Vivarium

Volume

32
1994

Reprintedwiththe permissionoftheoriginalpublisher
by
Periodicals Service Company
Germantown,NY
2013

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00:33:16 AM

CONTENTS OF VOLUME XXXII (1994)

JohnMagee

TheTextofBoethius'De divisione

ThomasHaye

DivisioScientiarum:
Ein bisher
unverffentlichtes
Wissenschaftsmodell
in derClavis CompendiidesJohannes
vonGarlandia
51

RolandJ.Teske

The Willas KingoverthePowersof

theSoul: Uses and Sourcesofan Image
in theThirteenth
62
Century

DominikPerler

WhatAmI Thinking
About?JohnDuns
Scotusand PeterAureolonIntentional
72
Objects

GabrielNuchelmans

WalterBurleighon theConclusionthat
YouArean Ass
90

ReviewArticle

102

Reviews

115

JanVan Laarhoven

Titlesand SubtitlesofthePolicraticus
A Proposal
131

C.H. Kneepkens

FromEternaltoPerpetualTruths
:A
Noteon theMediaevalHistoryof
De interpretation^
Aristotle,
Ch. 1, 16aI8

161

WilliamJ.Courtenay

DominicansandSuspectOpinionin the
Thirteenth
Century:TheCases of
PeterofTarentaise,
StephenofVenizy,
and theArticlesof1270 and 1271
186

JokeSpruyt

Discussionson
Thirteenth-Century
Modal Terms

196

WalterRedmond

FriarAlonsoon theLogic ofGod

227

Reviews

261

BooksReceived

283

00:33:16 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
'
The Text of Boethius De divisione*
JOHN MAGEE

The De divisioneof Boethius ( = B.) has come down to us in nearly

200 MSS dating fromthe 10th c. onward. The treatisemaintained a
positionof some importancein the medieval schools and as a resultthe
textual traditionis highlycomplex, although it remains unstudied for
the most part. L. Minio-Paluello investigatedand compared some of
theearly MSS in the course of editinga fragmentof B. 's revised Topics
translationthatsometimescirculatedas part of De divisione
, and he put
forwardtentativeconclusions as to the bearing of his findingson the
historyof the transmission of De divisioneitself. In what follows I
undertaketo examine the earliest extant MSS of De divisioneknown to
me, and to reconsider Minio-Paluello's hypothesis concerning the
early period of transmission.The study is in three parts: (a) analysis
'
of the evidence indicatinga lost ancient 4'edition' of De divisione
; (b)
the text of the treatise as transmittedto us by the oldest MSS; (c) a
. I have adopted the following
handlist of MSS containingDe divisione
sigla:
A Orlans,Bibi.Mun., 267 (pp. 88-99),s. X-XI
B Paris,B.N., NAL 1478(ff.80v-90),s. XI
C Paris,B.N., lat. 6400E(ff.76v-83),s. XI-XII
* I wouldlike to thanktheColumbia
CouncilforResearchin the
University
in theSummers
metovisitEuropeanlibraries
Humanities
fora fellowship
enabling
for the
and the NationalEndowment
of 1989-90,and ColumbiaUniversity
this
neededto complete
forfaculty
leavetimeandthefinancial
Humanities
support
alsotothearchivists
oftheinstituandlibrarians
I amgrateful
andtheedition.
study
and granting
accessto theMSS
microfilm
tionsholdingtheMSS forfurnishing
et d'Histoiredes Textesin Parisfor
and to theInstitut
de Recherche
themselves,
tothank
thosescholars
It is mypleasure
microfiche
andtheuseofitsfacilities.
finally
whohaveassisted
at variousstagesofthework:L.E. Boyle,O.P. (Vatican),Dr. U.
Winter
d. F. Avagliano,
O.S.B. (Montecassino),
Prof.V. BrownandFrat.
(Berlin),
Ch. HilkenF.S.C. (Pontifical
Institute
ofMediaevalStudies/University
ofToronDr. H. Hauke(Munich),Prof.Dr. O. Lang(Einto),Dr. B. Schemmel
(Bamberg),
Prof.P.O. Kristeller
(NewYork),Prof.J. Shiel(Sussex),Prof.L. Obertello
siedeln),
(Genoa),Prof.J.E.G. Zetzel(ColumbiaUniv.),Prof.L. Tarn(ColumbiaUniv.),
Prof.A.D.E. Cameron(ColumbiaUniv.),Prof.M. Asztalos(Univ.ofStockholm).
1

00:33:23 AM

D
E
F
G
H
/
J
K
L
M
N
O
P
Q

Bibi.Mun., 406 (ff.80-88v),s. X-XI

Valenciennes,
BPL 84 (ff.l-7v),s. XI
Leiden,Bibi.derRijksuniv.,
300 (ff.3-8v,17),s. XI
Bern,Burgerbibl.,
s. Xlex.
Rome,Bibi.Apost.Vat., Ottob.lat. 1406(ff.163v-176),
Rome,Bibi.Apost.Vat., lat. 8591(ff.201-216),s. XI
Clm. 6372(ff.30-40v),s. X-XI
Munich,Bayer.Staatsbibl.,
Paris,B.N., lat. 11127(ff.64v-74),s. X-XI
St Gall,Stiftsbibl.,
830 (pp. 353-369),s. XI
Arch,dellaBadia, 191(pp. 168-184),s. XI
Montecassino,
s. XI (to890b3
Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Regin.lat. 1649(ff.117v-125v),
only)
Bibl.Mun., 498 (ff.73-78),s. Xllmed.
Chartres,
Bibl.Mun., 187(ff.78v-89),s. XII
Charleville,
London,Lamb.Pal., 339 (ff.55v-68v),s. XII
Phill.1786(ff.61-107v),
s. X-XI
Berlin,DeutscheStaatsbibl.,

Ab PeterAbelard,comm.,ed. M. Dal Pra (Rome/ Milan,1954)

AlbAlberttheGreat,comm.,ed. F.M. De Loe (Bonn,1913)
Po L. Pozzi,Boezio:Trattato
sullaDivisione
(Padua, 1969).1
The title of the treatise ( + liber, placed either before or after) is
variously reported in the incipits:
de diuisione
F G O: diuisionum
ACH : diuisionis
BDEIJKLQ
1 Mi = Migne,PL 64. I havemade
collations
from
microfilm
ormicrofiche
complete
ofall namedwitnesses
ofO (whichis clearon
exceptL Q, and,withtheexception
in 1944),I havestudied(orin thecasesofL Q collated)all
film)andN (destroyed
MSS byautopsy.
inL weresubsequently
double-checked
Readings
againstmicrofilm
at thePontifical
Institute
ofMediaevalStudiesin Toronto.I havealsocollatedby
butdo notreport
MS ColumbiaUniversity
X88/Ar512.
are
autopsy
Myconclusions
attenuated
limitations
havemadeitpossibleto studyonly
bythefactthatfinancial
40 ofthe196MSS known
tome,butgiventhattheearliest
extant
tradition
isalready
a contaminated
oneitseemedunlikely
thatfurther
collations
wouldsignificantly
advanceourunderstanding
ofB.'s textas opposedtoitshistory
oftransmission
within
themedievalschools.It is generally
editionsthe
agreedthatof theearlyprinted
is thebest(perIoannem
et Gregorium
de Gregoriis
de Forlivio,
princeps
Venice,
fratres,
ofCons.phiL,De disc,schol.
at
1491-2),ofwhichI haveseenonlythe1497-8reprint
theUniversity
ofToronto.However,
Poreproduces
thetextoftheeditio
, with
princeps
10 corrections
adoptedfromMS Padua, Bibl. Ant.,Scaff.XXII,553. Martianus
Rota published
an editionoftheDialctica(Venice,1543,apudIuntas
, rpt.1547,
Loritus"Glareanus"usedfortheBaselOperaOmnia
1559)whichHenrichus
(1546,
Petrum
in Mi (1847,1860,
, rpt.1570);thelatteris in factreprinted
apudHenrichum
to Pagallo,Rota corrected
theeditio
1891).According
princeps
againstMS Venice
Marc.Z.L. 273. I haveconsulted
the1570Baseledition
and findin itsomeminor
differences
toMi. I do notrefer
tothetextus
inAlb,as it is thetextinMi
praemissus
withoccasional
corrections
introduced
byDe Loe (v. hispraef.11) andis therefore
ofno independent
value.Allcolumnandlinereferences
follow
Mi exceptthatwords
atline-ends
remain
undivided
anderrors
inthe1891impres(I do notnoteomissions
sion).Seefurther
(fullbibliography
givenbelow,p. 42ff.):Brandt,
147,
Entstehungszeit
n. 2; id., In Isag., praef.lxxiff.
; Schepss,Opuscula
561; Pagallo74 ff.
; 88 ff.;Cappuyns,Boce363; Van de Vyver,Etapes444,n. 4.
2

00:33:23 AM

(absent in M N P), and again in the explicits:

AD E H IJK
diuisionum
C F Q. diuisionis
:
(absent in B G L M N O F). But B. probably intended de diuisione
... disputabitur,
In Isag.11.150,8:cumdediuisione
apparebit;
composui;
Diff.top.1192d5: in eolibro... quemdediuisione
dictasunt;
et specieiperplura
Div. 885d2:seddediuisione
generis
inpartes
dicemus
ibid.887d4:nuncdeeadiuisione
quaeesttotius
(cf.890dl2f.);
diuisione
ibid.888d3:restt... utdeuocisin significantias
tractemus;
diuisione
ibid.890d9:est... degeneris
propositum
atqueexpeditum;
totiusque
ibid.892a9:et dediuisione
quidemomni... diligenter
expressimus.'2
Moreover, at 875d4 he appears to claim as a source one treatise by
Andronicus de diuisione{ liber editus), which is probably his Latin
translationof a Greek title,rcepSiaipeaeco.3
John of Salisbury {Metal.
=
B.'s
treatise
under the title{liber)
f.
knows
III. 9 [909a] 152,3 Webb)
diuisionum
, but Ab consistentlyuses de + abi.,4 while an ancient index
of Boethian titles(see below) gives de diuisione
, which on the whole apto
command
the
strongestsupport (henceforthDiv.).
pears
FromBoethiusto Vivarium
In some MSS therehas been preservedevidence of an ancient edition of B.'s logico-rhetoricalmonographs, of Div. in particular. The
most complete informationis provided by A (p. 88)5:
liber
Anicii(-tiia.c.) MalliiSeueriniBoetiiu.c. et illst.ex cons.ord.patricii,
diuisionum
ualdenecessarius.
MartiusNouatusRenatusu.c. etsp. relegi
incipit
meum,
which appears in abbreviated and (or) corruptedformin the incipits
of five other MSS:
2 De Rijk44, withn. 2. Cf. more
Brandt,In Isag., praef.xxxiif. The
generally,
or 877c4f.
genitives
mayhavebeensuggested
byDiv. 892al (<differentias
diuisionum)
diuisionis
no MS withanything
likethetitles,
{ratio
), butthereis, to myknowledge,
De diuisionis
De diuisionum
.
ratione,
differentiis
3 Littig11.12.At890dl1 f.B. says,
deomnibus
secundum
separtitionibus
... pertracquare
tatum
est.It seemsunlikely,
thatAndronicus'
treatise
was entitled
however,
rcepi
fiepiqio.
4 Sing,andplur.forms:160,29;162,16;163,15;203,16-27,
and pass.
5 See ingeneral
23 ff.;Usener47,n. 14;Brandt,
Jahn354ff.;Schepss,
Subscriptionen
InIsag.,praef.xxxiv,withn. 42; Minio-Paluello,
NotaX 102;Pagallo70,withn. 1;
Sev.Boez.1.346ff.;Zetzel219 f.; 288,n. 3. The subscriptions
inA have
Obertello,
beenwritten
and thoseinJ are in thesamehandas wrotethetitles
bya corrector
butnotthetext.
3

00:33:23 AM

B (f. 80v): Incipiteiusdemliberdiuisionis.

MartiusNotatus(sic)Renatus,
J (f. 64v): AniciiMallii SeueriniBoetiiliberdiuisionisincipit.Martius
"Renouatus(sic)"Nouatusu.c. et sp. relegimecum
K (p. 353): Incipiteiusdemliberdiuisionis.
MarciusNouatusRenatusu.c. et
mecum(sic),
sp. relegit
L (p. 168): Incipiteiusdemliberdiuisionis.
MartiusNouatusRenatus,
0 (f. 78v):AniciiManliiSeueri(sic)Boetiiu.c. etill.ex cons.ord.patricii,
incipitliberde diuisione.M. Nou. Ren. u.c. et sp. relegimeum,
where B L clearly stand apart fromthe rest.6The explicits make no
furthermention of Renatus, there is only a EYTYXOC common to
A D E I ( = FELICITER A2 B D2 Q), which in K has slipped over into
the incipit of the subsequent treatise {Comm. spec. de rhet.cogn.).7
Hyp. syll.was of course edited or correctedas well, and in MS Paris,
B.N. NAL 1611, originallythe second half of A ,8 at the end of that
treatise we read (f. 51):
ab eo estTheodoro
Contracodicem
Renatiu.s. correxi,
antiquario
quiconfectus
est.
qui nuncPalatinus
Furthermore,on pp. 64 and 73 ofA, in Diff.top., thereis written,relegi
meum
, while in Paris NAL 1611 followingsome rhetoricalexcerpts(see
below) fromthe same treatisethereis on f. 12v a relegi(-ge beforecorrection,pace Obertello, Sev. Boez. 1.346), and a relegiagain on f. 13.
The lattermaybe related to the Renatus subscriptionsabove, as in MS
Brussells 5439-5443 (s. XII) there stands at the head of the firstof
these excerpts (f. 53):
de rethorice
Marcus(sic)
speculationis
Incipitlibercommunis
cognatione.
NouatusRenatusuirclarissimus
relegimeum(iterum),
spectabilis
although it seems more likelythat this subscriptionhas crossed up the
name of Renatus with the relegithat we find attached to the excerpts
in Paris NAL 1611.
A table of contents" was drawn up for an ancient codex of the
Dialctica that has not survived to our day. The list of contents
originally stood before Diff. top. and it retains that position in the
6 Cf. below,n. 9, and p. 39 f.
' Corrupted
in E to YXOC. EVTIXOC (-TYX-p.c.) appearsin D.
8 Delisle61.
4

00:33:23 AM

extant MSS (A, p. 57; B, f. 56; D , f. 58; L , p. 129). In A it reads as

follows9:
Quae sintin hoccodiceAniciiMalliiSeueriniBoetiiuiric. et ill.:
I. De differentiis
topicislibriIIIIor
II. De diuisione
III. Communis
de rhetorica
speculatio
cognatione
IUI. Locorumrhetoricorum
(-rue-a.c.) distinctio
V. De multifaria
predicatione
VI. Quomodoargumentorum
uel undecolliguntur
(sic)loci,id est(vid.)
topica
VII. Liberantepraedicamenta
Vili. Introductio
in cathegoricos
sillogi.10
Villi. De ypotheticis
libriIII.
syllogismis
, add
Again B L are in agreement: theyomit the phrase, Quae ... codice
(id estB) ex cons. ord. afterillustrisiomit libriquattuorfromI and id est
topicafromVI, and add lib. II aftersillogismos(VIII).11
9 The common
inB L wereobserved
variants
21,
alreadybySchepss(Subscriptionen
n. 2). D commits
numerous
errors
whichI do notrecordhere.A different
egregious
ofthelistsurvives
inBrussells
version
5439-5443
(f.46), whichObertello
(Sev.Boez.
a tradition
made
1.349ff.)thinks
recension
mayreflect
goingbacktoan incomplete
I cannotbelieve,however,thatB. had anything
to do withthe
by B. himself.
MS seemsan aberration
as toboththe
rhetorical
opuscula(III-VI), andtheBrussells
ofV-VI itpreserves
a relectum
andthelist.In thetitles
, nodoubta corsubscriptions
ofrelegi
theanonymous
Sev.Boez.1.346).It was probably
(cf. Obertello,
ruption
whowrotetherelegi
reviser
in therhetorical
evenas he wrotetheaboveextracts,
mentioned
afterHyp.syll.Schepss(Subscriptionen
subscription
26) foundalmostthe
sameRenatussubscription
in 0 (f. 119)as theone in theBrussells
MS mentioned
Renatus
liber
derethorica
Marcus
above:Incipit
communis
cognatione
(sic)Nouatus
speculationis
meum.
ofIV andV. Renatus'nameseems
Anda relectum
relegi
appearsin theincipits
ofthefirst
tohaveslippedfrom
Div., whichRenatusdidin factrevise,totheincipit
tothemutation
aboveinconThiswouldthenbe similar
observed
rhetorical
excerpt.
andlistsufnection
withtheEYTYXOC inK. It is quiteclearthatthesubscriptions
fereddistortion
before
beingdroppedaltogether.
10VII-VIII are printed
underthewrongtitlesin Mi: Antepraedicamenta
(VII) = Inin categricos
troductio
ad syllogismos
syllogismos
categricos
(PL 64.761bff.);Introductio
categorico
(PL 64.793cff.).See McKinlay,Tests143,n. 1; id.,
(VIII) = De syllogismo
NotaX 102,n. 1.
De syll.cat.210; De Rijk38 ff.
; Minio-Paluello,
11Minio-Paluello
a lost
lat.V, praef.xxxviff.)reconstructed
(NotaX 101ff.;Arist.
in thetradition,
disturbances
fromthelistandcertainmechanical
"hyparchetype"
in
ofB.'s lostrevision
oftheTop.translation
fragment
amongtheman interpolated
corconsistent
are on thewholereliable,and thereis a pretty
Div. His figures
betweenfoliosize and columnsin Mi. K willserveas an example:
respondence
877bl4 =p. 354;878bll =p. 355; 879b6= p. 356; 880bl= p. 357;881al4= p. 358;
882al5= p. 359;883al3= p. 360;884al3= p. 361; 885al4 p. 362;886al3= p. 363;
No
consistent.
format
butis extremely
887all = p. 364,etc. is in a muchsmaller
offewer
than9 ormorethan11 11.Mi and86% ofthefolios
folioholdstheequivalent
the
is in estimating
of9.5-10.511.Mi. Of coursethedifficulty
holdtheequivalent
Minio-Paluello'
s
calculations
for
tables
I
would
and
diagrams.
adjust
spacerequired
at:Diff.top.,ff.1-65= 2,36711.Mi + 4 tables(tohis2,350);Div.,ff.88-89= 64 (65);
5

00:33:23 AM

It happens that only one of the MSS preservingthislist has all, and
only, the works enumerated therein, and that is Z), which is a composite codex, the first57 ff.being of independentoriginand material.
The contentsof / match the list preciselybut the list itselfis missing.
K has all nine items in uninterruptedsequence but places threeadditional worksbeforeand two after.A has all of the workson the list but
it too adds extraneous materiali:it retains I-II in that order (preceded
by In Isag. II), but its counterpartinterruptsthe sequence by interpos12
ing Victorinus' De definitioneand Abbo's De prop,et syll. cat. before
resumingthe integralseries III-IX, which is then followedby various
other items. B (also a composite codex) has only I-II, and C only IX,
II. E has II, IX, VIII, VII, while F has MI, VII-IX, and G I, VIIIIX, II. H has I, VIII-IX, II-IV, VII, and J II, I, III-VII, IX; L has
I-II, VIII (second bk. only), M VII, I-II, and (only II (Chartres 100
had I, III-VII, II, VIII; I omit the later MSS NOP). Apart fromB
D I and L (yet another composite codex) all MSS contain works
foreignto the Dialctica. By the time our MSS were copied and first
circulated in the medieval schools, then, the integral corpus of
monographs was already in an advanced stage of disintegration,and
so the table of contentsmust antedate our earliest witnessesby a conComm.
spec.,ff.90-96= 216 (220); Loc.dist.,ff.97-100= 93 (100); Mult,praed
., f.
= 37 (45); Antepr
101= 13 (15); Quom.
arg.,ff.102-103
., ff.104-144=1,502(1,520);
= 286 (215,butcf.NotaX 104,n. 3); Intr.y
ff.147-152
= 2,013(2,180);
ff.153-212
., ff.213-260=1,720 (1,740); ff.261-280=723 (730, althoughMinioHyp.syll
Paluellooughttohavewritten
732,cf.NotaX103);ff.281-285= 168(180).I estimate
a codexwiththeequivalent
of 10,05511.Mi(+ 4 tables),as againsthis10,209( +
1 table).Itis troubling
thattheonlyrealinconsistency
occursprecisely
intheexcerpts
about15to31 11./f.Minio-Paluello
(III-VI), whichrangeonlyfrom
therethought
andexplicits,
ff.90-103(NotaX 104).Alternativemaining
spaceneededforthetitles
ly, thecopyistmayhaveleftemptyspacefortheextracts
and overestimated
the
amountrequired.
In anyevent,themechanical
errors
musthaveoccurred
ina codex
thatcontained
theexcerpts,
as counting
41 ff.directly
fromtheend ofDiv. (i.e.,
theexcerpts)
doesnotgivethecentral
bifolio
ofa quinionneededtoexplain
bypassing
thetransposed
787c9-8c6.
We wouldreachinsteadtheendofthe
passageat Antepr.
thirteenth
theinfluence
quinion.InsularMSS boundinquinions
ofpracmayreflect
ticesin eastern
Theresurvive
3 LatinMSS in quinionsfrom
the4th-5th
scriptoria.
butonlyonewithscripton bothsidesoftheouterbifolio
centuries,
(Lowe1.5; 23;
35= nos. 12,74, 115respectively;
cf.II, praef.vi f.; III. 7, no. 296).I am indebted
to Prof.Brownforherobservations
on theseMSS.
12On whichsee
ofLibri's
22,n. 1. Schepssraisedthequestion
Schepss,
Subscriptionen
withthetitlesinA. One canonlytrust
possibly
havingtampered
(andthereis good
reasonto do so giventhecorroborative
evidencein otherMSS) thathe was not
fortheRenatussubscriptions.
VandeVyverascribed
themtoa "second"
responsible
hand{Etapes
447).
6

00:33:23 AM

siderable period of time.13As individual treatises were selected for

separate copying it would have been most natural for the scribes to
remove the list altogether,as it was proving increasinglysuperfluous.
This would explain its virtual disappearance by the 12th c.14 The
author of the list is unknown15but it seems unlikely that he was the
Renatus named in the subscriptions,as the four rhetoricalextracts
(III-VI) probably date fromthe late 6th centuryand therereallyis no
good reason for supposing that Renatus drew them up anyway.16
They read ratheras lecture notes than as the work of an editor who
(I assume) commissioned a copy fromTheodorus out of an interestin
procuringan accurate text of what B. wrote.17
Renatus ratherthan B. was responsibleforthe relegimeumaccompanying the authentic Boethian tracts.18An anonymous correctorlater
revised his own copy of the Dialctica against the codexRenati, which
had been transcribedby a Theodorus who was still alive ( qui nunc
13MSS withvarious
acrossEuropebya relatively
from
thecorpushadtravelled
tracts
cannothaveoccurred
all at once(cf.Van de Vyver,
earlydate,andthedispersion
ofotherMSS that
in medieval
444f.).Moreover,
thereis evidence
catalogues
Etapes
musthavebeenbroaderstill(e.g., Manitius
so thatthedispersion
disappeared,
276-98).
14Thesubscriptions
tooweredisappearing
alreadybythesecondhalfofthe11thc.,
Sev.toez.1.380;Van de
as weretherhetorical
nos. III-VI (Obertello,
excerpts,
Vyver,Etapes447).
15De Rijk5; Obertello,
Hyp.syll.162.
16PaceObertello,
isconhimself
theevidence
Sev.Boez.1.351.AsObertello
observes,
sistent
witha codexfromVivarium
(ibid.1.354;cf.1.367,n. 86).
17Cf. below,n. 23. The monographs
arenotchronologically
(Cappuyns,
arranged
thetreatises
Boke370),Diff.top.beingthelastwritten
compiled
(ca. 521).Whoever
ensemble
on
wantedthecomplete
andwascareful
togroupthethreeworks
evidently
last.Renatus'ordering
was,I think,I-II, VII-IX, as nowin F (which,
syllogisms
addsotherworksaftertheseries).
however,
18Or so it wouldappearfromthefactthatin hisIn Cic. top
. B. subscribed
the
inM (f.54),Vat.
survives
emendaui.
The subscription
authorized
operis
copy,conditor
lat. 567(f. 35v),Einsiedeln
324 (p. 199),MunichClm. 6367(f. 66) and 14272(f.
Class. 13(olimM.IV.l, ff.27 and34).
188v),Parislat.12957(f.88v),andBamberg
SeeStangl9 ff.(drawntomyattention
byProf.Cameron);Usener2, n.*;Obertello,
27. SomeMSS ofB.'s Inst,arith
Sev.Boez.1.346and 355; Schepss,Subscriptionen
.,
Boetius
a subscription
similar
totheoneintheDialctica:Seuerinus
however,
preserve
meum.This appears,withminor
u.c.(? et)ini.excons.ord.patricius
legiopusculum
inFlorence
Laur.Plut.XXIX.20(v. Bandini37),Parislat.7185(f.20v),
variations,
derelecto
7359(f. 36) and 14064(f. 37). Paris6639evidently
has thesubscription,
II
Boetiiderelectis
suo, whilean early12thc. Bambergcataloguerecords,
opusculo
meum
ofInst,arith.
connected
thelegiopusculum
(Becker192).Jahn(355) mistakenly
Sev.Boez.
withRenatus(Schepss,
28 f.;Usener47,n. 14;cf.Obertello,
Subscriptionen
1.356).
7

00:33:23 AM

Palatinusest)19when the anonymous correctorwas active. The latter

evidentlyproofread the rhetoricalextractsas well (hence the relegiin
Paris NAL 1611). Chance has brought it about that the identitiesof
Renatus and Theodorus are known to us. There is evidence forthe existence of one Renatus of Ravenna, who discussed the Theopaschite
problem with Severus of Antioch in Constantinople sometime ca.
508-11. He was a grammaticus
with ties to both the Ostrogothiccourt
and John the Deacon (probably later Pope John I) and fromSeverus
we learn that he was an orthodox supporterof Chalcedon and Leo's
Tome.20Theodorus, on the otherhand, we know fromsubscriptionsin
Priscian MSS. He copied out the Institutiones
of Priscian (his teacher)
in Constantinople between 526-7 and he was a palace bureaucrat.21
The connection with Priscian suggests a professionalor cultural link
with B.'s clan as well.22
B.'s monographs, then, were collected and revised sometime between 522-6,23 probably in Constantinople, by Renatus or perhaps
also by another member (? Priscian) of the circle associated with the
Anicii. Renatus either commissioned or obtained a copy of the
24
monographs fromTheodorus sometime around the year 527. How
the corpus firsttravelled from Ravenna to the East is a matter for
19Obertello,
Sev.Boez.1.352,withn. 26.
20Severus,Orat.III. 29 (72,23ff.Lebon);Cassiodorus,
Var.IV.37 (CCL 96.166);
loan.Diac., PL 59.400d.Cf.Martindale
99 f.;Obertello,
Sev.Boez.
939;Troncarelli
1.344ff.;id., Hyp.syll.159.
21The Priscian
lat.11.191;451;597; III. 105;208f.
subscriptions
appearin Gramm,
Keil. See Martindale
in B.'s Cat.
1098,no. 63 (wrongly
placingthesubscription
. ; Brandt,In Isag., praef.xxxiiif.; Schepss,
trans.);Cameron322; Zetzel220 ff
23 f.;Courcelle,Writers
Sev.Boez.1.347ff.;id.,
329,n. 50; Obertello,
Subscriptionen
whowasconsul
Hyp.syll.160 f.Thisis notthesamepersonas theFlaviusTheodorus
in505andtravelled
toConstantinople
withtheembassy
ofJohnI ( = Martindale
1097
wasstillalivewhentheanonymous
workcorrector
f.,no.62). OurscribeTheodorus
thedeathofCassiodorus.
after
ed,andthatmusthavebeennearor,moreprobably,
AtCons.phil.1.4,13B. usestheepithet
inreference
totheOstrogothic
court,
palatinae
butthePrisciansubscriptions
in Constantinople.
explicitly
placeTheodorus
22Prisciandedicated
threeofhisminortreatises
to B.'s father-in-law
Symmachus
lat.III. 405Keil),whohadcommissioned
a visittoConstantinothem
(Gramm,
during
327; Van de Vyver,Etapes443).
ple (Courcelle,Writers
23Cappuyns
to525-6,whileVande Vyver(Etapes
370)datesRenatus'revision
(Boce
between
522-6,andUsener(42)
443),De Rijk(5) and Pagallo(69) favorsometime
523. De RijkandVan de VyverthinkRenatusrevised
onlyDijf.top.,presumably
hadbeenunabletomaketherevision.
I donotseethatthisisprovbecauseB. himself
ed bytheplacement
ofthattreatise
at theheadoftheensemble,
whileitis obvious
in anyeventthatRenatusmustalso haverevised
Div.
24Obertello,
Hyp.syll.163f.
8

00:33:23 AM

speculation,25but the manner of its returnto the West can be surmised with fair probability. At an early point in the tradition six long
humanae
passages of B.'s Diff top. were intercalatedin the Institutiones
of Cassiodorus26:
Inst.(PL 70)"
Diff.top.(PL 64)
1174bll-6a9
1176a2-7c9
1177cl0-9d4
1180c4-2d6
1179d6-8
1cl3
1183c5-5b8
1186d5-96al5
1181cl4-90c3
1196al4-8al5
1208c2-10bl2
1198al5-1202cl2,
1
1212a7-16cl
while two others were extracted and given separate titles. They are
nos. III-IV in the list discussed above:
Comm.
spec.(PL 64)
1217c-22c
Loc.dist.(PL 64)
1221d-4c

Diff.top.(PL 64)
1207a3-12a7

Inst.(PL 70)
(1196al4-d3)

1212a10-4c8

( 1198b5-1200d3).27

The precise source of no. V in the list is unknown to me but VI is yet

another excerpt, more precisely, a schematic series of excerpted
thoughts and phrases, from Diff. top. The historyof Cassiodorus'
handbook concerns us only insofar as the interpolated recensions
make it certain that a copy of Diff. top., no doubt of the whole of the
Dialctica,28 was in Italy by the later 6th c. And according to Cappuyns, Cassiodorus also cited Diff.top.in the revisedversion of his ex29
position of the Psalms (original version writtenbetween 538-48). It
25It canbe asserted
onlythatifRenatusdidtravelto theEastwithJohnI (Van de
isnoextant
evidence
ofthefact.Obertello
entertains
various
Vyver,
Etapes
443),there
.; 1.351f.).The motive
forremoving
themonographs
hypotheses
(Sev.Boez.1.343ff
themduringthegreco-gothic
war(Obertello,
mayhavebeento preserve
Hyp.syll.
tieswiththeEastwerewellknown(Courcelle,Writers
317,n.
155),as B.'s political
129).
26An excerpt
of whichis foundinJ, f. 64 (Inst.II. 3.17-18,interpolated
recension= PL 70.1202cl3-3b7,
Memoriae
... possunt).
27Cf. Courcelle,
Brouillon
68, n. 4; Van de Vyver,Institutiones
74, n. 3; id., Etapes
Boce371; Usener62; Obertello,
Sev.Boez.1.367,
444; Oeuvre
286,n. 2; Cappuyns,
n. 86; Schepss,
22f.(forMunich6371read6372= I). Theexcerpts
surSubscriptionen
viveinMSS A ( = ParisNAL 1611),Z),//(two
5439-5443,
only),I J, K, 0, Brussells
671, Vienna,Nationalbibl.
100.The
2269,andtheywereinChartres
Klosterneuburg
Cassiodorian
extracts
sometimes
circulated
underthenameofThemistius
separately
Sev.Boez.1.374).Vande Vyversuspected
thata singlepersonmight
have
(Obertello,
beenresponsible
forthetwodifferent
setsofexcerpts
(Oeuvre
287).
28A briefparaphrase
ofDiv. 877b5-c3
in VI, however,
wouldappeartohavecome
from
indirectly
Diff.top.1192d( = Cass., Inst.1187d).
29Cassiodore
references.
themargins
Cassiodorus
1401,butwithno specific
supplied
withsiglaindicating
totheTopics
references
, butitis notalwayscleartowhose.On
9

00:33:23 AM

is possible, then, that he procured the codexRenatiduring his period

of exile in Constantinople and thathe broughtit West in 555. 30Troncatili has argued that Cassiodorus undertook an edition of the Consolatio either while still in the East or just after the foundation of
Vivarium, and if his theoryis correctit would not be unreasonable to
suppose that Cassiodorus took an interestin the preservationof the
Dialctica as well.31
To reiterate. There is an ancient ' 'edition' ' underlyingour tradition of the Dialctica. Priscian's pupil Theodorus transcribedthe codex
Renatiin the East shortlyafterB.'s death, and Cassiodorus, it appears,
later brought it to the West. At Vivarium an unknown corrector32
checked his own copy against the codex Renati at a time when
Theodorus was stillalive, sometime, that is, in the later 6th c. In certain MSS there survive indications that at an early date someone,
perhaps the anonymous corrector,articulatedthe internalsections of
Div., probably in capitals. The overall structureof the treatise is as
follows:
I. Introduction:
875dl-8d2
II. Divisionperse: 878d2-90dl2
a. Genusintospecies:880al0-7d4
b. Wholeintoparts:887d4-8d3
c. Spokensoundintosignifications:
888d3-90dl2
III. Divisionsecundum
accidens
: 890dl2-lall
a. Subjectintoaccidents
b. Accident
intosubjects
c. Accident
intoaccidents
IV. Conclusion:
891all-2al1.
the dates see Adriaen,praef.xii. Courcellethought
thatthe firstinterpolator
discovered
must
Diff.top.afterCassiodorus'death{Brouillon
85). ButCassiodorus
havehadHyp.syll.atleast,anditmaybethathesimply
nevergotaroundtoincluding
ofDiff.top.in hishandbook.
anydiscussion
30Cassiodorus
wasin Constantinople
in 550,returned
totheWestin 555,andproca. 560(Van de Vyver,Oeuvre
290;Cappuyns,
bablybeganworkon theInstitutiones
Cassiodore
1357f.; 1371ff.;1403f.; butcf.also Lehmann41 ff.).
31Cassiodorus
informs
us thathe organized
thelogicalworksintoa singlevolume
andputtherespective
commentaries
separately
{Inst.II. 3.18= 129,5ff.Mynors;cf.
Sev.Boez.1.354).The Dialcticawouldhaveoccupied
volume
Obertello,
yetanother
(cf.above,n. 11).
32Was he oneofthebookbinders,
or notarii
mentioned
translators,
byCassiodorus
theEastas
{Inst,praef.9; 1.5.2;1.8.3;1.30.3,etc.)? Othersmusthavecomefrom
well(cf.Cappuyns,
Cassiodore
is knowntohaveinstituted
a
1360),andCassiodorus
ofcorrectional
50 ff.;Courcelle,
Writers
system
signs(Troncarelli
370).Traube(130)
drewattention
totheCassiodorian
continentur
as, inhoccorpore
ringofsuchphrases
(cf.
ourlistofcontents,
certain
correctional
above).Shiel,on theotherhand,discusses
markswhichhe thinks
wereimported
ofcorrection
On themethods
byB. himself.
at Vivarium,
cf.Zetzel204 f.
practiced
10

00:33:23 AM

The three subsectionsof II, the heart of the treatise,were marked in

such a way that with copying the headings sometimesdriftedinto the
text. At 880b6, after respondetur
,
, A2 H add, Quomodogenusdiuidatur
.
At
after
diuiwhile B has in the margin, Quomododiuiditur
887d6,
genus
sionem
, I (before correction)J add, De diuisionetotiusin partes; E2 has
.
in the margin, De diuisionetotius
; and K in the margin, Diuisio totius
At 888d4, aftertractemus
, E J add, De uocisdiuisione'P has the same
in the
in the margin and an erasure of ca. 15 charactersaftertractemus
In
I
the
have
K
in
the
Diuisio
tended
has
uocis.
text;
headings
margin,
J
to blend in with the textof the treatise,while in A E they are slightly
offsetand in capitals. It may be that these markingstoo originated at
Vivarium.
The question has been raised whethersome of the variant readings
in Div. do not go back to the codexRenati.33Here we must keep in mind
the factsthat our MSS were made for use in the schools and consequently show a considerable degree of correctionand contamination
fromthe start,while there is virtuallyno indirecttraditionto help us
date the variants (Cassiodorus paraphrases one passage of Div., but
indirectlyfromDiff.top.). How can we be sure thata plausible variant
stems fromB. or Renatus ratherthan fromthe anonymous corrector
or an astute medieval reader? Everythingdepends upon the nature of
the variant in question: no errorswill have come from B. but some
4'variants" could be authorial revisions. Now we
simplydo not know
whetherB. lefthis own changes to the text, but it seems highly improbable thatRenatus emended or made conjectureson a large scale,
or thathe eithermissed or introducedmany significanterrors(' 'recension' ' at least would appear to be out of the question).
Finally, it remains to ask whether the copy possessed by the
anonymous correctorwas one newly transcribedfromand then correctedagainst the codexRenati, or was (or indeed had been transcribed
from) another that went back to B. independentlyof Renatus.34 To
'
'
put it another way, is the 'archetype' the anonymous corrector's
copy, as Van de Vyver supposed,35or the codexRenati?36Further,what
33Pagallo78, n. 2. Obertello
thinks
corrector
leftannotations
thattheanonymous
ofcopying
whichwereaddedto withsuccessive
generations
(Hyp.syll.169).
34On Ravennaas a sourceoftransmission
libraries
see Reynolds,
to themedieval
pracf.xxiiif.
3SEtapes
443.
36Obertello,
ofall theextant
Sev.Boez.1.352f.De Rijksays(5) thatthe"archetype
Theodore... andcorappearstohavebeenwritten
manuscripts
bythecalligraphcr
Renati
rectedafterthecodex
two
copyist."This is to conflate
by someanonymous
11

00:33:23 AM

is the differencebetween Renatus' 4'edition,' ' Theodoras' transcription, and the latteronce correctedby Renatus? We know nothingof
Renatus' editorialmethods,but it seems reasonable to assume (a) that
his relegimeummeant littlemore than insuringthat the apograph was
in accord with its exemplar,37and (b) that he had at his disposal a
sound exemplar ifnot the autograph against which he proofreadwith
considerable care. That is, Renatus' correctedtext of Div. may have
had one or two errorsof its own, but it was probably still very close
to the authorized copy that leftB.'s hands.
Minio-Paluello thoughtto have identifieda stage of transmissionat
which certain mechanical errorsentered one branch of the tradition,
thus giving grounds forinferringthe presence of two hyparchetypes.38
As I thinkit equally possible that the removal ratherthan the entry
of those errorsmarks the split in the tradition(insofar as a clear split
can be discerned at ail), and as I preferto maintain a distinctionbetween Renatus' " edition" and the medieval archetype39ratherthan
to introducethe potentiallyconfusingnotion of hyparchetypes,I shall
use the word " archetype" in referenceto the anonymous corrector's
codex, fromwhich, as I incline to believe, all of our MSS ultimately
descend. This involves a certain amount of question-beggingbut the
reasons for it will emerge in the course of discussion.
The Text
AfterCassiodorus and his monks the fateof the Dialctica adheres
to that of the Vivarium library,the details of which are not
perfectly
clear.40 The monographs themselves, in any event, recede into a
indicates
thatTheodorus
books,forthesubscription
infactwroteoutthecodex
Renati
,
whiletheanonymous
corrector
checkedanotherbook,whatI referto as the"ar( codex
chetype,"
againstTheodorus'transcription
Renati).
37
Cf. Zetzel228.
38Minio-Paluello
referred
to thebookwhichRenatus(wrongly
namedMartius
RenatusNouatus)"wrote"(jic)as the"archetype,"
andsawa decisive
splitbetween
FN andtheMSS withtheTop. fragment
. lat.V, praef.xxxix).He alsospoke
(.Arist
ofthecodexfrom
whichourMSS deriveas the"archetype
orsub-archetype"
(Nota
X 102),and againofthearchetype
and twohyparchetypes
on whichthemedieval
tradition
cf.
depends
(ibid.105; 107).Buthewasawarethatcertainty
as tothequestionofan archetype
withor without
theTop.fragment
couldnot
(discussed
below)
be attained
untilthetextofDiv. itself
had beeninvestigated.
39Cf. Pasquali21; 137,n. 1.
See Courcelle,
Writers
ch.8; Van de Vyver,Oeuvre
283;Mercati14ff.;Cappuyns,
Cassiodore
1397ff.;Rand437; Obertello,
Seu.Boez.1.369ff.Van de Vyver'sEtapes
remains
theonlygeneralaccountofthetransmission
oftheDialctica.
12

00:33:23 AM

period of darkness lasting about three and a half centuries, until the
Loire.
firstsigns of their revival emerge at Reims and Fleury-surIsidore evidently got what he did of B. from Cassiodorus, possibly
fromsome lost intermediaryas well.41Lupus of Ferriresis known to
have used or borrowed copies of B.'s Inst, arith.and In Cic. top. but
he does not mention the monographs. And while there is good
'
evidence forthe studyof the Consolatioand 44Old Logic' (particularly
Porphyry's introduction)in the 9th c., the Dialctica appear not to
have been used as school texts at that time.42Once they reappear,
however, theirdiffusionis widespread and rapid, and continues into
the 12thc., afterwhich all but Diff. top. and Div. relapse into general
desuetude. The textof Div. that surfacesforthe firsttime towards the
later part of the 10th c. preservesthe signs of an archetypein possession of its own errors.43We begin with these.
41See ingeneral,
Fontaine
615 ft'.;1168,ad loc. 828.2.Also,Pagallo71,n. 1; Van
de Vyver,Institutiones
70, n. 2.
42Lupus,Epp.5; 8; 16Dmmler.
B. s classification
doesnotfollow
IoannesScottus
. II. 526a= 6,30ff.Sheldon-Williams).
ofdivisions
inDio.(Periph
(22)
Ogilvyimplied
Prantl(11.17).Alcuinknew
thatAlcuinusedDiff.top.,buton thishemisunderstood
Herren(132),
ofit(Van de Vyver,Etapes431). Neither
excerpts
onlyCassiodorus'
oftheuse of
Laistner
(262),norMarendon
(pass.)appearsto havefoundevidence
theDialcticapriorto the10thc.
43In whatfollows
under
I sometimes
onlyforthosewordsorphrases
givethevariants
tothatefall variants
discussion.
WhereI record
fora passagethereis an indication
inAb, AlbandPoaresignalled
so thatthereader
fect.Readings
onlywhererelevant,
from
from
shoulddrawnoinference
silenceaboutoneormoreofthem.Allvariants
the
Poreflect
thetextoftheeditio
, notthecorrections
adoptedbyPozzifrom
princeps
Padua MS. I signify
madeeitherbythescribeor bysomeone
witha c corrections
I do notventure
fromthescribe's.In thecasesofA D E
whosescript
todistinguish
wherehands
FI J Mm particular
totrytointroduce
itseemedimprudent
precision
contemandA mayhaveas manyas three)
(someMSS havemorethanonecorrector
withandsimilar
scribeshavebeenactivein the
tothoseoftherespective
poraneous
resultnotonlyin errorsbutin unMSS and to numberthemwouldinevitably
in a handwhichI feelconfident
confusion.
Witha 2 I indicate
corrections
necessary
is drawn
is notthescribe's,andwhichis probably
ofa laterperiod.The apparatus
variantapplies.
exceptwhereit is obviousto whatword(s)a particular
positively
between
is to provide
evidencefortherelationship
whenmysoleconcern
However,
certain
MSS (as opposedto layingouttheevidencefora givenpassage)and I list
should
variants
sharedbythem(e.g., byA Q, B L, E I orF G), thesquarebracket
notbe takenas necessarily
variants
forthereading
thatthereare no other
meaning
in case it is notobvious,theword(s)in the
in question.It servesrather
to specify,
variants
arenoted
textforwhichthoseMSS sharethenotedvariant.
Orthographical
fordiffinitio).
and spellings
havebeennormalized
Finally,
onlyrarely
(e.g., definitio
I treatas a variantwhatappearsin the
thereareplaceswhere,without
discussion,
textofMi oras partofthetextwhatdoesnotappearat allinMi. It hasbeenimpossible to avoidthisinconvenience.
13

00:33:23 AM

877a3 f.
... egoid quoquesicutpleraqueomniaRomanisauribustradens...
id quoqueegoscr.: quoquis(quo eiusJc:quoqueeiusJ2) idJ: quoqueid ceti.
quoqueid is incorrect,since the point of the proemium generallyis to
draw attentionto B.'s exceptional status among the Romans. He will
make available to the West the science of division passed down by Andronicus, Plotinus and Porphyry,even as he has done forother subjects {sicutpleraque). B. is firstamong the Romans ( Romanisauribus
tradens
), not last among the Greeks. The transposition,id quoque, gives
De Rijk (48)
the rightsense (cf. In Cat. 159a2: hosquoque. . . perscribens).
understandsquoqueas pointingback to Andronicus. But then why not
to Porphyry,who has just been mentioned ? In any case, quare... doctrina(2 f.) and sicutpleraquemake it clear that quoqueis to emphasize
the subject matter,not the person who expounds it. Littig(11.12) was
"
dieLehrevom
surelyrightin paraphrasing, Bothiussagt... erwolleauch
''
.
Leser
rmische
Teilen, wieschonso vielesandere
, fr
bertragenJ obviously
entails a scribal aberration, but one that presumes the word order
found in all the other MSS. (In the microfilmof N facillimaque... quoque is partiallyillegible, but it is quite clear that quoqueid is the word
order.)
880d9ff.(Allvariants
noted.)
relinaliaestatim
... etharum(10) aliaeconsequentes,
(11) Statim
relinquentes.
quentes...
9-10harumaliae] = Dc:aliaeom.D : suntadd.L P: aliaeharumsuntN 10aliae
: statimaliaecodd.| | aliae2]=ACEc: om.E : alia A(vid.)| |
coni.Asztalos
statim
= Ec: om.E K N relinquentes
= Ec' om.E 11 Statim]
om.N
relinquentes]
statim
Mi and Po read, et harumaliae suntconsequentes
, aliae relinquentes
in
is
the
that
and
statim.Relinquentes
, etc.,
punctuation the MSS as well
(including E K' Ec supplies the missing words in the margin). But
statimmakes no good sense and is inconsistentwith B.'s
consequentes
he writes only consequentes
At
880dl2
, while at 881al0 and, if
usage.
I am correct (see below), 881b7 consequentium
(in any case without
statim
writes
he
statim
at
881a9
, and at 881b4 f. (see
relinquentium
);
I
below) quaestatimrelinquunt.thereforegratefullyadopt Prof. Asztalos'
suggestion.
886a2 ff.
... porroauteminferiores
(4) dif[ipsaquoque]specificis
(3) quaesuntindiuidua
ferentiis
carent,quocircaipsaequoquea definitione
(5) seclusaesunt...
3 [ ] egoseel.:ipsa(-ae O) quoquecodd.4 ipsaeAcD(vid.)EJMCO Q. ipse(-sse
H) F G H' I K: ipsaABC&LMNP
14

00:33:23 AM

ipsaquoque(3) is erroneous, as it makes no sense to say thatindividuals

toolack specificdifferentiae.The point is that ressuperiores
cannot be
definedas theyhave no higher genera; resinferiores
or individuals, on
the other hand (corresponsive autem
, with quidem, 885dl4), lack
specificdifferentiae,and so theytooescape definition.The emphasis is
needed in 4, which is probably the source of the errorin 3: the variant
ipsa (4) may have prompted the movement of the two words up to indiuidua(notice also how ipsae appears to have influenced 0 at 3).
There are also passages strongly suggestive of common errors
underlyingall of our earliest witnesses which were later removed or
adjusted for by conjecture:
878b8
Accidentis
ueroin accidentia
diuisioest ...
Accidentis
G: accidentium
cett.
At 877c 1 f. and In Isag. 11.155,5 B. writesaccidensin accidentia
, and at
878b 12 f. accidensin alia accidentia.At Diff. top. 1192d5 f. he says, acin accidentia
cidentis
, which is the expressionretained in the interpolated
redaction of Cassiodorus' Inst. (1187d8) and in Quom.arg. (no. VI in
the list discussed above). It also appears in the margin of A (p. 90),
to mark the third class of incidental division (cf. Ab 163,15 f.; Alb
26,26; loan. Damasc., PG 94.548bl5). I have no doubt that the gen.
of each of the threeclasses
sing, is correct.B. uses it forthe dividendum
in accidentia
of incidentaldivision: subiectum
, accidensin subiecta,accidens
in accidentia(877bl4-8d2; 891al; cf. 878d8, in accidentisdistributione)
.
The plur. may have been caused by the illustrationthat followsin b9
candidorum
(iomnium
), as, I suspect, was recognized eitherby the scribe
of G or by a correctorof his exemplar.
878d4
estquae sit(proprietas)
... (his)intellegendum
...
KcAP N: intellegenda
K M cett
.
intellegendum
The fem. probably arose by assimilation to the subject of the subordinate indirectquestion. The emendation to the neut. is such an obvious one that nothingcan be inferredas to the relationshipof KM
Adhere.A hits on (or follows)another felicitousconjecture at 889al5:
... (quotiens)sinedeterminatione
dicitur
uox ulla,facitintellectu
...
ullaN: iliacett.
(ulla is supported by nulla, b5, and ilia would be very awkward,
especially given the haecfollowing,even if the punctuation were to be
15

00:33:23 AM

placed afteruox, as it is in some MSS). But otherwiseTVregularlygoes

astray in its maverick approach to the text.44
881b4f. (Allvariants
noted.)
... ex eorumestgenerequae statinirelinquunt
...
eorumPo: eo codd. | est& F*AbAlb: suntD P ceti.| | relinquunt]
relincunt
B: relinquut
C: reliqunt
(-inq-p.c.) E : relinquerunt
N(sic)
suntcannot stand, as the subject is differentia
(ipsa, haec, al5-b2) and B.
will instance only one differenceanyway (ut sedere
, b5). The plur. may
have arisen fromthe parallel phrase at a9 (ex eo sintgenerestatimrelinquentium)or possibly by assimilation to quae ... relinquunt
(G I K 0, it
be
have
the
at
and
noted,
may
plur. seiunguntur b4),
my guess is that
it was in the archetype,i.e. , that the correctionin D is reallyan emendation. But even withestfurtheremendation proves necessary; either
we delete quae and writerelinquentium
forrelinquunt
(as at a9), or write,
with Po, eorumfor the eo of the MSS. The latter seems preferableas
being the less extreme. It is probably a humanist conjecture.
881b7f.
... ea suntconsequentium
differentiarum
...
codd.
consequentium
Po(-seg-):
permanentium
At 880d8 ff.B. divided differentiaeinto those that are (a) perse and
those that are (b) peraccidens
and (ii) statim
, and (b) into (i) consequentes
.45 At 881al0 most MSS have conflated permanereand
rehnquentes
:
consequi
F G P J1Q. persequentium
A 2^-quntconsequentium
a.c.) C D E H I J K L
M N O PQ?,
as also previously at 880dl2:
D2 E F G P J M2P Q. persequentes
A B C D H I J1K M N 0 Qf:
consequentes
uel sequentes
L.
At 881a9 f. B. mentions the three classes of differentiaein reverse
forperse (a).46 At b7, as the
order, substitutingin substantia
permanentes
44As,e.g.,withtheomission
ofnonat889cl2,which
I intend
todiscussina commenhimself
wasresponsible
forsomeoftheuniquereadings
tary.I suspectthatThierry
in N.
45Cf. Porphyry, 9,10ff.;B., In
Isag.
Isag.1.85-7;II. 241-8.
46Cf.permanet
sunt
, 881c2,withInIsag.1.86,4:magis
propriae
quaeinsubstantia
ipsapermanent.
The former
speaksofthespeciesthatdoesnotremain,butthelatterofthe
differentiae
thatdoremain,
anditis quiteclearthatmagis
propriaeperseyas B. uses
thesameillustrations
foreach(rationabilitas
, mortalitas
, 881a7f.; c5; In Isag.1.86,6;
16

00:33:23 AM

ensuing illustrationproves (being grey-eyedis separable fromthe subNote as well

ject rationesola), he can only have writtenconsequentium.
that B. then treatsthe threeclasses of a9 f. in strictorder: staiimrelinquentes(881bl-6); consequentes
(881b6- 12); in substantiapermanentes
offers
what
Po
appears to be no more than a
(881bl2-cl3). Again
humanist conjecture- another obvious one.
881bl0
... (estanimal)luminibus
glaucis,ut quilibethomo...
homoA2D2 F H P J2M2 N O P: om.ABCDEFGIJKLMQ
homois unnecessary,but it seems extremelyunlikelythat B. leftit out,
as (a) thereis no justification(certainlynot a stylisticone in a treatise
of thistype,in which the Latin is inelegant but always aims at clarity)
forthe possible confusionengendered by its omission, and (b) hominem
in 11 is leftquite unprepared withoutit. H , as we shall see, regularly
incorporatesthe correctionsin A, and seems to have done so here; N
0 P are the threelatest MSS and appear to have benefittedfromtheir
predecessors. The conjecture / emendation was made early on, no
doubt already by the early 11th c., and it stuck.
885bll
m ...
... sicutenimcirculu
sicutC ?L O Po: sicLc(vid.)ceti.
sicutis prepared by ut(10), which means "even /just as," not "as for
example" (as ut cl does): "A single genus (can be) divided many
ways, just as adibodies (can) .... For (enim)just as we divide the circle
... so too ( itaquoque, cl , sc. we divide) the genus. ' ' Again, C O are both
later MSS; and the confusion of sic and sicutis common at least in
minuscule script,47althoughit is unnecessaryto assume that the usual
triliteralcompendium sic was the cause of the error(if such it was) in
our archetype.L now has sic, but thereappears to be an erasure above
the c, so that it is possible that sicutwas once indicated.
886c12 f. (Allvariants
noted.)
...
... uocumsignificatiuarum
C ZXP AlbPo: om.D I ceti.
significatiuarum
15 f.).AtInIsag.11.261
thatinseparable
likesubstan11.243,
,22B. explains
accidents,
tialdifferentiae,
do notleavethesubject,
buttheyarenotthesameas substantial
differentiae
as theydo not"inform"thesubstance
(11.261,16f.).
47Lindsay,Contractions
46; cf.as wellNotae287.
17

00:33:23 AM

is genuine: B.'s procedure is consistentthroughoutthe

significatiuarum
illustrationand clarityis the whole point ( clariorem
, bll). Each stage
in the definitionof nomenbuilds upon the previous one. B. adds the
appropriate differentia,then proceeds to the successive division and
selection of the differentia.Thus at 886d9 he gives the complete foruocumsignificatiuarum
mula achieved so far{secundum
), as he
positionem
sine
secundum
does again at 887a 10 f. ( uocumsignificatiuarum
positionem
not
uocum
and
he
does
the
with
each
time
,
partitive gen.
),
tempore
sacrificeaccuracy to brevity.At 886c5 f. he has already applied thedifto uox, and thatis the verythinghe will now divide
ferentiasignificatiua
... diuido, 886c 11 f.). It is both redundant
( ipsamuocumsignificantiam
and wrong to make a division here of uox alone. I thereforecannot
believe thatB. leftsignificatiuarum
out, although,given the frequentoccurrence of words with the root signifie-throughoutthe passage, it is
easy to understandhow it mighthave fallenout of thearchetype,while
the remedy forthe omission is such an obvious one that it would undoubtedly have occurred to more than one corrector.So it is worth
recalling that C is later than D I : the error was apparently not corrected until sometime afterthe arrival of the earliest extant MSS in
the medieval schools.
890al3 f. (Allvariants
noted.)
...
... multiplicitatem
significationis
A C D EcF G H P J M N O Q. multiplicatis
P
Alb:
multiplicitatem multiplicitatis
K | significationis
P Alb:
E : multiplicitis
B L : multiplitatis
I: multiplicatas
K: significationem
cett.
significations
At 877d9 B. writes,pluralitassignificationis
, and at 890b3, significationis
in
The
affirmation
ofsignificationem
unanimous
multiplicitatem. virtually
the MSS suggests that our traditionis based upon a source that read
as well (-tisat least is the ending in all but K P ), although
multiplicitatis
therewe finda wider range of variants. P Alb give the correctreading,
as multiplicitatissignificationemis beside the point: an equivocal does
not necessarily signifya multiplicitybut the significationis multiplex
(cf. 888d9 f.; 889all f.). Again, the conjecture would have been an
obvious one, and the correct reading was indicated already by other
passages of Div. itself.
890b4ff.(Allvariants
noted.)
secundum
autemsignificationes
Diuiduntur
aequiuocationem
(5) aequiuocarum
utcumdico...
orationum
definitione,
(6) uniusparticulae
M)
(deest
= ZX:significarunes
4 significationes]
Po: aeD(v. ad loc.5) 5 aequiuocarum
18

00:33:23 AM

aeP: aequiuocorum
uel cett.(aeq. sign.u. tr.D) | | secundum
quiuocorum
C E P Po: om.I cett.| |
N 6 uniusparticulae
aequiuocarum
quiuocationem]
autA B D F G I
CEP: orationum
A2H L N P Po: uel orationum
orationum
=
B
Pc:
C D K Q. definidefinitionem
Pc
uel
K
orationum
O
|
|
Q.
definitione]
J
add.P
tionum0: orationum
4
The argumenthere turnson the distinctionbetween (a) 'equivocar'
'

4
( unumnomenmultasignificam)and (b) ambiguous' ( oratiocomposita
multasignificans
, cf. 878al-12; 888d5-8).48 889dl4-90b4 provide the
fullexplanation of (b), and 890a 13 (aliae inpartcula
) introducesan exis
tension of (a), to be explicated at 890b4 ff.An equivocal statement
while
in
an
homo
uiuit
is
an
term
one in which there
equivocal
(e.g.,
),
'
'ambiguous" statementthe syntaxitselfgives rise to the multiplicity
of significations(e.g., audio GraecosuicisseTroianos).The masc. / neut.
aequiuocorum
(5) is incorrect,as B. is going to discuss equivocal oranot
tiones
words; uel (5) may have arisen as part of an explanatory
,
gloss or variant, therestof which has since dropped out. uniusparticulae
(6) is required by sense and is furthersupported by 890a 13 / 15. uel
(6) was probably added to answer uel(5), but it is entirelyout of place:
aut (6) also must be rejected, and
again, B.'s sole concern is orationes.
on similar grounds. Having just reiterated the 4'ambiguous" /
"equivocal" difference,B. will go on {autemresumptive)to explain the
, 890bl f.).49
aequiuocationem
multiplex
"hybrid" ( = ipsa oratiosecundum
From amidst the confusionin the MSS one point emergeswithclarity:
the fem. aequiuocarum
(5) is necessary but is found only in Po, where
it may well be no more than a humanistconjecture. The MS tradition
which has
itselfis based on an incorrectmasc. or neut. aequiuocorum
stirredup considerable mischief.
There are finallyfive doubtful cases:
876d3f.
laudatain Categorias
Dicitenim...
... perhancIntroductionis
(4) utilitas.
=
add.P: scientiam
add.
add.E I J2:scientiam
diuidendi
hanc] F J: diuisionem
L: haecconi.Moraux
F2: hanc(hana.c.) notitiam
B. extolls the utilitasof the science of division, followingAndronicus,
Plotinus and Porphyry,hanc is in all the MSS, but difficultiesin its
= supralinear) which appear
construalhave occasioned glosses (F2
to have been promptedby 875dl f. ( scientiadiuidendi)and 875d3 ( haec
... notitia).EIL have actually incorporated glosses into the text. Ab
48I observe,
Eut.etNest.VII (118,46rev.Loebed.) B. uses
thatat Contr.
however,
thetwomoreor lessas synonyms.
49Cf. In Penh.11.168,25.
19

00:33:23 AM

is in agreement with F 2: Porphyrypraises the utilitasof his introduc. Alb loosely paraphrases, per introduction per hanc scientiamdiuidendi
'
, while Pozzi translates, 'e dal
tions, quas scripsitin Aristotelis
Cathegorias
vienelodatal'utilitdi introdursi
medesimo
nelleCategorie per mezzodella
scienza del dividere
fact
the
that by Introductionis
B. is
," overlooking
the
In
.
At
In
naming
Isag 1.15,2 f.; 11.143,11 ff.).
Isag. (cf.
Isag.
11.150,5 ff. B. says, nam nequepraetergenerisuel speciei cognitionem
discuntur
necdefinitio
etdifferentiam,
etin ceteris
praedicamenta
genusrelinquit
sit
utilis
iste
cum
de
et
diuisione
demonstratione
tractatus,
quam
disputabitur,
ap. The exposition of the science of division will shed lighton the
parebit
utilityof the Isag. At Div. 876d4-7a2, however, he paraphrases Porphyry (Isag. 1,5 f.) to the effectthat the Isag. will assist towards a
mastery of, among other things, the science of division (propter
utilitatem
is a subjective gen. (J2
quae estmaximapartiend).Introductionis
writesuel in introductionibus
above the line, while K has id estin isagogis
in the margin), but with what is it to be construed ? Moraux (120, n.
1), recognizingthat what followsis nearly a quotation of the opening
of the Isag. and thinkinghancunintelligible,proposed the emendation
haec: Porphyry praises the utility (sc. of the science of division)
"
totheCategories
throughthe following(sc. words) of the Introduction
Now B. uses hie 65 times in Div. either to referback to something
previously said or as the antecedent to a relative pronoun, and ille 8
times in anticipation of a statement;hocmodoappears 6 times, meaning "in the followingway." Ilia might have been expected, but haec
is possible and has at least some transcriptionalplausibility.It makes
laudata(sc. est)a vb. of equal weightwithdocet(875d3), and introduces
a strong sense break at et (876d2). Fatal to haec, however, is the fact
that enimindicates that B. is really paraphrasing, not quoting, Porphyry. Furthermore, as Prof. Asztalos points out to me, the symmetricalsentence structureargues stronglyin favorof hanc.The whole
balances on docet
: (a) Quam . . . diuidendi'(b) quamque. . . notitia'(c) docet'
...
et
repetitus;
(b')
(a') et ... utilitas.Andronicus' book (approved by
Plotinus and used by Porphyry) teaches of the esteem in which the
Peripateticsect held the science of division, and the utilityof the Isag.,
which Porphyry' 'acknowledges' ' (laudata) with referenceto (per) the
science of division, teaches of the benefitsof that science. So utilitas
(876d4) completes the sentence structureby harkeningback tofructus
depends upon it. Notice also how
(875dl), and the gen. Introductionis
is
balanced
peripateticam
disciplinam
by the referencesto Andronicus
(b)
and Porphyry(b'). No emendation is required.
20

00:33:23 AM

878all
... amphibola
atqueambigua...
= D : amphibolia
O: amD2 F L A/jf-phyb-^)
J M: amphibologia
amphibola]
G
phibologica
J1M2: anphiuologica
As B. has given the Grk. equivalent ( amphibolia
) of the Latin ambiguitas
in 9, so here he gives the adjectival forms,and the subject is oratio.If
amphibolais a straighttransliterationfrom the Grk., then B. or the
copyistof the archetypehas mistaken it for an adj. of three terminations, with a false fem. ending in alpha. But his translationof Soph,
el. 177al3 f. ( una interrogationum
amphibola)proves that B. employs a
Latin equivalent withthe usual endings in -us, -a, -urn.Again emendation is unnecessary.
879bl3
...
Amplius< quoque> genusomnenaturaliter
< > egosuppl.
Throughout the treatiseampliusquoqueis the transitionalformulawith
continuativeforce(879a7; cl 2 ; d5 f.; 882cl2 f.), and while quoqueis
not absolutely necessary, I stronglysuspect that B. employed it here
too.
885b12 f. (Allvariants
noted.)
... et in eos quos Graecitorneasuocant(nos diuisionespossumusdicere)
...
distribuimus
= E(-'ieac)F:
N | | torneas]
quos]= A H Q quodAcHcQf | Graeci]geometrici
= Mc' deuisioM | |
Po ' | diuisiones]
torneosD: thomeasF2 N O: TOfxe
possu[..]sN
nos ... dicereappears anacoluthic due to the asyndeton at uocantnos. If
diceremeans "say," then the phrase is an awkward parenthesis,
'
4
perhaps even a gloss; if, on the other hand, it means 'call' or
"designate," then some connective afteruocantseems desiderated (cf.
Pozzi's l<e noi possiamochiamare
") and possumusproves awkward. In
, uocareor
fact, B. frequentlyuses dicerein the sense of appellare
f.
that
the
In
but
nominare
,50
asyndeton may inIsag. 1.9,24 suggests
... fructusestartiseius quam GraeciXoytxrjv,
deed be genuine: necessarius
nos rationalem
, quod (etc.). Here the ellipse (sc. of uocant
possumusdicere
or dicunt
, with Graeci)and the position of the main vb. (est) admittedly
make fora more natural constructiongenerally,but I am unconvinced
50InIsag.1.14,2;25,10;42,15;95,15;11.168,12;
cf.11.140,4
( = Cicero).Conversely,
can mean"to say" (v. Brandt'sindex,s.v. appellare).
appellare
21

00:33:23 AM

that emendation is necessary in the Div. passage above. It is also unnecessaryto followPo withxofxe
(false accentuationon p. 120 but not
on p. 76), as the MSS (apart from Z), which is an obvious case of
assimilation) give an acceptable reading (v. LSJ, s.v. xofie,II.l).
889dl4 f. (Allvariants
noted.)
oratio[id estambigua]est,euenitut ...
Sin ueroamphibola
= /*("amf-^:
B: amsi C N I I uero]= P: estadd.Pc | | amphibola]
amphibolam
E2: estadd.C G: om.N | | [ ] egoseel.' '
P oratio]= E: estpraem.
fibologia
est1]etadd.L | est2]=A2' om.A C E G L P Q' oratioadd.N ' | ut]= O2:post
aliquotiens
(890a2)tr.O
B. has already introduced the Grk. terminologyat 878a9 / 11 (see
above), and the fact that at 888d6 he uses only aequiuocaand ambigua
(i.e., that he does not explain one language with the other) suggests
that the id estambiguaabove is a gloss. I findit hard to believe that B.
would have countenanced such a needlessly redundant, as well as
awkward, explanatory phrase.
With the exception of threeout of the last five,then, these passages
would seem to indicate an archetypecontainingcertainerrorssome of
which, ifmy surmiseis correct,were emended only afterDiv. firstappeared in the medieval schools. There is, however,a complicationthat
raises the question of hyparchetypes.At some early point in the tradition a fragmentof B.'s revised Topicstranslationwas inserted,in two
parts of equal length, at Div. 888a2 ( + Top. 122al0-36) and 890b351
( + 122a36-b24). The fragmentbears no relation to the surrounding
passages of Div. and so cannot have been due to marginal glossing.
Moreover, the interveningtextofDiv. (888a2-90b3) is twicethelength
of the fragment, meaning that a bifolio of the translation was
mistakenlyinsertedbefore the two central bifoliosof a gathering.Of
our MSS only F G H J N lack the fragment,while A D I P delete it
by means of correctionalsigns of one sort or another. Otherwise, the
fragmentsurvives in Klosterneuburg 671 (s. XII) and 1098 (s. XIIXIII, one halfonly), and in Venice, Marc. lat. VI. 65 (s. XV, one half
only).
The firsthalf of the fragmentruns from p. 183,4 (Astruenti
) in
Minio-Paluello's edition (Arist.lat. V.2) to p. 184,7 (est1),and it was
insertedbetween constatand ut (888a2); the second half runs fromp.
to p. 185,5 (genere),insertedbetween retinet
and ut
184,7 (praedicaretur)
(890b3). Effortswere made to adjust the intrusivepassages to context.
51Notb2, as Minio-Paluello
wrote.
consistently
22

00:33:23 AM

totum
At the end of the firsthalf, afterest,A2 C E2 L add, praedicaretur,
which
ueroquodgenusnonestnonita. E I K add only the praedicaretur
,52
has crept in fromthe beginning of the second half of the fragment.
to the second half of the
Similarly, to ease the transitionfromretinet
est
E
P
L
A2
C
,
add, (etC)53 ambigua etdiciturGraeceamphibola
fragment,
utcumdico{audio add. I2) Graecos(om. a.c. E) uicisseTroianos(.Romanos
ad reliquatranseamus
C L). Nuncistasufficiant,
(trans,ad rei.tr. I2). Genus
autem(Gen. aut. om. I2). The correctorof /has placed the phrase, nunc
... transeamus
(with invertedword order), separately in the lower left
" +
") its position as if coming before
margin, indicating (with a
diuiduntur
(890b4).54
Now according to Minio-Paluello, the Top. fragmententered only
one branch of the traditionofDiv. , so thatthe upper part of the stemma
codicumshould be drawn thus:
Div .

Top. fr.

a being the hyparchetypefromwhich F N (G H J as well ?) descend.

In fact there is a means of testingthe reliabilityof Minio-Paluello's
"hypothetical reconstruction," as one of the MSS lacking the fragment can be shown to descend fromanother that has it, but has also
correctionmarks indicatingthat the deletion is necessary. For as Van
de Vyver (and indeed Minio-Paluello) saw, H is in all probabilitya
of A + A2. This is supported by the text of Div. :
descriptus
877dl fund.al. tr.A H 878b6atque]=ACHc: etA C F G P Q. atqueet H
=A: om.A2H 879dl3quae]= A: quia A2Hc P: quia quae H'
878c2rursus]
880b6
quia F G J M2: et A2 H P: om.A M cett.(see below,p. 33)
= A: Quomodogenusdiuidatur
add.A2H (see above,p. 11)
respondetur]
880c9iunctum]= A H: scilicet
generiadd.A2Hc (seebelow,p. 27) 882al2
- A: oppositione
A2H: om.A
884a6aequales]aequilaterae
add.A2H
igitur]
= A: in887c8f.etrurs.rat.]= A2//(seebelow,p. 33) 887dl0continuum]
=A: incontinua
AcH 889blhomo]=A:
A2H 888bl5continua]
continuum
=A H: scilicet
=A: sicA2H
890al5habent]
ambulata^.A2H 889blOSunt]
add.A2Hc,
aequiuocationem
52Followed
in/byanerasure,
dicimus
beneath
which
appearsoncetohavestood.For
cumautem
ut(888a2)E I thenwrite,
(enimI) dicimus.
53A corrupted
?
fromtheendingofretinet
ofut(890b3),or a dittography
vestige
54Thereare severalinconsistencies
in Minio-Paluello
s transcripand inaccuracies
lat.V, praef.xl).
tionsoftheseaddedphrases{NotaX '01 f.;Arist.
23

00:33:23 AM

and we may furthercompare 889d8:

= D2:om.D E H L 0: autemA B M Q: cartem
N: scilicet
diuisionem
uel
artem]
A2:scilicet
diffmitionem
Hc.
diuisionem
H retains absolutely no trace of the fragment,so that if its exemplar
had disappeared and therewere no other related MS against which to
compare, it would be impossibleto know thatit was copied froma MS
with the fragmentrather than from one without it. The fragment,
then, does not constitutean infalliblecriterionforthe classificationof
MSS and the question of alternative stemmata must remain open,
e.g.:

Boethius
Renatus
^
Vivarium U7*'

a
(corrected text)

r
fr'

Boethius
Renatus
Vivarium ,
? 9th c

^ ^ fr'
r

(corrected text)

That is, the splitmay have enteredwhen the fragmentwas recognized

as spurious and removed fromthe treatise. We must search therefore
in the text of Div. itself for evidence of significant differences
separating the MSS (except H) that do not have it fromthose thatdo.
If there are patternsof significanttextual error that cut independent
trajectoriesacross the division suggested by the presence / absence of
the Top. fragment,and if there is reason to believe that at least some
of those errorsentered Div. only afterthe putative split caused by the
entryof the fragmentinto one branch of the tradition,thensuch a split
may not have occurred at all. Otherwise, the common errorswill have
arisen by a process of contamination. I have chosen to pursue the investigation firstaccording to passages ratherthan by MSS, in order
to show thatwe are dealing withan open tradition.I shall thendiscuss
the question of F G J N. Finally, after identifyingsome patternsof
filiationthat emerge fromamidst the confusion,it will be necessaryto
returnto Minio-Palluello's stemma.
We begin with the most disturbed passage in the treatise:
877a8 ff.(Allvariants
noted.)
Necputetsuperuacuam
harumrerum
rudis,(10)
(9) loquacitatem
inexperiens,
nouiaudientium
insolens
habereaequum,(11) necullusliuorid quod
mentes
et arduumnaturaestet (12) ignotum
nostris
...
24

00:33:23 AM

8 Nec ... nostris

inrasura
suntin
(12) a correctore
quasiscribae
contemporaneo
scripta
abaliomendose
inmargine
deinde
I, eisdem
repetitis
(harum... nouiproliuorstant);
simili
ratione
cod.A inmargine
Nec ... aequum(10) a correctore
sunt
,
; cf.infra
repetita
= AD: om.A2(mg.)
ad aequum(10) | | putet]
B Dc F I P(mg.)J K M O P | j
= P(mg.): superuacueam
I(~ca inc.) 9 loquacitatem]
superuacuam]
=JC:lo= P(mg.):harum/[..]
= A D G(-esp-)
/ | | inexperiens]
quatitatem
J | | harum]
D2J Kc AP 0 : inexpertes
I P Po: inexA2(mg.)
P(mg.)K M: inexperientes
=
D2 I J KcM2 O P: rudiB
pert* C I rudis] AD P(mg.)M: rudesA2(mg.)
K 10 insolens]
=A DKM : insolensque
C E F G P(mg.):insolentes
D2
A2(mg.)
Kc 0 P: insolentesque
I J M2' insolertesque
Po ' | audientium]
=A P(mg.):
I aequumC D(vid.)E Hc:om.G: aequum
audentium
.): audien///tium
A2(mg
esseN: esseaequumA2(mg.):
aequumestA B D2(vid.)H I P(mg.)J K L M 0
P Q. estaequumAbAlbPo: putetM2: aequm(c)est(aeq. e. s.l., p.c.),aliter:
necsuperuacuam
harumreruminexperientes,
rudes,insolentesloquacitatem
mentes
habereaequumest(es[.]es.l.,p.c.)F cf.supra
, ad
que nouiaudientium
loc.8 11 nec]= Ec: ec E | | liuor]=A2I Mc(uid.):laborA M Q. liborG : luor
L: om.P(mg.,v. supra
, ad loc.8) | | et1om.P ' ' et quod tr.L ' ' arduum...
est]= P(mg.):ard.(-du///um
I) e. nat.tr.GI L N: nat.e. ard.tr.P 12 ignotum]
= E: nostriB: estadd.E?(nunc
estadd.L ' ' nostris]
erasum)
It will be convenient to consider firstAb, Alb and Po, who read as
follows:aequumis complementedby est,putetis omitted,and the plurs.
inexperientes
(-pertes),rudes and insolentes(-rtesque
) are adopted or
understood. Both Alb (ne anxietas
al lettore
) and Pozzi ("per noninfliggere
ilfastidio") interpretutnec(6) as introducinga finalclause. The result
is that B. is saying that it is wrong forhis audience (audientium
mentes
),
who are inexpertand resistantto new ideas, to be subjected to a prolix
or incompleteexposition. In replyto thisseveral pointsmust be urged:
(a) on the whole thereis good support forputet(the lectiodijficilior
), so
that to dismiss it out of hand would be the counsel of despair; (b) of
the early MSS thatomit it onlyJ has (before
correction)the plur. forms
(9 f.), which are needed ifputetdisappears (the original reading in I
is lost to erasure and F has theduplexlectioafteraequumest, 10, probably
from a marginal correctionin its exemplar- O P are later); (c) one
point at least is certain: ifputetstands, est(with aequum)falls and vice
versa.55So it should be noted that while (before correction)C D E (N)
read putet. . . aequum(esse) and B I J K M O P favorestover putet
,A F
G H L Q either cannot be construed or make no sense. The correct
reading must emerge from context. 5-6 articulate two concerns, the
tractatio
and moderatabreuitas,that will be followed
competens
subtilisque

55Cf.Af2,on aequum
ofA
(10). The questionofthevb. has puzzledthecorrectors
estabove
nomen
J: A2(mg.)
glossesnouiwithuerbum
( = noscere
), whileJchas written
noui.
25

00:33:23 AM

up later. Div. will be thorough,yet to the point.56Notice the balance:

as decisae. . . sententiae
tractatione
(7) answers competenti
subtilique
(5 f.), so
answers moderata
breuitate
B.
is
superuacuam
loquacitatem
(6).
anticipating
the criticismsof a detractor57whom he characterizesas uncultivated,
intractable, etc. (cf. 877bl f., and the transposed phrase in the
marginal correction to /, noted in the apparatus ad loc. 8). Hence
liuor, obtrectationis
(13) and quidquidnouum... rpudiant
(bl f.). B. is not
in the least hostile to his audience. The plurs. inexperientes
, etc., then,
have been wronglyassimilated to mentes.There is a subtle shiftin the
forceof the subjunctives, as ingeratur
(8) is consecutive while putet, offuscetand dentque(14) are jussives. putetmust stand. I suspect that at
an early date est (hence esse also) was noted above aequumto explain
the idiom implicitin the ellipse, and that it subsequently forcedputet
out. B I J K M 0 P are in error,as are A F G H L Qin various ways.
A F I in particulardisplay symptomsof the confusionthathas entered
throughcontamination.
879al f.
... aequiuocatio
uerouniuersalior
redicitur
tantum
uoce...
quidemsignificata
significata
(-taHJ) redicitur
(dit-B) AcB C Ec F*G HcP J K McP2:significata
resdicitur
A D H M 0 Q' significata
remdicitur
P:
redicitur
Jc' significata
reducitur
E /: significare
F L : significare
dicitur
dicitur
significata
quae N
The burden of aequiuocatiois words rather than things (cf. In Cat.
166c15 ff.). An equivocal is more universal than its significatein
respectof uox, and canisis thus more universal than, say, latrabilisonly
in respectof signification.Genus, on the otherhand, is more universal
than species in nature. In relation to the species it is the whole, and
togetherwith the constitutivedifferenceit "produces" the species.
existente
notsignificatare is an abl. of comparison {Ab*s re significata
no
other
makes
sense
here,
is
an
exwithstanding);
reading
significare
ample of haplography. The allegiances witnessed in the previous
example have almost all been broken: C D E N have parted ways; B
J K are in agreement,but now as against MO, EI now agree in error.
880c1
... cumautempropriis
nominibus
...
speciesappellantur
56I notean interesting
. VIII. 20 [793c]= 11.373,3
parallelinJohnofSalisbury
(Polier
tarnen
utnecdeprolixitate
Webb),whoknewDiv. (cf.above,p. 3): diligenti
compendio,
taedium
necdebreuitate
obscuritas
generetur.
57Cf.882d7ff.;InPerih.
11.251,4
f.;421,6ff.;453,10ff.;464,14ff.;Cons.phil.1.3,5
f.; Trin.exord.(4,12ff.rev.Loeb ed.).
26

00:33:23 AM

D FcG L N P Q: app. spec.tr.M2:appellantur

om. A B I K
speciesappellantur
F: appellantur
M: speciesalpellatur
in species
C 0 : species
J: speciesdicuntur
noncarentA2H : noncarentspecies(-cesa.c. E) E Ie
At 885b 11 C O preservedthe correctreading ( sicut). 880c 1 is the only
passage in which these witnessesagree thus in error. The main points
in A B I K M , MSS which
of interestare the omission of appellantur
also agree elsewherebut not at all consistently,and more importantly
the implicitlink between A2 and E , which is, I think, unique to this
, b8) looks like a correctionto remedy the
passage, noncarent(cf. carent
loss of appellantur.
880c6ff.(Allvariants
noted.)
... quidmihi(7) necesseessetdicere"animalrationale
mortale",si (8) animal
essetnomineproprio
rationale
nuncupatum,
quod(9) cumreliquadifferentia,
uerissima
etintegra
hominis
ratione
idest"mortali",
iunctum
(10) definitionem
? Nuncautem...
perfceret
(11) conclusione
= Z>: dicerem
D 8 rationale]
estadd.
7 essetAcGNP Q: estA Qcett.' | dicere]
O PP:nunc
L : mortale
add.N nom.... nunc.]nomineproprio
noncupatum
L : pr.nom.nunc.tr.C G N: nom.nunc.pr. tr.E
nomineproprion
cupatum
I I quodC E P P AbPo: utF: etJ: om.I celt.9 cumqueM N ' | reliqua]= C
M: quoqueadd.A Cc G H L Mc P Q ' | id est]= (i ): idemPB PM | | mor= A HJ2:iuntum
L : iuncAcZXH N ' ' iunctum]
J: uictum
tali]= A D: mortale
= M2: defitionem
B:
tam 0: scilicetgeneriadd. A2 Hc 10 definitionem]
M: definitio
estTV| | hom.uer.]= O2:uer.hom.tr.O 11 concludefinitionum
= ZXP Mc: perficere
BI K
N ' ' perfceret]
ne PD: defmitione
sione]conclusio
M: perficeretur
D L II NuncA2C Ec F G Hc P J2L N P: nonA B D E P H
IJ K M OQ
esset(7) seems required as the quasi-apodosis to stanimal, etc. The conditions are all unfulfilled(cf. appellarentur,
jieret,5), and so B. uses the
in
also
8
11.
B.
in
and
effectargues: 44But as it is (cf. nuncautem,
subj.
11), not all species do have proper names, and so we divide by differentiae; otherwise there would be no need to construct definitionsex
"
pluribusterminis(3). Some connective is needed beforecum(9), given
esset(8). ut and et (perhaps a corruptionof ut, and weaker than it in
sense) are possible, but quodhas slightlystrongerattestation.The cumque (9) in M N may lend furtherclarification:either it is a variation
on et cum, or quodcumque
may once have been in the tradition,which
would perhaps explain the disappearance of quod(throughcorrection).
So many MSS are in error at esset(7) that littlecan be made of their
agreement. I note only that the uncorrectedMSS with essetare later
than A Q. C G N are linked, as are E /, by inversions of word order;
and F J may be related by ut / et (often confused). Nunc and non, of
course, would have been easily confused.
27

00:33:23 AM

880dl3
... (ut) capillicrispi(si nonamissisint),et ...
amissisintA2D H Q: sintamissiN: amissi(a///mE) suntEJK : demissisint
suntG: admissisintB F*: admissisuntP L P: amM2:demissisuntj2: dimissi
C: amisisintA: amisisunt/: amissisintcalamistro
missisuntM: sintammissi
D2 H2: demissisintcalamistro
F2:amissicalamistro
F: admissisintcalamistro
plicatisintO
The correctreading is amissi, as there being no hair loss and no noncongenital deformityof the eyes are both necessarypresuppositionsto
conseB. 's point thatcurlyhair and greyeyes are instancesofdifferentiae
here
of
that"
the
force
the
Grk.
et
.
si
has
ye, "assuming
(cf.
quentes
Denniston lvi), calamistro
may have been suggested by extrinsecus
(14)
in combination with the confusion of vbs., but the crimping iron
(followed by Alb) is a desperate effortto save the situation. It shows
up firstin F , but withan incompatiblevb., so thatF2 has had to make
adjustmentto accomodate what would seem originallyto have been no
more than a gloss. There appear to be fivemain types of errorhere:
(a) sunt; (b) adm or amm-' (c) amisi; (d) de or di-, although with dif. LMP
ferentmeanings; (e) calamistro
are essentiallythe same with
I
and
A
as
to
to
respect (a)
agree
(b);
(c), but not as to (a); (d) suggests
that an adjustment made for calamistro
, long or draping
(sc. demittere
hair- but then why the curlingiron ? ) at some point crossed over into
a text in which it was unnecessary (sc. one lacking calamistro
), so that
furtheradjustment was required: hence dimitiere
withoutcalamistro
, in
G. dimittere
but is far weaker than it
brings us back closer to amitterey
in sense (unless a shaved head is a desideratum; in any case, removing
one's hair would not affectthe natural quality of its curliness). Notice
that there are almost as many variants as there are MSS.
881b8(Allvariants
noted.)
... ut glaucisoculisesse ...
glaucis(-is/I) oculisesse(-se/D2)A2C D2E F G H I P: gl.es. oc. tr.Jc: glaucis
(cl-L) uerooculisesseB L : glaucisueroesseoculisJ K: glaucosoculosesseN
Qf:glaucosesseoculosMc: glaucosoculos0 : glaucosuero{vid.A) oculosesse
(-se/D) A D : glaucosueroesseoculosM: glaucos*ii*(vid.)oculosesseQ
Once again it is practically"every man forhimself." The abl. is obviouslycorrect(cf. luminibus
glaucis, 10; In Isag. 1.86,2; 88,23), and the
acc. would require haberein any case (cf. In Isag. 1.28,10 f.). There appear to be fourmain types of error: (a) acc. = A D M N O Qj,(b) abl.
+ uero= B J K L' (c) acc. + uero= A(vid.) D M; (d) esseoculis(-los)
transposed= J K M. But there has obviously been crossing of lines
28

00:33:23 AM

throughcorrection,and the representativesof (d) are divided as to (b)

and (c), while (c) combines (a) and (b), so that there must have been
layers of correctionwhich are now visible only in their intermingled
effects.The it- (sc. duos) in Q is probably a misreading of the usual
compendium for uero.
881c6(Allvariants
noted.)
...
... propter
quas speciesconsistit
= Ac
A D H N 0 Q: perP | | quamspetiesB | | consistit]
propter]Ac:praeter
A0 Q
H : nonconsistit
D H2 N Q: subsistit
G: nonsubsistit
of the
The confusionprobably arose originallyfrommisinterpretation
have
the
D
N
at
but
. A O Q agree with
praeter
compendium forpropter
subsistitof G, only with the nonwhich is necessary to make sense of
praeter.N agrees with D.
882d2f. (Allvariants
noted.)
... stabilefxumque
mutabili...
mutabili
A B C D E K M 0: stabilefxumque
I J:
stabilefxumque
motabili
instabili
stabilefxumque
et (om.Ie Mc) mutabili
(mot-Ie) A2H IeJ2Mc N:
stabileet fixum
instabili
mutabili
(-le G) et mutabili
(-lein
Qstabileet flxum
eadem
lectione
LP
mutabili
G) F G: stabileinstabili
(-lea.c. L) fxumque
There appear to be two independentstrainshere: (a) MSS withfxumque, and (b) those with etfixuminstabiliet. This would suggest thatA2
H Ie J2 Mc N offera contaminated version (note that all but H N are
corrections),as do LP (which make an unnecessarilyredundant pair
of opposites). (too has apparently sufferedcontamination, forwhile
it bears a close affinityto A (so also to H)'
om.
879a2totum]
quotaA(a.c.)Q 879d4compositio
A(a.c.)Q 879d5genere
A(a.c.)Q 882b8nomineom.A(a.c.)Q 883d9Sic]= AcQ. si A Qf 884b3
H 2Q 884dl2enim]= Ac:
adtf.
oppositio
Ac(nunc
deleta)
Haec] = A HQ. scilicet
ex ea add.A Q 885b12 quos] = A H Q' quod AcHc Q (see above,p. 21)
= A Q. constituens
886al4 suscepi]=i4Q: suscipeA Q 886bl5 continens]
=
A2C: om.A H Q
u.
e.
ir.
est
Hc'
886cl
q.
(1
quod uox]
A2(nunc
deletum)
888al5 pedes]=A: partesA2 Q 888c7animalA(a.c.) (1 889b3raptat]=^4
Q(vid.):raptaeAcQf(see below,p. 30) 889bll quandoom.A Q (seebelow,
p. 31) 890c9quaeror]uel add.A H Q 891a3dulcia]= A2Q: duciaA Qf
=A2: om.A Q,
891a9-llilli... subiecto]
there are also significantdifferencesbetween the two MSS:
= E2: disputatio
876dllibrisPlatonis((libriPiatonisF G) 877b4desperatio]
C E L Q 877c8quidemom.F G N Q 877dlf.con.an. tr.F G N Q 878al
F (ac distributio
estmod.ir.F G O ( 879al3 distributioque]
et distributio
G) 880dl2uel12 om.F G Q 881b8(seeabove,p. 28) 881dl2lux]etadd.
om.Q 882b13
F G Q 882b10uelom.G N Q 882b12 aliaenonrectilineae
ueroadd.F G Q 884c15 animal]
nec1... nigi2]
mediiQ 882c13 posterior]
etadd.F Q 885c2alii1]ueroadd.F Q 885dl4aliae]suntadd.F ,
29

00:33:23 AM

among them a tendencyforQ to agree with F , G, or both, against A.

Q has the etfixumof F G but not the instabiliet. It is difficultto choose
between A-E K M 0 and F G, the groups separated by both (a) and
(b), but it is my belief that B. wrotefixumqueas a mere appendage to
stabile, and that early on someone provided instabilieton the supposition thatstabileand fixumque
each needed a statedoppositum
(the enclitic
would then have been dropped in favorof et, fora strongerseparation
fromstabile).The reading in L P was adopted probably forsimplicity's
sake: the pairs of opposites were separated out.
883cl4 f. (All variants
noted.)
... definitionem
sed ...
contendit,
F H2
defnitionem
contcndit
F) sed(setH2) C D2(cont.def.s. tr.)E2(uid.)
(cumtP McN P: sedom.L: definitionem
contendis
sed(setA2puncto
praeposito,
H) A2
G HJCQ: definitionem
contendisset
lect.
orig.dubia)B ?E ?I K M: definiA2(ras.,
sed Z)(cont.def.s. tr.)J O
tionemcontendisset
sedapparentlypromptedcontendisset
and contendis
sedmay have
contendit
been an intermediary;with correctionthe sed was eitherreinstatedor
else removed altogether,as D J O and L would tend to indicate. B K
M are in agreement, as they were at 877a8 ff.But as we have seen,
- nor exclusively- coherentgroup (cf.
theydo not forma consistently
on 880dl3 and 881b8). And whereas F G were in accord at 877al0 (insolensque)and 882d2 f., they are here divided. Finally, while O here
disagrees with N P (cf. on 889bll, below), at 877a8 ff. OP agreed
, insolentes
, aequumest),while at 881b8 N
against N (putetomitted,rudes
0 (acc. glaucosoculos)agreed against P (abl.).
889b2ff.(All variants
noted.)
... nullaenimdefinitione
conclusa
audientis
flucmultis
(3) intellegentiam
raptat
tibuserroribusque
Quid enimquisqueauditorintellegat
(4) traducit.
(5) ubiid
nulladeterminatione
?
quoddicensloquitur
(6) concluditur
A Lc(vid.)'determinatione
2 enimom.H | | definitione]
Ac' definitionem
B
= Q: audiendC(inc.) 3 intellegentiam
B D2 F I J K M 0:
L(uid.)I I audientis]
A CD EG HJ2L N F Q ' ' multis]
multaE: permultaC: ad multa
intellegentia
E2 I I raptat
A B D(-ai/)FI J KM O Qf(vid.):
A2C E GJ2L N P ?Q;.
raptatur
H : raptaeAc ((s.l.) | | fluctibus]
efluctibus
K | | erraptetur
Q. erroribus
= A2: erroribus
A D Q. fluctibusque
K 4
quae B M: erroribus
roribusque]
traducit
: traducitur
A2CE G H
{peltrans-)
ABDFIJKMOQ
trans-)
{vel
L N P j I Quid]= D2 Ie: quodBCDIJLMPQ.
quidemA(vid.)' | auditur
E 5 dicens]= L2: omnishomoambulat
B L I I intelleget
add.L(fortasse
ex7,quo
A2C E F G I L P: concludit
locoeadem
omissa
AB
primitus
sunt)6 concluditur
D HJ K M N 0 d
The subject of conclusa(2) is uoxsinedeterminatione
, al 5) and the pass,
at 6 (the betterreading anyway), raptat(3),
voice supports concluditur
30

00:33:23 AM

traducit
(4) and intellegentiam
(3) are thereforenecessary. MSS may be
grouped (before correction) thus:
intellegentiam raptat
BJKMO
ADQ
CEGLP
N

X
XXX
X

traducit

concluditur
x
X
X

so that by reading across we see where the groups listed at the left
cohere in error
, and by reading down where theycombine to formnew
factions. F I alone come through these four hurdles untouched; H
About the
wavers as usual between A and A2 (except with raptetur).
most we can say otherwiseis that BJKM and ADQ cohere as they
sometimes have elsewhere as well, while F G have split once again.
889bll
... (si quis)dicat"da mihi",quandouel quiddaredebeat...
quandouel C E: om.F G H JcN P: uelA Q' quiddicat(-ama.c. M) da mihi
uel (u. om.Ac)AcBDIJKLMO
uel has the supportof all (before correction)but F G H N P, and A Q
cannot be right.Ac B D I etc. commit a dittography{quis ... mihi= 3
quid . . . mihi).At 889bl3 B. uses uelquando, but at c8 f. he says simply,
da mihi, quid daredebeat
, suggestingeither (a) that at bll uel originally
enteredas a means of adjusting the dittographyto context,or (b) that
B. in factwrotequandouel. (a) is difficultto explain, fortheremust first
have been the dittography,thenueladded; the dittographythenwould
have had to drop out throughcorrection,and quandoenter, now to account for the lingering uel. (a) suggests a simpler hypothesis: A Q
preservea vestigeof the original reading. And once quandohad disappeared it would have been necessary to remove uel also (as now in F
G etc.). I adopt the reading of C E , but with some hesitation.
The traditionwas, then, a contaminated one already by the end of
the 10thc. There are no distinctfamiliesof MSS, only tendencies- not
veryconsistentones at that- forcertain MSS to gravitatetowardsone
another beforegoing theirseparate ways once again. Are F G J N in
any sense exceptions to this pattern ? The evidence discussed so far
would indicate not, but the question requires furtherconsideration. It
will be convenientto begin with the relationshipof F G, which do in
fact share certain otherwiseunattested variants:
31

00:33:23 AM

876dllib.Pl. tr.(butcf.above,p. 29) 877al3util.leg.tr. 877c4f.diu.rat.

tr. 879d9id. e. man.tr. 880bl5quaed.mat.tr. 881cl2 in2om. 883b4
add. 883c5contraria2]
consimilis
contrariorum884a4inaequales]
negationi]
suntadd. 885d8def.poss.tr. 886al0 eius]eiusdem 890dl2autemom.
There are as well passages in which the readings in F G appear in other
pre-12th c. MSS (excluding H) only in the formof corrections:
- AJ M: a praem.
F G PJ2M2N 879b4totius]
878dl2f.quasdam/creationes
= A M: uersatur
AcF G H J2M2 0 P 880c13 f. uersetur]
AcF G H Mc,
of which tendency 890c 12 ff. offera particularlyclear example:
(deest
M)
-D H: ut audio(uidoH2) Troianosuinci(et add.H2: uelN)
12 adiectionem]
= D Ec H: om.E : ut
Graecosuicisseadd.D2 F G H2 N P 13 diminutionem]
= D H: ut Graeci
audioGraecosuicisseadd.D2 F G H2 N P 14 diuisionem]
Troiani(-noinc.H2) uictisuntadd.D2 F G H2 N P.
uicerunt,
- The additional phrases are not authentic,forB. will not instancethe
ambiguous statementupon which they depend until 890dl. Sometimes F G will emerge as the only uncorrected witnesses
(besides H) preservingthe accuratetext, as e.g. at 890dll:
... quarede omnibussecundum
se partitionibus
...
{deest
M)
se (seseA2) partitionibus
A2F G H: separationibus
A: se partitione
C J2N:
BD EcIJKLOQ' se diuisionibus
D2 /^duiuseparatioe
E(sic):separationem
a.c.),
or again as the only uncorrectedpre-12th c. witnessespreservingthe
accurate text (883d6):
... animaluerorationale
...
pera litteram
significatur
J>F G Hc Ie M2N P: significatur
ut est(etJ) A B D H(vid.)IJK
significatur
O Q. significat
utestL M: significabatur
C E.
They are joined by M in preservingthe accurate text at 882a4:
... (secundumquas ... harumquattuor)oppositionum
diuisiogenerissit
(monstrandum
est)...
sitF G M: fiatB M2: fitcett.
- B.'s usual idiom is diuisio +
fieri{facere
).58 At 883c4 estappears instead (generum
multadiuisioest; cf. 878al3), and although there C has
fit, the scribe has made the correctionto est. sit and fit are frequently
confused in minuscule script,59but the corruption of fiat to fit is
58Cf.877bl3;clO; d8; 879b6;880a5;c2; 883c7f.;cl2; 884a5;clO;dl4;
885b9;c7;
888a7;alO; bl 1; d4; 889cl3;890dl3.
59Thereare about10 occurrences
ofthisconfusion
in theMSS ofDiv.
32

00:33:23 AM

relativelyunlikely. The scribe of B, I submit, has either made or

followsan emendation (cf. A1).F G are similarlyjoined by J at 879dl 3 f. (all variants noted):
... (utinaerisuirgula)
cuiuspartes,
sunt(14)
quiaeiusdem
quae suntcontinuae
idemessequodtotumest...
aeris,uidentur
D | | quia F GJ M1',et
13 quae]= A: quiaA2HcP: quia quae H ' | continuae/
= Q' om.Q 13-14aer. s. tr.P
A2 H P: quoniamPo: om.A M ceti.' ' sunt2]
A2 F G H JcL N P: uidetur
14 aeris]= D : etadd. | | uidentur
AB CD
EI J KM Q. uidetur
enimO | | idem]autemL ' | esseD Po: essepartesZXcett.
I I estom.E I 0
- The evidence in this passage is rather complicated. There are two
main considerations,(a) quae ... quia. The possibilitiesappear to be:
, Po)yas given above, so thatthe phrase, quae
(i) quae . . . quia (or quoniam
... aeris,is epexegetic ofpartes(13); (ii) quae ... et,which is close to (i),
but weaker both in sense and in MS support; (iii) quia ...et (so Ab),
but withveryweak MS support; (iv) omission
explanatoryof uidentur,
as
of any word at quia, but then requiring an adjustment at uidentur,
idemesse,partes(13) is necessary;
only in 0 ( uideturenim). (b) uidentur
if uidentur,
plur., is correct,then essepartes(14) is not. If, on the other
is correct,thenpartes(14) is necessary but quae
hand, the sing, uidetur
(13) proves extremelyawkward, and even if quia replace quae, a difficultbreak in sense results at cuiuspartesand then again at eiusdem
(13). (i) is clearly the best reading as concerns (a): B. must state first
the fact,and thenthe explanation thereof,beforegoing on to draw the
ostensibleconclusion. Notice thaty failsat uidentur,
while F G fail only
at esse,where D alone saves the day. partes(14) may well have been
another error in the archetype.Similarly,at 887c8 f. F G preserve one half of a necessary phrase,
the other half being supplied by CE:
... et rursusrationabilium
...
(deest
N)
P: rationabilium
rationalium
H: etrursus
C E: rursus
etrursus
(-abil-egoscr.)A2
rursusP: om.ABDIJKLMOQ.
(-nal-F) F G: rationalia
But alongside the conjunctive ones mentioned earlier there are
significantseparative errorsbetween F and G:
877a2quoniam]
diuisionum
add.
quiaF 877c2ita]itaqueF 877c3exempla]
F 877cl3ueroom.G 878al2 Eorum]=A: horumAcE G P 878bl2f.in
alia accidentia
accidenstr.F 878d6totiusque]
et totiusG P 878dl0enim]
autemE G I 878dl1 f. separatur
... significations
om.G 879al2 fonasse
om.G 879al3distributioque]
etdistributio
F Q. ac distributio
G 880dlipsa
33

00:33:23 AM

= E2:om.
F 883all f.Neque... disponit]
om.F 881b5separatur]
segregatur
E G: postpriuationem
om.G 886dl0
(13) tr.L 884dl0f. et ... posteriores
aliaesinetempore
om.G 887dl1 dicimus]
forquoqueadd.G 888b13forma]
statuaexpartibus
G
mam,aliterenimconstat
suis,aliterexmateria
atqueforma
In general it may be said thatwhile F G are indeed linked by common
variants and errors some of which appear elsewhere only as corrections, it is clear thatneitherone is a copy of the other(G is in any case
probably slightlylater than F) and thattheydescend fromdifferent
yet
relatedexemplars. Their hallmarkis the preservationof good readings
that appear in the other early MSS only aftercorrection(given the
contaminated state of the traditionlittleimportance can be attached
to the appearance of those same readings in the later MSS), which
does not prove that the other MSS were correctedagainst F or G, or
thatF G are necessarilycongeners. It only suggestsa shared resistance
to otherwisewidespread errors. Do F G descend froma traditionin
which the Top. fragmentnever played a part ? The answer to this is
uncertain, but we can say (a) that they too are carriersof significant
textualerrorsthat go back to the archetype,and (b) thatit is probable
that the archetypewas made at Vivarium, as (i) the anonymous correctorcompiled the tracts and drew up the 44table of contents'' at a
time when the scribe Theodorus was stillalive, while (ii) it is unlikely
in any event thatthe mechanical errorsin bindingwould have escaped
Renatus' attention,although theymightwell have escaped the attention of a monk who tampered with the collection of monographs at
least to the extent that he inserted the four rhetorical excerpts.60
Everythingrestson (a), forif the textual errorsshared by all MSS go
back beyond the Vivaran archetypeto Renatus, then the possibility
remains open thatF G descend froma traditionwhich never admitted
the Top. fragment,as Minio-Paluello believed in the case of F N. It
is at least as likely,however, thatF G too descend froma Vivarian archetypein which certainerrorsfromboth bindingand copyingentered
the treatise for the firsttime, and this primarilybecause of the inherentimprobabilityof Renatus' having leftso many uncorrectedtextual errorsin Div. He was gatheringand proofreadingthe writingsof
his recentlymurderedcompatriotand must be supposed to have given
60Cf. above,n. 32. As therhetorical
did notfallneatlywithin
a single
excerpts
it is impossible
thattheyentered
a processofrebinding.
gathering,
onlythrough
thattheTop.fragment
Rather,theywerecopiedin withtheDialctica.I surmise
entered
whenthenewbookwas first
it couldhavecreptin with
bound,although
subsequent
rebinding.
34

00:33:23 AM

carefulattentionto that task. The Vivaran scriptorium,on the other

hand, was an environmentin which the chances forerrorwould have
been relativelyhigh, as the numerous mistakes in the interpolated
redactions of Cassiodorus' own handbook prove.
When the suppositionaldeletion of the Top. fragmentfirstoccurred
cannot be said withcertaintybut it would have to have been sufficiently early as to allow for the expunged text to mingle once again with
the uncorrectedone in order to account for the contaminationin the
MSS at the head of the extant tradition,yet not so late that the fragmentwould in all cases have been removed. ADI (F), we may recall,
have only the correctional signs, although Venice Marc. lat. VI. 65
proves that the fragment,or one half of it, could escape detectionby
as late as the 15th c. This however is the exception rather than the
rule, forit is prettyclear that the fragment,along with the list of contentsand subscriptions,had virtuallyvanished by the middle of the
12th c.
In all, it seems a strong possibility that the fragmentwas first
deleted in the 9th c., when new copies of B.'s writingswere being
made and men like Servatus Lupus were correctingtheir own MSS
against othersborrowed fromneighboringmonasteries.61This would
suggest somethinglike the situation described by my second stemma
above (p. 35). The Vivarian archetypesurvived into the 9th c., when
copies were made which subsequentlytravelled in various directions.
Someone (if it was only one person) recognized thatthe Top. fragment
did not belong and so put in deletion marks. New MSS were then
copied fromthe correctedone(s) and the fragmentgradually began to
disappear. Meanwhile the exchange of books caused some MSS that
still retained the fragmentto acquire correctionalsigns at that point
in the text,but probably along with a number of variants and glosses
throughout,which in turn generated new copies, now without the
fragment but with a blend of readings originating from various
quarters. By the later 10th c. this process would have been fairlywell
advanced, but the Top. fragmentwould not yet have disappeared
altogether. Such an hypothesis would account for the state of our
earliest MSS, although given the absence of any 9th-c. witnessesit is
impossible to verify.

61Cf.Traube133,andabove,n. 42. A papyrus

codexofB.'s Cicerocommentary
wasstillextantin Lupus'day.
35

00:33:23 AM

All this is not to say that the Top. fragmentis an insignificanterror.

But until we can be certain that the MSS lacking it descend froma
traditionthat never admitted it ratherthan fromone in which it was
expunged we must seek some otherbasis fortheirclassification.After
all, theiragreementon this point is not agreementin error; and ifthe
absenceof the fragmentis not in itselfa criterionfordeterminingfiliation, then neitheris its presence. Far more significantare the words
/ phrases that were added in order to adjust the fragmentto context.
Yet here too there is confusion,foronly C E I K L incorporatethose
words / phrases before correction, and their affiliationsdiffereven
fromone half of the fragmentto the other, while at least one of them
( L ) can be shown to be related to another that fallsoutside this group
(jB, see below). Once again, H proves that the fragmentcould be
removed withoutleaving any trace; only other
evidence betraysthe exF
G
are
more
but
F
at
least
emplar.
ambiguous,
provides one piece
of evidence tendingto support my hypothesis.At 890b3 f. it omits the
words, utsupraiam dictumest, which followdirectlyon the heels of the
second halfof the fragment.Now in D a correctorhas similarlyplaced
his closing expunction mark afterest, so as wronglyto delete the genuine phrase, ut ... est, as though it were part of the intrusivefragment. It seems highlyprobable that the omission in F arose fromjust
such an error in correction; if so, then F is indeed the descendant of
a branch that originallycontained the Top. fragment.In this connection it may be recalled thatF incorporatesinto the textwhat was probably only a marginal correctionin its exemplar at 8 77a 10 (see above,
p. 25), and we shall see that F shares numerous errors (more than
G does) with A Q and other related MSS, which suggests that F has
been influencedby layers of correctionno longer visible to us. But be
that as it may, it is certainlythe case that F G have not escaped the
process of contamination; whetheror not theirlack of the fragmentis
the result of the contamination cannot be said forcertain, of course,
but it seems highlyprobable thatthese two MSS too have come down
to us by some process like the one described above.
If this account holds, then neitherJ nor N stems froma tradition
originally free of the Top. fragment.At any rate, the evidence from
Div. itself indicates that J too is highly contaminated, as we have
already seen and as the followingselection of errorsshared by it with
one or more MSS furtherillustrates:
(J = ) B (haec,881cl2),D (libro,876dl),G (unde]at,892a7),/(iungunt
atque
om.,877d5),K (quam]cui, 882c5),M (amphibolia,
878all), M2 (sic] dicat,
36

00:33:23 AM

0 (definitionem
contendisset
sed,883cl4f.,
885a2),N (nat.tot.tr., 888d2),62
see above,p. 30), P (duritiam,
878dl),B K (aequat,886d5),E I (segregauit,
889dl0),B K L (sit]est,
889a2),I 0 (designificatiua,
885a3),G I (infinitum,
earum,887dl3),B I K M (hasoro.,886d2),A2B E H
881bl3),B I K (suarum]
huius,
(nonom., 887dl0),BDGKL (estdiet.tr., 890d9),BEI KL (huiusmodi]
888cl1),B I KL M (cumom.,888d8),E I K M2P (similes]
parteshabent[hab.
ueniat,889bl3),BD EI KM
par.tr.P] add.,879dl2),A2G I K N (ueniant]
882c8),A F G ?K M2 Q (destruxit,
(et2]ac, 881b3),BDI KL M (intellegit,
882b5),B C E G I K L M2P (sumo]ergoadd.,886cl),A2B D E H' I L M O
888cl0),A B C E
882dl),A E H I K M Q (enim]etenim,
Qf(priora]potiora,
F G L Q (utom.,890c6),
whileT2shows only a slightpreferenceforF G over, say, B I K, which
tend to come up in combination withJ. But its connections too are
diverse:
878b4;quare]=J: quoniamF: quoniamadd.J2,890dll), K
(J2= ) F (corpore,
add. , 876d3;spec.st.tr.,879c5),
877dl1),E /(hanc]diuisionem
(latrabilemque,
C N (se partitione,
892a5),F G N P (sint,886b8),F
890dll), N 0 (accidenti,
G P M1N (quasdam/creationes,
878d12 f.),AcF G H M20 P(totius]a praem.,
add.[er.e. pr. tr.E L], 881al5),
879b4),A2C F G H M2N P (ergo]primm
A'CEHLNPQ
(cuius]cum,879c8).
In otherwords,y only provides us furtherevidence of the contamination throughoutthe tradition.And while thereis relativelylittlepointingto a close tie to F G, thereis quite a bit arguing against it, so that
the lack of the Top. fragmentimplies nothingas to the relationshipof
the threeMSS as far as the textof Div. itselfis concerned,y has only
one good reading unattestedby any of its contemporariesbefore correction( ducto
, 885bl4, cf. below, n. 64), which could well be the reflex
of what appears as a correctionin other MSS ratherthan vice versa.
TVis in a similar situation.63It has connections extending in practically all directions, e.g.:
878b2;diff.spec,/r.,
884c5),C (subiectus,
(N =) B ?L(a.c.)M (inquisitum,
880al3),D (sua om.,879d4),E (haec,884cl0),F (eorum]modoadd.[modo
G Z2],890d3),G (paries,879cll; fitom.,880a6;dimidium,
884b2;ac] et,
praem.
autemadd.,888bl4); H (eodem... Sic om.,889a9-ll, cf.
886all; similiter]
conbelow,n. 66),P (autem]enim,881a6),J (nat.tot.tr., 888d2),K (constat]
sistit,
885dl),L (ueroom.,880d9;autemom.,883bl5),M (cumque,880c9),O
(et]atque,878bll; comp,esttr., 888al1),P(In eodem]ideo,882cl),()(uocit>us
om.,887b7;pertractum,
890dl2).
As in thecase ofJ} its uneasy relationshipwithF G servesas a warning
against taking the absence of the Top. fragmentas a criterion for
62Obviously
itshareswiththemmay
J wasnotinfluenced
byN O P, buttheerrors
havecomefroma lostearlierwitness.
are 11 illegible
63There
madebeforetheMS perished:
passagesin themicrofilm
877a3;878bl0f.;879a6f.;881al5 f.; dl 1; 882c8f.;884a7;d3 f.; 885c3-5;886dl3
f.; 887c8f.
37

00:33:23 AM

classification.For althoughN does sometimesagree in errorwithF G:

885b2sub)eodem(edema.c. F) add. 886a12f.esseposs.tr. 886b12f.quod
/ uelimusom.,
with F G Q,(cf. above, p. 29 f.):
877c8quidemom. 877dl f. con. an. tr.,
withA F H Q (Asia] Africa, 888c2), A F H P Q (Africa] Asia, 888c2;
atque] et, 888cl0), A E F H () (poss. sola ir., 890al0), and withA E
F H P :
889b14cognoscitur890a4TroianiGraecostr. 890b10adiect.(-nema.c. H)
quai. tr. 890b13 fluu.dem.et cal. tr.,
at other times it will have nothing to do with either F or G, whether
alone or in combination with other MSS, e.g.:
/magnitudine,
877dl3
(N = ) O (et]atque,878bll), C E I (inom., immoderata
f.),E I L P (diet.s. tr., 878c6),BD J KL M O (par.con.tr., 880a4),A B D
E I(vid.)J K M(vid.)Q (uniuersalior,
878dl4),AcC E HJ2L PcQ (cuius]cum,
praeter,
879c8),A D HO ((propter]
881c6),EcI J M2O P (dsignt]
significai,
et add.,881d3).
887al5),BCDIKLMOQ
(disiunguntur]
Other evidence of its tendencyaway fromF, G, or both has been seen
dicitur
already in the passages discussed above: 879al f. {significare
quae,
see above, p. 26); 880c8 (pr. nom. nunc.,p. 27); 880dl3 ( sintamissi,
, p.
p. 28); 881b8 ( glaucosoculosesse, p. 28); 882d2 f. {stabilefixumque
889b6
890b6
orationum
The
outstan, p. 19).
29);
{concluditip. 30);
(<
ding characteristicof N is its extraordinarilyhigh incidence of error,
forapart fromthe many shared withotherMSS eithersinglyor enbloc
N adds 302 (V)all its own. Once again, it has plausible or correct
readings in fivetroubledpassages,64but only once on itsown, and that
probably by conjecture.
We must conclude, then, that the MSS withoutthe Top. fragment
do not constituteanythinglike an independent familyof witnesses.
The traditionis highlycontaminated and although F G do cohere in
showing certain signs of independence, those signs are neitherconsistentin themselvesnor are theyconsistentlyreflectedinJ N. The latter
were copied from MSS in which the fragmenteither no longer appeared at all or in which it had acquired expunction marks- we cannot say for certain which.
Among theMSS thatdo have thefragmentwe have alreadyobserved
a ratherclose relationshipbetweenA and Q. Two furtherpairs emerge
64877a10 (aequum
esse)'878d4(intellegendum
); 881bl0(homo
); 889a15 (ulla)'885b14
aboveinconnection
with
(iducto
), mentioned
J (thecorrect
readingis reported
by
F2IeJ N O F).
38

00:33:23 AM

as

being worthy of note. E I are linked by common errors:

877c9f. gen. diu. in spec. tr. 878c9in par. sep. tr. 879a2 re dicitur]
reducitur879bl4autem]enim 880a4part.quid,const,tr. 881a3apt.e.
gen.tr. 881d6quat.opp.tr. 882cl3estaff.tr. 883bll haecom. 883c3
generis 883cl5rat.an. tr. 885al s. sub.tr. 885all habundes 885dl4
placitum
superioris
(a.c.) 886d5 non aeq. mihitr. 887a4 positionem]
animalis
add. 888a3uegetandi]
887c6estom. 887c10 rursus]
partessunt
animae,nonspeciesadd.,

although neitherMS is a copy of the other:

878c8nec] nequeE: naec/ 879a4quod om.E 879a5 sub gen. u. tr.I
879dl0 domus]estadd.E 880d5ita om.I 883c3autemom.E 884a3
I 888b10est]
I 886b6omnesom.I 887al1 positionem]
habentia
placitum
animoadd.E,
and we have seen instances in which they are divided as to their
, rudis, aequum, see above, p.
respective affiliations:877a8 ff. {putet
24 f.), 880c8 (quod, p. 27), 882d2 f. (p. 29), 883d6 (p. 32), 887c8 f.
(p. 33), 889b2 ff. (p. 30 f.), 889bll (p. 30), 890b6 ( unius ... orationum
, p. 18 f.), 890dll (p. 32).
Similarly,there are variants shared only by B L (furtherexamples
have been observed in the subscriptions,list of contents, and in the
passages discussed above):
/significatione
877d8propria 878al aut]ut 878dl1 propria
879cll interposita 881dl duo (-os L2)
cipitur 880a2substantiae 881al5 proposita]
882a9conueniant882b13aliinigriom. 883al1 enimom. 883c15animalis]
etadd. 885bl4diametrum886al0differentiam
887a7imperfecta]
estadd.
887c3diuisionis 888dl4ut est]autem 889cl3uocibus 890cl5aliqua,
and several othershighlysuggestiveof a common ancestry.At 882a6,
for instance, for etgenera
, which
, L has ac generawhile B has a genere
would appear to be related variants. At 886c 11, forut,B has sedwhile
L has si, but L confusessed(comp. s>) and si 19 times in Div. At 888b6
L adds operatione
afterspeculari
, while the scribe of B glosses actuwith
.
It
be
also
noted
that at 886cl0, at dsignant
, I adds alia
operatione may
while
B
E
L
add
reads
,
quaedsignant
dsignt
aliaquedsignant.
(corrected
to -nt)alie queletitie
, alie que, etc. There evidentlyhas been
(sic) dsignant
some interminglingbehind E I and B L. But neitheris B an apograph
of L nor L an apograph of jB65:
uel add.L (see above,p. 29) 881bl
880d8autemom.L 880dl2uigilare]
omnibusL 881b6subiecto]subitoL 881c7definitione]
hominiadd. L
881cl5bipes]bibesB 882bl enim1
om.L 882c2aut1]utB 882c8primi]
add.L 882d7siom.B 883al1 f.Neque... disponit
quattuor
postpriuationem
65ThescribeofL writes
huiusmodo
6 times,
butthemistake
(comp.-m)forhuiusmodi
V s affiliation
canbe inferred
from
it.
is suchan obviousonethatnothing
concerning
39

00:33:23 AM

L 883b2sicut]sicL' in
(13) tr.L 883bl frequenter
frequentamur
utamur]
om.B 883bl2oppositio]
oppositaB: perppositiones
(opp-p.c.) L 883cl4
B 883d2quod]quoniamL 883d13nominibus]
omnem
inomnibus
hominis]
L 884b10numeri]
autadd.L 885a2f.inanimata
alianimata
L(sic) 886c2
f. aliae2... significatiua
om.B 886c10 aliae quae animi]aliaqueanimaeB
L 887c5hominem]
887bl0disiunxi
totiuscompositiones
add.L 887dl3id
litarasB: litterasque
L 888b8actu]actumetiam
est]uel L 888b2litteras]
L 889al dicimus]
esseadd.L 889a5f.infinitae
... figurarum
om.B 889b7
certeom.L 890dl f. uicisse... Troianosom.B,
and we have seen B L divided in theirrespectiveaffiliations:877a8 f.
(putei,rudis, see above, p. 24 f.), 877all ( naturaest, p. 24 f.), 879al f.
, p. 33), 880dl3 (p. 28),
(significatare, p. 26), 879dl4 ( uidentur
882d2 f. (p. 29), 883cl4 f. (p. 30), 883d6 (p. 32), 889b2 ff.(p. 30 f.),
890b6 (orationum,definitione
, p. 18 f.). Most significantly,B makes
no effort,as L does, to adjust the Top. fragmentto context.L is second
only to N in the commission of unique errors(282, not takinginto account cases in which the scribe may have been responsibleforcorrections). The scribe has a penchant, as already noted, forconfusingsed
and si and forwritinghuiusmodo
forhuiusmodi
; he also writesclauc-for
at
/
10.
880dl4
and
881b8
not
There
is
a
glauc
single passage in which
L provides a good reading where the other MSS fail, nor has it any
good reading unattestedby at least one of its contemporariesprior to
correction.B has a considerablylower number of unique errors(132)
but is of virtuallyno greater assistance where difficultiesarise, foras
I have argued,fiat (882a4) may perhaps be preferrableon the grounds
of stylisticconsistency,but it is almost certainlya conjecture, and is
not to be adopted over the lectiodifficilior
(sit, F G M).
We may now returnto Minio-Paluello's stemma, which in its final
form is as follows(Arist.lat. V, praef. xxxix):
Div.
Top. fr.

/
^

/,

x
A

H
40

00:33:23 AM

C.

The stemma does not account forGJ M 0 Q (I am unsure how to accomodate P, but it cannot be a descendant ofA in the way that MinioPaluello's firststemma suggestsit is, Nota X 107). y has already been
considered, and the contaminated state ofMO P will be evident from
the passages discussed earlier. F N are not related as the stemma indicates, as theyhave been variouslyinfluencedalso by readings found
in MSS on the otherside of the stemma. We may recall, forexample,
how Fand N disagreed at 877a8 / 10 (putet,insolens,see above, p. 24 f.),
that N split fromF to agree with CG at 880c8 {pr. nom.nunc.,p. 27)
or with C J 2 at 890dll (se partitione,
p. 32), with D etc. at 881c6 ( non
consistita
, p. 29). Further,
p. 29), and with A D etc. at 881c6 ( praeter
thereare cases in which it is quite clear that I is not as closely related
to B K as the stemma would suggest(e.g., at rudisand naturaest, 877a9
/II), and others indicating that B L are moreclosely related than it
suggests (the Renatus subscription, list of contents, and common
variants mentioned above), while there are allegiances subscribed to
by A and D that are not at all intimatedby the stemma (e.g., at ap881c6, etc.).
pellante 880c 1, reliqua880c9, consistit
We have seen that (, which is in certain respects very near to A ,
occasionally sides instead with F , G, or both. Conversely, althoughF
is indeed related to G, which on Minio-Paluello's reckoningought to
fall on the side of F NA2, that relationshipis susceptible of rupture.
For F occasionally veers instead in the direction of A Q etc.:
(F = )A (Sic] si,889al1),664 HQ (enimom., 880bl3),AHN Q,(alia1] sunt
add.,878cl),A H P Q(d'u. quid,tr.,880a6),A D E H Q (mortalis
om.y
890b9),
A E H N Q (poss.solatr 890al0),A E H N P Q (un. nom.sign,/r.,888d7),
A E H I* (e. mon./r.,889d3),A H N P Q (atque]et,888cl0),A E H N P
889bl4;TroianiGraecostr., 890a4;adiect.[-nema.c. H] quai.
Q (cognoscitur,
tr., 890bl0;fluu.dem.etcal./r.,890bl3),A H N O P ((quid.sep./r.,888al2),
A B D H M O Q (uoxet]et uoxet,887a4).
But thereare also timeswhen both F G are in agreementwithA Qztc. :
=ACBcEc
878b6atque]=ACHc: etA C F G P Q. atqueetH 882b5destruxi]
= A2
A F GJ PKMcQ. dextruxi
B E : om.M 887al igitur]
Kc(vid.)
Q:destruxit
ZX:ergo/: om.A D F G K Q,
and two instances in which it is virtuallyimpossible to determinethe
error as such (ignoring the added suntand quoddam
):
66Hereis addedproofthatH wascopiedfrom
A, forH omitseodem
(9) ... Sic(11),
andthesi waserasedbythescribeor corrector
ofA. Thatis, theomission
in H is
due tohomoeoteleuton
in the
probably
(possit
), as si (forsic)was no longerpresent
itcannowbe madeoutbeneath
Afmakesthesame
theerasure.
exemplar
(>4),though
as H (cf.above,p. 37),andat889al1 thecorrector
omission
ofF hasmadesi intosic.
41

00:33:23 AM

habitm
883c7f.nigraalia(suntadd.N) albatr.A F G H N P Q 884c1 contra
A C F GH NPQ: quidd.contra
hab.contr.
quiddam(quoddamFN) contrarium
contrahabitm
tr.B D E I J K M 0: quoddamcontrarium
L,
but another in which the correctword order is unmistakable:
def.spec.tr.A C F G H N P Q.
886b4speciem,definitio]
Among the fourMSS, A F G Q, F and )are the more contaminated,
forwhile A F Q frequentlyagree in erroragainst G and F G Q against
A , we rarelyfindA G Q standingtogetheragainst F or A F G against Q,.
Minio-Paluello's stemma was based on a limited sampling of
evidence and drawn up with the Top. fragmentin mind. It correctly
makes H out to be a copy ofA but the rest does not accuratelyreflect
the complexityof the evidence in Div. In short,any stemmawe might
constructwould eitherdistortthe true nature of the evidence through
over-simplificationor be so complicated as to defeat its own purpose.
Finally, the stemma betrays two fundamental misconceptions in
Minio-Paluello's analysis: (a) Renatus did not transcribe the codex
Renati but Theodorus did (cf. above, n. 38); (b) the ancient codex
reconstructedon the supposition of errors in binding (hence the inserted Top. fragment)is not the codexRenatibut anotherone which the
anonymous reviser correctedagainst it, one that had the list of contents and rhetorical excerpts in addition to the authentic Boethian
tracts. So there is a stage in the historyof the Dialctica that is unaccounted forby the stemma, as the codexRenatiis in all probabilitynot
the point at which Div. and the Top. fragmentconverged, while
Minio-Paluello gave no indication that Renatus' revision or "edition" - that is, the codexRenati- marks a distinctstage of transmission
afterB. and before the anonymous corrector.

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Austria
1. Lilienfeld,
Bibi.desCistercienserstiftes,
153,ff.40v-53,s. XIV (Codd.40)
2. Klosterneuburg-bei-Wien,
Stiftsbibl.,
671,f.98-107v, Top. fr.,ff.104v-105,
106v,s. XII (Codd.
, Supp.43)
3. Klosterneuburg-bei-Wien,
Stiftsbibl.,
1098,ff.68-75v,Top.fr.(dim.),f. 75,
s. Xllex.-XIII(Codd.,Supp.51)
4. Melk,Klosterbibl.,
1675(olim852P.42), ff.235v-244v,
s. XIV (Codd.,Supp.
64)
5. Melk,Klosterbibl.,
1712(olim940R.20),ff.32-37v,s. XIV (Codd.,Supp.66).
Incomplete
6. SanktPaul im Lavanthal,Stiftsbibl.,
883(olim25.4.36),ff.24-32,s. XIV
(Codd.,Supp.78)
7. Schlagl,Stiftsbibl.,
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s. XIII (Codd.69)
8. Vienna,Nationalbibl.,
2269,f. 92-92v,s. Xllin. (Supp.2024).Incomplete
9. Vienna,Nationalbibl.,
2374,ff.32v-43,s. XIV (Codd.115)
10. Vienna,Nationalbibl.,
2517,ff.39-52,s. Xlllin. (Codd.126)
Belgium
11. Bruges,Bibi.du GrandSminaire,
ff.47-60,s. XlIIex. (Codd.162)
100/113,
12. Brussels,
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s. XIII (Codd.
(2905),ff.49v-61v,
168)
44

00:33:23 AM

Czechoslovakia
s. XV
a Bibliothka,
Archiv
VI. Fd. 8, pp. 172-242,
13. Roudnice,
Lobkowiczky
{Codd.216). Incomplete
England
14. Cambridge,
GonvilleandCaius College,199/105,
pp. 69-90,s. XIII {Codd.
224)
ff.66-81,s. XIII {Codd.
15. Cambridge,
Gonvilleand Caius College,465/572,
230)
16. Cambridge,
Gonvilleand Caius College,466/573,ff.26-32v,s. XHIex.
, Supp.231)
{Codd.
17. Cambridge,
Gonvilleand Caius College,468/575,
pp. 92-112,s. XIII-XIV
{Codd.232)
18. Cambridge,
ff.29v-39,s. XIII {Codd.,
GonvilleandCaiusCollege,494/263,
Supp.236)
19. Cambridge,
Pembroke
College,193,ff.39-49,s. XHIex. {Codd.221)
20. Cambridge,
Addit.1867,ff.43v-46,s. XIV {Codd.1912)
University
Library,
21. Canterbury,
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ChapterLibrary,
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C.I,16, ff.36-45v,s. XIV {Codd.268)
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Add. 18342,ff.75v-82v,
23. London,British
Library,
Endsat 888a13
24. London,British
Add. 18374,ff.189-196,s. XHIex.-XIVin.{Codd.
Library,
291)
25. London,BritishLibrary,Aruntinianus
383, ff.54-65v,s. XHIex. {Codd.,
Supp.294)
26. London,British
s. XIII {Codd.,Supp.
Aruntinianus
392,ff.151-158v,
Library,
295)
Burneianus
s. XlVin.{Codd.298)
27. London,British
275,ff.252v-256v,
Library,
Harleianus
28. London,British
3272,ff.52v-64,s. XlVin. {Codd.300)
Library,
29. London,LambethPalace,339, ff.55v-68v,Top.fr.,ff.65, 67-67v,s. XII
{Codd.,Supp.287).*
30. London,LambethPalace,456,ff.80v-92,s. XIII {Codd.289)
31. Oxford,
BalliolCollege,253,ff.80v-92,s. XIII {Codd.356)
32. Oxford,BodleianLibrary,
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F.66, ff.39v-47v,s. XlVin. {Codd.387)
35. Worcester,
ChapterLibrary,
36. Worcester,
F.165,ff.80-96v,s. XlVin. {Codd.390)
ChapterLibrary,
37. Worcester,
ChapterLibrary,
Q.30, ff.27-33,s. XHIex. {Codd.392)
France
38.
39.
40.
41.

s. Xlllin. {Codd.,Supp.410)
Amiens,Bibl.Mun., 404,ff.245-251v,
Arras,Bibl.Mun.,890 (446),ff.37-46v,s. XIV {Codd.421)
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Auch,Bibl.Mun., 11,ff.40v-53v,
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Avignon,
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42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Bibi.Mun., 228,ff.54-66,s. XIII ( Codd

. 405)
Avranches,
Bibi.Mun., 27, ff.38-48v,s. XIII-XIV (Codd.,Supp.456)
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Bibl.Mun., 39, ff.28v-36,s. XIII (Codd.465)
Charleville,
Bibl.Mun., 187,ff.78v-89,Top.fr.,ff.86-86v,88-88v,s. XII
Charleville,
(Supp.2056).Minio-Paluello's
description
incomplete
Bibl.Mun., 250,ff.47v-58v,
s. XlIIex. (Codd.468)
Charleville,
Chartres,Bibl. Mun., 100, ff. 149-160v,s. X-XI (Codd.,Supp.472).
in 1944
Destroyed
Bibl.Mun.,498,ff.73-78,s. Xllmed.(Codd.,Supp.475).Destroyed
Chartres,
in 1944
Bibl.Mun., 707,ff.34v-44v,
s. XIV (Codd.481)
Grenoble,
Laon,Bibl.Mun., 433, ff.39-49v,s. XIII (Codd.484)
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Paris,B. N., lat. 6291,ff.65v-74v,
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Paris,B. N., lat.6400E,ff.76v-83,Top.fr.,ff.81-81v,82v,s. XI-XII (Codd.,
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Paris,B. N., lat. 6575,ff.46-59v,s. XlVin. (Codd.592)*
Paris,B. N., lat. 6636,ff.31-43,s. XIV (Codd.594)*
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Paris,B. N., lat. 10202,ff.17v-21v,
Paris,B. N., lat. 11127,ff.64v-74,Top.fr.,ff.81-81v,82v,s. X-XI (Codd.
618). Lacombe'sdescription
incomplete*
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Paris,B. N., lat. 16092,ff.36-44v,s. XlIIex. (Codd.666)
Paris,B. N., lat. 16595,ff.41-49v,s. XlIIex. (Codd.695)
Paris,B. N., lat. 16596,ff.49v-62,s. XIII (Codd.696)*
Paris,B. N., lat. 16597,ff.39-49,s. XIII-XIV (Codd.697)
s. XlIIex. (Codd.701)
Paris,B. N., lat. 16611,ff.96v-108v,
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Paris,B. N., lat. 17903,f. 131,s. XIII. Fragment
Paris,B. N., lat. 18423,ff.77-88v,s. XIII (Codd.719)*
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extant

46

00:33:23 AM

87. Tours,Bibi. Mun., 678, ff.41v-52,s. XIV ( Codd

., Supp.767). No longer
extant
88. Troyes,Bibl.Mun., 1457,ff.46v-58,s. XIII-XIV {Codd.763)
89. Valenciennes,
Bibl.Mun.,406,ff.80-88v,Top.fr.,ff.86-86v,87v-88,s. XXI (Supp.2085)*
Bibl.Mun., 171,ff.16-23v,s. XlIIex. (Codd
90. Vendme,
., Supp.784)
Germany
91. Berlin,
DeutscheStaatsbibl.,
Phill.1786(174 Rose),ff.61-107v,Top.fr.,ff.
s. X-XI*
94-96,102v-104v,
92. Darmstadt,
HessischeLandesbibl.,
2282,ff.18-23,s. Xllex. (Codd.848)
93. Erfurt,
Stadtbcherei,
Ampl.,Fol. 39, ff.43-54,s. XIII (Codd.873)
94. Erfurt,
s. XHIex. (Codd.893)
Stadtbcherei,
Ampl.,Qu. 20, ff.25v-31v,
95. Erfurt,
Stadtbcherei,
Ampl.,Qu. 267,ff.30-38,s. XlVin. (Codd.899)
96. Erlangen,
191 Fischer(579 Irmischer),
ff.67-77,s. XII
Universittsbibl.,
, Supp.909)
(Codd.
97. Erlangen,
192Fischer
ff.71v-92,s. XIIIUniversittsbibl.,
(514 Irmischer),
XIV (Codd.,Supp.910)
98. Erlangen,
193Fischer
ff.36-44,s. XHIex.
Universittsbibl.,
(486 Irmischer),
(Codd.,Supp.911)
99. Fulda,Landesbibl.,
as of
C.3, ff.(?), s. XIII (Codd.924). Locationunknown
1929
100. Halle,Universittsbibl.,
s. XIII-XIV (Codd.947)
Yg. 2.3, ff.34v-43v,
101. Karlsruhe,
BadischeLandesbibl.,
Lichtenthal
31, ff.27-37v,s. XIII (Codd.
831)
102. Kassel,Landesbibl.,
Ms. Philos.2 28, ff.59-64v,s. XIV (Codd.832)
103. Leipzig,Universittsbibl.,
s. Xlllex.-XIVin.(Codd.971)
1352,ff.72v-93v,
104. Leipzig,Universittsbibl.,
1353,ff.20-24v,s. XIII-XIV (Codd.972)
105. Leipzig,Universittsbibl.,
s. XHIex. (Codd.973)
1354,ff.34v-42v,
106. Munich,Bayerische
Clm. 401,ff.51-64v,s. XIII (Codd.1021)
Staatsbibl.,
107. Munich,Bayerische
Clm. 6372,ff.30-40v,Top.fr.,ff.37-37v,
Staatsbibl.,
39v,s. X-XI (Supp.2105)*
108. Munich,Bayerische
Clm. 6695,ff.109-131,s. XV (Codd.1031)
Staatsbibl.,
109. Munich,Bayerische
Clm. 14564,ff.56-70,s. XIII (Codd.1059)
Staatsbibl.,
110. Munich,Bayerische
Clm. 14819,ff.71-96,s. XII
Staatsbibl.,
111. Wolfenbttel,
s. XV (Codd.
Bibl.,69.22.Aug.fol.,ff.210v-222,
Herzogliche
940)
Italy
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Assisi,Bibl.Com.,296,ff.34-52,s. XIV (Codd.1263)

Assisi,Bibl.Com.,658,ff.79-92,s. Xlllin. (Codd.,Supp.1266)
Assisi,Bibl.Com.,664, ff.64v-77v,s. XIV (Codd.1268)
s. XIV (Codd.
lat. 1155(2594),ff.97v-112v,
Bologna,Bibl.Universitaria,
1285)
Plut.XXII Dext.6, ff.62-72,s. XIV (Codd.,
Cesena,Bibl.Malatestiana,
Supp.1298)
di Montefano,
Mf.15, ff.40v-49v,s.
Fabriano,Conventodei Silvestrini
XlIIex. (Supp.2151)
Bibl.Med. Laur.,Plut.LXXI,14,ff.32v-43v,
s. XIV (Codd.1316)
Florence,
Bibl.Med.Laur.,Ashburnham
Florence,
952,ff.32-40v,s. XIV (Codd.1329)
47

00:33:23 AM

120. Florence,
Bibi.Med. Laur.,Gadd.Plut.LXXXIX Sup. 76,ff.45-55,s. XIII
., Supp.1341)
(iCodd
121. Florence,
Bibl.Med. Laur.,S. CrucisPlut.XI Sin. 3, ff.44v-55v,s. XIII
{Codd.1356)
Bibl.Med. Laur.,S. CrucisPlut.XI Sin. 5, ff.34v-42v,
122. Florence,
s. XIII
(Codd.1358)
Bibl. Med. Laur., S. CrucisPlut.XI Sin. 9, ff.14v-20,s. XIII
123. Florence,
(Codd.,Supp.1361)
124. Florence,
Bibl.Med. Laur.,S. Marci101,ff.64v-73,s. XIV (Codd.1381)
Bibl.Med. Laur.,S. Marci166,f.32v-40,s. Xllex. (Codd.1388)
125. Florence,
126. Florence,Bibl. Naz. Cen., Conv. Soppr.B.10.2856,ff.125-128v,
s. XV
(Codd.1398)
127. Florence,
Bibl. Naz. Cen., Conv. Soppr.I.X.12, ff.65-76,s. XIV (Codd.
1415)
128. Florence,
Bibl.Riccardiana,
160,ff.51-64v,s. XIV (Codd.1421)
129. Mantua,Bibl.Com.,D.III. 16, ff.36-44v,s. XIII (Codd.1431)
130. Mantua,Bibl.Com.,H.I.3, ff.27-34v,s. XlVex. (Codd.1432)
131. Milan,Bibl.Ambros.,
H. 138.Inf.,ff.46-56v,s. Xlllin. (Codd.1448)
132. Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,H.141.Inf.,ff.48v-56v,
s. XHIex. (Codd.1449)
133. Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,L.60.Sup.,ff.47-59,s. XIV (Codd.1451)
134. Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,
M.62.Sup., ff.83v-101,s. XII (Codd.1452)
135. Milan,Bibl.Ambros.,
M.96.Sup., ff.242-255v,
s. Xlllex. (Codd.1453)
136. Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,
R.55.Sup., ff.30-39v,s. XIII (Codd.1455)
137. Milan,Bibi.Ambros.,
Y. 7.Sup., ff.13M48v,s. XIV (Codd.1458)
138. Montecassino,
Arch.dellaBadia,191,pp. 168-184,
183,
Top.fr.,pp. 180-181,
s. XI (Supp.2145)*
139. Naples,Bibl.Naz., VIII. E.6, ff.20v-25v,
s. XIV (Codd.1473)
140. Padua,Bibl.Antoniana,
Scaff.XXII,553,ff.55-68v,s. Xllmed.(Codd.1511)
141. Padua,Bibl.Universitaria,
783,ff.62v-64,s. XII-XIII ( Codd
., Supp.1519).
Endsat 880d8
142. Padua,Bibl.Universitaria,
s. XIV (Codd.1521)
848, ff.31v-40v,
143. Padua,Bibl.Universitaria,
1688,f.41v-51,s. Xllex. (Codd.1526)
144. Poppi,Bibl.Com. Rilliana,27, ff.77v-88v,
s. XIII (Codd.1533)
145. Ravenna,Bibl.Com. Ciassense,46, ff.118v-134,
s. XIII (Codd.1535)
146. Rome(VaticanCity),Arch,dellaBasilicadi S. Pietro,Basilicanus
H.5, ff.
30v-39v(? 40), s. Xlllex. ( Codd.,Supp.1714)
147. Rome,Bibl. Apost.Vat., Borghes.9, ff.34v-43,s. XlVin. (Codd.,Supp.
1937a)
148. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Borghes.18, ff.36-44,s. Xlllex.-XlVin.(Codd.,
Supp.1720)
149. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Borghes.
56, ff.42-48,s. XIII (Codd.,Supp.1724)*
150. Rome,Bibl. Apost.Vat., Borghes.58, ff.46-57,s. Xlllin. (Codd.,Supp.
1726)*
151. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Borghes.131,ff.1-10,s. XIII (Codd.,Supp.1733)*
152. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Chis. E.IV.97, ff.133-136v,
s. XIII-XIV (Codd.,
Supp.1745).Incomplete
153. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Chis. E.V. 149,ff.45v-57,s. XIII (Codd.,Supp.
1746)*
154. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Chis. E.V. 150,ff.17-22v,s. XII
155. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Chis. H.VI. 186,ff.77-90,s. XV
156. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Ottob.lat.1406,ff.163v-176,
s. Xlex.(Supp.2184)*
157. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Ottob.lat. 2150,ff.60v-68,s. XIII (Codd.,Supp.
1765)*
48

00:33:23 AM

158. Rome,Bibi.Apost.Vat.,Palat.lat.987,ff.17-2lv, s. XlIIex. ( Codd

., Supp.
1773).Incomplete
159. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Palat.lat. 988,ff.62-71v,s. XIII (Codd.1774)*
s. Xlllin. (Codd.1775)*
160. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Palat.lat.989,f.47v-61v,
s. XlIIex. (Codd.1778)
161. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Palat.lat.996,ff.48v-60v,
s. XI. Endsat890b3
162. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Regin.lat.1649,ff.117v-125v,
(= Top.fr.,p. 185,4Minio-Paluello)*
163. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Vat. lat. 1722,ff.74v-80,s. XII. Endsat 886b6
s. XlIIex. (Codd.,Supp.
164. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Vat.lat.2117,ff.38v-48v,
1858)
165. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Vat.lat.2977,ff.57-66v,s. XIV (Codd.,Supp.1870)
166. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Vat.lat.2978,ff.26-32v,s. XIII (Codd.,Supp.1871)
167. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat., Vat. lat. 2979,ff.66-78,s. XlIIex. (Codd.,Supp.
1872)*
168. Rome,Bibl. Apost.Vat., Vat. lat. 8591, ff.201-216,s. XI (Codd.,Supp.
1897)*
169. Rome,Bibl.Apost.Vat.,Vat.lat.10683,ff.55-69,s. XIII-XIV (Codd.,Supp.
1902)*
170. Siena,Bibl.Com. degi'Intronati,
H.VI. 10, ff.23-30v,s. XIII (Codd.1565)
171. Todi, Bibl.Com., 190,ff.34-42v,s. XIII (Codd.1587)
172. Treviso,Bibl.Com.,548,ff.44v-55,s. XIV (Codd.1571)
173. Venice,Bibl.Naz. Mare.,lat.VI.65 (2847),ff.68-81,Top.fr.(dim.),f.80,
s. XV (Supp.2165)
174. Venice,Bibl.Naz. Marc.,Z.L. 273 (1574),ff.111-119,s. XII-XIII (Codd.,
Supp.1645)
Liechtenstein
175. Vaduz,Familienbibl.
derGrafenvon SeilernundAspang,B.12.IV.8 (olim
s. XIII (Supp.2169)
207),ff.31V-38,
176. Vaduz,Familienbibl.
derGrafenvonSeilernundAspang,B.12.IV. 10 (olim
210),ff.(?), s. XIV (Supp.2170)
The Netherlands
177. Leiden,Bibl.derRijksuniversiteit,
B.P.L. 84, ff.l-7v,Top.fr.,ff.6, 7, s. XI
(Supp.2026)*
178. Leiden,Bibl. der Rijksuniversiteit,
B.P.L. 1925,f. 175-175v,
s. XII-XIII
(Codd.147).Endsat 877d8*
179. Utrecht,
Bibl. der Rijksuniversiteit,
816, f. 175-175v,s. XII-XIII (Supp.
2028).Beginning
only
Poland
180. Krakow,Biblijoteka
2177,ff.50-62,s. XIII
Uniwersytetu
Jagielloskiego,
, Supp.1693)
(Codd.
Spain
181. Barcelona,
Arch,de la CoronadeAragon,
Ripoll134,ff.47-57,s. XIV (Codd.
1173)
49

00:33:23 AM

de San Lorenzodel Escorial,g.III. 16, ff.

182. El Escorial,Bibi.del Monasterio
s. XIV ( Codd
. 1222).Beginning
286v-289v,
only
183. El Escorial,Bibi.del Monasterio
de San Lorenzodel Escorial,g.III. 28, ff.
67-78,s. XlIIex. {Codd.1223)
184. Salamanca,Bibi.Universitaria,
delPalacioNa2627(olimMadrid,Biblioteca
s. XlIImed.(Codd.,Supp.1212)
cional,306),ff.34v-42v,
185. Segovia,Bibi.de la Catedral,85 (?), ff.39-48,s. XIII-XIV (Supp.2137)
186. Toledo,Bibi.del Cabildode la Santsima
IglesiaCatedral,94.11,ff.l-12v,
s. XlIIex. (Codd.1237)
187. Tortosa,Bibi.delCabildode la Santsima
IglesiaCatedral,107,ff.l-10v,s.
XIII (Codd.1177).Incomplete
Switzerland
F.I.l, ff.48-59,s. XlVin. (Codd.,Supp.1122)
Basel,Universittsbibl.,
s. XV (Codd.1125)
Basel,Universittsbibl.,
F.L5, ff.117-146v,
F.IV. 16,ff.35-42,s. Xlllin. (Codd.1147)
Basel,Universittsbibl.,
300,ff.3-8v,17,s. XI (Supp.2120)*
Bern,Burgerbibl.,
St Gall,Stiftsbibl.,
816,pp. 78-96,s. XIII-XIV (Codd.1160)
St Gall,Stiftsbibl.,
830,pp. 353-369,Top.fr.,pp. 364-365,367-368,s. XI
j Supp.1165)*
(Codd.
194. Zrich,Zentralbibl.,
Car. C.100, ff.18-26v,s. XIV-XVI. Beginsat 877b8
195. Zrich,Zentralbibl.,
Car. C.170,ff.62-72v,s. XHIex.-XIVin.(Codd.1168)
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

UnitedStatesofAmerica
196. New York,ColumbiaUniversity
Rare Booksand Manuscripts
Library,
X88/Ar512,ff.46v-57v,
s. Xlllex.-XIVin.(Codd.15)*
Toronto

ofMediaevalStudies
PontificalInstitute

50

00:33:23 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Divisio Scientiarum
: Ein bisherunverffentlichtes
Wissenschaftsmodell
in der Clavis CompendiidesJohannes von Garlandia
THOMAS HAYE

Als im 12Jahrhundert durch Vermittlung arabischer Quellen

neues aristotelischesGedankengut in den Okzident eindringt,fhrt
dies zu einer geistigenDynamisierung, die man als die zweite groe
Renaissance des Mittelalters bezeichnet hat.1 Nicht unhnlich der
Karolingischen Renaissance ermglicht hierbei die Wiederentdeckung bzw. erstmals vertiefteRezeption antik-paganer Literatur
eine Bereicherungdes Wissens, bedeutetjedoch gleichzeitigdie Notwendigkeit,das seit der Sptantike relativ stabile, vornehmlichauf
lateinischerSprache und Literatur beruhende Weltbild mit den neu
gewonnenen Erkenntnissenarabischer und griechischerProvenienz
zu vershnen.Auf der Ebene der Philosophie unternehmenzeitgenssiche Gelehrtewie Hugo von St. Victor und Dominicus Gundissalinus
den Versuch, die lange Zeit kanonische, nun jedoch obsolet gewordene Denkfigurder Septem
ArtesLiberalesin ein erweitertes,organisches
und in sich widerspruchsfreieswissenschaftstheoretisches
Modell zu
berfhren.2
Innerhalb der relativ kontinuierlichenWeiterentwicklungdieses
Modells entsteheneinzelne die verschiedenenAnstze bndelnde und
im Ergebnis normierendeRedaktionsstufen,frdie etwa Robert Kil1 Eineanregende,
kritische
mitdemBegriff
derhochinsgesamt
Auseinandersetzung
'
- eine'Renaissance
mittelalterlichen
Renaissance
beiP. vonMoos,Das 12Jahrhundert
oder
ein'Aufklrungs
in: Mittellateinisches
23 (1988),1-10.
Zeitalter'?,
Jahrbuch,
2 Vgl.zu diesem
dieBeitrge
vonM.-Th.d'Alverny,
Translations
Adaptationsproze
andTranslators
andRenewal
intheTwelfth
, in:Renaissance
, edd.R.L. Benson/G.
Century
Oxford1982,421-62;J. Jolivet,TheArabic
Inheritance
Constable,
, in: A History
oj
Western
, ed. P. Dronke,Cambridge1988, 113-48;J.A.
Twelfth-Century
Philosophy
TheNature
andClassification
intheMiddle
} Scope
, in:Science
Weisheipl,
,
oftheSciences
Ages
ed. D.C. Lindberg,
and
Chicago1978,461-82;R. McKeon,TheOrganisation
ofSciences
theRelations
intheTwelfth
andThirteenth
Centuries
Context
, in: TheCultural
ofCultures
of
Medieval
D. Sylla,Boston1975,151-92;K. Flasch,
, edd.J.M. Murdoch/E.
Learning
Das philosophische
Denken
imMittelalter
, Stuttgart
1986,298-309;ein kurzerideengeschichtlicher
berblick
bei Th. Kobusch,Philosophie
, E. Mittelalter
, in: Historisches
derPhilosophie,
Wrterbuch
Bd. 7, Darmstadt
Grnder,
edd.J.Ritter/K.
1989,633-56.
51

00:33:30 AM

symptomatischist.3 In dieser ideengewardby's De ortuscientiarum

schichtlichen Phase ist die Kanonisierung eines allgemeingltigen
Systems so weit fortgeschriften,da die Pariser Artisten-Fakulttdas
Thema 'Wissenschaftsmodeir in der Mitte des 13Jahrhunderts in
den Katalog des fr die Lizentiatsprfung relevanten Lehrstoffes
aufnimmt.4
Es ist wenig berraschend,da sich in der Folge bei den Studenten
das Bedrfnisnach didaktischkonzipierten,in Krze die Grundlagen
der Scientiaeskizzierenden Traktaten regt, dem seitens der Lehrer
durch die Produktionzahlreicher,zumeist anonym tradierterIntroductionesentsprochen wird.5 Wissenschaftsmodellewerden jedoch nicht
nur in monographischen Abhandlungen vermittelt,sondern finden
offenbarsehr schnell als - dem eigentlichenSachthema vorgeschaltete - EinfhrungenEingang auch in solche Lehrbcherdes Universittsbetriebes,die jeweils nur den Stoffeiner einzelnen Ars liberlisin
extenso behandeln.6
Ein Beispiel frdiesen bisherwenig untersuchtenRezeptionsproze
ist das Werk des zeitgenssischenGrammatikersJohannes von Garlandia (ca. 1195-1260), der als Lehrer an den Universittenvon TouFachlouse und Paris in seiner Disziplin zu den wirkungsmchtigsten
des Sptmittelalterszhlt.7 Seine literarischeTtigkeit
schriftstellern
zielt primr darauf ab, die beiden populrsten, aber seiner Ansicht
3 RobertKilwardby,
Britanni
Deortu
scientiarum
MediiAevi
, ed. A.G.Judy,Auetores
IV, Toronto1976.
4 Vgl. C. Lafleur,Quatre
la philosophie
de
Introductions
au XlIIe sicle
, Universit
de l'Institut
d'tudesMdivalesXXIII, Montral-Paris
Montral,Publications
1988,144-7.
5 Vgl. ebenda,123-61;dieVulgarisierung
wissenschaftstheoretischer
Vorstellungen
VinzenzvonBeauvais,
wurdezudemdurchden zeitgenssischen
Enzyklopdisten
einPanorama
derindeneinleitenden
Doctrinale
derwichtigKapitelnseinesSpeculum
Doctrinale
Modellebot(Vincentius
stenhochmittelalterlichen
,
Bellovacensis,
Speculum
Graz 19651,9-20),erheblich
Douai 1624[Nachdruck
gefrdert.
6 AusdemBereichderGrammatik
Tractatus
degrammatica,
vgl.z.B. denanonymen
NF 28, Mnchendes Grabmann-Institutes
ed. K. Reichl,Verffentlichungen
Wien1976;dergrammatische
Traktat
Paderbornwirddurcheinlngeres
KapitelDe
das integraler
Teil desTextesist.
divisione
philosophie
erffnet,
7 Die bezglich
vonGarlandiarelevante
Literatur
istzusammengestellt
bei
Johannes
deGarlandia,
in:Diedeutsche
Literatur
desMittelalters.
orstbrock,
VerfasserJohannes
F.J.VJ
York1983,Bd.4, 612-23;nochimmergrundlelexikon
, ed. K. Ruh, Berlin-New
oftheUniversity
Scolarium
, Memoirs
gend:L.J.Paetow,TheMorale
ofGarland
ofJohn
BedeuofCalifornia
1927,69-273;diejngsteStudieberJohannes'
4,2, Berkeley
von
Schulwesen
vorgelegt
tungfrdas sptmittelalterliche
Texteditionen)
(inclusive
andLearning
Latinin Thirteenth-Century
T. Hunt,Teaching
1991,
, Cambridge
England
I-III, passim.
52

00:33:30 AM

nach vllig unzureichenden und fehlerhaften

Grammatiken, den Grecismusdes Eberhard von Bthune (gest. 1212) sowie das Doctrinaledes
Alexander von Villa Dei (ca. 1170-1250), zu korrigierenbzw. durch
eigene Schriftenzu ersetzen.8Als Einfhrungund Ergnzung zu seinem Hauptwerk, dem Compendium
Gramatice
, verfater eine bisher
unverffentlichte
Clavis
die
er
mit
,
sog.
Compendii
einigen allgemeinen
berlegungen zu seinem dichterischenSelbstverstndnisund Konzept einleitet:9
Artisgramatice
dudumcompendia
quedam
Perstrinxi,
quorumclavemtenetistelibellus,
Quemprece,nonpreciovili,meadexteratendit.
Iocundostabilique
nichilprepollet
amico:
5 Elabuntur
opes,verusnonnutatamicus;
Etsipaupererit,comesestsapienciadives,
fortune
fulmina
Que nondeficiet
spernens.
Nach diesem topischenEinstieg, der in Thema (philosophia
, amicitia
)
und Formulierungauf Horaz und Boethius anspielt,10folgtunverzglich der Brckenschlagzum Widmungsnehmer:
Hec tibicollegi,cuiusprecemetraresumpsi.
Hec et amoretuitibidissociata
reiunxi.
10 Nec tamenhecuni,sed pluribus
erogo.Plures
Uniusfructu
fructum
quandoquetulerunt.
Wenn Johannes vorgibt, sein Werk sei auf Bitten eines amicusentstanden, so legt allein das Fehlen des Eigennamens dieses Freundes
nahe, da wir es hier mit einer literarischenFiktionzu tun haben, die
ihre Existenz der Gattungstradition verdankt:11 Die Anrede des
8 Eberhard
vonBthune,
Graecismus
1987(Ndr.derAus, ed.J. Wrobel,Hildesheim
vonVillaDei, Doctrinale
NewYork
gabeBreslau1887);Alexander
, ed. D. Reichling,
1974(Ndr.derAusgabeBerlin1893);zurRedaktion
desDoctrinale
durchJohannes
that
revised
theDoctrinale
de
vgl.M. Colker,NewEvidence
JohnofGarland
ofAlexander
VillaDei, in: Scriptorium
28 (1974),68-71.
9 Einekommentierte
kritische
EditiondesCompendium
Gramatice
, inderauchdie ClavisCompendii
eineAuflisting
undBeschreiwird,istin Vorbereitung;
bercksichtigt
beiL.K. Born,TheManuscripts
Works
bungderHandschriften
oftheMajorGrammatical
ClavisCompendii,
Arslectora
Ecclesie
fJhnofGarland:
Grammatice,
, in:
Compendium
Transactions
andProceedings
Association
, 69 (1938),259-73;der
oftheAmerican
Philological
imfolgenden
zitierte
TextistderHandschrift
ff.270r-299v
GC, 385/605,
Cambridge,
entnommen.
10Vgl. Boethius,
De consolatione
ed. L. Bieler,CC Ser. Lat. XCIV,
Philosophiaei
Turnhout1957,5, hierdie Abschnitte
1,3,4-6;zum Freundschaftstopos
vgl. die
an Boethius,
c.l, vv.21-22undQ. HoratiusFlaccus,Opera
sprachlichen
Anklnge
,
ed. S. Borzsak,Bibliotheca
Graecorum
et Romanorum
Scriptorum
Teubneriana,
iucundo
sanusamico
Leipzig1984,172:Nil egocontulerim
(serm.1,5,44).
11Vgl.E. Phlmann,
Charakteristika
desrmischen
undNiedergang
, in;Aufstieg
Lehrgedichts
derrmischen
Welt
Berlin-New
, ed. H. Temporini,
York,1,3,836-78,hierpassim.
53

00:33:30 AM

Freundes hat lediglich die Funktion, eine Figur zu schaffen,mit der

sich die Leser (plures
) als die eigentlichenAdressatendes Textes identifizierenknnen:
Metraiuvantnimos,comprendunt
plurimapaucis.
Pristina
commmorant,
que sunttriagratalegenti.
Nonhicornatalegecarmina,
sed properata.
15 Utilepropono.Fructu,nonflorecorono.
queris,
Quedamdispersamea percompendia
aliterneceidemclausarevelo,
Que reserans
Ut leviuspateantea, que tibipendulanutant.
Hiissimuladiecitibi,que reseranda
petisti.
20 Illorumquedampoterunt
prodesse
quibusdam,
Hie quia parvadaturreserans
clavis.
compendia
Unausgesprochen liegt dem Gedankengang ein Vergleich zweier
literarischerGenera, Lehrgedichtversus Prosatraktat,zugrunde. Der
Verfasserentscheidetsich, ebenso wie seine beiden literarischenKonkurrenten,Alexander von Villa Dei und Eberhard von Bthune, fr
das carmen
, dessen Form drei Vorteile habe: Nicht nur beschrnkesich
das Genus 'Lehrgedicht' in alle Krze auf komprimierteWissensvermittlung{paucis),sondernbiete dieses Wissen in einer - aufgrunddes
- mnemotechnischeffektivenFassung
gefalligen Metrums ( iuvant
)
) dar.12 Die Methode einer metrischenEinkleidung ist
( commmorant
daher primr funktionalund nicht durch einen poetischen Anspruch
motiviert; bei Abfassung der Schrift habe der didaktische Nutzen
(utile,fructu
), nichtder poetische Ornat (ornata,flore
) im Vordergrund
des Interesses gestanden. Uberhaupt habe das Werk lediglich die
zu erleichtern.Die
Gramatice
Funktion, die Lektre des Compendium
von Johannes vorgebrachten Erluterungen und Einschrnkungen
gipfeln in einer gattungstypischen Invocatio der himmlischen
Patrone,13mit der er den Prolog beschliet:
Vis patriseterna,sapiencianatepaterna,
interna
nos,Snete,guberna,
Spiritus,
penetrans
De rosulavernafios,Christe,
marisquelucerna.
25 Que suntexterna,
superna.14
purgavirtute
12Die Verse12-13,wenngleich
eineranderenQuelleentnommen,
als Exempelfr
Literatur
vonF. Brunhlzl,
Dielateinische
diezeitgenssische
literarische
Modezitiert
,
. Europisches
in: NeuesHandbuch
derLiteraturwissenschaft
, ed. W. ErzgrSptmittelalter
bei F. Brunhlzl,
ber,Wiesbaden1978,8, 551; Vorlagebzw.Dubletten
Florilegium
3 (1966),130,Anm.zu vv. 1-2.
Treverense
, in: Mittellateinisches
Jahrbuch,
13Vgl. Phlmann,
a.a.O., passim.
14EineDublette
manimMorale
ed. Paetow,a.a.O.,
dervierVersefindet
Scolariumy
211,w. 249-52.
54

00:33:30 AM

Da der Vergleich zwischenJohannes einerseitsund Eberhard bzw.

Alexander andererseitsauf dem Gebiet des grammatischenDidascalicon trotzder relativ geringen zeitlichenDifferenzauch ein Vergleich
zweier unterschiedlicherLehrbuchtraditionenund -generationenist,
zeigt der weitereVerlauf des Gedichts: Whrend die beiden Grammatikerder vorigen Generation unmittelbarim Anschlu an vergleichbare Prologe mediasin resgehen, stelltJohannes in einem theoretischen
Exkurs ein Wissenschaftsmodellvor, das den Studenten die Mglichkeit geben soll, die grammatischeDisziplin in einen universalen wisKontext einzuordnen:
senschaftstheoretischen
origo:
Audi,gramatice
que sitrationis
65 AlmaNoysprimopropagat
cunetacreata.
Quelibetex entespeciesestphilosophie.
notansensquedamdicitur
esse
Philosophia
Preter
opusnostrum.
Quedamnottensvelutexit
A nobis.Sic esteiusdivisioprima:
70 Enspreter
nostrum
factum
diversificatur,
Et quodde factonostroprocedere
fertur,
sibiprimum:
differt
Tripliciter
Colligepartes!
do partesphilosophic.
Ensut diversum
Ens preter
nostrum
factum
preitensquesecundo
75 Provenit
ex operenostro.Sic exereprimum:
illiusin esse:
Exitusestentistriplex
Si primum
queris,estillecreacio.Posthunc
Res estconposita.
Mutaciodeindesupremus.
Ens iuxtaprimum
speciesstudtuna videre:
80 Istamethaphisica
deindesecunda,
est,mathematica
Phisicasuprema.
Transcendit
prima,secunda
Abstrahit
a motu,remterciamotibus
addit.
Ensdaturex operenostro:Diversificatur
Hoc veludeffciens,
racioprius,indevoluntas.
85 Sermonem
racioproducit
opusquevoluntas.
Hincpartesgeminassacraphilosophia
requirit,
A sermone
estosecunda.
prior,a moribus
iuxta
Que triplex
primovultessepolitica,
Hancechonomica
se regitinde.
stat,monostica
90 Primadocetcivesfamulosque
secunda,suprema
istavoluntas.
Quodlibetin se ipso.Tria digerit
Ad finem
sermotendit.Triplextibifinis:
Perfectum,
verum,persuasio;sed tribusistis
Convenit
addiciotriplex:
Estadditaprimo
95 Congruitas
aliiqueprobabile
subsequiturque
sermoprobatur.
Ornatus,perquemperfectus
Trespetithas speciesa nobisphilosophia:
Grammaticam,
logicamdisponens
rhetoricamque.
Esttibiprimaparenstriagestansubera,quorum
100 Primum
lac puerisdatscilicet
orthographia,
Mammasecundasapitmel,quodprosodiafundit,
Terciaforte
merumreddit,
dumsynthesis
exit.
55

00:33:30 AM

Grammatice
potathodieparsmaximafecem.
Barbaries
qua garulaturbalaborat.
prodit,
sicdiffinire
105 Ex hiisgramaticam
potestis:
verbisestscriptasciencia,perquam
Ex propriis
apte
Quelibetex septemrectecongnoscitur,
Profertur,
legesdiscuntur,
gestasciuntur.
Dictiosensibiles
exquirit
proprietates,
110 Terminus
in logicaracionis
calliditates.
a logicante:
Et sic gramaticus
sibidiffert
rationeprobante,
Grammaticam
logicasequitur
cumsitquasi fabrica
Vocumgramatica
quedam.
et auctor.
Hanc ius nature,raciopreponit
Um die Grammatik zu lokalisieren, nimmtJohannes die Philosophie als Ausgangs- und Fixpunktseines sprachlichnchternenExkurses. Er entwirfthierzu ein Stemma logischer Differenzierungen,das
bieten soll. Ausgehend von einer
ein umfassendesModell aller scientiae
in
ens
und ens ex opere
die
Bereiche
Differenzierung
preteropus nostrum
nostroskizzierter ein aristotelischgeprgtes Modell, in dem alle konventionellen philosophischenKategorien wie spekulative Philosophie
(Metaphysik, Mathematik, Physik) und Moralphilosophie (Politik,
konomie, Monastik) enthalten sind.
Vom dem bis in das 12Jh. gltigen Kanon der ArtesLiberales
(genannt v. 107) wird lediglichdas Trivium nher erlutert.Johannes'
besonderes Augenmerk gilt selbstverstndlichder eigenen Disziplin:
Bei der Behandlung der Themen 'Sprache' und 'Grammatik' neigter
nicht nur zu grerer Ausfhrlichkeit(v.92ff), sondern verwendet
auch ein metaphernreiches,insgesamtpoetischeresVokabular (vv.9915
104). En passant richteter in topischer Zeitklage heftigeVorwrfe
gegen den aktuellen Lehrbetrieb (vv. 103-104). Nicht genannt, aber
und Doctrinale
zweifelsfreigemeintsind auch hier Grecismus
, die Johannes in seinen zahlreichenSchriftennichtnur als Zielscheibe sachlicher
Kritik, sondern auch persnlicherInvektive benutzt.16Mit scholastischer Grndlichkeitprsentierter den Studenten eine knapp formulierte Definition seiner Disziplin (vv. 105-108) und beschreibt deren
Verhltnis zu den brigenArtesLiberalesim allgemeinen (v.107) sowie
als eine zur Logik im besonderen (vv. 109-114). Die arsgrammatica
15ZurVerwendung
imMittelalter
vonSpeisemetaphern
Europivgl.E.R. Curtius,
scheLiteratur
undlateinisches
Mittelalter
, 2. Aufl.Bern1957,144-6.
16ZurKritik
Scolarium
desJohannes
, ed. Paetow,
vgl.zweiExemplaaus demMorale
a.a.O, 222-3:
.. (v.353)
viamclaudens
adphilosophiam.
Doctrinale
mus.(v.359).
estGrecis
Mendax
Grecismus
philosophis
56

00:33:30 AM

im engeren Sinne - propdeutische Wissenschaft stelle das Instrumentarium zur Verfgung, durch dessen Einsatz Logik mglich
werde ( sequitur
, v.112). Da die Grammatik zu dieser Zeit bereits
weite Teile der Logik in sich aufgenommenhat und eine strikteTrennung beider Wissenschaftender didaktischen Wirklichkeitder Zeit
lngst nich mehr entspricht,wird im Modell nicht thematisiert.17
WenngleichJohannes das Promium seiner Clavis hier enden lt,
ist das Modell noch nicht vollstndig beschrieben: Man findet an
wenigerexponierterStelle im hinterenTeil des Buches einen zweiten
theoretischenExkurs, in dem weitere Details ergnzt werden.
1055

1060

1065

1070

Marie,
vite,prolesgenerosa
Principium
sinete nichilordiarumquam,
intacte,
Virginis
Tu trivialis
apex,tuquadrivialis
origo.
A te,trine,petotria:verum,congrua,
pulcrum.
inventa
sciencianostri
Triplexsermonis
Dat congruitatem
Ad triplicem
tenditfinem:
Prima,secundadocetverum,beneterciasuadet.
arsintra,quandoprecepta
Traditur
moventur,
inicile.
Extra,quandolibripreponitur
construit
inde.
Hec scribit
recte,preponit,
Caldea Iudeaque,Greca,Latina
Gramata18
racione.
arsuna quidemforme
Si distant,
eiusprecepta
fdelem.
Ad finem
tendunt
Arsdaturergo.
et precipit:
Permittit,
prohibet
sermoremotum.
hiistribusestsubiectum
Artibus
Nontamenesteadem,quoniammathematica
queque
Vultprosubiecto19
sed suntpropriora,
quantum,
dicuntur
Perque distantes
quadriviales.

Wiederum wird das Thema mit einer Invocatio Christi erffnet,die

nicht nur als poetischerOrnat fungiert,sondern durch zahlenmystische Anspielungen auf Trivium und Quadrivium zum Wissenschaftsmodell berleitet. Nach Aufzhlung der drei kanonischen Ziele des
sermo(vv. 1056-1059) geht der Autor in einem das eigene Vorgehen
reflektierenden
Einschub auf den doppelten Charakter der grammatischen Disziplin als arsein (vv. 1060-1061): Deren Perspektiveist intrinsecusbzw. intra
bzw.
, insofernsie konkreteRegeln anbietet, extrinsecus
extra
, insofernihre Position, d.h. Qualitt und Materie, im Rahmen
des gesamtwissenschaftlichenSystems definiertwird. Eben diesem
17Hierzudiegrundlegende
im
vonJ. Pinborg,
DieEntwicklung
derSprachtheorie
Arbeit
zur Geschichte
Mittelalter
derPhilosophie
undTheologiedes Mittelalters
, Beitrge
19-30.
die historische
42,2,Mnster1967,hierinsbesondere
Einfhrung
18Konjektur
stattGramatica.
19Konjektur
stattsubiecta.
57

00:33:30 AM

will Johannes mit seinem wissenschaftsCharakter der ars grammatica

theoretischenPrfixentsprechen( libriinicile, v. 1061). 20Die einzelnen
Bereiche der Grammatik , Orthographie,Prosodie sowie Syntax, werden in aller Krze paraphrasiert(v. 1062). 21
Nur angedeutet findetman die von Petrus Helias sowie Dominicus
Gundissalinus propagierte Lehre der grammatica
universalis
und deren
die
sich
in
den
verschiedenen
manifestieren
,
Sprachen
species
22 Das in der
Einleitung nicht erwhnte zweite
(vv. 1063-1064).
Element der SeptemArtesLiberales, die quadrivialen Wissenschaften,
wird vom Trivium gelst und der Mathematik zugeordnet
23
(vv. 1068-1070).
Hier endet die Skizze. Die einzelnen Elemente des Modells und ihr
Verhltnis zueinander lassen sich in einem Schaubild verdeutlichen:
Das skizzierteModell ist organisch aufgebaut und in sich schlssig,
jedoch - wie erwartet- keineswegs originell: In ihrerFunktion als
jeweils letzte Glieder einer RezeptionskettepflegenSchulbcher stets
' zu
nur 'gesicherte Erkenntnisse', nicht jedoch ' Forschungsbeitrge
enthalten,wenngleich sie als Multiplikatoreneines allseits akzeptierten Traditionsgutes zweifelsohne eminente Bedeutung besitzen. So
spiegeltdas Modell lediglich einen relativ klaren Konsens wider, der
in Paris in der Mitte des 13Jahrhundertshinsichtlichdes genannten
Themas erzielt worden ist. OffenkundigeParallelen zu Robert Kiloder den von Lafleur edierten Pariser
wardby's De ortuscientiarum
Introductiones
dieser Zeit sprechen eine klare Sprache, ohne da sich
przise intertextuelleAbhngigkeiten nachweisen lieen.24
20Vgl.R.W. Hunt,TheIntroductions
tothe
Artes
intheTwelfth
Mediae, in:Studia
Century
valiainhonorem
in:R. W.Hunt.
, Brugge1948,85-112(erneut
R.J.Martin
abgedruckt
TheHistory
in theMiddleAges.Collected
, ed. G.L. Bursill-Hall,
of Grammar
Papers
Amsterdam
1980,117-44.
21Vel. vv.100-102.
22Vgl.K.M. Fredborg,
tosome
Universal
Grammar
Grammarians
,
12th-Century
According
VII 1/2(1980),69-84.
in: Historiographia
Linguistica,
23Einknapper
beiG. Beaujouan,
berdie Entwicklung
desQuadrivium
Uberblick
andRenewal
intheTwelfth
TheTransformation
,
, in: Renaissance
Century
oftheQuadrivium
Position
des
edd.R.L. Benson/G.
Oxford1982,463-87;zurvernderten
Constable,
in
vgl.P. Kibre,TheQuadrivium
speziellimParisdes 13.Jahrhunderts
Quadrivium
duQuatrime
ContoParis)in:Actes
Universities
theThirteenth
Century
(with
Special
Reference
dePhilosophie
mdivale
1969,175-91.
, Montral-Paris
grsinternational
24Vgl.insbesondere
desvonKila.a.O., 223-5(cap.66); einSchaubild
Kilwardby,
beiWeisheipl,
entworfenen
a.a.O., 480;einigeAbhnwardby
Wissenschaftssystems
stemmatisch
bei Lafleur,
a.a.O., 132-41.
dargestellt
gigkeitsverhltnisse
58

00:33:30 AM

philosophia (nott ens)

ens preteropus nostrum
triplexexitus entis: /
1. creado
/
2. res conposita/
3. mutacio /

methaphisica:
transcendit

ens ex opere nostro

'

(ens efficiens)
/
/
/

'
'
'

mathematica:
abstrahita
motu

/
phisica: rem
motibus addit /
/

artes
/
ratio:
quadriviales
producit sermonem

tendit ad tres fines:

congrua, verum, pulcrum
perfectum,verum, persuasio
congruitas, probabile, ornatus
/
gramatica: logica: rhetorica:
dat congrui-docet bene suadet
tatem
verum

voluntas:
producit opus

///
///
1. politica: docet cives
2. echonomica: docet
fmulos
3. monostica: docet
quodlibet in se ipso

orthographiaprosodia synthesis

59

00:33:30 AM

Da Johannes de Garlandia die Darstellung des akzeptiertenWissenschaftsmodellsjedoch nicht nur als eine didaktische Pflichtbung
ansieht, illustrierteine Parallele, die in einem vllig anderen Kontext
eine poetisch anspruchvollere Version desselben Modells bietet: Die
Rede ist von seinem Gedicht De triumphis
ecclesiae
, in dem er - aus
katholischer
Sicht
die
der
sdfranzsischen
streng
Niederschlagung
Albigenserbewegung darstellt. Angeregt durch den Gedanken, da
die (theologische) doctrinajede Variante der Hresie unterdrcken
werde, erlutertJohannes im sechsten Buch das zeitgenssischeBildungssystem:
Frondet
in eloquiumdivisascientia,
ramus,
eloquiumque
regit.
Qui sapitegreditur
Treshabeteloquiumramos,quosordinetendit
thimum.
Grammaticam,
logicam,rethoricaeque
Hincspeculativam
gignitsapientia,
gignit
Huncramumcujuspractica
nomenerit.
Practicadatramumqui dicitur
ethica,cujus
fronde
viret.
Corpusdivisumtriplice
haecurbidomuiquesibiquevicissim,
Providet
Debetenimprudensprovidus
essesibi.
Dat coeleste
dansea fisim
logosspeculatio,
Et mathesim,
ductatriplice
fronde
viret.
Dinumerat
astris
mathesis,
mensurat,
consonat,
et veresingulascirefacit.25
Instudet,
Entkleidet man die Begriffeihrer poetischen Hlle, so ergibt sich
ein strengin Triaden gegliedertesStemma: Johannes strukturiert
die
sapientiain die drei Bereiche Trivium {eloquium),Praktische Philosophie (practicascientia
) und Theoretische Philosophie {speculativa
scientia).
Das verbindende Element des Triviums ist die Sprache. Die Praktische Philosophie wird mit der Ethik gleichgesetzt,die wiederum die
drei Klassen 'Politik' {Providethaecurbi), 4konomie' {Providetdomux)
und 'Monastik' {Providet
sibi) umfat.Als theoretischeWissenschaften
werden Metaphysik {coelestelogos), Physik (fisis) und Zahlentheorie
{mathesis)genannt. Letzterer wiederum werden die Fcher des QuaMusik {consodriviums,Arithmetik{Dinumerat),Geometrie {mensurat),
nai) und Astronomie {astrisinstudet),zugewiesen.
Die beiden skizziertenModelle, in literarischenWerken sehrunterschiedlichen Charakters prsentiert,unterscheiden sich lediglich in
25Zitiert
de Garlandia,
De triumphis
ecclesiae
libriodo, ed. T. Wright,
aus:Johannes
vonP.G.
wirdvorbereitet
London1856,100(ohneVerzhlung);
eineNeuedition
i. Br.,weitere
Literatur
bei Paetow,a.a.O. 110-11;Repertorium
Schmidt,
Freiburg
Historiae
Fontium
MediiAevi
de Garlandia).
, VI, Rom 1990,321 (s.v.Johannes
60

00:33:30 AM

einem einzigen Detail: Whrend in De triumphis

ecclesiaedie Philosophie in drei Bereiche, nmlich Rationale, Theoretischeund Praktische
Philosophie, zerfallt,sieht die Clavis Compendiieine Zweiteilung der
sapientiain spekulativeWissenschafteneinerseits,"praktische" (ensex
andererseitsvor und ordnetletzterersowohl die sprach-als
operenostro)
auch die handlungsorientierten(d.h. die im engeren Sinne 'praktischen') Wissenschaftenunter. Es liegt auf der Hand, da man die beiden Texte trotz der einen Differenz nicht gegeneinander ausspielen
darf,indem man etwa dem Lehrgedichtaufgrundseines didaktischen
Charakters greres Gewicht beimessen oder Johannes gar eine
Weiterentwicklungdes Modells unterstellenwollte.26Vielmehr belegt
der Vergleich zweier Texte, die aus der Feder desselben Autors stammen, da in der Mitte des 13Jhs. zwar eine gewisse Vereinheitlichung eingetretenist, die aber gleichwohl Spielraum fr Varianten
lie. Das Fehlen einer endgltigen Kanonisierung ist offenbarauch
von Johannes de Garlandia nicht als Mangel empfunden worden.
Freiburg im Breisgau
Universitt
Albert-Ludwigs26Laut Paetow,a.a.O, 109 wurdeDe triumphis
und
ecclesiae
1229-1232
begonnen
1245-1252
die ClavisCompendii
vielleicht
1234verfat.
beendet,

61

00:33:30 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
The Will as King over the Powers of the Soul:
Uses and Sources of an Image in the ThirteenthCentury
ROLAND J. TESKE SJ.

In answering the question whetherthe will is a higher power than

the intellect, Henry of Ghent employs the image of the soul as a
kingdom in which the will has supreme power and, therefore,power
over the intellect.1Henry does hold that the will is the highestpower
in the soul and can command ( imperare
) all the other powers, but he
does not develop the image any further,though others earlier in the
Franciscan traditionhad done so. R. Macken notes that Henry here
uses a familiar image that was developed especially by Walter of
Bruges.2 Macken refersto a study by E. Stdter who has traced the
images of the soul as microcosm and as kingdom in threethinkersof
the middle Franciscan school, namely, Walter of Bruges, Peter Olivi,
and John Peckham.3
The image of the soul as a kingdom, in which the will rules as king,
is clearly developed by Walter of Bruges, who wrote his Quaestiones
disputataemost probably in 1267-1269 and later became bishop of
Poitiersin 1279 and died in 1307. Walter draws a parallel betweenthe
kingdom of God, a human kingdom, and the kingdom of the soul. As
God freelyacts in the macrocosm, freefromany laws, and as a king
rules over his kingdom, so the will presides over all the other powers
in the kingdom of the soul.4 For Walter the soul is a kingdom of
1 "Absoluteergodicendum
visestin totoregnoanimae,et
quodvoluntas
superior
itaipsointellectu."
deGandavo
I, qu. 14,inHenrici
HenryofGhent,Quodlibet
Quodlibet
/, ed. R. Macken,Leuven,Leiden1979,p. 89.
2 "Es istinteressant
zu beobachten,
da Heinrich
hiereinbekanntes
Bildbentzt,
das besonders
entwickelt
wurdevomFranziskaner
WaltervonBrggeu.a...." RaymondMacken,Heinrich
vonGent
imGesprch
mitseinen
ber
diemenschliche
Zeitgenossen
Freiheit
, in: Franziskanische
Studien,59 (1977), 125-82,here128,n. 16. Macken
refers
toWalter'sQuaestiones
in:LesPhilosophes
, IV (Ed. E. Longpr,
,
Disputatae
Belges
X, Louvain1928).
' undals
3 Cf.DieSeele
als 'Minor
Mundus
EinBeitrag
zurPsychologie
dermittleren
fRegnum
Franziskanerschule
undPartikularismus
im Mittelalter.
Miscellanea
, in: Universalismus
Mediaevalia5. Ed. Paul Wilpert
(Berlin1968),56-72.
4 WalterofBruges,Quaestiones
, q. 4; ed. Longpr,39-40.
disputatae
62

00:33:47 AM

viriumanimae)over which the will reigns as king. The

powers ( regnum
intellectholds the place of a counselor who can offeradvice, but the
will as king remains completelyfree to accept or reject the advice as
it wishes.5All the other powers of the soul are subject to it.6 The will
4
is "a lordly power' ' ( quaedamdominativa
potestas
) or 'a potency with
? Indeed, under God, the free will is the
power" (potentia
potestativa)
most powerfulpotency.8
Stdter suggeststhat the images of the soul as microcosm and as
kingdom were developed in the context of the condemnation of 219
9
propositionsby the bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, in 1277. The
condemnation chiefly touched upon the teaching of the radical
Aristotelians,such as, Siger of Brabant and Boethius of Dacia, though
it also included some doctrinesof Thomas Aquinas.10 Aftersketching
the reaction against the Aristotelians,especially concerningthe intellectual determinationof the will by the known good, Stdter claims
thata new image of man and a new psychologywas conceived thatled
to the views of the soul as kingdom and as microcosm.11
As sources of the two images, which-he traces throughWalter of
Bruges, Peter Olivi and John Peckham, Stdter points to Plato's view
of the structureof the soul as analogous to that of the state, to Aristotle's statementthat the soul is in some sense all things, and to the
biblical view of man as the image of God.12
Stdter is certainlycorrectin supposing that the image of the soul
as a kingdom in which the will has supreme power provides a strong
5 Quaestiones
63.
, q. 6 ad 9; ed. Lonenpr,
disputatae
6 Quaestiones
, q. 4 and q. 6; ed. Longpr,40 and 60-1.
disputatae
7 Quaestiones
disputataey
q. 4 ad 8 andq. 4 ad 14; ed. Longpr,44 and 45.
8 Quaestiones
estpoten, q. 6 ad 9; ed. Longpr,63: "Liberumarbitrium
disputatae
tissimum
subDeo."
9 "Wirmssen
unskurzdengeistesgeschichtlichen
Hintergrund
vergegenwrtigen,
aufdemdiesebeidenVorstellungen
sichgebildet
haben;dennsonstkannmannicht
warumgeradedieseFormulierungen
wurden.Das Jahr1277
verstehen,
konzipiert
stellt
einenwichtigen
im13.Jahrhundert
Einschnitt
dar" (Stadter,
56). On theother
thatWalter'sQuaestiones
wereprobably
written
hand,Stadter
acknowledges
disputatae
in 1267-1269
in reaction
(Stdter,
58) so thattheimageswerenotdeveloped
merely
to thecondemnation
of1277,butin theanti-Aristotelian
movement
thatledto the
condemnations
of1271and 1277.
10Cf.R. Hissette,
surles219articles
condamnes
Parisle7 mars
1277, LouvainEnqute
Paris1977,foran examination
ofthesenseofthecondemnation.
11"Gegen diese Anschauungwird ein neues Menschenbild
bzw. eine neue
diediesbezglichen
sichniederinder
Psychologie
konzipiert;
Bemhungen
schlagen
derSeeleals einemhierarchischen
als 'regnum',
undals einem
Vorstellung
Gefge,
Mikrocosmos"
(Stadter,
57).
12Stadter,
58.
63

00:33:47 AM

antidote to the Aristotelian views that the will is a passive power

moved by the known good and that the intellecthas the power of command {imprium).
If the will is king and rulerand its act ofwillingcommands all the otherpowers, includingthe intellect,so thatthe will cannot be prevented fromwilling or coerced to will, while the intellect
merelyserves as a counselor, then the will enjoys the autonomous rule
that makes it the absolute monarch of the soul.
However, Stdter is not correctin supposing that this image of the
will as king and ruler arose in the context of the reaction to
Aristotelianism consequent upon the condemnation of 1277. The
image is found in its fullydeveloped state much earlier in the century
in the writingsof William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris from 1228
until his death in 1249. 13
William became a master in theologyby 1223 at the Universityof
Paris. His principalwork is the mammothMagisterium
divinaleetsapieritiale, which includesDe trinitate
, De universo
, De anima>De virtutibus
, and
otherworkswhichhad, prior to this century,been regarded simplyas
independent works.14
There are at least three passages in which William develops the
image of the will as king or ruler. In De anima he maintains that the
44
will has the power of command ( imprium
) and cannot be prevented
against its will fromits proper operation, which is to will."15 The con44
cupiscible and irascible powers that we share with animals are not
free and are not in theirown power ( nequesuae potestatis)
so that they
can turn themselves aside or restrain themselves from their proper
4
actions, or in any way controlthemselves," but the will is 'most free
and in its own power in everyway" with regard to the act of willing.16
To explain the nature and nobilityof the human soul, William says,
thehumansoulbearsthelikeness
ofa well-ordered
and well-established
city,
becausethewillis present
initas kingandruler(rexetimperator
), theintellective
or reasoning
whilethelowerpowers,
theirascipoweris itscounselor,
namely,
and movingpowers,thatis to say,thosewhichcarryout
ble,concupiscible,
13ForWilliam's
lifeandworks,
cf.William
TheTrinity
Princi, orTheFirst
ofAuvergne:
translated
R. J. Teskeand F. C. Wade,Milwaukee1989,1-5.
ple,
by
'
14Cf.JosefKramp,Des Wilhelm
vonAuvergne
divinale'
, in: Gregorianum,
Magisterium
1 (1920),538-84and 2 (1921),42-78and 174-87.
15De anima
to
, c. II, pt. 14; OperaOmnia
II, 85a. ExceptforDe trinitate
, references
William's
worksaretoGuilelmi
Alverni
Parisiensis
2 vols.,ed. F.
Omnia,
Episcopi
Opera
Hodot,withSupplementum
, ed. BlaiseLe Feron(Orlans-Paris
1674;repr.Frankfurt
am Main 1963).
16De anima
, c. II, pt. 15; OperaOmnia
II, 85a and b.
64

00:33:47 AM

ofthewill
outtheorders
itis tocarry
whoseoffice
arelikeministers,
movement,
andrunners,
overandcommands
them.The sensesareall ministers
thatreigns
whatever
andyonand reporting
theylearnin theouterworld.17
goinghither
This kingdomof the will can be governed well or badly. It is well governed and administered,
andthewillcommands
whenreasoncounsels
byitscounsel,and the
correctly
for
notusurping
lesserministers
anything
merelycarryout thecommands,
hiscomoftheruler,butmerely
themselves
executing
againstthecommand
mand,his command,thatis, whichproceedsfromthe counselof reason
alone....18.
Since the senses are oftendeceitfulmessengers,one must beware of
their counsel, as well as their rule and command. If the will obeys
them contraryto the truth,the will surrendersits kingdom into the
hands of common and wicked servants,and the king himselfbecomes
subject to them.19
William's second use of the image of the will as king is found later
in De anima. William begins by recallingthathe has ascribed to thewill
and has said that "it holds in
a power to command ( virtusimperativa)
the whole human being and in the soul the place of ruler and king."20
Just as a ruler or king surpasses everyone else in the kingdom "in
'
power, dignity,office,and excellence,' so the will holds royal power
in the kingdom of the soul. The will, then, should "by the rightand
law ofnature" {jure.. . etlegenaturae)rule all else in itskingdom.21Moreover, William insists that the intellectivepower is subject to the will
in servitudeby the same rightand law of nature:
itcanat [thewill's]comForthisreason[theintellective
power]doeseverything
toargue,toinquire,
it tothink,
mand.Forexample,
whenthewillcommands
to deliberate,
itnecessarily
has to do eachofthese,justas counselors
haveto
orkingdom.
ofhisempire
assista kingorrulerbythelawandright
Theycannot
refuse
tocarry
outallthosethings
attheking'scommand
andorder.Otherwise,
andwrongfully
toward
him.Hence,bytheright
andlaw
theywouldactunjustly
ofnature,
mindorreasonservesthispowerandis subject
toitas itsinferior
and
as itsservant.22
Thus William makes it clear thatthe will is the highestpower in the
soul by reason of the will's royal power of command. The intellective
power can and should play an advisoryrole, and the will should follow
17De anima
II, 85b and 86a.
, c. II, pt. 15; OperaOmnia
18De anima
II, 86a.
, c. II, pt. 15; OperaOmnia
19Cf. De anima
, c. II, pt. 15; OperaOmnia
II, 86a.
20De anima
II, 95a.
, c. III, pt.8; OperaOmnia
21De anima
, c. III, pt.8; OperaOmnia
II, 95a and b.
22De anima
, c. III, pt.8; OperaOmnia
II, 95b.
65

00:33:47 AM

the advice of reason ratherthan of the senses or lower appetites. But

the will can command the intellectivepower; the intellectivepower
cannot command the will.
In De uirtutibus
, William uses the image of the will as king over the
powers of the soul a third time:
The willis present
in thehumanmindlikea rulertowhomall aresubjectand
whomall obey.Knowledge
andotherthings
ofthatsortare
(scientiae
), memories
likecounselors
whichcan onlysuggestand urgeadvantages
and pointout
butcannotcommand
orcarryoutanything.
The members
dangersin actions,
andlowermotive
arelikeministers
andmereexecutors
ofthecommands
powers
or ordersofthisruler.The external
sensesarelikemessengers
or runners
that
whattheysee and hearin theexternal
worldto thecounselors
andthe
report
ruler.Itisclearthatthegoodorbadadministration
ofallthisliesinthegoodness
or badnessofthisruler....23
William not merely used the image of the kingdom of the soul in
which the will is king and ruler; he also saw the whole world as a
kingdom in which God is king and ruler. In attemptingto assess the
originalityof William, B. Landry locates it, not in his study of the
philosophers or in his vast erudition, but in his intellectualtemperament and extraordinarilyrich imagination. His ebullient imagination
led him, Landry claims, to think of God as a living and abundant
source fromwhom all things flow, thus making his own Avicebron's
image of the source of life (fonsvitae).2*William, in turn, thoughtof
human souls as sources of life, though sources filledby God until they
overflow.25William's rich imagination was also, Landry claims,
stronglyinfluenced by his contact with the French monarchy. "He
came to Paris, and he was overwhelmedby the gloryof the Capetian
monarchy. He conceived God in the image of a king of France."26
Regardless of whether or not William was influencedby the French
monarchy, he does say:
Sinceeverygoodkingis an exampleandlikeness
ofthefirst
andsupreme
king,
whois theblessedCreator,
willnecessarily
be an
everywell-organized
kingdom
ofthatkingdom....27
exampleandlikeness
23De virtutibus
, c. Ill; OperaOmnia
I, 112aH.
24B. Landry,'L'originalit
de Guillaume
de la
, in: Revue d'histoire
d'Auvergne'
3 (1929),441-63,here454-5.
philosophie,
25"Ipsaeanimaehumanaefontes
vitaesunt,etpraesentia
Creatoris
inipsisimplentis
eas usquead redundantiam
De anima,
antedictam."
c. V, pt.24; Opera
Omnia
II, 152.
26Landry,463 (mytranslation).
Louis IX (SaintLouis) was bornin 1215and
becamekingundertheregency
ofhismother,
BlancheofCastilein 1226at thedeath
ofhisfather,
LouisVIII, whoreigned
from1223-1226.
De anima
Hence,William's
and De virtutibus
wereprobably
written
ofBlanche,whenLouis
duringtheregency
was stillin histeens.
27De universo
II-II, c. cxii;OperaOmnia
I, 964bF.
66

00:33:47 AM

Furthermore,he argues against a pluralityof worlds by once again

invokingthe image of a kingdom or royal palace:
It was, then,morefitting
thattheCreatorcreateone worldthatcontained
thesame
thanthathe createmanysmallworldswhichcontained
everything
manprefers
tobuild
as parts....You see toothateveryrichor powerful
things
forhimself
andhisfamily...
rather
thanmanysmallones.Moreonedwelling
is wholeand conover,thereis moregloryfortheCreatorthathiskingdom
tinuousthanscattered....28
Similarly, to illustrate the governance of the world by divine providence, William uses the image of the royal palace:
Ifyouwantanother
ofthegovernance
andcareoftheCreator,
consider
example
a royalhousewell-ordered
in everyrespect,
and first
theelders,i.e., thewise,
thetreasurers;
thedispensers
theking;thenthejudges;thirdly,
fourth,
assisting
thechamberlains....29
oftheroyalriches;fifth,
As the king governs and cares foreverythingin the royal palace, the
Creator governs the world, ' 'since the whole world is like the house
of the Creator and his royal palace."30
Hence, there is in William a triple analogy between God as king
and ruler of the world, and a human king and his kingdom, and the
will as king and ruler of the soul. God, the human king, and the will
each have in theirrespectivekingdoms the royal power of command
{imprium).The analogy between the will as king and God as king is
strikinglyclear in William's comparison of the power of the will with
the omnipotence of the Creator. William calls the power of the will
'4
4'most like the
mightof God." The will does everythingby its command, that is, by willing,just as the omnipotentCreator does, whose
word those things which are as well as those which are not must
obey....31 In fact,William describes the will's freedomas such that "it
cannot be prevented from its first,immediate and proper activity,
which is willing, and it cannot be forced to it against its will...," at
least if its willingis more than a velleity.32But that descriptioncomes
remarkablyclose to William's definitionof divine omnipotence in De
where he says:
trinitatey
be forced
The omnipotence
ofthefirst
onemeansthathecanneither
powerful
from
todo whathedoesnotwillnorbe prevented
doingwhathewills,andthis
is theliberty
ofhismagnificence.33
28De universo
I, 611aD.
I-I, c. xv; OperaOmnia
29De universo
III-I, c. xiv;OperaOmnia
I, 777bD-778aE.
30De universo
I, 778aE.
III-I, c. xiv; OperaOmnia
31Deanima
Omnia
II, 96a,whereheseemstoalludetoRom4:17.
, c. III, pt.8; Opera
32De anima
, c. III, pt. 8; OperaOmnia
II, 96a.
33De trinitate
AnEdition
: De triniiaie:
, c. IX, 59,in William
oftheLatinText
ofAuvergne
an Introduction
with
, Toronto1976;101,in theEnglishtranslation.
67

00:33:47 AM

Stadter pointed to Plato, Aristotleand the Bible as sources forthe

images of the soul as a kingdom and of the will as king. Can one suggest more proximate sources for the image in William? Landry, of
course, has pointed to William's fertileimagination and especially his
contactwithLouis IX. But William also offerssome otherclues, which
may indicate more proximate literarysources than those that Stdter
has suggested.
First of all, for the image of the world as the kingdom of God,
William explicitlyrefersto Apuleius. In answering the question of
how the Creator can rule and care forsuch a multiplicityand diversity
of things in the world, William attributesto Apuleius a comparison
between God and a king. He says:
As a kingorleaderrulesan armyofcountless
andat thesoundofthe
warriors,
somerushto arms,othersto horses,and stillothersto machines
of
trumpet
war...so onesignalfrom
theCreatorrulesthewholemultitude
ofcreatures
as
iftheindividual
natures
hearor perceive
him....34
Secondly, William mentions in a rare autobiographical note that,
when he was stilla young man, thereoccurred to him as he pondered
the functionsof the various angelic orders
thethought
ofa well-organized
andproperly
andof
arranged
earthly
kingdom
theroyalfamily.
Itoccurred
tomethattherelatives
andcompanions
oftheking
ofmenwhomustconstandy
the
oughttobe madeup ofthreeorders
accompany
king.35
William goes on to specifynine classes of men, who correspondto the
nine choirsof angels, divided into threeorders, mentionedby PseudoDionysius.36Hence, in his youthWilliam came to the idea of comparing the functionsof the angels to the functionsof various servantsin
the royal court, and he clearly was familiarwith the work of PseudoDionysius.37 Thirdly, William refersto "one of the wiser and holy
34De universo
Omnia
doesnotquotedirectly;
howIII-I, c. 14;Opera
I, 776aG.William
seemstobe toDe mundo
XXX. Cf.Apule
: Opuscules
ever,thereference
Philosophiques
"
etFragments
ilrex
omnium
etpater
, ed.J. Beaujeu,1973,149.ThereApuleius
compares
to a military
leaderwhodirects
all thevariousactivities
ofbattle.
35De universo
c. cxii;OperaOmnia
964aG.
II-II,
I,
36Cf.Decoelesti
hierarchia
: La Hirarchie
Cleste.
Sources
chrVI, 2,in:DenysVAropagite
tiennes
58. Ed. R. Roques,G. Heil,andM. de Gandillac,
Paris1958.The division
oftheninechoirsintothreeordersis characteristic
ofDionysius.
37Williamrefers
to Dionysius
in De universo
Omnia
II-II, c. 112; Opera
I, 963aD,as
thesourcefortheChristian
fortheGreeksand thenfortheLatins,of
people,first
theknowledge
oftheangelicorders;he mentions
thatthisholymanwastaught
this
bySt. Paul.
68

00:33:47 AM

teachers of the Christians" and to "the previously mentioned wise

man of the Christian people." In the firstcase he mentions this wise
man's comparisonbetween a king about to build a cityand God's providential governance of the world.38In the second case the wise man
said:
as ifin theuniversal
comesaboutin thewholeuniverseof things,
Nothing
thatdoesnotproceedfromtheintelligible
courtofthesovereign
ruler
republic,
or byallowing
or commanding
or permitting....39
bywilling
(imperator
), either
I have so farbeen unable to identifyeitherof these references,though
William clearly refersto some previous Christian author.
With regard to the image of the will as king over the powers of the
human soul, William also provides some hints. First, William says
that the act of willingdoes not arise fromthe will "in a natural manner, that is, in the manner of a servant."40 William knows that
Avicenna had said that a natural cause "does not act throughchoice,
but in the manner of a servant."41Furthermore,William held thatthe
knowledge of the soul in his De animawas not part of natural science,
since the soul in its higher functionsis above nature.42 Hence, by
implication,the will does not act naturallyor as a servant, but as the
master or ruler, preciselybecause it is above nature.
Secondly, William appeals to Aristotle's statementthat "the soul
gives commands, while the body is its minister."43William himself
goes on to say thatthe soul's act of commanding is its willing and that
it commands its intellectivepart "to think, investigate, dispute."44
Though William begins his De anima with the Aristoteliandefinition
of the soul, he interpretsAristotle in a very Platonic or, rather,
Avicennian fashion so that the body is no more a part of the human
being than the horse he rides or the house he lives in.45 Indeed, he
38De universo
II-II, c. XIV; OperaOmnia
I, 778bH.
39De universo
II-II, c. XIV; OperaOmnia
I, 778aF.
40De virtutibus
, c. IX; OperaOmnia
I, 120aF.
41Cf.Avicenna,
Latinus:
LiberdePhilosophia
Prima
sive
IX, 2, inAvicenna
Metaphysics
- Leiden1983,448.Cf. also
Scientia
DivinaII, ed. S. vanRiet,Louvain-La-Neuve
William's
De trinitate
, c. XI: Switalski,
75; translation,
112,whereWilliamsaysthat
theAristotelians
werecorrect
insayingthat"naturedoesnotactthrough
choiceand
will,butin themannerofa servant."
42De anima
, Prologus;OperaOmnia
II, 95a.
43De anima
Omnia
is tothefifth
book
, c. II, pt. 14; Opera
II, 84b-85a.The reference
oftheTopics128bl6-17,notto thesecondbook,as Williamssays.
44De anima,
c. II, pt. 14; Opera
Omnia
autemei evidenter
II, 85a: "imperat
cogitare,
et intendo
illudnonessenisivelie...."
investigare,
disputare
intelligibiliter:
45Cf. De anima
, c. III, pt. 11; OperaOmnia
II, 101a.
69

00:33:47 AM

appeals to Avicenna's "floating man" hypothesisto show that the

human being is wholly spiritual.46
Finally, William says that a certain wise man has said of human
freedom"nothing is so in our will as the will itself."47Though not a
direct quotation, William's words come very close to Augustine's
statement: "nothing is so in our power as the will itself."48William
could also have got from Augustine the image of the senses as
messengers.49Hence, given his veryAvicennian understandingof the
body-soul relation,along withAristotle'sstatementthatthe soul commands the body, and Augustine's views of the senses as messengers
and of the will as autonomous, William could easily have constructed
the image of the will as king over the powers of the soul from the
sources he acknowledges.
Conclusion
In this paper I have shown that the image of the will as king and
ruler over the other powers of the soul did not originate in the antiAristotelian reaction of the late thirteenthcentury,but was already
found in the writingsof William of Auvergne in the firstthirdof the
century.I have elsewheresuggestedthatWilliam of Auvergne was the
source forsome of the argumentsof the Franciscan school against the
eternityof the world.50On the basis of the presentstudyit seems likely
that William was also the source forthe image of the will as king and
ruler in the middle Franciscan school in the final quarter of the century.Since the image of the will as king and ruler implies that the will
is an active power thathas command over the otherpowers in the soul,
including the intellect, William's position on human freedom
anticipates the voluntarismof members of the Franciscan school later
in the century. If that is correct,then the conservativereaction often
referredto as Neo-Augustinianism, may not have been so much a
returnto Augustine as a returnto the thoughtof that earlier bishop
of Paris, William of Auvergne, whose thoughtwas stronglyinfluenced
not merely by Augustine, but also by Avicenna and Avicebron.
46De anima
, c. III, pt. 11; OperaOmnia
II, 101a,as wellas De anima
, c. II, pt. 13;
II, 82b-83a.
OperaOmnia
47De anima
omnia
, c. III, pt. 7; Opera
II, 94b.
48De libero
arbitrio
III, iii,7: "nihiltamin nostrapotestate
quamipsavoluntas."
49De Genesi
ad litteram
XII, xxiv,41: "neque enimcorpussentit,sed animaper
inseipsaquodextrinsecus
utitur
ad formandum
nuntiatur."
corpus,
quovelutnuntio
50Cf. William
ontheEternity
67
, in: The ModernSchoolman,
ofAuvergne
oftheWorld
(1990),187-205.
70

00:33:47 AM

The intellectual atmosphere had certainly changed between the

1220's and 1230's when William was writingand the 1270's or 1280's
of Walter of Bruges and Henry of Ghent. The later authors had to
countera highlydeveloped Aristoteliandoctrineon the relationof the
intellectand the will thatWilliam simplydid not face.51Hence, he did
not explicitlyargue against the idea that the will is a passive power
determinedby the known good. On the otherhand, the doctrineof the
will as an active power of command that is king and ruler over all the
powers of the soul, including the intellect, was clearly present in
William, along with the analogy between the soul as kingdom of the
will and the world as the kingdom of God.
Milwaukee, Wisconsin
MarquetteUniversity
51In fact,Williamcomplains
about
havesaidalmostnothing
thattheAristotelians
c. III, pt. 7; OperaOmnia
thewill.Cf. De anima,
II, 95a.

71

00:33:47 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
What Am I ThinkingAbout?
and PeterAureol on IntentionalObjects
Duns
Scotus
John
DOMINIK PERLER

1. The problemof intentionality

My thought that the house needs painting is directed toward the
house; it is aboutthe house, its object. Likewise, my hope that the sun
will shine is aboutthe sunshine, and my beliefthatthe chimera is white
is aboutthe white chimera. Intellectiveacts such as thinking,hoping,
and believing have one featurein common: theyare intentional,i.e.,
directed toward something. It would be erroneous to say 'I am just
thinking,but thereis nothingI am thinkingabout' or 'I have a hope,
but thereis nothingI am hoping for.' The object I am thinkingabout
may be loosely defined,and the aim of my hope may be vaguely fixed,
so that I may have some difficultyin giving an exact descriptionof
what I am thinkingabout or hoping for. Nevertheless,thereis always
somethingtoward which my thinkingor my hoping is directed. Even
if the object of my intellectiveact does not exist in reality,I directmy
act toward something. For instance, although there are no chimeras,
I can thinkabout a chimera and believe that it is white. So it seems
that the object of my intellectiveact cannot simply be identifiedwith
or reduced to an extramentalobject. By virtue of its "directedness"
or "aboutness" my act establishes a relationshipwith a peculiar kind
of object. But what kind of object? Is therealways such a peculiar kind
of object, even if I direct my act toward existingthings?And how is
the cognitive relationshipwith this object established?
Puzzled by these questions, late medieval philosopherseagerly discussed the problem of intentionality.They paid particularattentionto
the ontological and epistemological questions, analyzing (i) the
ontological status of the object of a directedintellectiveact and (ii) the
way this object is produced in the cognitive process.
Focusing on these two questions, I want to presentand discuss the
authors: John Duns Scotus
positions of two early fourteenth-century
and Peter Aureol. Of course, the medieval debate was not limited to
72

00:34:09 AM

these authors. I confine myselfto presenting some facets of a long

discussion which had its origin in the Arabic commentarieson Aristotle (mostly in those on De anima) and was continued throughoutthe
entire scholastic period.1
2. JohnDuns Scotus
on theSentences
In his Commentary
Scotus raises the problem of what
for
a
the
basis
cognitiverelationship.2If I know x and thereprovides
fore have a cognitive relationship with x, what is x? One might be
inclined to answer that in every cognition (except self-cognition)x is
an extramentalthing, which has its own existence. Such an answer
seems to be obvious, for Scotus takes the cognition of a stone as his
paradigm. This cognitionconsists, roughlyspeaking, of two acts: the
sensitiveact of perceiving (seeing, touching, etc.) the extramental
act of representingthe extramentalstone.3
stone, and the intellective
But Scotus points out that even somethinglacking existence can be
the object of a cognition. He may have in mind the cognitionof fictive
entities.Although a chimera does not exist in reality,I can establish
a cognitive relationship with a chimera when I imagine an animal
compounded of a lion, a goat, and a snake, thus directingmy intellective act toward a chimera. So it is not an extramentalthing, but an
imagined one, which directlyprovides the basis for a cognitive relationship. Scotus may also have in mind the cognition of something
thatdoes not exist anymore and will never exist again. Let us assume
1 Foranoverview,
seeP. Engelhardt,
Intentio
derPhilosophie,
Wrterbuch
, in:Historisches
ed. J. Ritterand K. Grnder,
vol. 4, Baseland Stuttgart
1976,466-74,and C.
Intentions
andImpositions
Medieval
PhilosoKnudsen,
, in: TheCambridge
History
ofLater
A. Kenny,
, ed. byN. Kretzmann,
1982,479-95.On the
phy
J. Pinborg,
Cambridge
ancient
ofthemedieval
seeR. Sorabji,From
Aristotle
toBrendiscussions,
background
tano:TheDevelopment
, in: OxfordStudiesin Ancient
oj theConcept
ofIntentionality
Volume,9 (1991),227-59.
Philosophy.
Supplementary
2 Ordinatio
I, dist.36, q.u., nn. 26ff.(VaticanaVI, 281ff.
I, dist.36,
) and Lectura
willbe basedmostly
on the
q.u., nn.23ff.(VaticanaXVII, 468ff.).
Mypresentation
Ordinatio
between
1300and 1304.See C. Balie,TheLifeand
, onwhichScotusworked
Works
DunsScotus,
in:John
DunsScotus
1265-1965
, ed.J. K. RyanandB. M.
ofJohn
D.C. 1965,1-27(especially
andLecBonansea,
Washington
16-21).FortheOrdinatio
turaI willuse thecriticaleditionprepared
Vatican
Scotistica,
by theCommissio
1950ff.( = Vaticana).ForScotus'sotherworksI willrefer
totheWaddingedition,
Paris1891ff.(=
3 NotethatsuchaWadding).
has theform'I havea cognition
ofx' andnot'I have
cognition
a cognition
thatx is F.' Cognition
inthisbasicform
isdirected
a simpleobject,
toward
nottowardsomething
expressed
bya proposition.
73

00:34:09 AM

that God, by virtue of his absolute power, destroys all the stones
existingin the world.4In that case no human cognitionof a stone can
be based on the perception of an existing extramentalstone. Nevertheless, a human being could remember what a stone is and, therefore,directhis or her intellectiveact toward such a rememberedstone.
It is clear fromboth examples, imagination and memory, that not
every cognitive relationship is directly founded on an extramental
thing. Admittedly,there is an indirectfoundation,forone can make
up an animal compounded of a lion, a goat, and a snake only if one
knows what each of these threeanimals is in extramentalreality.And
afterGod's destructionof all stones, one is able to have a cognition
of a stone only if one can remember an existing stone perceived
earlier. But in neitherof the two cases is an actuallyexistingextramental thing the immediate object toward which the intellectiveact is
directed.
Taking into account cases of this sort, Scotus claims that one does
not establisha cognitiverelationshipwith an existingthing,but rather
with somethingproduced by the intellectwhich, in contrastto a real
being, is an intelligiblebeing (esse intelligibile
).5 This claim involves a
host of problems. First,it is not clear what an intelligiblebeing is supposed to be. Is it a mental entityor some otherkind of entity?Second,
one may ask in what circumstancesthe intellectproduces an intelligible being: only when the intellecthas a cognitive relationshipwith
something non-existing(e.g., a chimera, a destroyed stone), or in
every cognition?
Scotus does not provide a detailed answer to these questions but
only gives some hints- hints,however, thatsparked an intensedebate
in the fourteenthcentury. As regards the ontological problem, he
4 On God'sabsolute
Deiabsoluta)
whichis onlyboundtotheprinciple
power(potentia
see Ordinatio
ofnon-contradiction,
I, dist.44, q.u., n. 7 (VaticanaVI, 366).On the
andon itsimpactonphilosophy,
seeE. Randi,
ofthistheological
theory
background
Powers
andOrdained
A Scotist
Between
God'sAbsolute
, in: From
WayofDistinguishing
to Wyclij
Ockham
, ed. A. Hudsonand M. Wilks,Oxford1987, 43-50;W. J.
A History
andOrdained
and Volition.
ofAbsolute
oftheDistinction
Capacity
Courtenay,
Power
, Bergamo1990.
5 Ordinatio
I, d. 36,q.u., n. 28(VaticanaVI, 281-82):"Quia sialiquidnonsit,potest
nonpropter
eiussiveexsistentia
a nobisintelligi
eius),ettarnen
(ethocsiveessentia
vel
exsistenessentiae
verum
esse
illud
habeat
nostram
intellectionem
quod
ponitur
- interintellectum
et nostrum,
divinum
tiae;necestdifferentia
aliqua- ut videtur
iliaintelligibilia
inesseintelligibili,
divinus
producit
quoadhoc,nisiquodintellectus
esse
nosternonproducit
primo.Sed si istudesse nonestex se talequod requirit
inaliquoessesimpliciter."
illudintaliesse'nonestproducere
simpliciter,
'producere
74

00:34:09 AM

holds that the intelligiblebeing is indeed a peculiar kind of entity.In

contrastto an extramentalbeing it has no real existence but only a
status he calls "diminished existence" ( esse deminutum
).6 So the
intelligiblebeing seems to lack full-fledgedexistence. Is it a kind of
"half-pint-being"? Scotus recognizes that one might be tempted to
in this way and hastens to add that
interpretthe esse deminutum
'diminished* is not to be understood quantitatively, as partigli
is ratherto be taken as existencein a cerexistence.The essedeminutum
tain respect {essesecundumquid), opposed to existence absolutely (esse
simpliciter).Referring to a well-known example from Aristotle, he
explains thisopposition as follows:An Ethiopian who has a black skin
can be called white, but only with respect to his white teeth. In
limitingthe denomination of 'white' in this respectwe are not saying
that we limit the intensityof the whiteness. We may say that he is
whitewiththe highestdegree of whiteness,but only withrespectto his
teeth.7
Scotus holds that the diminished existence of the intelligiblebeing
is to be taken in the same way, for it is also existence in a certain
respect. A stone taken in itselfhas existence absolutely. A stone considered as an intelligiblebeing, however, has existence in a certain
respect; it exists qua intelligiblebeing only insofar as it is the object
of an intellectiveact. That is why it has an objective or intentional
existence ( esse obiectivum/intentionale).8
Nevertheless, it is the entire
stone with all its features(color, shape, size, etc.) and not a kind of
"half-pint-stone"which is the object of an intellectiveact.
6 See Ordinatio
I, dist.36,q.u.,
I, dist.36,q.u., n. 33 (Vaticana
284)andLectura
'VI,
diminutum*
has Arabic
essedeminutum!
n. 26 (VaticanaXVII, 468). The expression
andMeaning
A Noteon its Origin
, in:
origins;see A. Maurer,Ens diminutum:
MediaevalStudies,12 (1950),216-22.
7 See Ordinatio
I, dist.36, q.u., nn.33-35(VaticanaVI, 284-85).Scotus'sexample
inthe
ofthisandsimilar
stemsfrom
examples
Soph.el.5 (167a).On thebackground
on
andCommentaries
on fallacies,
see S. Ebbesen,Commentators
medievalliterature
on
andMedieval
Ancient
A Study
Aristotle's
Elenchi.
Writings
ofPost-Aristotelian
Sophistici
vol. 1, 59-77).
Fallacies
, 3 vols.,Leiden1981(especially
8 Ordinatio
nostri'a
I, dist.36,q.u., n. 47 (VaticanaVI, 289):"... motiointellectus
reducitur
ad ipsumintellectum
divinum,
percuius'esse
quiditatibus
intelligibilibus'
obiectivum
..." Thefunciliaobiectahabentessesecundum
quid,scilicet
simpliciter'
in theproduction
oftheobjective
existence
shallbe distionofthedivineintellect
cussedbelow.Ordinatio
I, dist.3, pars1, q. 4, n. 260(VaticanaIII, 158):"... obiecnon habet'esse' reale sed tantum
tumin quantumhabet'esse' in intellectu,
- igiturnonestcapaxalicuiusaccidentis
realis."(The editors'use of
intentionale,
mention
theterm
commasmaybe misleading
inverted
here.Scotusdoesnotsimply
nordoeshe use it in a metaphorical
I, dist.3, pars1,
way.)See also Lectura
q. 3, n. 188(VaticanaXVI, 300).
75

00:34:09 AM

The distinctionbetween the thingtaken in itselfand the thingtaken

in its diminished or objective existence can be drawn forevery cognition, because every intellectiveact, whether it deals with something
existingor non-existing,is directedtoward a thinginsofaras thisthing
is the intellect'sobject. The differencebetween cognitionsof a real and
of a fictivethingconsistsin the factthatin the firstcase thereis a thing
in itselfand a thing as the object of the intellect. In the second case
thereis only a thingtaken as the object of the intellectwithouta direct
foundation in reality.9
But how can the intellecthave an intelligiblebeing as the object of
its act? There is obviously a disanalogy between the example of the
white Ethiopian and intelligiblebeing. In the case of the Ethiopian,
the being in a certain respect applies to a part of him, and the
paradigmatic relationship between being in a certain respect and
being absolutely is to be understood as the relationshipwhich obtains
between a part and the whole. In the case of the stone, on the other
hand, the being in a certain respect applies to the whole stone insofar
as it is the object of an intellectiveact. In this second case the relationship between the two existential statuses is to be understood as the
relationshipbetween dependent and independent existence.
In lightof this disanalogy, the comparison of intelligiblebeing with
the white Ethiopian appears to be misleading. We cannot explain
intelligible being simply by referringto a part and a whole. The
dependent intelligiblebeing is something that exists in additionto an
independent real being. A part, on the other hand, is not something
that exists in addition to the whole. Scotus seems to be aware of this
difficulty,forhe acknowledges that the intellectneeds to produce the
intelligiblebeing.10 But to do that it needs a means, the intelligible
species ( species intelligibilis
), whose function may be explained as
follows:When someone has a sense perceptionof a thing,say a stone,
he or she firstreceives a sensible species, a kind of visual image of that
thing, in the sensitive part of the soul. On the basis of this sensible
9 The crucialdifference
between
thesetwocasesis one ofScotus's mainreasons
nottheonlyone- forintroducing
thedistinction
between
intuitive
however,
cognition(i.e., cognition
ofpresent
and existing
and abstractive
things)
cognition
(i.e.,
awareness
of thingsin abstraction
fromtheirpresenceand existence).
See A. B.
DunsScotus
onIntuition
Wolter,
, Memory
, andOurKnowledge
, inidem:The
ofIndividuals
DunsScotus,
ed. M. McCordAdams,IthacaandLondon
Philosophical
Theology
ofJohn
1991,98-122.
10See note5 above.
76

00:34:09 AM

species, he or she is able to produce an intelligiblespecies, a kind of

cognitive image, in the intellectivepart of the soul.11 One can fully
representa stone only by virtueof this intelligiblespecies. Scotus harshlycriticizessome of his contemporaries(e.g., Henry of Ghent) who
deny the existence of an intelligiblespecies. He adduces two reasons,
among others, why such a species is necessary.
(1) By means of the sensible species in the sensitive soul one
cognizes a thing in the way it is given in a particular situation ( sub
rationesingularis).For instance, one cognizes a stone present in full
daylight.Such a cognition is indeed the firstcognition, Scotus holds,
because it is immediatelybased on sense perception. Yet, it is not the
onlypossible cognition. By producing an intelligiblespecies one is able
to abstract fromthe particular circumstancesin which the perception
occurs, and to cognize a thing independentlyof the particular situation ( sub rationeuniversalis).That is, one is able to abstract from the
specificlight in which the stone is seen and to cognize the stone as it
is independent of the perceptual conditions in a given situation.12
(2) The existenceof an intelligiblespecies is also necessary in order
to have the immediate presence of the cognized object in the intellect.
If we only had the sensible species, the object would only be present
in the sensitivepart of the soul, and the intellectivepart would relyon
an inferiorpart for a cognition. Such a dependence on the sensitive
soul is unacceptable, Scotus claims, because the sensitivesoul is only
contingentlyactive and only contingentlyconnected withthe intellect;
it may produce a sensible species and thus present an object to the
intellect,or it may not. To preservethe perfectactivityof the intellect,
the intellectmust have its own object independentlyof the activityof
the sensitive soul. The intelligiblespecies, produced by the intellect
and existing in the intellect,is such an object.13
11Scotusexpounds
in Ordinatio
hisspeciestheory
I, d. 3, pars3, q. 1 (VaticanaIII,
libr.
and
in
Arist.
De
anima
,
Quaestiones
qq. 14and 17(WaddingIII, 549super
209-44)
Foran
ofthesequestions
is notfirmly
53 and 575-93;theauthenticity
established).
andCertitude
in theAgeofOckham.
see K. H. Tachau, Vision
introduction,
Optics,
andtheFoundations
1250-1345
, Leiden1988,62-81,andR. E.
ofSemantics
Epistemologa,
inthePsychology
, in: The Monist,49
Dumont,TheRoleofthePhantasm
ofDunsScotus
(1965),617-33.
12See Ordinatio
I, dist.3, pars3, q. 1, nn. 351-53(VaticanaIII, 211-13,especially
stone.
oftheindividual
textus
Notethatbothspeciesprovidea cognition
interpolate).
' does notreferto a universal
'subratione
theexpression
universalis
In thiscontext,
feature
or natureinhering
in thething.
13See Ordinatio
I, dist.3, pars3, q. 1, 366-68(VaticanaIII, 222-24).
77

00:34:09 AM

Scotus's firstargument looks more compelling than his second, for

even ifwe grantthatthe intellectneeds the intelligiblespecies in order
to have its own object, we have to admit that the intelligiblespecies
is based on a sensible species. The intellectcannot just make up an
intelligiblespecies ex nihilobut abstracts it on the basis of a sensible
species which in turn is based on perception. Even in the case of the
cognition of somethingfictive,say a chimera, the intelligiblespecies
is based on threesensible species, namely those of a snake, a lion, and
a goat. The intellectdoes not purely make up the intelligiblespecies
of a chimera but compounds it by abstractingfromthe three sensible
species. Thus, if the sensitivesoul only contingentlyproduces a sensible species, the intellectivesoul also contingentlyproduces an intelligible species. There is no reason why the intellectshould act with full
perfection,disregardingthe activityof the inferiorparts of the soul.14
The production of the intelligiblespecies in the intellectis ratherone
step in a cognitive process that begins with sense perception and
culminates in intellection.15
Whether we consider Scotus's arguments to be convincing or not,
it is clear that he argues forthe existence of intelligiblespecies. Now
we mightask how such a species is related to intelligiblebeing. When
introducingthe intelligiblespecies, I said that this species is a means
that the intellectproduces in order to have access to the intelligible
being, which itselfneeds to be produced. But now intelligiblebeing
seems to be nothingother than the intelligiblespecies itselfthat exists
in the intellectand functionsto representthe thing.
Yet, such an identificationoverlooks an important point. Considered froman ontological point of view, the intelligiblespecies is an
accident of the intellect.16It belongs to the category of quality and
14Scotusexplicitly
iftheintellect
were
saysthattherewouldbe an imperfection
on thesensitive
dependent
I, dist.3, pars3, q. 1, n. 368
partofthesoul.Ordinatio
autemphantastica
intellectui
(VaticanaIII, 224):"... virtus
coniungitur
contingenter
inquantum
inoperatione
sua dependet
ab alia potentia
est;ergointellectus
potentia
cui contingenter
et ita hoc ponitin eo imperfectionem
coniungitur,
potentiae
vae: nullaautemimperfectio
cogniti
ponendaest in aliqua naturanisinecessitas
in naturatali,- ergotalisimperfectio
nonestponendain intellectu."
appareat
15Of course,senseperception
is notrequired
foreveryinstance
ofan intellection.
One can havean intellection
basedon memory.
In thatcase one reactivates
some
storedintelligible
specieswithout
needinga senseperception.
16In hisdiscussion
oftheroleoftheintelligible
Scotus
speciesinanactofsignification
between
itsontological
statusand itssemantic
function.
He explicitly
distinguishes
holdsthatthespeciesis an accident
ofthesoul.Inprimum
librum
Perihermeneias
Quaestiones
immediate
, q. 2 (WaddingI, 541): "... speciesintelligibilis
significatur
per
78

00:34:09 AM

exists in the intellectas in its subject. This is, of course, a form of

dependent existence,and since the subject is the intellectivesoul, it is
clearlya formof dependent mental existence. It is importantto note,
however, that dependent mental existence does not exclude real
existence. The intelligiblespecies has real existencein the intellectjust
as the color white,an extramentalquality, has real existencein a wall.
The intelligiblebeing, on the other hand, has no real existence. As I
'
'4
pointed out above, Scotus states that it has diminished existence'
(i.e., existence in a certain respect) in contrastto real existence.
Despite thisdifference,the intelligiblebeing seems to share withthe
intelligible species the features of being dependent and mental; it
exists insofaras it is the object of the intellect's act. The intelligible
being clearlydepends on the intellect'sact and is even constitutedby
this act. Therefore,one mightconclude, ifthereis no human intellect
performingan act and constitutingsomethingas its object, thereis no
intelligiblebeing either.
Although this conclusion seems to be obvious, it is fallacious. In a
strictsense, the intelligiblebeing does not have objective existence
because it is the object of a humanintellect.Even if no human being
were performingan intellectiveact, or even ifno human being existed
at all, the intelligiblebeing would still have its objective existence,
because it would stillbe the object of the divineintellect.God primarily
has each thing as his object by producing the intelligible being.
Human beings only secondarily have each thing as their object by
having access to the intelligible being which is located in God's
intellect.17
At firstsight,this argument seems merelyto be a theological thesis
with no philosophical relevance. But considered closely, it turns out
scilicet
estquidinse accidens,
autinquantum
consideratili*,
vocem,sedilladupliciter
rem." For an analysisof this
informans
animam;aut inquantum
repraesentat
&
, in: MedievalPhilosophy
passage,see D. Perler,DunsScotuson Signification
Theology
(forthcoming).
17See note5 aboveandOrdinatio
I, dist.3, pars1,q. 4, n. 266(VaticanaIII, 162-63):
etactusuodathuic
istaactusuoin 'esseintelligibili,'
"... intellectus
divinus
producit
obiecti- per
dateistalemrationem
obiecto'esse' taleetillitale,etperconsequens
Et
crtam.
movent
intellectum
ad
rationes
quodproprie
posset
cognitionem
quas
post
'videreinlucequialuxestcausaobiecti,'apparet
nostrum
diciintellectum
persimile,
cumtamenilludlumen
inlumineintellectus
dicimur
agentis,
intelligere
quiaproprie
cuiusobiectum
in actusuovelvirtute
obiectum
nonsitnisicausaactivavelfaciens
See alsoLectura
velutrumque."
I, dist.3, pars1,q. 3, n. 191(VaticanaXVI,
movet,
I, dist.36, q.u., n. 27 (VaticanaXVII, 469).
302) andLectura
79

00:34:09 AM

to be an important element of medieval Platonism, which has its

source in Calcidius's translation of the Timaeus and especially in
18
Augustine's Quaestiode ideis. The intelligiblebeings produced by God
and existingin God's intellectare nothingotherthan the eternalforms
or ideas of the mundane things, for each thing in the world has its
intelligiblecounterpartin God's intellect.19In thiscontextit is particularly importantthatthe intelligiblebeing is distinctfromextramental
and human mental entities,reducible to neitherof them. Rather, the
4
intelligiblebeing constitutesa 'thirdrealm" of being located in God's
intellect.
To be sure, Scotus never describes thisrealm explicitly.He does not
introduce a peculiar category of being for intelligible being,
presumably because it would infringeon the Aristotelian table of
categories to which he subscribes.20But his explanation of intelligible
being as the object of God's intellect,i.e., as somethingexistingeternally and independently of the human intellect, clearly betrays a
Platonic background.
Summarizing Scotus's position, we can distinguishthree entities
required for cognition:
, providingthe basis forsense-data and for
(a) some extramental
thing
the productionof species; it is, however, not the immediate object of
a directed intellectiveact;
, produced by and existing in the intellect,
(b) the intelligible
species
which functionsas a means of representingthe thing; it has real,
though mental and dependent existence;
'
'
, having 'diminished" and 'objective"
(c) the intelligiblebeing
existence; it is primarilyproduced by God's intellectand exists eternally in God's intellect.
The relationshipbetween these entitiesmay be explained as follows:
When someone sees a stone, the extramentalstone provides the basis
18See L. M. de Rijk,
Notes
onanImportant
Quaestiode ideis.Some
,
Chapter
ofPlatonism
in: Kephalaion.
Studies
inGreek
anditsContinuation
toProfessor
C. J. de
Philosophy
Offered
andL. M. de Rijk,Assen1975,204-13(onthemedieval
, ed.J. Mansfeld
Vogel
receptionespecially
dansl'usage
dumotidea
208-11);L. M. de Rijk,Untournant
important
chezHenride Gand,andJ. Hamesse,Idea chezlesauteurs
des12eet13e
philosophiques
sicles
Internazionale.
Roma
1989, ed. M. Fattori
, bothin: Idea.VIColloquio
, 5-7gennaio
and M. L. Bianchi,Roma 1990,89-98and 99-135.
19See Ordinatio
Scotusexplicitly
calls
I, dist.35,q.u., n. 40(VaticanaVI, 261)where
theintelligible
to it.
beingideaand ascribeseternalexistence
20See In librum
Praedicamentorum
, q. 2 (WaddingI, 439-42).
Quaestiones
80

00:34:09 AM

forsense-data and forthe productionof a sensible species of the stone,

on the basis of which the agent intellect produces an intelligible
species. In producing the intelligiblespecies, the human intellecthas
"
access to the intelligible stone, which eternally shines" in God's
intellect.21It is a highlycontroversialquestion how this access is to be
explained in detail a question which Scotus carefully analyzes
because he wants to avoid Henry of Ghent's solution that the access
is made possible only through divine illumination. This extensive
analysis shall not be discussed here.22The importantpoint in thiscontextis that Scotus obviously appeals to a thirdentityin explaining the
object of a directed intellectiveact.
But one might ask: Why should we distinguish three distinct
entities?Is it not superfluousto posit the intelligiblebeing as a third
kind of being- a somehow mysterious being beyond and above
extramental and mental beings? And doesn't Scotus lose the
extramentalthingas the object of a cognitionby saying that it is only
the basis forcognition, not the immediate
object of an intellectiveact?
How can I have a cognitionof the extramentalstone itself,given that
it is only the intelligiblestone that I cognize immediately? Some of
these questions were raised and discussed by Peter Aureol.23
3. PeterAureol
Peter Aureol extensivelydiscusses
on theSentences
In his Commentary
nature
of
the
of
the
the question
object of a directed intellectiveact.24

21Ordinatio
I, dist.3, parsprima,q. 4, n. 262 (VaticanaIII, 160): "... dicoquod
et in eis omne
divinihabent'esseintelligibile,'
actuintellectus
omniaintelligibilia
eorumintelligens
ea etvirtute
itaquodintellectus
de eisrelucent,
veritates
intelligens
necessarias."
istasveritates
de eis,videtin eis sicutin obiectis
veritates
necessarias
22See Ordinatio
I, dist.3, parsprima,q. 4 (VaticanaIII, 123-172).
23AureolmayhaveheardScotus,ifhe studiedat theUniversity
ofPans in 1304,
Petrus
desFranziskanerbischofs
inderUniversalienlehre
as R. Dreiling
{DerKonzeptualismus
IIMnster
1913,
nebst
,
Aureoli
Einleitung
biographisch-bibliographischer
d'Auriole)
(Pierre
toPeterAureoli,
ButE. M. Buytaert
super
primm
Scriptum
(introduction
IS) assumed.
outthatthereis only
N.Y. 1952,vol.I, viii-x)pointed
Sententiarum
, St. Bonaventure
ornotAureolworked
Whether
forthisassumption.
evidence
weaktextual
personally
ontheSentences
knewScotus's Commentary
, whichhecitesfrewithScotus,hecertainly
quently.
24Myanalysis
is chiefly
basedon Scriptum
I, dist.9, art.1, anddist.27, pars2, art.
can be
discussions
2. I use themanuscript
Vatican,Borgh.329. Otherimportant
in dist.
foundin dist.9, art.1; dist.23; dist.35, pars1, art.1. On thediscussion
Natalis
Hervaeus
secunda.Radulphus
ZumBegriff
derintention
Brito,
23,seeJ. Pinborg,
81

00:34:09 AM

He fully agrees with Scotus that this object cannot be a singular,

extramentalthing. In arguing forthis thesis, he adduces a new argument, which stems fromhis Aristoteliantheoryof science.25
The intellectiveact cannot be directedtoward an extramentalthing,
not only because of exceptional cases like the cognition of something
fictive(e.g., a chimera) or of somethingnon-present(e.g., a destroyed
stone). All knowledge in the strictAristoteliansense (scientia)would be
impossible if extramentalthingswere the objects of intellectiveacts.
For if these acts were directed toward extramental things, which
clearly are individual, our knowledge would deed with individual
things too, because knowledge is what we gain through intellective
acts. This contradictsAristotle's basic thesis that knowledge, strictly
speaking, is about the universal, not about individuals. For instance,
we could never know that everysum of a triangle's interiorangles is
equal to the sum of two rightangles. We would only be able to say
that the sum of the angles of this particular,extramentaltrianglehere
or of thattrianglethereis equal to the sum of two rightangles, because
we could direct our intellectiveacts only toward this or that triangle.
So we could never make a universal geometricalstatement.Likewise,
we would never be able to forma predication expressing the subordination of a species under a genus. For instance, we would not be
able to say 'I know that a rose is a flower,' but only 'I know that this
rose here is this flower here,' because the intellectiveact would be
directed only toward a particular, extramentalrose.26
To avoid these consequences, Aureol holds that the intellectiveacts
must be directed toward somethingthat presentsthe individual thing

undPetrus
Aureoli
inDiskussion
du Moyen-Age
GrecetLatin,
, in:Cahiersde l'Institut
13 (1974),45-59.For a conciseintroduction,
see also S. Vanni-Rovighi,
L'intenzionalit
dellaconoscenza
secondo
P. Aureolo,
in: L'homme
etsondestin
lespenseurs
du
d'aprs
Actes
dupremier
international
dephilosophie
mdivale
, LouvainandParis
Moyen-Age.
congrs
1960,673-80.
25On thistheory
in general,
seeP. V. Spade,TheUnity
toPeter
ofa Science
According
Aureol
, in: Franciscan
Studies,32 (1972),203-17.
26Scriptum
etdiffinitiones
I, dist.27,pars2, art.2 (f.30Ivb): "Tum,quia scientiae
nonessentde naturis
et universalibus
sedde particularibus
et individuis
simpliciter
etindividua
utparticularia
VII Metaphysicae
et
sunt,quodestcontraPhilosophum
secundoPosteriorum,
vel
qui aitquodscirepossumde omnimulaquodeststerilis,
de omnitriangulo
de hacmulaparticulari.
quodhabettresettarnen
ignorare
[...] Et
ita patetquod rosavel fiosvel triangulus
mentaliter
simpliciter,
quos praesentes
nonsuntparticulares
floresvel rosaevel trianguli
in sua singularitate
experimur,
extra."
proutexistunt
82

00:34:09 AM

to the intellectin a universal way. At firstsight,this act of presenting

seems to be performedby the intelligiblespecies. When I know that
the sum of a triangle's interiorangles is equal to the sum of two right
angles, the intelligiblespecies presentsa trianglein general ( simpliciter
)
to my intellect,whetherI actually perceive a particulartriangleor not.
Likewise, when I know that a rose is a flower,the intelligiblespecies
presentsthe rose in general to my intellect.
Now it seems as if one should identifythe object of an intellective
act with the intelligiblespecies that presents the thing in a universal
way. But Aureol decidedly denies that this is a correctaccount of the
object of an intellectiveact. If it were so, and if the intellectiveacts
did not go beyond the mental entity,we would have no knowledge of
the thingsaround us and would be blind with respect to them.27As
soon as the intelligiblespecies (or some othermental entity)is not only
taken as the means by which one representssomethingin an intellective act, but as the representedobject itself,we fall into the trap of
epistemic solipsism. For then we have to grant that everyone
representshis or her own object, because everyonehas his or her own
mental entity;consequently,everyone has cognitiononly of his or her
own mental entity.
Aureol faces a dilemma. On the one hand, he denies that our
intellectiveacts are directed toward extramentalthings; otherwisewe
would never have knowledge of something in a universal way but
would be confinedto knowledge of particulars. On the otherhand, he
also denies that our intellective acts are directed toward mental
entities;otherwisewe would never have directaccess to the thingsbut
would be imprisoned in our own facultyof cognition. So, what is the
object of our intellectiveacts? The only way out of thisdilemma seems
to be to posit a 4'third being" which is neither extramental nor
mental- a being with 4'objective," "diminished," or "intentional"
existence.
At firstsight,Aureol seems indeed to draw this conclusion, forhe
claims that everyintellectiveact requires an intentionalbeing. But he
hastens to add that this peculiar being has no real existence, that it
does not exist in the intellect,and that it is not the thing which the

27Scriptum
I, dist.27,pars2, art.2 (f.301rb):"Si ergoista[sc.obiectaquaeintellecfuerint
tualiter
actusvelspecies,etibisistitur,
nec
experimur]
numquam
disputamus
de rebusquae suntextraet sumuscaecicircaea."
habemusscientiam
83

00:34:09 AM

intellect contemplates.28The last claim is particularly important.

Aureol denies that the intentionalbeing is a thing sui generistoward
which the intellectis directed.
So, what is the intentionalbeing supposed to be, ifit is not an entity
of its own? Aureol holds thatit is nothingotherthan "the known thing
itselfin a certainobjective existenceinsofaras it functionsto bringthe
intellect'sgrasping[literally:the gaze] to its proper end."29 This claim
needs to be spelled out.
Like Scotus, Aureol speaks about objective existence, but in contrast to Scotus he does not set it apart ontologicallyfromthe thing's
real existence. The objective existencedoes not apply to the thingeternally existing in God's intellect, but rather to the real thing itself
insofar as this thing assumes a certain function, namely to be the
intellect's object. That is why the objective existence is a mode of
being ( modusessendi)of the real thing rather than an existence of its
own.30It would be erroneous to state that thereis, say, a real rose and
in addition to that a rose with objective existence toward which one
directs his or her intellectiveact. The rose with objective existence is
nothingotherthan the real rose insofaras it is the object of the intellective act; it brings the intellect'sactivityto its proper end by directing
the intellecttoward something. In assuming this function,the rose
fixes the directedness or, metaphorically speaking, the "gaze"
(intuitus)of the intellect.
But what, ontologicallyspeaking, is this real rose qua object of the
intellect?It cannot be the particularextramentalrose for,as I pointed
out above, Aureol clearly denies that intellectiveacts deal with something particular. It cannot be the species of a rose either, forAureol
also rejects the view that intellectiveacts deal with somethingpurely
mental. Rather, he takes it to be the real, extramentalthing insofar
as it is presentto the intellectin itsuniversality,not in its particularity.
28Scriptum
sub
affirmative
I, dist.9, art.1 (f. 168ra):"Nuncverooportet
procedere
rem
in
intellectio
Prima
omnis
positam
exigit
quidem
quod
quattuor
propositionibus.
Sed deficiunt
a
de qua istiloquuntur.
et illaestformaspecularis
esseintentionali,
in tribus.Primoquidemquia putantquodhabeatessereale;secundoquia
veritate
velphantasmate;
tertio
in intellectu
dicuntquodestsubiective
quia concedunt
quod
intellectus
ad rescumiliasitveraresquamintellectus
speculator."
perillamprocedat
29Scriptum
emanatet
I, dist.27, pars2, art.2 (f.300vb):"... in omniintellectione
inquodamesseobiectivo
secundum
rescognita
nonaliquidaliudsedipsamet
procedit
intellectus."
habetterminare
intuitum
quod
30Scriptum
non
I, dist.27,pars2, art.2 (f.302vb): "Et itarespositainesseformato
estaliquidaliudquamresextrasubalio modoessendi."
84

00:34:09 AM

For instance,the intentionalrose is a real, extramentalrose insofaras

it is presentto the intellectwith all the universal featuresof a rose. So
therecannot be an intentionalrose withoutthere being an act of the
intellect.For that reason the intentionalbeing is not an entityof its
own, but a mentallydependent one.31But thisdoes not amount to saying that the intentional being is created by the (human or divine)
intellectin addition to the real being. It is rather the real being itself
that appears under a particular modusessendiin the intellectiveact.
That is why Aureol calls the intentionalbeing also an esseconspicuum
32This
etapparens.
being is not somethingattached or supplementedto
the thing,but nothingother than the thing insofar as it is related to
the intellect. Therefore, the real and the apparent being are
"indistinguishablythe same."33
To be sure, what is an " apparent being" is not somethingexisting
onlyin appearance, a kind of mere phenomenal being.34Admittedly,
thereare some entities,e.g. chimeras, which have only intentionalor
apparent existencewithouta directrelationto somethingin extramental reality.And thereare some otherentitieswhich are apparent to the
intellectin another way than theyare in reality. For example, a stick
partlysubmergedin water appears to be broken; or a candle perceived
with one eyeball liftedup appears to be a double candle.35 But the
incongruencebetween real and intentionalbeing in these cases has its
source in an incomplete or false perception. The stick appears to be
broken because one has a distortedperception of the part submerged
in the water, and the candle appears to be double because the two
31Scriptum
estquod resnon
I, dist.9, art.1 (f. 168rb):"Secundaveropropositio
in intellectu."
potesthaberetaleesseapparensnisirationealicuiusrcalisexistentis
NotethatAureoldoesnotdistinguish
thedivineandthehumanintellect
in
between
thiscrucialpassage.So theintentional
ofthehuman
beingdependson theactivity
as wellas on thatofthedivineintellect.
intellect
32See Scriptum
I, dist.9, art.1 (f. 167va) "tertiapropositio."
33Scriptum
estquodresin
I, dist.27,pars2, art.2 (f.302rb):"Ubi considerandum
esseformato
inse aliquidabsolutum
nisiipsamrealitatem.
Unde
positanonincludit
nonponitin numerum
remet suamintentionem
quantumad aliquidabsolutum.
Claudittamenaliquidrespectivum,
videlicet
ut
apparere,
quod nondebetintelligi
affixum
autsuperpositum
illireisicutceteraerelationes,
sedomninointrinsecum
et
adunatum."
indistinguibiliter
34A phenomenalistic
dell'essere
readingwas suggested
by F. Prezioso,La teoria
nellagnoseologia
diPietro
Aureolo
46
, O.F.M. ( + 1322),in: StudiFrancescani,
apparente
15-43.
(1950),
35In Scriptum
I, dist.3, sect.14(ed. Buytaert,
op. cit.,696-97)Aureoladduceseight
betweenrealand intentional
examplesforan incongruence
beings.The examples
arethethirdand fourth.
mentioned
85

00:34:09 AM

eyballs are not parallel. Because of this defectiveperception,the stick

and the candle are present to the intellectin a defectiveway. Consequently, the intellect directs its acts toward a somehow distorted
object. But these are exceptional cases which can be explained as
perceptional errors. If there is a correctperception and if, therefore,
the object is present to the intellectexactly as it is in reality,there is
no incongruence between the real and the intentionalbeing.
4. Conclusions
In introducing the intentional being as a modusessendiof the real
thing, Aureol succeeds in avoiding two dangers that every theoryof
intentionalityhas to face:
First, he escapes from the danger of epistemic solipsism. When
someone thinksabout an object, one does not thinkabout a kind of
mental image, but about the extramentalobject itselfinsofaras this
object is present to the intellect. And when differentpeople think
about an object, they thinkabout one and the same object, although
each one uses his or her own intelligible species to represent the
extramentalobject. That which is representedin the intellectiveact
(the real thingunder a certain mode of being) is carefullyto be distinguished from that by whichthe object is represented(the intelligible
species).
Second, Aureol also escapes fromScotus's multiplicationof entities,
for he clearly states that the intentional being is not an additional
entitybut ratherthe real thingitselfunder a certainmodusessendi.The
thrustof his argument goes in the same directionas Husserl's. Focusing on the intentionalbeing and distinguishingit fromthe particular
thing does notamount to introducinga new categoryof being. Such
an introduction would lead to an absurd doubling of the world.
Husserl says:
the
therealobject(in theeaseofouterperception
"But ifwetry... toseparate
thelatteras
of nature)fromtheintentional
object,
placing
perceived
thing
' to
" immanent'
we arebesetby
as a realfactor,
within
experience
perception
eachother,whereas
mustconfront
thatnowtworealities
thedifficulty
onlyone
and possible.I perceivethething,theobjectofnature,the
oftheseis present
elseis therealobjectoftheperceiving
treethereinthegarden;thatandnothing
A secondimmanent
"intention."
tree,orevenan "innerimage"oftherealtree
thatstandsouttherebeforeme,is nowisegiven,and to supposesucha thing
leadsonlyto absurdity."36
bywayofassumption
36Ideen
undphnomenologischen
zueiner
reinen
, 90,Husserliana
Philosophie
Phnomenologie
transi,
toPurePhenomenology,
Introduction
III/l, The Hague 1976,207-8{Ideas.General
byW. R. BoyceGibson,5thed., Londonand NewYork1969,263).
86

00:34:09 AM

Like Husserl, Aureol is aware of this absurdity and refrainsfrom

44
identifyingthe intentional being with an inner image" and from
to the
postulatinga new entity.That is, he rejects the object-approach
of
this
is
that
The
main
feature
of
approach
intentionality.37
problem
it attemptsto explain the peculiaritiesof mental acts' "aboutness" or
"directedness" as peculiarities in the objects to which such acts are
related. Intentionality is taken to be unique because intentional
objects are supposed to be entities of a special kind, differentfrom
(mental or extramental) entitiesthat enter into non-intentionalrelato the
tions. Contraryto this approach, Aureol chooses an act-approach
problem of intentionality.Intentionalityis taken to be unique not
because intentional objects are peculiar entites, but because intentional acts are of a unique sort. These acts establisha peculiar relationship between the cognizer and the cognized thing, making it possible
that the thing is known under a certain aspect. Yet, this aspect (or
modusesserteli
, as Aureol says) is not a "double" of the real thingbut
in
something the real thing, grasped throughthe intellect's acts.
Although this act-approach looks promising, Aureol hardly succeeds in resolvingall the problems. I will mentionjust two difficulties.
First,it is not clear what should be understood by the modusessendi.
This mode seems to be a propertyconferredon the thingby a directed
intellectiveact- a property,however, that is not added as a distinct
entitybut is already inherentin the thing. How exactly does this act
of conferringoccur? And what impact does the mode have on the
thing?Aureol only says that under this mode the thingis "apparent"
to the intellect,that it brings the intellect's "gaze" to its proper end.
But we need an explanation of these visual metaphors in order to gain
an understandingof how the intellect- presumably a kind of "inner
eye" - can look at the apparent thing.
Second, Aureol claims that the intentionalbeing is the thingtaken
in its universality.What exactly is this universality:all the essential
featuresof a particularthing,or a universal inheringin such a thing?
And how can the universalitybe grasped? How, for instance, am I
and notjust this or that rose when
supposed to grasp a rose simpliciter
I directmy intellectualact toward a rose? An abstractionfromthe particular seems to be required here. But this important step in the
37I borrow
fromD. W. Smithand R. Mclntyre,
theexpression
'object-approach'
A Study
andLanguage
Husserl
andIntentionality.
, Dordrecht
1982,
ofMind,Meaning,
40-61.
87

00:34:09 AM

cognitive process- a step extensivelydiscussed by Husserl, as is well

known- remains unexplained in Aureol' s account.
Perhaps there is such a lack because Aureol' s analysis of intentionality is closely linked to a theory of predication which remains
unexplained. Whereas Scotus is mainly concerned with acts directed
toward simple objects, i.e., acts with the form 'I have a cognition of
X,' Aureol focuses on acts directed toward propositionsthat express
certain predications, i.e., acts with the form 'I know that x is F.' By
claiming that acts of knowledge are directed toward a thing taken in
its universality(e.g., 'I know that this thingis a rose') Aureol presupposes thatwe can predicate a universal of a particular,but he does not
explain how this predication occurs. And he neglectsto spell out how
the complex acts of knowledgeare related to or based on the more simple acts of cognition. What kind of simple cognitiondo I need to have
of a particularthingin order to be able to directmy act of knowledge
toward this thing qua rose, so that I may say 'This thing is a rose'?
Of course, one may answer that this is no problem at all, because in
cognizing a particular thing we always grasp its essence. That is, we
do not need to distinguishbetween simple cognition and predicative
cognition,forin having a simple cognition of this particularthingwe
abstract its essence rose, thus knowing that this thingis a rose. So the
simple cognition includes the grasping of the thing's essence and the
predicative attributionof this essence.
But even ifAureol implicitlyassumes thisessentialisttheory,we are
stillin trouble. Why should therebe an essence, distinguishablefrom
the particular existingthing? And how are we supposed to 44grasp,"
loosely speaking, this essence? The controversieson the definitionof
essence in the late thirteenthcentury make clear that the transition
fromthe simple cognition I have a cognition of this particular x' to
the predicative cognition 'I know that x is F' is crucial and needs to
be explained.
Although Aureol' s explanation of intentionalobjects looks promising, it is not the perfectone. Or it may be perfectonly ifthe problems
I have sketched are taken into account and resolved.38But however
incomplete his explanation may seem, Aureol can certainly be
credited with giving a clear answer to the question of how a directed
38Sincemyanalysis
is basedonlyonsomedistinctions
ofAureol'
s extensive
CommenontheSentences
totheproblems
raisedabove
, itmaywellbe thathegivesan answer
tary
inotherdistinctions.
A comprehensive
ofAureol'
s position
shallonlybe
presentation
is availablein a critical
edition.
possiblewhentheentireCommentary
88

00:34:09 AM

intellectiveact is related to a thing and of what this thingqua known

thing is. He clearly focuses on these epistemological and ontological
issues, much more than on psychologicalproblems (e.g., the problem
of abstraction,or the problem of the productionof species) whichwere
authors. Therefore,as is often
eagerlydiscussed by thirteenth-century
the case in philosophical debates, he may underestimatethe importance of one set of problems by focusingon another. Nevertheless,it
is an achievement to recognize one specific set of problems and to
elaborate a solution, even if this solution does not tell us the whole
storyabout the problem of intentionality.39
Los Angeles
of California
University
39I am grateful
forvaluable
to MarilynMcCordAdamsand NormanKretzmann
ofthispaper.
on earlierdrafts
comments

89

00:34:09 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
WalterBurleighon the Conclusionthat You Are an Ass
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS

The sentence Tu es asinus already plays a role in a collection of

puzzling propositions that were discussed by a certain Riardus
Sophista at the beginningof the thirteenthcentury:namely, under the
, Si dico teesseasinum,
headings Si aliquis dicitte esseasinum,dicitverum
dico verum
and
Tu
non
vere
te
non
esse
asinum.1 That it still
,
potes
negare
enjoyed the attentionof logicians in the seventeenthcenturyis proved
by the factthatArnold Geulincx, in thelast pages of his Logicaof 1662,
extensivelydwelled upon the way in which it is involved in what he
calls the sophismasplendidum.2
In general, the sentence seems to have
been popular as a strikingexample of a proposition that is patently
false and even impossible and absurd, while at the same time the
predicate asinuscould evoke propertiesthatmade the hearer or reader
even more reluctantto accept the sentenceas true. In the presentarticle I shall concentrateon the use made of the sentence in one passage
of Walter Burleigh's De puritate
artislogicaetractatus
brevior
(composed in
the thirddecade of the fourteenthcentury).More in particular,I shall
argue that the text of that passage in the edition of Ph. Boehner3 is
seriouslydefectiveand submit a reading that is more fittingto such
a keen logician as Burleigh undoubtedlywas. In order to get properly
equipped forthiscriticalundertaking,it will be helpfulto take a close
look at the lucid and plausible way in which Geulincx deals with the
sophismasplendidum.

1 See L.M. de
A Contribution
totheHistory
Rijk,Logicamodernorum.
ofEarlyTerminist
, II, 1, Assen1967,65, 67.
Logic
2 Arnoldus
hactenus
res
tituta,
in:
Geulincx,
suis,a quitus
Logica
jundamentis
Juerat,
collapsa
, ed. J.P.N. Land, I, The Hague 1891(reprinted
Operaphilosophica
Stuttgart-Bad
Cannstatt
451-3.
3 Walter 1965), Depuntate
artis
tractatus
with
a revised
edition
Burleigh,
logicae
longior,
oftheTractatus
brevior
St. Bonaventure,
N.Y. 1955,203,lines24-36;
, ed. Philotheus
Boehner,
204,lines1-3;205,lines1-24.
90

00:34:15 AM

'
1. Geulincx
of thesophisma splendidum
unmasking
1.1. The prominentsophism that Geulincx dubs sophismasplendidum
is exemplifiedby the followingargument:
Quicunquedicitte esseanimal,dicitverum.
thatis true).
saysthatyouarean animalsayssomething
(Whoever
Sed qui dicitte esseasinum,dicitte esseanimal.
(Buthe whosaysthatyouare an ass saysthatyouarean animal).
Ergoqui dicitte esseasinum,dicitverum.
thatis true).
he whosaysthatyouare an ass sayssomething
(Therefore,
Geulincx rightlyobserves that the form of this reasoning is quite
general and may be filledin by sophistsin order to derive all manner
of absurd conclusions: for instance, the conclusion that he who says
that somethingwhite is black says somethingthat is true apparently
followsfromthe premisses that whoever says that somethingwhite is
coloured says somethingthat is true, and that he who says that somethingwhite is black says that somethingwhite is coloured.4 In order
to appreciate Geulincx' way of counteringthe sophist's argument,we
have to keep in mind his rules of interpretationand a distinctionhe
draws with respect to the verb dicere.
In connection with his version of the medieval supposition theory
Geulincx lays down fourgeneral rules of interpretation(regulae
generales
.5 Leaving out details and refinements,theymay be stated
acceptionum)
as follows:
(1) The hearer should take the speaker's words according to the sense
intended by the speaker.
(2) The hearer should take the speaker's words in the most obvious
and common sense.
(3) The hearer should take the speaker's words in a sense that makes
the utterance true.
(4) The hearer should be consistentin his interpretation.
Furthermore, Geulincx notes that the verb dicerehas a twofold
or expresse
, that
formaliter
meaning. In one sense it is equivalent to dicere
4 La logique
oul'artdepenser
andP. Nicole,which
cameoutinthesame
byA. Arnauld
, has thefollowing
yearas Geulincx'Logica
example(III, 11):
ditvrai.
Celuiquiditquevoustesanimal,
Celuiquiditquevoustesunoison
, ditquevoustesanimal.
Doncceluiquiditquevoustesunoison
, ditvrai.
thesophism
Butthere
ishandledinan altogether
different
way,whichis notrelevant
to ourpurpose.
5 Logica
adlogic
am, in: Opera
, ed. Land,221-4.See alsoDictata
a, ed. Land,
philosophic
I, 487-8.
91

00:34:15 AM

is, assertingthatsomethingis the case thatcan be expressed by exactly

those words whichoccur in the declarative sentencein whichthe assertion is phrased. For instance, someone who uttersthe words 'You are
an animal' (Tu es animal) thereby formally,or by means of exactly
those words, says or asserts that you are an animal (te esseanimal). By
or
contrast, diceremay also be used in the sense of dicereconsequenter
, that is, saying or asserting by implication. For example,
implicite
when someone says 'I am standing' (Sto), he says by implicationthat
he is able to stand (se stareposse), although he does not say formallyor
explicitlythat he is able to stand, throughthe very words 'I am able
to stand' (Starepossum).6Taken by itself,the verb diceremay be held
to have the generic meaning of committingoneself to the truthof a
proposition. This generic meaning, however, can be specifiedin two
ways: eitheras committingoneselfonly to the truthof the proposition
expressed by the words actually employed, or committingoneself to
the truthof each and every propositionthat is entailed by the original
one and is thus a necessaryconditionof its truth.Evidently,in the first
sense a speaker is committedonly to the truthof the one proposition
that is expressed by his actual words, whereas in the second sense the
speaker is committedto the truthof infinitelymany propositions.
There can be littledoubt that Geulincx' distinctionbetween dicere
and dicereconsequenter
has its roots in the distinctionbetween
formaliter
and
secundarie
thatwas developed especially
significare
primarie significare
in the course of the fourteenthcentury.Roughly speaking, the notion
of significare
ypraecise,adaequate}principaliter,
primarie(or significare
primo
where
that
to
cases
which
is signifiedis expressed by
Maliter)applies
the same word as the signifyingterm, as in 'Homo' significai
hominem
,
'
as
Deum
in
(Deus
est
esse
the
infinitive
accusative
or,
, by
significai
plus
phrase that corresponds to the proposition.7The primary significate
of a propositionwas held to be decisive in establishingits truthvalue.
A propositionis true when it primarilysignifiesin such a way as is the
case and it is false when it primarilysignifiesin such a way as is not
the case. In particular, it figuresin the verificationof such so-called
officiabiles
propositions as Possibileest te esse: that proposition is true
6 Logica
, ed. Land,452; also 237-8,245.
7 Fordetailssee forinstance
PaulusVenetus,Logicamagna
, I, 1, De terminis
(edited
Oxford1979,108-21);II,
and notesbyN. Kretzmann,
withan Englishtranslation
11, De significato
propositionis
(editedwithnoteson thesourcesby Fr. Del Punta,
notesbyMarilynMcCordAdams,Oxford
withexplanatory
translated
intoEnglish
1978,190-9).
92

00:34:15 AM

3
when it is based on the truthof I stapropositio(Tu es estpossibilis
; quae
teesse.0Ways of signifyingthat are not primarywere
praecisesignificat
commonlycalled secondary. One subspecies of that kind of signification consistsof cases where a proposition is held to signifya state of
affairsthat is not formallyand explicitlyconveyed by it but merely
implied. William Heytesbury,forinstance, who is about a generation
4
youngerthan Burleigh, states somewherethat the proposition A man
is running' signifies the proposition 'An animal is running' not
3
'
primarilybut only secondarily( haecpropositioHomocurritnonsignificat
3
'Animal currit
hanc propositionem
).9 And
primariesed solum secundarie
according to Paul of Venice it was a common saying thatany proposition (secondarily) signifieswhateverfollowsfromit ( Quaelibet
propositio
comof
Venice
Paul
of
Followers
ad
quidquidsequitur earn).10
significat
of
for
this
name
variety secondary signification:
monly use a special
asserassertive.According to Paul of Prgula the significatum
significare
tivumis that which formallyfollows from some proposition. He also
assernotes thateven a false propositioncan have many true significata
est
asinus
Homo
tiva. For example, the proposition
signifiesassertively
(that is, by implication)thata man existsand thata man is an animal,
and so on. As is made clear by the rules of inference,that a truth
followsfroma falsehoodin a formallyvalid inferenceis not abnormal
bona etJormali).11
exfalso sequi verumin consequentia
( noninconvenit
8 See Some14thCentury
ed. L.M. de Rijk,
ontheProbationes
Tracts
terminorum,
1982,231,andpassim.
Nijmegen
9 QuotedfromDe veritate
et/abitate
(Venice1494,fol. 187 V) by A.
propositionis
7
di Guglielmo
nelle
dellaverit
, in: Studimedievali,
Heytesbury
Maier,Il problema
opere
in
A.
Strode
from
the
also
See
61.
Maier,
Terminologia
Ralph
quotations
(1966),
scolastica
dellatarda
logica
, Rome1972,489-90.
10PaulusVenetus,
etfalsitate
(editedby
, II, 10,De veritate
propositionum
Logicamagna
Fr. Del Punta,translated
byMarilynMcCordAdams,Oxford1978,74). See also
viewdefended
that,
byPeterofMantua,ontheground
p. 209,n. 10,fortheopposite
thelatter
fromTucurris,
as Deusestfollows
truestatement
sucha necessarily
though
from
sucha necessarily
andthat,though
thatGodexists,
doesnotsignify
proposition
does
thatproposition
thatyouarerunning,
a teitfollows
as Tudiffers
falseproposition
thatyouare running.
notsignify
11Paul of Prgula,LogicaandTractatus
etdiviso
desensucomposito
, ed. SisterMary
N.Y. 1961,140. See also p. 10: " 'Homo est
Brown,St. Bonaventure,
Anthony
esseasinum.Secundarie
etadacquatehominem
asinus'significai
significat
primarie
esse corpus."The expression
et hominem
esse substantiam,
multaut: hominem
is used and explainedin a similarwayby GaetanusofThiene
assertive
significare
diGuglielmo
nelle
dellaverit
Il problema
A.
, in: Studi
Maier,
Heytesbury
opere
by
(quoted
in: PauliVeneti
Blanchellus
7 (1966),61-2);andbyFaventinus
medievali,
Menghus,
ea commentum
... super
Faventini
, Venice1498(11476),biiR.
LogicaetMenghi
93

00:34:15 AM

As Geulincx, who studied and taught for a while at the university

of Louvain, was thoroughlyfamiliarwith the scholastic tradition,we
or expresse
and
formaliter
may assume that his distinctionbetween dicere
or implicite
was borrowed fromone or more of those
dicereconsequenter
authors who for practically the same purpose used such phrases as
secundarie
and significare
, or more specificallysignificare
significare
primarie
assertive.
1.2. We are now sufficientlyprepared to follow the moves in
Geulincx' strugglewith the sophist. As far as the firstpremiss of the
sophismasplendidumis concerned ( Quicunquedicit me esse animal} dicit
verum),Geulincx feels compelled to concede it, both in virtue of the
second rule of interpretationand in virtue of the third rule, which
requires that he take it in such a way that it becomes true. Now the
truth of that firstpremiss is guaranteed only if it is interpretedas
dicitme esse animal, dicitverum.For someone who
Quicunque
formaliter
says only by implicationthat I am an animal does not necessarilysay
something that is true, since he may explicitly assert some
falsehood- forinstance that I am an ass- that is an antecedentfrom
which the truththat I am an animal followsas a consequent. On the
other hand, the second premiss ( Atquiqui dicitmeesseasinum
, dicitme
esseanimal)is rejected by Geulincx, in compliance with the rule about
consistencyof interpretation.If the firstdicitin the firstpremiss is
taken as formaliter
dicit, the second dicitin the second premisshas to be
understoodin the same sense. But thenthe second premissis false. For
he who says that I am an ass does not formallysay that I am an
animal, but says so only by implication. Therefore,on a correctinterpretation the premisses are not both true.
The sophist,however, does not give up and claims that the second
dicitin the second premiss should be understood as siveformaliter
sive
dicit.
Then
the
can
be
All
second
as
true.
consequenter
premiss
accepted
right,but the result is that the whole argument is no longer a valid
syllogismin Barbara, because there are four terms: in the slot forthe
middle term in the firstpremiss the termformaliter
dicensmeesseanimal
occurs and the same place in the second premisscontains the different
dicensme esseanimal.
term siveformaliter
sive consequenter
If then the sophist goes on to amend the argument by stipulating
that in the firstpremiss too the firstdicitshould be interpretedas sive
siveconsequenter
dicit, it can be pointed out that,thoughin virformaliter
first
rule
of
tue of the
interpretationhe has a rightto do so, in the
94

00:34:15 AM

amended form the firstpremiss may fail to be true. The already

familiarreason is that on this interpretationsomeone who says either
formallyor by implication that I am an animal does not necessarily
say somethingthat is true; he may, for instance, confine himselfto
assertingthe proposition that I am an ass, which is false.
Finally, Geulincx maximizes his concessions and grantsthe sophist
the followingformof the argument:
velconsequenter
dicitme esseanimal,is formaliter
vel
Quicunqueformaliter
dicitverum.
consequenter
vel consequenter
dicitmc esse
Atqui,qui me asinumessedicit,is formaliter
animal.
velconsequenter
dicitverum.
Ergoqui measinumessedicit,is formaliter
However, triumphantfeelingson the part of the sophist are nipped in
the bud by making him realize that someone who duly accepts the
truthof the conclusion therebydoes not necessarilyconcede that he is
an ass. For someone who says that I am an ass commits himselfby
implicationto such truthsas that I am an animal, and so says either
formallyor by implication somethingthat is true and yet is not the
statementthat I am an ass. It is thispossibilitythat takes the stingout
of the final version of the sophist's argument.
As we saw in 1.1. , Paul of Prgula stressedthat not seldom a truth
correctlyfollowsfroma falsehood and that thereforea false proposition may signify by implication an indefinite number of true
statements. This point is also of crucial importance in Geulincx'
attemptsto curb the sophist's intentions.It is not the case that someone who says by implicationsomethingthat is true, forinstance, that
I am an animal, must always say formallysomethingthat is true. He
may formallysay somethingthat is false but fromwhich nevertheless
a truthlogically follows.
2. Burleigh'sproblem
artislogicaetractatus
brevior
opens with a chapter
Burleigh's De puritate
on the general rules of consequences. In that contexthe findshimself
faced with the problem of dealing with an objection against the
validityof the rule thatwhateverfollowsfromthe consequent of a conditional statementor inferencealso followsfromthe antecedent( QuidThe objection is first
, sequiturad antecedens).
quid sequiturad consequens
'I
in
the
form
a
of
counter-example. say thatyou are an ass;
presented
I
are
an animal' is a sound inference.Neverthat
therefore, say
you
thelessthere is somethingthat followsfromthe consequent but does
95

00:34:15 AM

not follow from the antecedent. For from 'I say that you are an
animal' it followsthat I say somethingthat is true and yet from'I say
thatyou are an ass' it does not followthatI say somethingthatis true.
Next, the objection is strengthenedby pointingout that, ifthe rule
is correct,it will be possible to prove with its help the conclusion that
you are an ass. The reasoning that leads to this absurdity is quite
Let us assume that both 'If I say that you are an ass,
straightforward.
then I say thatyou are an animal' and 'If I say thatyou are an animal,
then I say somethingthat is true' are true conditionals. Then, if the
rule is considered to be valid, it may be concluded that 'If I say that
you are an ass, then I say somethingthat is true' is equally true. But
if the inference'I say that you are an ass; therefore,I say something
thatis true' is correct,it is true thatyou are an ass: and, consequently,
ad
you are an ass. It is easy enough to trace the patternof this reductio
absurdumin Boehner's text, except for p. 203, line 36-p. 204, line 1.
is
As Boehner says in the Introduction,his textof the Tractatusbrevior
based on two manuscripts: L (in the Hoose Library of the University
of Southern California, Los Angeles) and Y (in the Vatican Library).
He also states that in his edition he has given preferenceto L unless
he thoughtthere was a good reason to deviate fromit (p. XVI). At
these lines, however, he seems to have mixed up readings fromboth
manuscripts,with the result that the text as it stands is rathermessy.
I confinemyselfhere to remarkingthatfroma logical angle the following textwould be perfectlyto the point: igiturdicendoteesseasinum,dico
verum(according to the rule of inference);igiturconsequens
(namely, Tu
es asinus) est verum.
3. Burleigh'sreplyto theobjection
3.1. At p. 205, lines 1-15, Burleigh makes some preliminaryobservations that in his eyes will enable him to give a satisfactoryanswer
to the objection mentioned. He points out that the propositionDico te
esseanimalis ambiguous in that the accusative plus infinitivephrase te
esseanimalcan stand eitherforwords or fora part of the worldof things
{potestsupponere
provocevelprore). In the firstsense the propositionconI
that
veys
say or utter the words Tu es animal, while in the second
sense it conveys that I say or assert that which is signifiedby those
words. In general, this distinctionapplies to illsentences in which it
is indicated that an act pertainingto a mode is related to an accusative
plus infinitivephrase (leaving out the nonat line 8 of Boehner's text,
96

00:34:15 AM

I read: Et eodemmodoestquaelibetoratiodistinguendo.,
in qua actuspertinens
ad modum[non]denotatur
in dictumtransir).For the act can be related to
the accusative plus infinitivephrase in respectof the words utteredor
in respect of the world of things( rationedictivel rationerei).
Burleigh furtherillustratesthe ambiguity he has in mind by the
As far as the elaboration of this examexample Ille seitteessehominem.
is
are
there
some
differencesbetween the text offered
concerned,
ple
L
and
Boehner's
text.
Boehner has:
by manuscript
... potest
esseduplexintellectus,
unusquodillesciatillamvocem:'Tu es homo',
ethocnonpotest
nisisciatlitteras.
Aliussensusestquodsciatremsignificatam
Latinum.
perillamvocem:'Tu es homo',et istudseitlaicusignorans
the perAccordingto thisreading, in one sense of Ille seitteessehominem
son in question recognizes the words Tu es homo; and he can recognize
them only if he is literate. In another sense he knows that which is
signifiedby the words Tu es homo; and this even a layman who has no
Latin can know. On this interpretationa contrast is pointed out
between a literateperson who is able to recognize certain words and
a layman who, withoutknowing Latin, may still know that you are
a human being. What one would expect, however, is rathera contrast
as it is expressed- according to the apparatuscriticus
by the textgiven
in manuscript L:
bonus:quodillesciatillamvocem:'Tu eshomo'
... potest
esseduplexintellectus
etquodistesciat,quodrealiter
etistudseitlaicusignorans
Latinum;
importatur
'Tu es homo',et hocnescitnisiclericus.
perhancpropositionem:
According to this L-text the sentence Ille seit te esse hominemcan
plausibly be taken in a twofoldsense: that he is aware of the sounds
Tu es homo; which is possible even fora layman who has no command
of Latin. Or that he knows that to which the proposition Tu es homo
refersin reality;and that is known only by someone who understands
Latin. At any rate, I cannot see a good reason to deviate from L.
As the phrase supponere
pro vocevelpro resuggests,Burleigh is thinking of thedifferencebetween material suppositionand, especially, personal supposition. At the beginning of the De puntateartislogicaetractatuslongior(p. 4) he states that in material supposition or pro vocethe
esse
esseanimalmay stand eitherforthe words hominem
phrase hominem
animalor forthe words Homo estanimal, that is, eitherforan infinitive
phrase or fora declarative sentence. On the other hand, if the terms
of such phrases as hominemesse animal or te esse animal are used
significativelyin personal supposition or pro re, they referto a certain
state of affairsin the world. It is quite natural, then, that to the dif97

00:34:15 AM

ferencein suppositionthereshould corresponda differenceofmeaning

in such a verb as dicere'when it is combined with an accusative plus
infinitivephrase used according to material supposition, it takes on
the meaning of utteringcertain words, whereas combined with such
a phrase used according to personal supposition it takes on the meaning of asserting that something is the case.12
It should be noted that in spite of a clear similarityof functionthis
distinctionbetween dicereas utteringand dicereas assertingdoes not
and dicereconsecoincide with the distinctionbetween dicere
formaliter
The
latter
distinction
has
made
Geulincx.
quenter
by
regard to saying
in the sense of assertingthat somethingis the case. Within that sense
between an act of assertingthat is tied to the
Geulincx differentiates
asserted state of affairsis expressed and an
which
words
the
by
very
act of assertingthat pertains to everythingthat logically followsfrom
the initial statement. What he has in mind, then, is a distinction
withinthe realm of signification,parallel to the differencewhichothers
secundarieor
marked by the phrases significare
primarieand significare
assertive.Burleigh, on the other hand, draws the line between dicerein
the sense of utteringsounds, in abstraction fromtheir signification,
and dicerein the sense of asserting,eitherexplicitlyor by implication.
This latter differencebetween two kinds of dicereas asserting is not
stressed in the present text by means of a special terminology,but
there can be littledoubt that Burleigh makes use of it in his reply to
the argument adduced against the rule Quidquidsequiturad consequens,
.
sequiturad antecedens
3.2. As we saw in section 2., Burleigh's opponents called attention
to the followingtriad:
(1) Dico te esseasinum,igiturdico te esseanimal.
(2) Dico te esseanimal, ergodico verum.
, igiturdico verum.
(3) Dico te esseasinum
If the rule is correct,and (1) and (2) are conceded, it followsthat (3)
too has to be admitted. But (3), or what can be derived from(3), is
patentlyfalse; therefore,given that it is difficultto doubt (1) and (2),
it is the rule that should be rejected. So someone who wants to save
the rule and at the same time agrees that (3) is false, finds himself
12ComparewhatGregory
themiddleofthefourteenth
ofRimini,towards
century,
: "Nam unomodoidemestquoddictum
remarks
aboutthetwofold
ofdicere
meaning
velformare.
Aliomodoidemestquodperdictum
aliquidsignificare"
{Super
proferre
etsecundo
Sententiarum
, I, Dist.42-44,q. 2, art.1).
primo
98

00:34:15 AM

faced with the task of showing that there is no compelling reason to

consider (1) and (2) as being incontrovertible.That is exactly the
strategyBurleigh chooses in order to defend the rule.
Let us firstlook at lines 16-19 of Boehner's text:
Perhocad propositum
dico,quodsi actusdicendiinilia:'Dico teesseasinum',
nontenet:'Dico teesse
indictum
ratione
transeat
vocis,sichaecconsequentia
dicote esseanimal'.
asinum,igitur
The only differencebetween this text and L is that at line 17 instead
of the firstasinumL has animal. Already a good reason to preferthe
reading animal is the fact that in the foregoing section about the
ambiguityof dicerethe proposition on which Burleigh concentratesis
Dico teesseanimal. Thus, let us assume that animalis preferableto the
firstasinum.Then Burleigh's firststep in defence of the rule consists
in pointingout that, if the act of saying in the propositionDico teesse
animalis related to the accusative plus infinitivephrase in respect of
the words uttered,then (1), the consequence Dico teesseasinum,igitur
dicoteesseanimal, no longer holds. For it is not true that, if I say that
13
you are an ass, I utter the words Tu es animal.
The case for reading animal instead of asinum is considerably
strengthenedand even decided by the second step in Burleigh's reply.
In Boehner's text, lines 19-20, this step is rendered as follows:
nonvalet:'Dico
Si autemtranseat
indictumrationerei,sichaecconsequentia
dicoverum'.
te esseasinum,igitur
It is evident that here the reading asinumcannot possibly be correct.
That the consequence Dico te esseasinum
, igiturdico verumis not valid
is preciselythe point which is made by Burleigh's opponents and is
What Burleigh needs of course is the contention
altogetherin confesso.
if
the
act
of
that,
saying in Dico teesseanimalis related to the accusative
plus infinitivephrase in respect of the world of things, then (2), the
, is no longer valid and
consequence Dico teesseanimal, igiturdicoverum
thereforeneed not be conceded. And again here, at line 20, L has
indeed animalinstead of asinum.
What is most interestingis Burleigh's justificationof his verdicton
(2). According to L thisjustificationhas the form:
esseverumsineconsequente.
Quia sidicoteesseasinum,
potest
quiaantecedens
dicendote esseasinumdicoteesseanimai.
nondicoverumet tarnen
13CompareGeulincx,
meesseasinum,
, ed. Land,452-3:"illeenimqui dicit
Logica
"
meesseanimai,sed tantum
nondicitformaliter,
consequenter.
99

00:34:15 AM

There is, Burleigh explains, a fatal possibility, namely, that the

antecedent (Dico te esse animal) is true without the consequent (Dico
verum)being true. As long as dicoin the antecedentis taken as asserting
a state of affairsthat is expressed by the accusative plus infinitive
- there is no
phrase- that is, in the sense of Geulincx' dicere
formaliter
problem; foron that interpretationthe consequent is true. But if the
undifferentiateddico in the antecedent is understood as asserting a
state of affairsonly by implication- that is, in the sense of Geulincx'
- the consequent need not be true. For when I
dicereconsequenter
say
that you are an ass, it is not the case that I say somethingthat is true;
and yet by saying that you are an ass I say (by implication) that you
are an animal.14 Precisely the fact that dicerein the sense of asserting
is leftundifferentiated
as to the subspecies of formallyasserting and
asserting by implication gives Burleigh the opportunityto repudiate
the claim that (2) ought to be conceded.
As far as thejustificationof this repudiation is concerned, the text
given by Boehner at lines 21-24 is differentin form,but practically
identical in import:
esseverum
sineconsequente.
quiaantecedens
potest
Quia sidicoteesseasinum,
dicoteesseanimal,secundum
indictum
ratione
rei,
quodactusdicenditransit
et tarnen
dicendote esseasinumnondicoverum.
The trouble is, however, that these lines completelylose their relevance if at line 17 and line 20 asinumis read instead of animal.
3.3. In the Introduction(p. XVI) Boehner declares that it has been
his policy to give preferenceto L unless there was a good reason not
to do so. However, in the passage which we have examined in some
detail it is perfectlyclear that only L offersa text that makes sense
from a logical point of view and that the text given by Boehner is
downright unintelligible. In order to show that (1) and (2) of his
opponents' triad are not beyond dispute and thus need not be conceded, Burleigh firstcalls attentionto the distinctionbetween dicerein
the sense of utteringwords and dicerein the sense of asserting that
something is the case, either explicitlyor by implication. Next, he
proves that, if dicereis taken in the firstsense, inference(1) has to be
rejected; and that, if dicereis taken in the second sense, inference(2)
14CompareGeulincx,
, ed. Land,452:"Licetenimverum
sit,meesseanimal,
Logica
verumex falsosequi,adeoquequi consequenter
dicit,meesseanimal
potesttarnen
aliquoddicit,ex quo sequaturme esse animal),nullatenus
(id est, antecedens
necessum
estut is verumdicat."
100

00:34:15 AM

leaves room for counter-examples. In justifyingthis latter claim, he

must have been aware that in the sentence Dico teesseanimalthe verb
dicocould be taken to cover both assertingexplicitlyand assertingby
implication. Although he does not mark this differenceby such a
assertive
or dicere
secundarie,
primarie!
forspecial terminologyas significare
he
was
that
alert
his
maliter!
consequenter
,
sufficiently
procedure proves
to it to make it a crucial factor in the refutationof his opponents'
argument.
Wassenaar, The Netherlands
Van Polanenpark 180

101

00:34:15 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Review Article

dialcticalibritres
Rudolph Agricola' s De inventione
MARC VAN DER POEL
tres.
DreiBcher
dialctica
libri
De inventione
ofRudolf
edition
Notestothecritical
Agricola.
vonAmsterdam
derEditionvonAlardus
AufderGrundlage
ber
dialctica.
dieInventio
von LotharMndt,
und kommentiert
bersetzt
herausgegeben,
(1539) kritisch
Verlag),1992.*
Tbingen:(Max Niemeyer
dialctica
Lothar Munds criticaledition ofDe inventione
, the influential writingon dialectic and rhetoricby the Frisian humanist Rudolph
Agricola (1444-1485), is a landmark in the study of Neo-Latin
literature. It is the firstmodern edition of Agricola's work, and the
firstfull translation into a modern language.1 The book contains a
briefintroduction(XIII-XXVII), the Latin text with facingGerman
translation (9-563), a commentary (565-654), an account of the
editorialprinciples('Editionsbericht', 655-720) containinga surveyof
the historyof Agricola' s text(655-91), two listsof textualemendations
and variants (692-720), a bibliography (721-41), and finally three
indexes, one of proper names and textualsources, one of subjects,and
one of Greek words (743-64). The Latin text is accurate, the translation offersadequate support forthe comprehension of the Latin text,
and the notes constitute a substantial basis for future research.
Mndt' s edition is thus a reliable tool that will be used by Agricola
scholars and all those interestedin the historyof humanisticlogic for
many years to come, although of course a text edition of this size will
give rise to some questions. Some remarkswill be made to elaborate
this view. In addition, I aim to provide some incentives for further
research on Agricola' s text and its influence.
Mundt's introductionoffersa short biography of Agricola and a
surveyof his writings,some cursoryremarksabout the influenceofDe
* The research
forthisreviewarticlehas beenmadepossiblebya grantfromthe
ofSciences.
RoyalNetherlands
Academy
1 Earliertranslations
in English,byJ.R. McNally
are published,
of fragments
LibriTres:A Translation
'sDe Inventione
Dialctica
, in:
Chapters
ofSelected
(Rudolph
Agricola
der
34 (1967),393-422)and,in German,byS. Otto,Geschichte
SpeechMonographs
und
Band3. Renaissance
inTextundDarstellung.
1984,
Neuzeit,
Stuttgart
frhe
Philosophie
reliable.
is notcompletely
126-49.See Mndt,717. McNally'stranslation
102

00:35:50 AM

inventionedialctica and the renown of Agricola' s name among

humanists,and finallya note on the older literature
sixteenth-century
and on the present state of affairsin the Agricola-Forschung. All the
informationprovided is accurate, but in the brieflist of modern editions of Agricola's other writings(XXV) one should add the edition
studioin: J. Hauser, QuintilianundRudolfAgricola.Eine
of De formando
zumJahresbericht
Studie
desK. humanistischen
, Programm
pdagogische
Gymnasiumszu Gnzburg
48-59
mediocre
text
based on the collation
1910,
(a
of the Editioprinceps(Antwerp 1511), the Alardus edition of Cologne
1539 and a Paris edition printed by P. Calvarin, 1550). It is to be
regrettedthat the editor has not provided some background information on scholastic and humanistic logic necessary to appreciate the
purport of Agricola' s book. Indeed, before embarking on the
examination of such a massive book, the reader will want to have an
idea not only of the contentof the book, but also of Agricola's motives
forwritingit and the reasons which make De inventione
dialcticasuch
an importantwriting.This desire is surelyjustifiedbecause Agricola's
book is, afterall, one of the firsthumanistictheoriesof discourse, and
possibly the best, and the value of the humanists' attemptto reform
scholasticlogic is still very much contested, as is clear, for instance,
fromthe appraisal of Agricola' s book given only recentlyin the 1988
'4
edition of KindlersLiteraturlexikon
, s.n. Agricola: Agrcolas Werk ist
ein charakteristischesZeugnis fr den Hang des Humanismus, ins
Rhetorischeund damit schliesslichin die reine Pedanterie abzugleiten
und so die Logik am Ende auf die blosse Kunst des richtigen
Ausdrucks zu reduzieren." It would therefore have seemed
appropriatefortheeditorto include in the introductiona brieforientation in the innovative aspects of the humanistic theoryof discourse
such as it is described by Agricola. Additionally, it is only in the context of its originalitythat we can understand properly the true scale
of the influenceof De inventione
dialctica
, as attested by the wealth of
editions, epitomes and commentaries it inspired.
is a travesty,
If thejudgement formulatedin KindlersLiteraturlexikon
in what terms are we then to define Agricola' s endeavor to reform
scholastic logic? It is true that Agricola, like all humanists, was
opposed to the exclusive trainingin formallogic in the artescourse at
the universities,because it failed to train the students in eloquence.
Agricola specificallysaw this as a problem for students in theology,
who had to be well-spokenin view of theirpastoral task. (See De inventionedialctica
, Book II, chapter 1, 198, lines 54-62. Compare Book III,
103

00:35:50 AM

chapter 14, 536, lines 24-31). This does not mean however, that
Agricola supplants the objectivity of logic by the subjectivity of
rhetoric.As its title shows, De inventione
dialcticafocuses on dialectic,
not rhetoric. The notion inventio' in the title has a polemical
purport2:Agricola criticizes scholastic dialectic because it focuses on
the study of propositions to the detrimentof argumentation, as he
clearly explains in book II, chapter 1 (196-206). In that chapter,
,
Agricola criticizes the use of the loci in the theory of consequentiae
because according to him the loci are used in that theorynot in order
to find arguments, but in order to verifywhether or not a given
argumentation is logically correct (196-8, lines 25-40). In Book I,
chapter 1, Agricola explains that it is his aim to give back to the loci
the role which they originallyhad according to him, namely the role
of instrumentin the organization of scientificknowledge and the role
of aid in discourses on human affairs (10, lines 45-57). Thus,
Agricola's theoryof so-called rhetoricaldialectic integratesthe system
of dialectical and of rhetorical loci and provides a comprehensive
theoryof methodical thinkingand reasoning applicable in all fieldsof
knowledge.3 His work offers a brilliant synthesis of the entire
preceding logical tradition. As such, it cleared the ground for other
innovative logicians such as Petrus Ramus (1515-1572).
As a practical alternative to scholastic logic, Agricola presents a
comprehensivetheoryof discourse. At the basis of his theorylies the
4 His criticalreview of all
close coherence among the artessermocinales.
2 L. Jardine
haspointedto thepropagandist
andcontroversial
natureofAgricola'
s
'
- ). Skinner
- E. Kessler-J. Kraye,eds., The
title(' Humanistic
logicin: C. Schmitt
, Cambridge
1988,182).
Cambridge
History
ofRenaissance
Philosophy
3
E. Meuthenprovided
a gooddescription
ofDe inventione
dialctica
whenhe wrote:
"Die Intentionen
seineritalienischen
erdie
weiterfhrend,
Vorgnger
systematisierte
anwendbaren
dasnicht
mehrbloss
Topikzueinemallgemein
Gliederungsinstrument,
ein Hilfsmittel
derRhetorik
in der
Probleme
war,sonderndie wissenschaftlichen
'
Identittvon Rhetorikund Logik zu erschliessen
gedachte.' {Kln unddie
humanistisch-rhetorische
Dialektik
, in: Geschichtein Kln, gegr. als studentische
Zeitschrift
am historischen
23 (1988),103-17.Citationat 108).
Seminar,
4 Agricola
thisprinciple
in thefollowing
expresses
succinctly
passage:"Orationem
omneminitiodiximusin id paratamesse,ut animisui participem
quisquefaceret
alium.Tria ergoconstatin omnioratione
esseoportere:
eum,qui dicit,eum,qui
ut
audit,et rem,de qua habetur
oratio,tresqueproindein dicendoobservationes:
utprobabile
sit
percipipossit,quidsibivelit,qui dicit,utcupideaudiat,cuidicitur,
fidesei, quod dicitur.Primumgrammatice
et
docet,quae emendate
habeaturque
viamtradit;
orationis
rhetorice,
aperteloquendi
proximum
quae ornatum
cultumque
etomnescapiendarum
auriumillecebras
invenit.
est,videbitur
Quodreliquum
igitur
sibidialectice
vendicare:
dicerede qualibetre,quae deducitur
in oraprobabiliter
tionem."(BookII, chapter2, 208-10,lines51-62.)
104

00:35:50 AM

the relevantsources, both ancient and modern, resultsin a theoryof

discourse which virtuallyabolishes the traditionaldistinctionbetween
dialectic and rhetoric.Thus, Agricola explains in the firstsentencesof
his work that the main task of discourse is 'docere'. Yet simultaneously he stressesthat the functionof 'movere' and 'delectare' cannot be separated fromthat main task.5 When Agricola deals with the
various formsof argumentation,he denies the validityof the conventional division which prescribed that dialectic belongs to the field of
theoreticaldiscourse in the formof dialogues and thatrhetoricbelongs
to the field of practical discourse in the form of orations. Instead,
Agricola observes, both formsof discourse can be used foreitherpurpose. As an alternative to the traditional distinction, Agricola
distinguishesbetween argumentationand exposition. Argumentation
is addressed to an audience which resistsor which must be forcedinto
assent, while expositionsets mattersout foran audience which follows
willingly.The basic pattern of ratiocination is in all cases syllogism
and induction, but according to Agricola these patternsmust usually
be varied by the application of rhetoricalstrategiesin order to assure
effectivecommunication. This principle is valid a fortioriwhen it is
necessarynot only to persuade the reader or listenerintellectually,but
to influencehis emotional attitudesand his philosophyof life as well.
Thus, when Agricola gives a survey of his entire theoryby means of
a dialogue between an Academic and an Epicurean concerning the
highest good, it appears that he himselfhas been profoundlyinfluenced by the Platonic doctrine of the winning of men's souls
(psychagogia) (book III, chapter 15).
Anotherinnovativeaspect which should have been touched upon in
the introductionconcernsthe elaboration of Agricola's ideas. De inventionedialcticais a scholarlymanual, and its scientificLatin is not as
fluentas Agricola's literaryLatin of the speeches6 and the colloquial
Latin of his letters.7Yet Agricola does stressthat he has done his best
to treat the difficultsubject in as plain a style as possible in order to
be intelligiblefor a general audience: 4'crassa crassis conveniunt" is
the proverbial expression by which he characterizes the style of his
5 BookI, chapter
in detailin BookII, chapter
1, 8, lines1-21.'Movere'is treated
indetailin Book
4 andBookIII, chapters
1-3(on theafjectus).
'Delectare'is treated
5 and BookIII, chapters
4-7.
II, chapter
6 Eightorations
survive.
See thelistin theAgrcola
-Proceedings
(see note46), 316-7.
7 Fifty
See thelistin Agricola
letters
survive.
(see note46), 321-5.
-Proceedings
105

00:35:50 AM

book.8 Hence Agricola uses various kinds of literarytechniques to

clarifyhis theoreticalexpositions. Thus, he uses comparisons (e.g., he
describes the technique of chiaroscuroin painting to explain the
manipulation of the audience by the writer of comedy; book II,
chapter 23, 356-8, lines 61-76) and illustrativestories from ancient
literature (e.g. he tells the story of the shadow of the donkey to
illustratethe functionof laughter to neutralize sudden powerfulemotions; book III, chapter 3, 452-4, lines 145-62), and he enlivens his
styleby the frequentuse of proverbsand colloquial expressions. More
importantly, Agricola illustrates his theoretical observations by
quoting many examples from ancient literature(especially the orations of Cicero, the major Declamationesof (pseudo-) Quintilian,
Vergil's Aeneidand Lucan's Bellumcivile).These illustrativequotations
are sometimes elaborated into compelling analyses of literarytexts
(such as the analysis of the narrativestructureof the storyof the Greek
spy Sinon in Aeneid, 2, 57-194; book II, chapter 17, 308-14, lines 2592). No writeron dialectic beforeAgricola had used these illustrations
from ancient literature to such a large extent.9 In sum, Agricola's
Dialecticis not an easy book, but if the reader is patient it will reveal
itselfto be what it trulyis, namely not only a comprehensivemanual
of logic, but also a fascinatingbook on speech and literaturemade for
specialists and lovers of literaturealike. It is forthese reasons that it
became one of the most successfulbooks in the period of Renaissance
Humanism.
As the subtitleof the book indicates, Mndt' s edition is based on
the 1539 edition of Alardus of Amsterdam (A), of which two copies
were perused.10 This edition has been compared with the Editio
princeps of 1515 (Ep), and the only two manuscriptsof De inventione
dialcticaknown to exist today, namely the Stuttgartmanuscript (a
copy which belonged to the two brothersVon Plieningen; S) and the
Uppsala manuscript (origin unknown; U). Since Ep, based on a
manuscript which is today lost (or at least hidden), contains many
printingerrorsand both manuscriptsare equally of poor quality,11the
text offeredby Mndt is basically a corrected version of Alardus'
8 BookI, chapter1, 12,lines63-4.
Comparetheepilogue,562,lines139-57.
9 See forthis
workP. Mack,Rudolph
important
aspectofAgricola's
Agricoles
Reading
in:Journal
oftheWarburg
andCourtauld
48 (1985),23-41.
ofLiterature,
Institutes,
10Namelythereprint-edition
1967andthecopy
published
byDe Graaf,Nieuwkoop,
oftheHerzogAugustBibliothek,
Wolfenbttel.
Mndt,680.
11Mndt,659-65(thetwomanuscripts);
673-7(theeditioprinceps).
106

00:35:50 AM

text.12As such, it is very trustworthy.I noticed two places where a

printingerrorin Alardus' text seems to have been overlooked.13New
printingerrors hardly occur.14 The critical apparatus has also been
composed with great care. It falls into two parts, namely the
'Eingriffe',listing the textual emendations to Alardus' text (692-5)
and the 'Varianten', listing the variant readings occurring in other
sources (695-716). In the list of 'Eingriffe' I noted that A's printing
error at p. 270, line 24 ('velut velut' instead of 'velut'; book II, 11)
has not been recorded.15At p. 332, line 92 (book II, 19) the 'Eingriffe'
erroneouslystate that the mistake in A is 'solum'; A has 'solus' (correctform'solam').16 In thelist of 'Varianten' two variant readings are
recorded withoutquoting the respective source.17
In sum, it appears that the text has been successfullyedited. However, Mndt' s editorialprincipleswarranta fewremarks.There exist
no standardrules foreditingNeo-Latin texts.Some editorsobserve all
the idiosyncrasiesin spelling and punctuation which occur in written
and printedtextsof the period. Others choose to standardize spelling
and punctuation, thus conformingto the principlesof classical Latin
texts. Mndt has not made a clear choice between these two options.
While expressinga desire to leave Alardus' textas intactas possible18
(e.g., he oftenleaves spellingunstandardized), he neverthelessadopts
the modern conventionsof capitalization, usage of u/v, printingof j
as i, expanded abbreviations and separated ligatures (691). Serving
his modern audience well, Mndt has appropriatelyadapted Alardus'
punctuation throughout,even though he asserts that he has left it
unchanged as faras possible.19In short,Mndt has neitherpreserved
12Although
MndtsaysthattheAlarduseditionwascarefully
made(691; seenote
a fairnumber
ofmistakes,
many(butnotall!)ofwhicharecorrected
18),itcontains
in a listoferrata;see Mundt's'Eingriffe',
692-5.
13232,line69,7tpc*)XTj[xa
instead
of7cp0Xrjjia;
instead
offacillime.
388,line42,facilime
14I noticedthefollowing
ones: 160,line 123:contaria
, readcontraria
; 272,line44:
480, line 26; untrunque
, readphilosophus'
, read utrunque'
562, line 138:
pihlsophus
mebrorum
, readmembrorum.
15'Eingriffe',
694.
16'Eingriffe',
694.
17'Varianten',
698 (at bookI, 12,line76) and 704 (at bookII, 8, lines95-6).
18"Es warmeinBestreben,
denvonAlardus
imallgemeinen
undvon
gutredigierten
seinemDrucker
in seinerhistorischen
TextnachMglichkeit
hergestellten
sorgfaltig
Gestaltzu bewahren."
(691)
19"Die Interpunktion
wurdegeringfgig
modifiziert.
wurdedasZiel
(...) Nirgendwo
demTextsystematisch
einmodernes
verfolgt,
Interpunktionssystem
aufzuzwingen."
(692)
107

00:35:50 AM

all the details of Alardus' text, nor provided uniformmodern standardization. It is desirable that Agricola' s text is available in a
thoroughlymodernized shape, because it is not only importantfor
studentsof Neo-Latin who are used to the typographicalidiosyncrasies
of 16th-century
editions, but also forall studentsof intellectualhistory
in the sixteenthcentury.
On top of that, one can wonder if the unique value attached to
Alardus' edition is fullyjustified.20If one accepts Alardus' claim that
he possessed the autograph of De inventione
dialctica
,21one must still
take into account that the autograph did not present a perfectand
uninterpolatedtext,because Alardus had to consultothermanuscripts
as well as the edition of Phrissemius (1523) in order to constitutethe
text of his edition. The edition, incidentally,had to be prepared in
great hurry,a circumstance which has resulted in the occurrence of
mistakesin the commentary.22For that matter,the textitselfcontains
errors, even if we do not count the errors which were corrected in
Alardus' listof errata.23The factthatAlardus has been able to consult
Agricola' s autograph does not mean that therewere no editorsbefore
Alardus who contributedto the transmissionof Agricola's text. I am
thinking specificallyabout the above-mentioned edition with commentary published by Phrissemius. Phrissemius consulted the
manuscriptwhich formedthe basis of Ep, and thisenabled him to correctmany of the printingmistakesoccurringin Ep. He also corrected,
eitherin the textor by way of marginal notes, all the inaccuratequotations of classicelisources in Ep. On the whole, Phrissemius's textcontains about 50 percent of the ca. 1200 improvementswith regard to
20Mndtformulates
ofsacrosanctity
thisprinciple
atp. 657-8,where
hepoints
outthat
itwasunimportant
as faras theconstitution
ofa critical
textwasconcerned,
whether
ornotthemediocre
textofEp hadbeenimproved
inthemanyeditions
ofAgricola's
thatofAlardus,becauseitis fairly
textwhichwerepublished
before
certain
thatno
editorbeforeAlarduscouldhave consulted
the autograph
or any otherreliable
manuscript.
21Alarduswrotein detailabouthis efforts
in a letterto
to locatetheautograph
toDeformando
Clenardus
andinhiscommentary
studio
aliLucubrationes
(R. Agricola,
*
editionNieuwkoop
ff.and203-4).
quot(...), Cologne1539(reprint
1967), 3-verso
See Mndt,666-73.P. Mack,towhomI amgrateful
forreading
thisreview,
through
communicated
to me thathe is notcertainthatAlardushad therealautograph,
becauseS andU bothhavenecessary
A lacks(e.g. inBookII, chapter
passageswhich
29, 416,line54).
22See Mundt'sremarks
on A, 678-86.
4
23See 'Eingriffe',
692-5.Mndt,however,
says: 'Mitwievielenformalen
Mngeln
derKommentar
auchbehaftet
seinmag:aufdie Redaktion
desTexteswurdeaber
allemAnschein
nachgrosseMheundSorgfalt
verwendet."
(686)
108

00:35:50 AM

Ep offeredby Alardus.24Additionally,Phrissemiusoffersin about 70

places a correctionof Ep which is differentfromthat of Alardus and
fromthe reading of any of the other sources recorded in the critical
apparatus. Thus one gets the impression that the modern edition
could have benefitednot only fromthe critical ingenuityof Alardus,
but also fromthat of Phrissemius. Within the limit of this review it is
not possible to examine carefully these 70 cases. But even if the
analysis of Phrissemius' variant readings were to prove that his work
is of no value or at least inferiorto that of Alardus, it stillwould seem
a matter of historic justice to have recorded Phrissemius' serious
attemptto improve Agricola' s textat a time when the autograph was
not available.
Yet Phrissemius' edition is importanton another account as well.
teacherat the universityof Cologne and was teaching
He was an artesDe inventione
dialcticain thepaedagogiaof the Cologne arts facultyin the
early twentiesof the sixteenthcentury. His aim was unquestionably
to provide an edition which would be usefulforteachersand advanced
students.In this respect,his edition was extremelywell made, and, in
my view, superior to that of Alardus. The major reason for this
superiorityis the fact that Phrissemius has presented Agricola' s text
in a more clearlystructuredway than Alardus by placing catchwords
or briefsurveysof contentin the marginsof the text. His notes, which
are farsuperiorto those of Alardus,25are made easily accessible by the
same method. Next, Phrissemius' commentary offers more comprehensive surveysof the^materialcovered by Agricola. Alardus has
a surveyof the 24 loci afterbook I, chapter 4,26and a synopsis of the
systemand the terminologyof the loci according to Agricola, Cicero
and Themistius, afterbook I, chapter 28. This last surveyoccurs also
in the manuscript versions.27 Phrissemius offers on top of these
surveysa clear synopsis of the various kinds of quaestiodistinguished
by Agricola,28a surveyof the terminologyof the parts of the syllogism
24Theseand thefollowing
are basedon thecomparison
ofMundt'scritical
figures
withPhrissemius'
text.I havenotbeenableto consultEp.
apparatus
25Mndthasmadeextensive
ofhisown
notesintheelaboration
useofPhrissemius'
on 719).
commentary
(see hisremark
26Reproduced
byMndt,566.
photographically
27Mndt,192-4;681-2.Alarduspointsoutthathissurvey
is substantially
improved
in
in comparison
to itspreviousversions.Still,Mndthas detected14 mistakes
Alardus' survey.The comparisonbetweenMundt's correctedsurveyand
showsthatPhrissemius'
has 12 mistakes.
Phrissemius'
survey
survey
28Phrissemius,
with
are to theeditionofCologne1528,reprinted
228. References
an introduction
York1976.
byW. Risse,Hildesheim-New
109

00:35:50 AM

according to Aristotle, Cicero, Boethius, Quintilian and Agricola29

and a survey of the two methods to counter arguments.30Finally,
Phrissemius' edition concludes with an index of technical terms.
Thus, Phrissemius' edition seems more functional than that of
Alardus. This judgement is confirmedby the printinghistoryof De
dialctica.After 1539, Alardus' text was reprintedas part of
inventione
the combined edition withvarious commentaries,but among these the
commentaryof Phrissemius figuresprominently.31In short,Alardus
of Amsterdam was not the only sixteenth-century
scholar who contributedsubstantiallyto the textualtransmissionand interpretationof
De inventione
dialctica.It is to be hoped that modern studentsdo not
infer from Munds edition that Phrissemius' edition may be
overlooked in the examination of De inventione
dialctica.The edition is
still available in a reprint edition published in 1976 by The Olms
Verlag.
It is appropriateto end these notes witha fewsuggestionsforfurther
research, to which this new edition forms an effectiveinvitation.
Research will mainly have to focus on two issues, firstlythe examination of Agricola' s textand secondlythe studyof its influencein the sixteenth century.
Munds commentary provides a wealth of source references,
mainly to the ancient sources, and incidentally also to medieval
sources. Of course the classical background is important,ifnot essential, for understanding Agricola's Dialectic, but the medieval
background should be looked at carefullyas well. Agricola wrote for
an audience versed in medieval dialectic, and, however much he
wished to change scholastic dialectic, he had to use current terminology in order to exert influenceamong this audience. Thus, his
definition of the argument seems purposefullycast in terms very
29Phrissemius,
257.
30Phrissemius,
271.
31Detailedinformation
on theprinting
ofAgricola's
worksinG. Huisman,
history
A Bibliography
Works
andTranslations,
1985and
Rudolph
Agricola.
ofPrinted
Nieuwkoop
P. Mack,in: Diedeutsche
Literatur.
undbibliographisches
Lexikon.
ReiheII
Biographisches
zwischen
1450und 1620),ed. H.-G. Roloff,
A:
(Die DeutscheLiteratur
Abteilung
7 bis 9, 10 bis 12, Bern-Frankfurt
am Main-NewYork
Autorenlexikon,
Lieferung
thattheeditionofJohannes
(1990),591ff.One observes
additionally
Noviomagus,
ofPhrissemius'
Cologne1540,hasreprinted
largesections
commentary,
augmented
withsomedatafrom
thenotesofAlardusandofanother
commenonlyincidentally
tator(Reinhardt
Thisfactmaybe interpreted
as a testimony
tothevalue
Lorichius).
ofPhrissemius'
notas a proofofNoviomagus'
uncritical
as
commentary,
attitude,
Mndt(719) seemsto suggest.
110

00:35:50 AM

similarto those used by Petrus Hispanus.32 NaturallyAgricola's ideas

on the use of loci were opposed to contemporary theories. Thus,
Phrissemiuspointed out, as we saw above, that it was the theoryof
in book II, chapter 1 which Agricola was attacking. One
consequentiae
that Agricola is referringto medieval dialecticians in
assume
may
some otherpassages as well, forinstance when he remarksthat many
authors believe that it is impossible to know the real differentia
of
whichwe accept by conventionto be real
things,but only the differentia
(as, e.g., the notion 'rational' to define man),33 or when he says that
some authors discern 'individuum' on top of 'genus', 'species' and
or that some authors effectuatedthe 'divisio' by means
'differentia',34
of the locus 'nomen rei',35 or that some authors have restrictedthe
proper 'divisio' to those elements which belong to the 'substantia' of
a thing,36or thatthereexists littleconsensus concerningthe definition
of 'propria passio'.37 Agricola not only used or commented on
medieval theoriesof dialectic, but he also introducedtheoriesbelonging to the fieldof the grammar course in his new dialectic. Thus, he
used medieval sources on the arrangement of poetic and historical
discourse, as Mndt observes.38More generally,Agricola's division
of arrangementin the natural, arbitraryand artificialorder may have
32Agricola:4'Id tertium
tummediumargumentationis
dicitur,
quoniamproposita
velutextrema
duoconiungit,
instrumentum,quia probabiliter
propositis
iungitur,
de illisfldei,vocaturargumentum."
tumqueestfaciendae
2, 16,
(BookI, chapter
lines58-61).PetrusHispanus:"Argumentum
estratioreidubiaefaciens
id
fidem,
estmedium
ostendens
conclusionem
quaedebetconfirman
perargumentum."
( Trac
tatus
5,2; ed. De Rijk,Assen1972,55, line17)
33
noncognosci
ulliusa nobisreipropriam
"...adeoqueputantnonnulli,
veramque
habereautemnos(quodfereinreliquis
rebusfacere
differentiam,
solemus)
provera,
quae prximaveraevideturaccedere.Ea est in homine'rationale'.Est enim
'rationale'
hominis
nota,nulliquippeanimalinisihomini
propria
inest,convenitque
homoesse,quod sit
homini,
quatenustalisest,hoc est,homoeo maximevidetur
capaxrationis."(BookI, chapter
5, 38, lines18-24)
34"Illud,quodad
nomengeneris
etspecieipertinet,
nonab refuerit
annotasse,
eos,
istadistinguunt,
addereistisindividuum."
qui exactius
6, 44,lines
(BookI, chapter
2"42
35
"Nomenreipraeterii,
credididivisioni.
quoniamparumaccommodatum
Quandivisionem
eiusinressignificatas.
Ut 'taurum'dividerent
quamfuerunt,
qui facerent
indomesticum
animaletsidusetmontem."(BookI, chapter
7, 52,lines76-78.See
PetrusHispanus,V, 40; ed. De Rijk,77, line13)
36"Nonnulliarctisadmodum
finibus
clauserunt
totamhancradonem
ut
dividendi,
omnem
autsubiecti
divisionem,
quaenonfitperea, quaeinsubstantia
sunt,dicerent,
essein accidentia,
autaccidentis
in subiecta,
autaccidentis
in accidentia."
(BookI,
7, 54,lines99-102.See PetrusHispanus,V, 40; ed. De Rijk,77,lines14 ff.)
chapter
37BookI, chapter
8, 56, lines15-7.
38BookIII, chapter
references
at 646.
9, 490-500,withthebibliographical
Ill

00:35:50 AM

been influencedby the distinctionbetween natural and artificialorder

made in medieval poetic and rhetoric.39Likewise, the discussion in
and abbreviatio
book III, chapter 3, of amplificatio
as a cohesive doctrine
have
influenced
been
medieval
may
by
poetic. Also, descriptioas
topical invention,which formsan essential part of the use of the loci
in Agricola's theory(book II, chapters 28 and 29), originallyoccurs
in the medieval arts of prose and poetry.40
Anotherproblem regardsthe structureof Agricola's book. Agricola
sets forthclearly in the opening chapters that he will deal solely with
'inventio' and he suggests in a few places that he will deal with the
Judicium' separately.41Thus, the storywas spread afterAgricola's
death that he had written six books on dialectic.42 Accordingly,
modern scholars have suggested that Agricola had planned to writea
second part devoted to traditional formal logic, especially the
syllogismand its various forms.43Thus, the suggestionarises that De
inventione
dialcticais not more than a torso. On the other hand, there
are passages where Agricola clearly infersthat 'inventio' cannot be
treated separatelyfrom'iudicium'. For instance, in Book II, chapter
3, where he defines the task of dialectic as the findingof arguments
on the one hand and the proper arrangement of arguments in a
discourse on the other hand, he writes: "Iudicandi enim partem hoc
ipso, quod faciendae fidei apta invenire debere praescribo, comprehensam in praesentiavelim. Nanque perinde videtur,non invenire
et invenire eiusmodi, quae iudicentur instituto nostro apta non
esse."44 Agricola's discussion of the use of the loci in argumentations
39Book III, chapter8, 484-90.This distinction
is an elaboration
of Horace's
on artificial
remarks
orderin Arspoetica
and
, 42-4.See D. Kelly,TheArtsofPoetry
Prose
des sourcesdu moyenge occidental,
fase.59),
, Turnhout1991(Typologie
68-71.
40Kelly(see note39), 72-4.
41In BookI, chapter
aresaidto belongto thefield
20, the"modiargumentando
ofJudicium'
(124,lines107-11).In bookII, 9 and 10Agricola
saysthatthedistinctionbetweentrueand falsestatements
willbe dealtwithin thesectionon the
'iudicium'(260,lines134-7;268-70,lines141-5).
42In De formando
studio
his threebookson dialectic.The editto
Agricolamentions
of thistext(Antwerp
princeps
1511)has thenumber'six' insteadof 'three';this
byAlardusin his 1539editionofthetext.In a notehe
readinghas beencorrected
Lucubrationes
givesa briefaccountofthe'rumorsexlibrorum'
(R. Agricola,
aliquot
(see note21), 199and 203-4).
43Mndt,XV, witha reference
toBookI, chapter
2, lines86-8.See alsoP. Mack,
Valla'sDialectic
intheNorth
2 (see note47), 260,whosuggests
thatthesecondpart
wouldhavedealtwiththecategories,
andtheforms
theproposition
ofargumentation.
44214-6,lines54-7.Compare286,lines25-6.
112

00:35:50 AM

also illustratesthat he saw the two parts of dialectic as indissoluble.45

Finally, Agricola discusses in detail the various ways in which the
argumentsmust be used in the actual discourse, stressingthe necessity
to diversifythe method of using strictsyllogisms,in the section on
'dispositio' (Book III, chapters 8-15). This section clearly deals, at
least in part, with the designated topics of 'iudicium'. After the
'dispositio', Agricola discusses in one chapter the exercise ('usus'), in
which he recapitulateshis entiretheoryand stresses,afterhumanistic
fashion,thatthe constantperusal of classical sources and regularpractice in composition are essential requirementsfor those who wish to
learn the art of discourse. These last sections of De inventione
dialctica
seem to suggest that Agricola did, afterall, write a complete theory
on humanistic discourse. The question can thus be raised whether
Agricola did reallyintend to writeon formallogic aftercompletingDe
inventione
dialctica.
dialcticaitself,much
Besides theseproblemsconcerningDe inventione
work stillneeds to be done with regard to the influenceof the book in
the Renaissance. A renewed interestforAgricola and his contribution
to humanisticdialectic is detectable in the last decade or so. The Proceedings of theAgricola Congress held at Groningen in 1985 illustrate
this development.46These Proceedings, containing besides the lectures held at the conference a comprehensive bibliography of
Agricola's published and unpublished worksas well as of the scholarly
literatureon Agricola, remain an indispensable tool for futurework
on Agricola. Recent studies, not included in the bibliographiesof the
and of Mundt's edition, deal withthe influenceof Agricola
Proceedings
in humanistic text-bookson dialectic and on 16th-centurylanguage
45See,e.g., hisremarks
in BookII, chapter
26, 386-94.In lines28-34ofthesame
The
inconnection
withtheelocutio.
hebrings
thearrangement
ofarguments
chapter
ofarguments
basicformofthearrangement
is, ofcourse,thesyllogism;
therefore,
defined
in BookII, chapter18,in spiteofthe
thepartsofthesyllogism
arebriefly
'
fact,Agricola
says,thatthisreallybelongsto theJudicium(318,lines47-51).
46F. Akkerman
- A. Vanderjagt,
Phrisius
eds.,Rodolphus
(1444-1485).ProAgricola
1985,
at theUniversity
28-30October
ofGroningen
ceedings
oftheInternational
Conference
was written
Leiden1988.The mostdetailedreviewoftheProceedings
byL. Mndt
19(1990),318-37.The Proin: Daphnis.Zeitschrift
frMittlere
DeutscheLiteratur,
: P. Mack,
withDe inventione
dialctica
contain4 articles
dealingspecifically
ceedings
- dialectique
etrhtorique
s Topics',
C.G. Meerhoff,
etRamus
; F.
Rudolph
Agricola
Agricola'
Portdialctica
dansla tradition
d'Aristote
Muller,Le De inventione
rhtorique
d'Agricola
s influence
onmethodical
thinkDistinctive
, andL. Jardine,
discipline:
Rudolph
Agricola'
Royal
A fewmissing
The bibliography
is virtually
exhaustive.
titlesare
inginthehumanities.
in Mundt'sbibliography.
included
113

00:35:50 AM

instructionin general.47But, as Mndt has pointed out rightfullyin

his reviewof the Groningen Proceedings, the bulk of empirical studies
on Agricola' s influence,especially in Germany, still needs to be carried out.48During the seventeenthcentury,topical dialectic gradually
lost its importance, but contrarymen like the scholar Giambattista
Vico (1668-1744) and the ministerChristianAugust LebrechtKstner
(1776-1832) promoted its use.49 The pertinent writings of these
authors show that Agricola' s methodologyis not solely a Renaissance
phenomenon.
It has been the purpose of these observations to stimulate further
examination of Agricola's hitherto somewhat neglected writing on
humanisticdiscourse, and to make clear thata proper answer to all the
questions raised by this text and its historyin the humanistic period
calls forinterdisciplinaryresearchinvolvingmedievalists,neolatinists,
and historiansof logic and literature. It is owing to Dr. Mndt and
his commendable edition of De inventione
dialcticathat this study can
be continued on a more solid basis than was possible to this time.
Nijmegen
KatholiekeUniversiteit
47P. Mack, Valla'sDialectic
in theNorth
2: Further
Commentaries
, in: Vivarium30
VallaandAgricola
in theTraditions
Argument.
of
(1992),256-75.P. Mack,Renaissance
andPractice
andDialectic
inRudolph
Rhetoric
, Leiden1993.P. Mack,Theory
(lecAgricola
- Rederijkers",
tureheldat theColloquium"Rhtorique,
Rhetoric
-Rhtoriqueurs
are forthcoming).
K. Meerhoff,
Amsterdam
10-13November1993; proceedings
lecteur
etanalyse
RenaisMlanchthon
textuelle
Humanisme
, Rforme
rhtorique
d'Agricola:
etculture
no-latine
LesAnalyses
textuelles
deBarvernaculaire.
sance,n. 30, 5-17;Rhtorique
in: EtudesLittraires,
24 (1991-1992)
Aneau,
(Universit
thlmy
(no. 3; La rhtorique)
Laval,Canada),63-80.
48Mndt(see above,note46), 322-3.
49Vicodiscusses
thesystem
oftopicsinDe nostri
studiorum
ratione
(1708;with
temporis
Germantranslation
oratoriae
byW. Otto,Godesberg
(1711; with
1947)andInstitutiones
s Topik
oder
Italiantranslation
andcommentary
byG. Crifo,Naples1989).Kstner'
des
in ihrer
aufdieBildung
Anwendung
vielfachen
Erfindungswissenschaft
aufsNeueerlutert
menschlichen
Geistes
undaufdenmndlichen
Vortrag
gezeigt
(Leipzig1816)maybe consideredas a modernversionofAgricola's
work.

114

00:35:50 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Reviews
Medieval
2nd.,rev.ed.,
JohnMarenbon,
(480-1150):AnIntroduction.
Early
Philosophy
&KeganPaul)1988,197pp.ISBN
LondonUK andNewYorkUSA (Routledge
0 415 0070 X
inthehistory
thegreatperiods
ofphilosophy
noneis moreinneedoffurAmongst
therstudyas the MiddleAges. This is especiallytrueof the philosophy
after
ofAristotle's
butpriorto theresurfacing
textsand theentry
of
Augustine
greatest
works
authors.
hasmadea verywelcome
conbyIslamicandJewish
JohnMarenbon
An
tribution
tothispoorly
studiedperiodin hisEarlyMedieval
Philosophy
(480-1150):
Introduction.
as opposed
Marenbon
is at painsin thisbooktoexamineonlythephilosophical,
ofthethinkers
totheological,
ofthisperiod.
rhetorical
andindeed,literary,
writings
include:proofs
ForMarenbon,
thetopicswhichfallundertherubricofphilosophy
ofGod; universais;
future
fortheexistence
andvariousother
contingents;
meaning
a shortreview
After
ofthe
aroundtheAristotelian
categories.
logicalissuescentered
Platonism
andAristotelianism
thatcamedownto theperiod,Marenboncompletes
theworks
ofBoethius.
thesephilosophical
PartOneofhisbookbyeliciting
topicsfrom
andhispresence
thebook,ensurethathisthought
ThepagesonBoethius,
throughout
a verythorough
treatment.
receives
ofthebook.In it,Marenandmostneededsection
PartTwoisthemoststimulating
ofas yetlesserknown
suchas Candidus,Fredegisus,
bondetailsthethoughts
figures
Silvestris
Whatisprobably
andothers.
Ratramnus
ofCorbie,Notker
Labeo,Bernard
ofsuchthinkers
isnotitstreatment
thefinest
feature
ofthisbook,however,
alongside
but
andAnselmofCanterbury,
thefamous
oftheperiod,likeJohnScottus
Eriugena
us to someofthemanyglossesand anonymous
thatitalsointroduces
manuscripts
showsquitenicely
howusefulsuchtextsarewhenconsideroftheperiod.Marenbon
a number
ofninthcentury
oftheperiod.Through
development
ingtheintellectual
ofEriugena
theextent
oftheinfluence
forexample,
Marenbon
canillustrate
glosses,
whichwentbeyondthoseof
doctrines
andthatsomereaders
developed
Eriugenian
isathisbest:helendsthereader
themaster
(76-7).It isatsuchpointsthatMarenbon
can be doneand
showshowinventive
research
thebenefits
ofhiscolossalreading,
In this
articles.
termpapersand evenprofessional
manyideasforstudent
suggests
atthebackofthebookcouldbe usedtogreateffect
listofsources
theexcellent
regard,
research
whowishedto assignindependent
bya teacher
projects.
thatarebetter
PartThree
ofthought,
likethatofChartres,
dealswithschools
known,
ofthewealth
oftextsincosmology
provides
goodsummaries
though
again,Marenbon
extensive
inthetwelfth
Thelatter
thatwerewritten
century.
pagesofthebookinclude
ofGilbert,
Boethius
ofAbelardand GilbertofPoitiers.
The treatments
treatments
andJohnScottusEriugenaare thebestin thebook.
itsothergood
isa clearandeconomical
writer
andthis,quiteapartfrom
Marenbon
forboth
hisbookas an accessible
introduction
doesmuchto recommend
features,
s bookisanoutButa wordofcautionisnecessary:
andstudents.
Marenbon'
scholars
ofearlymedieval
ofphilosophical
history
standing
history
logicandonlya reasonable
a failure
butitis certainly
orethical
Thismaysuitsomereaders,
metaphysics
theory.
forothers.Marenbon'
s history
of the earlyMiddleAges is
of the philosophy
For
on theideaofphilosophy
tradition.
in theAnglo-American
accepted
predicated
thisidea
andlearning
traditions
thoseteaching
within
theEuropean
orNon-Western
italsoleads
is toonarrow
ofphilosophy
andlimits
thebook'susefulness.
Moreover,
For example,Marenbonconto someseriousoversights
and misrepresentations.
s workplaysa significant,
butsecondary
cludesthat"Anselm'
partin thestoryof
115

00:36:00 AM

the"natureoflogic
becauseAnselmdidnotinvestigate
earlymedieval
philosophy"
itself"(104). Anselmis, veryprobably,
thegiantof theentireperiod.Another
andoddly,onethatmanyscholars
tocorrect
for
havebeentrying
misrepresentation,
reference
totheproblem
ofuniversais.
yearsnow,issuesfromtheauthor'sconstant
As theindexshows,thetopicofuniversais
has thelargestsubjectentry,
slightly
eventhanthenumber
ofentries
onGod. Anexample
ofan oversight
having
greater
between
thesamesourceistheabsenceofanydiscussion
oftherelationship
affectivity
andreason.Thisissuehasbeena topicfordebateinEuropean
onAnselm
scholarship
in particular,
in Abelardas well,fora goodnumber
of
thoughtheissueis present
yearsnow.
Despitethesereservations,
EarlyMedieval
(480-1150):An Introduction
Philosophy
remainsa verymuchneededand usefulbook. Many scholarsand students
of
Medievalphilosophy
willbe abletomakegooduseofitandbe thankful
toitsauthor.
Leuven

J. Decorte

andLearning
Latinin13th-century
, vol.I. Texts,vol.II.
TonyHunt,Teaching
England
Glosses,vol.III. Indexes,Cambridge
1991,ix&453pp., 175pp.,365
(Brewer)
pp. ISBN 085991299X.
The titleofthisimportant
is perhaps
nottheoneI wouldhavechosen.
publication
aimofthebook:toshowthatin theEnglish
thefirst
It hardly
indicates
schoolrooms
Frenchand Englishwereusedto teachtheLatintexts.The subtitles
ofthethree
arenotveryexplicit
volumes
either:'Texts'doesnotmeanthatthisis theedition
of
a number
someareedited),butthevolumecontains
ofschoolbooks
a study
(though
ofthevariousmanualswithspecialattention
tothevernacular
glossestheyreceived
from
masters.
VolumeII. 'Glosses'contains
theedition
ofinterlinear
English
glosses
ofsomemanualstreated
in vol. I. Vol. Ill 'Indexes'contains
an indexofglosses,
LatinVernacular
andVernacular-Latin,
meanttoguidethereadertotheplacewhere
it receivesfullerdiscussion,
whilevol. I containsalso an "Index of Manuscripts
Used" and an "Index" toutcourtofpropernamesand somesubjects.
- without
To continue
withexternal
fora moment
considerations
ofsome
speaking
- vol.I is not
titles(like"III. Grammar,
4. The Grammars")
veryconcisechapter
an easybookto read.The treatment
ofthevariousmanualsis verydiverse.Somea shortintroduction,
wefindthetranscription
ofan English
times,after
manuscript
ofa Latintext,sometimes
a listofvernacular
inthemanuscripts,
someglossesfound
timestheeditionofa glossedtext,sometimes
ofthese.The complexand
nothing
diverse
material
is notpresented
ina clearly
form.
recognizable
Pagesareverycomfromone subjectto thenextnoteasyto find.However,an
pactand transitions
readerwillfindhiswayand willdiscover
interested
a veryrichmaterial.
Letus cometothesubjectofthisimportant
book.The threeaimsthattheauthor
hadbefore
hiseyeshavelargely
beenaccomplished.
Firstofall,hehasclearly
demonstrated
thatteaching
in theschoolswasnotan exclusively
Latinbusiness.Manuals
werein Latin,themaster'scommentary
oftenused Anglo-Norman
(theinsular
between
thesethreelanguages
werenotclosed,
French)and English.The frontiers
as in medievalEnglish
but,as theauthorsays: "In themedievalschoolroom,
thethirteenth
werecomplementary,
Latin,Frenchand English
throughout
century,
deficiencies
ofvocabulary
in eachotheraccording
to thenatureand
supplementing
originofthesubject'(435).
The secondaim was to providea corpusof schooltexts,used in 13th-century
whichshowsall thevariety
ofthetexts
collection,
England.It is indeeda veryuseful
116
Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:36:05 AM

knowstohavebeenat
whomeverybody
readin theschools,
apartfromtheauctores
andtreatises
aboutterms
tocomthebasis.The schoolbooksrangefromgrammars
Hebrewand Greek.One couldwonderifsome
and 'exotica'concerning
mentaries
The presence
ofglosses,
even
herewereinfactusedforteaching.
ofthebookstreated
thepractical
doesnotseemtoproveautomatically
inthevernacular,
oflexicalglosses
itis hardtobelievethata bulkydicForinstance,
useofthetextin theschoolroom.
a number
usedlikethat.It contains
ofverlikethatofHuguciowasactually
tionary
totheauthor
havebeen
ofwhich
others
somecanbe attributed
nacular
himself,
items,
andcomestotheconcluaddedlater.Hunthasexamined
eightinsularmanuscripts
he
in thevernacular
entries"(387). However,
sionthatthereis "a certain
stability
and
doesnottellus howmanyvernacular
glosseshe hasfoundin thesemanuscripts
ifthereareclearindications
thattheywererealschoolbooks.
Hugucio's Derivations
whichwascertainly
usedbynumerous
wasa verypopularandinfluential
dictionary,
itwouldhavebeenaboutas
butforuse in theschoolroom
scholars
(and teachers),
as theThesaurus
Latinae.
unpractical
Linguae
Thatleadsus to another
hasbeenlaidon vernacular
glosses
question.Emphasis
anduseful,
sinceverylittleattention
hadbeen
andthisis,ofcourse,understandable
The problem
is thatwe nowhavean ideaaboutthepresence
paidtothembefore.
butnotabouttherelationship
andimportance
ofvernacular
anddistribution
glosses,
andLatinglosses.Forinstance,
whentheauthortellsus that"In the
ofvernacular
ofJohnofGarland[...] wereheavily
sometimes
theworks
thirteenth
century
glossed,
we wouldliketo havean ideaofhowmanyvernacular
in thevernacular",
glosses
character.
But
are foundin comparison
to theLatin,and iftheyare ofa different
ofthevernacular
we finda discussion
glossesonly(see also e.g. p. 85, on
mostly,
: "Manysetsofglosses,
bothLatinandvernacular,
Alexander
ofVillaDei's Doctrinale
wereproduced",
butin thefollowing
pages,apartfromone Latinglossquotedfor
itcontains,
andtheLatinaccessus
theinformation
, theauthorgivesa listoftheverSometimes
all oftheglossesare
nacularglossesfoundinsomeEnglish
manuscripts).
dedifferenciis
(125-35),anditseems
given,as itis thecaseforSerloofWilton'sVersus
Of course,this
to methatthisis thewayin whichglossedtextsshouldbe treated.
ofmanualsdiscussed
here.But
taskforthecollection
wouldhavebeenan impossible
itwouldbe a veryusefulthingto do foreditors
ofLatintexts.
There
aimofthestudywastomakea contribution
tolexicology.
thethird
Finally,
and notonlyforthevernacular
is no doubtthatit is an important
contribution,
I am surethatmycolleagues
oftheDictionary
Latinwillfind
oj Medieval
languages.
in thisveryrichand original
muchprecious
material
publication.
's-Gravenhage

Olga Weijers

andhisContemporaries
TheEternity
in theThought
, ed.
oftheWorld
ofThomas
Aquinas
J.B.M. Wissink,Leiden (E.J. Brill) 1990 (= Studienund Texte zur
des Mittelalters
Bd. 27).
Geistesgeschichte
ofa symposium
heldin December1986on therecepThissmallbookis theresult
oftheworldat the
tionofThomasAquinas'viewsinthethinking
abouttheeternity
was
ofthefourteenth
The meeting
andthebeginning
endofthethirteenth
century.
of
in Utrecht,
one ofthepurposes
bytheThomasAquinasWorkgroup
organized
ofall as a
whichis to evaluatethethesisthatAquinashas to be understood
first
Character
"The Theological
Ofthepapersinthisvolume,onlythefirst,
theologian.
"
s De aeternitate
mundi
ofAquinas'
byF.J.A. de Grijs,devotesitself
single-mindedly
117
Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:36:05 AM

to demonstrating
thatAquinas'interests
werepredominantly
theological,
arguing
thatAquinas'principal
motive
inDe aeternitate
wastoshowthateveniftheworldwere
limitless
in duration,
itwouldneverbe God. Buthowever
reasonable
Professor
De
ofThomasAquinasmight
be in general,
theevidence
ofDe aeternitate
Grijs'portrait
mundi
doesnotsupport
it:inthesecondpaperofthevolume,
whowas
J.A. Aertsen,
invited
tocomment
on thepapersofthevolume,quitethoroughly
demonstrates
the
ofProfessor
De Grijs'view.Giventhatbothpapersareprinted
inthe
implausibility
De GrijsrejectedProfessor
Aertsen's
volume,I can onlyassumethatProfessor
butthereis no indication
whathisresponse
to Aertsen
was.
arguments,
Thiscontradiction
between
thefirst
twopapersis indicative
ofa moregeneral
problemconcerning
thepublication
ofconference
papers:shouldthepapersbepublished
moreorlessas theyweregivenorshouldtheresults
oftheconference
discussions
be
thepapers?In thiscase,sincetheconference
usedtoeditandimprove
wasfocussed
so narrowly
on a singletopicandsincemuchwastobe learnedbyeachauthorfrom
theothers,
itappearsthateither
theeditorinhisintroduction
ortheauthors
inrevisthatthejuxtaposition
ingtheir
papersshouldhavedonemoretoshowthenewinsights
ofthepaperscouldbringabout.A smallexample
ofthisisthefollowing.
In hispaper,
ofWilliam
dela MareintheverJ.M.M.H. Thijssen
(note30)quotestheCorrectorium
"
sionfoundin the1954edition
oftheCorrectorium
to
," ascribed
Corruptorii
Quaestione
EarlierM.F.J.M.Hoenenhaddiscussed
WilliamofMacclesfield.
thesamepassage
to theversionfoundin the 1927editionof theCorrectorium
according
Corruptorii
"
"
insignificant
QuareofRichardKnapwell
(seenote66),wherethetextdiffers
ways.
toThijssen
dela Mare"onlycasually
mentions
thatAquinas
According
(87),William
didnotsucceedinsolving
theargument
thatan eternal
worldentailsthetraversal
of
an infinity,"
whilein theversion
citedbyHoenen(48), "Mare swearstoGod that
Thomas did not give a viable solution,neitherreal nor apparent,neither
northeologically."
Now theauthorsof thecorrectoria
philosophically
"Quare"and
"
"
thatWilliamde la Mare'sstrategy
in thiscasewasto
Quaestione
clearlythought
swearto God,becausetheyobject(Hoenen,52) thatan oathis an extremely
weak
intotruth
thatproceeds
andhasnoplaceinanenquiry
argument
bywayofa disputation(notes91,92). ThusThijssen
wellhaverevised
hispapertotakeHoenen's
might
evidenceintoaccount.
Mostofthepapersin thevolumeare ofa somewhat
nature,buta
preliminary
number
ofimportant
tolight.In William
de la Mare'sCorrectorium
pointsarebrought
Fratris
Thomae
forsayingthatthenon-eternity
oftheworldis
, Thomasis criticized
offaith
andcannotbe provedandthata causeneednotalwaysprecede
solelya matter
itseffect
intime,butWilliam
dela Marenevermentions
mundi
,
Aquinas'Deaeternitate
is mentioned
in onlyone ofthecorrectoria
the
which,
moreover,
corruptorii
(namely
44Circa with
oftheworld.Although
de la Marealsodoesnot
")
regardtotheeternity
criticize
thesestakenfrom
fromthethirdpart
works,
Aquinas'purelyphilosophical
oftheSumma
tode la Mare
tohavebeenunknown
Theologiae
(whichHoenenbelieves
at thistime),norfrom
BooksII-IV ofThomas'Commentary
on theSentences
(which
wasavailabletohim),moreuseshouldhavebeenmadeofthecorrectorial
silenceon
De aeternitate
tounderstand
mundi
thehistorical
of
significance
(orlackofsignificance)
thisparticular
workinrelation
toThomas'other
works.
Relatedtothisistheevidence
thatHenryofHarclayresponded
to Aquinas'arguments
on therelation
ofinfinity
oftheworldin theversion
to thepossibleeternity
foundin theSumma
contra
gentiles
as foundin theSumma
1.46.2
(Thijssen,note20) or to similar
arguments
Theologiae
andintheScriptum
libros
Sententiarum
and
II, d.1, q. 1, a.5, whileThomasWylton
super
WilliamofAlnwick
dependon HenryofHarclay,notgoingbacktoanyofthetexts
in Aquinason thisquestion.It wouldappear,then,thathistorians
haveoveremmundi
nexusofarguments
is to be
, ifthetruehistorical
phasizedtheDe aeternitate
understood.
118

00:36:11 AM

in thisvolumeshow,moreworkalsohastobe donetounderstand
As thearticles
oftheworldto
on theeternity
ofAquinas'arguments
relation
thehistorical
correctly
toBonaventure?
And
wasAquinasresponding
To whatextent
thoseofBonaventure.
toBonaventoAquinasortoBonaventure?
werelaterauthors
According
responding
toAquinasitis possiwhereas
worldis impossible,
created
ture,an eternal
according
thecase.ForBonaventure,
tofaith,
creation
not,infactandaccording
ble,although
to Aquinas(becausea causeneed
in time,whereasaccording
a beginning
requires
thetwoarticles
from
intime)itdoesnot.I infer
itseffect
notprecede
byP. vanVeldis possibleifit is
huijsenin thisvolumethatAquinas'viewis thateternalcreation
createstheworldas, byanalogy,a light
in thesensethatGod eternally
understood
- theeffect
will
toproducean illumination
be understood
sourcemight
continuously
toact(80, note23, quoting
toexistunlessthecausecontinues
notcontinue
Aquinas
nonesse,cum
si sibirelinquatur
dist.1, art.2 sol.:itaquodrescreata
In II Sent.,
, consequatur
LikeWilliamde la Mare,wholater
causesuperioris).
nisiexinfluentia
essenonhabeat,
seemsonly
Bonaventure
sworethatAquinasdidnotprovesucha situation
possible,
tosaythatsucha view,thattheworldiseternally
, isentirely
produced
byGodexnihilo
andreason,andso againstreasonthat,"I havebelieved
truth
) that
(crediderim
against
ofhowever
smallan intellect,
hadposited
noneofthephilosophers,
) this,for
(posuisse
contradiction"
a manifest
thisimplies
in itself
(Cf. 36, n. 45; and94, n. 17,forthe
Ifa philosopher
ofitsmeaning).
Latintext,and28and85 fordiffering
interpretations
suchas ThomasAquinasdoesmakethisclaim,wheredoesthatleave
ofgreatintellect
in thethirteenth
tobelievethat"philosopher"
Is itplausible
Bonaventure?
century,
ofantiquity?
to paganthinkers
as De Grijsclaims(3), onlyrefers
addstheargument
In support
ofBonaventure's
views,RichardofMiddleton
(Sent.
abeterno
theworld
, hewouldnecessarily
II, dist.1, art.3,q. 4) thatifGodhadcreated
thathe
itis impossible
createit,therefore
havecreatedit,buthedidnotnecessarily
in
a
to
seems
Here
Richard
created
itabeterno
effect,
take,
interpretatemporal
(72).
- whatis,whenitis,is necessarily.
Thisstrong
tionofnecessity
according
argument,
toVanVeldhuijsen
byHenryofGhent.Richardalso
(79,n. 15),hadbeenmadefirst
be possible
creation
ofhoweternal
Thomas'interpretation
byclaiming
might
rejects
fromconservation
wouldnotdiffer
creation
thaton thisinterpretation
(buthe has
theworldhasbeenmade(factum
est),itis notconFinally,
arguedthatitdoesdiffer).
ab
so thesensein whichAquinasclaimedthatcreation
becoming
(infieri),
tinuously
ruledout:Sedhaeccavillatio
ofcreation,
aeterno
is possibleis, as itwerebydefinition
estetnonestinconenim
Omne
, quam
quod
factum
procontraria.
facit
promeaopinione
magis
mundus
est.Cumergo
tinuo
sit,etnonsit
factus
, inaliquoinstanti
fierivelfactum
incepit
fieri
concecavillationem
utetiam
essepossent,
incontinuo
, necistaduosimul
ponentes
praedictam
fieri
autfactus
est,necaliter
produci
potuit
dunt,
fieriinaliquoinstanti,
incepit
quodmundus
sequitur
In II Sent.dist.1, art.3, qu. 4 sol. sequel).Van
(81, n. 31, quotingMiddleton,
toAquinasIn II
is responding
claimshere(78) to showthatMiddleton
Veldhuijsen
seems
butsinceVanVeldhuijsen
usedinthiscontext,
Sent.1, 1,2, a textneverbefore
ofthis
theaccuracy
ofbothAquinasand Middleton,
thearguments
to misinterpret
A relevant
identification
pieceofevidencewouldbe
oughtto be checkedfurther.
cannot
thattobe made(factum
infactAquinasconcedes
whether
esse)andtobe infieri
- as Middleton
claimstobe truefortheauthorof
bothbe thecaseat thesametime
abaeterno
wouldseemfromthisstudytohavebeena
thecavillatio.
Indeed,creation
etultimo
instanti.
deprimo
forlaterdiscussions
likelymotivation
usedby Bonaventure
aboutinfinites
are thearguments
ofgreatinterest
Finally,
butrejected
ab aeterno
is impossible,
to provethatcreation
and others
byHenryof
in theend
himself
in thearticleofThijssen.Thijssenconfines
Harclay,as discussed
thanprobing
on Harclay,rather
thedependency
ofWylton
andAlnwick
toshowing
I wouldhavelikedto be told
and issuesinvolved.
moredeeplyintothearguments
a Deo
sitaeternaliter
ilAnistasimul
tohisquestion,
howWylton
stent,
quodmotus
replied
119

00:36:11 AM

nonprodumundum
etcumhocquodDeussicproducit
libere,
ipsum
quodpotuit
productus
Discussions
xisse - inMedieval
, published
byBrillin 1990,
oftheWorld
oftheEternity
thatWylton
thesubtleanswer
tookplace,RichardDalesexplains
after
thisconference
cannotbe simultaneously
true,
gave:thatas faras he can see thetwopropositions
theworld
waseternally
thatmotion
byGod andthatGod freely
produced
produced
tothe
nothaveproduced
in sucha waythathe might
it,butnevertheless
according
In a footnote
thattheworldiseternal.
reasonitmaybe moreprobable
lightofnatural
thatin his 1984editionofHenryofHarclay'squestion,
(n. 71) Thijssenindicates
of
RichardDalessaysthatHenryofHarclayagreeswithAquinasthattheexistence
to Thijssen,"Fromthecareful
butaccording
worldis possible,
an eternal
studyof
mainmundi
Wippel(1981)...itisclearthatAquinasinnotextpriortohisDeaeternitate
worldis possible."Ifthearthatan eternal
andwithout
tainspositively
qualification
mundi
itis thatwithout
on De aeternitate
ticlesin thisvolumeshowanything,
,
replying
Thomas'successors
,
corruptorium
(Williamde la Mare,theauthorsofthecorrectoria
RichardofMiddleton,
HenryofHarclay,etal.) tookhimtohavearguedthroughout
ab aeterno
is philosophically
worksthatcreation
his theological
possible.Now that
mundi
is availablefrom
ofa corpusoftextsDe aeternitate
andedition
Dales' study
Brill,
issuesthatwere
theveryfascinating
willpursuefurther
itistobe hopedthathistorians
bythis1986symposium.
opened,butnotsettled,
Edith Sylla

NorthCarolinaStateUniversity

et
introduction
Premire
delogique.
Somme
Guillaume
d'Ockham,
partie.Traduction,
notesde JolBiard,Mauvezin(Trans-Europ-Repress)
1988,XXIV & 242 p.
de Guillaume
etthologiques
desuvresphilosophiques
Grce l'dition
critique
d'Ockhamparueentre1967et 1988(St. Bonaventure
University,
N.Y.), l'examen
desparties
la mmepriode,
Pendant
stimul.
desthories
d'Ockhama tfortement
iciJolBiard
Dansle livrerecens
ontttraduites.
du matrefranciscain
destraits
a traduit
la premire
en franais
logicae
('Somme
1-77)de la Summa
partie(chapitres
de cetteSommeontcitesparBiard:
desparties
de logique').D'autrestraductions
en anglaisparM. Loux(premire
lestraductions
partie)de 19741,etparA.J.FreddosoetH. Schurman
parR.
(uneanthologie)
(secondepartie)en 19802;enallemand
enallemand
cettelistela traduction
Kunze,19843.On peutajouter
(uneanthologie)
parR. Imbachde 19844etcelled'unepetitepartiede la Somme(II-3, 10-16)surles
et EleonoreStump,en
modalesen anglaispar NormanKretzmann
consquences
19885.
un tournant
de la philosophie
En gard l'importance
d'Ockham,qui constitue
en faciliter
contribuent
ces diversestraductions
de la philosophie,
dansl'histoire
et l'accessibilit.
l'interprtation
la premire
unedition
Biardnousprsente
partie
L'ouvrageconcernant
bilingue.
delogique,
iln'estpasclairsi la restesuivra.Le textelatina tphotograde la Somme
ont
desrfrences
etleschiffres
de 1974,maislesnotesde rfrence
phide l'dition
l'il.
Il en rsulte
desvides,qui ne sontpas trsagrables
tlimins.
fournie
trssommaire
d'Ockhaml'introduction
nonspeciliste
Pourunlecteur
par
mdide la philosophie
d'unexpert
sanscommentaire
Biardnefacilite
pasla lecture
tre
de supposition,
les termesimportants
vale. Par exemple,
verification,
signification,
et un index
Une tabledes matires
n'ontpas t expliqussystmatiquement.
le texteplusaccessible.
rendre
auraientaussicontribu
de l'anne
Dans sonchapitre
(p. II) Biardne faitpas mention
Repres
biographiques
en 1986parG. Gi: 1347au lieude 13496.Cettesugde la mortd'Ockhamsuggre
treuefavorablement7.
gestiona pourtant
120
Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:36:17 AM

La traduction
bonneetprcise,
estsuprieure
d'autresparuesrcemelle-mme,
ilva sansdirequedansles242pagesdela traduction
onpeutnoter
ment.Cependant,
certaines
fauteset contester
interprtations.
Voiciles fautesqueje noteici etles suggestions
que je propose8.
I. Des motset passagesqui n'ontpas ttraduits:
- p. 43 (voirle textelatin,ch. 12,r. 21): exintellectibus'
p. 49 (ch. 14,r. 5): singulari
; p. 51 (ch. 14,r. 45-7):estcausa... sol'p. 55
(singulier);
p. 93 (ch. 27, r. 6): dicitur
a tomisparhaplographie;
... particulares
p. 93 (ch. 27,
(ch. 15,r. 105):huiusmodi
r. 16):subiecti;
est
p. 114(ch. 38, r. 60-1):albedo
p. 103(ch. 34, r. 48): desubstantia)
n'a pas ttraduit.
Une exception
estle soleil,qui
ens'p. 115(ch. 39, r. 42): omnia
estunselonl'espceetaussiun selonle nombre;
p. 116(ch.39,r. 40): omnia'
p. 116
... quoderitvera
; p. 168(ch. 72, r. 168-70):etnondenotatur
;
(ch.49, r. 7): a reabsoluta
p. 217 (ch. 70, r. 74) immo.
II. Je proposeles corrections
suivantes:
- p. 54 (ch. 15,r. 84): inpropositionibus
mentalibus.
La traduction
nedonnepasle pluriel,maisle singulier;
p. 93 (ch. 27, r. 15): etesttraduit
par 'or' au lieude 'et'; p.
n'estpas systmatique
94 (ch. 28, r. 5 et 10): la traduction
de sermo
('formules',
'
'
'nonc');p. 99 (ch. 33, r. 5): je proposede traduirealbumpar 'ce qui estblanc'
au lieude 'blanc'parcequela doublesignification
doittreexprime
(voiraussipour
r. 54: 'ce qui estrationel'
descas semblables:
au lieude 'rationel';
33,
p.' 101,ch.
*
par'ce qui estmusical'au lieude 'le musicien');p.
p. 113,ch. 38, r. 43 musicum
104(ch. 34, r. 5): veldoittretraduit
par 'ou', pas par 'toutefois';
p. 217(ch. 70,
r.82): cum
extra
de la partie<de la proposition
>
parte
capta.
Jeprfre:
'accompagn
au lieude: 'accompagn
de sonobjectpropre',parceque
qui a tprisesparment'
cettetraduction-ci
se rfre
au niveaudeschoses,et pas au niveaude la langue;p.
'Il estdonccorrect
218 (ch. 71, r. 28-35):Je prfre:
d'infrer:
'celuiqui voittout
homme
estunanimal,doncceluiquivoittouthomme
estcetanimal-ci
[haplographie
estcetanimal-l
ou cetanimal-l
chezBiard],ou celuiquivoittouthomme
[omispar
Biard]et ainside suitepourchaqueproposition
[pluslogiquequ"animal',je crois]
voiraussi
omne
au lieude omnemy
Mais dansla phrase'tout[je prfre
singulire.
cf.p. 232,ch. 73, r. 65-6]ce qui voitun
de l'ditionmoderne;
criticus
l'apparatus
hommeest un animal' [Biardne traduitpas cettephrase],puisquele signe
ne
la totalit
de l'expression
< universel
> distribue
'qui voitunhomme',le prdicat
'de n'importe
Il va de mmepourla proposition
dtermine.
supposepasde matire
seulement
supposede manire
quelhommeun [Biard:1'] ne court',o le prdicat
Mais dans'l'ne de n'importe
confuse.
supposede
quel hommecourt',le prdicat
'aveclesquelles
manire
, je prfre:
dtermine';
p. 224(ch. 72,r. 151):aequivalenter
au lieud"implicitcment'
ilssontquivalents'
p. 231,ch. 73,
(de mmeparexemple
... quoderitveran'a pas Ctraduit.
r. 19); p. 225(ch. 72,r. 168-70):etnondenotatur
surle faitque la traendpitdesobservations
Pourfinir
ci-dessus,
je veuxinsister,
delogique
estbonneet intelligente.
de cettepremire
duction
partiede la Somme
E.P. Bos

Leiden

1 Ockham'
andintroduced
s Theorie
, translated
, PartI oftheSumma
by
Logicae
ofTerms
1974.
M.J. Loux,Notre-Dame-London
2 Ockham'
s Theory
, translated
, PartII oftheSumma
byA.J.FredLogicae
ojPropositions
1980.
Notre-Dame-London
introduced
dosoand H. Schurman,
byA.J.Freddoso,
3 Wilhelm
derLogik
vonOckham,
Summe
, AusTeilI: UberdieTermini.
Ausgewhlt,
von P. Kunze,
und Anmerkungen
und mitEinfhrung
bersetzt
herausgegeben
Lateinisch-Deutsch,
Hamburg1985.
121

00:36:17 AM

4 Wilhelm
zurTheorie
derErkenntnis
vonOckham,Texte
undderWissenschaft.
Lateinischundkommentiert
vonR. Imbach,Stuttgart
bersetzt
1984.
Deutsch,
herausgegeben,
5 in TheCambridge
Translations
Texts.
Vol. One. Logicandthe
oj Medieval
Philosophical
and E. Stump,Cambridge
, editedby N. Kretzmann
1988,
Philosophy
ofLanguage
314-36.
6 G. Gi, William
inApril1347, in: Franciscan
DiedImpenitent
Studies,42
ofOckham
(1982:paruen 1986),90-5.
7 VoirparexempleM. McCordAdams,William
Ockham
, NotreDame 1987,XVI.
8 Les numros
despagesdu textelatinsontlesmmesque lesnumros
despagesde
la traduction.

Oxford
au XIVesicle:
contre
etlibert
cre
J.-Fr.Genest,Prdtermination
Buckingham
Paris(Vrin)1992,327 pp. ISBN 2 7116 11140.
Bradwardine,
Thisis thefirst
detailedstudyofthedisputes
between
and
ThomasBradwardine
hisopponents,
whomhe calledthe'ModernPelagians',overtheproblem
offuture
issuesat Oxfordin the1330sand
It was amongthemostimportant
contingents.
wherethedebatesspreadtoParis.Although
intothefif1340s,from
theycontinued
and seventeenth
teenthcentury
and wererevivedin thesixteenth
centuries,
they
neveragainhadquitethesameimportance
which
partofthefourtheyhadinthefirst
teenthcentury.
Unliketheaccompanying
overtheneedfora supercontroversy
naturalhabitofgracein meritorious
acts,thedenialofwhich,andtheconcomitant
offreewill,wastheother
elevation
ofthepowers
partofBradwardine's
against
charge
theModernPelagians,
theproblem
offuture
didnotplaya comparable
contingents
andithasbeenlargely
inthediscussions
of
partin Reformation
theology;
neglected
latermedieval
Eveninthefirst
madein
studies
ofBradwardine,
full-length
theology.
the1950s,onlya fewpagesweredevoted
tohistreatment
offuture
Yet,
contingents.
as thethird
andfinalpartofhismagnum
as Genest
opus,De CausaDei, itcrystallises,
says,some of the mostimportant
century
speculation,
questionsof fourteenth
and theological;
and itswas to hisdoctrines
confuture
philosophical
concerning
thatBradwardine
owedmuchofhiscelebrity,
boththenandinthesixteenth
tingents
and seventeenth
centuries.
Genessbookis the firstproperstudyof thiscrucialfacetof Bradwardine's
inaddition
toDe CausaDei, hedrawsuponBradwardine's
earlier
andshorter
outlook;
treatise
on future
editedbyGenestin 1979,and setsthem
previously
contingents,
editedforthefirst
Questionon future
againstThomasBuckingham's
contingents,
was a former
timehere,delivered
in reply.Buckingham
at
pupilofBradwardine,
Mertoncollege,Oxford.His questionwas partofhisinaugural
determination
as a
masteroftheology,
to Genest,givenshortly
ofDe
aftertheappearance
according
CausaDei, in 1344.Nottheleastofthemerits
ofGenessbookis tohaveidentified
thenatureandcircumstances
ofBuckingham's
in whichhis
Theological
Questions,
themfrom
a fogoflargely
fanciful
on future
appears,rescuing
question
contingents
was framed
as a direct
speculation.
questionon future
contingents
Buckingham's
to thepointof takingfiveofthepropositions,
riposteto Bradwardine's
positions,
drawnupandcondemned
as erroneous,
themagainst
anddefending
byBradwardine
isso fartheonlyknown
andsystematic
Bradwardine's
detailed
charge.Buckingham's
ofthecommon
Genesttreatshimhereas therepresentative
replyto Bradwardine.
as ithadbecomeknown,
whichwashisprimary
Geness
opinion,
target.
Although
bookis almostwholly
withtheissueswhichthesedisputes
concerned
raised,to the
122
Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:36:29 AM

oftherestofBradwardine'
s outlook,
itmarksa newphasein thestudyof
exclusion
abouthimalmostforthefirst
andmakesa moreinformed
Bradwardine,
judgement
timepossible.
from
of future
whichreceiveditsclassicformulation
The problem
contingents,
a Christian
inhisConsolation
context,
, bookfive,arose,within
Boethius,
ofPhilosophy
withtheconas partofhisomniscience,
God'sforeknowledge,
overhowtoreconcile
andmoreespecially
thefreeactsofhumanfreewill.It was
offuture
events,
tingency
in De Interpretation
famous
, chapter
nine,that
statement,
byAristotle's
complicated
aboutpastandpresent
eventsarenecessarily
trueorfalse,proposwhilepropositions
whicharestilltohappen,remainopenandso contingent.
tionsaboutfuture
events,
and so foreknowledge
ofwhathadyetto
Thatseemedeitherto preclude
certainty,
determined
thefuture
come,or,iftherewassuchknowledge,
appearedtobe already
Discussionof theissues,and proffered
and humanfreedom
solutions,
destroyed.
and thirteenth
becamea regular
feature
amongtwelfth
century
theologians,
beginin the1320s,theyincluded,
byBradwardine,
ningwithSt.Anselm.As encountered
in identifying
thecommonopinion.Genestfollows
CalvinNormore
amontothers,
had
wasthat,whereas
Godnecessarily
Ockhamwithitsauthor.Itsmaincontention
ofpastandpresent
as already
comeintobeing,
determinate
events,
having
knowledge
was as contingent
ofthefuture
as theeventswhichhad yetto be.
his knowledge
remainded
becausehe
hisknowledge
ofthefuture
Nevertheless,
equallyinfallible,
The
knewfuture
eventsnolessimmutably
thanhedidthoseofthepastandpresent.
statusof whathe knew,notin thequalityof his
distinction
lay in thedifferent
Ifheweretoknowas existing
whatdidnotyetexist,andmight
notexist,
knowledge.
thefuture
wouldbe determined
and contingency
Ockhamwas able to
destroyed.
withGod's omniscience
reconcilesuchcontingent
by distinguishing
knowledge
takenin thebroadsenseof
of whatis trueand knowledge
betweenknowledge
thefalseas wellas thetrue,and theimpossible
as wellas the
knowable,
anything
didnotknow
possible.Hence,overwhatis trueGod can knowwhathe previously
- or,as
as truebeforeit becametrue.The changewas notin God buttheobjects
in
the
about
which
can
the
created
Ockhamtermed
it, propositions objects
change
to explainhowGod wasable to
worldofmutable
Ockhamdidnotattempt
things.
and yetas it changed.Thatwas a matter
offaith
knoweverything
unchangeably
whicheverybelievermustaffirm.
Genestshowsless thancomplete
with
rapport
todismissthisdistinction
between
thesetwodifferent
connotaOckham,appearing
tionsofknowledge
as simply
thereceived
distinction
between
of
God's knowledge
visionandhisknowledge
ofsimpleunderstanding.
Evenifthatis whatitwas,itwas
inOckham'
s hands,puttoa newandsophisticated
Noris
nevertheless,
application.
thereanysignoftheembarassment
s statement
whichGenestdiscerns
inOckham'
of
overhowGod knowseverything
future
and contingently.
The
ignorance
evidently
oftheological
ofa viatortoknowa multiplicity
is a regular
truths
refrain
in
inability
hiswritings
andoneofthemaininstruments
in hiscriticism
ofprevious
theological
andmetaphysical
suchas thehitherto
forGod'sexistence.
accepted
proofs
arguments,
WhereOckhamdid leavefaithvulnerable
was in hisadmission
thatdivineprotothefuture
couldhaveneverbeenrevealed.
Thatwasextended
pheciesdirected
by
hisimmediate
to mean,amongotherthings,
successors,
amongthemBuckingham,
thatrevelation
couldbe falseandthatGodandChristcouldmisleadand,inChrist's
todissociate
Godfrom
case,alsobemisled.Theywereforthemostpartcareful
lying;
buttheboundary
wasa fineone. RichardFitzRalphwrestled
withtheproblem
for
a solution.
twenty
years,without
reaching
Perhapsthatledhimtohislaterrenunciationofscholastic
As bothNormore
and Genestsay,revelation
was the
philosophy.
Achilles'
heelofthecommon
onwhichBradwaropinion.It wasoneofmaingrounds
dineopposedit,as theaccompaniment
oftheotherprincipal
ofmaking
God
offence,
withhiswilland knowledge
in accordance
withchangesin the
mutable,
changing
123

00:36:29 AM

Bradwardine
world.Fromthatstandpoint
was on muchstronger
groundthanhis
andGenestnotestheimpactofhisarguments
adversaries;
uponthem,inthe1330s,
as theydevisedincreasingly
If Ockhamhad provided
complexcounter-arguments.
forthecommon
theframework
wentfarbeyondanything
opinion,itsdevelopment
thathe hadsaid;and he hadtheprudence
tostopat thepointfromwhichhissucthecertainty
ofrevelation.
cessorsproceeded,
byquestioning
In factBradwardine
andhisadversaries
different
beganfrom
entirely
standpoints,
shows.ForOckhamandthefollowers
ofthecommon
as Genestclearly
conopinion,
meantmutability
and couldonlyoccurin time.Henceitcouldonlyapply
tingency
to thefuture,
whichbrought
had cometo be, in eitherthe
change.Once anything
orthepast,itwasnecessary.
Theonlynecessity
whichtheyrecognized
inrelapresent
was a conditional
tionto thefuture
statement
aboutthefuture,
whichfollowed
to theeffect
froma necessary
antecedent
that,ifGod willed
logically
proposition,
somefuture
conditional
untilit did so. For
event,it wouldoccur;butit remained
was governed
on theotherhand,everything
of
Bradwardine,
by a combination
andconsequent
as realities.
The first
described
antecedent
Godinhispure
necessity
causeofallexistence,
as first
atoncesupremely
inhimself
and
omnipotence
necessary
all thatwasoutsidehim.The second,consetowards
freein hisvolitions
supremely
from
theexistence
thatGodhaswilledbyhis
followed
ofeverything
quentnecessity,
antecedent
will,namelythe wholeof creation,includinghumanfreewill. As
God's antecedent
is not simplythe first
employedby Bradwardine,
necessity
immediate
causeofeverything
cause
else;heisat onceconcauseandmoreimmediate
in everycreatedsecondcause.Without
thecausationofthefirst
causethesecond
causecouldnotexistor act.Bradwardine
thuspresented
theapparent
paradoxthat
freewillandcontingency
nolessthannecessity
resulted
from
theantecedent
necessity
ofGod,notbecausehewilledtonecessitate
butbecausehewastheuniveranything,
causeofeverything,
so that,havingoncefreely
willedsomething,
sallyefficacious
thefreewilling
ofhumanfreewill,itmustbe. Thatis wherehe diverged
including
fromhisopponents,
likeBuckingham,
whorejected
sucha relation
between
God's
andconsequent
antecedent
insteada mutualconcourse
necessity
necessity,
positing
thedivineand humanwills,to whicheachcontributed.
between
In thatsense,as
Genestsays,theiropposition
overtheirdifferent
ofantecedent
conceptions
necessity
derived
from
their
different
waysofconceiving
consequent
necessity.
Theywentwith
different
ofcontingency.
forBradwardine,
wasnot
First,contingency,
conceptions
tothefuture
confined
butappliedtoeverything
as freely
willedbyGod.Correlatively,
wasnottheproperty
ofpastandpresent
butappliedequallytothe
necessity
things,
as equallythenecessary
ofGod's antecedent
will.Second,confuture,
consequent
in opposition
to Buckingham,
and also Ockham,did notconsistin suctingency,
cessivechangein timefrom
onestatetoanother,
butexisted
bothin God'swilland
freewillas a simultaneous
tochoosebetween
so thatevenwhen
contraries,
capacity
a choiceofone rather
thantheotherhas beenmadeand actualised,
thepowerto
choosetheotherremained.
a different
That,as Genestsays,represented
conception
offreedom,
as locatedinvolition,
whichBradwardine
owedtoGrosseteste
andabove
all DunsScotus,in contrast
tohisopponents,
whoidentified
itwithchange,which,
outsideGod, couldonlyoccursuccessively,
in time.
Thatcanbe seenintheir
different
ofthedistinction
between
God's
interpretations
absolute
andordained
between
thesetwoaspectofGod'spower
power.Theinterplay
wasoneofthefeatures
ofspeculation
inthefirst
halfofthefourteenth
It has
century.
beentakenas thehallmark
of'Ockhamism'
and'Nominalist'
As
frequently
theology.
bothofthesecategories
havecometobe,increasingly,
unreal,so hastheidentification
withthemoftheuse ofthedistinction
between
God's twokindsofpower.Among
Genest'
s moststriking
is theextensive
ofthedistinction
findings
employment
by
thearch-opponent
ofso-called
to assertGod's absolute
Bradwardine,
Ockhamism,
124

00:36:29 AM

antecedent
freedom,
power,nottohavewilledwhathasbecome
byhispureabsolute
ofthepast,together
The contingency
orconsequent
necessity.
pastbyhisordained
withthatof the present,lies in neverneedingto have been willedby God
forthemto be. Likehis
But,havingbeenwilled,it was necessary
antecedently.
nolimitation
Bradwardine
uponGod'sabsolute
power,as the
recognized
opponents,
antecedent
so that
will,savecontradiction,
pureandsimplepowerofhisomnipotent
Bradwarhecouldwill.Unlikehisopponents,
isnotcontradictory
whatever
however,
order
alternatives
tothepresent
dinedidnotapplyGod'sabsolute
powertopositing
decreedbyGod's ordained
Hence,while
byconsequent
necessity.
power,governed
countered
his
reviewer
toassert,as thepresent
itisuntenable
did,thatBradwardine
useofGod's absolutepowerbyhisuseofGod's ordained
power,where
opponents'
itcan be maintained
thatBradwardine
adhered
wereconcerned,
future
contingents
totheorderwhichGodhaddecreedforthisworldbyhisordained
power,wherethe
was concerned,
the relation
as governing
economyof graceand predestination
humanfreewill
between
God'swillandhumanwill.Justas,byconsequent
necessity,
invirtue
ofwhichitwasaloneableto
toGod'santecedent
oweditsliberty
necessity,
from
willfreely,
so itwasconstrained
beingabletoachievealonewhatwasnotfreely
from
thepartoftheequationwhichis missing
necessitated
byGod. It represented
Genest'
s book,becauseitis outsideitssubject.Ifthatmakesforlessthana complete
towards
a majorcontribution
s bookis nevertheless
Genest'
viewof Bradwardine,
thereceived
transformed
founded
view.Ithaslargely
a better
interpretation
achieving
anda return
notas an archaism
inhiscontext,
ofBradwardine
andplacedhimfirmly
butas verymuchof
ofAugustine,
lesssophisticated
toa moreimmediate,
theology
tobe feltintothe
hisage,uponwhichhehada directimpact,andwhichcontinued
seventeenth
century.
GordonLeff

York

d'Etienne
duaein Tholosam
et MarcVan derPoel,LesOraiiones
Kenneth
Lloyd-Jones
- Traduction
- Fac-simil
de l'Editionoriginale
Dolet(1534), Introduction
et
d'Humanisme
254
Genve
Renaissance,
Notes,
(Droz) 1992, pp. (Travaux
N CCLVII).
Enjuin 1531 la suitede nombreux
rixes,qui se rptaient
incidents,
bagarres,
des"nations
de Toulousemetfin l'existence
chaqueanne,unarrtdu Parlement
les tudiants
de
entrelesquellesse rpartissaient
ou congrgations
particulires"
sesactivits,
de poursuivre
Cela n'empcha
l'Universit.
franaise"
pas la "nation
'
puisqu'enmai 1533ellelisaitcomme'orateur"EtienneDoletg de 24 ans; en
"de Franceetd'Aquitaine"ilprodestudiants
devant
l'assemble
octobre1
gnrale
lesauteurs
de l'arrtvieuxplusde deuxans,accuss
discours
contre
nonaunviolent
mmede l'humade touteviesocialeetdoncdesfondements
d'trelesdestructeurs
la nationaquitaine,lui
nommPinache,appartenant
nit.Un "grammaticus"
sansdoutele 29 novembre,
jourde la saintSernin,patronde la ville;de
rpliqua,
ce qu'enditDoletqui,lu"prieur"de la nation
seulement
cetterplique
onconnat
au dbutde janviercontrePinache,contrela "nation
franaise
(doyen),pronona
encoreque le
plusinjurieux
aquitaine"etla villede Toulouse,un nouveaudiscours
de sonprotecArrt
le 23 mars1534Doletestlibrle 28 surintervention
premier.
au
teurJeande Pins,vquede Rieux.2Doletremercie
Minut,premier
prsident
incluant
de ses Oeuvres
maisn'enprpare
Parlement,
compltes
pas moinsunedition
Boysetpolit;sa lettre
etdespomeslesdeuxdiscours
avecdeslettres
qu'ilenrichit
Toulouse(Longeon,Corressondu 8 juindborde
d'unehaineencoreaccruecontre
125
Vivarium
XXXII, 1 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:36:38 AM

de Doletn 42, p. 48 et 138);celas'est-ilsu?le 22juinDoletestbannide

pondance
la ville;il se dirigeversLyon,mais,ralenti
parunemaladie,n'yarrivequ'enaot;
sesOeuvres
chezGryphe,
maislesprsents
dit-on
diteurs
d'ordinaire,
ysontpublies,
uneautrehypothse
de Doletysont
fort
plausible
proposent
(p. 217-220);lesuvres
unelettre
Cottereau
d'unesortede Prface,
d'unnomm
prcdes
SymonFinetius
avoirvol Doletle textede ses uvrespourles faireparatre;
on est
qui prtend
tonnque certains
rudits
au srieux
modernes
cetartifice:
besoin
tait-il
prennent
d'unvolpuisqueDoletlui-mme
sonintention?
avaitproclam
Pourmapartj'irais
etVan derPoel:ce Finetius
n'a sansdoutejamais
plusloinque MM. Lloyd-Jones
c'estunmasquede Dolet,uneinvention
l'orateur
exist,
quiluidonneplusdelibert;
n'a-t-ilpasle droitde mentir
etde transfigurer
la vrit
sa guise,commeil le proclamenavement
dansle 2e Discours
: "multainterdum
uelfingere,
uelofficiose
nonarcemex cloacafacere,sublimiadeprisimulare,
dissimulare,
nunquammentiri,
summoiurealiquandoagere,de iurequandoquedecedere,
mere,abiectaattollere,
omniadeniqueuariare,peruertere,
concessum
oratori
atquesolutum"
transferreque
la dfinition
de
, lui, le cicronien,
(p. 64, 1. 11-16)3et danssonErasmianus
rejette
l'orateur
comme"uirbonusdicendi
peritus":passerpour"bonus"aide persuader,
maisil n'estpas ncessaire
de l'tre4.
vivement
MM. L. et V. (qu'ils m'excusent
On remercie
d'abrgerainsileurs
delirecesdiscours,
clairs
etleurannonoms)de nouspermettre
parleurtraduction
Le premier
tation
dtaille.
taitceluidu texte;l'dition
de 1534comporte
problme
unelisted'errataqui sontici rpartis
dansles notes;MM. L. etV. en ontrelev
d'autresdontle plusamusant
est"animalium
monimentis"
(21,3)au lieude "anna" sembleavoir
"annalesdes vivants
lium",maisla traduction
prcdla correction.
On se permet
d'en suggrer
deuxautres:dans"reruminopiapressisociis,pecunia
calamitate
autcasualiquoafflictis,
adsumus"(14, 16)"pressis"
destitutis,
diligenter
offrirait
unsensplussatisfaisant5;
au milieudes"Gothos,Danos,Sclavos,- , Borusios" (10, 1-2)"Pomesanos"estune coquilleou une erreurpour"Pomeranos".
Inversement
certaines
corrections
dans"Audite,quaeso,quod
discutables;
paraissent
uelutiacceptainuisisa Deo opt.Max.antiquiilliusmandati
uideret
formula,
scilicet,
ne quid detrimenti
suae calumniae
acciperet,
Respub.Christiana
insignem
potius
reprocuranda
ddit."(59,27-60,3) fautquaminChristi
diligentiae
significationem
il corriger
"in uisis"en "inuisis"et comprendre:
"... commesi cetteglorieuse
et
- savoir,que nousdevionsveiller ce que la rpublique
ancienne
mission
chr- avaittentreprise
tiennenesubisseaucundommage
pardesgenshasdu grand
Dieu suprme"(175)6ou conserver
"in uisis" et traduire:
"... commesi dansdes
visions
elleavaitreude Dieutrsbonettrsgrandla formule
de l'antiqui chargeait
veiller ce que la Rpubliquechrtienne
ne subisseaucundommage,
que mission:
ellea manifest
de faonclatante
sonamourpourlesaccusations
fausses
plutt
que
sonzlepours'occuper
de l'intrt
du Christ."Il nes'agitpasde broutille;
L. etV.
"... l'importance
commentent:
d'un telparalllisme
procla(entresnatusconsulte
mantl'tatd'urgence
etbesoins
del'Eglise)mrite
d'tresouligne
carillaisseentendre l'urgencedes convictions
de Dolet sur cettequestion"(209); en ralitle
de Toulouse vouloir"sauver"l'Eglisepardes procs,
textecritique
la prtention
ce qui estsymtrique
en faitde la dmarche
rvolutionnaire
oppose,cellede Luther
la trasonattachement
avecvhmence
proclame
queDoletcritique
(54); lui-mme
riende
au "mosmaiorum"
dition,
qui n'ontapparemment
(55, 10)pourdesraisons
ilyvoit
c'estavecunerudeironie,
traditions
car,lorsqu'ilvoquecertaines
religieux,
dessuperstitions
dignesdesTurcs:chaqueannepourla saintGeorgeson introduit
desvuxsolennels
dansl'glisedeschevauxqui en fontneuffoisle tour;on forme
onconpourla santdeschevaux; datefixeon plongeunecroixdansla Garonne,
les
etsanscrue;pendant
clutun pacteavecle fleuve
pourque soncourssoitrgulier
de saints
statues
la villede vieilles
travers
scheresses,
l't,desenfants
promnent
126

00:36:38 AM

etsousla direction
onfaitdesprires
deprtres
pourla pluie(57). Ce passagevibrant
si Doletcomchrtienne
d'unepitvraiment
de colre7
tremisau compte
pourrait
la satiredesritessuperstitieux
paruneapologiede la pitrelle,intrieure;
pltait
de "in uisis"
maisalorson seraitchezErasmeetnonpluschezDolet.La correction
danslesdiscours
desmots
obsdante
en"inuisis"s'explique
parla prsence
peut-tre
sa
"inuideo","inuisus","inuidia"etde leurssynonymes
(soitque Doletproclame
haine,soitqu'il dnoncecelledontil estl'objet),maisellen'estpasjustifie.
propre
enlongues
danssesexordes,
la traduction.
Dolet,surtout
s'exprime
Aprsle texte,
avantleurs"antcdents",
lesinteril aimeplacerlesrelatives
priodes
compliques;
scinder
les
indirectes
avantlesverbesdontellesdpendent,
ou exclamatives
rogatives
d'unautregroupede mots."() inofficio
ensembles
grammaticaux
parl'inclusion
essemeputabo,(...) siquam,nisisensusexpersac sanamentecarens,nemoquidem
nonmodonondamnandam
sedomniretinostram
coniunctionem
iudiciis,
improbat,
lecfaciam"(3, 18-24); premire
nendam
cura,planum
atqueseruandam
diligenter
dont
tureon estdansle brouillard,
puison comprend
que "quam" estun relatif
nostram"
etqu'il estcomplment
l'antcdent
(si l'onosedire!)est"coniunctionem
il ya uneautreinversion
de l'ordrenormal,
de "improbat";
placer"nisi... carens"
on peuttraduire:
avant"nemo";finalement
queje suisdansmon
"(...) je penserai
seulement
devoirsije m'applique dmontrer
critique
par
que notreassociation,
etdpourvus
de bonsens,doittrenonpointcondamne
desgenssansjugement
par
avecle plusgrandsoin".On
lestribunaux,
maintenue
etprserve
maisau contraire
embarrass
au lecteur
sauragr MM. L. etV. du secoursqu'ilsapportent
parle
et le plussouvent
sa russite.
textelatin,il fautsaluerle couragede leurentreprise
Voicicependant
quelquespointsdouteux."Argumento"
(*2, 8) est "le sujet,le
mmepage,1.15-18,le sensestplussatisfaisant
thme"plutt
que "les arguments";
le gnitif
de "scripta"etnonde "scriptores":
on ne
si l'onvoitdans"scriptorum"
enpubliant
lesuvres
de Dolet,ce nesont
se dshonore
pourrapasdireque Finetius
uitaesocietate
desavoiretde style"."Quod cumcommuni
pasdescrits
"dpourvus
la viecommune
faciat"(3, 17-18):"ce qui favorise
ensocit",non"ce quiestcomdans:"(...) dum,
de la vieen socit".Quel entrelacement
patibleaveclesnormes
... labem... allaturum
estet antiquamnostram
sodalitatem
quoduestraedignitati
ne ex sententia
id aduersariis
cadat
uiasomneisdiligenter
dissoluturum,
persequor,
et nostraorationeaccurateprobetur,
quam uos ad hancipsamremuna mecum
omneisprouirilihonestum
sitincumbere."
"quod ... dissolutu(4, 4-9)!la relative
rum"a pour"antcdent"
"id", lui-mme
sujetde "cadat" dansla subordonne
ainsique, de faon
de but"ne ... cadat"qui dpendde "omnesuias persequor",
verbea poursujetla proposition
exclamative
indicedernier
hardie,"(ut)probetur";
cadere"signifie
"arriver
recte"quam ... honestum
sit"8;enfin"alicuiex sententia
selonlesvuxde quelqu'un";d'o
pourquelqu'unselonsesvoeux","se produire
finalement:
que soitprise
"(...) tandisquej'exploretouteslesvoiespourempcher
selonlevude nosadversaires
votrehonneur
etmettrait
unedcision
quientacherait
fin notreantiqueassociation,
avecsoindansmondiscours
etpourdmontrer
combienil seraithonorable
s'unisse moipour
que chacunde vous,selonsescapacits,
atteindre
ce but.""Aegritudo"
mais"le cha(7, 27)n'estpas"la maladiementale",
grin";"diuumtutelarem"
(14, 15) est"le saintqui protge","le saintpatron".
Dans"mihifidem
nullusstatim
ulliusoccafaciat,
qua istidisceptant
parte,tumultus
sionemproficisci"
(16, 18-19)"qua parte"quivaut "ea partequa": "nul ne me
ferait
croirefacilement
du ctd'o ces
que l'occasiond'unseuldsordre
provienne
Entre"Latine... dicentem"
gensle prtendent".
(25, 28) et "parlergrammaticalement"il ya, nonpasquivalence,
maisopposition,
commele ditQuintilien
I, 6, 27
etcommele rptent
"Candidoanimo"parattrenonpas la
Valla,puisErasme.9
"clartd'esprit",maisla sincrit,
la franchise,
la loyaut,
ets'oppose "falsa"(26,
Doletchantela gloiremilitaire
de la France,maisn'a-t-elle
nigme:
2). Nouvelle
pas
127

00:36:38 AM

tefface
de Pavie,la captivit
du roi?"Quam impudentiam
maledicparla dfaite
autratumhaberideberesustinet,
numhocsimuletimpudentumquequi uerisimile
Martiseuentumnon esse communem?
ter,et falsoasserereuideatur?
ducemque
noncomitem
consiliorum?
autidcirco
Romanorum
nongloGraecorumque
gloriam,
riamesse,(...) quodplagasmultassaepeacceperint?"
(45, 26-46,6); unepremire
difficult
les pointsd'interrogation,
saufle dernier)
tient ce que
(une foiseffacs
Dolet,au moinsdanscesDiscours
, emploie"num" au sensde "n'est-ilpasvraique
...?" (rponse:oui) et "nonne" dans l'acception"est-ceque par hasard...?"
"Mars estcommun
(rponse:non);l'adage"Mars communis"
signifie:
(aux deux
adversaires)","les chancessont partages","l'issue du combatdpenddu
la formule
ducem(esse),noncomitem
consiliorum"
s'claire
hasard"10;
"(euentum)
avec: "... vtex euentuhomines
de tuoConsilio
existimaturos
parle rapprochement
videremus"
facimus
ut Consilia
euentispondere(Fam. I, 7, 5) et "hoc plerumque
mus"(Rab.Post.1); bref:"Celui qui prtend
cetteinjuredoit
que cetteimpudence,
tretenuepourvraisemblable
ou vrifie,
nesemblerait-il
pasdummecoupaffirmer
et faussement
impudemment
que l'issuedes combatsn'estpas alatoire,qu'elle
dcidedes plansau lieud'en dpendre,
ou que la gloiredes Romainsetdes Grecs
n'estpas une vraiegloirepourla raisonqu'ils ontsubide nombreux
et frquents
checs."Brefunchecneremet
la valeurd'unplan,d'unmonarque
pasenquestion
ou d'un peuple.
On apprciera
lesnotesqui signalent
lespassagesde Cicronauxparticulirement
unefigure,
unmouvement;
soncicronianisme
quelsDoletdoituneexpression,
pourtantn'estpas pur,on l'a vu pour"num" et "nonne".Auxexemples
relevs
parL.
etV. ("digladatio"17, 10)ajoutons:"crimen"au sensde "crime"(12, 7), "nemo
ullus"(31, 12), "in numeroesse" (29, 12) sans"aliquo" {De Or.3, 33); Cicron
aurait-il
crit:"sentiant
habitaslatasa se aduersus
nossententias"
contemptui
(18,
Snquc11
. 37,5) "emotaeosmente"(14,9), auxGorgi22)?Doletemprunte
(Poly
centum,
ques(II, 43-44)"uocesccntum,guttura
eaque ferrea"(43, 19),etc.Plus
encorequ'auxpriodes
un peuartificiellement
il se plat
majestueuses,
compliques,
auxanaphores,
auxapostrophes
ou interrogations
commedeslitanies:
"Gairptes
lisnulla..., Gailisnullum..., Gailis... nulla..." (48, 7-8),"Num si qui ..., num
si qui ... numsi qui ...?" (48, 21-22),"Quis Lutetiae...? Quis ... dicitur?
Vasco.
Vasco." (48,23-29)ou: "TholosaebarbaQuisLutetiae...? quis...? quis... fertur?
Tholosaedolos,
riem,Tholosaeindoctosodium,Tholosaeinplerosque
crudelitatem,
Tholosaecalumnias"(67, 17 sq), "Tu solus... tusolus... tusolus... tusolus..."
tudier
lesclausules.Parmoments
ce sontde vraisdluges
(65, 20),etc.etil faudrait
il y a quelquechosedejuvniledanscettegriserie
verd'insultes;
parle mouvement
monotone.
estfaibleettientpeude place;
bal,danscetteoutrance
L'argumentation
dansle 1erDiscours
unepagesuffit
pouraffirmer
que les "nations"sontdes sortes
de socits
de secoursmutuel,
desquerelles,
lesapaisent;pas
qui loinde provoquer
unseulfaitprcis;Doletprfre
le thmedu De Inuentione
surl'loquence
dvelopper
de la viesociale;la disproportion
fondatrice
entrecetteidegrandiose
etle problme
desbagarres
d'tudiants
estproche
du ridicule.
Quandilparlede "nation"ilya parfoisquivoque:groupement
d'tudiants
ou toutun peuple?Dans la prosopope
de
"Gallia" n'oublie-t-il
taitunepartiedu royaume
de France?Et
pasque l'Aquitaine
comment
ne pas sourire
d'crire:"me minime
omnium
quandil se permet
cupidum
conuitiandi"
nonullamaleuolentia,
(24, 3) ou "... nonullo... odiomesuffusum,
nonullodetrahendi
studio"(65, 13-15).Il y a chezlui unepartvidente
dejeu maisjeu dangereux:
se fairedes ennemis,
provoquer,
puisfeindre
l'ingnuit.
Son cicronisme
n'estpas seulement
dans le style.Commed'autresimitent
le
il imiteCicron,il s'identifie
lui;l'expression
d'"homonouus",malcomChrist,
estn,commelui,dansunmilieuhumble
etpauprise,luifaitcroireque l'Arpinate
vre.Maiss'imaginer
conduit
au pouvoir
estunanachqu'au XVIe siclel'loquence
128

00:36:38 AM

le seul
des"optimates";
ronisme:
le bonplaisirdu monarque
n'estpasla rpublique
de s'leverseraitl'Eglise!A LyonDoletne renonce
pas au besoinde polmimoyen
le vieilErasme,
assaillir
(et religieux):
quer,maisil s'en tientau domainelittraire
un augusteconsulaire
c'estunpeufairecommecesjeunespatriciens
qui attaquaient
littraire:
n'estpas seulement
et le tortdu Rotterdamois
en vedette,
pourse mettre
d'autresauteurs
l'imitation
il arrive
bien Doletluiausside recommander
que CicEn seproclaron;maisErasmea beautrenourri
paenne,ilestchrtien.
d'antiquit
o saintJrmeaffirme
oublierla lettrefameuse
mantcicronien,
Doletpouvait-il
etchrentreBlialetle Christ:on nepeuttre la foiscicronien
qu'il fautchoisir
latinae
laquelleaspirel'auteurdes Commentarii
La seuleimmortalit
tien,12
linguae
A Toufutures.
c'estla gloireque luivaudracettegrandeuvredanslesgnrations
d'Etatcommesonmodle,Doleta-t-ilmdit
lousequandil rvaitd'treunhomme
? La siennene le serapas moins,mais
surla fintragique
de l'auteurdesPhilippiques
estcelui
de cesDiscours
la politique
n'yserapourrien.Le passagele plusmouvant
o il voquele supplicede Jeande Caturce:"Dixissetmultaaudacter,pleraque
essetnonmoderate
esset,haereticorum
supplicio
loquutus,omniscelerecoopertus
inhacurbeuidistis
admisisset,
plectenda
quemviuumcomburi
(nomenmortui
praesedhicadhucinuidiaefiamma
an tamen
tereo,ignequidemconsumpti,
flagrantis)
uia ad sanitatem
debuit?"(55, 20-26):
poenitenti
salutemque
praeciseintercludi
' 4Aurait-il
le plussouvent
oublila mesure
tenumaintsproposaudacieux,aurait-il
enparlant,
de toutessortesde crimes,
commis
desactes
aurait-il
tcouvert
aurait-il
celuique vousavez vu consumer
mritant
d'trepunisdu supplicedes hrtiques,
vivant
danscetteville(je taisle nomdu mort,car,s'il a tdtruit
parle feu,il brle
encoreicidansla flamme
de la haine),fallait-il
pourautant,alorsqu'il se repentait,
lui refuser
le cheminde la gurison
et du salut?"Commece discatgoriquement
de sa propredestine!
cours,aprscoup,paratprmonitoire
Maisons-Alfort

JacquesChomarat

1 Le 9 selonlesprsents
le pas Longeon( Correspondance
diteurs
, n
qui embotent
sur
l'indicacelui-ci
s'appuie
100);
19,p. 29et 151)lequelsuitsansdouteChristie
(p.
IdusOctobres"
; pourtant
tiondonnedansle 2eDiscours
p. 28: "antediemseptimum
Prvt(Longeonn 19)date"prid.IdusOctob."Dolet
Eustache
dansunelettre
De cesdeuxdatesfouretc." soitle 13octobre.
cumincidissem,
crit:"In istosheri
niesparDoletlaquellea le plusde chancesd'treexacte:cellequ'il donnele lendeou cellequ'il indiqueprsde 3 moisplustard?il mesemmainmmedel'vnement
de la lettre Prvt;
ne faitpas mention
13 9. Christie
ble qu'il fautsubstituer
Longeon!
9
le
"Exactement
en
note:
octobre.";
(Hier)
Longeoncorrige
2 II luiavaitdonn lired'avancepourla corriger
. n 17),mais
la le Oratio
( Corr
on nepeutsavoirce qu'en avaitpensl'vque,etbiensrle texteque nouspossdonsn'estpas celuiqu'il avaitpu lire,ni celuidu discoursrellement
prononc.
3 On estplusqu'tonn
de la rhtoride lirequ'ils'agitl "un aspectfondamental
sontdeuxchosesdiset le respectdu decorum
(211): le mensonge
que humaniste"
tinctes!
4 Dialogus
Erasmum
Desiderium
aduersus
Roterodamum,
proChrisCiceroniana,
, De imitatione
1535,fac-simil
, Lyon,Gryphe,
publiparEmileV. Telle,Genve,
Longolio
tophoro
de Dolet,qui
de Villeneuve,
porte-parole
Droz, 1974,106-9.C'est le personnage
s'exprime.
5 M.L.-J.me signalequ'en 14, 25 "Pictauiis"estprfrable
Pictauii".
6 Plusieurs
"inuisis".
la correction
raisonsgrammaticales
s'opposent
7 Un peuplusloinildnonce
ecclsiasl'objetlesautorits
l'espcede cultedontfont
uidet
uiuere
secum
obductos
et
tenebris
locales:
superstitiose
caligine
"quos
tiques
129

00:36:38 AM

flaminum
loco habereet obseruare,
uel secundum
(seil,urbsTholosa),sacrorum
"... ellelesconsidre
Deumreuereri":
et leshonorecommedes flamines
sacrsou
lesplacejusteaprsDieudanssa vnration."
Les flamines
semblent
d'obsexempts
et de superstition.
curantisme
8 Autreexemple:"... nonfacileconijcitur,
contentiones
quamexotiosas
acerbasque
certamina
excitet,
quamcrebraprouocet"(16, 10-11le sujetdesdeuxverbessubordonnsestplacen ttede la phrase:"Quae spesatqueexpectatio";
mais"conijcitur"a poursujetlesdeuxsubordonnes:
"Il estdifficile
d'valuercombien
funestes
etcruelles
sontlesluttesque fontnatrecetespoiretcetteattente,
combien
frquents
les combatsqu'ilsprovoquent."
9 Chomarat,
etrhtorique
Grammaire
chezErasme
, 259-64et 779.
10Dans YAdage
3649"Marscommunis"
(LB II 1108B) ErasmeciteTite-Liveetla
lie Philippique'
"Sed ut concedamincertos
exitusessebelli,Martern
communem,
etc.". Pourl'emploide "num" et"nonne"je mepropose
une
tarnen,
d'yconsacrer
brvetudespare;voicideuxexemplesqui me semblent
dcisifs:
(il s'agitdes
secours
etdel'assistance
numidreligioparla "nation")"numidsanctum?
apports
sum?numpiettiac Christianae
"cela n'est-ilpas
consentaneum?",
persuasioni
saint?n'estce paspieux?n'est-ce
la dvotion
et la foichrtienne?"
pasconforme
nonne(...) repente
in illaminuolabis?
(14, 20 sq); "Haec si tecumGallialoquatur,
nonne(...) insurges?
nonne(...) instabis?
nonne(...) opprimes?
Similenihilages:at
tussilebis."(42, 17 sq): "est-ceque parhasard...? non,mais
(...) uictuset(...) terri
tu ..."
11Tanttil le permet,
il exigequ'onimiteCicronseul;voirChomarat,
tantt
Dolet
etErasme
dulatin
, Prsences
, 175.
12Nullepartil n'a entrepris
de montrer
qu'onpeuttrel'unetl'autre,que l'alternativeestfausse,
Jamaisil ne le dit,jamaisil ne le suggre.

130

00:36:38 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Titles and Subtitlesof the Policraticus
A Proposal
JANVAN LAARHOVEN
quotcapita
totobstacula
{Metal.4, 6)
Titles are like trafficsigns: they informus where we will end up if
we take this or that road. Publishers are aware of the importance of
a tellingtitleand authorsknow that the same applies to chapter titles.
The firstselectionfora hasty reader to make is broughtabout by his
glimpsingat the table of contents.
Yet, it is interestingto note that medieval theoristsof literaturein
didn't pay much attentionto these expedients.
theirAccessusad auctores
Even though Bernard of Utrecht (fl. 1090) among the classic seven
'
'
questions 'in librisexplanandis'not only liststhe general titleof a work
"
"
but also the numerus
librorum and the " ordoqui et dispositiovocatur'
he appears to regard the quantity of books as useful only 44to commend the strengthof the author", and, with respectto that order, to
point only at the question "whether the author tells his storyin the
natural [i.e. chronological] order of events" . His plagiarist, Konrad
von Hirsau (d. 1150) is even brieferin this respect.1Introductionsto
scientific,medical books seem to display a greaterinterestin structure
and subdivisions: Bartholomewof Salerno (fl. 1150) asked in his com'
"
mentary on the Ysagogead artemGaleni: quae divisio operis" , and
"
".2
Maurus of Salerno (d. 1214) pointed at the modusetordotractandi
This relativenegligence can be noticed in medieval books proper.
Not so often in general titles, though these were not always established,3 but more frequentlyin subdivisions and (lack of) chapter
1 Cf. R. B. C. Huygens,Accessus
ad auctores.
Bernard
d'Utrecht.
Conrad
d'Hirsau,
auctores
, Leiden19702,59, 64, 77.
super
Dialogus
2 SeeD. Jacquart,
inSalerno
Aristotelian
, in: P. Dronke(ed.),A history
oftwelfththought
1988(reprint
1992),407-28,p. 414 n. 29. Andcf.the
Cambridge
century
philosophy,
atChardivisio
inanArticella
Scientific
manuscripts
commentary,
quotedbyCh. Burnett,
, Oxford1984(Studiesin
tres...,in: M. Wilks(ed.), Theworld
ofJohnofSalisbury
ChurchHist.Subsidia3), 127-60,p. 149.
3 Manyexamples
in thericharticleof E. Schrder,
AusdenAnfngen
desdeutschen
Klasse.
Philol.-hist.
Buchtitels
v.d. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Gttingen.
, in: Nachrichten
Nachr.aus 1937,Gttingen
1939,1-48.See forlatintitlestheclassicarticleofP.
131

23:19:46 PM

titles. Whereas for us the easiest instrumentto gain insight in the

structureof a book is the table of contentswith specifictitlesof parts,
units, and chapters, this helpful device is lacking in a great part of
antique and medieval literature. And if present, it was, more often
than not, added by a scriptor or sedulous lector later on. Classic
authors- and writers of the earlier middle ages following in their
tracks- looked upon their works as if each book was a continuing
story, demanding its readers to go through its entire contents from
beginning to end. If they did divide there work into books and
chapters, mostly for practical reasons remember Hugues of St
Victor4- , theyfeltno need to entitlethem. Augustine named the 22
books and 662 chaptersof his huge work withonly one title:De civitate
Dei. The modern editorof Bede's Historiahad to warn us forthe various readings of its headings.5 The care with which Peter the
- made his list of chaptertitlesis a rather
Lombard - afterwards!
exceptional factand a sign of the new requirementsforpractical finding devices experienced in the twelfthcentury.6The subdivisioninto
chapters, each marked by a coloured capital, ought to be enough for
an interestedreader who, ifrequired, could make himselfsome signs,
terms or 'titles', so to say in the margin of the manuscript,in order
to recover importantpassages. When a second or thirdscribe copied
Bchertitel
Mittelalterliche
, in: Sitz.-Ber.d. Bayer.Akad.d. Wiss.,Philos.
Lehmann,
desMittelalters
nowin: Id., Erforschung
and 1953/3,
hist.Klasse1948/4
, V, Stuttgart
another
titlefor
thatAdelardofBathwouldhavepreferred
1962,1-93.Remember
naturales
hisQuestiones
, in:A history
oftwelfth-century
speculations
Scientific
(Ch. Burnett,
desexdierum
Tractatus
, [aboven. 2], 151-76,p. 169n. 71),andthatThierry's
philosophy
varioustitlesin themanuscripts
received
, in:
ofChartres
(P. Dronke,Thierry
operibus
I.e., 358-85,p. 360 n. 11).
4 See hislaconicand practical
forthedivisionofhismagnumopusDe
argument
narrationis
. . incisio
"hocopusinduoslibrosdistinxi;
sacramentis'.
legentibus
quatenus
haberevolenautdivisim
nonvalentibus
scribere
etsimulutrumque
taedium
tolleret,
PL 176, 173-4).John
formamexhiberet"(Praefatiuncula,
tibuscommodiorem
ad
voluminibus
: 4'quemquattuor
ofhisMetalogicon
himself
arguedoutthestructure
lectoris[!] distinguerecuravi" (Prol., ed. Hall/Keats-Rohan
recreationem
10.62-3/824d.
17-18).
5 C. Plummer,
.. , Oxford1896(reprint
BaedaeHist,eccles.
Venerabilis
Anglorum.
gentis
p. CLXXI n. 2.
19756),
6 ententiae
, rrol.: Ut autemquod quaeriturtaciliusoccurrat,titulosquibus
see [I. Brady],Prolibrorum
praemisimus":
capituladistinguuntur
singulorum
IV:
Bonaventurianum
1971
Grottaferrata
1/1),137*-8*(also
,
(Spicilegium
legomena
introduced
ofthenewly
ofRobertde Melun).Thebestsurvey
attitude
forthereticent
tothe
attitudes
new
and
invenire
&
'Statim
in
R.
M.
Schools,
,
Rouse,
preachers
practices
inthe
andrenewal
& C. Lanham(eds.),Renaissance
, in: R. Benson& G. Constable
page
, Oxford1982(reprint
1985),201-25.
twelfth
century
132

23:19:46 PM

such a manuscriptliterallyread to pieces, he could collect these items

and place themat the beginningof the book. Thus, a table of contents
was born, but even at its best the product was still a bastard of its
originalauthor. Therefore,ifwe nowadays consult such tables, we can
only hope that the scribe or one of the firstreaders was a good and
competent reader who did understand the text, but we have no
guarantee at all that his notes correspond with the author's main
intentions.And even if those rubricaeare in themselvescorrect,more
oftenthan not theydon't satisfyour modern demands. We want short
and clear indications about the contentsof what is to come, that is,
genuine headings, summarizing in a few words substance and not
accidents, however interesting they may be. Moreover, we are
accustomed to the use of such an index of contentsas a medium for
selection and, forthat purpose, a mere collection of marginal rubricae
can seriouslymislead us.
These general statements7may serve as a preliminarydefence of the
followingattemptto make more clear the contents of an important
'medieval work, the Policraticus
, writtenby that famous polyhistorand
Canterbury secretaryJohn of Salisbury (1115/20-80), which was
dedicated in 1159 to the chancellor of Henry II, Thomas Becket (d.
1170). It is indeed an attempt,forone glance in the literatureso abundantly available8 is enough to convince everybody of the problems
connected with the summarizingof the work's eightbooks, each with
its own prologue and varied parts, and of the 166 chapterstheycomprise. However, reading and rereadingJohns's masterpiece, I badly
wanted a betterindex of contentsthan the lists supplied to us in the
medieval manuscripts. The experience gained from the difficulties
de dogmate
in John's Entheticus
with the so-called rubricae
philosophorum
were a stimulantto set up a similar experimentas performedin the
edition of that great poem, i.e. to create modern titlesand subtitles,
' and'com'
7 Cf. morein general:M. Parkes,Theinfluence
oftheconcepts
of ordinatio
Medieval
learnin:
&
Gibson
the
the
book
Alexander
M.
on
, J.
(eds.),
development
of
pilatio'
Hunt
toRichard
William
, Oxford1976,115-41.
Essays
presented
ingandliterature.
8 The bestsurvey
1980:lheworld
in thepapersoftheSalisbury-symposium
(above,
humanism
inthelifeand
H. Liebeschtz,
Medieval
n. 2). ForthePolicraticus
particularly:
, Nendeln19682(Studiesof theWarburgInstitute
17)
writings
ofJohnofSalisbury
ofthePolicraticus");
M.
and tendency
I.e. 1980),esp. 23-33("Structure
(reprint
seines
Policraticus
vonSalisbury
unddielogische
Struktur
Kerner
, Wiesbaden
1977;
.Johannes
zurNeuzeit
Das rhetorische
vonderAntike
als Topik.
andP. vonMoos,Geschichte
Exemplum
' imPolicraticus
vonSalisbury
1988(Ordo2).
unddie'historiae
, Hildesheim
Johanns
133

23:19:46 PM

in order to clarifythe maior and minor subdivisionsof the work. Even

more than that enigmatic poem the 793 pages of the Policraticus
, in
Webb's edition9,required such a survey of its contents,and that for
two reasons.
First of all, there is a negative one. In spite of its bipartitesubtitle,
consists of threeparts which did not receive a separate
the Policraticus
title each; the same applies to the eight books and to the main parts
of each of them. Thus, the overall structurein itselfremains unannounced. Secondly, the superscriptionsof the chapters are not real
headings in the modern sense of the word, but collectionsof more or
less interestingrubricsat theirvery best. Apart fromthe factthat the
telegrapheseof several of these superscriptionscan pose a problem to
the reader (as well as to the translator10),many of them are too long
or too short,theycan be arbitraryor far-fetched,theypick up details
and omit substantialmatters,theyenlarge or reduce statementsof the
author, they are too suggestive or not to the point, often not completely correctand sometimes incorrectaltogether.
A few examples may corroborate thisjudgment:
- The shortest
ofthePolicraticus
chapter
(II 8, only5 lines)hastwolinesforits
title,justas thelargestchapter
(II 27 = 558lines).
- Thelongest
insevenlines
work(aboveVII 23) 'summarizes'
titleoftheentire
with
a chapter
itself
of164lines(I 6) hastocontent
a textof165lines,whereas
a headingoftwolines.
- Theterm"studiis"inthetitleofI 2 doesnotoccurinthetextofthechapter;
ofallthe"offices"
meantbyJohnhere.
ontopofthisitseemstobea restriction
- One sentence
fromthetextof II 28 (line43-44/473a.
borrowed
25-27)is
10-12),butJohn'scondemnation
literally
quotedinitslongtitle(lines2-3/472b.
inhisyouth
andbasedonbiblicaldefense
ofseers,goingbacktotheexperience
is notmentioned
at all.
- The term"saluspublica"in thetitleofIII 1 indeedquotesthefirst
words
from
sentence
ofthe
areborrowed
thepenultimate
ofthechapter
infact,
(which,
itself
describes
the"salus" ofeveryman
butthechapter
prologue),
foregoing
or thegeneralwelfare.
notthe"salusuniversalis"
and certainly
- The famoustitleofIV 1 "on thedifference
is
between
princeand tyrant"
inthatthechapter
(Noteagainthat
speaksonlyofthetruesovereign
misleading
9 CI. Webb,Ioannis
carnotensis
Policratici
siveDe nugis
et
Saresberienses
curialium
episcopi
1909(reprint
libriVIII, London-Oxford
Frankfurt/M.
philosophorum
vestigiis
1965).
Thereis a new,butstillnotcomplete
editionbyK. Keats-Rohan,
Policraticus
I-IV,
Turnhout
1993(CChr.Cont.med.118).
10Cf. somemistakes
in thepartialtranslation
byC. Nederman,
JohnofSalisbury.
Policraticus
, Cambridge1990(reprint
1992)(Cambr.textsin thehist,of political
titleofIV 2 (p. 30), 4 (35), 7 (46), V 2 (66), 15 (95), VI 19 (122). The
thought):
Italianand Spanishtranslations
by L. Bianchi& P. Feltrin
(Milano1985,Bibi.di
cult,med.)resp.M. Laderoe.a. (Madrid1984,Clsicosparauna bibl.contemp.,
Pensamiento
morecorrect.
and,in thisrespect,
28) are morelittral
134

23:19:46 PM

thefirst
are linkedup literally
wordsofthechapter
withthelastwordsofthe
withtheendofIII 15).
and,moreover,
prologue
- Anyonereading
thetitleofIV 3 on "thesovereign
as thepriest's
servant"
willexpecta medieval
treatise
on thetwopowersbutaftertenlinesandsome
lines(lines44-128/516d-518c)
the
he willfinda hundred
examples
describing
function
forthecommunity,
indicated
of thetruesovereign
scarcely
by the
ofthetitle.
meagrehalfline
- The longtitleof V 16 needsthreelines(578a.10-13)in quotinga literal
from
theendofthechapter
therelesentence
(582b.23-26),butdoesnotmention
in thetwogreatbiblicalpassageson Samuelas
vantmodelexamplepresented
an irreproachable
judge.
- The sentence
aboveVI 8: "justas thetitleofsoldieris oneofhonour,
so it
in thetextofthe
is oneoflabour"soundsvervprecise,butJohn'sstatement
theopposite
chapter
saysexactly
(600b.2-3):hisaccountis on honour.
- The titleofVII 8 suggests
a difference
between
three"gradus"and three
"sectae",but bothtermsreferto thethree"ordins"Johnis speakingof
(652b.29-30).
- The headingofVII 13 doesnotsaythatBernard
hadsixkeys
ofChartres
butalludestothefirst
forstudy,
one("humilis"),quotesan exegetical,
though
detail(668a-b.3-19)regarding
the secondone ("studium
veryinteresting,
thelastkey("terraaliena").
quaerendi"),andmentions
explicitly
- At thesuperscription
of VIII 18 bothCaligula'sand Nero'sdeathare
itshouldbe noted,however,
is notmenthatthedeathofthelatter
announced;
butwillbe dealtwithamplyinthenextchapter
tionedinthetextofthischapter,
VIII 19 (789d-790a),
whosetitlehowever
doesnotmention
him.
- Finally,
a question,
hastobe posed:is itby
itis notan argument,
although
thatWebbwho,knowing
accident
hisclassicsbetter
thaneditorial
techniques,
severaldata in theconsulted
nevertheless
had to
overlooked
manuscripts11,
record122variants
inthetitles
Atleast23 ofthese
of73outofthe166chapters?
variants
are reallymorethanspelling-mistakes.
It is easier, as John himselfsaid12, to find more examples than to
count all them, because anyone comparing accurately superscriptions
and textwould put in the margin quite a lot of question- or exclamationmarksifthese superscriptionswere supposed to have the function
of real titles. Despite their description by von Moos13 as 4'nicht
unbedingt vom Autor selbst stammenden, aber meist sinngerechten
Kapitelberschriften,,,ifone applies to these chaptershis own definition of a booktitle as 4'eine zentrale Idee", then the conclusion is
inevitable: the actual 'titles' used in the manuscriptsand the editions
of the Policraticusare sometimes misleading or at least not entirely
trustworthyin this respect.
11Cf. K. Keats-Rohan,
in: StudiMedievali
, 29/1(1988),219-29,p. 224-5:"among
theworld'sworsteditors"!What,then,aboutother'editors'ofJohnsuchas J.A.
as saidH. Waddellin:
andblessedmemory",
Giles?orTh. Wright
("of inaccurate
LatinLyrics
Medieval
, London19485
, 336)?
12Pol.Ill 3: "faciliusestinvenire
(467481b.
quamdinumerare"
14-15).
13P. vonMoos,Geschichte
[aboven. 8], 287.
135

23:19:46 PM

Who, then, made these 'titles'? We don't know and, probably,we will
never know. It would be temptingto think of the presumably first
reader of the Policraticus
, Brito of Christchurch,"fur ille'' according
to Epist. Ill, " de cuius manu [my manuscript of the Poi] avelli non
'
4
.14 Kerner interpretedthis depingere
potuit,antequamtotusdepingeretur"
as "mit kreuzfrmigenNotae versehen", but his referenceto line 192
: ' ' accipiatqueBrito,te veniente
in Policraticum
of the Entheticus
",
, crucera
rathercontradictsthan corroborateshis in itselfinterestinginterpretation.15Better it is, to acquiesce to the fact that our title-makerwill
.16
remain- in the terminologyof Bernard of Utrecht- "inauctorabilis"
corcareful
or
himself?
He
is
not
Or was it, perhaps, John
always
rect and in some respectsrathernegligent;17certainly,he should not
be hired as a reliable correctorof proof-sheets!Theoretically,it might
be possible that he scribbled in the margin of his own rough-copy,
perhaps in haste and withoutmuch reflection,some points of interest.
Such a suggestionwas made by Rodney Thomson in order to explain
maior.Yet,
ofJohn's Entheticus
the curious stateof the so-called rubricae
as said in my introductionto that poem, it seems quite certain that
those marginal additions- to call them 'headings' would already suggest too much- are not the work of the poet himself.18Reading and
comparing the 166 'titles' of John's PolicraticusI would repeat that
statementwithregard to thisprosework. As noted above, it was a normadcustom of copiers or readers to place 'trafficsigns' forreading or
retrievingspecial passages, similar to our pencilling of arrows in the
margins of a book in order to pinpoint somethingof interest.Collect"19, but to call
ing these items in a list facilitatedthe listatiminvenire
such a list an Index of contents goes one step too far.
14Epist.111/81
(ed. Brooke182c/69a).
15Kerner,Struktur
auf
Anspielung
[aboven. 8], 113: Istdiesnichtemedeutliche
's Entheticus
moreamplyin:John
derEp. 111?".Myanswer
das 'depingere'
ofSalisbury
desMA. 17),II
maior
andminor
, Leiden1987(StudienundTextezurGeistesgesch.
439 n. 192b.
16Huygens,
Accessus
[aboven. 1], 59 1. 41.
17As wellin hisquotations
- besidesherdissertation
of1968- ,John
(seeJ. Martin
n.
in
hismention
of
as
in:
World
as
classical
scholar
,
ofSalisbury
[above 2], 179-201)
nachLeben
beriensis
undStunames(alreadynotedbyC. Schaarschmidt,
Sares
Johannes
likePol.5, 7: "An
undPhilosophie,
dien,
Schriften
Leipzig1862,91 n. 2); cf.statements
nonmultum
euro"(556d.2-4),orPol.VII
Timocares
fuerit
..., an Niciasmedicus,
alibi"
aliterinveniantur
prol.: "Nec moveat,si qua eorum,que hi scribuntur,
(637a.27-28)!
18Entheticus
maior
andminor
[aboven. 15],I 52-4("The rubricae").
19Rouse,Statim
invenire
p. 206-7.
headings
[aboven. 6], esp. aboutchapter
136

23:19:46 PM

A typicaltextualindicationmay underline the suggestionof a 'titleless' book. Many transitionsfromone chapterto anotherseem to have
been made withoutany thoughtof an interveningtitle: oftenthe end
of a chapteralludes to the theme of the next one. See forinstance the
transitionsfromPol. I 9 to 10, fromII 25 to 26, III prol. to III 1 (as
noted above), III 15 to IV 1 (thus, fromone book to another!), from
IV 10 to 11, V 17 to VI 1 (again), VI 30 to VII prol., VII 23 to 24,
VIII 18 to 19. Johnjust as so many othermedieval authorsargued on
the assumption of a lectiocontinua
, not of a pick and choose reading.
" doesn't referto
14
II
where " Hie vero
is
the
of
Very typical
opening
this chapter but to the contentsof the previous one. And the sudden
" oleum
"
peccatoris at the beginning of the famous chapter III 15 on
tirannicide can not be understood without reading firstthe end of
''
ergoinferiora
chapterIII 14 on flattery.In thismanner too connectantur
' ' 20
superioribus'
The problematicauthorshipof those marginal notes is not without
interest entirely, for in the interaction between author, text, and
reader, the last one too brings in his own contribution.But it is a differentmatterifthis contributionbecomes part of the textitself.If the
actual superscriptionsabove the chapters are to be considered as
readers' notes, then the author himselfruns the risk of fading away
being overshadowed by the suggestivehand of one of the firstscribes
or readers; not without consequences, of course, for later readers.
Take forinstance the famous 'title' of VIII 20, quoted everywherein
plenty galore. Reading "that it is lawful and glorious to kill public
tyrants" (793b. 21-22), many have saluted John of Salisbury as the
firstmedieval man who against the great powers of his time dared to
re-assume and develop a statement by Cicero. However, on consulting his own text, five impressive general conditions of notallowance can be foundtogetherwitha clear conclusion about the best
means to remove tyrants, i.e. prayer! And our growing distrust
against the title-makerwill even increase more, on detectingthat the
" don't occur at all in the text itself.Some
terms " licitumetgloriosum
modern authors quoting only this 'title' could at least be suspected of
perhaps not having read attentivelyenough the complete chapter, not
.21
to mention the complete treatiseon tyrannologyin the Policraticus
20Pol. II prol.(13-14/41
5
5b.15); notfornothing
thesame"oil" ofPs. 140/141,
at theendofbookVI 30 (635a.17).
returns
21Cf. myart.ThoushallNOT slaya tyrant!
Theso-called
, in:
ofJohn
ofSalisbury
theory
World
[aboven. 2], 319-41.
137

23:19:46 PM

Was it not John himselfwho warned medieval (nd modern) readers

that an author was not responsibleforthe mistakesmade by scribes?22
This should be enough to justifyour modest but not unpractical proposal. What do we want when consultinga whopper of a book? First
of all, apart froma general title,clear indicationsof its main structure,
of its principal subdivisions, and of the chief contentsof its chapters
are needed. Secondly, all this should be in a short, surveyable form,
so as to gain immediate insight in what we will read or omit. If,
thirdly,it is possible to give on top of this a summary of arguments
or importantdetails, so much the better,but the firsttwo desiderata
are of the highest importance for the hasty reader.
That is, in short,what I have tried to do, meant only as a helpful
assistance for those who try to grasp the rich contents of John's
masterpiece.23Needless to say that the constructionof such an instrument is at the same time a venture. Condensing fiveor ten pages into
one short title is in fact giving a judgment on their contents. And
grouping three or five chapters under one head has to give away a
vision on the structure of John's overall argument. Tracing and
retracinghis trains of thought I more than once called to mind the
4
warning of Montaigne: 'Tout abrg sur un bon livre est un sot
abrg".24 Of course, I have consulted competent authors on the
Policraticuslike Liebeschtz, Kerner, von Moos, Nederman, KeatsRohan, e. a., but above all I have read and reread John himselfand
asked him how he would have managed writing a modern book.
Actually, of course, no definiteanswers to these question came forward because we are dealing with a medieval writerwho, moreover,
according to Brooke, despite his many qualities, missed the capacity
to write a book.25 Especially in the chronologicallyfirstbooks of the
22Metal.IV 6: ' 'liber[i.e. Arist.,Anal,
est ..
post.].. ceterislongeturbatior
desuetudine
.. et postremo
adeo scripauctorem,
exemplorum
quod noncontingit
torum
estvitio,utferequotcapitatotobstacula
habea' (ed. Hall/Keatsdepravatus
Rohan,CChr.Cont.-med.
98, Turnhout
1991,145. 12-17/919d-20a.10-15).
23Thereseemstobelessneedtotrythesamefor
: generally
John'sMetalogicon
spoken
itstitles
areshorter
andmoretothepoint;andthemanuscript
isnotwavertradition
theeditors
ofthenewedition(aboven. 22) notedonlyone
ing:in the97 chapters
littlevariant(I 15: 35.2) and one missing
title(IV 41: 181.1).
24EssaisIII 8, ed. Pliade,1962,918.
25C. Brooke,Introduction
to Theletters
I, London1955(Medieval
ofJohn
ofSalisbury.
ancientand modern;fullof
texts),XLV: "John'sworksare a museumof matter
and landscapes,
richin ideas,butcluttered
withjunkand only
portraits
charming
It hasall theliterary
ofwhicha medieval
humanist
was
slightly
organized.
artistry
138

23:19:46 PM

Policraticus
, VII-VIII, it is clear thatJohn had various models in mind
forthe structureof thatpart: the fivestrivingscombattedby Boethius
and defendedby Epicurus, the fivesense-organsand theircorresponding vices, and all that combined with the seven capital sins according
to Augustine and Gregory's ramificationof vices frompride.26However, the separation in two books suggests thatJohn already during
writingsaw his plans blurred by the overwhelmingmaterial he tried
to get a hold on; certainlyfromthe actual text itselfno artificalconstructionof these underlyingstructuresas the main division of book
VII and VIII can be derived at, as did forinstance the division of the
members of the body for book V and VI (though here too less wellbalanced than a modern author would allow).
Of course, we lack the rightof rewritingthe Policraticus
and John's
" is valid for his
mindfulwarning about the handling of the " littera
books as well: "Words should be gentlyhandled; not torturedlike
captive slaves, to make them give up what theynever had".27 But we
may ask fora simple modern instrumentfacilitatingour lecture of a
difficultand complex book.
Finally, thewhole ventureremains subjective indeed, foreach summary is a commentary.If, however, the followingsurvey could help
a modern reader while consulting the 166 chapters of John's
monumental work, the undersigned reader would be content. The
second editor who printedthe Policraticus
, Constant Fradin in Lyons
had
next
to
an alphabetical index of subjects, his
1513,
already made,
own titles for the eight books.28 It is thereforenot against tradition
modestlyto tryand improve a tradition.
In order to avoid misunderstandingsfive arrangementsmay clarify
the method of my proposal:
- a richand elegantLatinstyle,pungent
and lucidillustration,
a
capable
thought
fundofinteresting
stories
andexempla.One thinghe lacked:thecapacity
to write
a book."Yet,there
seemstobe more'corn-position'
thancanbe observed
atthefirst
'con' maybe underscored:
corcombinations,
glance,ifonlytheprefix
connections,
and so on. Nevertheless,
HelenWaddell'sstatement
remainstrue:"He
relations,
readsbestinparagraphs'
ofthe
, in: Essaysandstudies
(John
ofSalisbury
bymembers
13 (Oxford1928),28-51,p. 38.
Association,
English
26Lucidly
forthefirst
timebyLiebeschtz,
Medieval
humanism
analysed
[above,n. 8],
28-33.
27MetalIII 1: "Litteraenimsuaviter
excutienda
acerbe
est,etnonmorecaptivorum
doneerestitut
41-3/89
Id.23torquenda
quodnonaccepit"(ed. Hall/Keats-Rohan
5); translation
byWaddell,I.e. [aboven. 24], 38.
28QuotedbyKerner,
Struktur
[aboven. 8], 108.
139

23:19:46 PM

1) All parts, books, sub-divisions of books, and chapters have got a

new titleof theirown, and thatin a radicallymodern way, i.e. a short,
clear one, substantiallyreferringto their main contents.
2) Each of the new chapter titles is accompanied by a number,
indicatingthe quantityof lines except, of course, the lines of the old
amounts of textJohn
'titles'. So, one can see immediatelythe different
spent on each of them. For a collation of the whole work the lines of
the Webb edition had to be counted.
3) Notwithstanding the decision of John's last editor "that the
attempt [of introducing sections of the paragraphs] cannot be
justified"29 each chapter is summarized- in smaller print by short
headings or truncatedclauses in order to catch the varied contentsof
its sections.
4) In parenthesesthe beginningsof these shortsummariesreceive two
or three references:
- the line of the Keats-Rohan edition (only for Books I-IV),
- column and letter of the Migne edition (PL 199, repeated in
black in the margins of the Webb edition),
- the line withinthis letteraccording to Webb (thus, withouthis
pages).
5) A general summarygives a quantitativesurveyof the greaterunits
of the work in order to compare them at a glance.
Needless to say, thisproposal doesn't offeritselffora criticaledition
of the text of the Polieraticus, but perhaps it can serve as a kind of
reader's guide and thus as a tool for someone who indeed strivesto
'kratein ta polla', i.e. to master the multitude present in that rich
store-house.30
Nijmegen
KatholiekeUniversiteit
29K. Keats-Rohan,
in theIntroduction
(aboven. 9): "I havefoundno wayofsucsections.
.. Thuswastheworkwritten,
thushasitbeenreadsince
cessfully
introducing
itwaswritten"
tosaddlethemodern
reader
with
(p. XLIX). Butarewereally
obliged
thesameproblem
as musthaveburdened
ourmedieval
colleagues...?
30See forthemeaning
ofthetitlethesuggestion
Struktur
byKerner,
[aboven. 8], 101invonMoos,Topik
excursus
7, andtherather
convincing
[aboven. 8], 556-82;reservationsbyKeats-Rohan,
Introduction
(aboven. 9), VIII-IX.

140

23:19:46 PM

THE MULTIMASTER
or
Curial Follies and Philosophical

Tracks
oflines
[number
in ed. Webb:]
306

Introd.

Indicator to The Multimaster

To thechancellor
and back(l/379a.l).
Canterbury
people(155/382b.9).
184
Prologue The triumphof writing. Purpose and method
ofliterature
Joyand profit
(3/385a.2).Unfitforthecourt
Contents
ofthisbook(70/387a.25).
(47/386b.31).
Use ofauthors
andchoicefortheAcademics
(94/387c.20)
(134/388b.7).
Recommendation
to Thomasand readers(148/388d.23).
PART I. OFFICIALS

AND THEIR

ADO

Book I. Curial Occupations of Courtiers

A. Starting-point
1. Fortune alienates
34
Truthbecomesobscured
(2/389a.l6)and peopleget
bestialized
(17/389b.9).
2. Other people's business
14
The exigencies
ofnatureand ofeverybody's
task
(2/389d.28)
3. Every one his own task
22
Stickto yourlast(2/390a.l3).Hunting
is a peasant'sjob
(13/390b.25).
B. Games
4. Hunting: historyand criticism
423
The obscureorigin(3/390c.7).Without
reasona ridiculous
show(31/391b.8).
and Ulysses(90/392c.
Falconry
14); classicalstories
1).
(131/393c.
Biblicalexamples:
Nimrodand Esau (159/394a.5);
but
neither
Maccabeusnorothergreator saintmen
(200/395a.22).
It is a disgraceto ourtime(232/395d.27),
it is inhuman,
and a burdento thesubjects(255/396a.25).
Fivereasonable
circumstances
(281/396d.24).
Butneverin highranks(352/398b.5):
no confusion
offunctionsin society
(372/398c.27).
5. Games of chance
106
diceand chess(2/398d.l0).Conditions
ofallowance
Playing
(56/400a.
13).
Tenderage learnsfromold age (80/400c.9).
141

23:19:46 PM

6. Good and bad music

164
Praiseofmusic(2/401a.3).Musicand thesoul(21/401b.3).
The voice(43/401d.27).
Abuse(67/402b.22)
andprofit,
if
in moderation
(91/402d.
16).
The current
at banquets(116/403c.
practice,
especially
13).
7. A bad musician
37
Thatshameful
Nero(2/404b.23).
8. Theatre and cabaret
90
In classicaltimesand nowadays
(2/405a.2).Attitude
towards
players
(74/406c.26).
C . Varieties
of magic
9. Conjuring
Refusalofthatinvention
byMercury
(2/406d.8).
10. Sorcerers
ofmagicians
Description
(2/407a.23).
11. Magic
Fourspeciesaccording
to Varro(2/407b.l4).
12 . Soothsayers
Thirteen
categories
(4/407c.23).
13. Predictions from nature
In pigeons,bees,and ants(2/409b.l2).In greator small
birds(28/409d.l4).
withanimals(122/41
Bymeeting
2a.8). In people
(159/41
2d.22).
In weather
and earthquake
4d.1).
(189/413c.25)
(245/41
Conclusion
(257/415a.
15).

14
14
6
95
290

Book II. The Truth of Signs

Prol.: Even more fuss
15
5a.3)
Candidlyaheadaboutotherfollies
(3/41
A. Trueandfalse signs
1. Faith and superstition
59
Naturalphenomenons
5c.20). The faithoftheobserver
(2/41
5d.14).
(17/41
2. Natural omens
60
In birdsand largeanimals(3/414d.3).
At thesky,in theair,and at sea (40/41
7d.15).
3. Their origin and appreciation
23
Sun doubling
8a.9). Generaland specific
(3/41
signs
8b.17).
(11/41
B. Excursion:Jerusalem
A.D. 70
4. Signs before the fall of Jerusalem
100
toJosephus
The warning
Presagesaccording
(3/418c.7).
by
An oracleon Christ
JesussonofAnanias(65/419d.20).
(82/420b.5).
142

23:19:46 PM

5. Josephus' story
DesasteroverJudaea(3/420c.20).
BookV: thefaminein
lb.23); theterrible
situation
in thecity
Jerusalem
(33/42
BookVI: fighting
forfood(1377423c.
(93/422C.22).
1).
6. A horribleexample
Maryeatingherbabyson(2/423d.24).
7. The outcome: the Jews
Numberofvictims
(2/425a.21);theprediction
by Tesus
(15/425C.3).
8. The outcome: the Christians
The exodusto Pella(3/425d.25).
9. Josephus on Christ
His testimony
on Christand theChristians
(2/426a.2).
C. Sequel:signs
10. Miracles by Vespasian
and a blindman(2/426b.21).
Healingofa paralytic
11. Unnatural signs
Senseofthesuneclipseat thedeathofJesus(2/426c.6).
12. Never against God's wil
oftheplantjuice
Nature,thewillofGod; cf.theoperation
(3/427b.
17).
13. Signs as divine warnings
Historical
and biblicalexamples
(2/428a.3).
14. Unsensorial signs
in dreams(2/428c.l9).
Trueor falsesignals,forinstance

169

59
35
5
17

14
39
37
15
22

D. Dreams
15. Five species of 'views'
164
Division(3/429a.l5):confusions
(6/429a.l9);phantasies
common
dreams(30/429c.20);
visions
(17/429b.3);
and oracles(97/431a.9).
(70/430b.3);
Conclusion
(145/432a.29).
86
16. Signification
depending
Mostlyvia likenesses
(3/432a.6);butconcretely
on theobserver
or via opposition
(40/432d.
18).
(28/432c.3);
exclusive
The fivespecies[ofch. 15]are notactually
Somepeoplesee moreclearly(63/433b.
13).
(56/433b.6).
136
17. Possibilityof interpretationof dreams
ConiecDreamsareidle,butstill(2/433d.2).The so-called
Danielis(22/434b.24).
The dreamsofDanieland
torium
An examplein Augustine
(73/435b.23).
Joseph(27/434b.3).
Faithin witches
derives
The dreamofJerome(87/435c.6).
fromevilspirits
19).
(99/435d.
E. A problem
179
18. A basic theoryof knowledge
via the
Frommthesis
to mathsis
Knowledge
(4/436c.21).
and by
senses(21/436d.
10), byimagination
(34/437a.25),
143

23:19:46 PM

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.
24.

25.

ratioand intelligence
oftheuniver7c.9). Knowledge
(50/43
salia(96/438c.29).
The quadrivium
(142/439c.
12).
and astronomers
Astrologers
(156/439d.28).
197
Astronomyand astrology
bymedium
Astronomy
(26/440c.6):
(3/440a.ll).Astrology
ofplanets(37/440d.20),
theirposition,
zodiac,and moon
and sun(93/441
d.17).
One doesn'tabidebytherulesoftheart(118/442b.
10) and
a homunculus
eventakestheriskofcreating
(139/442d.
1).
AcademicandPlotinian
astrologers
(150/443a.l3).
51
Providence and free will
menofhope
Godsmaiesty
anddeprives
contradicts
Fatality
and fear(4/443d.21).
theFall,and grace(20/444a.7).
Providence,
The problem of God's foreknowledge
186
Does God becomechangeable
(6/444d.l2)?
is simple,humanknowledge
God's knowledge
multiple
is all-enfolding
(41/445c
23); God's knowledge
(74/446b.27).
Providence
Stoicsand Epicureans
don'tacknowledge
(117/447a.9).
and causality
necessity,
Foreknowledge,
(138/447c.
1).
God is immutable
(167/448b.32).
353
Human possibility& divine immutability
The relationship
between
is a
possibility/impossibility
seriousproblem
doubt(28/449a.6).
(4/448c.ll).Academic
God (52/449c.32).
ButI don'tconfine
Man is movedbyforeseeing
(61/449c.l
1), God is not
moved(75/450a.26).
does
and predestination
Aristotle
Past,future,
(97/450c.l8).
nothelp(122/45
la. 15). God's strength
and maiesty
ought
notto be curtailed
Id.27). At thispointlanguage
(163/45
and reasonfailus (215/453a.
18).
to theGospeland the
Whatis probableaccording
philosophers
(238/453b.
11).
The problem
remains
(293/454c.l2).
Louis' catch question
19
No conclusions
froma bogusquestion
(2/455b.l3).
The when and whitherof certainty
69
Fromthestars(3/455c.6)?
However,we don'tknowthewillofGod and the'natural'
causeis uncertain
It is God whodetermines
(17/456a.22).
thetimes(41/456c.22).
God transcends the signs
102
The signified
doesnotalwayscometrue(4/457a.23).
Threebiblicalexamplesand Pautus(21/457c.
13).
theauthority
oftheCreator
One thingis certain,
(66/458C.1).

26. The dispensation of God above my ignorance

likea sovereign
thelaw
God determines
applying
(4/459a.7).
144

23:19:46 PM

116

is thedevil'sterritory
11).
Astrology
(34/459d.
I cannotsolvetheseproblems
(49/460a.28).
Butthechurch
forbid
and thechurch-fathers
astrology
a. 13).
(92/461
F. Prognostications
558
27. Soothsayers. Saul's tragedy
b.8).
Fourmethods
ofdivining
thefuture
(3/461
Saul according
to 1 Sam. 15: hisdisobedience
owingto
hisworthless
confession
greed(70/462d.28),
(112/463d.l0),
hisrejection
bySamuel(161/464d.
1).
to 1 Sam. 28: hiswayto Endor
Saul according
withthepythoness
14), themeeting
(203/465d.
withSamuel'sappearance
(241/466c.
25), hisconversation
hissuicideand death(405/470a.22).
(327/468b.30);
la. 19).
Oraclesand exorcisms
(456/47
28. Judgementof seers
162
No pardonforthoseso-called
seers(6/472b.l5).
Thereis a possibility
to foresee,
butithas beenforbidden
(36/473a.
19).
The experience
frommyownyouth(85/474a.
12).
The condemnation
in theScriptures
is clear(114/474c.
12).
70
29. Physicians in theoryand practice
Threekindsofadviceforthefuture
(2/475c.26).
The statements
oftheoretical
physicians
(10/475d.7).
I don'tjudgeofthepractical
physicians
(36/476b.
3)!
Book III. The Falsehood of Flattery
Prol.: The stimulus
Humanly
againsttheenemiesofpublicwelfare
(2/477a.3).
A. Introduction
1. Integrityof life
ofsouland body(2/477c.6).God pervades
the
Well-being
soul(20/478a.26).
andvirtuelead to everyone's
Knowledge
integrity
(59/478d.4).
2. Self-knowledge
to thyself
Applythetencategories
(3/479c.8).
Fruitsofself-knowledge
(36/480b.
13).
3. Love for one-self
Prideand self-seeking
(3/480c.28).
Concupiscence
(16/480d.
13).
Flatterers
areenemiesofthecommonwelfare
lb.8).
(40/48
B. Flattery
4. Flatterersand soothers
The flatterer
is dishonest
he is acting
(3/481c.20),
(24/482a.l4).The cajoler(45/482c.7).

27

95

48
51

92

145

23:19:46 PM

5. The surreptitiousflatterer
120
in disguise(3/483b.25).
Benevolence
is a good
Flattery
and theflatthing,ifit is honest(45/484a.7).The flatterer
tered(74/484d.
14).
6. Flatterersand the speakers of truth
88
theopposite
ofsympathy
andofbitter
Flattery,
(3/485c.24)
truth
wordsexpelthe
(28/486b.21).
Honey-poisoned
truthful
in Romeandelsewhere
speakers
(42/486c.6),
(60/486d.27).
7. Flatteringpresents
73
The warning
in Prov.5, 3-8(3/487b.26).
The craving
for
likethatis selfindulging
presents
(17/487c.
12). Friendship
(40/488b.l
1).
C. The theatre
of life
8. A comedy becomes a tragedy
169
The comparison
withmilitiainJob7,1 (2/488d.l3).
The worlda comedy(23/489b.6).
end
The tragical
(45/489d.8).
to paganphilosophers
Fortune,
chance,and God according
andJob(63/490a.27).
oftheworldand thefinale(111/49
The theatre
la. 17).
9. The real spectators
97
The splendour
ofvirtue(4/492a.ll).Classicaland biblical
stars(42/493a.25).
The trulyvirtuous
on theheavenly
gallery
(78/493d.5).
D. Applications
10. The Romans and flattery
177
to be
Cleopatralostherpart(4/494a.25).Scipiocontinued
11). The Romansare excellent
modest
flatterers
(46/495a.
and truth
(73/495d.
10). At thecostofliberty
(116/496d.29).
Flatterers
oughtto be resisted
(130/497a.
14).
11. Promise and deceit
113
A 'competent'
flatterer
doesn'tacceptanything,
butmakes
Valueand worthlessness
ofpromises
promises
(3/497d.23).
can notalwaysbe kept(66/499a.5).
(18/498a.7).Promises
12. Thrift,'friendship', and knowledge of secrets
175
A more'competent'
flatterer
is a thrifty
servant
to be on familiar
terms
and is
(5/500a.29),
pretends
withsecrets
Can therebe friendacquainted
(32/500c.29).
bad (39/500d.8)
and between
richmen
shipbetween
(52/501a.23)?
ofsecrets
is dangerous
Id.28), and turns
Knowledge
(83/50
one intoan accomplice
so, it is unsafe
(107/502b.26);
(146/503a.9).
13. The corruptionof fake affection
168
A 'competent'
flatterer
showsaffection
(4/503c.5).
All flatterers
stink(33/504a.6).I cannotholdmytongue
146

23:19:46 PM

abouttheirimmorality
Theyevensacrifice
(53/504c.29).
andsons(68/504d.
daughters
16).
willbe punished
Sucha corruption
(105/505d.26).
270
14. Criticism betterthan flattery
not
Criticisms
CecilBalbusto Augustus
(4/506d.23).
times(29/507b.
unlikein former
tolerated
16):
nowadays,
Alexander
nineGreekexamples,
particularly
(37/507c.23),
Romanexamples,
Caesar
nineteen
particularly
ofsixRomanemperors
examples
(81/508c.
21), and thirteen
(156/510a.l9).
lc.31).
flatterers
friends
Conclusion:
criticise,
praise(219/51
27
15. Who may be flatteredindeed
A doomedmanmaybe soothed
(3/512b.9).
theworstevilforthepublicwelfare
(20/512c.27).
Tiranny
PART II. PUBLIC

FUNCTIONS

Book IV. The True Sovereign

22
Prol.: The philosophersway of freedom
ofSpirit(2/513a.3).
affords
to truth
liberty
Fidelity
A. Royalethics
54
1. The true sovereign
3b.3). He is liketheheadofthebody
Rulerand law(2/51
3c.13). His poweris a divinething( 19/513d.22).
(11/51
66
2. A man of law
Law and equity(4/514c.l0).Shouldhe notbe boundby
15a.2)?!
laws(22/5
thesword(34/515b.15).
To upholdthelaw through
136
3. A man of community
sword
to thespiritual
The swordofbloodis inferior
( 12/516b.30) and twobiblical
(3/516a.20):threehistorical
testimonies
(34/516d.24).
The sovereign
society
(44/516d.8); cf.
personifies
7a.18) and theclassics(72/517c.8), Jesus
Melchizedek
(53/51
7d.32) andJuliusCaesar(119/518c.27).
(94/51
B. A royalmirror
fromtheOld Testament
93
4. Deut. 17,16: his wealth
is committed
to theroyallaw ofDeut.
The sovereign
17,14-20
(3/518d.13).
as a
The property
oftheruler(32/519b.11). His function
model(62/520a.
15).
104
5. Deut. 17,17: his wives and his money
Womenin theOld Testament
(2/520c.l7).
1a. 11).
has to be munificent
to others(26/52
The sovereign
1d.17).
Valueofmoneyandprices(59/52
196
6. Deut. 17,18-19a: his knowledge of the law
biblical
through
priests
(3/522c.30);
Legalknowledge
147

23:19:46 PM

7.

8.

9.
10.
11.

ofChristian
examples
emperors
(44/523c.l2)and examples
esp. Theodose(77/524b.
(59/523d.28),
17).
ofliterature
withthehelpofpriests
Knowledge
(90/524c.7);
cf.theroleofAristotle
and Socrates(130/525b.22).
Prov.
8,14-21(156/525d.23).
Deut. 17,19b-20a: his respect forGod's law
117
To be God-fearing
Tied byeverlasting
laws
(4/526c.28).
(30/527a.27).
has to be modest,
so
The sovereign
butnotdespicably
(53/527C.24).
The exampleofTaurusand thefather
ofthegovernor
(81/528b.31).
135
His association with his subjects
His actionmustbe healing(3/529a.4).Example:Trajan
11).
(38/529d.
and his
harmonize
Mercyand truth
(67/530b.
12). Plutarch
slave(94/530d.8).
Deut. 17,20b: his moderation
21
No excessive
virtuenorsuddenvice(3/53lc. 17).
Deut. 17,20c: the duration of his government
51
He is continued
in hischildern
12);
(2/532a.
and aboveall in heaven(21/532c.
2).
Deut. 17,20c: his succession
209
He willbe succeeded
byhischildern
(2/533a.2),unlessthey
misbehave
Alexander
and theBragmans
(28/533c.2).
(47/534a.22).
before
19): three
Commonwelfare
childern
(71/534c.
classical(78/534d.27)
and threebiblicalexamples
(129/535d.21).
The statement
ofmyhostat Piacenza(154/536b.
19).
Government
notbybirth( 174/536d.
bymerits
13).

C. Conclusion
91
12. Justice and virtuousnessfor the common welfare
Succession
ofkingdoms
(2/537a.9).Whatis justice/injustice
The fourcardinalvirtues
(21/537c.30)?
(37/538a.
18).
Head and members
(71/538c.26).

Book V. The Body According to Plutarch (1)

Prol.: Now more extensivelywith Plutarch
demandspace(539a.3).
Important
things

21

A. The comparison
withthebody
1. Plutarch's instruction
His letterto Trajan(539b.9).
2. The body of the commonwealth
as a bodyfromsoulto feet(540a.5).
The society
148

23:19:46 PM

21
53

B. The soul ofthebody

147
3. First of all: respect for God
on thesovereign
wantsto inculcate
Plutarch
Fourthings
forGod (541c.24).
ofall reverence
(541b.8), first
ofthe
Thisis alwaysmediated
(541d.l5);cf.theworking
fire(542d.l).
The senseofcult(543c.2).
171
4. Respect for persons, fivefold
ofrespect:
A personcanbe worthy
bynature(544a.29), by
hisfunction
(544d.7),social
(544b.15), hismoralconduct
(545b.4).
(545b.25), or hisfortune
position
and friends
forGod's ministers
is required
Specialrespect
(546b.4).
71
5. Respect for matters,twofold
and ecclesiastical
Forreligious
(547b.5).
rights
buildings
of
decrees(547d.21).Absolution
to imperial
According
is reserved
offences
(548b.14).
C. The headof thebody
270
6. Job as royal model
to thebiblein threeways
as headaccording
Appointment
(549b.17).
(548d.l9). No breathaboutbloodsuccession
ofbad counselors
The desaster
(549d.l4).
(550c.18).
Job29 (550a.25) and commentary
Job31 (553a.1) and 35 (553d.5).
238
7. Bad and good influenceof a sovereign
to Eccli.10 and Plato(554b.23).
A bad kingaccording
Trueloveis needed(554d.2):sevenclassicalexamples
(555b.25).
classicalexamples
Controlis needed:sixteen
(557b.1).
is^needed:theRomansas example(558c.30).
Perseverance
76
8. Trajan as example
to Gregory
PraiseofTrajan(558d.l8).According
(559d.l).
D. Heartand bowels
126
9. The senate of wise men; financial officials
The Senate(560b.15). Wisdom(560d.ll) and fearofthe
Lord(561b.5).
and treasures
Counselors
(562c.9).
(562a.22). Tax officials
E. Theflanksof thebody
218
10. Officialsof the Curia and lust for money
and thelongandnarrowexpenseroute(563a.3):
Officials
and everywhere
foreverything
(564a.25). Reasonablepayoffinancial
extortion
ment(564d.27)opposedbyexamples
(565a.14).
Ata curialikethata philosopher
becomeshermaphrodite
(566c.1)!
F. Eyes, ears, and tongue
123
11. Governors and judges
The praesides
(567c.17). Thejudges(567d.30).
149

23:19:46 PM

12.

13.
14.
15.

16.

17.

is at stake,notmoney(568c.8): biblicalandclassical
Justice
testimonies
(568d.l8).
153
Doubtful lawsuits ,
The judgeis committed
to thelaw and shouldnotbe afraid
- cf.hisfather
(570a.13): a caseoftherichAlexander
- was givenagainsthim(570c.10) and thesuitof
(570d.20)
vs. Evallushasbeen
evena famousmanlikePythagoras
cases(572c.17).
adjourned
(571c.30). Doubtful
81
The litigants
The oathofbothparties(573a.27).
The barristers
(573c.20). The accusers(574b.26).
48
The witnesses
on witnesses
The witnesses
(574d.l7).Thejudgment
(575a.2).
120
Fair jurisdiction and gifts
himself
Task ofthegovernor
(575d.8).A judgecontrolling
(576a.27).
ofbribes
Itinerant
justices(576c.24). Romaninterdiction
(576d.3).
worthimitating
examples
Contemporary
(577c.12).
237
Extortion and ecclesiastical functionaries
Romandecreesagainstextortion
(578a.13).
to 1 Reg. 12 (579a.7).
Samuel'sself-defence
according
their
and ecclesiastical
functionaries:
Cf. ourmagistrates
conduct
(579d.l3).
money-grubbing
I protest
(581b.24)! Samuelas an example(581d.5).
275
Lust for money and philosophy
ofrichesaccording
to Greekphilosophers,
esp.
Contempt
Diogenes(582d.20).
Buthissuicideis notallowedand moreover
unnecessary
and thelion(584b.21); it remains
(583d.20); cf.Andronicus
forbidden
(585c.19).
formoney(585d.4).The philosophical
searches
Everybody
attitude
towards
money(586c.14).
The exampleofSamuel(588a.24).

Book VI. The Body of Plutarch (2)

Prol.: Plutarch continued
The target:
to virtue(587d.3).
exhortation

35

A. The handsof thebody

179
1. Sheriffsand their practices
Thereis a militia
juristnextto thearmedmilitia(589a.15);
bothare handsofthesovereign
(589c.9). Publicservants
in theharvest
gathering
(589d.l9).
(591a.4).
Opposition
againstit is calledlese-majesty
Thatis harmful,
forthesovereign
especially
(592b.4).
150

23:19:46 PM

86
2. Wanted, skilfulsoldiers
Specialknowledge
required
(592d.29).
Trainingrequired
(593b.27).
40
3. Useless soldiers
soldiers
suchas Traso(594b.28) boastoftheir
Flaunting
exploits
(594d.22).
76
4. Training required
technique
Imperialsonstoohad to train(595b.16). Military
mustbe learnedbeforehand
(595c.7). Evenimperial
had to learn(596b.6). PraiseofCato (596b.17).
daughters
54
5. Selection needed
serviceis a goodjob (596d.3).
Military
Priests
as wellas soldiers
shouldbe selected
(597a.12).
65
6. Omission of selection harmful
work
out
of
selection
to
badly
appears
(597d.28).
Neglect
Remember
thefight
againstWales(598a.6) and Harold's
behaviour
(598c.6).
41
7. The militaryoath
toclassicaltestimonies
It is a religious
oath,according
(599b.8).
8. Comparison with priests
52
norsoldiers
Without
selection
andoathneither
priests
(600a.27).
ofthearmedmilitia
The twoswords(600c.16). The office
(600d.3).
9. Military loyalty
28
ofall to God
to thesovereign
Fidelity
(601a.24), butfirst
(601b.8).
46
10. The pledge of the sword
1
an
'oath'
d
.
is
the
Church
bound
to
27).
(60
by
Everybody
to thesoldiers
Cf.JohntheBaptistspeaking
(602a.22).
83
11. Discipline needed
a harsher
Abuseofpowerrequires
punishment
(602c.14).
slackenthesoldier(603a.8);
Luxuryand immoderateness
theclassicsalreadydidknowthat(603b.26).
155
12. Disobedience severelypunished
fourtestimonies
fordisobedience;
Variouspunishments
fromFrontinus
(604b.12) and twofromGellius(604d.6).
unless(605c.21).
Obediencewithout
comment,
fromFrontinus
ofpunishment:
Severity
eightexamples
(606b.1).
84
13. Abuse of the sword
Lossofthemilitary
belt:threeclassicaland onebiblical
example(607b.17).
othersagainsttheChurch
Abuseofpower,amongst
has to dealwithit (608c.31).
(608a.7). The sovereign
93
14. Discipline opposed to luxury
is needed;fiveclassicaltestimonies
(609a.16).
Discipline
(609d.27).
Luxuryis to be avoided:sexclassicalexamples
151

23:19:46 PM

15. Discipline and command

26
Romandiscipline
ofa competent
(61Od.23). Importance
commander
(61la. 7).
Laxness
16.
65
nowadays
Our slacktimes(61lb.23). See theWalesman
(611c.8).
Andcf.theMedianmothers
(612c.3).
17. Historical examples from Britain
54
Our Brennus
in Italy(612d.l8) andGreece(613b.5).
18. Contemporary examples from Britain
134
Cnut(613d.4). WilliamRufus,HenryI, and Robert['Curthose'](614a.4).
HenryII, thebest(614c.8): againstStephen(614d.1),
Eustace(615c.2), and at sieges(616a.6).
19. No rich machinerybut training
121
we can handleitverywell(616c.9), butthen
Actually,
without
glittering
apparatus
(616d.21).Butwithdiscipline
andschooling
(617b.19),pay(617c.9), and training
(617d.l6)likein all thearts(618b.9).
B. Thefeetof thebody
20. Farmers, artisans, valets
36
Countless
occupations
(618d.21).
Mutualrelationship
between
and lowerclasses
higher
(619b.9).
C. The commonwealth
21. Vergil's bees-state
82
The society
to nature(619c.30).
according
Vergil,Georg.4 (619d.5).
22. Needed, a prudent, careful sovereign
61
Prudence
and carealwaysneeded(620d.8).
Cf. Dido (621c.19).
23. Consequences of frivolity
38
It leadsto lust,and regret
follows
(622a.12).
Cf. Demosthenes
on Lais (622b.23).
24. Judgments on the sovereign; the parable of the stomachi75
The sovereign
mustbe tolerated
(622d.5).
Conversation
withpopeHadrianIV aboutRome:thecommongossip(623c.6), myopinion(624b.23), hisparableof
thestomach
(625b.14).
D. Aboutlese-majesty
25. Due reverence
129
ofheadand members
Coherence
(626b.11). Rulesandlaws
on lese-majesty
of
(626c.24). The six( + two)exigencies
fealty
(627d.25).
oftheCodexin casesoflese-majesty
Penalties
(628a.8).
83
26. Respect for the correctingtask of the sovereign
In a wedlock
are to be tolerated
the
defects
or removed,
samein thebodyofthecommonwealth
(629a.24).
152

23:19:46 PM

In this,a specialtaskforthesovereign
(629c.1).
Reverence
forthatimageofGod (630b.27).
47
27. To tell the truthis not lese-majesty
A pleaforthe'poor'(630d.24).Gnathois likeMarsias
(631b.3).
113
28. The true eulogy according to Apuleius
Praiseonlywhatis reallypower(63Id.18).
their
Apuleius,De deo Socratis21-24:peopledon'tnurture
mind(632a.4).
E. Generalconclusion
29. Head and members
23
The rightrelationship
(633d.12).
Becauseofreligion
peaceeverywhere
(634b.25).
30. The adversaries
52
ThoseGnatho-people
mischief
keepon brewing
(634b.11).
Triflers
(635a.13)!
PART III. PHILOSOPHICAL

REFLECTIONS

Book VII. Philosophy and Ethics

105
Prol.: Your proposal. Aim and sources of this book
is impossible
Actually,
yoursuggestion
(635b.3), unlessI
shouldpitymyself
(636c.8). Yet herewithsomesmall
presents
(636d.l3).
and myphilosophers
My authors
(637a.27).
Andmyaim:againstvices(637c.18).
A. Whichphilosophy?
1. The antique philosophers
53
Smartand famousbutalso proudlikethebuilders
ofthe
towerofBabel(637d.29).Stoics,Epicureans,
Academics
(638b.22).
109
2. The doubt of the Academics
The Academic
doubt(638d.25).Difference
man
between
and animal(639a.12).
ofan everdoubting
Uselessness
philosopher
(639c.10).
doubtful
to a manofwisdom
Twenty-eight
questions
(640b.17).
DecisionforAcademicmoderation
(640d.ll).
3. The frightenedStoic
65
The Academiawasa frightful
place(641a.25).
in thetempest
The philosopher
(641b.7).
Fearcausesmodesty
(642a.21).
4. Pythagoras
65
Lifeand workofPythagoras
(642b.4).
thatis: loverofwisdom(643b.1).
Philosopher,
5. Plato
191
Six Ionianphilosophers
(643d.19). Socrates(644a.12). Plato
153

23:19:46 PM

6.

7.

8.

B. How
9.

10.

1 1.
12.

13.

withtheOld (645c.4) and the

(644b.23): hisconformity
NewTestament
(646c8);hisdeath(647a.1).
Aristotle
74
His doctrine
and fame(647c.23), and histhirst
forglory
(648b.13).
The Academics
arehisdisciples
(648c.24).
A small theoryof cognition
98
Thereare first
hashisown
principles
(649a.24). Everybody
ofreligion
comprehension
(650a.14). The principles
fromtheseprinciples
are notto be
(650b.27). Consequences
calledin question(650c.5).
The only targetof felicitythroughphilosophy
131
and thatvia virtuebyphiManyschools,oneaim: felicity,
losophy
(65la. 4).
and aspirants
Threekindsofmen:wisemen,philosophers,
(652a.18).
ofphilosophy
variousvirtues
to felicity
(653b.21).
Through
to attaina goodphilosophy?
The so-called philosopher. What to read?
220
ofphiCurious'philosophers'
(653d.20). Modernteachers
losophy
(654b.15).
To readabouteverything
or aboutone themeonly
(655a.23)?
AdvicesbyCicero(655d.7)and Horace(656d.7).
on Varro(657a.25).
No studywithout
grace:Augustine
149
All reading is useful
All things
do benefit
men(658a.4).
The historical
and mystical
senseofNoach'sbenediction
(658b.16).
use (659d.28).
In thesamewaybooksare ofdifferent
withdiscretion
So, reading
(660c.9).
45
Through philosophy to love
= loveforthedivinity
Philosophy
(661a.3).
All philosophy
forthefurtherance
oflove(661c.25).
The stupid debater
231
menareinsupportable
Thoseconceited
(662a.24).Justtry
to arguewiththem(662c.20). Therearequitea lotofthem
nowadays
(663b.9).
is veryuseful(664a.17). Buto dear,that
Yet,disputing
oftheuniversalia
of
problem
(664c.5)! Andthoseinquirers
poses(665c.3).
Difference
between
and scientific
HolyScripture
readingmatter
(666a.5).
Six keys for study
201
The littlestanzaofBernardofChartres
(666c.7):
and simplicity
humility
(666d.l5);
to sixbiblical(667b.4) and three
searching
according
classicalexamples
(668c.3);
a lifeofquiet(668d.26);enquiry
(669b.12); poverty
land(669d.l3).
(669b.16); and foreign

154

23:19:46 PM

14. A seventh key

Love fortheteachers
(670c.17).
sevenotherkeys,butthereis onlyOne
Ticoniusmentions
key(671a.12).
15. Not Epicurus but Bothius
All haveone aim,Epicurustoo(671b.26); butyoucannot
thefivestrivings
reachit through
(67Id.25). Read
aboutthese(672b.21).
Bothius'De consolatione
forphilosophy
Whoreallyis yearning
(672c.5)!

35

98

C . Moneyand craving
forpower
16. Greed and stinginess
89
Variouswaysto riches(673a.5).
Avariceis horrible
and cannotbe satiated(674b.10).
175
17. Power and glory, even in the Church
Greediness
withfoolishness
together
(674d.ll).
Ambition
and tyranny
(675c.16).
forsale
Ecclesiastical
abuses(676b.20). Everything
fortheepiscopacy
(677d.16).
(677b.16). Striving
18. Those who pretend not to aspire to anything
82
ofbishop(678c.3).
Fallaciesforrejecting
theoffice
The failure
ofan ambitious
monk(679c.28).
is nothing
butappearance
Non-volition
(679d.9).
305
19. Those who openly aspire; obiections don't avail
Otherpeopleare openlyambitious
(680a.31), basingon
privileges
(681b.1).
(680c.1). Threemethods
in Apulia
ofthreecandidates
foran episcopacy
Exposure
refuted
counter-arguments
(682a.18). Thirty-nine
(682d.7).
is totally
Studyofphilosophy
lacking(684c.1).
no argument
Manifold
practice
(685c.18). Balachand the
donkey
(685d.2).
242
20. Imperial interdictions;protestsdon't avail
ofJustinian
Prohibitions
(686b.5), Leo (687b.26), and
Justinian
(687d.22).
is notboundby
ButDatanitepeoplesay,thesovereign
laws(688c.1).
Fourteen
stories
abouta tyrant
[Stephen]
(689b.11).
(689c.6). David acted
Appealon divinejusticeis rejected
otherwise
(690b.17).
D. Hypocrisy
21. Sanctimoniousness among the religious
Putting
up airsand graces(691a.26).
orders(69Id.7). Thereare,howPraiseofgoodmonastic
ever,Pharisees
amongthem(692b.9): theyappealto
tenths
Rome,rejecting
protests
(693a.3), andclaiming
(694b.5). Templars(694d.l0)!
The trulyreligious
are theopposite
(695c.25).
are Epicureans
Hypocrites
(696b.27).

274

155

23:19:46 PM

22. Deceiving appearances lead to death

71
Isaiah'sreproach
on Ezechia(696c.20); itssignification
(697c.31).
23. Good religious men
165
Carthusians
and Grandimontes
are goodones(698a.11).
Andothertrulyreligious
oftheso(699c.2). The religion
calledseculars(700b.7), according
toJerome
(700c.23).
The trueruleand hypocrisy
(701a.15).
E. Jealousy
24. Jealousy and disparagement
217
Thereare manyvices(70lb.4).
Whatis jealousy(702a.13): cf.Ovid andJoseph'sbrothers
(702c.8).
It is unbecoming
fora philosopher
(703b.19).
The disparagement
ofothers(704b.12): theconfession
of
Gilbert
ofHereford
andconclu(704d.l2);otherexamples
sion(705a.5).
25. Liberty and criticism
227
forliberty
a goodthing(705c.26): threehistorical
Striving
examples
(706a.18).
Freedom
ofspeech:seventeen
classicalexamples
(706b.5).
Difference
between
andgibes(708d.l0).
offences
The applying
ofliberty
(710b.31).
Book VIII. Ethics, Tiranny, Felicity
Prol.: For the public welfare
I am warning
againstdangers(709c.3).
CrieddownnowI willbe thanked
lateron (710c.7).
A. Thirstforglory
1. Pride and its ramificationsaccording to Gregory
Gnathosalwaysin Thrasos'service(71la. 28).
The treeofthesevenvicesaccording
to Gregory,
Mor.39
(71le.12).
Pridetakesrootsintovirtue(712d.13).
2. Praise and prodigality
Threemotives
forpraise(713a.5).
Circumstances
ofpraise:whereand bywhom(713d.7).
Liberality
(714a.30), evenforbuffoons
(714c.21)?
to Cicero,De off.(715a.19).
Prodigality
according
3. Types in Terence
Hear GnathoandThraso(716a.5), Thas(717a.18),and
Cherea(718b.21).
Conclusion:
no confidence
in friendship
whichis bought
(718c.8).
4. Praise fromliberality
No stinginess,
butgiveto theworthy
(719a.5).
Two examples
fromValerius(719d.8).
156

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46

94

148

152

75

5. Thirst for glory fromself-interest

150
forjusticeand self-interest,
and theconsequences
Striving
ofboth(720c.29).
to
ThirstforgloryoftheancientRomansaccording
Civ. Dei 5 (721a.26). Gloryis smoke(722b.18),
Augustine,
thatallegeddivineorigintoo(722c.6).
Stillworseis famethrough
crimes(723a.2).
B. Thefivesense-organs
6. The lusts. Insobriety
368
Libidothrough
thefivesenses,according
toJerome
(723c.9).
Relationbetween
and impurity
gluttony
(725a.21).
So-calledhospitality
(725b.8). Threekindsofbanquets
on immoderateness
(726a.13).Jerome
(727a.17).
Dido's banquetaccording
to Vergil,Aen. 1 (728b.16).
Fivehistorical
examples
(729c.1).
The banquetforAeneasbyEvandrus
to Vergil,
according
Aen.8 (730b.13).
7. Luxury at table
265
Fivesumptuary
lawsoftheRomans(731a.15).
A decreeagainstluxury,
and thatbyAntony
(732a.6).
Estimation
ofpikeand sturgeon
of
(733a.30). Adoption
foreign
luxury
(733d.11).
Caesar'ssumptuary
laws(734c.14).
My dinnerin Apulia(735d.22).Luxurious
eatingpastand
present
(735d.ll).
8. Three kinds of banquets
201
Popularbanquets(736b.10). Civicbanquets(737a.19).
Philosophical
banquets(737c.19) and thefood'laws'of
Jerome(737d.7),Macrobiusand Valerius(738d.l8).
The solemnbanquetaccording
to Valerius(739a.6).
Plato'sopinion,myopinion,and Paul'sopinion(739c.7).
9. Table-manners
125
The bestrulein thegospel(740b.18); comparetheheathen
(741b.9).
On thanksgiving
and table-talk
(741c.23).
and respect
in all things
Alwayshonesty
(742c.14).
10. Table-talk according to Macrobius
293
Macrobius(743a.9): on goodguests(743a.22), usefulconversation
(744a.4), inviting
questions
(744d.l8),and on the
difference
between
gibes(745d.5)and offences
(746d.30).
The judgment
ofPlatoaboutdrinking
(747b.14). Other
rules(748b.6).
11. Marriage and women
368
Voluptuousness
(748d.4).The nuptialtie(749b.2).
FromJerome'sLiberTheophrasti
(750a.11).
No secondmarriage
(75Id.2).
Femaleshamelessness
(752a.18): sixclassicaltestimonies
(752d.26).
Petronius'
storyofthewidowofEphesus(753b.26).
157

23:19:46 PM

Iovinianum
Adversus
from
Statements
(755a.23).
Jerome's
Praiseofthechastewoman(755d.5).
301
12. Music, theatre,and fashion
accordof
servants
also
Humandignity
(756c.
10)
26),
(756b.
(756d.21).
ingto Seneca/Macrobius
The tickling
oftheearsbymusic(757d.l6),oftheeyesby
dance(758c.23), and caressbyclothesformenandwomen
(760a.10).
and
Humanbehaviour
(76la. 5) and alwaysmoderation
decorum
(761b.20).
304
13. Sobriety togetherwith hospitality
on sobriety
(762b.6).
Judgment
ofQuintilian
I agreewithSeneca,despitethejudgment
(763a.20).
can tally(764c.6); examples:
and hospitality
Sobriety
of
fromtheOld Testament
(765c.9) and fromthehistory
thechurch
(766b.21).
Conclusion:
theydo tally(767c.20).
C. Trueglory
216
14. Glory by whom and why?
from
Praisehas to comefroman expert,
particularly
authors
(768b.5).
ofpraisefromtheclassics(770a.14).
Nineexamples
Valueof'strategical'
(77Id.13).
sayings
165
15. Motifs for glory
becauseofhonesty
Primarily
(772c.24).
Forhealth(772d.5),nobleblood(772d.lO),or material
for
possessions
(773d.31) don'tcountunlessas instruments
virtue(774a.15).
avaricehas to be avoided(774b.2).
Butsurely,
87
16. The Epicurean flood
unlikethoseoftheparadise,flowfromvolupFourstreams,
tuousness
(775d.20).
on forcedoesn'tafford
To prideoneself
glory,butcauses
(776d.22).
tyranny
D. Tyrannology
376
17. The tyrant,the shepherd, and the mercenary
withthetyrant
as contrasted
The truesovereign
(777c.4).
also amongpriests
(778b.11).
Tyranny
God willjudgeall ofthem:thestoryofSt Basil(779a.18).
Ezechiel34 on theshepherd
(779d.4);and on the
mercenary
(782b.7).
Oh no, I don'ttalkaboutpapaldelegates
(783a.14)!
ofthesheep(784b.29).
Finally,thethief
190
18. Roman tyrants
All power,oftyrants
too,derivesfromGod (785a.7) and is
good(785d.l3).
Bad examples:
Caligula(786b.6) and Nero(787c.5).
aboutresistance
Conclusion
(788d.5).
againstthetyrant
158

23:19:46 PM

19. Downfall of Roman tyrants

to Nero(789c.2).
JuliusCaesar(789a.19). FromAugustus
Domitianus
(791c.6).
(790c.21). FromNervato Commodus
Conclusion
(792c.5).
Extraon 'our' Severus(792c.14).
20. Downfall of biblical tyrants
Biblicalexamples
Saul, Eglon
(793b.25): Nemroth,
(793c.12).
(795b.7) killed,yettheywere
Jahel(794d.l3)andJudith
praised.
Conclusion:
how,yeaand nay,to expeltyrants
(796b.31).
21. Downfall of Julian and others
fromtheOld Testament
Fiveexamples
ofdownfall
(797a.10).
introduction
JuliantheApostate:
(798b.14),hiseducation
actionas emperor
(799a.27), first
(800b.21), thebook(s)of
thetemplein
ofrebuilding
Apollinaris
(802a.10),attempt
to Christianity
Jerusalem
(802c.2), adaptation
(803b.1), his
letter
to Arsacius(803c.19),hisdeath(805a.21).
Eadmund(806c.29).
Our ownmartyr-king
Eustacheandall British
disappeared
tyrants
(806d.22).
22. Gedeon as opposed to Antiochus
and Ozias (808a.8).
Gedeon(807b.12). Antiochus
Our times(808c.28).
23. Tyranny and schism
It is unchristian
to fight
forecclesiastical
chairs(809a.21).
moredesastrous
Schism,nothing
(810b.10),especially
themother-church
regarding
(81lb.21). Recentexamples
(812b.12).
ofthatkindwillperish(812c.14).
Tyrants
ofAdrian
The burdenofthepapacy(813c.29): complaint
IV (814b.11).

221

184

508

77
302

E. Conclusion
175
24. The Epicurean way doesn't lead to paradise
No paradiseforEpicureans
(814d.2).Theyarelikemoles
to evil
andotheranimals(816a.3). Humannatureinclined
(816c.25).
to Vergil(816c.10).
The sexagesaccording
The broadroadoftheEpicureans
(818a.24).
213
25. The road to felicity
and thewayto felicity
(818c.6).
Epicureans
The treeofknowledge
(819a.16) and theboughofProserpine(820a.28).
thetreeofgrace(820d.6).
Approach
toThomas
Do youliketo be happy(82lb.8)? Exhortation
(821d.27).
Thisbook(822b.17).

159

23:19:46 PM

SUMMARY:
andPrologue
Introduction
Part
I. Officials
ado.
andtheir
Bk.1.Curial
occupations:
a) starting-point
b)games
ofmagic
c) varieties
Bk.2.Thetruth
ofsigns:
andfalse
a) true
signs
A.D.70
b)exc.:
Jerusalem
c)sequel:
signs
d)dreams
e) a problem
I) prognostications
Bk.3.Thefalsehood
offlattery:
a) introduction
b)flattery
oflife
c) thetheatre
d)applications

489lines
.l
ch.: 701.
5 ch.: 8201.
5 ch.: 4191.

total:
1.309
lines

prol.: 141.
3 ch.: 1421.
6 ch.: 3851.
5 ch.: 1271.
3 ch.: 3861.
9 ch.:1.272
1.
3 ch.: 7901.

3.116
lines

prol.: 261.
3 ch.: 1941.
4 ch.: 373I.
2 ch.: 2661.
6 ch.: 9301.

1.789
lines

Part
II. Public
Junctions.
Bk.4.Thetrue
sovereign:
ethics
a) royal
mirror
theO.T.
from
b)a royal
c)conclusion
Bk.5.Thebody
toPlutarch
according
(1):
with
thebody
a) thecomparison
b)thesoulofthebody
ofthebody
c) thehead
andbowels
d)heart
ofthebody
e) theflanks
earsandtongue
f)eyes,
Bk.6.Thebody
toPlutarch
according
(2):
ofthebody
a) thehands
ofthebody
b)thefeet
c)thecommonwealth
d)about
lese-majesty
conclusion
e) general

prol.: 201.
2 ch.: 741.
3 ch.: 3891.
3 ch.: 5841.
1ch.: 1261.
1ch.: 2181.
7ch.:1.037
1.
prol.: 341.
19ch.:1.482
1.
1ch.: 361.
4 ch.: 3561.
4 ch.: 3721.
2 ch.: 751.

Part
III.Philosophical
reflections.
Bk.7.Philosophy
andethics:
a) which
philosophy?
toattain
a good
b)how
philosophy?
andcraving
for
c) money
power
d)hypocrisy
e)jealousy
Bk.8. Ethics,
andfelicity:
tyranny,
for
a) thirst
glory
b)thefive
sense-organs
c) true
glory
d)tyrannology
e) conclusion
Total:

total:
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lines
prol.:104I.
8 ch.: 7861.
7ch.: 9791.
5 ch.: 8931.
3 ch.: 5101.
2 ch.: 4441.
5.603
lines
prol.: 451.
5 ch.: 6191.
8 ch.:2.225
1.
3 ch.: 4681.
7ch.:1.858
1.
2 ch.: 3881.
166chapters

prol.: 211.
3 ch.: 2581.
8 ch.: 9261.
1ch.: 911.

total:
1.296
lines

6.214
lines

lines
6.099

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lines

2.355
lines

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9.319
lines

22.121lines

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
From Eternal to Perpetual Truths:
A Note on theMediaeval Historyof Aristotle,
De interpretaiione, Ch. 1, 16al8
C.H. KNEEPKENS

in thesoul are neither

truenorfalsewhilesomeare
Justas somethoughts
oneortheother,so alsowithspokensounds.Forfalsity
and truth
necessarily
havetodo withcombination
and separation.
Thusnamesand verbsbythemselves- forinstance
'man'or'white'whennothing
further
is added- arelike
thethoughts
thatare without
combination
and separation;
forso fartheyare
neither
truenorfalse.A signofthisis thateven'goat-stag'
signifies
something
butnot,as yet,anythingtrueor false- unless'is' or 'is not'is added(either
or withreference
to time)(Arist.,De interpr.
1, 16a9-18).
simply
This is the last sectionof the firstchapter of Aristotle'sDe interpr
etationein Ackrill's translation.1The last words of thispassage, which are
put between brackets, have been a subject of discussion ever since
scholars have occupied themselveswith the interpretationof Aristotle's De interpretatione
. The purpose of the presentarticleis to investigate the several ways in which this phrase was interpretedin the twelfth
and early thirteenth centuries. As is well-known, this period
experienced a "turn" of the intellectual paradigm, caused by the
inflowof Aristotle'spsychological,physical and metaphysicalworks,
theirArab commentariesand interpretations,and the new educational
institution,the university.It is, however, far fromclear when and to
what degree the new theoreticaltenets became active in remoulding
the concepts thathad built up the respectivedisciplines,and in having
an effecton the expositionsof the authoritativetexts. In her introduction to MasterJordan's NotulaesuperPriscianum
minorem
, a textthatcan
be dated to the 1240s,2 Mary Sirridge argues that the general
frameworkwithinwhich these Notulaehave to be placed, had changed
fundamentally,but that on the level of doctrinal details the change of
paradigm was not feltso clearly.3We can put on a level withthisLouis
1 Ackrill
dr. L. M. de Rijkforhisusefulcom1983,43. - ThanksareduetoProf.
on an earlierdraftofthisarticle.
mentsand criticisms
2 Cf. Gauthier1982,esp. 367-73.
3 Notulae
Priscianum
minorem
Partialedition
andintroduction
super
Magisti
Jordni.
by
M. Sirridge,
1980(CIMAGL, 36), 13.
Copenhague
161

23:19:57 PM

Kelly's observations on the influence of the theoreticalframe-work

that was based on Aristotle's Physics.Kelly shows that the modistic
grammarians,who were not active until the thirdquarter of the thirteenth century, "cherchent une explication par comparaison en
reliant la science du langage un concept central de science
naturelle".4 It is the ultimate objective of this study to contributeto
our insight into the way in which this change of the theoretical
foundations became operative on the level of the individual
disciplines.
The Greek words " haploos kata chronon", which at a first
glance seem easy to translate, have caused a lot of worries to the
learned translators and commentators from Antiquity up to the
present.5
In his annotations to these words Ackrillrejectsthe suggestionthat
"simply" alludes to the use of a verb in the presenttense in a timeless
or omnitemporal present proposition. Basing himselfon Aristotle's
distinctionbetween a verb in the presenttense and verbs in one of the
. , ch. 3), he defends the view that "simply"
other tenses {De interpr
refersto 'present time', whereas "with referenceto time" indicates
the 'past and futuretimes'.6
Ackrill follows Edghill who in the Oxford translation renders
Aristotle's words by "either in the presentor in some other tense".7
The same view is held by Weidemann in his recentbook on De inter: "sei es schlechthin,sei es in einer temporal abgewandelten
pretatione
Form".8 This line of interpretationis explicitlyrejectedby others.For
instance, Cooke, in the Loeb edition, translates"whether generally"
- a word which in the text itselfCooke expounds with the phrase
"that is to say, withoutdefinitetime connotation- or in a particular
tense", to which, in a footnote,Cooke adds the observation: "some
4 Kelly1977,123-4.
5 rora survey
otthemostimportant
andmodern
torinterpretation
Ancient
proposals
ofthesewords,see Montanari
1988,76-8.
6 Cf. Ackrill
a "timeless"proposition
andan
between
1963,115;forthedifference
see Lyons1977,680.
"omnitemporal"
proposition,
7 TheWorks
Translated
intoEnglishundertheEditorship
ofW.D. Ross,
ofAristotle.
translated
Vol. I: Categoriae
andDe interpretation,
by E.M. Edghill,Oxford1928
is notruth
orfalsity
aboutit,unless
butthere
1937]:"It hassignificance,
[phot.repr.
or in someothertense."
'is' or 'is not'is added,eitherin thepresent
8 Aristoteles,
vonH. Weidemann,
Berlin1994,
. Ubersetzt
underlutert
PeriHermeneias
histransladefends
4. In hiscomment
on thesewordsWeidemann
comprehensively
tion(cf. 157).
162

23:19:57 PM

would renderthese words 'in the presentor some othertense.' ".9 The
same line of thought we find in the translation by Apostle, who
renders: " either without qualification or with a temporal qualifica44
tion", to which he adds the followingcomment: To qualify somethingis to restrictit in some way, and so what is unqualified has no
restrictions.That which exists without qualification, then, would be
that which is not limitedby time but exists always, whethereternally
or hypothetically.For example, the universe exists always and eternally(according to Aristotle),and 'all men are mortal' is trueforevery
man regardlessof the time or place of his existence, even if any given
individual does not exist eternally. In science, all statementsof the
form 'every A is B' or 'no A is B' signifythings with unqualified
existence, as in the case of 'all vertical angles are equal'. But that
which has temporal qualification is limited to a definiteinterval of
time, whetherpresent, past or future."10
The uncertaintyattachingto the meaning of these words ofAristotle
may also be noticed in the early Arabic school tradition. In Alwhichwas, incidentally,not
Farabi's commentaryon De interpretations,
available to mediaeval Western scholarship, we find the view also
voiced which is held by Cooke and Apostle. Al-Farabi assumes
'haploos' to mean "in all time" and 'kata chronon' "in a specific
time".11 According to a scholion to the Arabic version of De interpretationethat is preserved in the MS Paris, BN, ar. 2346, Al-Farabi
appears to follow in this respect one of the two interpretationsthat
were traditional in the Arabic schools. The other Arabic view is
similar to the one held by interalios Ackrill,Edghill and Weidemann:
'haploos' means "the present time" and 'kata chronon' "the two
times surroundingthe present".12
9 Cooke1938,116-7.
10Aristotle's
andPropositions
Translated
withCommenCategories
(De interpretatione).
Iowa 1980,99-100.
tariesandGlossary
Grinnell,
byH.G. Apostle,
11Al-Farabi's
andShort
Treatise
onAristotle's
De interpretatione.
Translated
Commentary
andNotesbyF.W. Zimmermann,
withan Introduction
London1981,15: "Butthis
andwhatweunderstand
from
itisneither
truenorfalseunlesswestipulate
expression
withit thatitdoesor doesnotexist,in all timeor in a specific
time.Thinkofthe
manyanimals,suchas thehadil(?), thataresaidtohaveexistedin old times,and
ofthemanytalesthattellofanimalsthatwillexistin thefuture,
no havingexisted
before."
"
12Al-Farabi's
Note
: 4'Abu Bishir< Matta> says
14,note3: School
Commentary,
thataccording
tosomecommentators,
thepresent
Aristotle
meansbysimply
time,and
thetwotimessurrounding
thepresent;
to others,
whathe means
bytime
according
is permanent
future
andpast."
time,andbytime
time,i.e. present,
bysimply
specific
163

23:19:57 PM

Even in late Greek Antiquitya uniforminterpretationwas lacking.

Unfortunately,only two - late - Greek commentatorson De interhave appeared in print.In only one of themwe findan interpretatione
pretation which was also defended by Arabic and modern Western
scholarship.Ammonius of Alexandria, who was active near the end of
the fifthcentury,considered 'haploos' as "aoristoos", which he inter'
preted as 'without a temporal adverb". So the addition of the verb
'to be' "haploos" leads to sentences such as "the goat-stagwas" or
"the goat-stag is" or "the goat-stag will be"; "with an addition
according to time" means according to Ammonius "the addition of
a temporal adverb": "the goat-stagwas yesterdayor last year", "the
goat-stag will be tomorrow or next year".13 It is strikingthat in
Ammonius' discussion of the verb when taken "kata chronon", the
presenttense is not considered. It is possible that our textis defective,
so as to make it uncertainwhetheror not Ammonius meant to say that
the phrase "kata chronon" does not concern the presenttime. As we
will see below,14we findsome supportin Boethius' worksforthe thesis
that the text is defectivein this respect. The other Greek commentator, Stephanus of Alexandria, who lived in the seventhcentury,took
'haploos' to stand for "the present time" (ton enestoota chronon),
and 'kata chronon' for "the past and futuretimes"; Stephanus mentions presenttime in this contextwithoutany furthermodification.15
Boethius
Boethius provided mediaeval scholarshipwith a reliable translation
of Aristotle'sDe interpretatione.
He also composed two commentarieson
this work, which (especially the more extensive version) were widely
used in the Middle Ages. So Boethius had a great influenceon the way
in which the early mediaeval studentsof logic used to read Aristotle's
booklet, which was so concise that even Cassiodorus said that while
writingthiswork the Stagiritedipped his reed-pen in his mind instead
of in ink.16
13Ammonii
De interpretatione
InAristotelis
ed. A. Busse,Berolini
Commentantes,
1897,c.
in Aristotelem
2, 29, 22-7(Commentaria
Graeca,Vol. 4, pt 4-6).
14Cf. 167.
15Stephani
In Librum
Aristotelis
De interpretatione
Commentarium
, ed. M. Hayduck,
in Aristotelem
Berolini1885,6, 30-2(Commentaria
Graeca,Vol. 18,parsIII).
16Cassiodorus,
ed. R.A.B. Mynors,114,21-2:[II, iii,11]"Aristoteles
Institutions,
calamumin mentetingebat";
cf.Isaac 1953,
quandoPerihermeneias
scriptitabat,
12.
164

23:19:57 PM

In his more elementary firsteditio, Boethius gives his readership

'
"
only one explanation of Aristotle's "simpliciter"or secundum
tempus1.
"
"
'
He takes simpliciterto mean "with present time indication' and
" "with indicationof the
"secundumtempus
past or the futuretime". As
we have seen above,17 this is the same interpretationas that by
Stephanus of Alexandria and modern scholars as Edghill and Ackrill.
Boethius defendshis interpretationby arguing that in factthe present
time is not a genuine time, but the confinium or the borderline
between times, namely the past and the futuretimes, since it is the
beginning of the futuretime and the end of the past time.18
We meet the views of Ammonius and Stephanus in Boethius'
second and far more comprehensive commentary.19In this work,
Boethius gives three ways of interpretingAristotle's words.
17Above,162,164.
18Boethius,
In De interpr.,
primaeditio,ed. C. Meiser,Lipsiae1877,45, 15-27:
velsecundum
est:simpliciter
enim
, huiusmodi
"ergoid quodait vetsimpliciter
tempus
factaenuntiatio
secundum
est.Etenimquodpraesens
non
dicimus,
praesens
tempus
autemestfuturum
velpraeteritum.
est,sedconfinium
temporum,
tempus
Ergonon
autfalsitas
nisiei autesseautnon
, Veritas
inveniri,
potestin eo quodesthircocervus
esseaddatur.Vel praesenssignificans,
vel tempus,quod est
quod estsimpliciter,
'
aut futurum.
Si quis enimsic dicat hircocervus
es, simpliciter
id est
praeteritum
secundumpraesens,si quis autem'hircocervus
eri vel lfui
, secundumtempus
futurum
scilicet
et praeteritum."
19Boethius,
In De interpr
. , secundaeditio,ed. C. Meiser,Lipsiae1880,51, 2-52,9:
"velsimpliciter
velsecundum
Hoc veroidcircoaddidit,quodin quibusdam
ita
tempus.
enuntiationes
ut quodde ipsisdicitur
secundum
substantiam
in
fiunt,
proponatur,
verohocipsum'esse' quod additur,
nonsubstantiam,
sedpraesentiam
quibusdam
4
Cum enimdicimusdeusest*
t noneumdicimusnuncesse,sed
quandamsignificet.
in substantia
tantum
esse,ut hocad immutabilitatem
potiussubstantiae
quamad
Si autemdicamus'diesest', ad nullamdieisubstantiam
tempus
aliquodreferatur.
pertinetnisitantum
ad temporis
constitutionem.
Hoc estenimquodsignificat
est
, tam'
es. Quarecumitadicimusesseut substantiam
quamsi dicamusnunc
designemus,
estaddimus;cumveroita ut aliquidpraesenssignifcetur,
secundum
simpliciter
tempus.Haec una quamdiximus
expositio.
Aliaverohuiusmodi
est:'essealiqui duobusmodisdicitur:
aut simpliciter
aut
secundum
secundum
utsiquissicdicat
tempus.
Simpliciter
quidem
praesens
tempus,
' hircocervus
es. Praesensautemquod dicitur,
temtempusnonest,sed confinium
porum:finisnamqueestpraeteriti
futurique
principium.
Quocircaquisqussecundumpraesens
hocsermone
utitur.
, utitur,<eo> simpliciter
quodestesse
Qui vero
aut praeteritum
illenonsimpliciter,
scd iamin ipsumtempus
iungitaut futurum,
incurrit.
Temporanamque(ut dictumest) duo ponuntur:praeteritum
atque
futurum.
dicit.Cum utrumlibet
Quod si quis cumpraesensnominat,
simpliciter
velfuturum
secundum
enuntiatione.
dixerit,
praeteritum
tempusutitur
Estquoquetertiahuiusmodi
ita tempore
ut
utimur,
expositio,
quod aliquotiens
indefinite
dicamus:ut si quisdicat(esthircocervus,
erithircocervus'
hoc
,
fuithircocervus
indefinite
et
dictum
est.Sinveroaliquisaddat*nunc
es vel'heri
fuivel
'eraseri adsimpliciter
dicitur
addittempus.
, hocipsumessequodsimpliciter
Quaresecundum
165

23:19:57 PM

Boethius' firstinterpretationcalls our special attention.He is of the

opinion that when we say: "God is" (Deus esi), we do not intend to
say with such a propositionthat God is existingnow, but ratherthat
God is in substance only. This implies that the present tense of the
verb 4to be' applied to God refers to the immutabilityof God's
substance rather than to some time-aspect which, incidentally,
includes mutability. Boethius attributesthe determination 'simply'
to this use of the verb 4to be' When, however, we say "it
(simpliciter)
is daytime" or "day" (diesest),we do not intend to referto the day's
substance, but we only want to say that it is day now; so we have used
the verb 'to be' secundum
tempus.In his article on Boethius' notion of
being L.M. de Rijk points to the distinctionBoethius makes between
the two senses of the verb 'to be', viz. to signifysubstance and "some
kind of presence". De Rijk emphasizes that Boethius' acceptation of
the verb 'to be' as signifyingsubstance stands in the tradition of
Platonic metaphysics, and that in this context Boethius was highly
influenced by a theological speculation which we also find in the
writingsof St. Augustine.20 De Rijk's observations are completely
right.Boethius seems to attemptto keep the discussionwithinthe philosopher's domain. He speaks of an opposition between a proposition
secundum
substantiam
and a proposition secundum
praesentiam.
Although
he does not place any restrictionon the range of the use of the term
'
"
'substance', is it obvious fromhis using the example Deus es and
the explanation he added thathe does not take 'substance' in the sense
Aristotlehas in his Categories
(c. 5, 2all-27). Boethius here presentsan
interpretationwhich is based on a blend of Neoplatonic metaphysical
and Christiantheologicalconsiderations.St. Augustine, inter
alia in his
in Psalmum89 (n. 3), had already used words which show
Enarrationes
a strikingresemblance to Boethius' text: "It is entirelycorrectthathe,
the poet of the Psalm, did not say: 'from all eternityyou have been
and you will be to all eternity';but he used a verb with presenttime
indication, thus introducing God's substance as incommutable in
every respect, in which there exists no Was nor Will be, but only
Is".21
harumexpositionum
unamtrium
estquodait:si nonvelessevelnonesse
intellegendum
addatur
velsecundum
, velsimpliciter
tempus
20See De Rijk 1988,13-5.
21August.Enarr.inPs. , 89 (n.3): "Optimeautcmnonait,A saeculotu fuisti,
et
tueris;sedpraesentis
verbum
Dei
usqueinsaeculum
significationis
posuitinsinuans
substantiam
omnimodo
ubinonestFuitetErit,sedtantum
Est".
incommutabilem,
166

23:19:57 PM

For Boethius the notion of 'timelessness' in this context was a

theologicalone. Its appearance in thisdiscussion was only a side-effect
caused by the introduction of the christianized Neoplatonic
'4
4substance'
vel
-concept into his comments on the phrase simpliciter
in
it
will
an
.
become
secundum
However,
ingredient
important
tempus"
the mediaeval discussions.
In the second interpretation,which is similar to Stephanus',
Boethius explicitlyargues thathe who uses the verb 'to be' in the present tense {secundum
, forthe presentis not "a
, uses it simpliciter
praesens)
in
the
other
"a
of
but
confinium
cases, the past and
times";
time",
futuretenses, one enters time.
Boethius' thirdinterpretationcorrespondsto Ammonius' view: We
oftenuse the several tensesof theverb 4to be' withoutany furthertem), by which
poral indication. In thatcase we use it indefinitely( indefinite
in "the
instance
for
adverb Boethius renders Ammonius' aoristoos
,22
goat-stagis", "the goat-stagwas", "the goat-stagwill be". When we
add a furtherdeterminationof time,by saying forexample, "is now",
"was yesterday" or "will be tomorrow", we use theverb 'to be' secundumtempus.It should be noted that in this passage Boethius not only
gives the finiteverb in the past and futuretenses with examples of
them,but also in the presenttense, which, as we have noticed above,23
is lacking in Ammonius' text.
Commentaries
TwelfthCentury
has
One of the earliest mediaeval commentarieson De interpretatione
come down to us in MS Oxford, Corpus Christi College 233. John
Marenbon dates it to the early twelfthcentury, "after c. 1110". 24 It
"
vel
is a remarkable text, for its comments on Aristotle's simpliciter
"
secundumtempus deviate from Boethius' interpretationsand from
commentaries which we will meet.
most of the other twelfth-century
The anonymous master says that according to Aristotleeithera word
with time consignificationor one without time consignificationis
added. The author adds that in a special situation a verb may drop

22For the difficulties

the influence
of
whichstandin the way of establishing
see Courcelle1948,269.
on Boethius,
Ammonius
23See above,164.
24Marenbon1993,117(H7).
167

23:19:57 PM

its time consignification,namely as a resultof the addition of a tem25

poral adverb, such as 'now' or 'sometimes':
uel simpliciter
uel secundumtempus.Hoc estitaquodilludadditibi:siuesit
ut 'curriaut *currens
ut 4album
'
', seu minime,
tempusconsignificat[iu]um,
Verbaquoquenonnumquam
omnino
exalitemporis
deponunt
significationem
' uel 4currit
ut si dicam'curre
modo
quo adiuncto,
aliquando'
It is notable that the firstsentence of thisexplanation shows, albeit in
a more concise form, a great resemblance with the firstpart of
Abaelard's discussion in the glosses on De interpretatione
in his Logica
''
' 26
Ingredientibus
Vel simpliciter
vel secundumtempus,hocestvelquae nondesignet
tempus,
' vel
utcumdicitur:
'hircocervus
nonalbum
ut'hircocervus
curquae
tempus
designet,
rensvelnon' 'hircocervus
currit
velnon1
.
In the manuscripts Orlans 266 and Assisi 573 an early twelfthhas been handed
centurycommentaryon Aristotle's De interpretatione
down which is of great relevance to our inquiry. Up to the present,
thistexthas been commonlyreferredto withthe qualificationof being
composed by an anonymous master.27To my mind there is serious
evidence that it was composed by Master V. to whom Abaelard refers
in the chapter of his Dialcticain which he deals with the words called
dictiones.
Abaelard asks the question whyAristotledoes
by him definitae
not mention the infinite phrases, for instance " non-albus-homo"
,
alongside the infinitenouns and verbs, since it is Abaelard's own opinion that phrases, too, can be made infinite."However, this view is
absolutely rejected by others," Abaelard continues, "and Master V.
agreed with them, as I remember well." This scholar rejected the
possibilityof making phrases infinite,"not on semantic grounds, but
on account of syntactic considerations", Abaelard emphasizes. In
order to substantiatethis statement,Abaelard refershis readers to the
GlosulaesuperDe interpretatione
by this master, "in which you can find
this utternonsense".28 In the commentaryat issue we finda passage
which almost litterally corresponds to the opinion which was
25MS Oxford,
CorpusChristiCollege233,f. 129ra.
26Peter
Abaelards
, hrgg.vonB. Geyer,3.Heft:Die Glossenzu
Philosophische
Schriften
Perihermneias,
i. W. 1927(Beitrge
Mnster
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
und
des Mittelalters.
TexteundUntersuchungen,
333, 14-7.
Theologie
XXI),
27Forthiscommentary,
see Marenbon1993,118(H9).
28Abaelard,
Dialctica
, ed. De Rijk(Assen21970),141,26sqq.:"alii veronullomodo
orationem
infinitan
V. assentiebat;
necquidem
concedunt,
magister
quibus,memini,
id tamsecundum
sententiam
constructionis
cuius
naturam;
negabatquamsecundum
dictionum
calumniamin Glossulis
eius super
quideminvalidamde coniunctione
Periermenias
invenies."
168

23:19:57 PM

denounced by Abaelard. In the beginningof the second book we read

4'an oratiocannot be made
infinite,since although sometimesit might
the
constructionof the words does not allow
a
give sound meaning,
it: oratioautemnondebetinfinitan,
quia etsisnussensusindequandoqueconci"
non
tamen
dictionum
iunctura
,
pateretur(MS Orlans, p. 23b).
peretur
This correspondence allows us to conclude that this commentary
was composed by the master V., mentioned by Abaelard. He might
be Ulger of Angers, but not William of Champeaux,29 at least as far
as I can see now, since the semanticsof the infinitenouns maintained
by William of Champeaux do not correspondwith those proposed in
this commentary.30
So far for the authorship of this importantcommentary. Turning
now to our author's discussion on the interpretationof Aristotle's
velsecundum
, we find that this text appears to
tempus
phrase simpliciter
have seriouslyinfluencedthe opinion of the young Abaelard. In this
commentarywe meet the three Boethian interpretations.Abaelard's
master observes that in Boethius' firstinterpretation,in which the
opposition between the timeless present and the three times plays a
4
role, only the verb to be' is at stake, whereas the two otherinterpretationsmay also apply to otherverbs. As we have seen above,31Boethius
himselfis not thatexpliciton this account. Anotherpoint of difference
is thatwhile Boethius underlinesthe opposition between the substantiaand the praesentiasignification,this master more openly speaks of a
timelessagainst a time-boundopposition while using the phrases "sine
ratione
, which he applies to the proper and immutablebeing,
temporis"
and " cum rationetemporis"
, which obviously does not pertain to any
immutability:32
sicexponitur:
Boetium
uel simpliciter
uel secundum
tempus,quodsecundum
ut 'Deuses. Hec ad proprium
sinerationetemporis,
Estaliquandopredicatur
et ad tempusnequaquamrefertur.
et immutabile
essedicitur
Aliquandocum
Conv.573]
ut'dieses. Hec ad nullam[add.MS Assisi,
ratione
ponitur,
temporis
'
. Quarecum[add.
diesestnunc'
dieipertinet,
sedsubintelligitur
immutabilitatem
MS
addi; cum uero etiam
simplexesse dsignt,dicitursimpliciter
"Si non
EthocestquoddicitAristotiles:
secundum
tempus
tempus,
predicatur.
idestnonhabitaibi rationetemaddaturuelesseuel nonesseuel simpliciter,
idestsecundum
temporis."
aliquamrationem
tempus,
poris,uel secundum
uerbum
dicitur.
Presens
Velsicexponitur:
uerbum
Quaresiquispresens
simplex
es, presens
uerbum
predicatur.
Qui ueropreteritum
simpliciter
ponat,ut'homo
29Cf. De Rijk'sintroduction
to theeditionofAbaelard'sDialctica
, XIX-XX.
30ForWilliamofChampeaux'theory
1993.
oftheinfinite
noun,see Kneepkens
31See above,166.
32MS Orlans,B.m.,266,8a.
169

23:19:57 PM

4
uelfuturum
uel'eri, nonsimplex
sedtempus
uerbi
uerbum,
ponit,ut homo
fuit1
Preteritum
incurrit.
enimet futurum
uerbitempora
sunt.
Item.Aliaexpositio.
uerbosinedeterminatione
utimur
Et
Aliquotiens
temporis.
' uelkeriC
hocestquodaitsimpliciter,
ut'homo
est
uel'fuit'.Si ueroaddatur
nunc
ucl eriuel eras
, determinatur
tempus.Et ideodicituerbumsecundum
tempus
predican.
In primasententia
tantum,
accepitBoetiusperesseetnonesseesthocuerbum
sed in aliispossuntaccipiet estet quelibetuerba.
In addition to the three Boethian interpretations,this commentary
also provides us with a fourthone. Unfortunately,the text of this
passage as it has been handed down in our two manuscripts,is not
clear in every respect,but neverthelessit is possible to grasp its tenor.
Both the codices give as the firstpart of thisinterpretationthatit could
have been Aristotle's intentionto refer,with the adverb simpliciter
, to
the use of the verb 'to be' as principal predicate only, as forinstance
in a proposition as 4homoes . The Assisi manuscriptsays that Aristotle's secundumtempuspointed to the use of the verb 4to be' as tertium
adiacens. In all probability the Assisi wording is a gloss which has
replaced the original text,of which the remnantshave been preserved
in the Orlans manuscript: "according to time, that means so that
time is predicated as second" (p. 8a: ita ut tempussecundumsit
predicatum
):
Vel alitersecundum
Rodbertum:
uel simpliciter,
idestita ut per
magistrm
uerbumprincipaliter
uel secundumtempus,idestita ut tempus
predicatur,
secundum
sitpredicatum
adiacensMS
[ut...-atumMS Orlans
quodsittercium
Two points must be noticed here. First,thisview is explicitlyascribed
to a master Rodbertus, who is the only master mentionedby name in
this commentary, namely here and in a discussion on the consequences of the conversion of an indefinitepropositioninto a universal
proposition.33Unfortunately,it is not possible to identifyhim with
33MS Orlans,B.m., 15b/Assisi,573,f.54vb:
dixerat
"Quocircaquia Aristotiles
indefinitas
MS
nonessecontrarias,
ne inde[idemMS
[infinitas
propositiones
uideretur
nonessecontrarias,
subipsasuniuersales,
quepereas significantur,
dit:Que autemsignificantur
ab indefinitis
idestuniuersales,
est[om.
propositionibus,
MS Assisi],
idestcontingit,
essecontrarias."
. c. 7, 17b8-9].Porphirius
sic
[Deinterpr
4
estsanus 'homo
nonestsanus1
sanitaset
, in hisindefinitis
exponit:Cum dico homo
In De interpr.
ed.sec.,U.c. 7,
egritudo
que suntcontraria
significantur,
[cf.Boethius,
sui
159,7sqq. (ed. Meiser)].Remotioenimuniusimmediati
signifcat
positionem
immediati
circasua subiecta.Herminius
sic: Indefinitarum
MS
[infinitarum
unaaliquandosignifcat
uerumuelfalsum,
utinnaturali
etinrem,ota.
Verumautem
etfalsum
suntcontraria.
aliquandoab in <de> finitis
Quarecontraria
significantur
InDe interpr.
ed.sec.,U.c. 7, 157,30-158,14 (ed. Meiser)].Robertus
sic:
[cf.Boethius,
170

23:19:57 PM

any certaintywith any of the other Roberti of the late eleventh and
early twelfthcenturies,as, forinstance, withRobertus Parisiacus who
is said to have been one of the pupils of master John, the vocalist
dialectician, and who - I mean Robertus - would have been a colleague and contemporaryof Roscelin;34 or with the Robertus whose
opinion on the significativefunctionof the substantiveverb is listed
in the now lost Chartres manuscriptof the
in the Opinionesdiversorum
Priscian Glosulae,35
Be this as it may, the view he broughtto the fore must have been
considered an importantone by his contemporaries,forwe also find
thisparticularview in Abaelard' s commentson De interpretatione
in his
literalglosses, called in modern literaturehis Introductiones
parvulorum.
In thisgloss, Abaelard discusses only two ways of interpretingAristotle's words at issue: In the first interpretationAbaelard accepts
as indicatingthat estor nonestis predicated principally,for
simpliciter
instance "homo est", whereas secundumtempusindicates that "that
time" - perhaps rendered better anachronisticallyby that "timemarker" - est or non est is the second, that means the adiacent
"
36
predicate, as in sentences of the type homoanimal est". We find
in the MS
nearlythe same textin the literalglosses on De interpretatione
Mnchen, BS, CLM 14779. These glosses are written by an
anonymous master,whose exact doctrinalaffiliationhas not been established yet, but who might have been a pupil of Abaelard, if these
glosses are not a product of Abaelard himself.37The other interpretation is the well-knownway of takingsimpliciter
to stand forthe addition
of a verb of the present tense, and secundum
tempusforthe addition of
idestuocesque enunciantur,
in indefinitis,
esse conQue significantur,
contingit
trarias
additosibisignouniuersali."
efficiuntur,
propositiones,
quandouniuersales
34See thetextsquotedbyC. Mews(1992),4-33,esp. 5, n. 7.
35Hunt1943,206 and 224. Forthat
thepossibility
thatthesetwoRoberti
matter,
areoneand thesamepersonshouldnotbe ruledout,I think.
36Abaelard,
Glossae
Aristotelis
De interpretatione,
ed. Dal Pra,76: "velsimpliciter,
super
id estquod estvel nonestprincipaliter
ut homo
nonest, vel
est,homo
praedicatur,
< secundum
id est> itaquodistudtempus,
scilicet
estvelnonestsitsecuntempus,
uthomo
est
animal
animal
nonest.Aliter:si
dum,id estadiacens,praedicatum,
, homo
nonaddaturaliquidvel simpliciter
vel secundum
vel secundum
praesenstempus,
aliudtempus,
id estpraeteritum
et futurum."
37Cf. Marenbon1993,117(H5). The textreads:
idest
"[f. 45v]uel simpliciter,
sicut'homoest', uel secundum
quod illuduerbumestprincipaliter
predicetur
ut 'homoestanimal'.Vel aliter...uel
predicetur,
tempus,idestquod secundario
idestquodaddatur
uelsecundum
tantum,
simpliciter,
presens
tempus
tempus,idest
uel futurum."
Forthistext,see also Iwakuma1992,57-9.
preteritum
171

23:19:57 PM

a verb of the past and futuretenses, that is the interpretationalso

given by Boethius in his editioprima.
,
According to Marenbon, the commentary on De interpretatione
which has come down to us in MS Citt del Vaticano, Vat. Reg. lat.
230 (f. 80r-7r)shows a close affinityto the commentaryof the Orlans
in
MS 266. 38We find, indeed, the same expression, sc. ratiotemporis,
the comment on Boethius' first interpretationin both texts. The
'
'
emphasis is on the opposition between esse as the verb expressing
God's full being and 'esse9as the marker of actual presence:39
Boethium:
secundum
uel secundumtempus,quod sicexponitur
Simpliciter
ita scilicet
Duobusmodisenuntiationes
fiunt,
quod aliquandode quibusesse
ut
nonsecundum
secundum
rationem,
substantiam,
dicitur,
ponitur,
temporis
rationem
cumdicimus4Deuses> noneum[cumMS Vat.]dicimussecundum
uthocad immutabilitatem
essedicitur,
potius
esse,sedsubstantialiter
temporis
substantie
Aliquandouerode quibusesse
quamad tempusaliquodreferatur.
ut cumdicimus'dieses, ad
rationem
dicitur,secundum
ponitur,
temporis
diei pertinet,
sed tantumad temporis
substantie
nullamimmutabilitatem
es. Quare
si dicamus4diesnunc
rationem.
Tantumenimualet'diesesquantum
immutabilitatem
cum ita dicimus[f. 82rb]esse ut substantie
designemus,
' addimus.Cumueroitaut
4esse
secunaliquodtempus
significemus,
simpliciter
4esaddimus.Et hocest
Si nonaddaturei
dumtempus
quoddicitAristotiles:
uel
idestnonhabitaratione
uel esse uel nonesse,uel simpliciter,
temporis,
secundumtempus,idestsecundum
temporis.
aliquamrationem
The two other interpretationsdo not show a remarkable deviation
from the traditional line. It should be noticed, however, that the
fourthinterpretation,sc. that of master Robertus, is missing in this
commentary:
Essealihuiuslittere
Estquoquealia testeBoethio
expositio,
que esthuiusmodi:
aut secundumtempus.Simpliciter
aut simpliciter
quidduobusmodisdicitur:
es.
utsiquisdicat4homo
nontempus
uerbiproponitur,
uerbum,
quidempresens
uerbumdicitur.
Presensenimnontempusuerbi,sed simplex
Quarequisqus
utitur.Qui
eo simpliciter
secundum
, utitur,
qui estesse
presenshoc sermone
eriuel 4homo
<ut> dicat4homo
uerbumiungitaut futurum,
ueropreteritum
uerboutitur,
sed in idipsumtempusuerbiincurrit.
Jui, illenonsimpliciter
sunt.
uerbitempora
Preteritum
namqueet futurum
ut
itauerboutimur
terciaexpositio
Estquoquehuiusmodi
quodaliquotiens
utsiquisdicat'hircoetsinedeterminatione
indefinite
dicamus,
temporis
aliquid
' uel
dicetsinedeterminatione
etindefinite
ceruus
'Juiuel'eri, hocsimpliciter
eras', ad hocipsum
esuel 'eriJuiuel 'erit
Si ueroaddit'nunc
tumesttemporis.
dixisseAristotiles:
addittempus.
Vndeuidetur
essequodsimpliciter
dicebatur,
idestsinedeterminatione
Si nonaddaturuelesseuel nonesseuel simpliciter,
ut 'nunc
uel secundumtempus,idestcumdeterminatione
temporis,
temporis,
es uel 'eriJuiuel 'eraseri.
38Marenbon1993,118-9(Hll).
39MS CittdelVaticano,Biblioteca
Vaticana,Reg.lat.230,f. 82ra*b.
Apostolica
172

23:19:57 PM

In his glosses on De interpretatione

as found in the Logica " Ingredien
tibus" Abaelard also deals with the phrases simpliciter
vel secundum
he
an
we
have
offers
which
tempus.First,
already seen
explanation
above.40 In this interpretationthe phrase simpliciter
velsecundum
tempus
is not restrictedto the addition of a verb. The phrase simpliciter
is
meant forthe addition of words which do not have a time-consignification in theirsemanticstructuresuch as the noun, whereas the phrase
secundum
tempuscovers the addition of those words which have timeconsignificationsuch as the verb and the participle. But Boethius,
Abaelard continues, restrictedthe whole phrase simpliciter
velsecundum
to
the
verb.
Boethius'
threefold
Next,
tempus
interpretationis listed
and commented on. The fourth explanation, viz. that of master
of the young AbaeRobertus, which we have met in the Introductiones
lard,41has been left out. Abaelard deals in a rather comprehensive
substance interpretaway with Boethius' first,that is the simpliciter!
tion. His contributionto the discussion is of paramount importance.
He moves away fromthe Neoplatonic interpretationof the verb 4to
be', as indicatingGod's immutable substance, to the timelesspropositionson the theologicaltruths.Abaelard explicitlyargues thatnot only
the verb 'to be' when said of God in the present tense is added 'simply', but also when it is added in the past tense. When saying "God
is by necessity" or "God was before all times", we do not take these
verbs in any temporalconsignification.If we do so, these propositions
would be false,Abaelard argues, at least ifwe would say thatGod was
in a temporal way before time, or if we would say that God is by
necessityin the presenttime, or else it would happen that the present
time exists of necessity. So when we say 'to be' of God, we use this
verb always withoutany implicationof time. However, as soon as we
use it speakingabout Socrates or any otherof the created beings which
are conceived of as subject to time, we take the verb 'to be' according
to time.42
40Cf. 168.
41See above,171.
42Peter
Abaelards
Philosophische
Schriften,
hrgg.vonB. Geyer,3.Heft:Die Glossenzu
Perihermneias,
Mnster
i. W. 1927(Beitrge
zurGeschichte
derPhilosophie
und
Texte und Untersuchungen,
Theologiedes Mittelalters.
XXI), 333-4: "Vel
vel secundumtempus,hocestvelquae nondesignet
ut cum
simpliciter
tempus,
dicitur:4hircocervus
nonalbuir
velquae tempusdesignet,
ut 'hircocervus
currens
velnon
,
hircocervus
currit
velnon'
. Boethius
vero'esseet nonesse'de verbotantum
accipit,et
tripliciter
exponit,primumsic: quod verbapositain enuntiationibus
aliquando
sineullascilicet
discretione
simpliciter
accipiuntur,
temporis,
aliquandocumdiscre173

23:19:57 PM

The commentary on De interpretation

> which has been preserved
in
the
Arsenal
with
910, shows some affinity
manuscript
anonymously
Abaelars glosses. According to Marenbon it dates fromthe period
after 1120. 43This textalso supplies us with the three Boethian inter/ substance interpretation,
pretations. In the firstone, the simpliciter
we are confrontedwith a view that resembles Abaelard's, for the
emphasis is explicitlyput on timeless= eternal: not governedby time,
because of its eternity.Thus the example is no longer "God is", but
"God is from eternity", whereas the addition secundumtempusis
instantiated by a proposition on a created being, viz. "Socrates
runs":44
Vel simpliciter,
iliauerbum
idestuelsicquodinoratione
nonsittemporis
conut in hac 4Deusestabeterno*
. Verbumenimin hacpropositione
significatiuum,
non est significatiuum.
Vel secundumtempus,hocestuel nisisic
temporis
in additione
iliatemporis
addaturuerbum
sitconsignificatiuum,
utfitin
quod
curri
. [f. 166va]
hac 4Socrates
etiamalitersicscilicet:
Si nonaddatur'esse' uel 'nonesse', hocest
Legitur
uerbumaffirmatum
Vel simpliciter,
hocestuel <per> presens
uel negatum.
uerbumdicitur,
tempus,quod proprieetiamsimpliciter
quoniam[temporis]
estconsignificatiuum,
alia
uerbum
appellat,
presents
temporis
quodAristotiles
ueronegatesse uerba.Per uerbumetiampresens,cumuerbumsit presens
tale
eiusquodinest.Vel secundum
copulatio
tempus,hocestuelsi nonaddatur
uerbum quod solummodouerbum appellatur,quoniam temporisest
Et hechuiuslitterc
lectioreperitur
in commento.
consignificatiuum.
Resttetiamalia que talisest. Si non addaturuerbumaffirmatum
uel
uel simpliciter,
utinhac 'Socrates
hocestsinetemporali
adicctione,
negatum,
' vel 4Deus ante
Cum enimdicimus:4Deumnecesse
tionetemporis.
estesse
y
fuit tempora*
nullumtempusin verbisaccipimus,
falsae
essent
si diceremus
enuntiationes,
quia
Deumfuisse
antetempora
velsi diceremus
temporaliter
quodDeusestexnecessitate
exnecessitate
esseconexsistente,
praesenti
tempore
alioquinipsumpraesens
tempus
Cumitaqueessede Deo praedicamus,
nonad discretionem
tingeret.
temporis
ipso
sedpotiusid secundum
et incommutabile
esseeiusdicimus.Cum
utimur,
proprium
veroSocratem
> velceteras
esse< dicimus
creaturas
concludimus,
quassubtempore
id estsecundum
secundum
verbum
et
tempus,
significationem
temporis
accipimus,
itamodosecundum
modosimpliciter,
id estsinesignificaverbum,
tempus
accipitur
tone temporis.
Secundoautemsic exponit:praesenstempusquod continut
et
praeteritum
terminus
et confinium
Tune
nontempusappellatur.
dicitur,
futurum,
temporum
autemverbum
etquasisinetempore,
simpliciter
accipitur
temporis
quandopraesentis
hic,ut dictum
est,nonvocatur
designativum,
quodscilicet
praesens
tempus.Tunc
verosecundum
velfuturm.
tempusponitur,
quandodsignt
praeteritum
Tertioverosecundum
tempusverbumponitur,
quodverbumaliquando
ponitur
4Socrates
id estsinedeterminatione
vel
veluticumdicitur:
simpliciter,
temporali,
legit
4
hocmodo: Socrates
velleget
nunc
,' 'aliquandocumdeterminatione
temporali
legit
leget'
eras'.
43Marenbon1993,118(HlO).
44MS Paris,Arsenal910,
f. 166rb.
174

23:19:57 PM

uel secundum
adiectionem
ut
legi,
temporalem
tempus,idestuel secundum
hic*Socrates
nunc.
legit
In this commentary we also meet a fourth interpretation. The
use to the substantiveverb
anonymous master assigns the simpliciter
used in a sentence but not being tertium
adiacens, as in sentences like
"homo est". So far, it is the same as the proposal made by master
Robertus. Next, however, he claims a use of the verb 'to be' which
he calls " non'. This is not the same as secundum
, and
simpliciter'
tempus
does not occur in Aristotle'stext,but has to be supplied 4'in thought".
It covers the use of the substantive verb as tertium
adiacens.Secundum
tempusis taken to indicate the use of all the other verbs, which are
called "second" with respect to the substantive verb:
Resttquartalectio,hecscilicet
si nonaddaturesse,idesthocuerbum
estaffiruel nonesse,hocest:uel sicquodnegatum,
uel simpliciter,
idestuel
matum,
sicquodinpropositione
nonsittercium
idestuel
adiacens,uelnonsimpliciter,
sicquodibisittercium
enimsubintelligendum
est.Vel
adiacens;nonsimpliciter
secundum
tempus,hoccstuelaliuduerbum
quamsubstantiuum,
quodsecundumappellatur
dicitur
etdignius
aliisuerbis
substantiui,
respectu
quodprimum
aliauerbahabent
etperipsumhabent
eoquodperuimuerbisubstantiui
copulari
i."
rsolu
The same line of interpretationof the firstBoethian exposition of
simpliciteris found in the commentarywhich has been preserved in
the MS Berlin, Lat. fol. 624. This work is supposed to have been part
of the instructionof logic during the 1130s.45In all probability,it was
composed by a pupil of Alberic of Paris or Abaelard46, and was a
productof the school activitiesat Mont Ste Genevive. This commentary gives the three Boethian interpretationsvery concisely, but in a
reversed order. It may be observed that in this text, as well as in
Abaelard' s Logica "Ingredientibus"
we come across the phrase " discretio
" instead o" ratio
, which was the usual one. Furthertemporis
temporis"
we
find
the
timeless
more,
,
interpretationof the addition 'simpliciter'
which in the commentaryby Abaelard' s master was said to pertain to
the substantiveverb only, extended to the verbs of all propositions
which deal explicitlyor implicitlywith God's eternity:so not only in
a proposition such as "God is" but also in propositionsof the kind
"God governs all":47
'

45Cf. Marenbon1993,120-1.
46Cf. De Rijk1966,39 and 46, and Marenbon1993,120(H 17).
47MS Berlin,SBPK, Lat. fol.624,f. 89vb.
175

23:19:57 PM

uel secundumtempus.Simpliciter,
idestsineadiectione,
secunSimpliciter
dum tempus,idestcum adiectionetemporali,
ut 4Socrates
est nunc'.Vel
4
idestin presenti,
ut Socrates
es, secundumtempus,idestsecunsimpliciter,
in preterito
uelfuturo.
Vel simpliciter,
dumreliquatempora
idestsinediscre4es
tionetemporis,
ut4Deuses, 4Deusgubernat
omnia'.
Hicnonnotthocuerbum
4
et guberna
ut
temporis,
tempus.Secundumtempus,idestcumdiscretione
4Socrates
es. Hic nottpresenstempus.
We also meet the phrase " discretio
temporis"in the commentaryon
De interpretatione
which has been preserved in the MS Paris, BN, lat.
15015. 48 De Rijk assigned this work to the intellectual area of the
Mont S te Genevive.49Firstthe anonymous glossatorgives the second
Boethian interpretation:50
uel secundum
cumuerbopresents
uel simpliciter:
temporis
ponitur,
tempus:
uelfuturi
Presens
erlim
quodconpreteriti
temporis
adiungitur.
quandouerbum
et complectitur,
tinetpreteritum
propriediciturtempus
tempuset futurum
sed secundum
alia nondicuntur
tempus.Vndeuerbum[f.
tempora,
simplex,
uero et futurum
uerbi
183rb]presenssimplexuerbumdicitur,preteritum
tempora.
Boethius' firstinterpretationunderwentthe same modificationas we
have already seen in the Arsenal 910 commentaryand in Abaelard's
The emphasis is not on God's immutability,
Logica "Ingredientibus".
but on God's eternityand the connected eternal truthsof theology.
The verb 1es does not signifythe presenttime in contradistinctionto
the past or futuretimes in the proposition"Deus estantescula", since
it signifies'without any discriminationof time":
ut 4Deusestantesecula'uel
uel simpliciter,
idestsinetemporis
discretione,
.
ut 4Socrates
< secundumtempus,idest> cumtemporis
discretione,
legi
The thirdinterpretationcorrespondsto Boethius' last one, but in this
commentaryit is assigned to a Master P. We do not find it literally
. The wording is rathercloser to
in Abaelard's Logica "Ingredientibus"
the commentarypreservedin Arsenal 910. However, it is notable that
in this commentary,the commentaryin Arsenal 910, as well as in
'
'
Abaelard's,51 we meet the adjective noun temporalisused in this
context:
48Cf. Marenbon1993,120(H 15).
49See De Rijk1966,46-52.
50MS Paris,BN, lat. 15015,f. 183ra
b.
51Ed. Geyer,333,38 - 334, 2: Tertioverosic exponit,
aliquando
quodverbum
veluti
idestsinedeterminatione
cumdicitur:
'Scrates
ponitur
temporali,
simpliciter,
hocmodo:'Socrateslegit
temporali
legitvelleget',aliquandocumdeterminatione
nuncvellegeteras'."
176

23:19:57 PM

secundum
idestsine adiectionetemporali,
MagisterP. glostsimpliciter,
idestcumadiectione,
ad uerbum
utcumadditur
aduerbium
temporale
tempus,
'
'
.
eras1
uelsemper
ut Socrates
utmodo
uelaliquidhuiusmodi,
nunc' Platoleget
legit
Before turning away fromthe commentaries of the firsthalf of the
twelfthcentury to their successors of the thirteenthcentury, some
observations have to be made about the related discussions in the
writingsof the contemporarygrammarians.
First, it is strikingthat in the discussions of the dialecticians about
the present time indication of the present tense verb no referenceis
made to contemporarydiscussions as found in grammatical texts,
where, provoked by Priscian (/G, VIII, 51), grammariansas William
of Conches52 and Peter Helias53 distinguished between the simplex
, namely that ever moving point of time between past and
presens
future,which was consignifiedby the substantiveverb only, and the
, the presenttime which is usually consignifiedby the
presens
compositum
otherverbs of the presenttense, which necessarilycovers a part of the
past and a part of the future. Incidentally, this distinctionalready
occurred in older texts such as the GlosulesuperPriscianum(MS Kln
201), but was not referredto in theseolder textswiththe qualifications
of simplexand compositum.
Secondly, in thiscontextthe dialecticianscompletelyleftout of consideration the time consignificationof the verb in propositionsof the
"
type "rosa estflos when uttered in wintertime. This is the more
remarkable since even the grammarian William of Conches in his
4
gloss commentaryon Priscian touched upon this question: 'When I
41
am', I say that I exist in the simple present. Furthermore,it
say
should be noted that the substantive verb sometimes signifies the
inherenceof the predicate in the subject and not the existencein present time, forinstancewhen I say in wintertime'a rose is a flower' For
52WilliamofConches,In Priscianum
maiorem
Glose
, ad IG, VIII, 51 (MS Paris,BN,
lat. 15130,f.63ra):"Excepto.Dixeratquodpresens
cuiusparsestpreterita,
tempus
Modoexcipit
tarnen
illudpresens
a uerbosubstantiuo.
parsfutura.
quodsignificatur
Sumenimsinplexpresens
de quo nichilpreteritum
nichilfuturum.
Et
consignificat
hocuerbum
merito
dicitur
existencia
sinplexpresens
significare,
quia significat
que
in minimo
in qua (!?) res
pu<n>cto habent.Nonenimesttambreuemomentum
nonexistt.
Sedceterauerbaqueauctores
compositum
presens
significant,
consignifinichilagi potest.
cant,quia in sinplici
Et notandum
naturaliter
tameniunctum
quodquanuissumtalepresens
significet,
ex adiuncto,
ut 'sumlegens'Et quidmirum
compositum
participio
presens
significai
si ex adiunctoparticipii
cumex adiunctoeiusdem
compositum
presenssignificat,
'sumlecturus
"
ut 'sumlectus
uel legendus'
', uel futurum
preteritum
significet
53PetrusHelias,Summa
ed. L. Reilly,vol. 1, Toronto,
Priscianum)
489,77sqq.
super
177

23:19:57 PM

I do not say that a rose exists, but that such a genus inheres in such
a species. So while speaking about such propositions,Aristotlesays:
It connotes a certaincompositionwhich cannot be understoodwithout
. , ch. 3, 16b25)".54
its components {De interpr
of
Paris
Robert
points to the phenomenon that sometimes
Thirdly,
a
the
context, verb discards the consignificationof time.
compelled by
are
taken fromthe domain of the theological proposiHis examples
'
tions as fuitquandononfuittempus*
, in which the first
fuitis said to have
discarded the consignificationof time. According to Robertus, the
same holds good forthe substantiveverb eratin the firstwords of the
.55It is notable
Gospel according to St. John lin principioerat Verbum'
we do not find
that in the commentarieson Aristotle'sDe interpretatione
verb in those
use
of
the
substantive
the
reference
to
any
peculiar
statementsthat are part of the theological discourse.
The Early Thirteenth
Century
In the latterhalf of the twelfthcenturyand the firstdecades of the
are almost absent
thirteenthcenturycommentarieson De interpretatione
in the manuscripts.It is not untilthe thirdor fourthdecade of the thirteenthcenturythat we see them reappear in larger numbers. Already
a firstexamination of some of them shows a salient modificationof the
firstBoethian interpretationin particular.
In the manuscriptMunich, BS, CLM 14460 a commentaryon De
has been preserved, which is listed by Charles Lohr as
interpretatione
54WilliamofConches,In Priscianum
maiorem
Glose
, ad IG, VIII, 51 (MS Paris,BN,
Et notandum
nominare.
lat. 15130,f.63ra-b):"Nos verosubstantivum
possumus
substantiuum
a principali
dicitur
significatione.
Significai
[-etMS
quodhocuerbum
nonremperse existentem,
sedexistenciam:
substantiam,
Paris]enimprincipaliter
Sed cumsubstantiam
signiprincipaliter
que inestalicuireiexistenti.
proprietatem
Cumenimdico'sum
', mein sinplici
ficai,secundaric
presinplexpresens
significat.
dico.
senti[f.63rb]subsistere
in subiecto
inherenciam
Item.Notandum
[et
predicati
quod aliquandosignificai
utsi in hiemedicam4rosaestflos'
MS Paris
subiecti
existenciam,
] et nonpresentem
VndeAristotiles
sedtalegenustalispecieiinherere.
Nonenimdicorosamexistere,
ait: Consignificat
quamsinecomquandamcompositionem
loquensde huiusmodi
16b24-51."
positisnonestintelligere
[De interpr.
55Robertus
"Breue
sit", ed. C.H. Kneepkens,
ofParis,Summa
1987,73-4:
Nijmegen
Item.Queritur
utrum
non
"... 4fuitquando
tempus.
fuitibiconsignificet
fuittempus'..
'in principio
eratuerbum1
. Ibi eratnonconsignificat
Dicimusquod non Similiter
temnon
. Sifuitibiconsignificaret
Velfuit
, cumdicitur
quando
fuittempus'
'fuit
tempus.
ueltempus,
quantitatem;
ergoaliquod
temporis
quando
significaret
porisquantitatem
tempusfuitquandononfuittempus."
178

23:19:57 PM

being among the spurious writings of Nicholas of Paris.56 The

anonymous master offerstwo of the three Boethian interpretations.
Only a few words are devoted to the second of Boethius' interpretaindicates a verb of the present tense,
tions, namely, that simpliciter
of
a
verb
the
secundum
past or futuretenses. The other intertempus
is
more
mentioned
interesting. First, the author
pretation
concern the contingentmatwhich
distinguishesbetween propositions
ter of the topicus, and those which are about the necessary matterof
the demonstrator.Well, since necessitystands apart fromany time,57
the verb simplyused couples time in propositionsof necessarymatter,
in propositions of contingent matter the verb couples determinate
time:58
etquid
uerbum
littere
etiamad expositionem
Dubitatur
simpliciter
quidappellet
uerbumsecundum
tempus.
uerbum
uerbum
dicunt
Adultimum
presents
simpliciter
aliquiquodappellat
uerbumsecundumtempusappellatcasus uerbi,scilicetuerbum
temporis,
et futuri.
preteriti
deenuntiatione,
Aliter
dici.Nam,sicutdictum
est,inhoclibrointendit
potest
Materiatopici
ad materiam
indifferenter
topicietdemonstratoris.
que pertinet
est.
necessaria
materia
autemdemonstratoris
estuelut contingens,
contingens
uernecessaria
etideoin materia
ab omnitempore
autemabstrahit
Necessitas
in materiacontingenti
bum copulai tempussimpliciter,
copulattempus
in hancet nullam
Et ideo cumenuntiatio
determinatum.
possitdescendere
dicituelsimpliciter,
ad materiam
materiam
demonstratoris,
quantum
quantum
ad materiam
topicidicituel secundumtempus.
The occurrenceof the notion of determinatetime is importantin this
context. It shows an unmistakable affinitywith the set of notions of
4
. These
and 1presens determinatum1
or indeterminatum
presensconfusum
half
of
second
of the
new
the
in
the
were
logic
developed
concepts
twelfthcentury,initiallyas part of the doctrine of the fallacies.59It is
'
not my intentionto argue that the notions itempus
simpliciter
copulatum
'
'
' should
and 4tempusdeterminatum
equate the set presensconfusumand
4
/ indeterminatum'
, forthereare essential differencesto
presensconfusum
be noted. The notion of timelessnessis a basic ingredientforthe tempus
56Lohr1972,299.
57Traditionally
andremota
wasdividedintonaturalis
themateria
, contingens
propositions
, ed. De Rijk,Assen1972,7; Lambertof Auxerre,
(cf. Peterof Spain, Tractatus
a different
Summa
, ed. F. Alessio,Firenze1971,
19),butRogerBaconintroducing
" necessaria
"Pretereasciendum
naturalis
quod triplexest
scopecallsthemateria
scilicet
materia
'necessaria',
'remota','contingens'
(Sumule
categorice,
proposicionis
Dialectices
, ed. R. Steele,Oxford1940,244)."
58MS Mnchen,
CLM 14460,f.64rb.
59Cf. De Rijk 1962,534,5-7(FallacieVindobonenses
logicalia
);
); 615,15-21(Frustula
618,2-4(ibid.).
179

23:19:57 PM

'
is used to
, whereas the notion of presensconfusum1
simpliciter
copulatum
a
of
the
often
verb
tense
does
not
indicate
a state
that
present
explain
of affairsas actuallyoccurringin the present.60They meet each other,
and the tempusconhowever, in the fact that both the presensconfusum
in
a
time
which
confused
the
indicate,
way,
they signify.Furfusimi
a
the
is
thermore,
tempus
confusum always signifiedby verb of the pres'
'
The
ent tense.
notions of 1tempus
determinatum*
do
confusumand tempus
not occur in the commentaries on Aristotle's De interpretatione
only.
They are already presentin treatiseson thetheoriesof suppositionand
appellation dating from the early thirteenth century.61 The
"
anonymous author of the Logica Cum sit nostra"holds that the verb
"
4
'to be' is predicated 4 confuse in those propositions in which the
de necessitate
,
predicate necessarilyfollowsthe subject: the propositiones
'
but when the predicate does not followthe subject, the verb 'to be
is predicated " ut nunc", i.e. in the presential way.62
A comparable position is found in the commentarythat is ascribed
in Lohr's survey to Nicholas of Paris himself. In this commentary,
which has been preserved in only one manuscript, Vatican latin
301 1,63 Nicholas brings forwardtwo interpretations.Unfortunately,
the text does not appear to be completelyreliable. Nevertheless,it is
possible to grasp the master's views. Nicholas concisely states that
Aristotlehad propositionsof necessarymatwith the adverb simpliciter
here to be a scribal
ter in mind - I take the manuscriptreading remota
to
with
secundum
and
errorfornecessaria ,
tempus propositionsof contingent matter. Nicholas' other interpretationis quite peculiar, at
least, if the manuscriptreading in indicatiuomodois not also a scribal
error. Simpliciter
, we read in the manuscript,means "in the indicative
' inmodern
60Forthediscussion
cf.Lyons
of'presens
ofthenotion
linguistics,
confusum
678.
1977,
61Cf. Maier1972,209-10.
62Logica Cumsitnostra, ed. L.M. de Rijk(197),vol. 1, 450: Lhcendum
quod
in quibus predicatum
de necessitate
in propositionibus
sequitursubiectum,
unumtempus
hocestquodnonmagisrefert
esseconfuse,
quamaliud.In
predicatur
veroinquibuspredicatum
subiectum,
predicatur
numquam
sequitur
propositionibus
indifferenter
esseconfuse,
Sed quandopredicatur
hocestesseutnunc.
essedeterminate,
communis
terminus
prohiisque suntetque nonsunt.Dico quodestvera
supponit
'homoest animal',quamvisnullushomosit in mundo.Et hec
de necessitate:
'
' tonitrus
est', quia in prima
tonitrus
Et nonsequitur:
estsonus
terribilis'
similiter:
ergo
Et sic est fallacia
in
determinate.
conclusione
li 'est'significat
tempusconfusum,
dictionis."
figure
63Cf. Lohr1972,299.
180

23:19:57 PM

mood", secundum
tempusin some other time, eitherin the present, or
in the past or in the future:64
uel secundum
Si uel esseuel nonesseaddaturuel simpliciter
tempus.Hoc
legiturdupliciter.
Simpliciter,hocestin indicatiuomodo,uel secundum
uelinpresenti
uel
uelinpreterito
idestsecundum
aliquodaliudtempus
tempus,
futuro.Vel sic. Simpliciteruel secundumtempus,idestuel in materia
necessaria
MS' uel contingenti.
[remota
It should be observed that in this commentary,which is said to be
composed by Nicholas, no mention is made of Boethius' thirdinterexplicitly
pretation,although Nicholas of Paris in his Syncategoreumata
refersto the interpretationof simpliciter
without, and secundum
tempus
with a temporal adverb added.65
We meet the same line of thoughtin Kilwardby's commentaryon
which was one of the products of his teaching
De interpretation,
activitiesat Paris in the thirdand fourthdecades of the thirteenthcentury.66 Kilwardby maintains the second and third positions of
Boethius without furthercomment, but he modifies Boethius' first
interpretationto a considerable extent. He speaks of esse as being
'
, when something 'perpetual" is predicated, as for
simply appositum
instance lhomoestanimal1
, whereas Aristotlemeant by secundum
tempus
the appositionof the verb 'to be' when somethingtemporaland variable is stated, as, for instance, ' homoest albus1. Kilwardby leaves the
and determinatum
outside the discussion,
notions of the tempusconfusum
and replaces Boethius' eternal - a theological - connotation by a
- a logical - connotation:67
perpetual
hie uel simpliciter
et secundumtempus,tripliciter
Quod uocatAristotiles
secundum
Boetium.Primosic. Essesimpliciter
apponitur,
quando
exponitur
estanimal*
ut 4homo
' secundum
aliquodperpetuum,
predicatur
tempus,quando
4
'
ut homo
estalbus
et uariabile,
aliquodtemporale
predicatur
uerbum
Secundo sic. Esse simpliciterapponitur,quando predicatur
Presens
etsecundum
uelfuturi.
preteriti
presents,
tempus,quandopredicatur
nonesttempus.
enim,cumsit*continuacio
temporum,
uerbumsine
Tertiosic. Esse' apponitur
quandopredicatur
simpliciter,
ut 4Sortes
curri
secundumtempus,quandocumdeterminadeterminatione,
;
ut 4Sortes
hodie'
tionetemporis,
currit
64MS CittdelVaticano,BAV,Vat. lat. 3011,f. 22v*.
65Cf. Braakhuis
: 44Item.
Idemvideturin adverbiis
1979II,284,21-5,7
temporis:
in
circaidem;sedtempus
ad aliquid,eteiusdifferentie
consignificatum
quodfertur
4 '
verboestcircacompositionem;
, ubidicituressevel
quodpatetin libroPeriarmenias
sed
velsecundum
circacompositionem;
temporis
tempus;
simpliciter
ergodifferentie
difdifferentie
temporales
quedamsuntmodificationes;
ergoadverbia
que significant
faciunt
ferentias
modales;"
temporis
66Cf.Lewry1975,13+ , Lewry1982,33 and Lewry1984,412(notin Lohr1973).
fi7MS Venezia,Biblioteca
Nazionale,San MarcoL.VI.66, f. 2V.
181

23:19:57 PM

We also meet the threeBoethian interpretationsin the commentaryby

Nicholas of Cornwall68. It is, however, notable that this master connects the perpetual interpretationof Kilwardby and the eternal interpretation of the Boethian tradition:69
diceretripliciter
secundumBoetium.Vno modo 'esse'
Ad hoc contingit
aliquodperpetuum
etincorporale,
ut
apponitur,
quando
predicatur
simpliciter
' uel 'Deuses. Cum
'homo
estanimai
enim<dicimus> 'Deuses, ut
cumdicitur
in substantia
nuncesse,sedtantum
dicitBoetius,noneumdicimus
esse,utad
substantie
inmutabilitatem
quam ad aliquodtempus.'Esse'
potiusreferatur
et uariasecundumtempusapponimus,
aliquidtemporale
quandopredicatur
' uel 'dies
'
estalbus
est1
. Cumenimdicitur
'dieses, ad nullam
bile,ut hic homo
ad temporis
Vndeidem
constitutionem.
substantiam
dieipertinet
nisitantum
' et 'diesnunc
es.
'estdies
uerbum
Alio modosic. 'Esse' simpliciter
quandopredicatur
apponitur,
aut
'esse'secundum
preteritum
temporis;
presents
tempus,quandopredicatur
nonest
cumsitcontinuado
Presens
futurum.
enim,utdicitBoetius,
temporum,
et initium
futuri.
tempus.Estenimfinispreteriti
sine
uerbum
Terciomodosic.'Esse' simpliciter
apponitur,
quando
predicatur
'
secundum
esuel'Sortes
uthic1Sortes
eri;'esse'
determinatione,
fuiuel Sortes
'
estnunc
uthic'Sortes
determinatione
temporis
predicatur,
tempus,quandocum
'eraseri.
ucl
uel lheri
fui
Nicholas of Cornwall's position is not surprisingsince, as Osmund
Lewry has pointed out, this master was heavily dependent on
Kilwardby.70
Final Remarks
In conclusion I would like to make the followingsummary.
In late Greek Antiquity there was no consensus on the interWe have witnessesof two
pretationof Aristotle'shaploos katachronon.
differentinterpretationsat least. Under the influenceof Neoplatonic
and Christian theological thinkingBoethius, basing himselfon the
distinction between the substantive and the existential significative
functionsof the verb 'to be', added or ratherprefixeda third interpretation,in which God's immutabilityand eternitywere opposed to
being in time. These three interpretationsbecame canonical for the
greater part of the mediaeval tradition. In the early 12th centurya
serious effort to add a fourth interpretationcan be signalized:
means thatthe verb 'to be' is used withouta predicatenoun,
simpliciter
secundum
tempusthat the verb 'to be' is joined with a predicate noun.
68ForNicholasofCornwall,
see Lohr1972,287,butesp. Lewry1985,20-4.
69MS Oxford,
ChristiCollege119,f. 126r*'sqq
(notin Lohr1972).
Corpus
,0 Lewry1984,413.
182

23:19:57 PM

This way of interpretingthe Aristotelian phrase, however, did not

persist.
Another importantaspect is that in the commentaries of the late
eleventh and firsthalf of the twelfthcenturies the timeless against
time-boundinterpretationwas more and more emphasized, with the
restrictionthat in this context 4timeless' {sine rationetemporis)
is taken
to mean 'eternal'. In general, the theological character of Boethius'
firstinterpretationwas retained in these commentaries. Incidentally,
it is strikingthatwe oftencome across discussions on eternal propositions in the contemporarytheological texts without any referenceto
the cognate discussions in the Perihermeneias tradition.
The next seventy-five
years saw the break-throughof the new logic.
One of its achievements was the development of the distinction
in the Fallaciebetween thepresensconfusum
and thepresensdeterminatum
tradition.The philosopherswho maintained this distinction,partially
associated it with the distinctionbetween propositions of natural or
necessarymatterand thoseof contingentmatter.In the writingsof the
masters of the third and fourthdecades of the thirteenthcenturywe
find it remodelled into the opposition of timeless against time-bound
propositions: tempusconfusum
Applied to
against tempusdeterminatum.
Aristotle's words at issue, this new distinction made it possible to
substitutethe logical perpetual truthsforBoethius' eternal truths.In
all probability,the standardizingof universityteaching promoted the
acceptance of this substitutionas a basic component of the thirteenth16al8.
centurydiscussions of Aristotle,De interpretation,
One had expected to findsome referencesto St. Augustine's discussion of the so-called eternal truthsof mathematics,71so prominently
present in this period for instance in Grosseteste's De liberoarbitrio,12
71Augustine,
Delib.arb. , II, viii,21: ' 'septem
autemettriadecern
sunt;etnonsolum
nunc,sed etiamsemper;equeullo modoaliquandoseptemet trianon fuerunt
aut aliquandoseptemet trianoneruntdecern.Hanc ergoincorruptibilem
decern,
numeri
diximichiet cuilibetratiocinanti
essecommunem."
veritatem,
72RobertGrosseteste,
De libero
arbitrio
Werke
des Robert
, in: Die philosophischen
Grosseteste
vonLincoln,
i.W. 1912,150-241
ed. L. Baur,Mnster
zur
, Bischofs
(Beitrge
derPhilosophie
Geschichte
des Mittelalters.
Texteund Untersuchungen,
IX) esp.
168:"Dico igitur,
quodnecessarium
duplex,unomodo,quodnonhabetpossealiquo
modoad eiusoppositum
uelcuminitiouelfine,cuiusmodi
esthoc:"duo ettriaesse
ad
quinqu"- Istudenimpossenonhabuitequeantetempus,
equein tempore
nonesseverum.Et taleestnecessarium
simpliciter.
Est et aliudnecessarium,
quod nequesecundum
praeteritum,
nequesecundum
futurum
habetpossead eiusoppositum,
sinetarnen
initio
praesens,
nequesecundum
fuitpossead hoc et fuitpossead eius oppositum,
et taleest "Antichristum
fore
futurum"
et omnium
eorum,quae suntde futuro".
183

23:19:57 PM

but for some reason they were not incorporated into the early thircomments on this passage. In general, it is noticeable
teenth-century
in
that we do not find a directreferenceto Aristotle'sDe interpretatione
the discussions of grammarians, dialecticians and theologians on
related subjects. Anyhow, it is remarkablethat in the 13thcenturythe
logicians of the Western Latin Middle Ages replaced theeternaltruths
of theologyby the perpetual truthsof logic, thus arrivingat a point
which theirArab colleagues had already reached about threecenturies
before.
Universityof Groningen
Department
ofMedievalStudies

List of booksreferred
to
withNotesby
Ackrill
andDe Interpretatione.
Translated
1963- Aristotle's
Categories
Oxford1963
J.L. Ackrill,
- Al-Farabi'
De interTreatise
onAristotle's
s Commentary
andShort
Al-Farabi's
Commentary
withan Introduction
andNotesbyF.W. Zimmermann,
Translated
pretatione.
London1981
Termen.
Inleidende
Braakhuis
1979- De 13deEeuwseTractaten
over
Syncategorematische
'
vanNicolaas
vanPrijs
studie
enuitgave
, 2 vols.,Ph.D. thesisState
Sincategoreumata
Leiden1979
University
Mass.- LonCooke1938- Aristotle,
Oninterpretation
, byH.P. Cooke,Cambridge,
don 19381(The Loeb ClassicalLibrary,
Aristotle,
I)
Cassio
Leslettres
enOccident.
De Macrobe
Courcelle1948- P. Courcelle,
dore,
grecques
Paris1948
"averNotessurlesdbuts
dupremier
Gauthier1982- R.A. Gauthier,
(1225-1240)
66 (1982),321-74
ettholoeiques,
in:Revuedessciences
roisme>'
philosophiques
I:
onPriscian
intheEleventh
andTwelfth
Centuries.
Hunt1943- R.W. Hunt,Studies
Petrus
HeliasandHis Predecessors
, in: Mediaevaland RenaissanceStudies,I
inthe
Middle
ontheHistory
oj Grammar
(1943),194-231[repr.in:id.,Collected
Papers
Amsterdam
Studiesin
1980,1-38(Amsterdam
, ed. byG.L. Bursill-Hall,
Ages
theTheoryand History
ofLinguistic
Science,III)
De Boce
SaintThomas.
Histoire
enOccident.
Isaac 1953- J. Isaac,Le Perihermeneias
stote,Paris1953
littraire
d'untrait
d'Ari
Iwakuma1992- IwakumaYukio, Vocales
, in: Traditio,47
, orEarlyNominalists
(1992),37-111
danslesouvrages
degramd'Aris
toteetlaphrase
simple
Kelly1977- L. Kelly,La physique
desmodistes
maire
, in:A.JolyetJ. Stefanini
gnrale
(eds.),La grammaire
spculative
auxidologues
, Lille1977,107-24
Dicitenimetverumest,
Id. , (178)"Et hocidemvultbeatusAugustinus
expresse.
duoettriaessequinqu;sinonfuitab aeterno
scilicet:
quodhocsineinitiofuitverum
fuitverum."
eiusoppositum
verum,de necessitate
184

23:19:57 PM

1993- C. H. Kneepkcns,
Orlans
266andtheSophismata
Collection:
Master
Kneepkens
andtheinfinite
words
intheearly
Joscehn
, in: S. Read(cd.),
ofSoissons
twelfth
century
inMedieval
, Dordrecht/Boston/London
Sophisms
1993,64-85
LogicandGrammar
on'Priscian
Maior'Ascribed
, in: TheCommentary
Lewry1975- TheProblem
ofAuthorship
toRobert
de Copenhague.
Cahiersde l'Institut
du Moyen, Universit
Kilwardby
AgeGrecet Latin,15 (1975),12+ -7+
andtheItalian
Lewry1982- O. Lewry,Robertus
, in: A. Maier,
Anglicus
Kilwardby
Actsofthe5thEuropeanSymEnglish
LogicinItalyinthe14thand15thCenturies.
posiumon MedievalLogic and Semantics,
Rome, 10-14November1980,
Napoli1982,33-51
Grammar
1220-1320
, LogicandRhetoric
Lewry1984- O. Lewry,
, in:J.I. Catto(ed.),
TheHistory
Oxford1984,
, Vol. I: TheEarly
Schools,
Oxford
oftheUniversity
ofOxford
401-33
Nicholas
andPeter
onPastandFuture
Lewry1985- Oxford
Logic1250-1275:
ofCornwall
Realities
, in: O. Lewry(ed.), TheRiseofBritish
Logic.ActsoftheSixth
European
onMedieval
1983,
Symposium
LogicandSemantics
, BalliolCollege
, Oxford
, 19-24June
Toronto1985,19-62
Lohr1972- C.H. Lohr,Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries.
Authors:
Narcissus
in: Traditio,28 (1972),281-396
Richardus,
Lohr1973- C.H. Lohr,Medieval
LatinAristotle
Commentaries.
Authors:
Robertus
in: Traditio,29 (1973),93-197
Wilgelmus,
1977
, 2 vols,Cambridge
Lyons1977- J. Lyons,Semantics
Maier1972- A. Maier,Terminologia
dellatarda
scolastica
, Roma 1972
logica
Marenbon
1993- J. Marenbon,
Medieval
LatinGlosses
andCommentaries
onAristotelian
Texts
andThirteenth
Centuries
Glosses
andComLogical
, in:Ch. Burnett,
oftheTwelfth
mentaries
onAristotelian
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Arabic
andMedieval
LatinTraditions
,
Logical
TheSyriaCy
London1993,77-127
Mews 1992- C. J. Mews,Nominalism
andTheology
Abaelard:
NewLighton
before
Roscelin
30 (1992),4-33
, in: Vivarium,
ofCompigne
Montanari1988- E. Montanari,
La sezionelinguistica
del Perihcrmcncias
di
Voi. 2: Il commento,
Firenze1988
Aristotele,
de Rijk1962- L.M. de Rijk,Logica
Modernorum.
A contribution
tothehistory
ofearly
terminist
theories
, Vol. I: Onthetwelfth
logic
century
offallacy
, Assen1962
de Rijk1966- L. M. de Rijk,SomenewEvidence
ontwelfth
and
century
Logic:Alberic
theSchool
in: Vivarium,
4 (1966), 1-57
ofMontSieGenevieve
(Montani),
de Rijk1967- L.M. de Rijk,LogicaModernorum.
A contribution
tothehistory
ofearly
terminist
andearly
, Vol. 11,1:Theorigin
logic
,
development
ofthetheory
ofsupposition
Vol. 11,2:Texts
, Assen1967
de Rijk1988- L.M. de Rijk,OnBoetius's
Notion
A Chapter
SemanofBeing.
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,
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Dordrecht-Boston-London
1988,1-29.

185

23:19:57 PM

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
:
Dominicans and Suspect Opinion in the Thirteenth
Century
The Cases of Stephenof Venizy,Peterof Tarentaise, and theArticlesof
1270 and 1271

WILLIAMJ. COURTENAY

What role did the mendicant orders play in investigatingand

adjudicating cases of potential false or hereticalteaching among their
members?Did the intra-ordertrialsof Peter ofJohn Olivi by the Franciscans in 1283 or of Durand of St. Pourain by the Dominicans in
1314 introduce a new and relativelybrief competingjurisdiction in
such mattersalongside episcopal, papal, and universityjurisdictionin
cases of doctrinalteachingand academic heresy?1And formendicants
whose opinions were disseminated in universityclassrooms,what role
did universitymasters play in investigatingand adjudicating these
cases?
The firstcase in which a friar,teaching at a university,had his opinions investigated and condemned is that of Frater Stephanus,
presumably the Dominican bachelor Etienne de Venizy, in January
1241. 2 The textof the condemnation has come down to us in two dif1 On themultiple
ofOliviand Durand,seeJ. Koch,Kleine
,
Schriften
investigations
Olivi
vol.2, Rome1973,169-274,367-86,423-50;D. Burr,ThePersecution
,
ofPeter
der
zurGeschichte
deS. Porciano
O.P., Beitrge
1976;Koch,Durandus
Philadelphia
desMittelalters,
II, 7-168.
i.W., 1927,andKleine
26, Mnster
Schriften,
Philosophie
inden
undUniversitt
seeJ. Miethke,
On theissueofjurisdiction,
, Ortsbischof
Papst
des 13. Jahrhunderts
PariserTheologenprozessen
, in: A. Zimmermann
(ed.), Die
imXIII. Jahrhundert
Universitt
anderPariser
, Berlin1976,52-94;
Auseinandersetzungen
in Medieval
Roleof Universities
TheChanging
R.W. Southern,
, in: Historical
Europe
Freedom
: Academic
andInquisition
60 (1987),133-46;W.J.Courtenay,
Research,
Inquiry
58 (1989),168-81.
inMedieval
Universities
, ChurchHistory,
2 Chartularium
and
citedas CUP),ed. E. Chateiam
Parisiensis
Universitatis
(henceforth
ofthiscasehas
H. Denifle,
vol.I, Paris1889,170-72(#128).Mostofthediscussion
descondamthedatingoftheevent,a debateinitiated
concerned
byV. Doucet,La date
? in: Mlanges
le cartulaire
del'universit
nations
Parisiennes
ditesde 1241.Faut-il
corriger
Universit
etde philologie,
d'histoire
Receuilde travaux
Louvain,3rd
Pelzer,
Auguste
copiesof
ser.,fase.26, Louvain1947,183-93.Doucetnotedthatsomemanuscript
in origin(Assisi428,f. Ir; Leipzig,Univ.
someofthemFranciscan
thedocument,
416,f. 163v;RouenA.263,f.305r;Turin,Univ.E.V.25,f.218v;Vat. lat. 692,f.
179v),read:"AnnodominiMCCXLIII nonisianuarii[i.e.,5 Jan.1244]subscripti
de mandato
Universitatis
articuli
inpraesentia
Parisiensium,
theologiae
Magistrorum
Odonen
etreprobati
examinati
fuerunt
dominiGuillelmi
perCancellarium
episcopi,
186

23:20:12 PM

ferentforms,one in which the orthodoxopinion is listed immediately

aftereach offendingstatement(e.g., Paris, B.N. lat. 16533), and one
in which the orthodox rebuttal comes after the list of condemned
errors (e.g., Auxerre 243, Paris, B.N. lat. 15661, and B.N. lat.
15820). That the focusof attentionwas on the positionsor statements
of the offendingscholar,not on the scholar himself,is suggestedby the
fact that only one manuscriptof the twentythree identifiedso far in
which these condemned articles are recorded bothers to mention the
accused, and then only as "frater Stephanus".3
The suppositionthat "fraterStephanus" was (1) a Dominican, and
(2) is to be identifiedas Stephanus de Varnesia (Etienne de Venizy)
is based on conjecture,but seems probable. The regentmastersin the
theological facultyof Paris played a major part in condemning these
articles, so we may assume, as did Emile Chatelain and Heinrich
Denifle, who included the document in theiredition of the Chartularium
'
Parisiensis
Universitatis
, that "frater Stephanus' was a member of the
universityof Paris or at least fellunder itsjurisdiction.4The articles
are scholasticin nature, address subjects found in the firsttwo books
of the Sentences
and may well have come froma bachelor's lectura.Further, in 1241 only two religious orders had houses of study at Paris:
etfratrem
Alexandrum
de OrdineFr.Minorum."Against
Doucet,F. Pelster
argued
forthedateof13January
1241on thebasisofParis,Arsenal532andothermanuDie Pariser
von1241, in: Archivm
18
Fratrum
Praedicatorum,
scripts;
Verurteilung
condemnation
standsthewitness
of
(1948),405-17.In favorofa doubleorrepeated
vol. Ill, Oxford1900,p. 47:
, II, c. 5, ed. I. H. Bridges,
RogerBacon,Opusmaius
"Nam universitte
Parisiensi
bis vidiet audivivenerabilem
Antistitem
convocata,
dominum
Gulielmum
Parisiensem
f.m.coramomnibus
sententiare
episcopum
quod
intellectus
betweentheconagensnonpotestesseparsanimae."For similarities
demnedarticles
andtheteaching
ofHughofSt. Cher,see H. Dondaine,Hugues
de
etla condemnation
S. Cher
de1241, in: Revuedes sciences
et thologiphilosophiques
in
toAlexander
de Hales,Glossa
ques,33 (1949),170-174.See alsotheintroduction
libros
sententiarum
Petri
Lombardi
, vol. I, Quaracchi1951,15*-16*.
quatuor
3 Paris,Bibl.Nat.,lat.16360,f.3r.Thefulllistofknown
is: Assisi428,
manuscripts
f. Ir; Auxerre
243(206),f. 78r;Erfurt,
CA Q. 151,f. 3r; EscorialT.I. 15; Leipzig,
Univ.416,F. 163v;Munich,Clm3798;Naples,VII.C. 12;Oxford,
Merton267,f.
NewCollege109;Paris,Arsenal532,f.219r;Paris,B.N. lat. 15661,
115v;Oxford,
f.99rb;Paris,B.N. lat. 15702,f. 186;Paris,B.N. lat. 15820,f. 193ra;Paris,B.N.
lat. 16360,f.3r; Paris,B.N. lat. 16533,f. 54r;Rouen587 (A. 263),f. 305r/306v;
Turin,Univ.E.V. 25, f.218v;Valence,Capit.;Vat. Borgh296; Vat. Borgh361,
f. 219v;Vat. lat. 692,f. 179v;Vat. lat. 4847,f.66v;Vat. lat. 9821,f. 128.
4 Mostcasesin whichmasters
in thetheological
at Pariswereaskedto give
faculty
theiropinion
on doctrinal
matters
fromteaching
at theiruniversity.
stemmed
From
timetotime,however,
theywerecalledon (usuallybythekingor bishop)to help
theuniversity
judgecasesoutside
community,
e.g., theTalmudin 1248( CUP I, 209aeternum
ofGerardofBorgoSan Donninoin 1254( CUP
11, #178),theEvangelium
187

23:20:12 PM

the Dominicans and the Franciscans. While thereare no known Franciscans by the name of Stephen at Paris at this time, there was a
' 'Etienne de
Venizy" who became a master of theologyat Paris for
the Dominicans withina fewyears of thisevent.5The factthatVenizy
incepted at Paris does not argue against this identification,since
academic censure did not usually inhibitan academic or ecclesiastical
career.6 Finally, most contemporarymention of the event occurs in
the records of the Dominican order.7 The errorswere condemned by
the Dominicans at their general chapter at Paris in 1243, and again
in 1256 at the general chapter at Paris and at the provincial chapter
in Provence.8 Presumably, the intentionwas to make an impression
on upcoming Dominican students,bachelors, and young masterswith
regard to the kind of teaching that would not be permitted.
If the manuscript tradition is all but silent on the person of the
accused, other facts regarding the event were frequentlyrepeated in
the manuscripts. The condemnation was issued by the chancellor of
Notre Dame (and of the University),Odo of Chateauroux, along with
the regentmastersof theologyon Sunday, January 13, 1241.9 If later
the
I, 272-76,#243);Arnoldof Villanovain 1300( CUP II, 86-90,#615-616);
in 1308(CUP 11,125-28,#664),Margarite
in 1310(CUP II, 143,
Porette
Templars
ofthebeatific
visionin 1334(CUP II, 429-33,#981-982).
#681)),andthedoctrine
5 On Etiennede Venizysee P. Glorieux,
desmatres
enthologie
deParisaux
Rpertoire
XlIIesicle,
Paris1933,I, 79-80.Paris,B.N. lat. 15702contains
thelistoferrors
as
wellas theprincipia
ofStephen
andotherbachelors
in the1240sat Paris.In
reading
thelistofregents
in 1247-48)signing
thecondemnation
oftheTalmud
(presumably
ofAuxerre
(CUP I, 210, #178)in May 1248,Stephenis listedas Stephen
("frater
Autisiodorensis
de Ordinefratrum
Stephanus
Predicatorum").
6 Amongthosewhobecamemasteroftheology
areGiles
despiteacademiccensure
ofRome,DurandofSt. Pourain,lohnofCalore,andpossibly
lohnofMirecourt.
7 It shouldbe notedthatBonaventure
inhiscommentary
on bookII oftheSentences
,
in or shortly
written
after1250,mentioned
theeventandlistedthetencondemned
articles
becauseitsissueswererelevant
to thequestion
he wastreating
andbecause
oftheFranciscan
thefounder
schoolat Paris,Alexander
ofHales,hadparticipated
in thecondemnation
as regent.See Bonaventure,
, vol. II, Quaracchi
Operaomnia
at Parisextended
theinception
ofJohn
1885,547.ThatAlexander's
regency
beyond
of Rupellain 1238 [despiteGlorieux,Rpertoire
desmatres
II, 15] is convincingly
de Hales,Glossainquatuor
toAlexander
libros
sententiarum
arguedin theintroduction
Petri
Lombardi,
1951,70*-74*.
Quaracchi
8 It is curiouswhyDominicansfeltthelistof condemned
articlesneededto be
thatyear.In anyevent,theactionoftheDominican
in 1243
repeated
general
chapter
is significant.
IftheParismasters
actedin 1241,thentheorderconfirmed
thatjudgment.If,ontheotherhand,thePariscondemnation
inJanuary
occurred
1244,then
theDominican
actionsevenmonths
earlierwasthefirst
judicialaction.
9 CUP I, 170(#128):''Isti suntarticuli
veritatem
et
contratheologicam
reprobati
a cancellanoParisiensi
Parisiusregentibus
Odoneet magistris
reprobati
theologie
annoDominiMCCXL dominica
secundapostoctavasNatalisDomini[i.e.,Jan.13,
1241]."
188

23:20:12 PM

practice is any guide, that action would have been taken at the
Dominican convent of St. Jacques before the assembled body of the
universityor at least its masters.10Combining the informationcontained in the various versions of the opening line of the condemnation
decree, it would appear thatthe bishop of Paris, William of Auvergne,
had delegated the judicial deliberation to the regent masters of
theology,under supervision and authorityof the chancellor of Notre
Dame. When the determination was reached, the bishop gave his
approval and declared anathematized anyone who dared to dogmatize
or sustain the erroneous opinions.11
Because we only have the finallist of censured errors,many aspects
of the case cannot be reconstructed.12Precise informationconcerning
all of the stages between initial accusation and finalcondemnation are
missing, as is any direct information(as opposed to inferencesfrom
othersources) regardingthe subsequent career of "fraterStephanus".
We do not know who broughtthe accusation and compiled the initial
list of suspect propositions (possibly a fellow bachelor or one of the
regentmasters),nor do we know to what authorityhe initiallybrought
his complaint. Theoretically the accused came under threejurisdictions: that of the bishop by reason of clerical status and residence in
Paris, thatof the chancellorby reason of universitymembership,and
that of his religious superiors by reason of his membership in a
10On theonehand,the
- orat leastthetheological
as a whole
university
faculty
wasexpected
to attend.On theotherhand,thereis no waythatSt.Jacquescould
haveaccommodated
thetotalmembership
oftheuniversity,
whichmayalreadyhave
numbered
overa 1500bymid-thirteenth
century.
11As a variation
to theopening
wordscitedabovein n. 9, Oxford,
Merton267,f.
115vhas:"Istisunterrores
detestabiles
... a ven.patreGuillelmo
Parisiensi
episcopo
convocato
Consilio
omnium
tuncParisiusregentium
..." See
magistrorum
theologie
alsoBonaventure,
Sent.II, d.23,a.2, q.3 in Opera
omnia
II, 547: "Nam hieestunus
de decernarticulis,
ab universitte
Parisiensium
reprobatis
magistrorum
tempore
Alexandi
de Hales, patriset
EpiscopiGulielmiet OdonisCancellariiet fratris
sunt."
nostri,
magisti
qui, utevitentur,
subscripti
12Memoryof the
eventand the official
textof condemnation
werepreserved
in therecords
recorded
ofvariousDominican
primarily
bytheDominicans,
chapter
thelistofcensured
articles
couldbe found
meetings.
Bytheearlyfourteenth
century
in sometheological
oftengroupedwiththeParisand Kilwardby
conmanuscripts,
demnations
of1277andTempier's
earlier
condemnation
in 1270underthetitle"collectioerrorum
inAngliaet Parisiuscondemnatorum".
that
Amongthemanuscripts
havethisgrouping
areParis,B.N. lat.15661(late13thorearly14thcentury);
Erfurt,
CA Q. 151(late14thcentury);
and Paris,B.N. lat. 15820(15thcentury).
Forthe
oftransmission
ofthetexts
ofacademiccensures,
seeCourtenay,
ThePreservahistory
tion
andDissemination
Condemnations
attheUniversity
ofAcademic
,
ofParisintheMiddle
Ages
to appearin theActsoftheNinthInternational
CongressofMedievalPhilosophy,
Ottawa,August1992.
189

23:20:12 PM

religious order. The finaljudgment in this case appears to belong to

the chancellor and the regentmasters in theologyand would seem to
support the notion that the principal judicial forumforsuch cases in
Paris in the thirteenthcenturyhad become the facultyof theology.
The second Dominican case is one that did not make it into the
Chartularium
, namely that of Peter of Tarentaise. Pierre de Tarentaise
had been sententiarius
at Paris around 1256-57 and became regent in
the French Dominican chair by or before June 1259. 13 Sometime
between 1264 and 1267, that is during the later years of Peter's first
term as French provincial minister, someone, presumably a fellow
Dominican, extracted a list of 108 suspect propositions fromPeter's
Sentences
commentaryand submittedthemto the master general,John
of Vercelli.14Vercelli sent thelistforevaluation to one or more prominent Paris-trained theologians within the order, including Thomas
Aquinas (the only one from whom an evaluation has survived).15
Thomas scrutinizedthe list and concluded that the propositionsfrom
Tarentaise could be understood in an orthodox sense. In light of
13Forthecareerandwritings
ofPierre,
seeJ. Forget,
"Innocent
V", in:Dictionnaire
de Thologie
, 7 (Paris,1927),col. 1996-7;B. Innocentius
Catholique
papa V: Studiaet
documenta
, Rome1943.
14The precise
dateoftheseevents
is notknown.Thesubmission
ofthelistofsuspect
s electionas Dominicanmaster
beforeVercelli'
opinionscouldnothaveoccurred
in
generalin 1264,and ThomasAquinas'squestionon divineattributes
disputed
Romearound1266or 1267suggests
thattheaffair
hadalready
beenresolved.
Since
thesuspect
werederived
from
Peter'scommentary
onbookI oftheSentences
opinions
andthefirst
thirteen
ofbookII, onewonders
distinctions
whytheaccuserwaitedso
oftheSentences
before
action.Fordiscussions
ofthe
longafterPeter'sreading
taking
Descrits
case: P. Mandonnet,
desaintThomas
, 2nded., Fribourg
authentiques
d'Aquin
St.Thomas
1910,123-7;M.-D. Chenu,Toward
, Chicago1964,335.O.
Understanding
a secondredaction
whodiscovered
ofbookII ofPeter'scommentary,
believed
Lottin,
thatPeterhadrevised
hisworkundercriticism;
Pierre
deTarentaise
a-t-il
remani
Lottin,
soncommentaire
surlesSentences
de Thologie
et mdivale,
ancienne
?, in: Recherches
2 (1930),420-33.H.D. Simonin,
Lescrits
dePierre
deTarentaise
, in:B. Innocentius
papa
discounted
thismotivation
forrevision,
sinceit was thefirst
V, 196-206,however,
redactionthatwas disseminated
at Paris in the 1270s.
throughthe stationarius
Simonin'sargument
is not fullypersuasive,
sinceearlierredactions
of someof
Thomas'textsavailablethrough
thesamebookseller
continued
tobe copiedaftera
revised
hadbeenputintocirculation;
edition
R.H. andM.A. Rouse,TheBookTrade
at theUniversity
B.G. Guyot,and R.
ofParis,ca. 1250-ca.1350, in: L.J. Bataillon,
Rouse(eds.),La Production
universitaire
au moyen
du livre
etpecia
, Paris,
age:Exemplar
1988,41-114at 60.
15ThomasAquinas,Explanatio
de dictiscuiusdam,
dubiorum
cd. P. Mandonnet
in
ThomasAquinas,Opuscula
vol.III, Paris1927,211-45;reprinted
as "Responomnia,
sio ad lect.Vercell.de art. 108", in OperaOmnia
, ed. R. Busa,vol. III, Stuttgart
1980,642-6.
190

23:20:12 PM

Thomas's response and whateverotherevaluations Vercelli may have

received, Vercelli dropped the investigation.Tarentaise went on to a
second termas regentmaster at Paris and subsequentlybecame archbishop of Lyons, cardinal bishop of Ostia, and on January 21, 1276
was unanimously elected pope as Innocent V. He died five months
later on June 22, 1276.
It would appear that no one in the Dominican convent at Paris or
in the wider universityraised objections to Tarentaise' s statementsor
conclusions at the time he was bachelor of the Sentences.
Presumably
then, the charges were based on the writtenversion as disseminated
in the early 1260s and, given Peter's seniorityand prominence at the
time, may have been motivatedby personal animosity.Moreover, the
judicial agent to whom the accuser appealed - i.e., thejudicial forum
in which the plea was entered- was not the bishop of Paris or the
chancellorof the university,but the master general of the Dominican
order, the person who remained the spiritual and administrative
superiorof Peter ofTarentaise and possiblyof the accuser. In thiscase
we do not have any final list of condemned articles, since none ever
resulted. But we do have a partial but interestingpaper trail of the
earlier stages of the process: evidence of an anonymous accuser and
the preparationof an initial list of suspect articles; the submission of
that list to some judicial authority;the redirectionof that list to one
or more learned theologiansforevaluation; and one of theirrepliesor
evaluations, variously termed declaratio
, responsio
, or explanatio.
Withina fewyears of the Tarentaise affaire,Dominican theologians
became involved in a more famous case, that of 1270, usually treated
as the firststep in the investigativeprocess over Averroisticdoctrine
thatled up to Etienne Tempier's condemnationof 219 propositionsat
Paris in 1277. 16In 1270 Giles of Lessines, a young Dominican from
the regionof Hainau t who had studied under Albert, sent Alberta list
of 15 propositionsthat were being taught in the schools of Paris by
men of reputation in philosophy.17Albert found all fifteenarticles
16Thetextofthearticles
as condemned
at PariswaseditedinCUP I, 486-87( #432).
The eventsbehindand meaningof thearticles
condemned
at Parisin 1270have
a largebodyofliterature,
muchofitconcerned
withtherelation
ofthese
generated
articlesto thoseof 1277,theabsenceof twoof theoriginalfifteen
articlesin the
andtherelation
ofthosetwoarticles
toThomas'teaching.
condemnation,
episcopal
See in particular:
FriarThomas
, NewYork1974,272-85.
J.A. Weisheipl,
d'Aquino
17Portions
ofGiles'letter
toAlbert,
without
date,werepreserved
unfortunately
by
PeterofPrussiainhis VitaB. Alberti
from
textin CUP I, 487n.
, c. 32; excerpt
Magni
ForAlbert's
all fifteen
seeAlbert,
De quindecim
response,
condemning
propositions,
191

23:20:12 PM

erroneous. Either by way of Albert, the master general John of

Vercelli, or someone else, the articlescame to the attentionof Etienne
Tempier, bishop of Paris. Templer condemned thirteenof the fifteen
in 1270.
The aspects of this case relevant to the present inquiry are as
follows. A list of suspect opinions (whether prepared by Giles of
Lessines or already under debate in the facultyof theologyat Paris is
unclear) was submittedby a young Dominican to a senior theologian
and prelate in his own order. An evaluation was prepared in whichthe
articleswere considerederroneous. Sequentially or independently,the
bishop of Paris, acting presumably on the recommendation of the
chancellor and regent masters of theology, condemned thirteenof
those articles. Did the Dominicans, findingsufficientevidence, turn
the matterover to the universityand bishop, or was the issue being
examined simultaneouslyand independentlyby two different
groups?
In the followingyear, apparently in the winteror spring of 1271,
friar Bassiano of Lodi, then lector at the Dominican convent in
Venice, became concerned about opinions then in circulation at
Venice involving cosmology, angelology, astrology, theology, and
physics.18Bassiano sent a list of 36 suspect opinions eitherto Thomas
directlyat Paris or by way of the ministergeneral, who then passed
them on to Thomas. Thomas sent two replies to the lectorat Venice:
a firstredactionaddressing30 articlesand a second redactionaddressing 36 articles.19At the same time the minister general, John of
Vercelli, thenvisitingLombardy, collecteda listof 42 similarpropositions under discussion in the convents of northernItaly, and submitted those to Thomas, to the provincial ministerof England, Robert
Kilwardby, and to Albert.20Thomas received the list in March 1271
latin
auXlIIesicle
deBrabant
etVAverroisme
, pt.
, ed. P. Mandonnet,
Siger
problematibus
Le 'Dequindecim
d'Albert
II, Louvain1908,13-36.F. Van Steenberghen,
problematibus'
inhisbelief
Pelzer
leGrand
, Louvain1947,415-39,appearscorrect
, in:Mlanges
Auguste
ofThomasAquinas,buthisdating
do notreflect
thatthelasttwoarticles
positions
Discussion
ofthesespecific
is improbable.
to1273-76
Albert
oftheLessines/
exchange
before
at Pariswouldhaveoccurred
Tempieriactionon December10,
propositions
1270,notafterwards.
18J. Destrez,
latradilettre
aulecteur
deVenise
dite
La Lettre
deSaintThomas
d'aprs
d'Aquin
vol.I, Paris1930,103-89;M.-D. Chenu,Les
tionmanuscrite
Mandonnet,
, in:Mlanges
Manin:Mlanges
deJeandeVerceil,
etdeKilwardby
a la consultation
deS. Thomas
Rponses
donnet
, I, 191-222.
19Thomas,Opera
omnia
, ed. R. Busa,vol. III, 637-40.
20See note18
, 333-35.
above,and Chenu,Toward
Understanding
192

23:20:12 PM

and responded on April 2, 1271. 21 Kilwardby responded at the

General chapter at Montpellier in May of that year. The matterwas
concluded through action of the order taken at that same general
chapter.
In looking back at these cases and keeping in mind the partial or
fragmentarynature of the evidence that has survived (or, more
precisely,was intentionallyor accidentallyretained), a number of conclusions emerge. First, the judicial forum to which the matter was
initiallybroughtwas determinedby where or with whom the accuser
lodged his complaint, and that decision may have been influencedby
the statusof the accuser and of the accused. If those two parties were
bothmembersof the university,thenthe charges and thelistof suspect
propositionscould be (and probably were) broughtto the attentionof
the chancellor,who representedboth the theologicalfacultyas well as
the bishop in such matters. If the accuser and the accused were both
members in the same religious order, then the complaint and list of
suspect propositionscould be brought to the attentionof the general
of that order or some prominenttheologian within it.
Secondly, where the case was initially brought determined the
forumin whichit was adjudicated. Religious and academic authorities
were concerned about false doctrine and erroneous opinion, but it is
unlikely that they aggressively competed among themselves for
jurisdiction. It is more likely that the choice of judicial forum was
made frombelow, not fromabove. This may even have been true for
many of the cases adjudicated at Avignon under John XXII and
Benedict XII. What we have been viewing as a situationof authorities
competing for jurisdiction may, with a few exceptions, have been
simplya resultof where and to whom a case was brought.22Moreover,
a supposed jurisdictional conflictbetween the bishop of Paris and the
chancellorof the universityhas been overstated. Since the chancellor
was also the chancellorof Notre Dame and thus of the bishop, charges
brought to either might result in a similarjudicial process, namely,
one in which the chancellor, acting under the authorityof the bishop,
would enlistmastersof theologyin the process of evaluation; and any
censure thatresultedcould be issued as an episcopal letter(as Tempier
did in 1270 and 1277) or as a pronouncementof the chancellor and
21M.-D. Chenu,Toward
St. Thomas
, Chicago1964,333.
Understanding
22Forthe
andCourtenay
view,seethearticles
Southern,
"competing"
byMiethke,
citedabovein note1.
193

23:20:12 PM

theological faculty,under the authority(or in the name of) the bishop

(as in the Venizy case).
Thirdly, all authorities, whether it be the bishop of Paris, the
chancellor of the university,a general of a religious order, or eventually the pope, relied upon masters of theology to help make the
evaluative judgments on the lists of suspect opinions. All cases in the
thirteenthand fourteenthcenturies,whetherthejudicial forumwas an
episcopal court, a general chapter of a mendicant order, or the papal
court, relied on theological experts, namely regent or post-regent
masters of theology capable of understanding technical scholastic
language, argumentation,and conclusions.
Fourthly,the mendicant orders had been involved in such matters
as farback as the case of Peter of Tarentaise in 1267. The Franciscans
thus did not initiate a new system of internal investigationwith the
Olivi case in 1283.23But theOlivi case did have otherinnovationsthat
went beyond all of the earlier Dominican procedures we have
examined. While Dominican accusers wrote to individual Dominican
theologians, and while the Dominican master general consulted
several Dominican theologians independently, the Franciscan
minister general in the case of Olivi appointed a commission composed of regents,non-regentprelates, and even bachelors of theology
who were expected not only to examine the suspect articlesbut to consult and discuss with one another beforearrivingat a decision. It was
that model, withoutthe addition of the bachelors, thatwas adopted at
Avignon when the papacy- whetherby design or by reason of pleas
entered- appointed commissions to help adjudicate most or all of
these cases between 1320 and 1344.
Finally, there is no firmevidence that cases were shiftedfromone
jurisdiction to another. The Venizy case began and ended withinthe
Universityof Paris. The Tarentaise case began and ended withinthe
Dominican order. The same is true for the Olivi and Durand cases,
both of which began and ended withintheirrespectiveorders. While
we cannot exclude the possibility that the list of articles Giles of
Lessines sent to Albert the Great was subsequentlyturnedover to the
bishop of Paris forjudicial action, it is equally possible thatGiles was
sending a list that was already under discussion and judicial review at

23See above,note1.
194

23:20:12 PM

Paris.24And since the author or authors of those opinions were not in

the Dominican or any religious order, an order would not have been
the forumof finaljudgment. Only in the case of 1277, where the list
of articleswere under review at Paris and Rome simultaneously,was
thereany question of the appropriatejudicial authority.But the case
was neverformallytransferredor called to Rome, nor did Rome assert
finaljurisdictionin the matter.Apart fromthe elementsof timingand
adequate consultation, the case of 1277 began and ended with the
bishop of Paris and the regent masters in theology.
If, in the second halfof the thirteenthcentury,the mendicantorders
began to police theirown cases of academic orthodoxy,it was probably not a result of administrativedesign but a response to doctrinal
concerns at the level of local convents, even if that convent happened
to be the house of studies at the Universityof Paris.
Madison, Wisconsin
of Wisconsin
University
24Giles'letter
citedfrom
CUP I, 487:"Artculos,
toAlbert,
quosinscolisproponunt
vestre
Parisius,
paternitati
tanquam
majoresreputantur,
qui inphilosophia
magisti
transmitiere
illuminato
verointellectu
dignumduxi,uteosjam in multis
congregaterminetis."
vosotiovestriimperii
tionibus
impugnatos

195

23:20:12 PM

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Discussions on Modal Terms
Thirteenth-Century
JOKE SPRUYT

1. Introduction
Throughout the historyof philosophythere has been a continuous
'
struggle to deal with inferencesthat involve the terms "necessary"
and "possible" and the words derived fromthem. In his PriorAnalytics
that come
Aristotlemade an attemptto analyse the special difficulties
when
modal
and
Mediaeval
textbooks
also
with
inferences,
up
dealing
often contained discussions on modal syllogisms. However, till this
. day we are stillnot in agreementabout the validityof argumentscontaining modal terms.
The centriliproblem that comes to mind when dealing with terms
such as "necessary" and "possible" is the following:to what type of
entitiescan these termsbe applied, or, what kind of propertydo the
terms in question referto? Roughly one could suggest that there are
two options here: necessity(and possibilityor contingency)eitherhas
to do with the way in which we talk about things,or it concerns the
things themselvesand thus is independent of our way of conceiving
them. In other words, necessityis either a matterof logic or of ontology.
The discussion on modalityplayed a major role in the Middle Ages.
It was an important item in treatises on logic and, moreover, the
analysis of modal termswas considered crucial to come to grips with
the notion of God's omnipotence. In the fourteenthcentury, for
instance, the authors John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham
adhered to the notion of radical contingencyin order to ensure that
our way of conceivingthe eventsof the world do justice to the idea that
God was in no way bound by the actual course of nature.
In an earlier period therewas ample attentionforthe peculiarities
of modal terms.For detailed informationon thissubject we are to turn
treatiseson syncategorematic
to the contentsof the thirteenth-century
words. Although there is no evidence for a position of radical con196

23:20:28 PM

tingencyin the thirteenthcentury,the discussions on modalityin this

period are neverthelessof great importance, because one can find a
significantdifferenceof opinion in the authors of syncategoreumatatreatises as to what can properly be called necessary and/or contingent.In otherwords, one can come across distinctviews as regards
the application range of the terms in question.
The syncategoreumatatreatisesare an extremelyrich source forpeople
interested in the differentaspects of modal terms.1 The authors
themselvesdeal with a host of problems connected with these words.
In the treatisesone often finds a section on grammatical aspects of
modal terms,presentedas questions on what the modifiers"necessari'
'
ly" and 'contingently' are modifiersof. Furthermore,the authors
take a great interestin the meaning of the words 4'necessar(il)y' 9 and
"contingently)", and the relationshipsbetween the use of "necessari'
ly' and/or "contingently" in modal propositions on the one hand,
and the extra-linguisticstates of affairsthe words "necessary" and
"contingent" referto on the other. Finally, the sophisma-sentences
that are discussed in the treatisesoften enlightenus on the question
as to what type of necessityan author is committedto: is "necessity"
based on somethingreal, or is it merely an expression indicatingthe
way in which we, human beings, look at things?
Before going into the philosophical issues connected with modality,
let us firstsee how the syncategoreumataauthors consider the functionof
adverbs of modality.
2. On whatthemodifiers
modify
John le Page startsoffhis section on modal termsby raising a question about what kind of modifiersthe ones are that make a sentence
into a modal sentence.2 (The terminology"modal" is based on the
distinctionmade by Aristotlein Anal. PrioraI, 2, 25al-2, where he tells
us that thereare two types of propositions,namely the ones that the
"
Mediaevals have labelled lide inesse
("of inherence") and the ones
"
that are named modales
He
".)
specifies this question by raising the
" and "
" necessario
" are the
whether
problem
contingenter
only modifiers
1 Quite a numberof excerpts
fromthesetextshavebeen published
by H.A.G.
in:De 13deEeuwse
Tractaten
over
Termen
Braakhuis,
Syncategorematische
(2 vols.;Vol. I:
Inleidende
van Nicholaasvan Prijs),Meppel
studie;Vol. II: De Syncategoreumata
1979.
2 PartsofthepassagesquotedherehavebeentakenfromBraakhuis, cit.
op.
197

23:20:28 PM

thatmake a propositioninto a modal one.3 In his replyto the question,

Le Page comes up withthe specificnature of modal terms.As opposed
authors
to adverbs or adjectives, modifiersthat many syncategoreumatacharacterizeas signifyingdispositionsof a subject or predicatequa res,
there are other types of modifiersthat concern the subject insofaras
it is the subject or a predicate insofaras it is the predicate.4The distinctionbetween these two types of disposition is also described as a
distinctionbetween a dispositionof the reswhich functionsas the subas opposed to a disposition of the resinject ( dispositioreique subicitur)
subicitur
sofar as it functionsas the subject ( dispositiorei inquantum
).
man
is runn"A
are
white
two
of
of
the
types disposition
Examples
'
44
'
ing' ( homoalbuscurrit)and Every man is running' ( omnishomocurrit)
'
4
respectively.In the former, 'white* is a dispositionof the thingrefer4
red to by the subject term, whereas in the latter, the term 'every"
{omnis)determinesthe subject in relationto the predicateand viceversa.
It is only the lattertype of dispositionthat can qualifythe proposition
it occurs in, not the former.5
It is settledthen that thereare certain typesof modifiersthatdetermine the typesof propositiontheyoccur in. In factit is the lattertype
of disposition that is usually considered the definitionof a syncategorematic term in general. What Le Page now needs to explain is
whetherthereis any specifictype of modifier(generallycharacterized
3 Syncategoreumata
citedas F) f.46vb.:"Circa
(ms.ParisB.N. Lat. 15.170,hereafter
ille
utrum
et Contingenter']
modales'necessario'
primodubitatur
quas [sc.dictiones
detervel alie verborum
enuntiationes
modificent
verborum
sole determinationes
minationes
quodpossunt[possint
P' <ille>."
possint
4 Thisis a distinction
PorusedbyPeterofSpain;cf.Peter
Hispanus
ofSpain( Petrus
andIndexesby
Editionwithan Introduction
, FirstCritical
Syncategoreumata
tugalensis)
Ph. D., Leiden,
Translation
L.M. de Rijk,Ph. D., withan English
byJokeSpruyt,
seeJoke
etc.1992;Introductio,
cap. 2, p. 38-9.Foran analysisofthisdistinction
Text.Translation.
andNegation.
Peter
, NijCommentary
ofSpainonComposition
Spruyt,
meeen1989,110.
5 Syncateg
eius
subiecti:
et quedamestdispositio
. , f.46vb:"... duplexestdispositio
subiectum.
Verbigratia:hecdicinquantum
quedamestsubiecti
quodestsubiectum,
eiusquodsubiectum
estetnonsubiecti
tio'albus'significat
inquantum
dispositionem
'homoalbuscurrit'.Nonenimpossumdicerequodhomo
cumdicitur
estsubiectum,
Undealbedoestdispositio
hocestquoniamhomoquiestalbussubiciatur.
subiciatur,
nonrei
Aliaestdispositio
subiectum.
estetnonsubiecti
reique subiecta
inquantum
sicut hoc signum'omnis'.
que subicitur,sed subiectiinquantumsubiectum,
. Sed ille modus,< scilicethoc> quod dico
uniuersaliter
enimquoniam
Significai
subicitur....
reique subicitur,
sed reiinquantum
nonestdispositio
'universaliter',
differenab ultimasolumaccipitpropositio
Cumigitur
sitduplexdispositio
subiecti,
tiamaliquam,et nona prima."
198

23:20:28 PM

as a disposition of a subject insofaras it functionsas a subject) after

'
which a sentence is named a 44modal' one. The author puts it this
way: do all dispositionsof the composition (as opposed to dispositions
of the subject-substrateor predicate-substrate)make a propositioninto a modal one? The two examples he comes up within thisconnection
are adverbs of time and the particle "not".6 Beforehe proceeds to tell
us of the distinctivefeatureof adverbs of modality, he firstexplains
4
why it is that adverbs of time do not qualify for the 'modal" status.
Adverbs of time, he says, do not signifytime as concerningthe composition as accomplished by the verb, but rather as concerning the res
verbi,namelythe actingor being acted upon signifiedby the verb. This
is obvious, he continues, because the verb restrictsthe subject in virtue of the time signifiedor consignifiedas concerningthe composition.
For instance, in the sentence "A man is running", the term "man"
is restrictedto the present,and in the sentence "A man has run", it
is restrictedto the past ones, and in "A man will run", the term applies only to the futureones. If adverbs were to signifytime as concerning the composition as accomplished by the verb, in that case the
adverb would make the subject be restrictedso as to supposit only for
the supposita forwhich it is possible that they are, have been or will
be in virtueof the time. This would mean thatin the sentence "A man
is always", the subject "man" would be restrictedto the men thatare
always.7
The object of this discussion was to argue that adverbs of time are
not modal terms, somethingthat has now been ruled out by showing
that such adverbs do not signifytime as concerning the composition
as carriedout by the verb. Hence one thingis clear about modal terms
of
proper, namely that contrariwisethey do concern the composition
theirverb, and not, unlike the adverbs of time, the resverbi.However,
6 Ibid. : "Queritur
modificare
utrumadverbiaconsignificantia
tempus
consequenter
sit
omnis
videtur
Similiter
negativa modalis,
quod
possintcompositionem....
verbi."
negatiocircacompositionem
significatur
quoniamin omninegativa
7 Ibid.: "... dicendum
circacomnon
adverbia
tempus
significant
temporis
quoniam
Quod
verbisedcircaremverbi,scilicet
[sedP] circaactumvelpassionem.
positionem
rationetemporis
subiectum
cohartat
significati
sicestmanifestum
quoniamverbum
Undecumdicitur'homocurrit
, cohartatur
circacompositionem.
velconsignificati
'curread
cumdicitur'cucurriad pretritos,
'homo'ad presentes,
illeterminus
circa
adverbia
si
composifuturos.
47ra]
tempus
[f.
consignificarent
temporis
Quare
solumprosupilliusad supponendum
ratione
subiectum
tionem
verbi,cohartaretur
Et ita,si dicatur
illiustemporis.
velfore,ratione
esse,fuisse,
posaisquibuscontingit
ad
illeterminus
P] cohartatur
'quidlibe[quilibet
/>]estsemper',
'quidlibet
[quilibet
essesemper."
ea solumquibusconvenit
199

23:20:28 PM

that stillleaves us with the problem in what way the negation differs
frommodal terms,because the negation too is a termthatmodifiesthe
composition.8
John explains thatthereare differentways in which adverbs can occur in combination with a composition. Some adverbs signifytheir
content{remsuam) in the manner of a quality, some in the manner of
time, some in the manner of a quantity,etc.It is only the adverbs that
signifytheircontentin the manner of a quality that modifythe composition. These adverbs are "truly", "falsely", "possibly", "impossibly", "necessarily", and "contingently". The adverbs of time
and the negation, on the other hand, do not signifytheircontent in
the manner of a quality.9
Nicholas of Paris has a similar way of introducinghis discussion of
modal terms.His firstconcern is to decide whetheradverbs of modality can be called syncategorematicwords at all. When formulatinghis
solution to this problem, he tells us exactly what typesof disposition
there are and which types qualify the proposition. He begins by explaining the distinctionbetween dispositions in termsof the different
elementsof a locution. A locution has threeelements,namely the compositionor the formof the entirelocution, and also the subject and the
predicate. First there is the disposition that modifies ( disponit
) that
which is the subject, such as "white", "black", and so on, and this
type of disposition, he tells us, does not denominate a proposition,
because it belongs to its material "content" ( materiamaterialis).Then
thereare the dispositions that belong to the subject insofaras it functions as a subject, for example the signa "all", "every" and
"whatever". It is afteradverbs of the latterkind that a propositionis
called universal, and thistypeof dispositionbelongs to the formalcontent( materia
formalis).These adverbs do not, however, have anything
to do with the propositionbeing a modal one, fora modificationconcerns the nature of theform,10which, as he had explained, is the composition found in the locution.
8 See above,n. 4.
9 Syncateg
. , f. 47ra: ' 4Propter
estaliterdicentes[/]quod quedam
quod dicendum
adverbiasignificant
remsuampermodumqualitatis
et alia permodumtemporis
et
aliapermodum
etaliapermodumnumeri,
etsicde aliis.Dicendum
quantitatis
ergo
quod adverbiasignificantia
[per]aliquid per modumqualitatis[quantitatis
/,
modificant
.' '
compositionem
10Syncateg.
, ed. Braakhuis,
285(8-17):"Dicendumad hocquod,cumsintduepartes
substantie
enuntiationes
scilicet
subiectotius,
preter
compositionem,
que estforma
tumet predicatum,
Sed alia estque disponit
id
utraquesuashabebitdispositiones.
200

23:20:28 PM

What are we to understandby the material matter,the formalmatter and the nature of the form?In my opinion these labels are another
way of expressingthe differencesbetween what we have seen earlier
as the ressubiecti
and thepredicatum
subiectum
in, the subiectum
inquantum
In other words, the expression 4'material matter"
quantum
predicatum.
of a propositionindicates its subject-substrate,the "formal matter'' is
to be identifiedwiththe logical subject11of the locution, that is to say,
the kind of thingreferredto by the termin subject-position,and finally the "nature of the form" can be nothingotherthan the specifictype
of composition involved. Another disposition, Nicholas continues, is
of the type that pertains to the respredicata
, that is, that which is
predicated. An example of a sentence in which we find such a disposition is "Socrates is running well". Now it is quite easy to see that
this is not a kind of dispositionthathas anythingto do withmodality,
forif it did, the inference"Socrates runs well; thereforethat Socrates
is runningis good" would be a valid one.12 Nicholas explains his position in the followingmanner: the propositioncannot be named after
thistypeofdisposition" . . .because the predicate is not part of the matterin thisway",13 and afterthathe gives theexample of Socrates' running well. Obviously what he means here is that we cannot inferfrom
the sentence "Socrates runs well" that the predicate "good" inheres
in the "subject-substrate" thatSocratesis running.
Eventually Nicholas presents to us his description of modality: it
arises froma disposition in virtue of the predicate. Could this mean
that it is a disposition pertaining to the respredicataafterall? It will
become evident that this is not the case. Nicholas explains that there
is a differencebetween a modificationof the predicate and a modification of the composition, and it is the latter afterwhich a proposition

a qua nondenominatur
enuntiatio,
quodestsubiectum,
quiaestmaterie
[etadd.ed.]
ut'albus','niger',etc.Etiamestalia que estsubiecti
subiecmaterialis,
inquantum
ut signauniversalia
tum,a qua denominatur
enuntiatio,
formalis,
que estmaterie
'omnis'et'quiclibe.A quibusdicuntur
universales
nectamenmodales;modificatio
enimspectatad essentiam
forme."
11Cf. theextreme
ofa proposition
in a syllogism,
in thiscase theone in subjectposition.
12Syncateg.
aliaestdispositio
, ed. Braakhuis,
285(17-20):"Similiter
que esta ratione
reipredicate,
a qua nonestpropositio
nonestsicin
denominabilis,
quia predicatum
utcumdicitur'Sortescurrit
est
materia,
bene',nonsequitur
'ergoSortemcurrere
bonum'."
13Ibid.: "... quia predicatum
sicnonestin materia..."(see above,n. 9).
201

23:20:28 PM

is called a modal one.14 He explains the distinctionin terms of the

elements contained in a verb: a verb conveys both an act and a composition, and it is not the dispositionsbearing on the act that make a
propositiona modal one, but ratherthe ones that bear on the composition. Thus in a sentence such as "Socrates runs fast", the adverb
'fas ' bears on the act of
runningonly. What the sentence means is:
"Socrates' running is fast"; one cannot inferfromit "That Socrates
is running is fast". This also applies to adverbs such as "well" and
"badly".15
Our author finishesup his discussion on the criteriaformodalityby
coming up with an example in which an adverb does pertain to the
composition. One can meaningfullysay "That Socrates is runningis
good". The term "good" does not bear on the act of running, in
which case we would say "Socrates runs well". In factit does bear on
the composition,in the sense according to whichin each thingthe being
is that which it is, the trueis that by means of which it is known and
the goodis that by means of which it is strivedafter. Nevertheless,he
tells us, this is still no reason to admit such terms,namely termslike
"good", in the categoryof modes, foralthough theydo pertain to the
composition in question, they do not modify the inherence of the
predicate in the subject.16Finally, as regards the adverbs "truly" and
"falsely", these do not indicate modes either, because the truthconditions theyinvolve and the ways theyare used in a syllogismare
in no way differentfromthe ones associated with propositionsde inesse.11This means thatthe truth-conditions
forthe sentence "Socrates
14Ibid.,
eiusin rationepredicati;
285(20)- 286(2):"Alia estque estdispositio
que
tamendifferens
est sive predicatum
sive compositionem
disponat...;ab hac
modificatur
enuntiatio."
15Ibid., 286(3-10):
in verboduosunt,scilicet
etactus,que
"Quia igitur
compositio
determinant
ratione
actusnonmodificam
utestceleritas
dispositionem
enuntiationes,
ettarditas;
'Sortescurrit
celeriter'
vel'tarde',sensusestcursus
quodpatetcumdicitur
Sortis
estceler
veltardus
currere
estcelere
veltardum.
Sic ergo,quia
, necestsensusSortem
'bene'et 'male'disponunt
actumet noncompositionem,
nonfaciunt
propositiones
modales."
16Ibid.,
est
286(11-8):"Quia tamenobiciturquod benedicitur'Sortemcurrere
estquodalia estbonitasque estactus,que hicnonponitur,
bonum',dicendum
que
dicendoscilicet'curritbene'; alia estque estcompositionis,
significatur
que hie
dicitur
secundum
quoddicitAugustinus
quodin unoquoqueestesseid quodest,et
verumquo cognoscitur,
etbonumquo appetitur.
... nontamenmodisunt,quia non
modificant
inherentiam
ad subiectum."
predicati
17Ibid., 287(1-3):
veritatem
nec
etfalsitatem
"Quia 'vero'et'falso'nonaliamhabent
autemmodumsillogisandi
contraillosde inesse,ideononfaciunt
ab ildifferentias
lis."
202

23:20:28 PM

is running" are the same as for " Socrates is truly running". The
negation does not apply forsuch a status either,because the negation
adds nothingto the composition involved, but rather removes it.18
To sum up: Nicholas employs three criteria to decide whether a
4
word lives up to the name 'modal": firstof all, it must indicate a
disposition in virtue of the predicate, secondly it must bear on the
), and finallyit
compositionas found in the verb (and not the resverbi
is to modifythe inherenceofthe predicatein the subject. What the two
authorsJohn le Page and Nicholas of Paris are in agreementon is that
modificationhas to do with composition.
Anotherthirteenth-century
author, whose views on certain matters
are significantlydifferentfrom the ones just mentioned is Peter of
Spain. Nevertheless,as regards the special propertyof modal words,
he too is of the opinion that they pertain to the composition. To a
number of objections made by opponents who believe that the modal
expressions "necessarily" and "contingently" can only be applied in
virtueof the predicateitself,Peter explains thatone should distinguish
between the necessity(or contingency)of thingsthemselves,and the
necessity (or contingency) of a composition, which is in fact the
necessity (or contingency) of inherence. The word "necessarily"
determinesthe composition,and in thatway it produces a modal proposition.19One can see that in this respectPeter of Spain's ideas are
on the same track as those of John and Nicholas.
As faras tellingapart the quality fromthe quantityof a proposition
is concerned,Peter does presenta slightlydifferent
explanation. In his
words:
theproposition
as itis thesubjectdenominate
ofthesubjectinsofar
dispositions
is called
becauseaftertheseonestheproposition
on thepartof itsquantity,
inofthepredicate
Thedispositions
orsingular.
indefinite,
universal,
particular,
onthe
theproposition
ontheotherhand,denominate
sofaras itisthepredicate,
is calledaffirmative,
theseonestheproposition
becauseafter
partofitsquality,
modal,or deinesse.21
negative,20
De inessesentencesare definedas expressingthe inherenceof the predicate in the subject.22
18Ibid., 287(9-10):"... sednegatio
sedpotiusprivat;etideoa neganichilapponit,
"
tionenonfitmodificatio.
19Syncateg.,
ch. VII, cap. 13, p. 290-1.
ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
20Whatis remarkable
is thatunlike
Johnle Pageand Nicholasot ans, eterconundertheheading"qualityofa proposition".
as falling
sidersthenegation
21Syncateg.
eh. VII, cap. 13,p. 290-1.
, ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
22Ibid.
203

23:20:28 PM

At firstsight Peter of Spain's categorization of propositionsseems

differentfromJohn's. Unlike the latter, Peter includes negations in
the category "quality of a proposition". John le Page, on the other
hand, says that negation is not a modificationof the composition in
the way of a quality. This means that while "necessarily" and "contingently"correspondwith a certain qualificationof the composition
theyare said of, the negation cannot be called a qualification.To deny
somethingof somethingdoes not amount to qualifyinga certain way
of something'sobtaining. If we carefullyobserve Peter's way of using
the term "quality" in connectionwith the negation, however, we can
see that his classificationof propositionsis not significantlydifferent
fromJohn's. In his Tractatus23
he shows us what he means by the
"
"
a
of
The
"quality"
question qualis ("what kind of a
proposition.
proposition?"), he says, is a question concerning the quality of a
proposition,and should be answered withthe terms"affirmative" or
"negative". The modal ones are dealt with separately as sentences
that contain an adverb that determines the composition
(or qualifies
it).24So modal termsindeed correspondwitha separate class of propositions as contrastedwith negative or affirmativeones.
Peter also explains exactly why termslike "good" and "bad" are
not modal like "necessary" and "contingently": the former
areonlysaidofthat
Socrates
is running
or bywayofa cause,
bywayofan effect
and notbecausetheyaredispositions
ofthecomposition.
ForwhenSocrates
is
healthor illnessor something
running,
goodor bad is causedin him,and
therefore
is running"
''good" or "bad" is saidof"thatSocrates
bywayofan
effect
or a cause.25
Besides discussingthe distinctivefeaturesof a modal proposition(as
contrasted with propositions that have non-modal adverbs), John le
Page and Nicholas of Paris also deal with the question whether
sentences of the form "Socrates is necessarilyan animal" are modal
ones in the same way as "That Socrates is an animal is necessary" is
modal. This problem comes up when the authors turn theirattention
to Aristotle'sdefinitionof modalityto the effectthat to be and notto be
are the subjects of modality.26Hence as we can see in John le Page's
discussion, modal propositionswould seem to be those in which to be
or nottobeserve as the subjects, and not propositionsin which the sub23 Tractatus
I, ed. De Riik,5 (11).
24Ibid.,12(7)13(16).
25
., ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
eh. VII, cap. 14,p. 292-3.
26Syncateg
De interpr.
12,22a8-10.
204

23:20:28 PM

"
curjects are things.Now forthatveryreason, the propositions Sortem
'
'
'
li
estcontingens are modal ones,
rereestnecessariurr
and Sortemcurrere
because theseare the only ones in which tobeserve as subjects.27There
is an argumentto the contrary,however, in which modal propositions
are compared withnegative ones. The argumentbegins withthe statement thatin a modal proposition,the mode is signifiedas a mode (implying that in a non-modal sentence that contains a modal term, the
mode is not signifiedthus). Now a negative proposition,it is argued,
is a propositionin which a negation is not signifiedas a res, but rather
as a negation. For instance, the proposition"That Socrates is running
is denied" is not a negative one, but the proposition "Socrates is not
running" is. The reason why the former is not a negative one is
because in the firstsentencethe negation is not signifiedas a negation.
Therefore,the opponent concludes, it is true that unless in a certain
propositionthe mode is signifiedas a mode, it does not answer to the
name "modal". So the sentence "That Socrates is running is contingent" is not a modal proposition, whereas the sentence "Socrates
is contingentlyrunning" is. In the former the term "contingent"
indicates contingencyas a quality, and not as a mode.28
Before going intoJohn's rebuttalof this argument, we should first
see what is meant by the differencebetween signifyinga mode as a
mode, and signifyinga mode as a res. If we take the sentencesJohn
27Syncateg
., f. 47ra: "Queriturconsequenter
[quod P' cuiusmodiorationessint
vel ille
'Sortescurrit
modales,utrumille 'Sortescurritnecessario',
contingenter',
estcontingens'.
Et videtur
estnecessarium',
'Sortemcurrere
'Sortemcurrere
quod
in libroPeriarmeneias
et nonalie,quia dicitAristotiles
illeultimesintmodales,
quod
essevelnonesse.
itain illis[de]modalibus
sicutin illisde inessesuntressubiecte,
essevel nonesse et nonin
suntmodalesin quibussubicitur
Quare propositiones
et
Sed in istispropositionibus
'Sortescurrit
contingenter'
quibusressuntsubiecte.
suntressubiecte,
etnonessevelnonesse.In aliisverosunt
'Sortescurrit
necessario',
estcontingens',
esseetnonessesubiecta.Quareilleeruntmodales'Sortemcurrcre
subiciatur
esse et non
est necessarium',
cum in istisorationibus
'Sortemcurrere
esse."
28Ibid.: "Si hoc[scilicet
estpropositio
estcontingens'
currere
modalis]
quod'Sortem
modusutmodus.Quod
contra:modalisestiliain qua significatur
aliquisconcedet,
sedinqua significatur
utressignificatur,
inqua negatio
patet:orationonestnegativa
negatur',
negatiout negatio.Ut patet:hecorationonestnegativa'Sortemcurrere
sed ista'Sortesnoncurrit',quoniamin primanonsignificatur
negatiout negatio.
modalis
nisiillainqua significatur
estquodpropositio
nondicitur
hocverum
Propter
conestcontingens'
nonsignificatur
modussicutmodus.<Sed> in'Sortemcurrere
sicutmodus,sed in istasolum'Sortescurrit
Quareillaest
contingenter'.
tingentia
estcontingens'.
nonautemista'Sortemcurrere
modalis'Sortescurrit
contingenter',
enimdicitcontingentiam
et nonsicutmodum."
sicutqualitatem,
'Contingens'
205

23:20:28 PM

le Page lets his opponent produce as examples, viz. "Socrates is not

running" and "That Socrates is running is denied", we can see that
the distinctionis nothingotherthan one between the negatioutconcepta
,
i.e. the negation as conceived of, and the negatioutexercita
, the negation
as carried out.29
John's answer to the opponent once again shows that in his view
modal propositionsare called modalafterthe dispositionbelonging to
the composition. In his opinion both the sentence "That Socrates is
'
running is contingent' as well as "Socrates is contingentlyrunning"
are modal propositions. Indeed, "contingent" signifiescontingency,
but thisis not a quality of substance, but rathera quality of a composition or division. Well, it is because a propositionis called modal after
a certain disposition of beingor nonbeingitself(or of composition and
division), and because the disposition"contingent" in the proposition
at issue answers to that requirement, that thereforethat proposition
will be a modal one.30To explain his idea that "contingency" is signified as concerningbeing and non-being in the case under discussion,
John adds a ratherobscure remark31that "the factthatverbs in themselves are nouns, that is infinitiveverbs, is in virtue of their consignificationand not in virtueof theirsignification."32The relevance
of this final remark becomes more apparent in the remainder of his
discussion on the domain of modality. An opponent suggeststhatthe
29Foran analysis
ofthisdistinction
seeGabrielNuchelmans,
TheDistinction
actusexercitus/actus
inMedieval
Semantics
Kretzmann
, in: Norman
significatus
(ed.),Meaning
andInference
inMedieval
inMemory
Studies
etc.1988,
, Dordrecht
Philosophy.
ofJanPinborg
57-90.Cf. Spruyt,
cit.(1989),144-5.
op
30
f.47ra:"... dicendum
essemodalis'Sortem
Syncateg.y
quodutraqueistarum
potest
currere
estcontingens',
'Sortescurrit
Et dicimus
contingenter'.
quodinhocnomine
sicut modus; 'contingens'enim non significai
'contingens'est contingentia
nataminessesubstantie,
sednataminessecompositioni
etdivisioni.
Cum
qualitatam
dicatur
modalisa dispositione
igitur
propositio
ipsiusessevelnonessesivedivisionis
etcompositionis,
eritpredicta
enuntiatio
modalis,quoniamconsignificat
contingentiamcircaessevelnonesseet noncircasubiectum..."
1 Cf. Aristotle,
De interpret.
a verbis a name
3, 16bl9-25: "Whenuttered
byitself
andsignifies
butas suchitdoesnotyetsignify
whether
itis ornot.For
something...
noteventosay'to be' or 'nottobe' is a signofthestateofaffairs
(norifyousimply
itis nothing,
butitadditionally
somecomposition,
say'being');forbyitself
signifies
whichcannotbe thought
without
theextremes."
I haveleaned
(In thetranslation
onAckrill.)
ForAristotle
itisitsconsignification
thatmakesa verbintoa verb
heavily
proper.
32Syncateg.,
f.47ra:"... quia <quod> verbasecundum
se dictanominasunt,idest
verbainfinita,
hocestsecundum
et nonsecundum
consignificationem
significationem."
206

23:20:28 PM

"
" Sorteracrrete
est
expressions "Sotterricurrereest contingens and
necessarium"
not
be
for
The
reason
this
well-formed.
might
suggestion
" is
is that the adjective " necessarium
supposed to signifynecessityin
the manner of a quality, in the same way the adjective 44bonus'9
"
"
signifies bonitas in themanner of a quality.33The opponent explains
his remarkas follows. " Bonitas" ("goodness") is signifiedin different
ways by the words "well" and "good". The word "good" signifies
goodness in the manner of a quality and thereforeit signifiesgoodness
insofaras it is a quality of a substance. On the other hand, the word
"well" consignifiesgoodness insofar as it is concrete in an act, and
this is because it signifiesadverbally. Now because the two words
"well" and "good" signifyin differentways theycannot be added to
the same typeof word, forit does not make sense to say "*homobene"
"* curritbonus"
("*he runs good").
("*well man"), nor can one say
in
the
which
is
way
necessity spoken of must be different
Analogously,
4

in the words necessarius"and "necessario", forthe formersignifiesin

the manner of a quality, whereas the latter does so in the manner of
an adverb. Well, the opponent continues, a word that signifies a
disposition of an act cannot be added to a word that signifies a
"
. And thus a word that
substance, forone cannot say *homonecessario"
signifiesnecessityin the manner of a quality cannot be added to a
noun thatsignifiesan act or a word thatsignifiesa compositioneither.
" and "Sortera
estnecessarium
Thereforethe expressions " Sortemcuttere
"
estcontingensare not well-formed.34
currere

33Ibid.: "Et videtur

estconquodnon[sc. quod congruedicatur'Sortemcurrere
quia 'necessarium'necessitatem
tingens','Sortemcurrereest necessarium'],
sicut'bonus'bonitatem
permodumqualitatis."
significai
permodumqualitatis,
34Ibid.: "Significatur
P]
enimbonitasdifferenter
per has dictiones[differentias
bonitatem
'bene'et 'bonus'.Quod patetquoniamhecdictio'bonus'significai
per
substantie.
hocsignificai
bonitatem
et propter
modumqualitatis
proutestconcreta
Sed hecdictio'bene'bonitatem
actui,et hocestquia
significai
proutestconcreta
dif'beneet 'bonus',quia significant
Sed isteduedictiones
adverbialiter.
significai
Nonenimdicitur
'homo
nonpossunt
addieidempartiorationis.
ferenter
bonitatem,
dicitur'currit
bene'necaliquidestdictu'currit
bonus'.Sed congrue
bene','homo
necessitas
dicitur
differenter
bonus'...consimiliter
'necessarium',
perhas dictiones
'necesenimhecdictio'necessarium'
'necessario'.
permodumqualitatis,
Significai
sario'autempermodum
adverbii...
dispositionem
[Pi. 47rb]...Seddictiosignificans
Nichilenimestdictu
substantiam.
actusnonpotestaddi <dictioni> significanti
necessitatem
'homonecessario'.
permodum
Quare [necadd. P' dictiosignificans
vel
dictioni
actum
non
addi
nomini
composisignificanti
qualitatis poterit
significanti
estnecessarium',
'Sortemcurrere
currere
tionem.
Etitadiceretur
'Sortem
incongrue
estcontingens'."
207

23:20:28 PM

To this problem Le Page replies that the verbs tobe and notto beare
verbs absolutely, but when used in a certain constructiontheycan be
nouns. He adduces Aristotleand Priscian as evidence forthissuggestion. Hence grammaticallyspeaking, there is really not a problem,
because if the verbs in question functionas nouns in a sentence, then
it is not out of order to add to them a word that signifiesa quality.35
Hence the factthatsometimesverbs can functionas nouns is sufficient
to explain how a term like 1' necessarius'
' a word that signifiesin the
manner of a quality, can indeed be joined with a verb.
Nicholas of Paris has a similar discussion on the well-formednessof
" and comes
est contingens
a sentence like " Sortemcurrere
up with the
same solution as John le Page does, namely that one ought to
quid on the one hand and nomina
distinguishbetween nominasecundum
on
other.
the
simpliciter
A final problem thatJohn le Page deals with is whetherthere are
more modal words than "necessary", "contingent", "possible",
"impossible", "true", and "false".36 Without going into the discussion on this item what is interestingto note here is thatapparentlyLe
Page counts "true" and "false" among modal terms(even thoughhe
does not mention them any more along the way). As far as I know,
he is the only one to do so; even the author closest to his ideas,
Nicholas of Paris, does not agree with him on this point.37

35Ibid., f.47rb:"... quedamestdictioque estnomensimpliciter,

quedamestdictio
licetnonsitnomenin
que estnomensecundum
quid,sivenomenin ordinatione,
significatione
propria[primaP' et absoluta.Et ab hocultimomodoverbainfinita
inlibroPeriarmeneias
secundum
se dietanominasunt,quodsignificat
Aristotiles
, cum
dicit:verbasecundum
se dictanominasunt;*et dicithocPriscianus
quodverbum
estnomenreiverbi.**Ex hisitaquemanifestum
infinitum
estquoniamlicet'esse'
et 'nonesse'sintverbasimpliciter,
in ordinatione
tarnen
suntnomina,
ethocmodo
eisaddidictiones
licetnonsi<n>t nomina[nomen
possunt
qualitatem,
significantes
proutsuntin propriasignificatione."
P]
* De
3, 16bl9-20.**Inst,gramm.
XVIII, 43,p. 226(6-7);47,p. 227(31-32).
interpret.
It is interesting
tonotethatwhileLe PageusesAristotle
as evidence
forhisposition,
he appearstobe sayingexactly
theopposite
ofwhattheauctoritas
says(cf.above,n.
Aristotle's
and Le Page'sintentions
boildownto thesamething:in
28). However,
theinfinitive
theverbfunctions
as a noun(in thesensethatitis thenameofa certain
in a conjugated
form(usedas a predicate),
it is not.
"thing",whereas
36Ibid.: "Habitoa quibus
dictionibus
dicatur
modalis
ethabitocuiusmodi
propositio
sintpropositiones
utrumdebeantessepluresdicmodales,queritur
consequenter
'
tionesquam ille 'necessarium',
',
'contingens',
'possibile','impossibile',verum
'/a/jwm'."
37Cf. above,n. 14.
208

23:20:28 PM

From what we have seen so far, most of the authors associate the notion of modalityof a sentencewith the compositionexpressed in it. So
far we have only used this term in passing when discussing the views
of Peter of Spain, John le Page and Nicholas of Paris, but we also
come across the notion of composition in other syncategoreumatatreatises. We shall divert to the writingsof William of Sherwood for
a moment, in order to grasp the significanceof the notion of "composition" when determininga word's "modal status".
"
3. On " composition
author William of Sherwood the notion
For the thirteenth-century
of "composition" is crucial to determine whether a modal word is
This very distincused categorematicallyor syncategorematically.38
tion is also of major importance as regards the functionof words like
"necessary" and so on: ifsuch words in a sentencedo not modifythe
res verbibut the composition, they are not categorematic but syncategorematicwords.39The question thatnow inevitablycomes up is,
what does William mean by "composition"?
In his work on how modal concepts featuredin the thirteenthcentury,Klaus Jacobi pays a great deal of attentionto William of Sherwood. At a certainpoint he comes down to discussing Sherwood's use
of the term "composition". From his account it appears thatJacobi
practicallyidentifiesthe meaning of the term "composition" in this
connection with the formula"S is P".40 As the startingpoint forhis
in
position Jacobi refersto Sherwood's remark in his Introductiones
" est
verb
the
of
logicamon the significationand consignification
es das, was von anderengesagtwird,und
Weil "ist" Verb ist,bezeichnet
mit(consignificat
die Verknpfung
Aberes bezeichnet
istes Prdikat.
folglich,
), undjedesandere
), was(dieFunktion
der)Kopulaist(queestcopula
compositionem
mitdurchderen(nmlichder Kopula)
so (die compositio)
Verb bezeichnet
natur.41
38Unliketheircontemporary
continental
colleagues,Williamof Sherwoodand
the
between
thatone shouldmakea distinction
mention
RobertBaconfrequently
the
word
on
a
of
use
and
the
hand
the
one
on
use
syncategorematic
categorematic
other.Cf. Spruyt,
op.cit.,Vol. I, 385.
op.cit.,245 and Braakhuis,
39Syncateg.,
ed O'Donnell,in: MediaevalStudies,III (1941),46-9.5,
p. 73: ... et
Si
vel
esse
'necessario'
dictio
haec
sciendum
potest categorema syncategorema.
quod
"
tunccompositionis.
si syncategorema,
sicestdeterminatio
praedicati;
categorema,
40SeeKlausJacobi,DieModalbegriffe
vonhyreswooa
desWilhelm
indenLogischen
Schriften
und
. Funktionsbestimmung
des12. und13. Jahrhunderts
undin anderen
Kompendien
228-30.
Leiden/Kln
1980,
Gebrauchin derlogischen
Analyse,
41Ibid.,229.
209

23:20:28 PM

' as
Now according to Jacobi, Sherwood uses the term " compositio'
1
6
synonymouswith the term Aussage", that is, an enunciation,
...die dadurchentsteht,
da ein im Nominativ
stehendes
Nomenund ein
Prdikatsausdruck
durchdie im Prdikat
enthaltene
verKopulamiteinander
bundenwerden.42
As evidence for his conclusion Jacobi adduces material taken from
Sherwood's discussion in the Syncategoreumata
on the adverb "not".
The latteropens his discussion on "not" by presentinga problem that
comes up when considering the mode of signifyingincolved. In his
words:
...it maybe arguedthat"non"signifies
a division
and thisdivision,
as itaptothecomposition
denoted
pears,is opposite
bytheverb"est".Andthus"non"
mustbe a verb,justlike"est"is too.43
In this argumenttwo claims are made: firstof all, the spokesman says
that "est" signifiesa composition, and secondly, he counts divisionas
the opposite of composition.
According to Sherwood, the argument
breaks down owing to preciselythose two statements.Indeed, he says,
the verb "est" does not signifya compositiononly, and thisis why the
two "est" and "non" are not contraries. Moreover, the composition
signifiedby the word "est" is not opposite to that of "non" , because
composition is a mode of signifyingin a dependent way.44
Jacobi was quite right to draw our attentionto the key notion of
composition, which plays such a significantrole in not only Shertreatises compiled by his
wood's, but also in the syncategoreumatawe
As
have
contemporaries.
already remarked, Jacobi identifies
'
with
the
of
'composition"
unity subject and predicate. However, this
interpretationis not entirelyclear to me. In order to see the difficulty
here, we must look at how Sherwood himselfexplains this notion in
a passage dealing withthe mental activitiesof consentingto and rejecting a proposition:
42Ibid.,230.
43Syncateg.
, ed. O'Donnell,71: "... etvidetur
quod['non']debeatesseverbum
quia
divisionem
et haec,ut videtur,
denotatae
significat
opponitur
compositioni
perhoc
verbum'est',et sicdebetesseverbum
sicutet ipsum;contraria
enimejusdemsunt
generis."
44Ibid.,72: "... haecdictio'non' cum
- haecdictio
divisionem
tantum
significet
- tum
'est' nonsignificai
tantum...
etsicnonsignificant
contraria
compositionem
etiamquia compositio
denotatasiveconsignificata
hoc
verbum
'est'
non
per
"opei quodest'non',quia compositio
estmodussignificandi
ponitur
dependenter.
210

23:20:28 PM

which,as we shall
When,on theonehand,themindconsents
[tosomething,
itasserts,
andthereis an affirmation.
When,
see,is thecomposition
involved],
andthereis a negation.
it "disasserts",
on theotherhand,theminddissents,
intheverb"est"is,as itwere,thesubject
thecomposition
Therefore
conveyed
" is
Andthenegation
in " non
ofaffirmation
andnegation.
conveyed
opposedto
the
affirmation
iscalled"comthe
and
not
to
theaffirmation
composition
(unless
in theverb
fromtheoneconveyed
is different
butthatcomposition
position",
"O.45
'
If we carefullylook at what Sherwood says, ' 'composition' cannot be
4
identifiedwith the formula 'S is P" (or the union of the subject and
the predicate). To illustrate the point, consider the examples
'
"Socrates is running' and "Socrates is not running". The compositio
found in both sentences is one and the same, Sherwood says. In the
firstsentenceit is affirmed,in the second denied. Now properlyspeaking, the composition found in the affirmation"Socrates is running",
is not the same as the affirmationitself(although you mightwish to
call thelatterthe composition),and eo ipsoit is not to be identifiedwith
the union of the subject and predicate, viz. "S is P". On the contrary,
the composition is that which formsthe basis of both the affirmation
"Socrates is running" and the negation "Socrates is not running".
It must thereforebe somethingthat can both be affirmedand denied.
To take up the examples again, what can both be affirmedand denied
. This means that the composition spoken
here is thatSocratesis running
ofcan be nothingotherthan thepragmaor state of affairsthatsomethingis-something}*
In Nicholas of Paris' treatiseone also findsan implicitanswer to the
question as to what is meant by "composition" as it is used in connection withthe descriptionof modal words. His explanation of the term
featuresin the section where he deals with imaginaryopponents who
claim that dispositionsof modalitycan modifyeitherthe composition
or the predicate.47This qualificationof modal termsis suggestedas a
solution to the sophisma-sentence"Every man who is white is white
45Ibid.: "Cum autemhuicconsentit
cumautem
anima,asseritet estaffirmatio;
etestnegatio.Estergocompositio
deasserit
hujusverbi'est'sicutsubjectum
dissentit,
etnon
etopponitur
etnegationi
affirmationi
ejusquodest'non'affirmationi
negatio
ethocestaliuda compositione
vocetur
nisiaffirmatio
hujus
compositio,
compositioni,
verbi..."
46Sherwood's
thatofHenry
resembles
oftheverb"is" rather
discussion
remarkably
ofGhent.Unlikethelatter's
fellow-continentals,
Henryalsoexplains
contemporary
itcancouple;seeSpruyt,
ofthekindofbeing
oftheterm"is" in terms
themeaning
op.cit.(1989),237-8.
47Syncateg
. , ed. Braakhuis,
298(18-19):"... [sunt]qui ponuntquod huiusmodi
velpredicatum."
determinare
compositionem
possunt
dispositiones
211

23:20:28 PM

contingently", given that three men are white at present and that
tomorrowa man will be born who is white of necessity.The problem
this sophisma-sentenceis supposed to illustrateis that a modal term
can modifyeitherthe compositionor the predicate in question. Let us
see how Nicholas deals with it.
First of all he brings us an argument that is meant to prove the
sophisma-sentence.There is a rule that says that a common termthat
is not ampliated is restrictedto the present only.48The argument to
the contraryruns: everyman is whitecontingently;thereforeit is contingentthateveryman is white,and so thatthe one to be born tomorrow is white is contingent.49So far nothing has been said about a
distinctionbetween a modal term's modifyingeitherthe predicate or
the composition. Some people employ thisdistinctionwhen discussing
another sophisma-sentence:given that Socrates is white contingently
and Plato is whitenecessarily,thenboth of themare whitecontingently. The proofruns: that both of them are < white> is true, and it is
not a necessary truth;thereforeit is a contingenttruthand hence the
sophisma holds good.50 The contrary argument states that both of
them are white contingently,thereforePlato is white contingently.51
However, in the section that followsit is claimed that therecannot
be such a distinction.In the firstplace, it is argued, whateverdoes not
belong to a certain genus, does not belong to the species {i.e. the
species thatcomes under the genus in question) either. Now according
to Aristotle, truth and falsityapply to the composition only, and
thereforeso do necessityand contingency.52
The crux of thisargument
is that the notions necessityand contingencyare each species of the
genericnotionsof truthand falsity.To put it differently,
necessityand
are
a
certain
sub-kind
of
truth
and
contingency
falsity.(We shall see
later on thatin Nicholas' account the extensionof the notion 4'necessi4
ty" is less wide than that of the notion of 'truth".)
48Ibid.,
com299(5-6):"Et quodsequatur
patetperregulam
quedicitquodterminus
munisnonampliatus
ad presentes."
restringitur
49Ibid.,
299(6-8):"Contra: omnishomoest albus contingenter;
ergo omnem
hominemesse albumest contingens;
est esse
ergoeras nasciturum
contingens
album."
50Ibid.,299(11-2):"Probado:
istorum
esse < album> estverum,
etnon
utrumque
estverumnecessarium;
estverumcontingens;
ergo
ergo
prima."
51Ibid.,
estalbuscontingenter;
299(12-3):"Contra:uterqueistorum
ergoPlatoest
albuscontingenter."
52Ibid., 299(23)300(2):"Sed quodhocnichilsitvidetur,
quiacircaquodnonhabet
essegenus,necspecies;sed circacompositionem
tantum
estVeritas
velfalsitas,
ut
"
dicitAristotiles;
estnecessitas
velcontingentia.
ergocircacompositionem
212

23:20:28 PM

'
As to the distinctionbetween ' 4necessityapplying to the predicate'
4
'
and necessity applying to the composition'', Peter of Spain is an
author who adheres to the view that one can in fact make such a
distinction.This becomes apparent in his discussion of the sophismasentence " If Socrates necessarilyis mortal, Socrates necessarilyis immortal". In his view the antecedent "Socrates necessarilyis mortar'
is ambiguous, "because the word 'necessarily' can modifythe composition or the predicate." In the former case, the sentence is
equivalent to "The followingproposition is necessary: 'Socrates is
mortal' ", which means (a) that the predicate "mortal" is said to inhere in Socrates always and of necessity,as well as (b) that Socrates
is a necessarybeing. On the other hand, the word "necessarily" can
also be said to modifythe predicate "mortal" only, in which case it
can once again be interpretedin two ways: it can eitherpertainto the
thing in which mortalityinheres, namely Socrates, or it can pertain
to the act involved in the predicate, namely that of dying.53
To returnnow to the question of what "composition" is supposed
to mean, it cannot be otherwisethan thatit includes the stateof affairs
is thecase. If one says that the proposition "Socrates is
thatsomething
mortal" is necessary,thisamounts to the same as saying thatthe state
of affairsthatSocratesis mortalis necessary. For Peter of Spain modal
termslike "necessarily" can apply both to the state of affairs{i.e. the
composition)expressed by the entirepropositionin question, or it can
refer to the one of the elements of the composition found in the
predictate-term
(the compositionof the act and the substance signified
the
by
verb).
Besides dealing with the modality of the modal terms, the
authors also pay attention to what the words
thirteenth-century
and
"contingen(ly)" mean.
"necessar(il)y"
"
"
"
"
4. The semantics
of theterms necessaryand contingentand their
modalterms
corresponding
thenounsand adverbsof modality
between
4. 1 On therelationship
under considerationall have something
The syncategoreumata-authors
to say on what the words "necessarily" and "contingently" mean, or
what typesof thingstheyreferto. Robert Bacon firstmakes a distinc"
"
"
tion between the pair " necessariumand contingenson the one hand,
53PeterofSpain,Syncateg.,
eh. VII, cap. 26, p. 300-1.
ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
213

23:20:28 PM

" and "de

"
and "de necessario
contingention the other. There is a difference,he explains, between a necessary or contingentproposition,
''
and a propositionde necessario
or de contingenti.
The terms' ' necessarium
and "contingens"add somethingessential to the composition,whereas
" and "de
'
the terms "de necessario
contingentiare but accidents of it.54
What he means is apparent fromthe remainder of his account: one
" or "de
and the same propositioncan be "de contingenti
necessario
", for
instance one can have the proposition " Socrates is runningnecessari"
ly", Socrates is running contingently", "That Socrates is running
is necessary" and "That Socrates is running is contingent" (which
" and " de
are propositionsof the type "de necessario
' thatis,
contingenti'
propositionscontainingthe modes "necessarily" and "contingently"
respectively), but one and the same proposition cannot be both
necessaryand contingent,in the same way a truthcannot be both fallible and infallibleat the same time.55The distinctionthen is between
the type of propositionone is dealing with on the one hand, and the
typeof truthit expresses on the other. As to the semantical basis these
words have when occurringin a proposition, Bacon says that theyall
add somethingto the composition "ex parterei' that is, "on account
of something real". He separates these notions from the adverbs
"doubtfully" ( dubie) and "probably" (probabiliter
), because the latter
do not add somethingto the composition on the basis of something
"
real, but rather"ex partenostra that is, on our account. A proposition
is called "doubtful" {dubia) only in relation to our knowledge.56
For Robert Bacon then, by using the words "necessarily" and
"contingently", one is committed to some extra-cognitionalbasis.
Something in the real world is at the basis of both necessityand contingency.
,4 Braakhuis, cit.
necessaria
etcontingens
op. (1979),Vol. I, 145:"Aliaestpropositio
etdenecessario
etdecontingenti.
Hoc ergoquoddico'necessarium'
et 'contingens'
adduntad compositionem
differentias
sedhocquoddicodenecessario
etdeconessentiales;
adduntaccidentia
tantum."
tingenti
55Ibid.: "Nameadem
essedenecessario
etdecontingenti
propositio
potest
, ut'Sortescurrit necessario'et 'Sortes curritcontingenter',
vel <'Sortem currereest
necessarium'
> , 'Sortemcurrere
estcontingens'.
Sed eadempropositio
nonpotest
essenecessaria
etcontingens,
sicutnecVeritas
estfallibilis
et infallibilis."
56Ibid.: "Ad hoc dicendum
quod nullumadverbium
potestfacerepropositionem
modalem
nisideterminei
etaddatad compositionem
aliquidex parterei;...perhoc
'dubie' et hoc adverbium
quod dico 'ex parterei' excludohoc adverbium
'probabiliter'
nichilenimadduntex parterei
quamvisaddantaliquidad compositionem,
sed ex partenostra.Nullaenimpropositio
ex se estdubiased in comparatione
ad
nostram
dicitur'dubia'."
cognitionem
214

23:20:28 PM

Like Bacon, Peter of Spain and Henry of Ghent also account forthe
'
4
4
meaning of the terms 'necessary" and 'contingent' on the basis of
reality.The formerfirstof all presentstwo typesof "necessity", quite
in line with the ones we have just seen in Robert Bacon. In the first
place, there is the neccessityof mode, and secondly the necessityof
"things" or states of affairs. Necessity of mode is indicated by the
term "necessarily". It is used, he continues, withoutthe necessityof
states of affairs.57To illustratethe differencehe comes up with the
sentences "Socrates necessarily is running" and "A man is an
animal". The firstis a sentence de necessario
, that is, it contains the
modal adverb "necessarily", but there is no question of a necessary
state of affairs,but rathera contingentone. The second sentence, on
the otherhand, is a propositionde inesse
, that is, an assertionwithout
a modal modifier,but all the same, the state of affairsit expresses is
is not automatinecessary.58In otherwords, a propositionde necessario
a
cally necessary proposition.
Henry of Ghent59has a similardistinction,but instead of employing
modi" he speaks of "necessitasmodisignificandi
the expression" necessitas
". He is more explicit than Peter on the " necessitas
sive enuntiandi
": this type of necessity is understood and signifiedas in the
rerum
thingsthemselves,just as the correspondingtypeof contingency.This
typeof necessityand contingencyconcerns not only incomplex things,
in accordance with which God and an angel are necessary things
whereas all celestials and all things that can be generated and things
that are corruptibleare contingentones, but also propositions,in accordance withwhich qua state of affairs{secundum
rem)the proposition
"A man is an animal" is necessary,and "A man is running" is a contingentone.60This typeof necessityand contingencycould be labelled
57Syncateg
. , ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
ch. VII, cap. 3, p. 282-4.
58Ibid.
59Syncateg
I am very
cod. 510, ff.227ra-237vb.
. , ms. Bruges,Stadsbibliotheek,
of the
Braakhuisforallowingme to use his transcription
to Professor
grateful
manuscript.
60Syncateg
dicitur
modalisde quibussciendum
. , f.233rb:"Undeab ipsispropositio
Est enimquedam
et similiter
est primoquod duplexest necessitas
contingentia.
Necessitas
siveenuntiandi.
alia modisignificandi
sivecontingentia
necessitas
rerum,
Et estduplex,
similiter.
etsignificata,
rerum
estinipsisrebusintellecta
contingentia
secundum
necessitas
velcontingentia
terminorum,
quod
quiaquedamest,quedicitur
etcoretomniagenerabilia
resnecessaria
etomniacelestia,
Deusetangelusdicuntur
sivecontingentia
Aliaestquedamnecessitas
dicuntur
rescontingentes.
proruptibilia
secundumquod hec propositiocomplexadicitursecundumrem
positionum,
'homocurrit'."
necessaria
'homoestanimai',et heccontingens
215

23:20:28 PM

as modes of being.On the other hand, there was the second type of
into the
necessityand contingency,which once again is differentiated
' ".61 These
9and 4 modumactus
11 modumsubstantiae*
significati
per
type per
labels are obviously the verysame ones Peter of Spain uses in his division of the kinds of necessity.The lattersays thaton the one hand we
have necessityof substances,and on the otherthe necessityofacts. Accordinglyone has differentsigns of necessity,namely necessityas a
'
'4
,
disposition of a substance, signified by the nouns necessarius1
" and
" and " necessarium
" necessaria
an
of
as
a
act,
necessity
disposition
.62
signifiede.g. by the adverb "necessarily"
Althoughthe authors do all see the differencebetween modal terms
as such and the corresponding nouns and verb (" contingit
"), one
should bear in mind that the distinctionwe have just seen does not,
as Nicholas of Paris so aptly puts it, concern their respective
significates,but rather their modes of signifyingand function.63
4. 2 On thetypesof necessity
and contingency
Both Peter of Spain and Henry of Ghent have ratherexplicit opinions on how the modal terms are related to time. Before going into
the temporal aspects, we should firstsee how they take the terms
"necessity" and "contingency". Firstof all, Peter of Spain statesthat
the definition"Something necessaryis what cannot be otherwisenow,
in the futureor in the past" is inadequate, because this would mean
that only the First Cause would be necessary in itself.64However, as
we shall see later on, he does tell us that the words "necessarily" and
"contingently" allow the propositionstheyare part of to cover more
cases than the ones that obtain at the time that correspondswith the
basic proposition. Instead of giving an alternative definition of
necessity,Peter gives a list of the typesof "things" thatcan be called
necessary. This list includes the necessityof "common logical inten"
tions", that is, notions encountered in logic, e.g. 'of whatever the
61Ibid. : "Necessitas
et
estduplex,quia se habetutdispositio
modorum
significandi
reiincomplexe
ut res.Quedamenimestdispositio
permodum
signumnecessitatis
alia est dispositiorei complexeper modumactus
substantiesignificate;...
'
significate...'
62Syncateg
eh. VII, cap. 9, p. 288-9.
. , ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
63Syncateg
'conde differentia
istorum
. , ed. Braakhuis,
291(7-9):"Quod queritur
inresignificata
dicendum
et'contingenter',
et'contingens'
quodnondifferunt
tingit'
et officio."
sed in modosienificandi
64Syncateg
eh. VII, cap. 2, p. 283-4.
. , ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
216

23:20:28 PM

species is predicated,the genus is predicated as weir and 'of whatever

the definiensis said, the definitumis said as weir ''65 In otherwords,
certainconceptsnecessarilyinvolve otherconcepts as well. If one concept (e.g. the species man, or the definiens rationalanimal) applies to
something,some other concept (in our case the genus animaland the
definitumman)will also apply. Again, necessitycan also apply not only to the intentionsthemselves,but also to "the specificthingsthe intentionsconcern, namely the things that are considered in a specific
science.' ' Examples of this type are "every number is even or odd",
a mathematicalnecessityso to speak, and "every triangle has three
angles equal to two rightones", a geometricalnecessity.66Note that
Peter of Spain mentions propositions as instances of this type of
necessity,but his idea is that it is a necessary propertyof number to
be eithereven or odd, and of a trianglethat it has threeangles equal
to two rightones.
Having dealt with "necessities", Peter of Spain next fillsus in on
the diverse typesof contingency.There are two main ways in which
we can characterize somethingas "contingent", namely either in a
narrow sense as opposite to "necessary", in which case it is described
as what can both be and not be the case,67or in a broad sense which
covers both thingsthat are necessary and thingsthat are the opposite
of being necessary.The permissionto use "contingent" in this broad
sense to include necessary thingsas well is a consequence of the fact
thateverythingwhich is necessaryis the case and by thattoken is contingent(e.g. thata man is an animal).68Again the modes of contingen'
"
ad utrumlibe
cy are distinguishedin three kinds also, viz. contingens
'
"
as what can both be and not be the case, contingens
natum as what
"
is bound to occur and, finally contingens
inpaucioribus
velraro" as what
is more likelynot to occur than to occur, or "what is less related to
being than to non-being".69 Peter of Spain hastens to add that
although these are differentmeanings of the word "contingent", the
term is not equivocal, because its significateshave a certain order of
"prior" and "posterior".70 Leaving aside the meaning of this rather
65Ibid.,cap. 4, p. 285-6.
66Ibid.
67One can easilysee nowthatPeterdoesconceiveof
as applying
to that
necessity
whichcannoinotbe thecase,orcannotbe otherwise,
without
theaddition
oftimes,
however.
68Syncateg
. , ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
eh. VII, cap. 5, p. 284-5.
69Ibid.,
cap. 7, p. 286-7.
70Ibid.
217

23:20:28 PM

crypticremark,71we would be inclined to say thatthereis not so much

question of types or meanings of "contingent", but ratherof degrees
of contingency.
Unlike Peter of Spain, Henry of Ghent does actually give a definition of "necessarium"("necessary"), statingthat it is the same as what
"
"
is " nonpotensse aliterhabere
("unable to be otherwise") or nonpotens
"
nonesse ("unable to not be (the case)").72 Moreover, he presentsa
"
division of differenttypes of necessity,namely into necessitas
respec. The formeris defined as
absolta'1
tiva" and " necessitas
a continuity
ofinwithrespect
tothecomposition
denotes
thetypethatmerely
inthesubject
underthecondition
ofsomething
herence
ofthepredicate
else,and
moves
thisis thecasein theconditional
proposition,
e.g."Socratesnecessarily
Andit is notcalled
ifhe runs",44WhenSocratesruns,he runsnecessarily".
tosomething
butbecause
becauseitobtains
withrespect
present...
"respective"
it obtainswithrespect
to another
inherence.73
absoluta", on the other hand, is the kind that obtains
The " necessitas
without referenceto another.74
Nicholas of Paris mentions differentways of labelling the types of
"necessity" Henry has spoken of. One can speak of necessity/rse as
distinguished from necessityper accidens.The formerapplies to that
which cannot (now), could not (in the past) or cannot (in the future)
be false. The latter,on the other hand, is that which could have been
or has at some time been false, but which cannot now or in the future
be false, e.g. that Caesar has conquered Pompei.75 Secondly he mentions a division of necessity,which is very similar to the one Henry
' and " necessitas
of Ghent broughtup, namely into " necessitas
absoluta1
71The remark
is abstruse
in thesensethattheexpression
of"an orderofpriorand
isusedbyPeterofSpainhimself
toexplainonetypeofequivocation
see Tracposterior"
tatus
modusequivocaVII, cap. 31, p. 100(18-20):"Secundaspeciessivesecundus
tionsestquandoeademdictiosecundum
sienifcat
diversa..."
priuset posterius
72Syncateg
. , f. 233rb:"Est autem'necessarium'
idemquod 'nonpotensse aliter
habere'sivequod 'nonpotensnonesse'."
73Ibid.,f. 233rb:"Est autemduplexnecessitas,
quedamabsoluta,
quedamrespectiva.Respectiva
estillaquesolumcircacompositionem
inherentie
ad subiecpredicad
tumcontinuationem
dnottsub conditione
ad aliud. Et hec est in propositione
ut 'Sortesnecessariomovetur,si curri,'Sortes,quando currit,
conditionali,
necessario
curri.Etnondicitur
alicuiuspresents...
sed
'respectiva'
quiafitrespectu
inherentie."
quia estalterius
74Ibid.:"Absolutaestillaque sinerespectu
alterius
est."
75Syncateg.
est
, ed. Braakhuis,
296(15-8):"Sciendumigiturquod hec necessitas
necpotuitnecpoterit
duplex,scilicet
perse etperaccidens.Perse: quodnecpotest
essefalsum;peraccidens:quod potuitvelfuitaliquandofalsum
sediamnecpotest
necpoterit
ut Cesarem
vicisse
essefalsum,
."
Pompeium
218

23:20:28 PM

"
comparata (which, he tells us, derives fromBoethius).76 He explains
it in a way somewhat differentfrom Henry, however. Absolute
necessityis identifiedwithnecessityperse, e.g. that a trianglehas three
comparata)is said to be basangles, whereas relativenecessity( necessitas
to
a certain period of time,
of
affairs
related
states
ed on contingent
e.g. that you are sittingwhen you are sitting,or contingentsrelative
to theiropposites, e.g. that you are running or not running.77(Note
that the necessitiesconsidered here are obviously certain states of afrespecfairs.) So while Henry explains the distinctionbetween necessitas
absolutawith referenceto somethingobtaining under
tivaand necessitas
the conditionof somethingelse or not respectively(and he expressly
denies that this condition should obtain in the present), for Nicholas
the two types are distinctbecause the necessitas
comparata(to use his
terminology)is based on something'sobtaining in the present. So for
him modal termsappear to have somethingto do with time, a feature
that will become even more prominent in his discussion of certain
sophismata.Finally Nicholas adds that Aristotlehas a distinctionbetween natural necessity ( necessitas
naturalis)and necessity in virtue of
motion, e.g. that a stone is carried downwards and upwards, of which
the formerhappens by nature and the latter by voluntarymotion.78
Accordingto Nicholas the logician need only concern himselfwiththe
firsttwo ways of necessity,whereas the last one mentionedis primarily
a matterof nature.79
'
44
'
As to the counterpartof 'necessary' viz. contingent", Henry of
Ghent has a slightlydifferentway of classifyingthem than Peter of
Spain. The formerdoes not mentionPeter's primaryclassificationinto a broad and a narrow sense, but merely recognises the three differenttypesof "contingent" similar to the ones Peter sums up later.
Firstof all, thereis the contingentwhich is identical to the necessary,
in the sense that everythingwhich is necessary is contingent,such as

76Cf. In Periherm.
II, 241(1)- 243(20).
77Syncateg
Boethium:
. , ed. Braakhuis,
296(19)- 297(3):"Vel alio modosecundum
tres
habere
Absoluta:
aliacomparata.
,
aliaabsoluta,
necessitas
que perse,uttriangulum
uttesedere
relatisad tempus,
, dumsedes,vel
que estex contingentibus
comparata:
velnoncurrere
uttecurrere
ad opposita,
78Ibid.,297(3-6): Alitersecundum
enim
: necessitas
inlibroostenorum
Aristotilem
necesse
deorsum:
etsursum
utlapidemdeorsum
aliapermotum,
alianaturalis,
ferri,
idestpervoluntatem."
sursum:permotum,
estpernaturam,
79Ibid., 297(6-7): "Primo modo et secundonecesseest logicmconsiderare
veropriusnaturalem."
tertio
necessitatem;
219

23:20:28 PM

the stateof affairsthata man is an animal.80In the second sense a con4'

ad utrumlibet
", is opposite to
tingent,also known as what is contingens
what is necessary, and carries the definition:that which can both be
and not be the case; thistypeHenry describes in exactlythe same way
as Peter of Spain.81 The last kind of contingencyHenry presentsis the
one which is identical to possibility,in the sense that it can be said of
what is contingent,what is necessaryand what is not necessary,in the
same way as ' 'possible' ' can. This type of contingencyHenry identifieswith Aristotle'sway of understandingthe notion of beingpossible
as following from beingnecessary
, to the extent that from a part its
universal follows.82Thus in this sense the necessary is a species of the
contingent.Nicholas of Paris also has thissense of "contingent" listed
in his ways of using the term, but adds that in sophismata, 4'con'
ad utrumlibet"
. Contingent' is always taken in the sense of "contingens
to
of
Nicholas
seems
to take
Ghent, however,
trary
Henry
"contingent" in this lattersense as the one identical to "possible".83
Thus it is to be identifiedwith somethingthat has an equal chance to
either occur or not occur.
Enough now has been said on what the authors views are on the
meaning of the terms "necessary", "contingent" and "possible".
Although this is of course a very importantaspect of the semanticsof
modal terms,it does not yettell us much about the typesof thingsthat
can trulybe called necessary or contingent.Another way to put it is
this: what we are interestedin is how the authors deal with the question of the application-rangeof the terms under consideration.

80
f. 234rb:"Circa hancdictionem
notandum
Syncateg.,
'contingenter'
quod 'contingens'tribusmodis dicitur.Primo modo dicitur'contingens'idem quod
secundum
esseanimalestcontingens,
'necessarium',
quod dicitur
quod hominem
estesse."
quia necesarium
81Ibid.' "Alio mododicitur
sic: conquod opponitur
necessario,
quod diffinitur
estilludquod potestesseet nonesse,et dicitur
ad utrumlibet',
tingens
'contingens
essevelnonesse."
eoquodnonestnecessarium
82Ibid.: "Tertiomododicitur
Etestcom'contingens'
quodidemestquodpossibile.
munepredicabile
de contingenti,
necessario
et non necessario,
sicut'possibile',
secundum
Aristotiles
inParyarmeneias
essesequitur
esse
quodprobat
quodad necessarium
<ad> partem
universale."
possibile
tamquam
83Syncateg.
298(13-6): "... et hocmodo[sc. secundum
, ed. Braakhuis,
quodconestidemquod contingens
ad utrumlibet]
convertitur
cumpossibili.In hac
tingens
autemacceptione
sumitur
in sophismatibus."
contingens
220

23:20:28 PM

and modality
4.3 Reference
authors in quesTo determinein what way the thirteenth-century
tion consider " x is necessary" a true sentence, we should find out
what the term"x" can stand forin theiropinion. The best way to go
about our enquiry is to look at how the authors deal withthe question
of the suppositioof terms in sentences containing modal expressions.
The authors present their views as regards the referenceof terms in
combination with modal operators in two seemingly distinct ways.
Firstof all theydiscuss the question whethera termlike "necessarily"
has ampliaiive force,and second, theytackle the problem whetherthe
subject-term of a modal sentence can be distributed.
To start with the firstitem, like John le Page, Nicholas of Paris
deals withthequestion whetherthe suppositionof a common termused in combination with the term "necessarily" is restrictedto the
period of time expressed in the tense of the verb, or whetherit can be
ampliated to stand forany time whatsoever.84Both John le Page and
Nicholas use the example-sentence 44Every man is an animal of
necessity" to illustratetheir positition. At firstsight it would appear
that the expression "of necessity" would cause the term it is used in
combinationwith to referto individuals existingat another time than
the present,forifwe say "Every man is an animal of necessity", this
is a necessaryproposition. In other words, the propositioncannot be
false at any time, which in factmeans that it is always true. Now, the
supposed arguer continues, whatever is true at all times, must also be
at all times. Consequently, the supposition of the term uman" must
also be forever,owing to the forceof necessity. Hence the supposition
of the common termat issue is not limited to cover only the time corresponding with the tense of the verb.85
The main notion the argumentjust presentedcentresaround is that
of being.Obviously what the argument expresses is that thingswhich
84Ibid.,312(11-4):"Gratiahuiusqueritur
utrum
termini
communes
quibusadditur
inverteneantur
secundum
hecdictio'necessario'
temporis
consignifcati
exigentiam
differentia."
bo velamplientur
ad supponendum
(Cf.Johnle
proqualibettemporis
f. 47vb.).
Page,Syncateg.,
85Ibid.,312(15)- 313(1):"Et quod amplientur
cumenimdicosic 'omnis
videtur:
esse
hecestnecessaria;
homoestanimalde necessitate',
potest
ergoa nullotempore
veraest.Sed nonestveruminquolibettempore
falsa;ergoinquolibet
quod
tempore
'homo' <que> veraest
huiustermini
nonestin quolibet
tempore;
ergosuppositio
eritsempiterna
<et non> aspicitad difethocpervirtutem
necessitatis,
sempiterna,
ferentiam
, f.47vb.).
temporis."
(Cf.Johnle Page,Syncateg.
221

23:20:28 PM

are of necessityare of a superior type than things that merelyare. If

a state of affairsis necessary, this argument presupposes, it will continue to be in the future,and not merely in the present. Necessity is
thus linked withomnitemporalityand is a quality thatsomehow determines the mode of existence of the situation it is attributedto.
witha certain typeof being was not an unIndeed to equate necessity
in
the
common position
thirteenthcentury.Peter of Spain, forexam'
'
ple, insists that 'necessarily' has an ampliative nature. Both
' and
4
'necessarily'
"contingently" ampliate the terms involved so as
to include thingsthatare in the futureas well as thingsthatare in the
present.86In fact,his way of associating necessitywithampliation fits
in well with the way in which he descibes the meaning of the words
"
"contingently" and necessarily". The former,Peter says,
natureowingto thepotency
hasan ampliative
in [it]whichcanbe
understood
ordered
towards
theactbywhichit is fulfilled.87
He explains what he means here by givinga fewexamples: in "a man
can read" the potency to read can be fulfilledby reading and in "a
man can run" the potency to run can be fulfilledby running. On the
other hand, the word "necessarily" has an ampliative nature owing
to its indication of perpetual being itself,and by the very fact that it
is perpetual being that is indicated, the state of affairs(the being) extends to all times.88
For Peter of Spain thenthe word "necessarily" connotesa real state
of affairs.For John le Page and Nicholas the focusis entirelydifferent.
It is telling that the latter pay attention to the supposition for individuals at all in this connection, somethingwhich, as we shall see
below, would clash with Peter of Spain's instinctsabout the nature of
necessity.
To returnto the question of ampliation, as we have seen, in Peter
of Spain, the term"ampliation" applies to the state of affairsexpressed in a modal sentence. For Nicholas of Paris (and John le Page) it
concerns the supposition of a term for individuals. Once again, the
question was whetherin the sentence "Every man is of necessityan
animal" the term"man" could referto individuals not existingat the
time correspondingwith the present tense of the verb. Both authors
answer in the negative. Their argument involves the relationshipbet86Syncateg
. , ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
eh. VII, cap. 15, p. 292-3.
87Ibid., cap. 16,p. 292-3.
88Ibid.
222

23:20:28 PM

ween the notions of beingand necessary

being.The two authors both
narrow range than being.
a
more
is
of
that
being
necessary
argue
never be wider that that
can
Thereforethe extension of necessary
being
of being.Now being,John le Page explains, is limitedto the presentonbeing.In other words, their(i.e. John's and
ly, thereforeso is necessary
that in de necessario
runs
conclusion
propositionsthe comNicholas')
that
mon term at issue stand for things
actually {in actu) are.89
Another significantdifferencebetween Peter of Spain on the one
hand and John le Page and Nicholas of Paris on the other concerns
4
the way in which the authorsdeal with the sophisma-sentence 'Every
man is of necessityan animal" . Peter of Spain evidentlyfeelsthat the
sentence does not concern individual beings, but should be seen as a
sentence about the nature of man in general. An illustrationof this
point can be found in his attack on the claim that from"Every man
is of necessityan animal" it follows"Therefore Socrates is of necessity
an animal".90 This inference he considers invalid owing to the
impermissibletransitionfroma statementcontaininga termsimpliciter
{i.e. a term that is used in referenceto a form) to one that contains
utnunc).The sentence "Every
what he labels a termas-of-now
( terminus
man is of necessityan animal" is a truthsimpliciter
obviously because
the term "man" in this case is taken in the absolute sense, or, in
Peter's words "as signifyingthings that have necessary being."91
Thus forPeter of Spain it would appear that manhas necessarybeing
whereas an individual man does not.
Althoughinitiallyit seems appropriate to somehow distinguishbetween relationshipsthatinvolve "natural kinds" and statementsabout
individuals, this argument of Peter's does have its drawbacks,
however. In combination with the quantifier "every" (omnis) we
would expect the term "man" to have personal supposition. We
would at least wonder why it should not follow "Every man is of
necessityan animal; thereforeSocrates is an animal", on the condition, of course, that Socrates is a man. This is in factthe directionthe
89Syncateg.
se exnonpotest
ad necesseesse;sedinferius
, 47vb:"... esseestsuperius
homo.
inesse
non
animal
inest
non
ultrasuperius,
Quare
tendere
potest
quarequibus
ad esse,ad illudad quodextendit
esse,necnecesse
cumnecesse<esse> sitinferius
nonsupponit
de necessario
etdicimus
esse...Quodconcedimus,
quodinpropositione
., 314,ed.
nisipro <eis> que actusunt."(Cf. NicholasofParis,Syncateg
terminus
Braakhuis.).
90Syncateg
eh. VII, cap. U,p. yo-/.
. , ed. De Rijk,tr.Spruyt,
91Ibid.,cap. 21, p. 296-8.
223

23:20:28 PM

two Parisians John le Page and Nicholas ofParis take when discussing
the sophisma-sentenceunder consideration.92For the latterthe startingpoint forthe discussion was the question whetherifone uses' com'
mon terms in combination with the modes Necessarily' and
' the
4
supposition of these common terms is rendered
'contingently'
immobile.93It is in view of this problem that Nicholas deals with the
sophisma-sentencewe have discussed.
Subsequent to a number of argumentsproand contrathe truthof the
sophisma-sentence,Nicholas comes up withhis solution. Necessity,he
tellsus, can be divided into two typesin accordance witha distinction
between two differenttypes of contingency. The firsttype of contingencyrefersto somethingcontingentthat somethingifit existscan
either have or not have. For example, if Socrates exists he can both
have or not have health, or he can both be seated or not be seated.94
Thus health and to be seated are contingents.There is also another
type of contingencythat something,if it exists, cannot not have. An
example of thistypeof contingencyis being an animal, whichis a propertyan individual man who exists, like Socrates, cannot not have.95
Well, ifwe look at the sentences "Socrates is of necessitya man" and
"Socrates is of necessityan animar', these sentences are true in the
sense of necessityas opposed to the firsttype of contingency.In this
case the formeramounts to "Of Socrates his being a man cannot not
be the case when he exists". If necessityis taken as opposed to the second type of contingency,however, the sentence would be false.96In
that case it would give to understand that Socrates' existence is
necessary, which in fact it is not.
92Considering
thefactthatthetwodiscussions
onthismatter
areso alikeitwillbe
sufficient
to go intotheargument
forward
brought
byNicholasofParis.
93Syncateg
. , ed. Braakhuis,
302: "Quia tarnen
alitersolvere
ad predicta
aliquivolunt
dicentes
ad probationem
dictionis,
sophismata
[ad om.ed.] quodibiestfallacia
quia
ab immobili
ac si essetmobilis,
proceditur
suppositione
quodillimodi
supponentes
'necessario'et 'contingenter'
distributiones
ad quas feruntur
reddunt
immobiles,
estutrumhocsitverum."
propterea
querendum
94Ibid.,309(7-11):"Dicendumquodduplexestnecessitas
secundum
conduplicem
Estenimquoddamcontingens
inesseet
tingentiam...
quod rei,dumest,contingit
noninesse,sicutSortiexistenti
inesseet noninessesanumet sedere."
contingit
95Ibid.,309(11-4):"Est aliudcontingens
sitinesse,nonconquod,licetcontingit
estcontingens
ei,
tingittamennoninesserei,dumest,sicutSortiessehominem
tamennoncontingit
noninesse,dumSortesest."
96Ibid., 309(15-8):"De necessitate
veroque estopposita
esthec
primecontingentie
vera'Sortesesthomodenecessitate'
et'Sortesestanimalde necessitate',
etestsensus
'Sortiinessehominem,
dum est, non contingit
non inesse'.De secundavero
necessitate
estfalsa."
224

23:20:28 PM

Nicholas of Paris (like John le Page) distinguishesthe two types of

necessityspoken of above, labelling them "necessity of orderingand
terms" and "necessity of ordering only". The firsttype of necessity
occurs in syllogismsin which by necessityof the premises the conclusion is "caused", in virtueof theirabsolute relationshipwhich obtains
at all times. On the otherhand, the necessityof orderingoccurs when
in an inferencethe conclusion followsnot on the basis of the necessity
of the terms, but merely in virtue of the quantity, quality and
ordering,97that is, propertiesthat belong in the domain of reasoning
and not in the domain of the extra-linguisticworld. Anotherexample
Nicholas gives us in this connection is the inference"Every walking
person is moving of necessity; Socrates is moving; thereforeSocrates
is moving of necessity".98In this inferencethe conclusion followson
the basis of the necessaryconnectionbetweenwalkingand moving
, from
be
otherit
cannot
is
if
that
someone
which it can be deduced
walking
wise than that he is moving. A similar type of necessityplays a part
in the sentence"Every man is of necessityan animal", whichdoes not
mean thatit is necessarythatman is an animal always, but ratherthat
if a man exists it cannot be otherwise than that he is an animal.99
remarks
5. Concluding
and sophismata
From the research done so far on syncategoreumatatreatisesin the thirteenthcenturyone is gradually able to sort out a
pictureof people who agree on the natureof discourse and its relationship to the things it concerns. Already it has appeared that the
are not a homogeneous collection. Thus
syncategoreumata-tTcatises
Braakhuis has drawn our attentionto the fact that one differencein
accounts on syncategorematictermshas to do with whetherone takes
97Ibid., 309(19)- 310(7): "Propter
estquodduplexestnecessitas,
quod sciendum
Primaestinsillogismis
tantum.
autordinationis
etterminorum,
ordinationis
scilicet:
conclusiopropterincausatur
de
necessitate
premissorum
quando
probabilibus,
omnetempus.
et secundum
ad invicemsimpliciter
eorumhabitudinem
trinsecam
in quibusnichilsequitur
estque estin sillogismis
ordinationis
Necessitas
inferentis,
a quanmodificationis
ratione
sedtantum
de necessitate
terminorum,
que causatur
"
et ordinatone.
titateet qualitate
98Ibid.,310(7-9):"Ut cumdicitur'omneambulansde necessitate
sed
movetur;
movetur'."
Sortesestambulans;
ergoSortesde necessitate
99Ibid.,310(13-6):"Similiter
'omnishomo<necessario>estanimai',
cumdicitur
sedquia,cum
esseanimalsemper,
sithominem
hecestvera,nonquia necessarium
est,nonpotestnonesseanimai."
225

23:20:28 PM

a semantical, or instead a syntacticalpoint of view.100Moreover, as

far as reflectionon logical reasoning is concerned, the thirteenthauthors have distinctviews as to what can be
centurySyncategoreumata
classifiedas valid rules of inference.Elsewhere I have shown, forexample, that people like John le Page and Nicholas of Paris favour a
more formalaccount of inferencethan Peter of Spain and Henry of
Ghent.101The resultsof the presentenquiry into the works on modal
have proved to confirm this differencein outlook.
syncategoreumata
with what we know about the authors' views on
them
Combining
composition and conditional sentences, we can now get a fairlyclear
idea of the major diversityof opinions in the thirteenthcentury.
All the authors we have discussed pay attentionto the functionof
'
4
modal operators, their relationship to the propertiesof 'necessity'
'

and 'contingency' and the relationshipsbetween modal sentences

and the things they referto. On the firsttwo scores their views can
easily be compared. It is however on the question ofjudgements about
what is contingentand what is necessary that they go their separate
ways. While Peter of Spain clearly relates logical necessity to ontological necessity, and in fact hardly keeps the two apart, John le
Page and Nicholas of Paris turn away frommetaphysicalissues and
instead start concentratingon the specificallylogical properties of
modal expressions. It is not necessityof beingthese two are interested
in, but rather the necessityof inferences.
Maastricht
State University
of Limburg
100Braakhuis,
op.cit.(1979),Vol. I, passim.
101Joke Spruyt,Thirteenth-century
on theRule "ex impossibili
Positions
sequitur
in: KlausJacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie.
zuden
Scholastische
quidlibet",
Forschungen
undsemantischen
korrekten
, Leiden1993,161-93.
logischen
Regeln
Folgerns

226

23:20:28 PM

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Friar Alonso on the Logic of God
WALTER REDMOND

and all inference

Can thelogicallawsofopposition
principles
applyto terms
aboutGod as theydo to ' 'profane"terms?
This question is asked in the firstphilosophy work published in the
New World (1553-4), a two-volumeset on logic writtenin Mexico by
the Spanish Augustinin Alonso Gutirrez de la Vera Cruz (15041
84). I will review the answers he discusses in a shorttreatisetherein
4
on 'how to argue with terms referringto God."2 The brevityand
densityof the text make my remarkstentative,but theywill serve to
'
introducethe sophisticated 'logical theology" done in theSiglode Oro,
the Luso-Hispanic golden age spanning Europe and America.
In this context Alonso and his colleagues were presupposing an
extensional
logic, based on the identityrelation between several kinds
I TheRecognitio
Resolutio
andDialctica
Summularum
, Salamanca1562,69, 73,93. W.
fromtheLatin),in: Saber
la lgica
deDios(translation
sobre
Redmond,
FrayAlonso
1 (1994);id.,La Teora
estudios
Anuario
del
Centro
de
Novohispanos,
Novohispano,
de Mxico
NacionalAutnoma
dela argumentacin
, withM. Beuchot,Universidad
enfray
Alonso
dela Vera
Cruz
, withM.
y realidad
(hence:UNAM) 1994;id.,Pensiamento
centenario
a fray
Alonso
dela VeraCruzenelcuarto
UNAM 1987;id., Homenaje
Beuchot,
enel
mexicana
1584-1984,
withM. Beuchot,
UNAM 1986;id., La Lgica
desumuerte:
Mexican
andJ6th-Century
, withM. Beuchot,UNAM 1985;id., Relations
siglodeoro
de Investigaciones
Filosficas,
UNAM, 22/65(Aug.
, in: Crtica,Instituto
Logic
delsiglo
xui, in:Actas
enlalgica
mexicana
,
complejas
y unidades
1990),23-40;id.,Relaciones
enla lgica
aserII Encuentro
de la Filosofa
1978;id., Extensionalidad
Novohispana,
Universidad
modal
dela Nueva
Iberoamericana,
, in:Revistade filosofa,
Espaa
tricay
dela Vera
Cruz
modales'
lasoraciones
17/51(1984);id., 'Sobre
, in: Revista
porjrayAlonso
Mexico
17/50
de filosofa,
, in:Crtica,
century
(1984),233-4;id.,ModalLogicinSixteenthdela Vera
enAlonso
Cruz
descenso
15/43
,
y elascensol
(April1983),31-49;id.,La suposicin
15/42(1982,349-93;id., Extensional
in: Revistade filosofa,
Interpretation
ofGeneral
American
in16th-Century
beroSentences
, in: Crtica,13/39(1981),45-73;id., Un
Logic
14/40
enla lgica
delsigloxvi,in: Revistade filosofa,
dela cuantificacin
mltiple
ejemplo
Alonso
dela obradefray
enla Nueva
,
Espaa:Aspectos
formal
(1980),27-37;id.,La Lgica
in: Latinoamrica,
CEL-UNAM,12 (1979),225-44;id., Formal
LogicinNewSpain:
19/3
, in: International
Philosophical
Quarterly,
ofFrayAlonso
Aspects
oftheWork
(1979),331-51.
"
2 The relevant
divinis
interminis
texts:v.l, ch. 11,"De ModoSyllogizandi
(Mexican
= ch. 12,Salamanca1573,112A-115A)
andendofprevious
ch.
59rB-61rA;
edition,
" De
(Salamanca,
expositorio
plusa passagefromthetracton supposition
syllogismo
arepreceded
B contains
a translation
32A). Appendix
byasterisks).
(references
227

23:20:51 PM

of names. Since theirtheologicalanalysis cannot be understood apart

from this presupposition, I begin by introducing a simple formal
language thataccuratelyreflectsthisidentitylogic (1 .).3 Then withthe
help of this language I explain the paradoxes they saw arising when
logic is applied to discourse about God (2.) and inspect the solutions
they offered(3.). Finally, to show the surprisingsimilaritybetween
their discussion and contemporary Trinitarian logic- in both
approaches identityissues are central- , I close with an imaginary
dialogue betweenAlonso and a philosopherof religiontoday, A. Martinich (4.).
I.A.

Logical World-View

1.1 The QuijoteWorld

Let us suppose a world inhabited solely by don Quijote (having the
proper name q), Dulcinea (d), and the horse Rocinante (r).4 Quijote
and Dulcinea have the propertyhuman(M), Rocinante the property
horse(H), and all have the propertyanimal(A). Owing to his proper44
'
ties, Quijote has the sortal names (or wander-terms,' as the
schoolmen called them): mq ("this/that [indicating Quijote] human
being") and aq (' 'this/that[indicating Quijote] animar'). Dulcinea
has the sortal names
("this/that [indicating Dulcinea] human
being") and a, and Rocinante hr ("this/that[indicatingRocinante]
horse") and ar. Here is a semantic schema relating language and
objects:
EXTRALINGUISTIC
Generalproperties

i
Individuals
LANGUAGE
ProperNames
SortalNames

1
M

r
r

q
mq
aq

ad

hr
ar

3 It isolatesthelogicalcontent
ofAlonso'sexamples
(hisobjectlaneuae).
4 I dispensewith
markswhenmentioning
quotation
symbolic
expressions.
228

23:20:51 PM

1.2 SingularSentences
Sentences made up only of names, proper or sortal, are called
'
singular.' We may thinkof them in this way. Any combination of
two names on one word-list is a true affirmativesentence: qmq
("Quijote is this [indicatinghim] human"), hrar,dd. Any combination of names, separated by a slash "/", fromdifferentlists is a true
negative sentence: q/mj ("Quijote is not that [indicating Dulcinea]
human"), r/q, aq/ar. Sentences of the opposite patterns are false:
q/mq, rq. Our language has no special sign for "is"; the mere juxtapositionofnames in a singularsentenceshows thatthereis an identity
between them: qmq can be understood as "Quijote is identical to this
[indicating him] human being."
"

1.3 Quantification
Sentences having words like "every" and "some" are said to be
analysis, quantified sentences are underquantified. In an extensional
stood in termsof singular sentences. Schoolmen recognized two basic
types of quantification:particularquantifiers(in English "some" or
"a") and universalquantifiers("every," "all," "any," etc.). I use
brackets "[ ]" to enclose termswhich are particularlyquantifiedand
parenthesis "( )" to enclose terms which are universallyquantified.
Examples: q[a] ("Quijote is an animal"), (m)[a] ("every human
being is an animal"), (h)/(m) ("no horse is human," i.e., "every
horse is not any human").
Here is the traditional square of opposition, with the examples
marked true or false in the Quijote world:
(m)[a]
[m][a]

T
T

(m)/(a)
[m]/(a)

F
F.

1. 4 Analysis
If qmq, then q[m]; for that matter, if qmq then {qmq v qm^}
("Quijote is this [indicating him] human or he is that [indicating
Dulcinea] human").5 If mq[a] & m^a], and if the two humans are all
there are, then (m)[a] ("every human is an animal").
5 Alonsoknewtheaddition
rule;indeed,sincehispropositional
ours,
logicparallels
"
- he tookstrict
I willuse theconnectives
"v" (or),
(and), >" (if...then)
"
"
- , and O
as normal
implication
(ifand onlyif).
229

23:20:51 PM

Alonso saw quantified sentences (in appropriate circumstances)as

equivalent to (co-implying) disjunctions or conjunctions of singular
sentences. In the Quijote world
q[m]
(h)/(m)

is equivalent to
is equivalent to

qmq v qm<j
hr/mq& hr/m

and (m)[a] is equivalent to

{mqaq v niqad v mqar} & {mdaq v mdad v mdar}.
'
"
We will call such a combination of singular sentences the analysis*
of the quantified sentence.6
Sometimes an analysis will consist of one singular sentence; e.g.,
(h)r <> hrr,since Rocinante is the only horse. For the same reason
we have this equivalence: (h)r <> [h]r <> hrr (the followingare
'
'4
4
equivalent: every horse is Rocinante," some horse is Rocinante,'
4
and 'this horse is Rocinante").7
2. Logical Paradox
Alonso notices that some inference patterns give rise to paradox
when the terms referto God but not when they referto 4"profane"
things.8He examines the principlesthatjustifythese inferences,to see
if they do indeed apply universally.
2.1 Puzzle Patterns
He treatsof the followingtypes of paradoxical arguments:
* all the terms of the
argument are quantified (i.e., no step is a
singularsentence): syllogismstraditionallycalled darii(affirmative;Al
and A2) and ferio(negative; A3 and A4); the correspondingrules have
the same names
* all terms are
quantified except the middle term (the one not
appearing in the conclusion), which is a name: called expository
6 Scholastics
calledtheinference
fromthequantified
sentence
to theanalysis"descent"andtheoppositeinference
"ascent"or "induction."
Theyhadseveralways
ofdealingwithinductive
sufficiency.
7 A sentence
withan individual
to one witha universally
subjectwas assimilated
47.
quantified
subject;see Extensional
interpretation
8 A listofparadoxical
tothembya number
A; I refer
arguments
appearsinappendix
sentences;
preceded
by "A". I often"convert"symmetrical
e.g., writing
dadand
[a][h]insteadofaddand [h][aj.
230

23:20:51 PM

syllogisms(A5-A10); I referto such argumentsand to the rulejustify'

ing their conclusions as 'expos"
* no term is
quantified; that is, all terms are names and all steps
in the argument are singular sentences (Al 2); the inferencerests on
this identityprinciple (*9.32)
are thesameas a thirdare themselves
thesame
whatever
[things]
which for convenience I will treat as a rule, "ident"9
* The
only quantifiedtermis that appearing in one premise and in
the conclusion (All); the inference rests on this substitutionrule,
abbreviated here as "subst" (*5)
ifa refers
tothethingthat
andb is thesameas a, thenb refers
tosomething,
to.
a refers
Alonso points out the apparent dilemma, that in certaintheological
contextsheresyresultsif the rules of logic apply, and if orthodoxyis
maintained the rules do not apply.
2.2 Darii, Ferio,Expos
Let us begin witha straightforward
semantic schema fortermsreferrto
DSl
, functioninglogically in the same way as the Quijote
ing God,
schema. Father, son, and holy ghost10are each "the same as" the
divine essence, that is, they are God (to simplify,I will referonly to
the firsttwo persons):
i

SORTAL

NAMES

fj
d]

s2
2

r
G

Here d is a sortal name for divineessence

, f forfather
, and s for son.
Numbers 1 and 2 will serve as subscriptsfor the fatherand the son
respectively;e.g., fj ("this [indicatingGod the father]father" or, if
the context is definite,"the father") and d2 ("that [indicating God
the son] divine essence").
9 Alonsostatestheprinciple
in 1:28:3)
objection
(mentioned
byAquinasin thefirst
oftheargument
as thefirst
in *10.1.
premise
10I do notcapitalize
thesewordsin ordernotto begsemantic
questions.
231

23:20:51 PM

Firstlet us look at two affirmativeargumentswith the same conclusion ([s][f]), reached through darii and expos rules respectively(the
analyses are displayed at the right):
AI

djfi & d2fi

d2s2 v dis2

(d)[f
[s][d]

darii
S2fi
[s][f]
(every divine essence is a father/a son is a divine essence//therefore a son is a father),
A6

difj
d]S2

d [f]
_dl[s]
m

S2fi
(this [indicating God the father]divine essence is a father/this
[indicating the same] is a son//thereforea son is a father).
The conclusion [s][f] is false; in the analysis of the argument, the
terms of S2fi are not on the same name-listin DS1. In the premises
dfj and d2S2 are true because their termsare on the same lists, but
d2fj and djS2 are false since the termsare not on the same list. For the
same reason the second premise of the A6 argument must be false.
Also, the firstpremise of Al here must be false, since one false conjunct falsifiesthe whole conjunction (the second premise still holds
true since it is a disjunction). Hence the darii and expos rules are not
reallythreatenedin DS1, since one premise is false in each example.11
So what is the problem?
to consider these premisesfalse,since
The problem is thatit is heresy
thereis only one divine essence (there is only one God). According to
'
'
orthodoxy, 'every' divine essence is the fatherand the father'sdivine
essence is the son.
Analysis of the negative formsof these arguments(ferioand expos)
invalidates syllogisticrules, since the premisesare truebut the conclusions are feltto be heretical:
A3

expos

(f)/(s)
_[d][f]
[d]/(s)

ferio

fl/s2
djfj v d2fi
dj/s2 v d2/s2

thereforea
(no fatheris any son/ a divine essence is a father//
divine essence is not any son).

11 Alonsoheld,as wedo,thataninference
it)isinvalid
(andhencetherulepermitting
is false.
is trueandits"consequent"
whenits"antecedent"
(conclusion)
(premises)
232

23:20:51 PM

A9

d2/(f)
d2[d]
expos

[d]/(f)

d2/fi
d2dj v d2d2
d!i' v d2/fj

(this [indicating the son's] divine essence is a father/ this

[indicatingthe son's] divine essence is a divine essence//therefore
a divine essence is not any father)
Alonso also puts (*2.11) the challenge to the expos rule in thisway:
both the conclusion [d]/(f) and its negation (d)[f] seem to be right;
thereforeopposition rules are invalid:
(d)[f]
[d][f]

T?

(d)/(f)
[d]/(f)

T?

In otherwords, the sentences(d)[f], d2/(f),and d2[d] are all orthodox

yet constitutean inconsistentset, since the last two entail by expos
[d]/(f), which contradictsthe first.
Strictlyspeaking, the conclusions of both arguments are true in
DS1, since one singular disjunct in the analysis of each is true: dj/s2
Since
forA3 and d2/fjforA9. The problem is that they are heretical.
there is but a single divine essence, the father'sdivine essence must
be this son (djs2) and the son's must be this father(d2fj).
Consequently there must be somethingwrong with the straightforward semantic schema DS1. Using " divine essence" with more than
one subscriptendangers the divine unity,because dj and d2, being on
differentlists, may not be combined into a sentence; that is, d i/d2 is
allowed but heretical.
2.3 Identity
Since DS1 does not safeguardthe divine unity,let us set up another
scheme, DS2, which does. We can do this by giving the sortal term
d a single subscript,d ("this divine essence"):
i

SORTAL

NAMES

f!

s2

<jd

<d

r
G

233

23:20:51 PM

But DS2 does not work either. Alonso uses the followingexample12
to show how ident seems to be invalid in this context:
*10.1

ddf T
d<jS2 T
fS2 F ident

(the divine essence is this father/the divine essence is this son//

thereforethis son is this father).
This is troubleindeed. The premisesare true and clearlyorthodoxyet
the conclusion is false and heretical; thereforeident does not hold.13
DS2 contains an obvious inconsistency:it both allowsfidj and S2d<j,
since its terms are on the same list, and forbidsthem, since its terms
are on different
lists (that is, it also allows fi/d^and S2/d<j).And since
dd, being on differentlists, can serve as a middle termto unite terms
on these differentlists, ident is invalidated. Hence neither schema
seems to work.
2.4 Substitution
The notion of the father'sbegettingor generatingthe son gives rise
to another series of paradoxical arguments, involving not only rules
fordarii (A2), ferio(A4), and expo (A8), but a rule fora different
type
altogether:subst (All). Let us include bj on the father'slist of sortal
names, since he has the propertyB, thatof begettingtheson, and consider this inference14(analysis to the right):
All
fbi
f[b]
fd
fd
d[b]

subst

dbi

(the fatherbegets (the son)/ the fatheris the same as the essence//
thereforethe essence begets).

12The termscan be seenas sortaltermsor

- definite
propernames
descriptions
sincein singular
sentences
in thesameway.
function
("the father"),
they
logically
13When
"dd" replaces"dj" and "d2" in Al andA6, theycollapseintoargument
ofAl andA6. Sincetheantecedent
is trueandthe
A12;i.e., A 12isalsotheanalysis
false,darii,expos,and identrulesareall threatened.
consequent
14To simplify,
I use propernames.
234

23:20:51 PM

Since both in DS1 and DS2 the premises are true and the conclusion
'
heretical, the principle of substitutingthe "same things' must fail.
When we add b' to eitherdivine schema, we see that some names on
the samelist may not be joined under pain of heresy: b may not be
combined with either d^ or d'
3. The outs
It does indeed look as if we must choose between logic and
orthodoxy.What are the outs?
3. 1 The Agreement
Principle
For Alonso, thatlogic and faith"stand together" is the traditional
position (*2.22), and he supports it (*2.21) with the followingargument (L is the conjunction of logicaliprinciples and F is that of faith
propositions):15
L
F
L &F

"the true agrees with the true."

The rules of opposition and inference,he says (*8), in fact "apply in

the highestdegree.' ' But how does this "agreement principle'' apply
to the paradoxes?
To find solutions, Alonso and his colleagues tinkerwith the sense
and referenceof the terms. He rejects a "Modern" position (3.2)16
and advocates other approaches from his own time (3.3) as well as
"Ancient" solutions (3.4).

15The agreement
whichI illustrate
as a rulehe statesas a premise
in the
principle
argument.
16The ' 'Moderns"(*4.21,2,4)go backto the14thcentury,
butAlonsoreferred
to the"decrepit
hisown"golden
mainly
age" oflogic(Ila, 43rA,46A)preceding
age" at midcentury.
TheyweremainlyIberianlogicians
(he singledoutEncinas,
andhisownteacher
withlate15th-c.
nominalism
at the
Esbarroya,
Soto)associated
ofParisandpublishing
in thefirst
thirdofthe16thcentury.
Alonsodid
University
notopposetheir
extensional
thatmuchmatebuthethought
logic(heusedithimself),
rialtaught
wastoodifficult
forstudents.
Criticism
oflogicwasthenin vogue(J.L.
oflogicfindtheiranalyses
Vives),buthistorians
interesting.
235

23:20:51 PM

3. 2 The ModernOut
3. 2. 1 The ModernPosition
The Moderns in effectcombine the two divine schmas and point
out when d' and d2 or d should be used in sentence building. They
distinguish, explains Alonso (*3.1), two types of quantificationand
'
analysis. 'Complete" quantification,both universaland particular,is
the normal case. There, (d) and [d] are to be read (*3.21) respectively
as 4'everythingwhich is d" and " somethingwhich is d" and analyzed
respectivelyas a conjunction or disjunction of d and d2.
'
'Incomplete'' quantificationallows analysis only to the "essence"
in question, that is, to d.17 I will indicate incompletequantification
by doubling the parentheses "(( ))" or brackets "[[ ]]."
Alonso applies (*3.2) the Modern solution only to the negative
expos argument. The complete/incompletedistinction saves the
opposition principle,claim the Moderns, since in eitherinterpretation
one sentenceof the contradictorypair is true and the otherfalse. Here
is the complete sense, with analyses to the right:
(d)[f]
[d]/(0

F
T

F (TF)
d! fi & d2fi
v
T
dj/fj d2/fi
(FT).

According to the Moderns (*3.21), d2/(f)is true because "the son,

who is somethingwhich is the divine essence, is not any father." This
would give us a normal square of opposition:
(d)[f|
[d][f]

F
T

(d)/(f) F
[d]/(0 T.

But when d is incompletelyquantified,

T
((d))[f]
[[d]]/(f) F

ddf, T
dd/fj F,

one contradictorysentence is true and the other false, but now their
truthvalues are reversed. We would get the followingsquare:
((d))[f]
[[d]][f]

T
T

((d))/(f) F
[[d]]/(f) F.

' mediate'
' and "immediate"couldhave
17Its "immediate
opposite
significate'
("
in
16th-c.
meanings
writers).
236

23:20:51 PM

Presumably argument form A9, if all three steps are quantified

completely,is normallyvalid. However if all the occurrencesof d are
taken in the incompletesense, the firstpremise and the conclusion are
false. Here are the two versions (analyses to the right):
T
T

T expos

d2/fi
d2d v d2d2
dj/fj v d2/fj

dd/(f)
dd[[d]]

F
T

dd/fj
dddd

F
T

[d]]/(0

F expos

dd/fj

F.

d2/(f)
d2[d]

T
T

[d]/(f)

Either way, claim the Moderns, expos is saved.

3.2.2 Alonso's Criticism
of theModerns
Alonso remarksfirst(*4.22) that it is scandalous for a Catholic to
say in one breath "a divine essence is a father" ([d][f] and [[d]][f] are
both true) and "is not a father'' ([d]/(f) is trueeven if[[d]]/(f)is false).
He also argues (*4.21) that the Modern doctrineborderson heresy.
Let us inspect this expos inference(in the complete interpretation;
partial analysis to the right):
f[d]
fi[b]

T
T

~[d][b]

fjdi v fjd2
fjbj
'd{[b] v d2[b]

T
T
TF

Although the conclusion in the incomplete sense, [[d]][b], would be

flat-outheresy,[d] [b] is true in the complete sense, since, says Alonso,
one of the disjunctsof its analysis, dj[b], is true and "the truthof one
singularsentencesuffices"forthe truthof a disjunction. However, the
churchcondemnedJoachim of Fiori forsaying that the divine essence
begets the son.18
3.3 Alonso's Current
Out
Alonso advocates (*7.) "according to the truth of the matter"
another solution, which, he thinks (*7.22) makes the Modern complete/incompletedistinctionsuperfluous.
18In thefirst
editionthepersonis the"mediate"significate
of"essence"butlater
editions
have"middle."Aquinasmentions
condemnation
in 1:39:5.
Joachim's
237

23:20:51 PM

As we saw, although it is orthodox to say (d)[f), it must be false in

DS1 since the second conjunct of its analysis, d2[f], is false (djfi &
d2fi, TF). Alonso says (*7.21; cf. *7.1111) in a case of this sort the
universal quantificationof the left-handterm, (d), must be read as
particular. He explains (*7.21, *9.1) that d "when universallyquantifiedcan referonly to... the essence," "not to the persons." So in
(d)[f], (d) does not mean "everythingwhich is D," nor does it apply
"to each" D-thing; rather, (d)[f] has the force only of [d][f]: some
divine essence is a father. But he adds (*7.1112) that in negative
sentences like [d]/(f) the opposite is true; in this context [d] actually
means "everything which is D" and it applies "to each" D-thing.
That is, [d]/(f) must be read (d)/(f): everydivine essence is not any
father.
Alonso thinks (*9.1) that this reduction solves the opposition
problem (2.11), since the analysis of (d)[f], when read as [d][f], would
be not a conjunction but the disjunction djfj v d2fj. This disjunction
is true, since its firstdisjunct is true. And the analysis of [d]/(f),read
now as (d)/(f), is the conjunctiondj/(f) & d2/(f),which is false because
the firstconjunct is false.
The expos argument A9, put forward to prove [d]/(f), now
becomes:
d2/(f)
d2[d]
[d]/(0

T
T
-

(d)/(0

and even thoughthe antecedent(premises) is true and the consequent

false, expos rules are not invalidated, since it is no longera valid expos
syllogism(which may not have a universal conclusion).
So, "when instantiated,d is not an adequate middle term for the
''
expos syllogism, says Alonso (*9.311, *7.21), because of its semantic
ambiguity: it is both "like a singular name... and so not attributed
severally,... and like a common term since attributedindividuallyto
the persons"; it is a singular term "in referringbut attributedto
several different"things. If he means thatthe instantiationof d is the
analysis of [d] or (d) (that is, not a single individual termbut d'... v
d2-.. or d|/... & d2/...) the expos argument *2.11 would now become:
d /(f) & d2/(f)
v
_d2di d2d2
~[d]/(f) - (d)/(f)

d[d] v d2[d] -

[d][d]

F (FT)
T (TT)
F

238

23:20:51 PM

and of course thisis not an expos syllogism.This criticismapplies also

to *2. 13a, whose "middle term is not sufficiently
instantiated/' and
does not apply "to each":
di[f
di[s]

d,[f] v d2[f] d, [s] v d2[s] -

kn

[d][f T
[d] [s] T
F

He indeed says (*9.312) that the argument "because of 'essence/

'
argues fromall particular' premises (any standard syllogismboth of
whose premises are particular is invalid).
He adds (*9.313) that if we interpret"essence" as "this thing
which," that is, either as d' or d2,19 we get two valid expos
syllogisms, and since each has one false premise, logic is not
jeopardized:
*2. 13a

di[f
_di[s]
[s][f]

T
F

*2. 13b d2[f]

d2[s]

F expos

[s][f]

F
T
F expos

When he applies (*9.22) the reductionin the darii context,Alonso

denies that thereis any valid inferencepattern,since afterthe reduction preventing(d) to apply "to each," both premises are particular:
(d)[f]
[s][d]

[d][f

T
T
F

KM

It would also work with ferio because of the reduction of the conclusion:
T
T

(f)/(s)
[d][f]

(d]/(s) -

(d)/(s)

nor would the result be a ferio or any other valid syllogism.

Alonso applies (*7.112) the above reductionsto a left-handterm d
only when the right-handtermof the statementrefersto a single person. If on the rightwe have a term applicable to the essence (e.g.,
"essence") or to more than one person, e.g., "substance"
*4
19Theargument
isstated
thesameessence
(*3.12)as thisdivineessence[indicating
the
same
or (*9.313)
person]."
239

23:20:51 PM

'
'
(abbreviated here as "H" and "h") or 'person,' the reductionsdo
not apply and a universallyquantifiedtermapplies "to each." So we
have normal analyses of:
and

(d)[d]

dj[d] & d2[d]

(d)[h]

d,[h]

T.

d2[h]

'
Hence, he says (*9.22; cf. *9.322), darii argumentswork with 'per'
'
"
son' and substance.'
" Outs
3.4 " Ancient
3. 4. 1 The Fallacyof theAccident
Alonso also explains (*9.32) an "Ancient" solution, referringto
Aquinas,20 to save darii and ferio: thefallacyoftheaccident.Things, he
, perse, "in both the thing
says (*9.322), may be "the same" (1) wholly
and the notion," "according to the same definition," or (2) accidentally, "in the thing but of differentdefinitions." In the first the
ordinary case, what is attributedto one thing is attributedto the
,
other; his Aristotelianexample is "clothing" and "raiment" ( vestis
indumentum
).
Alonso applies what I will call the "notion principle" to distinguish
two cases of things accidentallythe same:
in thingsaccidentally
thesame,whenever
is attributed
to one not
something
to thenotionbywhichit is distinguished
fromtheother,itlikewise
according
appliesto theother.21
The principleholds, he says (1 14B), forthe followingargument,(DS1
and DS2 analyses displayed for comparison):
(d)[h] { d !hi v djh2} & {d2h! v d2h2} T (TF FT) ddhj v ddh2 T (TT)
T (TF)
T
f,d
[f][d] fjdj v fjd2
T (TFFT) {fa v {fa T (TF)
~[f|[h] fjh, v fjh2v f2hjv f2h2
therefore
(everydivineessenceis a substance/a fatheris a divineessence//
a fatheris a substance).
Here H applies to both D and F, since H applies to D but not in a
notion by which D differsfrom F.
20The Treatise
onFallacies
, ofdoubtful
authenticity
(*9.321).
21In Alonso'sstatements
oftheprinciple
of"it (is distin(9.322-3),theantecedent
guished)"is unclear.
240

23:20:51 PM

Alonso gives the followingdarii syllogismsas examples of fallacies

when the notion principleis violated (*9.323 = Al in *2.12 and A4;
analyses at right):
(d)[f]
[s][d]

djfj & d2fi

s2di v S2<2

]s][f]

s2fi

F (TF)
T (FT)
F

(f)[b]
[d][f]

fjb!
d,f, v d2f
djb, v d2b

T
T (TF)
F (FF)

~[d][b]

ddfj T
S2d<j T

ddf,

d^

F.

The firstpremise of the formerargument,(d)[f), is false in DSl (even

though orthodoxyfeels it to be true), so darii is saved. But the first
argument in DS2 and the second argument in both divine schmas
have truepremisesand a falseconclusion; thereforedarii and ident are
invalid.
What is wrong? Alonso says of the firstargument that F applies to
D in the notion by which D is distinguishedfrom S, so F need not
apply to S, and of the second that B applies to F as F is distinguished
fromD, so B need not apply to D. This misuse of the notion principle
he calls the fallacyof the accident: the mere fact that a middle term
(D) applies accidentallyto F and S, does not mean that F and S apply
to one another,and the factthat F applies accidentallyto D (F applies
fullyto B), does not mean B and D apply to each other.
He treats (*9.324, 9.324') ferio syllogisms(relevant identities in
both schmas added):
A3

A4

fi/s2
djfj

T
T

ddfj

~[d]/(f) d2/fi

dd/fj F

d ! /b! & d2/bi T

T
fid!
F
~[f]/(b) fj/bj

dd/b{ T
fjdd T

(f)/(s)
[d][f]
(d)/(b)
[f][d]

The factthat D applies accidentallyto F, says Alonso, and F does not

apply to S, does not mean that F and D do not apply to each other.
And the factthat F accidentallyapplies to D and D does not apply to
B, does not mean that B and F do not apply to each other.
This move is supposed to block inferenceto certain sentencescombining terms(fi-s2, dj-bi, dd-bi, etc.) withoutrulingout all combina241

23:20:51 PM

tions of thingsaccidentallythe same. For example, the second premise

of the valid darii argumentabove ("a fatheris a divine essence") and
that of the invalid A2 ("a divine essence is a father") yields the same
analysis (with conversion): djfj (d^fj), where the termsare the same
in the thingbut not in the notion. However, claims Alonso, H applies
to D but not in a notion where D differsfromF since D and F are both
substance, while B applies to F in a notion where D does differfrom
F since D and F are not both B.
3. 4. 2 Restricting
Identity
At the end of his treatmentof divine termsAlonso states (*10.1) a
logicatiproblem "without expositoryprocedure":22
fd T
T
_sd
fs F
(the fatheris the divine essence/the son is the divine essence//therefore the fatheris the son).
The inferenceis justified by substitutionin the ident principle (2.1
above). The premisesare true and the conclusion false; thereforeident
is invalid.
He uses Aquinas's distinctionto solve the puzzle: ident holds only
4
in the case of what is the same both 4 in thingand notion." So ident
does not apply to fs, since f and s are the same only "in thing," that
is, in d. All that follows,he says, is that "f is a thing [i.e., d] which
s is."
Aquinas says23that fd and sd are not proper expressions, since the
termsare identical in the thingonly. Alonso mentions(*6.1) this text
and explains that df and fd are true as identitiesbut not formally.So
ident does not apply to identities"in the thing only."
Substitution
3. 4. 3 Restricting
Alonso uses (*5.) a point made by Aristotle,cited by Aquinas, to
answer the subst paradox.24 Action and passion, explains the Saint,
22I treatthemhereas propernames(definite
descriptions).
23 1:39:5:adl; cf. l:28:3:adl.
24I:28:3:adl, referring
to Physics
202B13.
242

23:20:51 PM

are the same thingbut have differentnotions inasmuch as they connote differentrelations (action: source of motion; passion: its
otherness).If we use Aristode's examples of teaching and learning we
have the followingfallacy (with symbols for the nonce):
this teaching in Quijote is done by Dulcinea
this teaching is the same as this learning

tq[d] T
tqlq T
lq[d] F

this learning is done by Dulcinea

For Aquinas, F and S (' 'fatherhood'' and "sonship") are the same as
D 4'in the thing'' but have differentnotions. The fallacy Alonso
discusses (All) seems to be parallel (2.4 above):
fl[b]
fidi

T
T

fj[b]
fjdd

T
T

dj[b]

dd[b]

subst

Alonso denies the general applicability of subst. It does not apply

here because, he claims, although the fatheris the same thingas the
divine essence, theydifferin the notion B: the factsthat fj "refers to
something," [b], and that fj is the same as dj (or d) do not imply
that d' (dd) "refers to something," [b].
The friar gives (*5.) a psychological explanation of why the
substitutiondoes not go through:althoughD and B are the same thing
in God (and teachingand learning are the same thingin the student),
"the mind does not accept' ' them as the same. Nor does the mind,
he says (*6.1) associate f and d in a sentence like fd.
4. The Logic of God Today; A Comparison
Over 400 years after Alonso' s Recognitio
, A. Martinich made a
remarkably similar approach to the logic of God.25 A dialogue
between them could go like this.
Martinich
I, too, Friar Alonso, see problems arising for certain logical rules
when we speak about God. For example, true premises seem to entail
heresies such as Arianism
, "the son is not God" (please allow me to
25Identity
andTrinity
, in: TheJournalofReligion,58/2,(1978),169-81,and God
,
andRelative
, in: Franciscan
Studies,39, (1979),180-91.
Identity
Emperor
243

23:20:51 PM

use my own 20th-cent.symbolism:Gs), Sabellianism

, "the fatheris the
father
son" (f = s), and Patripassianism
on the cross for
suffered
("the
our sins" (Cf). Also, a set of orthodox propositions appears to be
inconsistent,since a contradictioncan be derived fromthem.
FriarAlonso
Tell me, Professor Martinich, what logical rules do you see
threatened?
Martinich
Basically, two identityrules: transitivityof identity(transid) and
called by a philosopherafteryour time by the name of
substitutivity,
Leibniz the "indiscernibilityof identicals" ("indisc"). They remind
me of your notions of ident and subst.
FriarAlonso
And what is this seemingly inconsistentset of orthodox propositions? By the way, you rememberthat I also spoke of an apparently
inconsistentset of orthodox propositions.
Martinich
From these four propositionsa contradictionis derivable:
1) "there is only one God," Ex{Gx & Uy{Gy > y = x}}
2) "the fatheris God," Gf
3) "the son is God," Gs
4) "the fatheris not the son," f^s,
since the fourthis contradicted by "the fatheris the son," (f = s),
which I can derive fromthe firstthree(thus establishingthe Sabellian
heresy, of course). Transid allows the crucial step in the derivation:
1 f= a
2 a=s
3 If = s

1,2 transid.

My out is simply to replace absolute identityby relative identity,

worked out by a logician of my day, P. Geach, and permit a corre244

23:20:51 PM

sponding transitivityrule ("transrelid"). So I rewritethe argument

like this ( = g means identical as God and = p identical as person):
1 f=g a
2 _a=G s
3 f
s

1,2 transrelid.

That is, if the fatheris the same God as somethingwhich is the same
God as the son, then the fatheris the same God as the son. Then I
rewriteproposition4 above as f^> s, the fatheris not the same person
as the son. Now, you see, this new proposition4 does not contradict
step three about the father'sbeing the same God as the son. And at
the same time, Sabellius's conclusion f= s is blocked.

FriarAlonso
Good, Professor;your relativeidentityactually sounds familiar. In
this situation I would use my distinctionbetween thingswholly and
accidentallythe same. Of the arguments26
fd
ds
fs

hd
ds
ident

sh

ident,

the one on the leftis parallel to your firstinference.It is invalid but

the one on the right is valid. This is so (*10.2), because s is only
accidentlythe same as f: they differin notion even though they are
both the same as the thirdthing d.
This move would block the left-handargument, but not the other.
As I mentioned (3.42), all we can conclude is that 4'the fatheris a
thing [the divine essence] which the son is." This is prettyclose to
your "the fatheris the same God as the son."
By the way, Professor,although I admit a version of what you call
relative identity,I see no need to abolish absolute identityentirely,
since it would presumablycontinue to apply to thingswhollythe same.
Now tell me how you deal with Arius.

26Al2 ( = an analysis,
withproper
ofthevalidargunames,ofAl) andan analysis
mentabove(d)[h],[f][d] [f][h],withpropernames,conversion
ofthepremises,
father
forson.
and substituting
245

23:20:51 PM

Martinich
Arius used propositions1, 2 and 4 fromthe list above to deduce the
negation of the third;thatis, he claimed thatthe son is not God (-Gs).
The decisive part of the proof follows by Leibniz's indisc:
1
2

f=s
f= a

a^s

1,2 indisc.

But with my relative identitywe must rewriteit like this:

s
1
2 J=ca
3 atp s

1,2 indisc.

So Arius is thwarted,because now he cannot use thislast proposition

to complete his proof that the son is not God.
FriarAlonso
I would think of Arius's inference as this negative version of
*10.1:
f/s
fd
d/s.
To block the conclusion, I could use the notion principleI spoke of in
the context of ferio arguments (*9.324; see 3.41): the fact that D
applies accidentlyto F and F does not apply to S does not implythat
D does not apply to S. In other words, just because the fatheris the
divine essence withoutbeing the son, it does not followthatthe essence
is not the son. Then again, I mightrestatethe principlein *5 fornegation: the assumptions that f does not referto s and that f is the same
as d does not entail that d does not referto s. In eithercase, Arius's
argument does not succeed.
Martinich
But you and I still have a problem, Friar Alonso. I derived "the
father is the same God as the son" (f =g s) by transrelidand you
admitted "f is a thing [i.e., d] which s is." Now, if we introducethe
246

23:20:51 PM

obviously true statements=p s, "the son is the same person as the

son," we get the Sabellian heresyback: the fatheris the same person
as the son:
1 f=G s
2 s =p s
3 If =p s

1,2 indisc.

Actually, we have the same problem with Patripassianism, if to the

firstthreepropositionson our list we add that the son sufferedon the
cross (Cs). The relevant inferenceis
1 Cs
2
Gf
3 Cf

1,2 indisc.

And notice thatthe logical formhere is similar to your All argument

about the fatherbegettingthe son.
Even restrictingindisc by means of semantic postulates doesn't
block the inferenceto f=p s. So I chose the only alternative:dumping
Leibniz's indiscernibilityof identicals.
Now, don't get the idea, Friar Alonso, that this move is ad hoc, just
to reconcile dogma and logic. In my articles I mentioned how recent
philosophersdiscuss identityproblems involvingevening and morning
stars and suchlike, and showed that Tertullian, even Leibniz and
Aristotlethemselves,had questions about principles like indisc.
FriarAlonso
Well, I'm not being ad hoc, either. I cited Aristotleon action and
passion and said I could give other examples- I was thinking of
teaching and learning and also of the road from Athens to Thebes
being the same as the one fromThebes to Athens.
And I, too, suggested a semantic rule, the notion principle. The
Sabellian inferenceis blocked because s applies to s (to itself)in the
notion of being the same person as s, but in this notion s differsfrom
f. And the Patripassian argumentis blocked because sufferingapplies
to s in the notion of personhood (not that of the divine essence), but
in this notion, too, s differsfrom f.
Whatever may be said about our solutions, Professor,one thingat
least seems clear, and I assume you would agree. You with your sym247

23:20:51 PM

bolic logic and I with my scholastic logic are thinkingabout the

Trinity along the same lines- and forboth of us the logic of identity
lies at the heart of the problem.
Austin,Texas
Arguments
AppendixA: List ofProblematic
Dariisyllogisms
Al
*2.12
T
(d)[f
T
*9.323
[s][d]
F darii
[s][f]
a sonis a divineessence//
therefore
a son
(everydivineessenceis a father/
is a father)
T
*9.323'
A2
(f)[b)
T
jd][f]
F darii
[d][b]
a divineessenceis a father//
a divineessence
therefore
begets/
(everyfather
begets)
Feriosyllogisms
A3
T
*9.324
(f)/(s)
T
jd][f]
f[d]/(s) F ferio
therefore
a divineessence
is anyson/a divineessenceis a father//
(nofather
is notanyson)
A4
*9.324' (d)/(b) T
t
mi
|~[f]/(b) F ferio
does
a father
isa divineessence//
therefore
a father
(nodivineessencebegets/
notbeget)
Affirmative
expository
(expos)syllogisms
A5
T
*2.13
dx[f
_dx[s] T
F expos
[s][f]
is tobe replaced
wherethex ineachpremise
by1 or2; hencewehavetwo
forms:
T
A6
*2.13a
dj[f]
T
di[s]
F expos
[s][f]
A6a
T
*2.13b
d2[f
T
_d2[s]
F expos
[s][f]
this[indicating
thefather
orson]divineessenceis a father/
(this[indicating
thesame]is a son//
therefore
a sonis a father)
T
A7
*0.1
d[f
T
_d[s]
F expos
[s][f]
248

23:20:51 PM

thedivineessenceis a son//
a son
therefore
(thedivineessenceis a father/
is a father)
A8
T
*4.21
[d]f
T
Jib]
F expos
[d][b]
thefather
therefore
a divineessence
(a divineessenceis thefather/
begets//
begets)
Negative
expository
(expos)syllogisms
A9
*2.11 . d2/(f) T
_d2[d] T
[d]/(f) F expos
theson]divineessenceis a father/
this[indicating
theson]
(this[indicating
divineessenceis a divineessence//
a divineessenceis nota father)
therefore
AIO
*9.1
T
s/(f)
T
_s[d]
[d]/(f) F expos
theson is a divineessence//
therefore
a divine
(thesonis notanyfather/
essenceis notanyfather)
"Substitution"
(subst)argument
All
*5.
T
fb]
T
_fd
F
d[b]
I
thefather
isthesameas theessence//
therefore
theessence
(thefather
begets/
begets)
"Identity"
(ident)argument
A12
fd
*10.1
T
sd
T
fs
F ident
is thedivineessence/
thesonis thedivineessence//
therefore
the
(thefather
is theson)
father

AppendixB: Translation:Alonsoon theLogic of God

" De modo
" ch.
I havetranslated
interminis
divinis
syllogizondi
' ' 12,pp. 112A-115A,
and
the
end
of
the
io"
(Salamanca1573)
previous
chapter
(ch.11) Desyllogismo
expositor
theRecognitio
Summularum
(0. below)from
, byFriarAlonso,plusa passage(32A7from
histreatise
on supposition
(6.0).
Wordsin theSalamancabutnotMexicanedition
areenclosed
(1554,59rB-61rA)
in braces"{
wordsin theMexicaneditiononlyare enclosedin slashes"//."
Translator's
additions
and originalLatinwordsarc enclosedin brackets"[ ]."
is incorporated
intothetext.Technicaltranslations:
"referto"
Marginalmaterial
and "reference"forsupponete
"indicatesreference
to" for
pro and supposition
and "universal/particular
demonstrare^
"quantified
universally/particularly"
quantification"for distribui
and distributio,
univer
/particular
salizatio
izatio' "instantiation/instantiate"
forsingularizatio.
0 [Introduction
(11IB)]
249

23:20:51 PM

ON THE EXPOSITORY SYLLOGISM

thelogicoftheexpository
0.1 The syllogism]
...[112A] Objection[against
syllogism
thedivineessenceis a father
/and/
a sonis thedivineessence
therefore
a sonis a father
does not followaccordingto expository
rules,becauseits antecedent
[thetwo
is trueand itsconsequent
is
sincethefather
heretical,
premisses]
[theconclusion]
otherthantheson.
[0.2] Solution
Weshouldtakethisopportunity
tomakea fewpoints
/that
is/onthewayofarguing
withdivineterms.
Andwhiletheologicans,
notlogicians,
discusstheir
divine
content,
itis up tothelogician
howterms,
todescribe
evendivineterms,
areused.So
things,
itwillbe worth
inCatholicfashion
ourwhiletoraisea fewpoints,
andwithreserve,
forthosewhobynotknowing
makethemistake
themmight
ofthinking
thatAristotle'ssyllogistic
rulesdo notholdin thecase ofdivineterms.
CHAPTER TWELVE
THE WAY OF ARGUINGWITH DIVINE TERMS
[1.] The question
Let us proceedwithorderandstateourquestion:
canthelawsofopposition
andalllogicalinference
holdindivine
principles
termsas theydo in,shallwe say,"profane"terms?
[2. Opinions]
2.1: Firstopinion[:logicdoesnotapplyto talkaboutGod]
It doesseemthattherulesdo nothold,forthefollowing
reasons.
First
argument
[2.11]
the[sentences]
to theruleswe havebeenpresenting,
According
everydivineessenceis a father
some[112B]divineessenceis notanyfather
are contradictory,
and /yettheyareboth/true.This is clearlyso. The affirmative
is obviously
sentence
to
true,andthenegative
also,sinceitfollows
validly
according
rules(where44thisdivineessence"indicates
reference
to theson)in
expository
thisdivineessenceis notanyfather
thisdivineessenceis somedivineessence
therefore
somedivineessenceis notanyfather.
[2.12]Secondargument
The [argument]
everydivineessenceis a father
a son is a divineessence
therefore
a son is a father
is notvalidin darii[since]theantecedent
is trueand theconsequent
/is/false.
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[2.13]Thirdargument
44
The [argument]
to thesame
reference
(where thisdivineessence"indicates
essence)
thisdivineessenceis a father
this[divineessence]is a son
therefore
a sonis a father
to expository
shouldbe validaccording
rules,butit is not.
The
contrary
opinion[:logicappliesto talkaboutGod]
[2.2]
The opposite
is thetruth.
[2.21]Argument:
thetrueagreeswiththetrue
Allsyllogistic
are trueandbasedon truth
principles
taughtbyAristotle
whatis offaithis notonlytruebut{infallibly
itself/
[so]} /truth
therefore
theywillstandtogether.27
fromtradition]
[2.22Argument
all Catholictheologians
And/thus/
thatlogicholdstrueevenin divine
profess
terms.
To answerour question[1.] and solveall relatedproblems,
we mustnotethe
following.
[3.] Note[1: theModernsolution]
quantification
[3.1] Twofold
are
twotypesofuniversal
There
andparticular
ofdivineterms:
quantification
[3.10]
andincomplete.
complete
quantification]
[3.11Complete
Whencomplete,
thetermstandsforitsimmediate
and mediatesignificate.
For
example,the[expression]
everydivineessence,
is a complete
universal
whentakenbothforitsimmediate
quantification
significate,
theessence,
andforthedivinepersons,
whicharethesameas theessence.And/thus/
a divineessence
is a complete
whentakenforbothessenceandperson.The
particular
quantification
Ancients
calledthis"in theterm,outsidethetermandoutsidethenumber."
[3.12Incomplete
quantification]
universalquantification
Now, incomplete
quantifies
only forthe immediate
only.
significate
thatan essential
namemaybe quantified
andparticuTheysay/thus/
universally
thecomplete
or theincomplete
sense.
larlyin either
ofthearguments
[3.2] Solution
[2.11]
Their
solution
tothearguments28
wouldbe/thus/.
The claimshouldbedenied
[3.20]
27"Therefore,
sincewhatis offaith...."
28The modern
solution
is appliedonlyto thefirst
argument.
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23:20:51 PM

that
and

everydivineessenceis a father

somedivineessenceis notanyfather,
arecontradictory
yetbothtrue.
[3.21Complete
sense]
Forif"essence"is takenin thecomplete
senseinboth,theaffirmative
[sentence]
is false,becausethesenseis
everythingwhichis a divineessenceis a father,
the
which
isa divineessence")isnotanyfather)},29
{because son(whois "something
and thenegative
is true.
[sentence]
[3.22Incomplete
sense]
On thecontrary,
if"essence"is takenin theincomplete
sensein bothsentences,
but/thistime/
thenegative
theyarecontradictory,
[sentence]
somedivineessenceis notanyfather
is false,while
everydivineessenceis a father
is true,sincein thiscase it is notallowedto indicatereference
to thefather.
oftheModernposition
of3.]
[4.] Note2: [critique
leadsto misunderstanding]
[4.1 Generalcriticism:
AsSt.Augustine
wellsaid{De Trinitate
/allowed/
thatwespeak
, bk.3), {itisfitting}
witha certainrule,themoreso lestourwordsgiveheretics
occasionto stray.We
dislikethiscomplete/incomplete
universal
ofan
[113A]andparticular
quantification
essential
withtheviewoftheAncients.
term,becauseitisoutofkeeping
The reason
is thatthefiction
of"essence"beingquantified
andparticularly
forthe
universally
leadsthemtogrant,
their{view}/opinion/,
whatCatholic
faith
persons
has
following
deniedand theuniversal
churchhas condemned.
Hencealthough
a Catholicwill
retaintheCatholicsenseofthewords,theirinjudicious
expression
givesoccasionfor
error.
[4.2 Particular
arguments]
[4.21]Joachim
LestI seemto talkgratuitously,
I shallargueforthisclaim.The sentence
an essencebegets
wascondemned
AbbotJoachim.30
YettheModerns
affirm
ittobetrueinone
against
sense/that
is/:when"essence"standsforthe{middle}/mediate/
thatis,
significate,
fortheperson.Because/then/
an essenceis thefather
and thefather
begets
therefore
an essencebegets,
29The Mexicaneditionhastheredundant
"and it is false."
30Cf.Aquinas,1:39:5;
reference:
"Extra,de Summa.Trini,etsi. cathoc.
marginal
Firmetur."
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23:20:51 PM

where"essence"
sothewhole[conclusion]
istrue,sinceoneofitssingular
[disjuncts],
theson
is indicated
is true.Foralthough
it[also]signifies
torefer
onlytothefather,
ofthe
sentence
suffices
ofone singular
and theholyghost,thetruth
[forthetruth
disjunction].
wasthat
it without
condemned
thereasonwhythechurch
distinction,
However,
oneought
[theword]standsonlyfortheessenceandhasonlyonesense.Therefore
butsoberly"(Rm 12[:3]).
thanoneoughtto think,
"notto thinkmorehighly
be
the
The
not
father
would
[4.22
Godhead]31
forces
It alsotellsagainsttheModernsthattheircomplete/incomplete
distinction
themtograntthesetwosentences:
somedivineessenceis a father
and
somedivineessenceis notanyfather;
inhisfaith
would
oronewavering
he
is
a
yet
singlethingmostsimple.Fora heretic
a division
toheara Catholic
sincehewillconceive
bescandalized
admitting
[...them],
admit
andutterly
indivisible
inthatmostsimple
Theymustlikewise
mistakenly
thing.
a divineessenceis different
froma father
/wherein/
theytake"essence"fortheson).
(whereby
wouldbe theson]
[4.23The father
themto grant
As ifthiswerenotenough,theirposition
forces
is a son,
a father
sense/thatis/forthe
becauseit is truewhenthetermsare takenin thecomplete
essenceis theson'sessence.Butin theCreedthechurch
essence,sincethefather's
is otherthantheson.And
is nottheson,becausethefather
confesses
thatthefather
andI areone,"buthedidnotsay
intheGospel(Lk 10[:30])Christsaid"thefather
"I am thefather,"
etc.
would
notbe himself]
The
father
[4.24
ButtheseModernsmustconcedestillmore:
a father
is notanyfather,
intheincomplete
is indicated
terms
the
sense,because(where"non-father"
bytaking
to refer
to theessence)
a father
is thisnon-father
therefore
a father
is notanyfather,
whenthesonis indicated.
of"father"yieldsone true[sentence],
sincean analysis
identity]
[5.] Note3: Aristotle[:
to something,i.e.,
thatsometermrefers
Assuming
a refers
to something,
and that
b is thesameas a,
that
itdocsnotfollow
to.
b refers
to thethingthata refers
31In themargin
at 4.22 and 4.23: "note1" and ''note2."
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23:20:51 PM

For/thus/
Aristotle
(Physics
[113B]bk.3,tx. 19 [ch.3; 202B13]):actionandpassion
ofthe
are thesame[thing]butactionis notpassion,{as we said whenspeaking
categories}.
thisnow,"essence"in
/So/applying
a divineessencebegets
whichtheessence
andeventhough
thefather
is thesamething
refers
totheessence,
doesnotacceptit/thus/,
thatactionandpas[is],theunderstanding
justas, granting
sionare thesamething,theunderstanding
doesnottakethemforthesamething.
Hencealthough
thefather
begets
and
thefather
is thesameas theessence,
are true,
theessencebegets
is notgranted;
likewise
thesonis begotten
and
he is thesameas theessence,
but the understanding
does not understand
it as if theessencewerebegotten.
also/be givenin otherareas.32
Examplescould/thus
[6.] Note4: Aquinas[:thewayofsignifying]
[6.0 Relativeandabsolutepredicates33]
lackreference,
it shouldbe
{In regardto theclaimthattermsoutsidesentences
notedthatsomeThomists
holdthecontrary
anduseSt. Thomas'swordsinsupport
1:39:4& ad 3): thename"God," as also "man," can refer
to a person
{[Summa,
owingto theirwayofsignifying.
Weshouldnevertheless
retain
theclaim,anditisoftheholydoctor's
mindnotwiththequotedpassage,sincehe therestatesthat["God"] refers
totheNature
standing
whenit forms
like
partofa sentence
God creates,
and to a personin
God begets,
God spirates,
etc.Andwhenhesaysthat"God" refers
totheNatureandnottoa person,
byitself
totheNaturebyvirtue
ofitself,
"byitself'meansthat["God"] refers
independently
ofanyrelation
toan absolutepredicate,
as in
God creates
and
God is good.
But["God"] doesnotrefer
toa person
unlessitisdetermined
bya relative
predicate
as in
32Aristotle
mentions
and learning
and theAthensroadto and
(202B6ff)
teaching
fromThebes.
33Thispassage(6.0), lacking
inMexicanedition,
is from
Alonso'stracton supposition(32A).
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23:20:51 PM

God begets,
God is a father,
toa personnotbyvirtueofitself
butowingtoa relation
etc.,where"God" refers
to sucha predicate.
Thisis hardforbeginners,
butitwillbecomeclearwithtime.}
andformal
[6.1 Identity
predication]
It shouldbe noted,as theholydoctorsays([Summa],
1:39:5[:ad4]),{that}"God"
because
and"Godhead"or "essence"formally
thesameessence.However,
signify
"God" signifies
thedivinenaturein theconcrete,
it has fromitswayofsignifying
thatitonlystands
forandrefers
toa person.But"Godhead"and"essence,"because
in theabstract,
theirwayofsignifying,
that
do nothavefrom
theybespeaktheform
toa person.Nowif"essence"doeshappentobe predicated
ofa person,
theyrefer
itis predicated
as an identity
ofthedivineperson,
sincethe
owingto thesimplicity
of"essence"andthatof"person"arethesamething.Forin orderthat
significate
a termrefer
tosomething,
ofitthrough
an identity
itis notenoughthatitbeverified
And/thus/
alsorequired
is thatitbe so through
a formal
predication;
predication.
is theessence,oneshouldbe said
and thefather
giventhattheessenceis thefather
notformally,
oftheother,butas an identity,
doesnot
becausetheunderstanding
forthefather
fortheessence.
northefather
grasptheessence/thus/
[7.] Note5[: syntactic
adjustment]
[7.1 "One ofeach"]
Weshouldnoteaccording
tothetruth
thewaytheunderstanding
ofthematter
conceives[itsobjects]in speech.
[7.11"Essence"as subject
7.111withdiscrete
and personal
predicate
7.1111in affirmative
sentence]
Whenthename"essence"isplacedas thesubject
ofan affirmative
whose
sentence
otherterm[extremum
is a discrete
and personal
name,it is not
, herethepredicate]
validforoneofeach[nonvalet
unideomni
] evenifthesubjectshouldbe takenwith
a universal
Forthe[sentence]
quantifier.
everydivineessenceis a father
has onlytheforceof[tantum
valet
sicut
]
somedivineessenceis a father,
noris it equivalent
to
everythingwhichis a divineessenceis a father.
[7.1112in negative
sentence]
Butina negative
sentence
itagainhasthesenseofeach[redit
deomni],
sensum
even
a universal
without
Forexample,
quantifier.
an essenceis notanyfather
has onlytheforceof
no thingwhichis an essenceis anyfather.
with
non-discrete
personal
[7.112
predicate]
I saidwhentheothertermis "discrete
andpersonal"becauseifitis personal
but
notdiscrete
oressential,
thenitis equivalent
"to oneofeach" [aequivalet
unideomni],
because
255

23:20:51 PM

and

everyessenceis an essence

everyessenceis a person
havethesense"of each" 'Jacit
deomni].
sensum
A
as
[7.12 person subject
7.121in affirmative
sentence]
Now ifthediscrete
nameof a personis takenas thesubjectof an affirmative
it is alwaysequivalent
"to oneofeach" [aequi
valet
unideomni],
sentence,
as
a father
is an essence
has theforceof
everything[114A]whichis a father
and
a father
is a son
the
force
[has
of]
everythingwhichis a father
etc.
[7.122in negative
sentence]
Howeverif[thesentence
itis nevervalid"to oneofeach" [numquam
is] negative
valetunidi omni],
for
no father
is anyson
to
is notequivalent
no thingwhichis a father
is anyson
butto
somethingwhichis a father
is notanyson.
Alltheseequivalences
holdtruein virtueof[ex]the[Credal]articleon themost
holyTrinity.
[7.2 Corollaries]
[7.21]Corollary
1[: quantification
collapse]
Fromthisitfollows
thatinthecaseofan absolute
andabstract
essential
nameand
a discretepersonalname,universalquantification,
and
particular
quantification
instantiation
amountto thesamething.For
everydivineessenceis a father
and
a divineessenceis a father
are equivalent,
as are
is a son
everyfather
and
a father
is a son.
Thereasonisthatsinceneither
namerefers
totheother's
itcanbe universignificate,
and immediately:
/andso/
sallyquantified
onlyforits own formalsignificate
"essence"onlyfortheessenceand"father"onlyforthefather.
/Andso/"essence"
is a singulartermin referring,
it is predicated
of manyreallydistinct
although
{thatis}, ofthedivinepersons.Forthisreason"essence,"[when]instan[things],
tiated,is notan adequatemiddletermfortheexpository
syllogism.
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23:20:51 PM

ofcomplete/incomplete
distinction]
2[: suppression
[7.22]Corollary
all thisthatwe neednotdistinguish
andincomplete
from
It alsofollows
complete
or particular,
sentences
sincein affirmative
universal
anyuniversal
quantification,
and in
of "essence" is equivalentto a particular
quantification,
quantification
sentences
any particular
quantification
[equivalent
negative
[is] completely
to] a
is trueofdiscrete
namesofthepersons,
whiletheopposite
universal
quantification,
as I havejustargued.
: mainthesisrepeated]
[8.] Conclusion[
in replyto thequestionwe raised[1.], we answerthatthetrue
Consequently,
it [2.21].Thatis why
agreeswiththetrueinsuchwisethatitin no waycontradicts
andtheprinciples
ofthesyllogisms
notonly
thelawsofopposition
byAristotle
taught
in thisareabutapplyin thehighest
arenotcontradictory
degree.
forcontrary
position
(2.1)]
[9. Solutionto arguments
1 [2.11: restricted
to
the
argument
reference]
[9.1] Response
Wherefore
we grantthatthetwosentences
everydivineessenceis a father
somedivineessenceis notanyfather
butnotthatbotharetrue/then/
atthesametime,sincethenegative
arecontradictory
oneis false.Anditsproof
theson34is notanyfather
thesonis a divineessence
[therefore
somedivineessenceis notanyfather]
because"divineessence"refers
mustbejudgedinvalid,
onlytotheessenceandnot
Thisis why
to thepersons.
an essenceis notanyfather
is false.
2 [2.22:particular
quantification
[9.2] Responsetoargument
9.21 Invalidargument]
The replyshouldbe thattheinference
everydivineessenceis a father
a sonis a divineessence
therefore
a sonis a father
is notvalidin darii.The reasonis thatwe arc arguingfromseveralparticular
of the middleterm["divine
quantification
owingto the particular
[premisses]
essence,"for]thesentence
everydivineessenceis a father
hasonlytheforceof
a divineessenceis a father.
in
Andtheinference
is invalid,sincethemiddletermis notuniversally
quantified
Nordoesitholdinanyofthemodes,becausetheuniversal
either
quan[premise].
tification
it contains
is notequivalent
unideomni].
"to one ofeach" [nonaequiualet
34The original
thesoninstead
objection
(2.11)has"thisdivineessence"indicating
of"theson."
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23:20:51 PM

[9.22A validdariisyllogism]
doesholdaccording
to syllogistic
rules:
Howeverthefollowing
argument
a
is
divine
essense
person
every
a sonis a divineessence
therefore
a sonis a person,
"to one ofeach" [aequivalet
unideomni]
when[114B]
becauseit is thenequivalent
in relation
tothecommon
term"person"[used
"essence"is universally
quantified
as thepredicate].
to argument
3 [2.13]
[9.3] Responses
Current
insufficient
instantiation
response:
[9.31
9.311Semantic
of
ambiguity "essence"]
theclaimis madethatthesyllogism
In answerto thethird[argument],
doesnot
follownoris it expository,
becausethemiddletermis notsufficiently
instantiated.
For"essence"in theabstract
hassomething
ofa singular
name,sinceit is used
in a sentenceforand refers
to one singlething,and henceit is notpredicated
to a commontermin thatit is
On theotherhandit has a similarity
severally.
ofthreepersonsindividually
owingto theiridentity.
predicated
[9.312"One ofeach" notapplied]
- itispredicated
- granting
itis stillnot
ofthem,
Andbecause
thatitis instantiated
in a sense
a middletermforan expository
becauseit is notinstantiated
syllogism,
unideomni
to oneofeach[sensu
aequivalenti
equivalent
] sinceitcanneverbe ofeach
[essedeomni].
I grant,
theargument
butit
then,/that/
syllogism,
[2.13]lookslikean expository
is not so. It ratherarguesfromall particular
by virtueof theterm
[premises]
as we saidabove,it is invalid.
"essence,"and,/forthatreason/
[9.313"One ofeach" applied]
reference
to thesamepersonin
On theotherhand,ifwe weretosay(indicating
bothpremisses)
thisthingwhichis a divineessence(or thisperson)is a father
a sonis thisthingwhichis a divineessence
therefore
a sonis a father,
toexpository
rules.Ifyouindicate
tothe
itwouldfollow
reference
according
formally
theminorwouldbe false.
son,themajorwouldbe false,and ifto thefather
applicability
[9.32] Responseof the Ancients,St. Thomas: non[-general
of]
arethesameas a thirdare themselves
thesame"35
"whatever
[things]
thesame]
[9.321Wholly/accidentally
on
like St. Thomas(in one of his opuscula,the Treatise
Ancients,
however,
like
Fallacies
36)wouldsaythatarguments
everydivineessenceis a father
a sonis a divineessence
etc.[therefore
a sonis a father]
351:28:3:objl & adi.
36Of doubtful
authenticity.
258

23:20:51 PM

oftheaccident.
thefallacy
[arg.2 againstdarii,2.22]commit
Forsomethings
thesameinthemselves
arewholly
inboththing
[deperse],namely,
andnotion.
Thatis tosay,[they
tothesamedefinition,
are]thesamething
according
as "clothing"and "raiment."37
In thiscase whatever
is predicated
of one /is
oftheother.
predicated/
{predicates}
Thereareother
wherethedefinition
ofoneisnotthedefinition
oftheother;
things
at timestheyarethesamething,
inwhichcasetheyaresaidtobe thesame
although
Thisis howessenceand personare.
"accidently."
to thenotion"]
"Not
[9.322
according
whenever
Hencein these[things],
to the
appliesto onenotaccording
something
notion
itlikewise
from
theother,
bywhichitis distinguished
appliestotheother.So
this[argument]
follows:
essenceis a substance
[every]38
a father
is an essence
therefore
a father
is a substance.
to thenotion"]
[9.323"According
Butwhenitappliestooneaccording
to thenotionaccording
to whichitis distintheother,
from
itdoesnotfollow
thatitappliestotheother./And/
thus,since
guished
thename"father"
tothenotion
bywhichitisdistinappliestotheessenceaccording
doesnotfollow:
guishedfromtheson,[thisargument]
everyessenceis a father
a sonis an essence
therefore
a sonis a father.
Neither
does[thisargument]
becausebegetting
follow,
appliestothefather
according
to thenotion/bywhich/
fromessence:
{because}he [it]is distinguished
everyfather
begets
an essenceis a father
therefore
an essencebegets.
Thesefallacies
arecalled"of theaccident"/namely/
becausefrom
thefactthata
middletermaccidentally
so itis
or both,itfollows,
appliestoa subjector predicate
and son
claimed,thatthesubjectand predicate
applyone to another.For father
intheessencesinceitisoneabsolutely
inall
[115A]applytooneanother
[simpliciter]
threepersons.
[9.324Ferio]
oftheaccident
The fallacy
is also present
in negative
sentences:
analogously
no father
is anyson
a divineessenceis a father
therefore
37 Vestisi
to in 10.2) tunica!
indumentum'
indumentum-,
Aquinas(I:28:3:adl referred
Aristotle
himation.
(202B13)
loopion!
38With"every"supplied,
theargument
is darii;without
"every"andif"essence"
is takenas a definite
itis expository
a father
description,
("theessenceisa substance/
is theessence//
a father
therefore
is a substance").
259

23:20:51 PM

and

a divineessenceis notanyson

no essencebegets
a father
is an essence
therefore
a father
doesnotbeget,
ora predicate
becausefrom
theaffirmation
or[fact]
thata subject
accidentally
applies
so itis
to [cum]a middletermwhichis deniedto applyto theother,therefollows,
claimed,thedenialthatthesubjectandpredicate
applyone to another.
[10. A final]rebuttle
[10.1Argument:
identity]
of
Butsomebody
couldstillprovethetruth
thefather
is theson
/butlikethis/:
without
procedure
usingan expository
same
as a thirdare themselves
thesame
are
the
whatever
[things]
andthesonare thesameas theessence
thefather
therefore
thesame.
theywillalsobe themselves
reference./
/Andso whatweintended
evenwithout
andincomplete
follows
complete
of
Answer
restriction
of
St.
applicability]
[10.2]
Thomas[:
as theholydoctorteaches(Summa,
This argument
can be answered
/namely/
1:28:3[:adl]): themaxim"whatever
arethesameas a thirdarethemselves
[things]
thesame" is understood
to applywhenever
theyarethesamein thingandnotion,
as in
Peteris an animal
Peteris a humanbeing
therefore
a humanbeingis an animal.
Butwhen[things
arethesameonlyinthething
arethesameas a third
thing
which]
Allthatfollows
is
theirmutualidentity
doesnotfollow.
owingto [ex]theiridentity,
thatone[thing]
is something
whichtheotheris. Andin thissenseAristotle
,
(Physics
butactionisnotpassion.
bk.3)saysthatactionandpassionarethesameas a motion,
Eventhough
father
andsonarethesame{in}
So letus applythistotheobjection.
thatthefather
is theson,sincetheyare
itdoesnotfollow
/as/theessence,thething,
whichtheson
not[thesame]innotion.Allthatfollows
is thatthefather
is something
is.
[11. Envoi]
elsewhere:
bothin the[Posterior]
Butthesematters
aremoreaptlytreated
Analytics
and in theSentences
analyses}.39
(bk.l, tx.19){in ourtheological
39I do notthinkthistheological
workis extant.

260

23:20:51 PM

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Reviews
imlateinischen
WalterBerschin,
undEpochenstil
Mittelalter.
III Karolingische
Biographie
750-920n. Chr.,Stuttgart
(AntonHiersemann
Biographie
Verlag)1991.XII &
484S. ISBN 3 77729102(QuellenundUntersuchungen
zurlateinischen
PhiloBand 10).
logiedes Mittelalters,
WalterBerschins
der Biographie
im Mittelalter
Darstellung
(Band I, 1986; II,
1988:sieheVivarium
Band
25, 1987,79-80und27, 1989,83-84)istumeinendritten
vermehrt
welcher
derkarolingischen
in der
worden,
EpocheundihrenVorlufern
aetasBonijatiana
ist.Wiebeianderen
literarischen
zeichnet
sich
gewidmet
Gattungen
in derBiographie
derNeuanfang
ab, derdie lateinische
Sprach-und Literaturgeschichte
in derkarolingischen
Der dritte
Bandfhrt
bis zum
Epochekennzeichnet.
kulturellen
derNormannenzeit.
Tiefpunkt
In frheren
hatteBerschin
schongrundlegende
vorbereitende
Verffentlichungen
Arbeitgeleistet
undInsulafrdie Schriftstellerei
in SanktGallenund
(wieinEremus
in GriechischLateinisches
Mittelalter
u.a. frdieCharakterisierung
derUbersetzungstdes Hilduinus).
tigkeit
Der Zusammenhang
zwischen
denbishererschienenen
Bndenzeigtsichin der
hnlichen
des Stoffes
sowienamentlich
in denzahlreichen
RckverweiDarbietung
Parallelen
undaufdas Fortwirken
sen,die sichz.B. aufstilistische
biographischer
MotiveundTopoibeziehen.
Auchimdritten
Bandsinddieeinzelnen
Perioden
und
dieregionalen
klarherausgestellt
undcharakterisiert
worden
Entwicklungen
(u.a. die
- St. Wandrille
dauerhaften
literarischen
Traditionen
in Klstern
wie Fontenelle
undFuldasowiedieeventuellen
einesBiographen).
Absichten
Beidenmehrausfhrlichbeschriebenen
Vitae
werdenwichtige
im lateinischenText
Abschnitte
fters
mit
deutscher
wobeidieEigenheiten
undspeziellen
zitiert,
Ubersetzung
Zgederlatinitas,
dieja imMittelalter
vieleNiveauunterschiede
aufweist,
hervorgehoben
sachkundig
werden.
Hiersindbeispielweise
dieCharakterisierungen
derSprachederVitaCorbiniani(S. 88-89),desLateinsAlcuins
zwischen
deminsula(S. 133),derUnterschiede
renLateininEngland
undIrlandaufdereinenunddemmerowingischen
Lateinauf
deranderen
SeiteunddieBeschreibung
derRckkehr
zumgrammatischen
Standard
um800 zu erwhnen.
kannderVergleich
Besonders
interessant
verschiedener
FasVitaS. Gallimitdenenderkarolingischen
sungeneinerVitasein,wiedie Vetustissima
berarbeiter
WettiundWalahfrid.
Die ArtundWeise,wieBerschin
denumfangreichen
Stoff
hat,zeugtvon
bewltigt
Erudition
undeingehender
Kenntnis
derTexteundderSekundrliteratur.
grosser
EineklareGliederung
undausfhrliche
Indiceserleichtern
dieBenutzung
diesesin
Stilgeschriebenen
Hierfolgen
Handbuchs.
angenehmem
einigekleineBemerkungen.
stattPatrologia
S. 72179lesemanPatrologia
Graeca
GraecoLatina.FrAlcuinsGedicht
aufdie HeiligederKirchevonYork(S. 114)knnte
aufdie Doktorarbeit
vonFrau
M.L. vanPoll-vande Lisdonk(Alcuins
De sanctis
Euboricensis
Vers1-604.De
ecclesiae
bronnen
vaneenCarolingisch
werden.
Vielleicht
ver, Rotterdam
epos
1981)hingewiesen
dientvero
nontulit
... humni
inimicus
MotivErwhgeneris
(S. 233)als traditionelles
dass der "Astronomus",
der BiographLudwigsdes
nung.Man darfannehmen,
dieseWendung
aus derTradition
die mitderKirchengeschichte
Frommen,
kannte,
vonCsarea(10,8,2;inRufins
desEusebius
nontulit
invidia
infelix
Ubersetzung:
[ = invidus
diabolus
laetis
successibus
velilliuserga
crescere
; abstr.proconcr.]velnostrorum
pacem
nosstudia
durare
Teufelversucht
Gedeihen
zu zer; derneidische
inquassata
glckliches
undder VitaAntonii
des EvagriusvonAntiochien:
stren)
(c. 5 in derUbersetzung
inimicus
nominis
Christiani
tantas
inadulescente
diabolus,
impatienter
ferens
wrta/)anfangt.
261

23:21:01 PM

Vielleicht
mandochversusinddurchaus
treffsicher.
knnte
Die bersetzungen
in AlcuinsPrae/atio
devita
zwischen
chen,denbewussten
Gegensatz
gradiundcurrere
velversu
"in Prosaund
crrente
sanciiWillibrordi
; Berschin:
gradiente
prosa
(S. 119-120
da zustehen.
DieserGegensatz
scheint
vereinzelt
allerdings
Vers") wiederzugeben.
um den rhythmischen
bekanntlich
Zwaristcurrere
GangeinesVerseszu
gelufig,
kennzeichnen
(vgl.z.B. Horaz,Sat. 1,10,1;Ep. 21,13)aberdas giltnichtfrgradi,
hatkennzeichnen
Schritt
dessermo
wollen(etwa:
womitAlcuindeneinfachen
pedestris
Prosaundin rhythmisch
fliessendem
"in einhcrschreitender
Versma").
in derottonischen
vierteBand wirdder Biographie
Renaissance
Der folgende
sein.
gewidmet
Nijmegen

G.J.M.Bartelink

&money.
Thewindows
atChartres
wine
Cathedral
,
Bread,
ofthetrades
JaneWelchWilliams,
ofChicagoPress)1993263 pp. 155plates
Chicago/London
(The University
ISBN 0 226899136.
I enthusiastically
reviewed
Someyearsago(inVol.29of1989,152-4ofthis
Journal)
DieErzhling
dermittelalterlichen
, Mnchen
Wolfgang
Kemp'sSermo
corporeus.
Glasfenster
intherepresen1987.Thegreater
bookdealtwiththeinnovating
methods
partofthat
in stained-glass
in Franceat thebeginning
tationofnarratives
windows
ofthethirteenth
Itgaveilluminating
tous,modern
toreadthestories
viewers,
century.
insights
lead
toldagainsttheintricate
geometrical
gridsmadeupbythelinesofthesupporting
strips.
tothetraditional
tradeswindows
ideaoftheso-called
Kempadhered
beingdonated
artisans
andmerchants
andgiving
us someglimpses
ofthe
bytheguildsofdifferent
reallifeoftheworking
bya newbook
peopleatthetime.Thisviewisnowchallenged
onthestained-glass
windows
ofChartres
Cathedral
'The windows
byJ.W.Williams.
notreality'.The donorsof thewindowswerethe
projectecclesiastical
ideology,
canonsandthebishop.Theywerethepeoplein power,whodecidedwhatwasdone
inthecathedral
andwhatwasdepicted
inthewindows
andelsewhere.
Thisis indirect
toKemp'sview,whichtellsus thatthescenesdepicted
onwhat
depended
opposition
andtheclergy
viewbyKempandotherauthors
theguildswanted
allowed.Thelatter
as a romantic
is putasidebyWilliams
thataccumulated
in thepublic's
conception
mindthroughout
theagesaftertheinitialperiodofthethirteenth
century.
Williams
on Kemp'sideasofthenewstory
doesnotcomment
methods
that
telling
in thisbranchofartat thetimeandin so farsheis notquitefair
weredeveloping
himbythewayforhisinsufficient
towards
ofcontemKemp,reproaching
knowledge
has something
to say.Her ideason the
YetWilliams
documents.
important
porary
makestimulating
ofthetradesat Chartres
Cathedral
windows
as Kemp's
reading,
us withnewinsights
bookdoes. The bookprovides
on careful
based,apparently,
ofcontemporary
written
letme say it at once,her
sources,though,
investigation
aresometimes
somewhat
overstated.
arguments
on Theliterature
intotwointroductory
andThehistorical
Thebookisdivided
chapters
Bread
on thetradeswindows
circumstances
, threemainchapters
, Wineand
showing
Coinsfollowed
byan Epilogue.
Thefirst
thestateofthequesofthebooksonthesubject,
chapter
givesanoverview
tionofdatesandthelimited
setofcompositions
behindtherepresented
scenes.The
in thesensethatonlythoseideasof
is beingdealtwitha bitselectively
literature
inthisbook.Thissometimes
former
aregiventhataretobe attacked
results
authors
ina somewhat
as inthecaseofW. Kempreferred
biasedviewofformer
publications,
262
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

23:21:01 PM

conand merchants
shownthattheimagesofartisans
to above.It is convincingly
The implication
setoffigurai
variations
on a limited
stitute
posesandcompositions.
in my
ofreallifeis notconvincing
thatthescenesdo nottherefore
depictelements
ina formalized
way,notgivesome
Whywoulda scene,evenifrepresented
opinion.
and attributes?
ofreallife,e.g. in detailsofclothing
glimpses
wasa
ofthecathedral
makeclearthattherebuilding
The historical
circumstances
the
It
and
the
the
strain
on
the
however,
was,
canons,
bishop
townspeople.
great
ofagricultural
theexploitation
burdenthrough
canonswhotookthegreatest
producwhopaid
thepeasantsandtheserfs
tion.In theviewoftheauthoritwasultimately
orderedthe
forthecathedral
bytheirlabourin thewheatfields.The ecclesiastics
theircompetition
forpowerandtheirneed
thusexpressing
ofthewindows,
imagery
of the
in theoveralliconography
to increasetheirincome.The lackofcoherence
Cathedralis no obstaclefortheauthor;it is
windowsof Chartres
stained-glass
alliancesofcanonsand bishopsand notbythedifferent
bytheshifting
explained
wishesofthedifferent
guilds.
makeclearhowimportant
Thethreemainchapters
bread,wineandcoinswerein
Theactualplacewithin
intheperiodof1150-1250.
atChartres
situation
theeconomic
as wellas theinterrelatheseobjectsisexplained,
ofthewindows
thebuilding
showing
andtheseparatedomainswithin
andliturgical
thewindows
tionsbetween
practices
withtheliturgical
ofbreadare clearly
connected
The representations
thebuilding.
the
ofbreadon majorfeastdays.In reality,
andthedistributions
however,
offerings
between
ina contradiction
whichresulted
wereprescribed,
breadofferings
ideological
and harsh
as seenin thewindows
offreeofferings
in a liturgical
setting
premises
reality.
winecellarstothenorth
locatedneartheChapter's
ofwine,primarily
In theimages
on thepartof thechurch
of thenave,theinhibition
againstexcessivedrinking
wasplayeddownas muchas possible.Suchan attitude
authorities
explainswhyat
areshown.
Son no winecupsordrunkeness
oftheProdigal
in thewindow
Chartres
that
and socialprivilege
of economicenterprise
It is theideological
justification
ofthewinewindows.
underlie
thecontents
of
oftheexcellence
withdepictions
together
appearin windows
Moneychangers
wasruledbythebishop
business
The moneychanging
thebishop'sadministration.
counts.
of coinageby neighbouring
to securestablecoinageagainstdevaluation
In theimageso money
character.
tothebishop'sexcellent
Stablecoinagethusattests
comtowards
attitude
ofgoldand silvercoinsa progressive
andofferings
changers
from
farremoved
is expressed,
merceandmercantile
townspeoordinary
exchange
ple'slives.
as showninthewindows
triestoshowthatthebreadandwinetraders
The author
inornearthecathedral
thatworked
avous
weretheso-called
building,
, thosetraders
in townwouldnothave
oftheChapter.The traders
forandunderthesupervision
even
sometimes
ofthecathedral,
as theyopposedtheecclesiastics
beenrepresented
near
their
business
whether
ina violent
theyexecuted
changers,
way.Andthemoney
dominated
or in town,werecompletely
thecathedral
bytheclergy.
A lotofwhattheauthorhas tosaymakesinteresting
readingandexplainsquite
that
detailsand overallviews.It is a discussion
a lot ofotherwise
unexplainable
and whichmakesus awareofthecomplexrelations
to be takenseriously
deserves
whichis
thatalsoexistedin thirteenth-century
andreality
between
society,
ideology
mustindeedhaveplayeditsparteven
ideal.Powerstructure
seenas simply
so often
then.
on account
withtheauthor,
toagreecompletely
Yetonehesitates
mainly
perhaps
thebook.To say,inthediscussion
ofherarguments
oftheoverstatement
throughout
middle
ofthesculptural
ofbreadscenes,thatthewholeiconographie
porprogramme
belowtheBeau
talofthesouthtransept
pivotsonthelittlesceneofbreaddistribution
263

00:28:16 AM

is that
Moreimportant
Dieuon thetrumeau,
maybe takenas a minorexaggeration.
confronted
withthefactthatofthe43 (ofa totalof176)windows
thereaderremains
withtradesthereareonly5 whichshowbread,10wineandagain5 money
changers.
and whytenwithwineagainstthelesser
Whatabouttheother28 tradeswindows
It is quitewellpossiblethatChartres
ofbreadand moneywindows?
number
(and
in theearlythirteenth
as faras
was an exception
century
Bourgesto someextent)
are concerned
economicrelations
(as arguedby theauthor),but howdoes this
in othertowns(and theircathedrals
with
to thesituations
correspond
phenomenon
Cathedral
The innovating
windows
atChartres
areprobably
windows)?
stained-glass
Buttoconclude
elsewhere.
seenas havingsetthetonefortradeswindows
correctly
thattheguildsthemselves
thatitwasonlyjustafterChartres
tookovertheideaof
the
inthesenseofgaining
influence
insidea church
without
tradeswindows
building
oftheecclesiastics,
asksforfurther
argumentations.
ideological
supervision
notes
itremains
a stimulating
In spiteofsuchquestions
book,withveryextensive
influTherearea lotofnewideas,whichwillcertainly
anda veryfullbibliography.
totheintriguing
tradeswindows
encefuture
at Chartres
andelsewhere,
approaches
butforwhichespecially
is so famous.
Chartres
Nijmegen

HarryTummers

KlausJacobi,ed., Argumentations
theorie.
Scholastische
zu denlogischen
und
Forschungen
korrekten
York-Kln
semantischen
, Leiden-New
Regeln
Poigerns
(E.J. Brill)1993,
XXXI & 791pp. ISBN 9004098224
(StudienundTextezurGeistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters,
Band38).
Thisbookcontains
on
contributions
totheEighth
thirty-five
European
Symposium
MedievalLogicand Semantics,
heldin 1988at Freiburg
in Germany.
As thetitle
thecentral
themeoftheconference
wasthetheory
inso
ofargumentation
indicates,
faras itmanifests
itself
inscholastic
ofthelogicalandsemantical
rules
investigations
ofcorrect
inference.
In treating
someaspectofthissubject-matter
contributors
were
tokeepin mindmodern
andtohighlight
those
systematic
encouraged
developments
and attempts
at solvingthemwhichare apt to showa certainaffinity
problems
between
medieval
efforts
and research
in ourtimes.As a consequence,
thevolume
isa fineexample
ofan attractive
andfertile
thehistory
ofphilosowayofapproaching
textsmayprofit
them
phy.On theonehand,thestudyofmedieval
byscrutinizing
in thelightoftheresults
oftherevolutionary
oflogicaldisciplines
thathas
growth
takenplacein thelastcentury.
On theotherhand,thereis reasonto expectthat
medieval
viewswillsometimes
tomodern
provetobe a sourceoffruitful
inspiration
researchers.
As a matter
offact,bothsidesofthisinteraction
inmany
aretobe found
ofthearticles
assembled
here.The editorhas arranged
thepapers,twenty-five
in
andteninGerman,
insixsections,
eachsection
witha veryuseful
English
providing
bothinGermanandinEnglish.
thesepiecesoffer
a valuable
introduction,
Together,
ofthestateoftheartinthisparticular
fieldandan introductory
survey
guideforthose
whowanttobecomeacquainted
withworkthatischaracteristic
ofa majorpartofthe
ofmedieval
In ordertogivean impression
oftherichconhistoriography
philosophy.
tentsofthiscollection
I shallbriefly
mention
theissuesthataredealtwithineachof
thesixsections.
The first
tothekindofinference
section
is devoted
treated
thatwasfirst
ina more
orlesssystematic
inhis Topics.
It openswitha magisterial
account
waybyAristotle
ofthetheory
oflociinAntiquity
andtheMiddleAgesbyS. Ebbesen.Subsequently,
are discussedin connection
with
specialproblemsconcerning
topicalinference
Williamof Sherwood,
whoclaimedthatall topicalarguments
can be reducedto
264
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:28:16 AM

ofSaxony(C. Kann),whiletheplaceofthe
syllogisms
(H. Brands),andwithAlbert
withthehelpof theso-called
is determined
studyof theTopicsin thecurriculum
a kindof 'Consumer'sGuide' forthirteenth-century
BarcelonaCompendium,
onthenotorious
Thesecondsection
concentrates
ofphilosophy
students
(C. Lafleur).
a falsehood
from
follows
thatanything
andstrict
ofmaterial
implication:
paradoxes
weredivided
andschools
Medievalauthors
follows
from
andthata truth
anypremiss.
anda negative
a positive
wasoften
as a choicebetween
onthisissue,which
presented
from
Iwakuma
Y. showsthatthere
aretexts
eximpossibili
attitude
tothethesis
quidlibet.
hemustconfess
inwhich
thisproblem
isalready
thetwelfth
debated,
although
century
of twelfth-century
that,givenourlimitedknowledge
logic,severalplacesstillare
tolaterphasesofthedebate,
drawattention
hisunderstanding.
Otherarticles
beyond
indisputes
conducted
in theschoolofthenominales
bythirteenth(W.J.Courtenay),
inBuridan
(A. d'Ors),andinOckham(F. Schupp,M.
century
logicians
(J.Spruyt),
to builda bridgebetweenmedievalconFinally,St. Read attempts
Kaufmann).
over
andcertainideasthathavebeendeveloped
siderations
concerning
implication
theemphasis
thatitlays
oflogicwhichis namedafter
thelastdecadesinthatversion
in thethird
Two ofthepapersthatarebrought
on thenotionofrelevance.
together
In ourcencalledInsolubilia.
thatwereposedinthetreatises
focusonquestions
section
havebeenhandledbydrawsomekindofself-reference
thatinvolve
turyantinomies
A meticulous
between
reading
objectlanguageand metalanguage.
inga distinction
ofsomerepresentative
medieval
textsshowsthatthisis oneofthecaseswhereinterin our daysmusthave
shouldbe waryof assumingthattoolsfavoured
preters
as well(R. vanderLecq).Whatthey
ofmedieval
totheequipment
logicians
belonged
as theLiarparadoxisillustrated
hadtosayaboutsuchinsoluble
actually
propositions
onJohnBuridan,
whoinnolessthanfivepassagestriedhishand
inthesecondarticle,
withwhat
at them(F. Pironet).
in thethird
section
The otherarticles
areconcerned
ofmedieval
istheobjectofoneofthemorerecent
branches
ofthestudy
logic:writings
. Thesetracts
towhicha responcalledDe obligationibus
laydowntherulesaccording
withthepurdentshouldreacttopropositions
submitted
bya questioner,
probably
witha viewadopted
therespondent's
to maintain
consistency
poseoftesting
ability
thecasusthat
atthebeginning
ofthedialectical
resembles
joust.Suchan initial
positum
insophismata
orpuzzling
formed
thesituational
orcontextual
basisforreasoning
proptexts
ositions.
M. Yrjnsuuri
somerelevant
fourteenth-century
analyses
Accordingly,
oftreatises
inordertoshedmorelightonthesenotions.
detailsoftheimport
Further,
De obligationibus
are givenwithrespectto Albertof Saxony(H.A.G. Braakhuis),
and RalphStrode
WillemBuserofHeusdenin theNetherlands
(C.H. Kneepkens),
in hefourth
of
The papersgathered
sectionshowa diversity
(E.J. Ashworth).
interest.
in whichthedoctrine
ofsupposition
First,thereis an article
playsa prominentrole,in connection
to reconstruct
a theoryof immediate
withan attempt
inferences
contained
in Buridan'sLogic(E. Karger).Another
papershowshowin
which
aregiveninAristotle's
spiteofthefactthatthelistandthenamesofthefallacies
elenchi
remainthesame throughout
theMiddleAges,thecontentand
Sophistici
ofaccident,
toa particular
suchas thefallacy
assigned
fallacy,
maydiffer
explanation
and medieval
considerably
(J.M. Gambra).Two keynotionsof theAristotelian
toAristotle,
ofapodictic
proofarethesubjectofthenextarticles.
theory
According
an apodictic
has to meetthreeconditions:
itsattribute
mustbe katapantos,
premiss
kathauto
thethirdcondition
on whichL.M. De Rijk
, and katholou.It is especially
thatmay perhapsprofitably
be
considerations
comments,
offering
interestingly
extended
to sucha passageaboutthesignijicatum
as occursin Paul of
adaequatum
Venice'sLogicamagna
, at theendofPartII, Treatise11 {De significato
propositions).
In connection
withthesameAristotelian
thelogicalpropoint
J. Van Rijendiscusses
in suchreduplicative
pertiesattributed
by medievalauthorsto the^aa-operator
on
sentences
as 'Socratesqua manis rational'.Alsoputin thissectionarechapters
265

00:28:25 AM

toeradicate
anattempt
thePorphyrian
tree(I. Angelelli),
onthelogical,metaphysical
and psychological
thatare involved
in ThomasAquinas'streatment
of
conceptions
theparalogism
'Socratesis a man;manis a species;therefore,
Socrates
is a species'
themodern
attitude
(G. Klima),andon thequestionifan approachthatresembles
ofordinary
to thestudyoflogicalinference
is discernible
in
languagephilosophers
medieval
Alfarabi
andAvicenna
intheArabworld(A. Bck).The
authors,
including
fifth
section
ofsomeessayson subjects
thatbelongtotheperiphery
of
consists,
first,
as thediscipline
ofstrictly
formal
deductive
One ofthose
logicconsidered
reasoning.
whichmedievalthinkers
of
subjectsis induction,
concerning
developeda variety
all of themrather
different
fromtheshapetheproblem
ofinduction
has
theories,
takenin modern
ofthefifteenth
philosophy
(E.P. Bos). Thatamongthescholastics
there
wasa growing
interest
indialectical
andrhetorical
forms
ofargumentacentury
tionis madeprobable
bytheprominent
placewhichtheseforms
occupiedinthecuroftheUniversity
ofCracow(M. Markowski).
riculum
The notionofenthymemc,
whichbelongs
bothtodialectic
andtorhetoric,
iselucidated
whoconbyR. Wrsch,
centrates
on thewayin whichtheAristotelian
waselaborated
concept
byAvicenna
and Averroes.
Thispartofthefifth
sectionis concluded
byan articleon medieval
withrespect
to actsofwilling:ifforinstance
from'I am
practical
logic,especially
stuckinthemudwith100guilders'
itfollows
thatI amstuckinthemud,doesitlikewisefollow
from'I wanttobe stuckin themudwith100guilders'
thatI wanttobe
stuckin themud?(S. Knuuttila).
The articles
in thesecondpartofthefifth
section
areonrulesfordemonstration
andrulesforanswering
inThomasAquinas
questions
whowereactiveat Parisduringthe
(C.F.J.Martin),on theviewsheldbylogicians
first
decadesofthesixteenth
abouttheroleofassentin inference
century
theory
(A.
answers
tothequestion
whether
suchrational
Broadie),andon late-medieval
operationsas drawinginferences
and syllogizing
to theintellect,
as
belongexclusively
opposedtothesenses(K.H. Tachau).The titlebymeansofwhichthepapersinthe
sixthand lastsectionare characterized
is 'Logicand Theology'.One ofthevexed
tothisareawasthequestion
ofhowGod'sforeknowledge
canbe
problems
belonging
harmonized
withhumanfreedom,
a questionwhichwas closelyconnected
with
Aristotle's
discussion
ofa future
sea-battle
inDe interpretation,
9. In hiscommentaries
on thelatterpassageBoethius
had introduced
thenotions
ofdefinite
and indefinite
truth.One ofthearticlesis concerned
withthewayin whichthisdistinction
was
tobe related
to thedistinction
between
andcontingent
truth
regarded
necessary
(F.
theargument
inAbelard'
s DialcBeets).Another
paper,byH. Weidemann,
analyses
ticawhereby
he triestosolvetheproblem
ofhowGod'sinfallible
is to
foreknowledge
be reconciled
withtheviewthatthereareseveralpossibilities
forthefuture
developmentoftheworld.Thiscontribution
is a striking
effectiveness
exampleoftheelegant
achievable
ofphilological
acumenandmastery
ofup todatelogical
bya combination
tools.The lasttwoarticles
in thesixthsectionand in thebookas a wholecontrast
thecommon
coreofthescholastic
viewsconcerning
as theyhavebeen
argumentation
elucidated
inthepreceding
deviant
attitudes.
pageswithsomemarkedly
J.A. Aertsen
difference
between
theconceptions
oftheprinciple
ofnonpointstothefundamental
contradiction
thatare setforth
byThomasAquinasand NicholasofCusa, whereas
Ch. Lohrtriestomakesenseofthestrange
thatRamonLullread
logicaldoctrines
intothetraditional
vocabulary.
Thisimpressive
collection
offruits
ofresearch
contributed
whomainbyspecialists
tainan invariably
to theenormous
madebythe
highqualitybothtestifies
progress
in thecourseof thetwentieth
and
studyof medievallogicand semantics
century
continuations.
Theattractively
bookendswith
pointsthewaytopromising
produced
ofcitedmanuscript
sourcesandsecondary
sources,
literature,
bibliographies
printed
and is also furnished
withhelpful
indexes.
Leiden
Gabriel Nuchelmans
266

00:28:25 AM

PeterofSpain(PetrusHispanusPortugalensis),
Firstcritical
edition
Syncategoreumata.
withan introduction
andindexesbyL.M. de Rijk;withan Englishtranslation
Leiden-New
York-Kln
byJokeSpruyt.
(E.J. Brill)1992619 pp. ISBN 90 04
094342 (StudienundTextezurGeistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters,
30).
Thispublication
marksan important
moment
inthehistory
ofmedieval
logic,for
itcompletes
thetask,begunbyL.M. de Rijkin 1972whenhe published
theTracofgivingthereaderaccessto all thelogicalwritings
ofPeterofSpainin a
tates,*
modern
critical
edition.
As intheearliercase,De Rijkhasgivenus a version
ofthe
textwhichis as closeas possibleto theoriginal,
rather
thantheone readbylate
medieval
andpost-medieval
It is important
tonotethis,as hitherto
theSynlogicians.
hasbeenfully
availableonlyin Mullally'stranslation
whichwasbased
categoreumata
ontwoincunabular
inmanywaysquitedifferent
from
theoriginal.
We are
editions,2
at lastina position
toassessthecontribution
ofoneofthemostpopularandinfluentialmedieval
evenifputting
thatcontribution
in itsfullhistorical
context
logicians,
is dependent
authors.
uponfurther
studyofotherthirteenth-century
To understand
thebackground
ofPeterofSpain'sSyncategoreumata
one mustconsiderthelogicalwritings
oftheperiod1175-1250.
Thesecan be seen,notjustas a
reaction
tothedoctrines
ofthenewlyrecovered
, particupartsofAristotle's
Organon
elenchis
tosuchsources
as Priscian's
Institu, butalsoas a reaction
larlytheDesophisticis
tiones
Grammaticae
and Boethius's
De topicis
Thereis a focuson natural
differentiis.
andtheproblems
itpresents
forargumentation,
onemustremember
language
though
thatthegeneralapproachto languagetendedto be formalistic
and rulegoverned.
unitswereregarded
fromthepointofviewofconventional
Linguistic
objectively,
rather
thanspeaker
andalthough
context
wastakenintoaccount,
itwasthe
meaning,
intra-sentential
context
described
in terms
oftheinterplay
between
different
typesof
and syncategorematic
termsrather
thanthepragmatic
context
subjects,
predicates,
ofan actualsituation
and theirrespective
intentions
or
hearers,
speakers,
involving
levelsofunderstanding.3
Thistypeofapproach
tolanguagegaveriseto twosortsof
bothrepresented
writing,
byPeterofSpain.On theonehand,therewerediscussions
oftheproperties
ofcategorematic
terms(signification,
in
supposition,
appellation)
whichthesemantic
and syntactic
of subjectand predicate
termswere
properties
on theotherhand,therewerediscussions
ofsyncategorematic
all
explored;
terms,
thoselogicalterms
thatgivesentences
theirprecisestructure
and sense.
Therearethree
distinct
concerned
withsyncategorematic
terms.
genresofwriting
Therearetreatises
on sophismata,
treatises
calledabstractiones,
alongwithassociated
in whichambiguous
or puzzlingsentences
wereconsidered,
and thedifficulties
resolved
terms.4
Therearetreatises
byappealtothelogicalrulesforsyncategorematic
on distinctiones,
in whichtheauthortypically
beganwitha logicalrulemakinga
distinction
aboutdifferent
usesofsyncategorematic
to
terms,and thenproceeded
showhowsophismata
couldbe resolved
andfallacious
avoidedthrough
the
arguments
useofthisdistinction.5
therearethetreatises
onsyncategoreumata
inwhichthe
Finally,
terms
werecarefully
classified
anddescribed
inordertothrow
syncategorematic
light
ontheir
roleininferences
andinthesolving
offallacies.
AswefindinPeterofSpain,
rulesweregiven,andsophismata
wereadducedto illustrate
thepointsbeingmade.
It is important
to notethecloserelations
between
thesethreegenres,
andalso to
notetheappearance
ofsimilarmaterial
bothin generaltreatments
oflogicand in
treatises
onconsequences
orinthelatergenres
oftreatises
onexponibilia
andtheproofs
ofterms,
forwehavein factveryfewtreatises
devotedto syncategoreumata
explicitly
availabletous. Thereisan anonymous
Monacensia
treatise,
, whichhas
Syncategoremata
beeneditedby Braakhuis6
and translated
and Stump.7Thereis a
by Kretzmann
treatise
editedbyO'Donnell8and translated
byWilliamofSherwood,
byNorman
Kretzmann.9
Thereare treatises
by RobertBacon,JeanLe Page,and Henryof
267
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:28:31 AM

ofwhichhavebeenpresented
and finally,
thereis a
Ghent,extracts
byBraakhuis;
andsomeextracts
from
treatise
byNicholasofParis,editedin fullbyBraakhuis,10
and Stump.11
In sucha situation,
whichhavebeentranslated
it is
by Kretzmann
tohaveanother
treatise
on syncategoreumata
madereadily
available.
doublyimportant
toassessPeterofSpain'steaching
onsyncategoreumata
ingeneral.
I shallnotattempt
ofhistextthatmight
tosomefeatures
be unexpected.
Instead,I shalldrawattention
has pointed
outin herearlierstudyofthefirst
twochapters
ofthe
AsJokeSpruyt
of the copulaand negationlead us into
,12the longdiscussions
Syncategoreumata
andtheology
bothcropup inchapter
Naturalphilosophy
6, on
ontological
questions.
*
timebeginsorceases,
and4desini
, wherePeterraisessuchissuesas whether
incipit'
Peterexplicitly
and howit is relatedto theFirstCause (p. 264). In thiscontext,
attacksthosewhoerr "not onlyagainstfaithbut also againstnaturalscience"
is notfoundin Mullally's
text,whichomitssections
(p. 267). Mostofthismaterial
6 (pp. 256-268);andI onlynoticed
oneortwoverybrieftheological
8-22ofchapter
ofself-reference
in NicholasofParis.13
Problems
andthefallacy
secundum
references
"
inthecontext
arediscussed
ofthesophisma
tlsinichil
est
est
, aliquid
quidetsimpliciter
one
note
that
as
Peter's
discussion
lacks
here, elsewhere,
(pp. 238-244),though may
thesophistication
ofsomelaterlogicians.Indeed,at timeshe is evenconfusing.
I was particularly
struck
oftheSyncategoreumata.
One was
bytwogeneralfeatures
inPeter'spresentation
useoftheTopics.Thisis particularly
noticeable
theconstant
oftheproofthatfromtheimpossible
follows
anything
(pp. 230-238),whichhasthe
form:ifP andnot-P,thenP; ifP, thenP or Q; ifP andnot-P,thennot-P;ifP or
Q and not-P,thenQ; hence(fromfirstto last)ifP and not-P,thenQ. In later
therulesappealedtowerepurely
butPeter
as is wellknown,
authors,
propositional,
usesonlyTopicalrules.Indeed,he alsorejectstheinferential
sequencebyappealto
(p. 236)thatthemove"ifP orQand not-P,thenQ" cannot
Topicalrules,arguing
oftheTopic"fromdivision"on thegrounds
thattheoriginal
countas an instance
P
bothpositsandannihilates
P, and so not-Pcannotbe usedto annihilate
premiss
notonlyfrom
thatfoundin Nicholasof
differs
here.Peter'sdiscussion
considerably
but also fromMullally'stext,whichomitstheinferential
Paris,14
sequencejust
reasonforrejecting
theparadox.Insteadofappealing
andgivesa different
examined,
thatin a validinference,
an antecetotopicalrelationships,
itrelieson theprincipie
thetruth
oftheconsequent".15
dent"cannotbe truewithout
including
thatstruck
mewastheamountofmaterial
thatrelates
The secondgeneralfeature
concerns.
in thefirst
For instance,
verycloselyto grammatical
chapter
(p. 46 ff.),
Priscian's
definition
ofthenounas signifying
substance
with
PeterofSpainconsiders
thateverynounisequivocal,
a question
andaskswhether
itimplies
already
quality,16
answered
in thenegative
PeterHelias.17Peter
by thetwelfth-century
grammarian
Helias also helpsto shedlighton Peterof Spain'sdiscussion
of therelationship
affects
andthemoodsoftheverb(pp. 60-62),though
between
thelinksaresomewhat
as "assertion".
PeterHelias
hiddeninEnglish
bythetranslation
(p. 61)of"indicatio"
tellsus thattheindicative
moodis foundin all tenses,
becauseitsignifies
indicatio
as
ofthesoul,(p. 491),andhealsotellsus thatindicatio
is alliedwithimperatio
an affect
,
in termsofa
, and dubitatio
optatio
(p. 449). In PeterofSpain,all thisis expressed
thesoulis characterized
, which
whereby
psychologico-causal
theory,
byan affectus
whichin turnproducestheindicatio
, or imperatio
, or optatio
,
producesan inclination
whichgivesus themoodoftheverb.Closelyrelated
tothismaterial
is thedistinction
and
and between
madebetween
and affects
concepts
signification
permodum
affectus
ofthedistinction
conbetween
permodum
conceptus
(p. 72,p. 310),andthediscussion
ceivedand exercised
acts(see pp. 104,164,340).18
I shallnowturntoconsider
oftheeditionitself.
features
The Latintextis lucidly
andhas beencarefully
and sections,
so thatit is
intochapters
presented
organized
madeas easyas possible
forthereadertofollow
Thereis a useful
Peter'sarguments.
268

00:28:31 AM

itis at theendofthebookrather
butunfortunately
thanat thebottom
apparatus,
ofthepage.Thismakesitimpossible
forthereadertoknowimmediately
whether
an
variantis signalled
and whether
thetextactually
number,
important
bya footnote
contains
oneofDe Rijk'sscattered
as thedeviceof
conjectural
especially
readings,
has notbeenusedforadditions.
Forinstance,
brackets
on p. 60, theword
pointed
'actuhasbeen
addedto 4tarnen
' buttheonlysignalinthetextis a footconjecturally
notenumber
on 'tarnen'.
someofhisconjectural
De Rijkmentions
on p. 28
readings
oftheintroduction,
and in at leastfourofthesecases(pp. 28, 134,254,and 376),
madesense.Why,forinstance,
itseemedtomethatthemanuscript
readings
change
" to " dictum
"
" dictum
" to "ars" in "ut
estquod
or " Aristoteles
vult
antiquum
(p.
48),
"
aristoteles
one must
(p. 376)? Even if theviewcitedis not foundin Aristotle,
themedieval
remember
to readAristotle
as sayingwhatpeoplewanted
propensity
himto say.
In theintroduction,
De Rijkgivesfulldetailsofthemanuscripts
heusedtoprepare
theedition
wearenotgivenanydetailsofthemanuscripts
that
(pp. 10-24)),though
werenotused,otherthanthecasualremark
(p.10) thatthereare "quitea lot" of
them.He alsogivesa fulldiscussion
oftheprinciples
he employed
(pp. 24-28).In
theintroduction
contains
twoshorttexts,
an introduction
totheartoflogic
addition,
intwoofthemanu(pp. 16-17),anda noteonconsequences
(p. 24),thatwerefound
On thefirst
is someverysparsematerial
scripts.
pageoftheintroduction
(p. 9), there
on PeterofSpain'slifeandworks,
and thereaderis referred
to theintroduction
to
theTractatus
in the
, without
anyattempt
havingbeenmadetoupdatethis,especially
criticisms
from
Gauthier
to do withthedatingofRobertus
lightofrecent
Anglicus
andGuillelmus
Arnaldi
on p. 11)andwiththethesisthatPeterprobably
(mentioned
wrotein thenorth
ofSpain(mentioned
on p. 26).19Therearethreeindexes(called
'indices'in the runningtitle,thoughnot elsewhere),
one of citations,
one of
and a subject-index.
The latteris useful,butshouldhavebeenmore
sophismata,
"
detailed.Forinstance,
thereare no entries
subiecti
for" constantia
(p. 210),or for
"inter
lectio"
for
we
find
' under"nunc"
(p. 310); logicalTopics
only"locus:passim"
we finda reference
to "terminus
utnunc
", whichis alsofoundunder"terminus"
, but
"
"
utnunc"and"consecutio
utnunc"arefound
under consequentia"
and
consequentia
only
" consecutio"
.
The mostgrievouslack on theeditorialside has to do withthe absenceof
inall fairness
I shouldsaythat,giventhelength
ofthe
material,
explanatory
though
to countenance
refused
that
book,it is quitepossiblethatthepublisher
anything
wouldfurther
it. Nevertheless,
few,ifany,medievallogictextsstandon
lengthen
their
ofan introown,andtheyneedtobe mademoreuser-friendly
bytheprovision
duction
tothegenre,a bibliography,
andexplanatory
notes.Herethereis nodiscussionofthegenreofsyncategoreumata;
and thereis no bibliography
ofworkson synfootnote
reference
toSpruyt
andBraakhuis.
Thereis
, otherthana brief
categoreumata
notevenanymention
ofKretzmann'
s basicdiscussion
in TheCambridge
History
ofLater
Medieval
.20Therearea fewnotes,butonceonehasdiscounted
references
Philosophy
andcross-rcferences,
thereareonly18 dealingin anywaywithdoctrine,
and most
ofthesearejustonelinelong.Thisis reallynotenough.
Ofcourse,
onemajorsteptowards
user-friendliness
hasbeentakenbytheprovision
ofa translation,
in thesedayswhenmoststudents
do notread
particularly
helpful
Latin.The translation
is workmanlike
and accurate,
without
beingelegant.While
is generally
thereare a numberofsmallinfelicities.
I
excellent,
Spruyt'sEnglish
"
wondered
in themindhadbeenrendered
as ''similarities"
on p.
why similitudines"
61 and "similitudo"
as "exterior
resemblance"
on p. 73. "Body(whyexterior?)
of"unwell"for
juices"for"humours"is misleading
(p. 213); andthesubstitution
"ill" in "ill-formed"
was unfortunate
(p. 171). "Dispossession"for"habitus"
Thereweresomepersistent
(p. 109)seemstomix"possession"and "disposition".
269

00:28:31 AM

errors.
hasa tendency
tousethesubjunctive-form
'be' insubordinate
clauses
Spruyt
doesnot;21
withtheword"rather";22
whereEnglish
shehasgreatdifficulties
sheuses
suchcurious
as "No word
"like" inplaceof"forexample"or"as", giving
sentences
theact it carriesout,liketheword'man' doesnotsignify...";23
and she
signifies
"well".
colloquialism
beganatleast26 sentences
(ona roughcount)withthemisused
Noneoftheseproblems
isserious,
buttheyshouldhavebeenironed
outbytheeditors
oftheseriesor thepublisher.
I noticedabout40 typographical
mostofwhichwereveryminor.A few
errors,
errors
wereirritating:
"minuscle"for"minuscule"
occurred
onpp. 13,15
repeated
for"quantitative"
onpp. 177,211,221(twice),and
and21; "quantative"
occurred
twiceon p. 255.
243; "principle"for"principal"occurred
De Rijkand Spruyt
are tobe congratulated
forthis
remarks,
Despitemycritical
addition
tothelibrary
ofeveryone
interested
in
volume,whichwillbe an invaluable
medieval
logic.
Ont.
Waterloo,

E.J.Ashworth

1 PeterofSpain,Tractatus,
called
Summule
les,editedbyL.M. de Rijk,
afterwards
Logica
Assen1972.
2 JosephP. Mullally,Peter
andSelected
ofSpain.Tractatus
Syncategorematum
Anonymous
Treatises
Wis. 1964.A partialLatintextis foundinH.A.G. Braakhuis,
, Milwaukee,
De 13deEeuwse
Tractaten
over
Termen,
Syncategorematische
Meppel1979,Vol. I, 259-308;
andthefirst
twochapters
wereearliereditedandtranslated
seeJoke
byJokeSpruyt:
Peter
onComposition
andNegation
, Nijmegen1989.
Spruyt,
of
Spain
3 As IrneRosierhasshownin a number
ofrecent
therewasalsoa school
articles,
of intentionalist
to thepragmatic
thatpaid attention
logiciansand grammarians
I am discussing
elements
here:see,e.g., IrneRosier,La
ignored
bythelogicians
actus
distinction
entre
etactus
exercitus
danslessophismes
duMS BN
significatus
grammaticaux
lat.16618etautres
textes
inMedieval
, in: Sophisms
, edited
apparents
LogicandGrammar
1992,257-9.
byStephenRead, Dordrecht-Boston-London
4 See Alainde Libera,La littrature
desSophismata
dansla tradition
terministe
de
parisienne
la seconde
moiti
duXIIIesicle
andPhilosophical
Texts
, in: TheEditing
ofTheological
from
theMiddle
1986,213-244;andAlainde
Ages,editedbyMonikaAsztalos,Stockholm
desAbstractiones
etlatradition
Libera,La littrature
, in: TheRiseojBritish
d'Oxford
logique
, editedbyP. OsmundLewry,Toronto1985,63-114.
Logic
5 Forsuchtreatises
seeL.M. de Rijk(ed.),Some
Earlier
Parisian
Tracts
onDistinctiones
, Nijmegen1988.
Sophismatum
6 Braakhuis,
De 13deEeuwseTractaten
over
Termen
, Vol. I, 95-104.
Syncategorematische
7 NormanKretzmann
and EleonoreStump,TheCambridge
Translations
ofMedieval
Texts.Volume
One.LogicandthePhilosophy
, Cambridge
1988,
Philosophical
ofLanguage
164-73.
8 J. ReginaldO'Donnell,TheSyncategoremata
, in: Mediaeval
ofWilliam
ofSherwood
Studies,3 (1941),46-93.
9 Williamof Sherwood,William
Treatise
on Syncategorematic
Words
,
of Sherwood's
translated
NormanKretzmann,
1968.
by
Minneapolis
10Braakhuis,
De 13deEeuwseTractaten
over
Termen
, Vol. I, 117-67
Syncategorematische
(Bacon),184-246(Le Page),351-73(HenryofGhent);Vol. II (NicholasofParis).
Braakhuis's
workis notreadily
to NormanKretzavailable,andI amverygrateful
mannforlendingmehiscopy.
11 Kretzmann
and Stump,TheCambridge
Translations
Texts
,
ofMedieval
Philosophical
Vol. I, 175-215.
270

00:28:31 AM

12Spruyt,
Peter
andNegation.
ofSpainonComposition
13Braakhuis,
De 13deEeuwseTractaten
overSyncategorematische
Termen
, Vol. II, 259,
261-2.
14Braakhuis,
De J3deEeuwse
Tractaten
over
Termen
, Vol. II, 199-204.
Syncategorematische
15Mullally,
Peter
andSelected
Treatises
ofSpain.Tractatus
, 57.
Syncategorematum
Anonymous
Cf. NicholasofParis,in: Braakhuis,
De 13deEeuwseTractaten
over
Syncategorematische
Termen
naturalis>estin qua antecedens
nonpotest
, Vol. II, 199:14<consequentia
esseverumsineconsequenti
et in qua clauditur
in antecedenti..."
consequens
16Priscian,
Institutionum
Grammaticarum
libri
XVIII, in: Grammatici
LatiniVols.2 and
New York1981),II. 18, p. 55:
3, ed. H. Keil, (Leipzig1855:rpr.Hildesheimestnominis
substantiam
et qualitatem
"Proprium
significare."
17PeterHelias,Summa
ed. Leo Reilly,2 vols.,Toronto1993,191.
Priscianum,
super
18Fordiscussion
oftheseissues,seeGabrielNuchelmans,
Thedistinction
ActusExercitus/Actus
inMedieval
Semantics
andInference
inMedieval
Philos, in:Meaning
Significatus
London 1988, 57-90,
, editedby NormanKretzmann,Dordrecht-Bostonophy
entre
actusexercitus
etactussignificatus
61-72;andIrneRosier,La distinction
especially
danslessophismes
duMS BN lat.16618etautres
textes
, 231-61.
grammaticaux
apparents
19See Ren-AntoineGauthier,Prface
libri
, in: *Thomas Aquinas, Expositio
Editioaltera
retractata
, OperaomniaI 1, Roma (Commissio
Peryermenias.
Leonina)Paris1989,52*-3*.
20NormanKretzmann,
, in: The Cambridge
Syncategoremata,
exponibilia,
sophismata
Medieval
, Cambridge
1982,211-45.
History
ofLater
Philosophy
21See pp. 55, 67, 125,299,337.
"
"
22See pp. 353,373,399.On pp. 59 and69 shetranslates
magisas "ratherthan"
of
instead "morethan".
23P. 105.Cf. pp. 47, 81, 179,189,193,217,265,399.

Paravicini
e Scienze
dellaNaturaalla Corte
deiPapinel
Agostino
Bagliani,Medicina
Duecento
, Spoleto(CentroItalianodi StudiSull'AltoMedioevo)1991488 pp.
Paravicini
bookisa collection
ofreprints
andrevisions
ofhispreviouslyBagliani's
work.It alsocontains
somenewmaterial,
mostnotably
on cultural
and
published
scientific
between
thepapalcourtand thatofFrederick
II. Thereis also
exchanges
newinformation
on thelivesand writings
ofpapalphysicians.
Taken together,
the author'sassembledarticlesdemonstrate
by painstaking
thatthepapal Studium
curiae
was a
analysisof a numberof typesof documents
ofscholastic
culture
in naturalphilosophy
thethirteenth
flourishing
entrept
during
mostnotably
underthecelebrated
ofBoniface
VIII. Theauthor's
century,
patronage
are familiar
ones:Campanode Novara,Witelo,Williamof
principal
protagonists
Moerbeke,
RogerBacon,Simoneda Genova,andJohnPeckham.His principal
academic
areoptics,
andmedical
hermeticism.
Ifthesetopicsseem
medicine,
subjects
tous uncomfortably
to medivalscholastic
thinkers
disparate,
theywerefarfromit.
Forunderlying
muchofParavicini
ofhisCircolo
di
Bagliani'sstoryis theencounter
Viterbo
withtheastounding
workofthePersianphysician
Avicenna
(IbnSin),whose
all thesematters
and more.
writings
encompassed
The authorcasthisnetverywidely,
to present
notonlyan explication
intending
ofnatural
butalsototouchon theacademic"growth
industries"
texts,
philosophical
ofhistory
ofmentalits
andbodyhistory.
Theselatter
ambitions
arelesswellrealized,
butthisshouldnotdetract
fromtheundoubted
of thisbook,whichis a
strength
detailed
examination
ofscholastic
andwriting
atthepapalstudium.
learning,
teaching,
Of particular
interest
is whatmaybe thedefinitive
ofthe
studyoftheauthorship
271
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:28:41 AM

accidentium
senectutis
work
, the medical/alchemical
hugelypopularDe retardatione
to RogerBacon,RaymondLull, and Arnaldof Villanova.
attributed
variously
inhistreatment
ofthecomplexities
Paravicini
involved
Baglianiisparticularly
strong
on touchysubjects
likealchemy
in papalattitudes
human
and, in othercontexts,
dissection.
Paravicini
's bookwillserveas a useful
totheexcellent
work
Bagliani
complement
likeNancySiraisi,DanielleJacquart,
CharlesSchmitt,
DavidLindberg,
ofscholars
andCharlesBurnett
ontheLatinwest'sunderstanding
ofArabicnatural
philosophy.
Madison,YVI

FayeM. Getz

Boetium
sitio
De Trinitate.
LibriBoetii
deAquino
Omnia
SanciiThomae
, t.L. Super
Expo
Opera
1991.
Rome-Paris
De Ebdomadibus
Praedicatorum,
, curaet studioFratrum
dela Commissio
desaintThomaspubliesouslesauspices
La seried'ditions
descrits
La
les textes
d'uneuvreimpressionnante.
met la disposition
deslecteurs
Leonina
Elleestun modlepourtousles
n'a pas besoind'etresouligne.
qualitde l'dition
aussidestudesqui
de textes
latins.On nesaitpas toujours
diteurs
qu'ony trouve
mmeceux
touslesmedivistes,
et intressent
sontde vritables
joyauxd'rudition
aux
directement
parsaintThomas.Je pensenotamment
qui ne sontpas concerns
volumecontient
une
du preGauthier.Le cinquantime
introductions
galement
commenousallonsle voir.
bellesurprise,
biendissimule
le commentaire
surBoce,De trinitate
Ce volumecontient
deuxuvrages,
, texte
dela Commission
tablipar"le travail
collectif
lonine",avecuneprface
signepar
de Boce,ditparL.J.BatailsurleDe ebdomadibus
P.-M.J.Gils,etle commentaire
d'uneintrolonetC. A. Grassi.Lesdeuxeditions
sont,commed'habitude,
prcdes
et suiviesde diverses
tables.
ductiondtaille
de Boce
surcesuvres
Bienque runisdansce volume,lesdeuxcommentaires
Commeleremarque
lepreBataillon
dans
sousplusieurs
sontassezdiffrents
aspects.
decaractre
semble
le second,esssentiellement
sonintroduction,
mtaphysique,
ignoil estconucommeune
necitantque la BibleetAristote;
rertoussesprdcesseurs,
d'ailleurs
surAristote.
On apprend
dansla lignedescommentaires
queThoexposition
de Bocedeekdomadibus,
ainsiletitre
obsmasa appellui-mme
expliquant
l'ouvrage
curde Bocepar"id estde editionibus"
(voirp. 262).
surDe trinitate
Le premier
, estdu mmetypeque celuisur
texte,le commentaire
lies l'explicadesquestiones
troitement
lesSentences
de PierreLombard,
comprenant
de
tiondu texte.Datantdesannes1257-58probablement,
l'enseignement
pendant
un
sousuneforme
saintThomas Paris,il estpossible
rdige,
que ce textereflte,
comme
maisilsepeutaussiquel'auteurseservedesquestions
genred'enseignement,
uneparticipation
Riendansle textene laissetransparatre
d'un procdlittraire.
actived'lvesventuels.
ditsestpourvud'unsommaire,
Chacundestextes
placau dbut.La tabledes
De Trinitate
intitule
du Super
Boetium
matires
, curieusement
"Prface',necomprend
Maisle texte
desaintThomasestsuivid'un
del'introduction.
quela tableducontenu
SaintThomas
crivain
, il est
Appendice
(p. 175)qui n'estsignalnullepart.Intitul
y relate,
je cite,ce que plusde trente
signdu preGils,le 7 mars1986.Ce dernier
desautographes
de saintThomasluiontapprissurl'auteur:sa
ansde frquentation
cellede se tromper.
ses habitudes,
faond'crire,ses problmes,
y compris
D'un stylesimpleet direct,maisaussid'une
C'est une histoire
passionnante.
de sonanalyse.Composdedeux
infinie
le preGilsnouslivrelesrsultats
prcision,
et rvisions",
cet
parties:"Ecritureet graphies"d'abord,puis "Composition
272
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:28:41 AM

nousenseigne
sursaintThomaset sa personnalit
une foulede dtails
Appendice
au
prcieux,
qui nousle rendent
beaucoupplus proche.J'en citequelques-uns
hasard:saintThomas,hommepresset impatient,
critles lettres
avec une telle
toutesversla droiteet qu'on estobligde compter
les
rapidit
qu'elless'ouvrent
la mmeimpatience
luifaitmettre
lesabrviations
traits;
troploin,ce qui peutprter
confusion.
De plus,il commet
de nombreux
lapsus,plusou moinscomprhensibles
du s final?).D'autrepart,Thomas"estde
frquente
(maisd'o vientla disparition
etrdigent
ceuxqui pensent
encrivant".
Il reprend
doncsescritsetlesretravaille.
On esttonnde voirqu'il s'embrouille
danslesdivisions,
la
qu'il oubliede mettre
et des
ngationdans une phrase.Mais souvent,ses raturessontdes prcisions
ce qui n'empche
affinements,
pas d'ailleursque sonstyleestsouvent
abrupt.
la qualitde cetteanalyseet la familiarit
Pourpouvoirapprcier
admirative
et
lucidedu preGilsavec saintThomascrivain,
il fautlirel'ensemble
de ce texte
il fautprendre
savourer
lesnombreux
le tempsde regarder
lesplanches
de
exemples;
une
l'autographe
(dansce volumepp. 71-2),pourse rendre
compte
qu'il fauteneffet
trslonguefrquentation
etbeaucoupde patience
etconnatre
cette
pourcomprendre
criture.
a sansdoutesa placedansce volumedu faitque le Super
Boetium
De
L'Appendice
a tconserv
Trinitate
"dansla rdaction
pourla plusgrandepartieen autographe,
de l'criture
mmede sonauteur".Maisce seraitvraiment
si ce
originale
dommage
les manuscrits
n'tait
texte,important
mdivaux,
pouttousceuxqui frquentent
prsent.
consultable
o il se trouve
Sa publication
sousforme
de gros
qu' l'endroit
articleou de petitemonographie
rendrait
un trsgrandserviceaux mdivistes
de
toutesles disciplines.
Olga Weijers

's-Gravenhage

ClaudePanaccio,LesMots
etlesChoses.
La smantique
deGuillaume
d'Occam
, lesConcepts
etle nominalisme
. , Montral-Paris
1992288 p.
d'aujourd'hui
(Bellarmin-Vrin),
ISBN 2 89007731 4 (Analytiques,
3)
Commel'indiquesonsous-titre
deGuillaume
d'Occam
etlenominalisme
{La smantique
), ce livrede ClaudePanaccioadoptesurla penseockhamiste
d'aujourd'hui
(1285Le partiqui estainsiprissduirales
1347)un pointde vuersolument
rtrospectif.
chezd'autresdesrserves,
selonla conception
uns,etil suscitera
que l'on se faitde
la philosophie,
de sa placeetde sa fonction
dansl'ensemble
du mouvement
desides
etdansl'histoire.
Une tellelecture
unereconstruction
de la docsupposeen effet
trineockhamiste,
unetraduction
dansun langagediffrent
(voirp. 18) - ce qui
du contenu
doctrinal
auxformes
de la pensupposedjuneextriorit
d'expression
se.Il n'ya assurment
moinsd'intpasde raisonpourque le MoyenAgeprsente
rtphilosophique
de la pense,etnesoitpassusceptible
de susqued'autrespriodes
citeren nousautantde rflexions
la philosophie
de l'Antiquit
ou de
que nele ferait
de Claude Panacciosupposeplusque cela. Il
l'ge classique.Mais la dmarche
desdoctrines
du passrisquede
appuiel'ideque la seuleconsidration
historique
la prtention
la pluspressante:
cellede direquelquechosede vrai(p. 17)
ngliger
suruneconception
de la vrit:cesthsesportent
le plussouvent
sur
atemporelle
certains
aspectsstablesdu monde,du langageet de la pense.Une telleapproche
surlestextes.
nouveaux
On peutcraindre
toutepeutsansdoutejeterdesclairages
foisqu'elleneconduise
prlever
telou telaspectde la doctrine
et disconcerne,
soudrela dimension
essentielle
d'intervention
dansuneconjoncture
motithorique,
ve parles enjeuxintellectuels
de la priodeconcerne.
Car s'il estvraique les
273
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:28:49 AM

avancdes thses
(ibid.),si l'on peutdireparconsphilosophes
[...] onttoujours
n'ontde sensque parles thsesqu'ilspermettent
de poser,
quentque lesconcepts
ne prennent-elles
cesthseselles-mmes
pas sensdansetpardesproblmatiques
qui
toutun contexte
et historique?
A le sous-estimer,
doctrinal
s'articulent
quelques
nesontpas exclure.
de dfendre
effets
unelecture
Ainsi,tout sonprojet
trompeurs
d'Ockham(etj'accordevolontiers
naturaliste
imporqu'il s'agitl d'unedimension
de faireabstraction
desdterminations
tantede sonoeuvre),ClaudePanacciochoisit
Ce que [lathorie
de la penseockhamiste:
reconstruite
thologiques
quej'ai propode l'occamisme
est pourune largepartindpendant
de la division
se] conserve
et du spiritualisme
mdivale
des sciences
qui l'ontvu natre
(p. 91; voiraussip.
touteconsidration
de la
148,p. 151...). Peut-on
pourautantcarter,
parexemple,
certes
admisesansrserve
absolue,tenuepourunedimension
surnaturelle,
puissance
dansl'ordrenaturel
treignore
ou philosod'Ockhammaispouvant
parGuillaume
sertbienau
desdeuxpuissances
phique?Il y a l unepartde vrit:l'opposition
XIV sicle autonomiser
le coursde la nature,et autorise
certains
s arts
matres
parler
. MaislorsqueGuillaume
naturaliter
de sonComl'voquedansle Prologue
proposde la connaissance
mentaire
desSentences
intuitive
du non-existant,
l'argument
s'insre
dansundveloppement
li la thorie
dela connaissance,
et,loind'treextrieurau discours
iljoue un rleessentiel
dansla dmonstration
philosophique,
puisd'tablir
la distinction
rellede l'actede connaissance
que il permet
(enl'occurrence
etde sonobjet.Jen'enconclurai
intuitif)
pas seulement
qu'il faut,dansce contexte,
dansla sparation
treprudent
despointsde vuethologique,
d'unepart,etphilosodel'autre,maissurtout
de resituer
unethseparrapphiqueou naturel
qu'ilimporte
et un instrument
dansson
portau problme
qu'il s'agitde rsoudre,
conceptuel
histoire.
Si je mesuisquelquepeuattard
surla dmarche
de cettetude,c'estparceque
l'auteurlui-mme
enpermanence.
Maisc'estprcisment
sonmrite
yinsiste
(etson
mrite
sa
proprement
philosophique)
qued'treclairsursesprsupposs,
d'expliciter
d'trelucidesurlesoprations
vis visdel'auteur
tudi.
dmarche,
qu'elleimplique
Qu'il s'agissed'unehypothse
ajouteou d'unaspectcart,toutesttoujours
signal
avecla plusrigoureuse
minutie
(voirparexemplep. 59, ou p. 91).
aussibienunlecteur
la philosodcouvrant
L'ouvragequienrsulte
peutintresser
dansla mesureo aucuneconnaissance
n'estrequiseet
phieockhamiste,
pralable
o lesprincipaux
sontexposssystmatiquement
dansle chapitre
concepts
premier,
dansla mesureo l'auteur,qui en est
qu'un lecteur
dj au faitde cettedoctrine,
l'undesmeilleurs
deplusieurs
difconnaisseurs,
s'engagedansl'interprtation
points
ficiles.
celuiqui s'intresse
la philosophie
videmment
Enfin,
analytique
y trouvera
deslments
de rponse
certains
problmes
contemporains,
puisquetelestle pari
initial:Quantau fond,je m'intresse
aux discussions
de la philosophie
analytique
autourde la question
du nominalisme
etje medemande
si la pense
contemporaine
a quelquechosede positif
y apporter
d'Occam,dmentreconstruite,
(p. 19).
Le premier
de la signification,
de la supposition
chapitre
exposeendtailla thorie
et de la vritde Guillaumed'Ockham.Cl. Panacciometen vidence
les aspects
de l'ockhamisme,
novateurs
proposduquelil n'hsitepas parlerde rvolution
Cettervolution
occamiste
s'enracine
dansdeuxchoixprincipieis:
scientifique.
- d'o le thmedu nominalisme,
absoludu singulier
ici pos
lcm,le privilge
- , 2enlladistinction
commeemblme
entrece
minutieuse,
presqueobsessionnelle,
lieudansle monde
quinesepassequedansl'ordredessignesetcequia effectivement
extrieur
l'ideque la viamoderna
se caract(p. 18).Au deld'Ockhamlui-mme,
riseparunesmantisation
de la pense(p. 71), meparatd'unegrande
gnrale
fcondit
bonnombre
de dveloppements
du MoyenAgetardif.
pourcomprendre
Unefoisqu'ila reconstruit
sousforme
d'unsystme
constructionnel
de dfinitions
et de rglesla smantique
de Guillaumed'Ockhamet les lments
d'ontologie
274

00:28:56 AM

sur troisquestions,
qui sontau coeurde
qu'elle implique,Cl. Panacciorevient
deslaboraetsurlesquelles
l'oeuvred'Ockhamcontient
rflexions
contemporaines
autourd'undialoguepriviCeschapitres
sonttoustroisconstruits
tionsapprofondies.
Tel esttoutd'abordle cas avec
avecunauteurcontemporain.
lgide l'ockhamisme
questiondu langagemental,abordedu pointde vue de Fodor.Car Occamfut,
de l'idede langage
le plusexplicite
avantFodor,le thoricien
et le plusmarquant
etvrit
du rapport
entresignification
esttrait
mental
(pp.69-70).Puisle problme
unenouvelle
Cl. Panacciosoutient
avecDavidson.A cetteoccasion,
en relation
fois,
la priorit
absoluede la signification
contre
touteinterprtation
propositionnaliste,
des
Enfinla questionde la portesmantique
surtoutevariation
intra-langagire.
esttudiedansle quatrime
C'estdansce cadrequ'est
gnraux,
chapitre.
prdicats
ralistes
traite
la question
du signeuniversel.
Plusieurs
contemporaines,
positions
afinde montrer
etla pertinence
des
ou nominalistes,
sontconvoques
l'originalit
ockhamistes.
solutions
Guillaume
d'Ockhamrcusel'ideque lesprdicats
gnraux
etil dfend
tellesque desproprits,
dnoteraient
desentits
rellesnonsingulires,
l'ided'unerfrence
Cl. Panaccioexaminealorsdeuxsriesd'objections
multiple.
non
destermes
coextensifs
rcentes
cettesorted'approche.
D'unepart,le problme
de la connotation.
d'Ockhamrpondparsa thorie
synonymes,
auquelGuillaume
D'autrepartl'objection
ditefondationnaliste,
c'est--dire
l'nigmede l'applicabi certains
individus
litde prdicat
gnraux
pluttqu' d'autres.C'est icila codes individus,
inddes partiesessentielles
c'est--dire
unequivalence
spcificit,
toutesaisieconceptuelle
de notreintellect
etde notrelangage,antrieure
pendante
de concepts
de la ressemblance,
et parl l'attribution
gnqui fondecettedernire
de l'ockhamisme
raux.L'accentmisde la sortesurcertains
permet
aspectsdifficiles
enparticulier
de N. Goodman,
sonapportau regard
desthories
de situer
modernes,
prisicicommepointde rfrence.
ClaudePanaccioestconduit prendre
partisurquelquespointsd'interprtation
del'ockhamisme
endbat,voirequile sontencore.Surla pluquionttrcemment
ici
maisil nousoffre
il s'taitdj exprim
dansdes articles,
partde cesquestions,
de sa propreinterprtation.
des misesau pointsynthtiques
et unevued'ensemble
le dbat,troispointscruciaux:
nipoursuivre
sanspouvoir
dvelopper
Jementionne,
le problme
destermes
dansle langagemental- Cl. Panaccioa dfendu
connotatifs
il y a quelquesannes,la
avecun certain
dominante
succs,contrel'interprtation
- ; la question
du rapport
entre
detelstermes
danslelangagemental
signifiprsence
- o, comme
en
fermement
cationetsupposition
je l'ai dj indiqu,il argumente
- ; le rapport
etla causalit
faveur
de l'atomisme
entrela ressemblance
smantique
surla
commefondement
du signemental- o, touten insistant
de la smanticit
une
chanecausaleentrela chosemmeetl'acteconceptuel
ce quiconforte
abstractif,
naturaliste
de la connaissance,
il maintient
unrlepourla similitudo
,
interprtation
de combiner
cesdeuxmodles.
Toutesces thsessontargumentes
jugeantpossible
ne
la discussion
de manire
etsouvent
mmesi,surcertaines,
convaincante,
prcise
manquera
pas sansdoutepas de se poursuivre.
cetouvragetienten finde
A la foisd'un accsais et d'une grandeambition,
unexposrigoureux
de l'ockhamisme,
sonpari,de proposer
compte
qui enfassepro desenjeuxconla comprhension
toutenle confrontant
surquelquespoints,
gresser
temporains.
Jol Biard

Paris

275

00:28:56 AM

MittelalderAristotelischen
Politicaimspten
undInterpretation
Fleler,
Christoph
Rezeption
PA (VerlagB.R. Grner)1992XV, 335
ter
, Teil 1-2Amsterdam-Philadelphia,
1 [fr
beide
undVII, 209S. ISBN 90 6032/335
(Bochumer
Teile]
T.l]' -336-8[fr
19. 1-2)
StudienzurPhilosophie,
Die quantitativ
recht
schmale
die
einephilosophische
Dissertation,
Untersuchung,
1989inFreiburg
worden
festist,entpuppt
sich,dasseivorweg
(Schweiz)approbiert
alseinefundamentale
Problemfeld
derRezepStudie,diefrdaskomplexe
gehalten,
tionderaristotelischen
Politik
imlateinischen
Mittelalter
nicht
alleindeninternationalen (sehrzersplitterten)
vollprsentiert,
sonderndarberhinaus
Forschungsstand
undzahlreiche
weiterfhrende
Hinweise
fur
Besonders
wichtige
erbringt.
Klrungen
einhistorisches
Interesse
wirddas BuchohneFragenochlangeunentbehrlich
sein.
Offenbar
hattesichderVerfasser
die Sklavereiund
ursprnglich
vorgenommen,
ausdenPolitikkommentaren
derPariser
j4rtey-Fakultt
des13.
HerrschaftsaufTassung
und 14.Jahrhunderts
Alser dannaberanscheinend
immer
nherzu untersuchen.
wiederfeststellen
Kommentaren
literarzu schlichten
mute,da zu deneinzelnen
kritischen
also dem "Wer?Wann?Warum?Wie berliefert?"
Einleitungsfragen,
keineeinhelligen,
keinebegrndeten
vorallemaberweitgehend
Antworten
zu finden
allererst
waren,machteer sichselbstan die Arbeit,hierdurchfundierte
Analysen
einensicheren
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Textes(besonders
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wird.
gemacht
276
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:29:04 AM

Bei diesenErrterungen
konnteund wolltesichF. nurfrdie Theologenauf
insbesondere
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undGrenzendes Magisters
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werden,
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des 14.
vorallemstarke
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sind.Flelerweistdaraufhin,da Petrusnichtnurdie
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und
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gen
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vonOckhamalsLeserderPolitica
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polidingszeigenkonnte
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im14.Jahrhundert
tischer
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Mnchen1992,207-24,bes.21Iff.).
, hg.J. Miethke,
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wennauchseinertheoretischen
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nichtallzubedeutsamen
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wiederdemJohannes
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dreimal
gedruckten
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als mag.art.
zurPolitik
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in Paris1379-1387
zu. Die eindeutige
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Autorschaft
zu denkompliziertesten
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deshistorisch-literarkritischen
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bestens
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126)Quaestionen
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227),7 (der87) Quaestionen
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aus Ms. Vatican,Pal. lat.
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inkritischer
nachdenHss. undDrucken
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thematisch
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umdie Diskussion
weis,Testimonien
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zu machen.
zentriert,
nachprfbar
- nachdemKernstck
Liste(S. 1-100)Im zweiten
Teil folgen
derkritischen
nochntzliche,
ebenfalls
z.T. nachHss., z.T. nachdenaltenDrucken
wiekritisch,
zahlreiche
zu Kommentaren
zur aristotelidergegeben,
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schenPolitik
undzurpseudoaristotelischen
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Oekonomik,
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unddesNico(S. 101-1
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12),desMailnder
(S. 112-119)
las de Vaudmont
seien.
(S. 121-40)hervorgehoben
277

00:29:04 AM

Das Buchrechnet
offenbar
mitgeduldigen
diedieSchtzeseinerAusBenutzern,
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Heidelberg

MlETHKE
JRGEN

Adamde Wodeham,
in Librum
Lectura
Secunda
Primum
editedwithan
Sententiarum,
introduction
andindexes
byRegaWood,assisted
byGedeonGi,St. BonaventureNY University
Institute
ofSt. Bonaventure)
1990,3 vols.
(The Franciscan
50 &+ 354 pp., 374 pp., 491 pp.
AdamWodeham
a comment
troisreprises
lesSentences
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manuscrits
eten rdactions
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1974,12-30).Nous
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dfendue
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l'hypothse
parWilliam
278
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:29:04 AM

 la place,celle
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1323(p. 12*).Gauthier
Chatton,
qui avaitaussitle professeur
279

00:29:10 AM

cesannes-l
franciscain
de Londres,
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s'inscrit
enbonne
Jeferais
l'hypothse,
d'uneluttede prestige
l'intrieur
mmede l'Ordrefrancispartiedansle contexte
cain.N'oublions
la thologie
d'Ockham
pasqu' l'poqueo cesleonssontdonnes,
estsuspecte
auxyeuxdesautorits
estdjexcommuecclsiastiques,
que lui-mme
ni pourses positions
surla pauvret
de l'glise,et qu'il a fui,en compagnie
de
MicheldeCzne,la courpapaled'Avignon
(1328).Ce sontdeschosesqu'onnepouvaitpas,vers1329-1330,
ne pas avoir l'esprit
dansun studium
franciscain
comme
celuide Norwich
le nomd'Ockham.Il auraitsansdoutet
lorsqu'onentendait
- que l'onptdisagrable la Papaut- et sespartisans
parmilesfranciscains
surle planintellectuel
de tourner
enrond.Etla criticrditer,
mme,cetempcheur
laquelles'taitlivrChattonquelquesannesplusttau profit
que systmatique
de Duns Scotauraitl-dedanspu jouerun rlesi ellen'avaittneutralise
avec
autantd'habilet
etdebrioparl'intervention
deWodeham,
dontla propre
renomme
dansles annesqui suivirent,
futpourbeaucoupdansle prestige
de la
finalement,
enmatire
de philosophie
etde thologie.
Il fautsavoirgr Rega
penseockhamiste
Woodde nousdonner
accsaujourd'hui,
au terme
d'untravail
considrable
etd'une
280

00:29:10 AM

 l'Institut
franciscain
de Saint-Bonaventure,
qualitqui, de nouveau,faithonneur
ce tmoignage
de premier
ordresurunepriodeintellectuelle
la foistrouble
et
crative.
exceptionnellement
Trois-Rivires,
Qubec

Claude Panaccio

Rfrences
bibliographiques
W.J.Courtenay,
AdamWodeham.
AnIntroduction
tohisLifeandWritings
, Leyde(Brill)
1974.
K.H. Tachau,Vision
andCertitude
inthe
. Optics
andtheFoun, Epistemologa
AgeofOckham
dation
1250-1345
, Leyde(Brill)1988.
ofSemantics
Walter
Chatton.
etLectura
Sententias:
Collatio
adLibrum
Primum
etPrologus
Reportatio
,
super
ed. J.C. Wey,Toronto(Pontifical
Institute
ofMediaevalStudies)1989.

Lelio Guidiccioni,
LatinPoems.Rome1633 and 1639. EditedwithIntroduction,
Translation
andCommentary
byJohnK. Newmanand FrancesSt. Newman,
Hildesheim
1992,xii & 278 pp. ISBN 3 615000749.
(Weidmann)
LelioGuidiccioni
is certainly
nota well-known
authorand I readily
admitnever
tohavecomeacrosshisnamebefore
I sawtheneweditionofhispoemshereunder
Eventheeditors
review.
ofthetextdo notseemtoknowmuchabouthimsincethey
aresatisfied
withthescanty
information
thathe was"a priest,
poetandscholar"in
RomeunderUrbanVIII (1623-44),whomhe celebrated
in Latinpoemswritten
in
theyears1633-39.In fact,as faras myinformation
goes,thereseemsto be hardly
availableexceptfortheshort
notices
intheoldbio-bibliographical
works
anyevidence
ofGuidiccioni's
Leo Allatius,
contemporary
ApesUrbanae
(Rome1633),172-4andof
theslightly
IanusNiciusErythraeus
younger
(Gianvittorio
Rossi),Pinacotheca
(ColwhichwelearnthatGuidiccioni
a Latinelegy
II, 127,from
ogne1645-48),
published
onTivolias earlyas 1612andanother
oneon Urban'selection
in 1624.He alsoheld
an oration
on PaulV in 1623andwas,furthermore,
a bilingual
author
justlikethe
as a newAugustus.
popewhomhe celebrated
UnderUrbanVIII, himself
a respectable
poetin bothLatinand Tuscan,Latin
in Romewas stillflourishing,
literature
withscoresofItalianand foreign
authors.
Famousamongthemwere,forinstance,
theItaliansFabiusChisius(thelaterAlexanderVII), Alexander
andFamianusStrada,
Ferrarius
Donatus,
Johannes
Baptista
the Pole MathiasC. Sarbievius,the GermansJacobusBidermannus,
Lucas
Holstenius
and Athanasius
theFrenchman
GabrielNaudaeus,theGreek
Kircher,
Leo Allatius,
theIrishman
Bonaventura
Baroniusand severalothers.In thiscircle
LelioGuidiccioni
is anything
buta majorfigure.
Allthesame,hedeserves
ourattentionbecauseofhisremarkable
AraMaximaVaticana
of942
, a longpoetical
description
hexameters
ofBernini's
famous
canopyoverthemainaltarin St. Peter's.As a conreaction
tothesculptor's
workandas a typical
oflearnedpoetry
temporary
specimen
itisan amazing
Theeditors
document.
itverymodestly,
whentheywroteintheir
put
c<
likeGuidiccioni
are noteasilyunderstood
without
some
preface: Scholar-poets
oflearning."
I formypartwonder
howmanymonths
ofpainstaking
work
apparatus
wentintothetranslation
andcommentary
ofthisreally
difficult
I am
poem.Although
rather
usedtoreading
humanistic
Latintexts,I mustconfess
thatGuidiccioni
wasa
hardnuttocrackandthatmanypassagesdemanded
reiterated
I understudybefore
stoodor thought
I understood
whatexactly
thepoetwassaying.
281
Vivarium
XXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden

00:29:18 AM

unlimited
The neweditionis an exampleofsolidphilological
workanddeserves
introducpraise.The bookfallsintotwomainparts.First,ina longwellresearched
arediscussed,
whichis
tionthehistorical,
rhetorical,
poeticand aesthetic
problems
fora correctunderstanding
of the poemagainstthe
and assessment
necessary
ofthecenturies
inall thosefields.The readersometimes
background
longtraditions
ifallthedetailsofthosetraditions
werereallyconsciously
wonders,
however,
present
awareof
Morelikelyhe himself
was clearly
or directly
in themindofGuidiccioni.
outofwhichhispoemarose.Thesecond
onlya partofthatrichcultural
background
ofthemain
a Latintextwithfacing
partofthevolumecontains
Englishtranslation
andotherminorpieces.Thesetextsareaccompanied
by
poemandsomepreliminary
butalsothe
an enormous
wealthofnotestoalmosteveryverse.Notonlytheeditors
ourwarmest
thanks
andcongratulations
forthegreatcareandskill
deserves
publisher
withwhichthiseditionwasprepared
and produced.
I haveonlya fewminorremarks
oftheancientand
to add: (p. 6) The teaching
4'an oldRenaissance
wasnotexclusively
ideal".It goesbacktothe
sacredlanguages
lateMiddleAges,andPaulV's injunction
toteachHebrew,Greek,LatinandArabic
is an echoofa recommendation
madeat theCouncilofViennein 1311.It is true,
beforethe
however,thatthelanguagedecreeswerenot seriously
implemented
of thehumanists,
and theendeavours
Renaissance
(p.56) The poeticalfriendship
asJ. Warszawski
has
wasnotat all unclouded,
between
UrbanVIII andSarbievius
latinaa Romana
Scrittori
shownin hisDramat
Rzymski
(Rome 1984;seeJ. IJsewijn,
dalBarocco
in:StudiRomani36(1988),229-49,esp.236-7).(pp. 138al Neoclassicismo,
ofverses362-364("Belgarum... campis,/
... MarsetNeptunus
139)thetranslation
simul...) into4'In Flandersfields..." is an anachronism
of the
inundant/Quos
American
whoweremislead
anda famous
authors,
byreminiscences
poemofthefirst
WorldWar.The "Belgarum... campi"inthispoemwerenotatallinFlanders,
but
in Holland(and in contrast
to thetranslation,
theannotation
on p. 220 is correct:
"The Dutchfloodedtheirfields..."!). The 16thand 17thcentury
"Belgae" are
- the
not- and one mustrepeatthisagain and again to Renaissancescholars
"Belgians"ofmodern
English(to whichgrouptheFlemmings
belong),butall the
oftheLowCountries
inhabitants
fromDunkirk
toGroningen.
The historical
notes
tothefollowing
versesarealsoweak(evennon-existent)
becausetheclassicalnames
of nationsand countries
werenotconsistently
in thetranslation:
modernized
the
andthefollowing
"Insubria"
"gensSubalpina"ofvv. 279-80is, in fact,Piedmont
statueenjoyed
Lombardy,
(pp. 200-201,noteto v. 19)The conceitofthespeaking
a longtradition
in
amongtheRomanhumanistic
poetsalso. It appearsrepeatedly
of1524.(p. 201,notetov.20) The
suchas thefamousCoryciana
poeticalcollections
editors
expect"vobis"insteadof"vestri",but,I cannotat all see why.Ifthepronounwaslinkedtotheverb"libet",an accusative
wouldhavebeenrequired.
That
forthefollowing
"astra" is perfectly
aside,"cunabulaortusvestri"as a definition
ancient
inManiliusIV 876ff.
clearandrecalls
viewsfound,
forinstance,
poetical
(see,
i.A.,v. 910: "cognatumque
sequenscorpusse quaeritin astris").The translation
mustbe corrected
as follows:"Will it neverbe yourpleasureto wingacrossthe
spheresabove,to traverse
againthestars,thecradlesofyourorigin,and viewthe
askwhythepoetwrote"NumBeingsonhigh?"(p. 208,notetov.120).Theeditors
..." and not "moritur"whichis, of course,
quam oritur,numquamemoritur
I think
andhardly
different
inmeaning.
thepoetwanted
theaddimetrically
possible
tional"e-" in ordertoeliminate
thesecond"-quam" and,so doing,toestablish
a
soundparallelwiththepreceding
setofwords,(p. 236,noteto v.713) I do
perfect
notseehowintheexpression
"Carolusingens"(Charlemagne)
is "looktheadjective
to 'Gallo'" ofv. 710. I canonlyseeitas an alternative
tothe
ingbackpolemically
ofCharles.
unsuitable
"magnus",theusualepithet
metrically
Leuven
JozefIJsewijn
282

00:29:18 AM

Vivarium
XXXII, 2 (1994) E.J. Brill,Leiden
Books Received

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introduit
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Ablard,
parP. Morin.
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undsemantischen
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Scholastische
Regeln
Argumentationstheorie.
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Yorkrekten
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38)
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MarcoArosio,Credibile
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Marmo,Semiotica
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deiModisti.
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42)
Poems.
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Epigrams
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E.J. Brill,Leiden-New
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e Porfirio.
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Plotino
riferimento
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Vitae Pensiero,
e filosofia
Collana Platonismo
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Studie testi,5)
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A Census
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Treatises
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EmilJ. Polak,Medieval
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Revue
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deLucien.
Contribution
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A la recherche
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tents
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danslesditions
L 'utilisation
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grecs
au XVIesicle
ettraductions
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extraites
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Sources
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'
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manuEnchiridion;
ofEpictetus
J.-I. GarcaArmendriz,
scrit
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S. Piron,L'origine
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duDidascalicon
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surl'dition
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D. Bguin,Informatique
et recherche
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de thologie
etde philosophie,
(colede thologie,
Toulouse),XCIII/1 (1993) 176 p. - Contents:H. Donneaud,Les cinquante
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dela RevueThomiste
d'Ar
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G.
; M. Bastit,La science
premires
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La communication
dela nature
divine
enDieuselonThomas
P.de
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La contribution
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1994
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43)
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Selected
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