PROPERTY TITLE V and beyond

LIST OF CASES POSSESSION

Concept of an Owner Acquisitive Acquisition under Public Lands Act RA 1942
Director of Lands vs IAC, May 1992
Narrative:
Respondent Angelina Sarmiento, initially together with spouses Velasco and
Busuego, filled at the CFI an application for a lot on San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.
Another party, the Amadors contended the claim claiming the land belongs to
them.
The court released a special default against the whole world, with the exception
of the Amadors and the mayor of San Jose del Monte. The petitioner Director of
Lands filed an opposition and the court granted the opposition and lifted such
special default against the world.
Eventually the court held in favour of Angelina Sarmiento and allowed for the
registration of land subject to payment of requirements certain taxes defaulted
by the predecessors-in-interest which she allegedly have bought the land from.
The Director of Lands contended the judgement and raised the case to the
Intermediate Appellate Court which sustained the decision of the lower court.
The Intermediate Appellate Court held that the predecessors-in-interest and
Angelina Sarmiento had held the land in continuous possession and thus are
qualified to acquire the land through acquisitive prescription
The Director of Lands then raised the case to the Supreme Court who reversed
the decision of the lower and appellate court.
Ruling of the cour:
In order to acquire lands through acquisitive possession under section 48 of the
Public Land Act the registrant by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest must have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding
the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war of force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

This section is the law on judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.

By its very nature, the burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he as an
imperfect or incomplete title. Such is the duty of one who holds the affirmative
side of an issue.
Specifically, under paragraph (b) thereof, the applicant must prove that: (a) he
or his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of an agricultural land of the public
domain; (b) such possession and occupation must be for a least thirty (30) years
preceding the filing of the application; and (c) such possession and occupation
must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not
clandestine. It is continuous when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent
or occasional; exclusive when the adverse possessor can show exclusive
dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and benefit;
and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of
by the public or the people in the neighborhood.
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious.
Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not affect the continuity
of possession is that caused by war or force majeure.
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation."
Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of
the law is not to make one synonymous with the order. Possession is broader
than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore,
the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect
of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for
one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid section, his possession of the
land must not be mere fiction.
The court held that the possession and occupation of his predecessors-ininterest questionable. None of the predecessor-in-interest declared for taxation
purposes their alleged land holdings. It was only the private respondent who
declared the taxes for such land. The predecessors-in-interest were also not
presented as witnesses. Also, out of all the land claimed in this case, significant
amount of land is not utilized. All of these put serious doubt on the actual
possession of the predecessors-in-interest who had sold to the respondent said
lands.

Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

Gabriel Lasam vs. Director of Lands, 17 March 1938

Facts:
Gabriel Lasam filed at the CFI Cagayan an application of 152 parcels of land of
24,723,436 sq meters situated in Solana Cagayan. The Director of Lands
opposed the application on the ground that it is not supported by any title fit for
registration and that the land sought to be registered is public land.
Subsequently several others filed opposition to the application.
After a protracted hearing, the lower court rejected and the oppositions filed,
declaring the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, the owner of parcel No. 9 as indicated in
the plan Psu-67516 (Exhibit K), and decreed the registration of said parcel in his
favor.
Counsel for the Director of Lands, et al. and for Jose Chan Hong Hin, et al. make
various assignments of error in their respective briefs.
Issue:
Whether or not the applicant, Gabriel Lasam, is entitled to registered on the
basis of public, continuous, and adverse possession under a claim of ownership
during the time prescribed by law (par. 9, application)
Held:
Based on the evidence Gabriel Lasam has presented, the court ruled that the
application to register the land by Lasam be hindered without prejudice to him
filing for a new application covering the land actually occupied by him by
presenting evidence of the land actually occupied by him.
The court found the evidence lacking in certainly as to the particular portion
occupied and the extend thereof.
Lasam for the applicant invokes the doctrine of constructive possession in that
case is subject to certain qualifications, and this court was careful to observe
that among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the size of the
tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the
claimant." While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean
that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of ground before it can
be said that he is in possession", possession is not gained by mere nominal
claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a
Magellan like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as
a means of acquiring ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere
Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

fiction. In the present case, upon the description of 7,000 brazas as the area of
the land said have been originally possessed by Domingo Narag and conveyed
to the applicant, only two hectares of which were according to the applicant
cultivated at the time of such transfer, the applicant would on the basis of the
computation hereinabove referred to and given at the trial by surveyor Jose
Mallannao, be entitled under Exhibit L to more than 13,000 hectares, although
only 2,432 odd hectares are now being sought for registration in these
proceedings. The fact, however, that he is claiming only a portion of the land
claimed by him to be included in his title, the further fact that according to his
own testimony he has given up more than 1,000 hectares to the Bureau of
Forestry, the discrepancies in the boundaries, his tax declarations, and the
existence of numerous homesteaders and claimants are significant and tend to
show that his possession over the entire portion of the land sought to be
registered is not "such as to apprise the community and the world that the entire
land was for his enjoyment."
Vano vs. Director of Land
Facts:
Applicant desires by these proceedings is to obtain title to a tract of land
containing a little over 3,793 hectares, including within its boundaries four
municipalities and constituting a not inconsiderable part of the entire Province of
Bohol. Certainly a modest hope which, however, was thwarted by the
oppositions entered by the Director of Lands and the Director of Forestry, and
the adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, denying the
registration of the land, with costs against the applicant, without prejudice.
Issue:
Whether the applicant can claim such land
Held:
No
To prove title, open continuous, exclusive, and notorious occupation of the land
by the applicant and his predecessors in interest since 1882, interrupted by the
revolution, is relied upon. Included within the perimeter of the tract are
approximately 685 hectares of forest land and four logging trails in the nature of
highways. These portions should, without question, be eliminated from the
claim. The government concedes, however, that approximately 1,060 hectares
are under cultivation and that certain other portions have been used by the
claimant for pasturage. But the doctrine of Lands cannot be successfully

advanced for the claimant is not holding the land under color of title. To the
tracts, of which applicant is in actual possession, he can secure title, on
submission of proper plans
Ramos vs. Director of Lands:
Facts:
Restituo Romero gained possession of a considerable tract of land located in
Nueva Ecija. He took advantage of the Royal Decree to obtain a possessory
information title to the land and was registered as such.Parcel No. 1 included
within the limits of the possessory information title of Romero was sold to
Cornelio Ramos, herein petitioner.
Ramos instituted appropriate proceedings to have his title registered.
Director of Lands opposed on the ground that Ramos had not acquired a good
title from the Spanish government. Director of Forestry also opposed on the
ground that the first parcel of land is forest land. It has been seen however that
the predecessor in interest to the petitioner at least held this tract of land under
color of title.
Issue:
Whether the actual occupancy of a part of the land described in the instrument
giving color of title sufficient to give title to the entire tract of land
Held:
The general rule is that possession and cultivation of a portion of a tract of land
under the claim of ownership of all is a constructive possession of all, if the
remainder is not in the adverse possession of another.

The claimant has color of title; he acted in good faith and he has open,
peaceable, and notorious possession of a portion of the property, sufficient to
apprise the community and the world that the land was for his enjoyment.

Possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet
on every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession.
Ramos and his predecessor in interest fulfilled the requirements of the law on
supposition that the premises consisted of agricultural public land.
Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

On the issue of forest land, Forest reserves of public land can be established as
provided by law. When the claim of the citizen and the claim of the government
as to a particular piece of property collide, if the Government desires to
demonstrate that the land is in reality a forest, the Director of Forestry should
submit to the court convincing proof that the land is not more valuable for
agricultural than for forest purposes.

In this case, the mere formal opposition on the part of the Attorney-General for
the Director of Forestry, unsupported by satisfactory evidence will not stop the
courts from giving title to the claimant.
Petitioner and appellant have proved a title to the entire tract of land for which
he asked for registration. Registration in the name of the petitioner is hereby
granted.

Article 541
Manotok IV vs. Heirs of Barque, March 2012
Facts:
The Barques filed a petition for administrative reconstitution of TCT No. 210177
issued in the name of their predecessor, Homer L. Barque, which was allegedly
destroyed in the fire that gutted the Quezon City Hall, including the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Quezon City, sometime in 1988.
The Manotoks filed their opposition to the Barques petition, claiming that the lot
covered by the title sought to be reconstituted by the latter forms part of the
land covered by the formers own reconstituted title, TCT No. RT-22481, and
alleging that TCT No. 210177 in the name of Homer L. Barque is spurious.
On June 30, 1997, the reconstituting officer denied the reconstitution of TCT No.
210177 on grounds that the two lots covered by the Barques title appear to
duplicate the lot covered by the Manotoks own reconstituted title; and that the
Barques plan, Fls-3168-D, is a spurious document.
On appeal by the Barques, the LRA reversed the reconstituting officer and
ordered that reconstitution of the Barques title be given due course, but only
after the Manotoks own title has been cancelled upon order of a court of
competent jurisdiction.
The parties separately appealed to the CA. The two divisions of the CA where the
cases landed similarly modified the LRA decision, ordering the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City to cancel the Manotoks title without a direct proceeding with the
RTC, and directing the LRA to reconstitute the Barques' title.
Thus, the Manotoks filed these petitions to the SC
The consolidated petitions were DENIED by the Supreme Court 1st Division,
which AFFIRMED the appealed CA resolutions.
Subsequent motions then ensued
On December 18, 2008 en banc resolution (8-6-1 vote, Tinga, J., ponente), which
reversed the decision of the 1st Division and remanded the petitions to the CA for
further proceedings;
On August 24, 2010 en banc decision (9-5-1 vote, Villarama, J., ponente), which
denied the Manotoks consolidated petitions and declared their title null and
void, but also denied the petition for reconstitution of the Barques and declared
that the subject lot legally belongs to the national government of the Republic of
the Philippines;
Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

On The March 6, 2012 en banc decision (9-6 vote, Villarama, J., ponente)
denying with finality the motions for reconsideration of the parties.
Issue:
The CA earlier said that none of the parties were able to prove a valid acquisition
of Lot 823 of the Piedad estate from the government in accordance with the
provisions of Act 1120, or the "Friar Lands Act."
Due to the "serious flaws" in the title produced by Severino Manotok that were
brought to light during the reconstitution proceedings, the CA deemed it proper
to give all the parties full opportunity to present more evidence, and in
particular, for the Manotoks to prove their presumed just title over the property,
which is also claimed by the Barques and the Manahans
Maintaining their objection to the order for reception of evidence on remand, the
Manotoks argue that as owners in possession, they had no further duty to
defend their title pursuant to Article 541 of the Civil Code which states that: [a]
possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it.
Thus the pertinent issue for our lesson is whether the contention of the
Manotoks, being possessors in the concept of owner, enjoys legal presumption of
a just title and thus cannot be obliged to prove it
Held:
Article 541 of the Civil Code states that: a possessor in the concept of owner
has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it.
Such presumption is prima facie, and therefore it prevails until the contrary is
proved. In the light of serious flaws in the title of Severino Manotok which were
brought to light during the reconstitution proceedings, the Court deemed it
proper to give all the parties full opportunity to adduce further evidence, and in
particular, for the Manotoks to prove their presumed just title over the property
also claimed by the Barques and the Manahans. As it turned out, none of the
parties were able to establish by clear and convincing evidence a valid alienation
from the Government of the subject friar land. The declaration of ownership in
favour of the Government was but the logical consequence of such finding.

Article 544 Entitlement to fruits

respondents), which, according to petitioner, is not the payment envisaged in

the decision which would entitle private respondents to the possession of the
property. Furthermore, with respect to portion "B", petitioner alleges that, under
the decision, he has the right to retain the same until after he has participated
and lost in the public bidding of the land to be conducted by the Bureau of
Lands. It is claimed that it is only in the event that he loses in the bidding that
he can be legally dispossessed thereof.

Ortiz vs. Kayanan

Facts: Plaintiff used to be the legal guardian of Martin Dolorico II. When his ward
died, plaintiff continued to cultivate and possess the latters property, which was
formerly a subject of homestead application. In the said application, the wards
uncle was named as his heir and successor in interest. Thus, the uncle executed
an affidavit relinquishing his rights over the property in favor of Comintan and
Zamora, his grandson and son-in-law and requested the Director of Lands to
cancel the homestead application. The homestead application was cancelled to
the protest of Ortiz saying that he should be given preference to purchase the lot
inasmuch as he is the actual occupant and has been in continuous possession of
the same. Still, the lot in question was sold at a public auction wherein
defendant Comintan was the only bidder.

It is the position of petitioner that all the fruits of the property, including the tolls
collected by him from the passing vehicles, which according to the trial court
amounts to P25,000.00, belongs to petitioner and not to defendant/private
respondent Quirino Comintan, in accordance with the decision itself, which
decreed that the fruits of the property shall be in lieu of interest on the amount
to be paid to petitioner as reimbursement for improvements. Any contrary
opinion, in his view, would be tantamount to an amendment of a decision which
has long become final and executory and, therefore, cannot be lawfully done.

The plaintiffs protest was investigated upon but his claim was not given due
course. On appeal, respondent court rules that half of the portion of land should
be given to the defendant, being the successful bidder. The other half should be
awarded to Zamora without prejudice to the right of Ortiz to participate in the
public bidding of the lot. If Ortiz is to be not declared the successful bidder,
defendants should reimburse jointly said plaintiff for the improvements
introduced on the land, with him, having the right to retain the property until
after he has been paid for.
Plaintiff appealed the judgment. It was later found out that Ortiz collected tolls
on a portion of the property wherein he has not introduced any improvement.

The issue decisive of the controvery isafter the rendition by the trial court of
its judgment in Civil Case No. C-90 on March 22, 1966 confirming the award of
one-half of the property to Quirino Comintanwhether or not petitioner is still
entitled to retain for his own exclusive benefit all the fruits of the property, such
as the tolls collected by him from March 1967 to December 1968, and
September 1969 to March 31, 1970, amounting to about P25,000.00.
RULING: Negative
1

The judgment became final and executory. Private respondents filed a motion for
its execution requesting that they file a bond in lieu of the amount that should
be paid to Ortiz, on the condition that after the accounting of the tolls collected
by plaintiff, there is still and amount due and payable to the said plaintiff, the
bond shall be held answerable.
Petitioner thus filed the instant petition, contending that in having issued the
Order and Writ of Execution, respondent Court "acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion, because the said order and
writ in effect vary the terms of the judgment they purportedly seek to enforce."
He argued that since said judgment declared the petitioner a possessor in good
faith, he is entitled to the payment of the value of the improvements introduced
by him on the whole property, with right to retain the land until he has been fully
paid such value. He likewise averred that no payment for improvements has
been made and, instead, a bond therefor had been filed by defendants (private
Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

No contention that the possessor in good faith is entitled to the fruits received
before the possession is legally interrupted. Possession in good faith ceases or is
legally interrupted from the moment defects in the title are made known to the
possessor, by extraneous evidence or by the filing of an action in court by the
true owner for the recovery of the property. Hence, all the fruits that the
possessor may receive from the time he is summoned in court, or when he
answers the complaint, must be delivered and paid by him to the owner or
lawful possessor.
However, even after his good faith ceases, the possessor can still retain the
property (Art 546) until he has been fully reimbursed for all the necessary and
useful expenses made by him on the property. he principal characteristic of the
right of retention is its accessory character. It is accessory to a principal
obligation. Considering that the right of the possessor to receive the fruits
terminates when his good faith ceases, it is necessary, in order that this right to
retain may be useful, to concede to the creditor the right to secure
reimbursement from the fruits of the property by utilizing its proceeds for the
payment of the interest as well as the principal of the debt while he remains in
possession.

Petitioner cannot appropriate for his own exclusive benefit the tolls which he
collected from the property retained by him. It was his duty under the law, after
deducting the necessary expenses for his administration, to apply such amount
collected to the payment of the interest, and the balance to the payment of the
obligation.
We hold, therefore, that the disputed tolls, after deducting petitioner's expenses
for administration, belong to Quirino Comintan, owner of the land through which
the toll road passed, further considering that the same was on portions of the
property on which petitioner had not introduced any improvement. The trial
court itself clarified this matter when it placed the toll road under receivership.
The omission of any mention of the tolls in the decision itself may be attributed
to the fact that the tolls appear to have been collected after the rendition of the
judgment of the trial court.
As to the other lot, it appears that no public sale has yet been conducted by the
Bureau of Lands and, therefore, petitioner is entitled to remain in possession
thereof. This is not disputed by respondent Eleuterio Zamora. After public sale is
had and in the event that Ortiz is not declared the successful bidder, then he
should be reimbursed by respondent Zamora in the corresponding amount for
the improvements on Lot 5785-B.
Article 546 Right of retention ; remotion; amount of refund
Carbonell vs. CA
Facts: Jose Poncio agreed to sell his 195 hectare lot in Rizal lot to Rosario
Carbonell; who then paid the arrears on the mortgage burdening the lot. Poncio
and Carbonell then stipulated in a document that the seller could use the lot for
one year without paying any rental thereon. Later, he sold the same lot to
another named Infante. Subsequently Carbonell asked the Poncio to issue a
deed of sale which Poncio refused to do stating that he sold the same lot already
to Infante. Carbonell in turn registered the lot to the Registry of Property. This
was 4 days before Infante.

Written by Daniel Luis P. Macalino for Property Class Atty. Josephine Santiago

The main issue of this case discusses about double sale. In which the supreme
court had decided in favour of Carbonell declaring him in good faith when he
registered his lot to the registry of property and thus becoming the legitimate
owner as prescribed by law.
Issue: However, from the facts of the case, it is shown that Infante has already
occupied the property for 20 years and has made certain improvements to the
land such as filling up with garden soil, constructing a house and a gate.
The issue is whether Infante has the rights to the improvements
Held: No, she does not have the right to be refunded or to retain the useful
improvements because she is a possessor in bad faith. She however may
remove the improvements unless Carbonell prefers to pay their value at the time
the improvements were introduced.

The court held that Infante was possessor in bad faith for the following reasongs:
Carbonell wanted an audience with Infante, which desire underscores
Carbonell's good faith. With an aristocratic disdain unworthy of the good
breeding of a good Christian and good neighbor, Infante snubbed Carbonell like
a leper and refused to see her. So Carbonell did the next best thing to protect
her right she registered her adversed claim on February 8, 1955. Under the
circumstances, this recording of her adverse claim should be deemed to have
been done in good faith and should emphasize Infante's bad faith when she
registered her deed of sale four (4) days later on February 12, 1955.
The court also said that the fact that Poncio was no longer in possession of his
mortgage passbook and that the said mortgage passbook was already in
possession of Carbonell, should have compelled Infante to inquire from Poncio
why he was no longer in possession of the mortgage passbook and from
Carbonell why she was in possession of the same