,
toDescartes
(eds.),
(Oxford,
Janet
John
Broughton,
forthcoming).
Deborah
andthePassionate
Mind(Cambridge,
Brown,
2006).
J.,Descartes
"Aristotle
onUnderstanding
inAristotle
onScience
: Proceedings
Miles,
Burnyeat,
Knowledge",
of
the8thSymposium
ed.byE. Berti
97-139.
Aristotelicum,
(Padua,
1981),
Descartes's
Clarke,
Desmond,
2003)
Theory
ofMind(Oxford,
ABiography
, Descartes.
2006).
(Cambridge,
onActions
andEvents
Davidson,
Donald,
(Oxford,
1980).
Essays
inEssays
onActions
andEvents
, "Mental
Events",
, 207-227.
There
Bea Science
ofRationality",
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inQuestion,
ed.M.deCaro&
, "Could
D. Macarthur
Mass.& London,
2004),152-169.
(Cambridge,
Natural
inLateAristotelian
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DesChene,
Dennis,
Physiologia.
Philosophy
Thought
& London,
(Ithaca
1996).
Form:
LateAristotelian
& London,
, Life's
2000).
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Machines
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inDescartes
& London,
, Spirits
(Ithaca
2001).
deDescartes
12vols.,
revised
edition
Descartes,
Ren,Oeuvres
, ed.C. AdamandP.Tannery,
(Paris,
1964-76).
translation
& R.StoothofF
, The
byJ.Cottingham
Philosophical
Writings
ofDescartes,
English
& D. Murdoch,
2 vols.(Cambridge,
1985).
vol.3: TheCorrespondence
, The
1991).
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(Cambridge,
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Descartes'
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(LonJohn
John
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Philosophy
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Descartes
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2003),
Gary,
inDescartes'
Naturalism
about
theMental",
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ed.S. Gauk, "Descartes's
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& J.Sutton,
630-658.
roger
Terence
Materialism
andtheExplanatory
ofPsycholE.,"Nonreductive
Horgan,
Autonomy
- A Critical
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ed.S. J.Wagner
& R. Warner
Dame,
(Notre
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Appraisal,
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1993),295-320.
Interaction
andSubsumption",
in Early
Moelern
Loeb,LouisE., "TheMind-Body
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Matter,
, ed.C. Mercer
Philosophy
Metaphysics
2005),47-64.
TadM.,"Descartes
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ThePhilosophical
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Schmalz,
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inDescartes'
ofNature",
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ed.S. Gaukroger,
Verbeek,
Theo,"TheInvention
Philosophy,
andJ.Sutton,
149-167.
J.Schuster
"Descartes
andtheCorporeal
Mind.SomeImplications
oftheRegius
Wilson,
Catherine,
in Descartes'
Natural
ed.
S.
and
Affair",
Schuster,
J.
J. Sutton,
Philosophy, Gaukroger,
631-659.

15:40:27 PM

y s*
'v
BRILL

VIVA
RIUM
www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium
46 (2008)443-461

Marin

Cureau

de la Chambre

on the Natural

Cognition of the Vegetative Soul:

An Early Modern Theory of Instinct

MarkusWild
Berlin
Humboldt-Universitt,

Abstract
- steering
between
theAristoMarinCureaudeLa Chambre
a middleway
According
and
ofthesoul- everything
thatlivescognizes
totelian
andtheCartesian
conception
of
sticks
with
the
distinction
that
is
alive.
Cureau
tripart
general
cognizes
everything
of
soul
has
its
own
and
intellectual
soul.
Each
the
sensitive,
part
cognition.
vegetative,
andenvironisthewayinwhichliving
bodilyequilibirum
Cognition
beingsregulate
or
is
mentalnavigation.
Thisregulative
byacquired byinnate
activity gouverned
is
innate
Natural
(or
instinct)
by
imagesonly.Cureau
cognition
cognition
images.
instinct.
His theory
of
natural
a
(or
theory
specialized')
develops highly
originel
of
instinct
to
five
features
(innateness,
specialization,
species-specifitiy,
attemptsexplain
a
tomyinterpretation,
Cureauproposes
coerciveness,
nature).
According
ideological
a
of
innate
of
what
is
called
'teleosemantic
theory'
cognition.
species
Keywords
teleosemantics
sensitive
instinct,
soul,vegetative
soul,cognition,
image,
1. Introduction
thenameof theFrenchphysiof the 17thcentury,
Amongthephilosophers
of Ren DescartesMarin Cureau de
and contemporary
cian, philosopher,
we
not themostillustrious.1
la Chambre(1594-1669) is certainly
Therefore,
1}Forgeneral
dela Chambre
MarinCureau
accounts
ofCureaus
work
andlifeseeIlseFrster,
inFrankreich
Literatur
EinBeitrag
zurGeschichte
derpsychomoralischen
1594-1675.
(Breslau,
"Marin
Cureau
deLaChambre",
Diamond,
1936),Salomon
Journal
oftheHistory
ofBehavioral
dansl'oeuvre
de
Lescorps
immatriels.
etimages
4 (1968)40-54,
Albert
Science
Darmon,
Esprits
dela Chambre
Marin
Cureau
(Paris,
1985),5-16.
(1594-1669)
Koninklijke
Brill
2008
Leiden,
NV,

DOI:10.1
163/156853408X360993

15:40:36 PM

444 [222]

M. Wild/Vivarium
46 (2008)443-461

first
haveto setthestageforhisentry.I willdo thisbya verybriefconsiderationofthetransformation
fromtheAristotelian
soul to theCartesianmind,
followedby a more extensiveexaminationof the earlymodernnotionof
instinct.2

2. AristotelianSoul, CartesianMind, and Cureau'sProposal

The notionof the soul Descartesrejectsis not the same as Aristotle's
but a
historical
claimthatthesoul is thatin
descendantof it. WhileAristotelians
virtueof whicha livingbeingis alive,Cartesianshold thatlivingbeingsare
ofthesoul- suchas repropartofthephysicalworld,and thevitalfunctions
duction,nutrition,
appetite,sensationand pergrowth,decay,self-motion,
The
ception are to be explainedin termsof matterand its properties.
and
sensitive
life-functions
are
no
of
the
because
soul,
vegetative
longerpart
whenCartesianssay thataniTherefore,
theyare explanatorily
superfluous.
malsdo nothavesouls,theyarenotdenyingthatanimalsliveand perceive.3
What theysayis something
likethis:"Asfaras life-functions
are concerned
and
are
we
sensitive
souls
can
do
betterwithuseless,
explanatorily
vegetative
out them."4Still,Cartesiansretainsomething
similarto theintellectual
soul,
2)Inanappendix
entitled
estlaConnaissance
desbestes
etjusques
oellepeutaller'to
"Quelle
Lescharactres
despassions
asPassions)
Cureau
articulated
thetheory
ofinstinct
forthefirst
(cited
time.
Theappendix
inthenewedition
isreprinted
ofTrait
delaconnaissance
desanimaux
(cited
as Trait,
cf.Trait,
After
thesevere
onCureaus
viewthat
animals
reason
315-366).
critique
by
theCartesian
Pierre
Chanet
etdela connaissance
desanimaux,
avec
{De L'instinct
physician
l'examen
decequeM.delaChambre
a crit
surcette
matire
defendend
, 1646),Cureau
extensively
hisviewintheTrait
further
in
In
discussion
over
animal
instinct.
hisfinal
, without
engaging
workSystme
del'me(citedas Systme)
hereasserted
andexpanded
theoriginal
of
theory
instinct.
3)SeeHenri
11.12.1648:
Moresletter
toDescartes
"Caeterum
nulltuarum
aniopinionum
musmeus,
e
est
mollitie
ac
ac
ab
internecin
ill
&
teneritudine,
abhorret,
pro qu
aeque
brutis
omnibus
vitam
sententi,
tulisti,
iugulatrice
quamin Methodo
sensumque
eripiens,
anpotius
vixisse
Desdicam,
(ATV,243)Compare
praeripiens?
Nequeenim
unquam
pateris."
cartes
answer
toMores
"vitam
enim
nulli
animali
21.02.1649:
complaint
utpote
quam
denego,
insolocordis
calore
consistere
statuo.
etiam
aborgano
corsensum,
[.. .] necdenego
quatenus
(ATV,278).
poreo
dependet."
4)In theworkTrait
del'meetdela connaissance
desbtes
Cartesian
(1676)oftheradical
Antoine
oftheanimal
soulhasa decisive
function:
"LaconoisDillythequestion
demarcating
sance
decette
estabsolument
necessaire
delaPhilosophie:
question
pourlaparfaite
intelligence
carsoitqu'onse range
a costdesphilosophes
ou qu'avec
le grand
nouveaux,
qu'onappelle
nombre
& etlafoule
ousetienne
attach
laphilosophie
desAnciens
& principalement
celle
d'Aristote."
Cf.Albert
Studies
Balz,Cartesian
(NewYork,
1951),106.

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[223] 445

becausetheCartesiansoul is thethinking
thing,distinctfromthebody,and
thesubjectofmentalactssuchas believingor desiring.
To clarify
his rejectionof theAristotelian
conceptionDescartesdismisses
the notionof "soul" (anima), and recommendsthe use of "mind"(mens)
instead.The mindis thesoul,and thesoul is themind.The Aristotelian
soul
is theprincipleoflife,5
theCartesianmindis thethinking
substance.The soul
makeslivingbeingsalive,themindmakesthinking
beingsthink.Manyinters theoryof the soul withDescartes'theoryof the
preterscontrastAristotele
mindin termsoflifeversusthought.6
Thissetting,
as itwere,seemsdramaticenough.EnterMarinCureaude la
Chambre.His proposalrunsas follows:lifeisa formofthinking.
"On peutdire
que toutce qui estvivantconnoist,et que toutce qui connoistestvivant."7
thatlivescognizesand everything
thatcognizesis alive.The prinEverything
functions
of
life
are
.
I
will
continue
to translate
"Connoissance"
cipal
cognitive
by "Cognition"and "connaistre"
by "to cognize".I hope thereasonsforthis
choicewillbecomeclearenoughin thecourseofthispaper.
Let me now set out Cureaus generalpicture.Cognitionis firstof all an
"
It is theactivity
of forming
or images' as Cureau
activity.8
representations
callsthem.Moreprecisely,
theterm"cognition"
refers
to theactivity
bywhich
and
information
from
the
environment
or from
livingbeingsacquire
process
withinthelivingbeing.This information
is storedin theformof imageson
whichlivingbeingscan act.Cognitionis thewayin whichlivingbeingsregulateboth,theequilibrium
insidetheirbodiesand thenavigation
in theirnatural environments.
This regulative
is
activity governedby acquiredor innate
framework:
thesoul is the
images.CureaustickswiththegeneralAristotelian
distinction
ofvegetative,
sensiprincipleof life.He also retainsthetripartite
soul. Despitetheproblemsthiswayof speakingmight
tive,and intellectual
I shallcontinueto talkofthree"parts"ofthesoul.9
foster,
5)Cf.Garreth
"DeAnima
2.2-4andtheMeaning
inEssays
ofLive",
onAristoteles
De
Matthews,
Anima
andA.Oksenberg
,ed.M.C. Nussbaum
(Oxford,
1992),185-194.
Rorty
6)Fora critical
ofthis
discussion
dialectic
cf.Peter
"Deanima
andDescartes:
Anstey,
Making
up
Aristotle's
17
237-261.
Mind",
(2000),
History
ofPhilosophy
Quarterly
7)Systme
3.3.4,144
8)Passions
, 545;Trait,
38,53-56;Systme
1.1.1,22-24.
9)Forearly
modern
Aristotelian
ofthesoulseeKathleen
"TheOrganic
Park,
Soul",
conceptions
inTheCambridge
to
Renaissance
ed.
C.
B.
Schmitt
and
(CamQ. Skinner
Companion
Thinkings
A.MarcSmith,
theMind.TheRepresentation
ofThought
1988),464-484.
bridge,
"Picturing
intheMiddle
20 (1992),149-170,
Dennis
Des
AgesandtheRenaissance",
Philosophical
Topics
Form.
LateAristotelian
Chene,
2000).
Life's
Conceptions
oftheSoul(Ithaca/London,

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46 (2008)443-461
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de l'mefrom1664
CureausownDe anima, ifyoulike,hisworkLe systme
continueswitha
consistsof sixbooks.It beginswitha book on theintellect,
The titlesof
book on sensation,followedbya book on thevegetative
faculty.
"De la connoissance
thesethreebooksare:"De la connoissance
intellectuelle,'
This means,thateach partof the
"De la connoissancenaturelle".
sensitive",
- be it intellectual,
or natural.And each
soul has itsown cognition
sensitive,
innate
or
either
the
soul
by acquired by
images,withthe
partof
cognizes
Naturalcognitionis moreor less- cognition
ofnaturalcognition.
exception
byinnateimagesonly.I say"moreor 1ess",becauseCureauthinksthatevery
in thelessperfect
ofa higherpartofthesoulisforeshadowed
cognitive
activity
activities
ofthelowerparts.Fortworeasons,thisis a crucialpoint.
First,Cureaudoesnotfollowwhatmightbe calledthe"MethodofLevels".
In Cureaus systemof thesoul it is notthecase thatin everynewpartof the
Cureauratherfolnewkindofactivity.
soul therecan be founda completely
in eachpart
lowswhatmightbe calledthe"MethodofUnfolding
Repetition":
of thehigherpartscan be found.
or levelof thesoul thecognitiveactivities
has importantmethodological
Second, the foreshadowing
implicationsfor
de l'medoes notbeginwiththe
Cureau.As I havejustindicated,Le systme
soul.
lowestpart,thevegetative
soul,butwiththenoblestpart,theintellectual
in
the
sensitive
foreshadowed
oftheintellectual
are
As theactivities
part,
part
the examinationof intellectual
cognitionis a meansper analogiamforthe
ofthesensitive
ofsensitive
examination
cognition.Likewise,theexamination
for
natural
is
an
part
cogniton.10
analogy
As I have said, naturalcognitionis (more or less) cognitionby innate
As natural
images.Cognitionbyinnateimagesis whatCureaucalls"instinct".
in each
as
it
can
be
found
of
and
is
the
most
basic
sort
cognition,
cognition
of
to
the
examination
me
now
move
on
matters.
Let
of
the
instinct
soul,
part
notion
of
instinct.11
someaspectsoftheearlymodern

10)"Lanature
enquelque
sorte
raisonner
dansl'imagination."
s'essaie
, 560)Generally,
CPassions
T
dansles
makes
de
ses
inthelower
of
the
she
nature
excercises
herself
soul,
essay
ouvrages
parts
lesplusbasses."
choses
,48).
( Trait
11)Forthehistory
desInstinktes
Ernst
DerBegriff
ofinstinct
seeHeinrich
oftheconcept
Ziegler,
derTierpsychologie
dieGeschichte
unddieGrundlagen
einst
und
EineStudie
ber
1910),
(Jena,
jetzt.
ScioftheInstinct
Salomon
"Gestation
Diamond,
Journal
oftheHistory
ofBehavioral
Concept",
YearofInstinct
"FourHundred
Salomon
ence7 (1971),323-336,
Diamond,
Controversy",
ofNature:
Natural
A(1974),237-252,
Robert
A.Greene,
"Instinct
Genetics
Behavior
Law,SynandtheMoral
Sense",
deresis,
Journal
oftheHistory
ofIdeas58(1997),173-198.

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[225] 447

3. Four Kinds of Instinct

"Instinctis a greatmatter",as WilliamShakespearsFalstaff
points
rightly
out.12In earlymodernphilosophy,
thenotionof instinct
has different
meanfourmeanings.
ings.As I see it,we maydistinguish
the
s workDe ventate
influence
of
Edward
Herbertof Cherbury
Through
naturalis"
becamea synonym
fortheactions
(1624) theconceptof"instinctus
oftheinnatefaculty
oftheintellect
. In hisdescription
oftheintellectual
faculin
that
the
that
are
classified
addition
to
faculties
under
ties,Cherbury
suggests
thetraditional
sensesand reason,thereis
senses,internal
headingsofexternal
anotherevenmorefundamental
whichis thesource
natural
instinct,
faculty,
of the so-called"notionescommunae".13
to
common
According Cherbury,
notionsare givenuniversalassentby people in all places and at all times.
Common
People arriveat thesenotionswithoutreasoningor reflection.
first
and
notionsare foundational,
are
they logically
principles, theyexhibit
are
vital
for
the
and
ofhumanbeings.14
certainty.
They
preservation flourishing
In a criticalnoteto Mersenne,Descartescommentson Cherburyin thefolthatone shouldaboveall follownaturalinstinct
lowingway:"He recommends
from
which
he
all hiscommonnotions.Formypart,I disderives
especially,
two
kinds
of
instinct.
One
is in us qua humanbeings,and is purely
tinguish
mentis
intellctual:
it is thenaturallightor mentalvision'intuitus
] . Thisis the
I
think
Descartes
is
of
course
more
instinct
which
we
should
trust."15
only
thanCherburyto commithimselfto mattersof universalconsent.
reluctant
betweenthecriterion
ofuniversal
assentand the
Forthereis a greatdifference
criterion
of naturallight,since,as Descartessays,hardlyanyonemakesgood
An additionalmatterof disputeis thatDescartes'natural
use of thatlight.16
shines
on
theoretical
principles,whereasCherburysnaturalinstinct
light
bothagreethatthisinstinct
detectsmoralandteleological
However,
principles.
Let
is purelyintellectual
and,therefore,
trustworthy. s followDescartesin callthis
the
"intellectual
instinct".
ing
12)William
IV' II,4.
Shakespeare,
Henry
13)Edward
Herbert
ofCherbury,
De veritate
Cannstatt,
1966),44:"Instinctus
(Stuttgart/Bad
inomnihomine
sano& integro
a quibus
naturales
suntactus
illarum
facultatum
existentium,
internam
circa
Communes
illaeNotitiae
circa
rerum
causam,
sunt,
(cuiusmodi
quae
Analogiam
atindividui,
etfinem
rerum
medium
bonarum,
malum,
etc.)maxime
speciei,
pulchrum,
gratum
sinediscursu
conformantur."
& universi
conservationem
facientes,
perseetiam
generis
14)Cherbury,
savieetses
F.deRmusat,
Lord
Herbert
deCherbury:
De veritate
63;Cf.Charles
oevres
(Paris,
1874),154f.
15)Descartes
toMersenne
13.10.1639
(ATII 599).
16)Ibid.(ATII,598).

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to? His letterto

Now, whatis the otherkindof instinctDescartesrefers
Mersennecontinuesas follows:"Theother[kindofinstinct'
belongsto us qua
of our
towards
the
is
a
certain
of
nature
and
animals,
preservation
impulse
not
and
so
on.
This
should
of bodilypleasure,
body,towardstheenjoyment
even
Thisnotionofinstinct
seemsverylooseand general,
alwaysbe followed."
animals
seek
the
and
shun
and
other
Humans
instinctively
good
colloquial.
theharmful.
Lets callthis"lowerinstinct".
whichhumanslack.
instincts,
However,
manyanimalsdo haveveryspecialized
work
Characteristics
from
Hereis an exemplary
(1711):
Shaftesbury's
passage
haveindeed
I said,haveinstincts
that
manhasnot.True,
saidhe.They
Butbeasts,
percepifI mayusetheexpression,
which
forhispart,
andpre-sentations,
man,
tions,
sensations,
andbefore
habe
Their
hasnotinanyproportionable
females,
newly
they
pregnant
degree.
oftheir
state
which
isto/follow,
know
borne
havea clear
orpre-sensation
prospect
young,
inwhatmanner
Howmany
dothey
whattoprovide
andhow,
andatwhattime.
things
Theseasons
oftheyear,
thecountry,
the
Howmany
atoncecomprehend?
preponderate?
the
the
the
basis
of
their
materials,
architecture,
climate,
situation,
place,
aspect,
building,
inshort
oftheir
thewhole
oftheir
andall
dietandtreatement
economy
nursery,
offspring,
oftheir
lifeafterwards.17
this
asperfectly
atfirst
asatanytime
andwhen
inexperienced
"
instincts
Lets call thisthirdspeciesofinstinctspecialized
', becausetheworkaredirected
towards
specialpurposes.Thebreedingsofthisspeciesofinstinct
or
martins
isoneparadigmatic
behaviour
of
swallows
and
ing,nesting, migrating
in
of
debates.
Animalcapacities
for
this
kind
instinct
modern
early
example
features.
suchas theseexhibitfivecharacteristic
1. Theyareinnate
. WhichmeansthattheyarenottheoutcomeofexperiIn Shaftesbury's
orreasoning.
habituation
ence,learning,
eyes,forexamifyou dislikethe
is definitional.
He writes:"Therefore,
ple,thisfeature
andcallinstinct
word"innate",letus changeit,ifyouwill,for"instinct",
thatwhichnatureteaches,exclusive
ofart,cultureor discipline."18
2. Instincts
arehighlyspecialized
. Thisis a complexfeature.
It meansthat
thattheyare triggered
theseinstinctsare domain-specific,
by certain
in certainregularbehavstimulionly,and thattheyexpressthemselves
iouralsequences.
17)EarlofShaftesbury,
Formore
onShaftCharacteristics
1999),282-283.
ofmen
(Cambridge,
notion
ofinstinct
seeRobert
A.Greene,
"Instinct
ofNature:
Natural
Law,Synderesis,
esbury's
andtheChoral
Sense"yJournal
ofIdeas58(1997),173-198.
oftheHistory
18)Shaftesbury,
Characteristics
335.

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[227] 449

to a speciesof animals.Which meansthatthe same

3. Theyare specific
can be foundin all healthyor normalmembersof a certain
instincts
species.
the
Once the behaviouralsequenceis triggered,
4. Theyare compelling.
thoseacts.
animalcannothelpperforming
The behavioural
flavour.
5. Theyhavea teleological
sequenceis a purposeful
animal
seems
to chooseappropriat
a
certain
end.
The
sequence,aiming
ate meansforcertainends,as ifbyintention.
. In contemtheidea ofinnateness
Letme briefly
commenton thefirst
feature,
porarydiscussionsconcerningbiologythe conceptof innatenesscombines
rather
ideas.Hereis sucha bunchofideas:"innate"means(i) present
different
at birth,(ii) not learned,(iii) a distinctly
organizedsequenceof behaviour
not
affected
drivenfromwithin,(iv)
by development,(v) a behavioural
causedbya geneticdifference,
difference
(vi) adaptedoverthecourseofevolution,(vii) sharedby all membersof a species,(viii) intendedor meantto
ofcourse,areirrelofadaptionand geneticinheritance,
develop.The features
innateness
is notto be
contextof Cureau.19Moreover,
evantin thehistorical
Therearetworeasonsforthis.First,thereis spontaconfusedwithheredity.20
and spontain earlymodernbiologicalthinking,
neousand sexualgeneration
instincts
fromtheir
inherit
cannot
specialized
neouslygeneratedanimals
oftheembryois controlled
bythe
parents.Second,althoughthedevelopment
whether
on
and
there
is
much
debate
of
the
life,
soul,
speculation
principle
Cureaude la Chambre,forone,
fromoutside.21
thereis a kindof imprinting
rejectsthe idea thatthe workingsof the specializedinstinctsare in every
Cureausuggests
ofthePrimeCause. i.e. God. Nevertheless,
instancetheeffect
thatthe principlesgoverningthe workingsof the specializedinstinctsare
directly
by God beforebirth.And of course,therelationbetween
imprinted
The earlymodern
God and theanimalcreationis nota relationofinheritance.
two
ideas:
itself
is
defined
of
innateness
by
specializedand intellectual
concept
19)However
sAcoount
of
Information:
Gassendi
ofGenetic
"TheSoulasVehicle
cf.SaulFisher,
E.
H.
Smith
ed.
in
Modern
inThe
Animal
Generation
Problem
,
Inheritance",
J.
Philosophy
Early
of
2006),103-123.
(Cambridge,
20)Cf.Justin
Modern
inEarly
Generation
E. H. Smith,
The
Problem
,81:"In
Philosophy
ofAnimal
Aristotelian
toeradicate
effort
onthepartofthemechanist
oftheintense
physiologists
spite
interms
inseeking
toexplain
account
ofsexual
formative
virtues
from
their
heredity
generation,
notion
ofa formative
much
liketheAristotelian
ofcongenital
alone,
very
acquisition
something
under
a newguise."
virtue
persists
21)Cf.Shaftesbury,
Characteristics
335.

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M. WildVivarium

arepresentat birth,and theyarenotlearned(as Shaftesbury

instincts
points
ofNature.Nevertheless,
thefaculties
areteachings
out). Instincts
performing
actionsstill
the relevantinstinctive
bodily(or,forthatmatter,intellectual)
of membersof a
have to developin the courseof the normaldevelopment
species.
In
I willpointout a fourth
Forthesakeofcompleteness,
speciesifinstinct.
on HumanNature(1739/40),David Hume distinguishes
the Treatise
specialfromthe"commoncapacities"ofanimals,suchas thecapability
izedinstincts
oflearning.
Whenreferring
to specializedinstincts
Hume speaksofthe"more
in
instances
of
animal
behaviour
and usestheparadigextraordinary
sagacity"
maticexample,theswallow.22
As is well-known,
Hume callsreasonitselfan
instinct.More precisely,
he is talkingaboutour causalinferences
concerning
reasonis nothing
matters
offact.Hume states:"To considerthematteraright,
in oursouls."23
instinct
Reasonis theprodbuta wonderful
and unintelligible
uct of experienceand habit,and of courseneitherexperiencenor habitis
in thecourseofexperience
innate.Thedisposition
to establish
causalinference
is innate.Accordingto Hume,evenourbeliefin external
and habit,however,
instinctof nature".Nevertheless,
thisvery
objectsis "a blindand powerfull
beliefhas to be learnedin the courseof experience.Hume and afterhim
Frenchsensualists
suchas Condillactakeinstincts
to be thedispositionto be
trainedbyexperience
and habit.Lets call this,ratherparadoxically,
"aquired
instincts".
in earlymodern
Theseare the fourmeaningsof the notionof "instinct"
The
second
and
the
fourth
varieties
instinct"
and "aquired
("lower
philosophy.
in our context.However,thereareimporinstinct")are notveryinteresting
tantsimilarities
betweenintellectual
instinctand specializedinstinct.Intellectualinstinct
is theprivilege
ofthehumankind,itis directed
at God, eternal
real
and
the
instinct
is
to therealm
confined
truths, beauty,
good. Specialized
of theanimalkingdom,and it is directedat thebasic needsof life,suchas
and reproduction.
food,defence,security,
Despite the fact,thatthesetwo
to
kindsofinstinct
be
rather
theintellectual
instinct
seemsto
different,
appear
sharesome of thecharacteristic
of thespecializedinstinct.Bothare
features
innateand specific
toa species
. The intellectual
instinct
is domain-specific
, forit
a prioriknowledge.
aimsat non-inferential,
At leastin Cherburys
view,natural instincthas a teleologial
becauseit is ultimately
directedat the
flavour,
in
of
human
beatitude
to
be
found
all
normal
and
and healthy
promotion
22)Treatise
1.3.16,177.
23)Ibid.179.

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Vivarium
46 (2008)443-461

[229] 45 1

membersof our species.Once theintellector thenaturallighthitsupon an

eternaltruthor an innateidea, "therefollows(as Descartesputsit) a great
in thewill to giveassent".24
The intellectual
is
instinct,
however,
propensity
notto thesamedegreecompelling
as thespecializedinstinct.
is usedto explaintheintellectual
Up to thispoint,thenotionof "instinct"
tendenciesof humanbeingsto arriveat firstprinciples,
the generalanimal
of
the
behavioural
tendency self-preservation,specialized
sequencesofcertain
animals,or the innatecapacityto learncertainthingsor to acquirecertain
habits.But instinctis theunexplainedexplainer.
How is instinctitselfto be
The
similarities
between
intellectual
and
explained?
specializedinstinctsugcoreto theworkings
of "low"
gestthatthereactuallyis a common
explanatory
and "high"instincts.
thereseemsto be roomforthesuggestion
that
Therefore,
intellectual
and specializedinstincts
share
a
common
core.
may
explanatory
Whatis thiscommonexplanatory
coreaccordingto Cureaude La Chambre?
4. Cureau'sTheoryofAnimalSpecializedInstinct
As instinctmanifests
itselfmostobviouslyin animalbehaviour,and as the
of
the
in thevegetative
activities
sensitive
soulareforeshadowed
part
cognitive
and refinedin the intellectual
part,instinct(accordingto Cureau) should
be examinedin animals.In animals,we can findmanymanifestations
firstly
of specializedinstincts.
It seems,therefore,
reasonableforCureauto explore
in orderto establishan explanatory
thiskindofinstinct
schemefortheworkthestrategy
Cureau
ingsof instinctive
cognitionin general.This is precisely
willfollow.
in theearlymodernera,Cureauis commitedtoAvicenLikemanythinkers
nas and Aquinass explanationof specialized(or natural)instinct.His theory
of instinctis bestintroduced
as a continuation
and critiqueofAvicennaand
Cureaus
is:
what
do
animals
do whentheyareconfronted
Aquinas.25
question
withperceivable
withtheseobjectsin a purposeful
way
objects,and interact
withoutanyaccessto experience
The paradigmatic
and learning?
exampleAvicennaintroduced
is thelambor thesheepfleeinga wolf.How can thelamb
- say,in contrast
to thesheep-dog?
know,thatthewolfis dangerous
Whydoes
24)ATVII,59.
25)Thefollowing
"Intentionali
isindebted
totheaccount
Perler,
ty
byDominik
passage
given
inIntellect
and
ofAnimals",
Discussions
on theCognitive
andAction.
Medieval
Capacities
Acts
International
ed.M.C. Pacheco
and
Imagination.
oftheXIth
Congress
ofMedieval
Philosophy,
(Turnhout,
2006),72-98.
J.F.Meirinhos

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452 [230]

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46 (2008)443-461

the lamb reactin an appropriate

way and runsaway fromthe wolf- for
to attacking
thewolf?
instance,in contrast
Forcasessuchas this,Avicennadistinguishes
betweentwoactivities.
On the
one hand,theanimalapprehends
sensibleformswhenit perceives
objects.In
an intention(intentio
addition,theanimalalso apprehends
).26The important
betweenwhat is apprehendedby the
point is thatAvicennadistinguishes
externalsensesand theintention
whichis not receivedthroughtheexternal
senses.The intention
is apprehended
one
bytheso called"estimative
faculty",
oftheinnersenses.
In virtueof theestimative
theactionsof thenon-rational
animals
faculty,
"havea certainlikenessof reason",as Aquinasputsit27,becausetheyseemto
be engagedin a processof categorization.
The lamb categorizes
thewolfas
.
The
lamb
flees
the
if
wolf
"as
its
nature
were
hostile".
The
beingdangerous
lamb sees thewolfand apprehendsit as beinghostileor dangerous,which
makesit flee.And it does so by instinct,
as Aquinassays:"But as faras the
intentions
discussed
are
there
is a difference:
otheranimals
concerned,
just
such
intentions
some
natural
instinct
,
[naturaliinstinctif
perceive
solelyby
whereashumanbeingsperceivethemalso by a processof comparison."28
As
Avicennarepeatedly
theintention
in theobjectand not
is something
stresses,
in theperceiver.
In hisstudyon Avicenna,Dag Hasse callsthiskindofintention"connotational
It is an attribute
attribute".29
to be foundin thesensible
notin theperceiving
lamb.However,it is connotational
because
objectitself,
26)Avicenna
describes
this
second
asfollows:
"Anintention
isthat
which
thesoulappreactivity
hends
with
to
the
sensible
even
the
exterior
sense
has
not
regard
object, though
previously
apprehended
it.Forexample,
a sheepapprehends
theintention
which
ithasofthewolf,
namely
that
itought
tofear
itandtoflee
from
itssense
doesnotapprehend
thisinany
it,eventhough
/"intentio
autem
estidquodapprehendit
anima
desensibili,
nonprius
way."
quamvis
apprehendatilludsensus
sicut
ovisapprehendit
intentionem
delup,quaescilicet
est
exterior,
quamhabet
debeat
eumtimere
etfiigere,
non
hoc
senus
ullo
modo."
Avicenna
quare
quamvis
apprehendat
latinus
deanima
seuSextus
denaturalibus
, Liber
1.5,ed.S. VanRiet(Louvain/Leiden,
1972),
vol.I, 86(quoted
inPerler,
andAction).
Intentionality
27)Thomas,
deveritate
autem
habent
simil,q.24a.2 co.:"Bruta
Queastiones
disputatae
aliquam
itudinem
inquantum
secundum
rationis,
naturalem,
participant
quamdam
prudentiam
quod
natura
inferior
adidquodestnaturae
attingit
aliqualiter
superioris."
28)Thomas,
Summa
adintentiones
differ, I,q. 78a. 4 co.:"Sedquantum
theologiae
praedicats
entia
intentiones
solum
naturali
est,namaliaanimalia
instinctu,
percipiunt
hujusmodi
quodam
homo
autem
etiam
collationem."
perquandam
29}Cf.DagN. Hasse,
Avicennas
DeAnima
intheLatinWest.
The
Formation
Phiofa Peripatetic
Turin,
(London/
2000),132-134.
losophy
oftheSoul1160-1300

15:40:36 PM

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46 (2008)443-461

[231] 453

extracted
it is notjustanother
sensibleformbutsomething
bytheestimative
of
sensible
forms.
from
the
multitude
faculty
in Aquinass accountit is less clearwherethe lamb getsthe
By contrast,
thattheestimative
from.Aquinasstresses
extraintention
poweris directedat
in
no
that
are
intentions
waygatheredthroughthesenses.As
apprehending
RobertPasnaupointsout:"Theanimaldoesnotlearnthatwolvesareharmful,
mustsimplybe
or inferas much fromtheirappearance.That information
While Avicennastressesthat the lamb
builtinto the estimativepower."30
in
the
sensibleforms,
information
extracts
Aquinasallowsthelamb
comprised
Thisis therouteCureau
thesensorydatabyinbuiltinformation.
to transcend
willfollow.
ofthefaculties
As we haveseen,Cureauthinksthatcognitionis an activity
act on and use. For
of thesoul. Images,then,are thevehiclesthesefaculties
Cureau,as I will explainin a moment,theinstinct
by
ofanimalsis cognition
innateimages.As the instinctof animalsis alwayscognition
foraction(the
suchas Avicennaand Aquinasconlambfleesthewolf),and as philosophers
thewolf),theytendto
sideranimalinstinctin actiononly(thelambisfleeing
Thisis a mistake,or so Crueauargues.
in theestimative
faculty.
placeinstinct
The
estimative
like
this.
His
faculty"decides"whether
Why?
argumentgoes
in
it
to
or
harmful
order
is
pursue or to avoidit. Thisis the
something good
a
it
is
functionof theestimative
faculty
faculty,
foraction.Like everyother
mustbe informed
theestimative
byimages.As soon
faculty
faculty,
cognitive
as sucha facultyreceivescertainimages,it is activein a certainway,it is in
instinctive
behaviourare presentwithin
action.Now, the imagesgoverning
is in action,becauseinstincts
or nottheanimals instinct
theanimal,whether
areinnate.Buttheimagesin questioncannotjustbe builtintotheestimative
wouldbe in actionall thetime.
theestimative
otherwise
faculty,
behaviourlocated?
Where, then,are the images governinginstinctive
Cureauexploitsa parallelwithperceptual
cognition.In thecaseofperceptual
in
whereresembling
are
stored
sensible
memory,
imagestend
images
cognition,
And thats how perceptualcognitionworks:Sensible
to unitethemselves.
30)Robert
isusing
Nature
onHuman
Thomas
2002),268.Pasnau
Pasnau,
(Cambridge,
Aquinas
ofobjective
ofa notion
Theapplication
inhisbookonAquinas.
theconcept
ofinformation
seeFred
tome.Forsucha notion
seems
tosuchtheories
information
content
Dretske,
adequate
Smith
and
andtheFlowofKnowledge
1981),John
Maynard
(Cambridge/Mass.,
Information
Paul
E.
see
discussions
For
crititcal
TheOrigins
ErsSzathmry,
1999).
ofLife(Oxford,
68
inSearch
A Metaphor
ofa Theory",
Information:
"Genetic
Griffiths,
ofScience
Philosophy
(2001),394-412.

15:40:36 PM

454 [232]

M. Wild
46 (2008)443-461
/Vivarium

sensibleimagesarestoredtogether,
imagesarestoredin Memory,resembling
and newlyentering
sensible
as membersofan
resembling
imagesareclassified
collection.
stored
already
image
inMemory
The samegoesfortheinstinct.
thereis an innatecolImprinted
- thesensiblefeatures
lectionofimages.Theentering
sensibleimages
ofa wolf
- arecollatedwiththeinnateimagecollection,
forexample
whichin turngets
or as Cureaurepeatedly
activated,
says:theseinnateimagesare "wokenup".
The imaginative
actson thisinnateimagecollectionand thereafter
the
faculty
estimative
the
in
sets
animal
the
lamb
for
action.
faculty
example
Thisis theessenceof Cureaustheoryof animalinstinct:
Instinctis a kind
ofcognitiongovernedbya collectionofinnateimagesimprinted
in Memory.
Cureauhimself
callstheseimages"ImagesConnaturelles".
He writes:Instinctivecognitions
stem
from
theimages
mentioned
before.
must
beinnate,
because
these
are
They
cognitions
totheanimal
useful
from
thevery
ofitslife.[...].There
isnopoint
inthelifebeginning
ofthelambwhere
ofthehostility
ofthewolf
would
notbeuseful,
lhe
history
congition
chance
butvery
In
lambwillgeta second
order
to
the
of
wisdom
God
this,
rarely.
prevent
hasimprinted
stable
inthelamb
andunchangeable
s soulfrom
thebeginning
ofits
images
life.
Theinnate
which
cannot
becognized
thesenses
and
images
represent
things
through
which
arenevertheless
ofabsolute
forthelambs
oritsfurther
ends
necessity
preservation
andpurposes.31
Of course,Cureauis concernedwithwhatI called"specializedinstinct".
The
main
the
issues
that
were
mentioned
that
earlier,
passageemphasizes
namely
innateness
arenotconceptually
and heredity
linkedin earlymodernthinking.
Cureaus theory
canaccountforthreeofthefivefeatures
ofspecialized
instincts.
Those featuresare: innateness,
and teleologicalflavour.The
determination,
them;theyhavea teleoimagecollectionsareinnatebecauseGod imprinted
because
sustain
flavour
the
animal
s
and theyare
they
preservation;
logical
becausetheyare "fixeet immuables".Moreover,
theanimalhas
determining
no choice,thereis no powerin thesensitive
will
such
as
free
forinstance,
part,
able to inhibitinstinctive
behaviour.Now, what about the last and most
31)Systme
venir
dontnousparlons
nais3.2.4,129: . .nepeuvent
quedesimages
quidoivent
treaveclesAnimaux,
leursontncessaires
dslepremier
moment
parce
quecesConnoissances
deleutvie[...].Cariln'ya point
detemps
olaBrebis
n'ait
besoin
deconnoistre
laviolence
du
et
rarement
en
faire
deux
fois
La
Divine
a
donc

cela
Loup;
peut-elle
l'espreuve.Sagesse
pourve
dansTame
desAnimaux
aupoint
deleurnaissance,
lesimages
fixes
etimmuables
des
imprimant
choses
connoistre
etquisontabsolument
ncessaires
leurconqu'ilsnepeuvent
parlesSens,
servation
ou lafin laquelle
ilssontdestinez."

15:40:36 PM

46 (2008)443-461
M. Wild/Vtvarium

[233] 455

? Specializedinstinctsare domain-specific,
importantfeature:specialization
in certain
and theyexpressthemselves
are
certain
stimuli,
by
they triggered
thisfeaaccount
of
We
can
illustrate
Cureaus
behavioural
sequences.
regular
turebyone ofhisfavourite
examples,thestoragehabitsofants.32
In autumnantscollectgrains,wheatforexample.Accordingto thedoctrinesof earlymodernnaturalhistorythe followingsequenceof behaviour
takesplace: antsfindsomewheat,theytakeit, theybiteoffthegerm,they
and storeitinside.Whatdo antsdo thisfor?
thegrainto theant-hill,
transport
of course.This is the functionof the entirebehavioural
For stockpiling,
collectwheatin
sequence.It goeswithoutsayingthatantsdo notintentionally
biteoffthegerm
in winter,
nordo theyintentionally
orderto prevent
starving
in orderto avoidgermination.
However,theyaredoingitforexactlythispurpose,withoutactuallyhavingthispurposein mind.
The wholebehaviouralsequenceis triggered
bya certainstimulus,i.e. the
features
of thewheatgrain,or a leastone of them.The detection
perceptible
ofthewolfbythelamb.The
ofthewheatgrainis analogousto theperception
ant formsan "image"of thewheatgrain,and thisimageis combinedwith
to Cureau,
soul.According
similarimagesin theMemoryoftheantssensitive
collection
of
an
innate
in theantsMemoryis thefirst
thewheat-image
image
has
a
is
the
that
of images.The important
sequential
point
image-collection
likea chain.33If you pull the
it is- as Cureauputsit- structured
structure,
is linked
willfollow.The innatewheat-image
first
link,theothersnecessarily
and so on. The same
to theanthill-image,
thegerm-image
to thegerm-image,
avoidancebehaviouror theswalargumentappliesto the lambs instinctive
is
lows instinctive
breedingbehaviour.In thefirstcase,theimage-collection
of
the
These
activities
more
in
the
second
it
is
much
complex.
verysimple,
becauseImaginationhas to produceactualimages
soul arecognitive
sensitive
accordingto theinnatesequencein Memory.Onlytheseactualimagesarefor
animalbehaviour.
action, whichmeansthattheycausetheappropriate
the
feature
of
at
least
one
by
perceptible
grainofwheat,antsperTriggered
oftheinnateimageinstructions
to
the
formbehavioural
sequencesaccording
collection.Theyact as Cureau says like a man,who acts in accordance
devoidedof anyknowledgeof thepurposeof his
withwritteninstructions,
actions.The animalhas no need to knowthepurpose.However,theuniting
As Cureauhas it: "celles
elementoftheinnateimagecollectionis thepurpose.
32)Trait
3.2.4,132.
, 345;Systme
33)Trait,
345;Systme
3.2.4,131.

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M. WiLl/
Vivarium
46 (2008)443-461

unemesmefinsontliesensemble."34
qui se rapportent
Imagesthatservethe
samepurposeor function
areunitedin a collection.
The image-collection
has a purelysequentialstructure,
howeverthewhole
chainor structure
is significant
becauseof itsoverallpurposeor function.
In
virtueofthisinnatecollectiontheanimalis tunedto certainpiecesofpercepand to certainbehavioural
tuallyreceivedinformation
sequences.Specialized
instinctsare explainedby innatefunctionally
structures
thatare
significant
sensitive
to certainincomingpiecesofinformation.
In modernparlancethisis a teleosemantic
theoryof specializedinstinct.
Teleosemantic
theories
the
content
o
internal
statesorstructures
explain
partly
The imagecollections
havethefunction
ofguiding
byappealingto functions.
theanimals behaviour.
In Cureaustheory,
theanimals behaviouris governed
an
thatrepresents
a certainorder
innate,
structure,
by
functionally
significant
ofactions.35
Cureauonlysaysthismuch:ImagesrepreNow,howdo imagesrepresent?
sentbya double-relation
ofresemblance.
Again,lets considerthecaseofperA
theobjectit represents
ceptualrepresentation.perceptualimageresembles
theimagetheanimalhas stored(secondrela(firstrelation)and it resembles
is therepresentational
tion).The Memory-image
type("le patron",as Cureau
callsit),thesense-image
ittherepresentational
token
. Imagination
unifiesrepresentational
and
token
for
the
of
action.
type
representational
purpose
Only
theunified
isthegenuinerepresentation
productoftheImagination
("image").
The activity
of producingrepresentations
is, as we knowby now,cognition
in
at
least
the
first
of
Therearesev("connoissance")
step cognitive
activity.
eralproblemswiththissketchy
butinteresting
proposal.The mostworrisome
Therelationofresemblance
is alsoemployed
problemis its obviouscircularity.
in theexplanation
of thestorageof therepresentational
but
typein memory,
of coursethe elementsin stockdo not represent
each other.Moreover,the
in Memorydoes not by itselfbuild up a
storageof perceptualinformation
butwhichpiecesof
representational
type.The animaljuststoresinformation,
information
haveto be connectedin orderto buildup a representational
type?
each otherhaveto be conWell,theobviousansweris: thepiecesresembling
nected.But in orderto connectthem,the animals Memoryalreadyneeds
34)Systme,
3.2.4,131.
35)Thevariety
ofteleosemantics
I hintatisbestcaptured
inKaren
"Dretske's
Innate
Neander,
Australasian
andKaren
7A(1995),258-274,,
"Content
Neander,
Journal
Modesty",
ofPhilosophy
forCognitive
in Teleosemantics
andD. Papineau
Science",
, ed.G. McDonald
(Cambridge,
2006),167-194.

15:40:36 PM

M. Wild/Vivarium
46 (2008)443-461

[235] 457

is simplynot enoughto
somesortof representational
type.So, resemblance
the
and
the
relation,
representational
groundingof thisrelationis
ground
threatened
a
by regress.
The beautyof Cureaus theoryof innatecognitionis thatit solvesthe
relaand adds an additionalelementto therepresentational
regress-problem
is solvedby the fact,thatthe image-collection
is
tion.The regress-problem
innate.The additionalelementforgenuinerepresentation
is givenby the
functionor purpose.Only the imagesthatregulatethe
image-collections
behaviourof theanimalaregenuinerepresentations.
And thisis justthecase
fortheinnateimage-collections.
Wheredoes thefunctionality
of theinnate
structure
derivefrom?
As we havealreadyseen:from"La SagesseDivine".God
or ultimatecauseof instinctive
the
is, so to speak,thestructuring
behaviour,
information
fromoutsideis thetriggering
or proximate
cause.The innatecollectionofimagesis thestructuring
causeofthebehaviour.36
- forthesensitive
soul.HowThisis Cureaus accountofspecializedinstinct
ever,whataretheanalogiesin theotherpartsofthesoul?In thefinalsection
of mypaper,I will considerthespecializedinstincts
thatare locatedin the
soul.
vegetative
5. Instinctin theVegetativeSoul
Because of the astonishingly
purposefulbehaviourof simpleanimals,the
specializedinstinctsof the sensitivepartare moreevidentthanspecialized
in thevegetative
areforeshadinstinct
ofhigherparts,however,
part.Activities
owed in thelowerparts.This is whytheexplanationof sensitiveinstinctive
ask
cognition.Let us first
cognitionis a usefulanalogyfornaturalinstinctive
to explain.Whatis cognitionin thevegetathequestionwhatCureauis trying
to theactivAs I arguedin thefirst
tivesoulanyway?
section,cognitionrefers
information
from the
which
and
process
ity by
living beings acquire
is also the
orfrominsidethelivingbeing.Cognition,therefore,
environment
. And itis
theequilibirum
insidetheirbodies
wayin whichlivingbeingsregulate
in
that
is
other
words:
thisregulative
instinctive,
activity
governedbyinnate
images.
36)Cureau
tothe
isnotexplained
reference
stresses
thepoint
that
instinct
bydirect
specialized
lheterminology
ofstructuring
and
Prime
Cause
a mediated
causal
factor,
, i.e.God.Godisonly
Behavior.
Reasons
ina World
causeisFredDretske's
cf.FredDretske,
of
Explaining
triggering
ofproximate
andultimate
causeis Ernst
Causes
1988),theterminology
(Cambridge/Mass.,
cf.Ernst
Toward
a NewPhilosophy
1988),25-37.
Mayrs
Mayr,
ofBiology
(Cambridge/Mass.,

15:40:36 PM

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46 (2008)443-461
M. Wild/Vivarium

in plant-behaviour,
Cureaupointsout someexamples
Not muchinterested
in
our
humans.37
ofregulative
First,
bodyretains
goodhumoursand
cognition
betweenthepoint
there
is
no
difference
sense
of
touch
bad
for
the
expels ones;
a differnevertheless
our
of a needleand thestingof a bee,
bodyrecognizes
ence;our stomachjudgesfoodto be bad, thatour senseof tastedoes not;in
sicknessour bodychoosesa certaintimeforattackingthe intruding
germs
of theimmunesystem,the
thatmakeus sick.In otherwords:theactivities
or our
thegastrointestinal
cardiovascular
tract,theendocrinesystem,
system,
activities.
These
activare
and
for
ability nociception thermoception cognitive
i.e. governedby innatefuncitiesare governedby innateimage-collections,
between
differences
Thereareseveralsignificant
structures.
tionallysignificant
and vegetative
sensitive
specializedinstinct.
specializedinstinct
Firstof all, the sensitiveinstinctgovernsactionsof the whole animal,
inpartsand organs
ofthelivwhereasthevegetative
instinct
governsactivities
The
centralized.
ing being.Second,the sensitiveinstinctis physiologically
- whichare thefaculties
of thesensitivesoul thatis relevant
internalsenses
- arelocatedin theCentralNervousSystem,
i.e. in thebrain.One
forinstinct
implicationof Cureaus analogybetweensensitiveand vegetative
important
soul has itsown Memory.Now,thisMemoryis
instinct
is thatthevegetative
all
it is distributed
not "dansle Cerveaucommeestla memoireSensitive"38,
in
are
located
therelevant
overthebody,or moreprecisely:
image-collections
instinctin question.Cureau
the partsor organsthatexhibitthevegetative
s De
remindsthereaderofthespecialstatusthesenseoftouchhasinAristotele
all overthe
anima. It is thelowestof theexternalsensesand it is distributed
is a linkbetweenthe
skin.In Cureaus view,the senseof touch,therefore,
soul.
soul and thesensitive
kindsof cognitionto be foundin thevegetative
Moreover,Cureau invokesa widelyused example,also mentionedby Descartes:theplayerofthelutehas his memoryin hisfingers.
Third,thevegetain humours,
tivefaculty
poisons,food,or
cognizesonlyverydimlydifferences
sickness.The eye distinguishes
manycoloursand shapes,the ear discerns
between
soul differentiates
directions
and pitches,and so on. The vegetative
The
whole
"doucesetfcheuse,
bonneset mauvaises"
sequenceof
inputsonly.
is triggered
instinctive
activities
byjusta fewimages.Vegetative
cognitionis
built-incognition.It foreshadows
moreor less single-cued,
discriminatory,
37)Systme
seeHansWerner
Geschichte
oftheplant-soul
3.1.1,113f.Forthehistory
Ingensiep,
vonderAntike
biszurGegenwart
undbiologische
derPflanzenseele.
(StuttPhilosophische
Entwrfe
2001).
gart,
38)Systme
3.4.7,147.

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46 (2008)443-461

[237] 459

moresophisticated
sensitive
activities
bythefactthatvegetative
cogcognitive
well.
information
from
outside
the
as
nitionis triggered
by
livingbeing,
Let me sumup bytakingup Cureausgeneralthesis,namely:lifeis a form
of thinking.
The formof thinkingCureau has in mindis cognitionin the
to governbehaviour.
senseof theactivationof significant
internalstructures
in instinctive
is
an
innate
The internalstructure
functionally
sigcognition
to certainincomingpiecesof information.
nificant
sensitive
image-collection
in memory(and
In thesensitive
soul theseimagecollectionsare centralized
In
are
the
soul
these
notin theestimative
power).
vegetative
image-collections
aboutthesoultakesplacein a
distributed
all overthebody.Cureausthinking
schemeofthesoul. However,he usesthisschemeas a
verybroadAristotelian
orto develop
for
hisowntheories,
and notto preserve
background developing
in the firstplace. One of the most interesting
Aristotelianism
aspectsof
in
a
his
for
consists
Cureaus theoryofinstinct,
however,
suggestions theoryof
animalaction
innaterepresentational
content.
Accordingto Cureauinstinctive
This is
of innateimage-collections.
is governedby the teleologicalstructure
startsbuildingup an
one of theraremomentsan earlymodernphilosopher
content.
explicittheoryofrepresentational

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M. Wild/Vivarium
46 (2008)443-461

[239] 461

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Fischer,
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15:40:36 PM

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15:40:42 PM

Contents
Volume
46 (2008)/Vivarium
46 (2008)462-463
Peter King
Richard Cross
Martin Lenz
Jean-BaptisteBrenet
Jol Biard
Lodi Nauta
Ian Maclean
Lilli Alanen
Markus Wild

The InnerCathedral:Mental
in High Scholasticism
Architecture
SomeVarieties
ofSemanticExternalism
in Duns ScotussCognitivePsychology
Ockhams
WhyIs ThoughtLinguistic?
Two ConceptionsoftheIntellect
Ameintellective,
me cogitative
: Jeande
Jandunet la duplex
formapropriade
Thomme
Diversitdes fonctions
et unitde l'me
dansla psychologie
pripatticienne
(xrv^-xv
sicle)
Froman Outsiders PointofView:
LorenzoVallaon theSoul
Cardanos EclecticPsychology
and its
Caesar
CritiquebyJulius
Scaliger
CartesianScientiaand theHuman Soul
MarinCureaude la Chambreon the
NaturalCognitionoftheVegetative
Soul: An EarlyModernTheoryof
Instinct

15:40:42 PM

463
253
275
302

318
342
368
392
418

443

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15:40:42 PM

& Indexing
Abstracting
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Dietrich's
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Current
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International
ofBookReviews
ofScholarly
International
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Bibliography
andLanguageBehavior
Bibi.;Linguistics
Abstracts;
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Philosophy
East:Abstracts
& Index;MLA; M L A International
of Books&
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